Vertical Geopolitics:

Baghdad and After

Stephen Graham
Global Urban Research Unit, School of Architecture Planning and Landscape,
University of Newcastle, UK; [email protected]

Introduction: Vertical Geopolitics and the

Urbanisation of Warfare
Geopolitics is a flat discourse. It largely ignores the vertical dimension
and tends to look across rather than to cut through the landscape.
This was the cartographic imagination inherited from the military and
political spatialities of the modern state (Eyal Weizmann 2002:3).
The orbital weapons currently in play possess the traditional
attributes of the divine: Omnivoyance and omnipresence. (Paul
Virilio 2002:53)
Official US military and geopolitical strategy rests on the exploitation
of a putative high-tech “Revolution in Military Affairs” to deliver global
pre-eminence against any currently existing military or “terrorist” threat
on the planet (see Gray 1997; Shelton 2000). This strategy, which is
highly contested, centres on the exploitation of the United States’
massive global superiority in surveillance, information and targeting
systems. These are intimately connected to systems of killing at a dis-
tance via increasingly intelligent, automated, and cyborgian machines
(DeLanda 1991). The explicit objective of US strategy is to use these
systems of power projection to achieve what the US military call “Full
Spectrum Dominance”. This is defined as “the ability of US forces …
to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range
of military operations” (Coates 2002:2; see Shelton 2000).
Digesting the scenes of demolition and bloodletting in Jenin the
month before, the US military columnist Richard Sinnreich wrote an
article in the Washington Post in May 2003. Sinnreich speculated on
the role of closely built urban spaces within this globe-spanning, “net-
work centric” model of US military hegemony. “As the United States’
ability to detect and strike targets from remote distances grows”, he
wrote, “so also does an enemy’s incentive to respond by locating his
military forces in cities, where concealment and protection are
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Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After 13

easier”. He predicted that, in a rapidly urbanising world, “scenes such

as those in Jenin are likely to become the rule rather than the exception
in war”.
Building on Sun Tzu’s ancient dictum that “the worst policy is to
attack cities” (1963:78), such suggestions that rapid global urbanisation
undermines the US “Full Spectrum Dominance” strategy have been a
recurrent feature of US military analysis since the end of the Cold
War. Cities and urbanised terrain are widely portrayed in this dis-
course as arenas that limit the US expansivist economic and military
project. In particular, they are seen to reduce the effectiveness of the
US military’s expensively developed systems of aerial and space-based
targeting and killing. Such discourses are fuelled by predictions of a
“coming anarchy” (Kaplan 1994) of internecine urban warfare. They
are also haunted by recent memories of superpower defeats on the
streets of Mogadishu and Grozny.
A vast research and development programme has been fuelled by
such debates. This is tasked with developing the strategy, doctrine,
tactics and technologies necessary for the US to extend its geostrategic
hegemony into the nitty-gritty of so-called “Military Operations in
Urban Terrain” (or “MOUT”). The RAND analyst Russell Glenn, for
example, argues that the US military must now “cleanse the polluted
urban seas” to address “terrorist” threats at home and abroad (2002).
This is a difficult challenge, he argues. The complex, congested and
contested terrain within cities limits the effectiveness of high-tech
weapons and surveillance systems. It reduces the ability of US forces
to fight at a distance. And it necessitates a much more labour, and
casualty-intensive way of fighting than the US is used to these days.
In this rhetoric an awe-struck reaction to the scale and rate of
urbanisation in many of the world’s geopolitical conflict zones mixes
with an extreme Orientalism and anti-urbanism. Anticipating a “new
age of siege warfare”, for example, the influential US Army com-
mentator Ralph Peters (1996:2) urges that attention should now be
shifted way from what he terms “the sanitary anomaly” of the first
Gulf war.1
Peters goes on to argue that the “conventional” doctrines used in
the first Gulf war—whilst infused utterly with the latest air and space-
based electronic surveillance and targeting technologies—actually
originated in Cold war “air and land battle” strategies. Emphasising
the rapid movements of air and tank formations over and above open
plains, such doctrines stressed the horizontal projection of power
across an essential “flat” and featureless geopolitical space. In such a
paradigm, space was seen to be made up of contiguous territories
separated horizontally by geopolitical borders; these spaces incor-
porated static and moving targets located (again horizontally) by grid
references (and, later on, Global Positioning System coordinates).
14 Antipode

These targets were then marked for aerial annihilation on traditional

“flat” paper-based or computerised maps. Whilst this power projec-
tion involved increasing vertical as well as horizontal dimensions—
with aerial and satellite surveillance and targeting allowing the US to
completely dominate—the key vector of power operated through the
essentially horizontal geopolitics that was a key product of the extension
and elaboration of modern nation states between the eighteenth and
twentieth centuries.
To Peters the virtually universal urbanisation of geopolitical terrain
serves to undermine this model of power projection and domination.
“In fully urbanized terrain”, he writes, “warfare becomes profoundly
vertical, reaching up to towers of steel and cement, and downward
into sewers, subway lines, road tunnels, communication tunnels, and
the like” (1996:2). This verticality breaks down communication. It leads
to an increasing problem in distinguishing civilians from combatants.
And it undermines the awareness and killing power that high-tech
sensors give to US combatants in the urban battlefield.
Like many of his colleagues, Peters’ military mind recoils in horror
at the prospect of US forces habitually fighting in the majority world’s
burgeoning megacities and urbanising corridors.2 To Peters, these are
spaces where “human waste goes undisposed, the air is appalling, and
mankind is rotting” (1996:2). Here cities represent decay, anarchy,
disorder and the post Cold War collapse of “failed” nation states.
“Boom cites pay for failed states, post-modern dispersed cities pay for
failed states, and failed cities turn into killing grounds and reservoirs
for humanity’s surplus and discards (guess where we will fight)” (1996:3).
Peters highlights the key strategic role of urban regions starkly:
“Who cares about Upper Egypt if Cairo is calm? We do not deal with
Indonesia—we deal with Jakarta. In our [then] recent evacuation of
Sierra Leone, Freetown was all that mattered” (1997:5). Peters also
candidly characterises the role of the US military within the emerging
American neoconservative “empire” (although he obviously doesn’t
use these words). “Our future military expeditions will increasingly
defend our foreign investments”, he writes, “rather than defending
[the home nation] against foreign invasions. And we will fight to
subdue anarchy and violent ‘isms’ because disorder is bad for business.
All of this activity will focus on cities”.
Echoing Sinnreich, Peters, too, sees the deliberate exploitation of
urban terrain by opponents of US hegemony to be a key likely feature
of future war. “The long term trend in open-area combat is toward
overhead dominance by US forces” he observes (1996:6). “Battlefield
awareness may prove so complete, and precision weapons so widely-
available and effective, that enemy ground-based combat systems
will not be able to survive in the deserts, plains, and fields that have
seen so many of history’s main battles”. As a result, he agrees with
Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After 15

Sinnreich that the United States’ “enemies will be forced into cities
and other complex terrain, such as industrial developments and inter-
city sprawl” (1997:4).
To Sinnreich, Peters, and many other US military commentators,
then, it is as though global urbanisation is a dastardly and cowardly
plan to stop the US military gaining the full benefit from the complex,
expensive and high-tech weapons that the military industrial complex
has spent so many decades piecing together. Annoyingly, cities simply
get in the way of the US military’s technophiliac fantasies of omni-
potence. The fact that “urbanised terrain” is the product of complex
economic, demographic, social and cultural shifts that involve the
transformation of whole societies seems to have escaped their rather
paranoid eyes (see Graham 2003).

From “Shock and Awe” to Street Corners:

The Battle for Baghdad
This reflection on the US military’s perceptions of urbanised space
over the past two decades now needs to be placed against the (ongoing)
experience of the second Gulf War. Tying into this long-standing
military discourse, much was made by Western media during the build
up to the invasion of Iraq of the ways in which Saddam Hussein’s
forces would try to exploit Baghdad as a verticalised defensive space
to force a long and destructive siege-like war.
There are signs that this was, in fact, attempted (if on a limited
scale). Iraqi military leaders clearly changed tactics after the aerial
annihilation of their forces in the open desert in 1991 (see Virilio 2002).
They may even have themselves tracked the US military’s debates
about the urbanisation of war (much of which, after all, is available on
the web—see http://www.urbanoperations.com). Tariq Aziz, Saddam’s
foreign minister, argued in Autumn 2002—as the build up to invasion
gathered pace and the heavy bombing started—that “some people
say to me that the Iraqis are not the Vietnamese! They have no jungles
of swamps to hide in. I reply, ‘let our cities be our swamps and our
buildings our jungles’” (quoted in Bellamy 2003:3). In many cases
Iraqi defenders in Basra and Baghdad did try and burrow, and hide,
in the cities. They also tried to blend in with civilians and base them-
selves near hospitals and schools.
It is also very clear that the US military, believing that “the road
to Baghdad lay through Jenin” (Justin Huggler, cited at http://b-c.
blogspot.com, 31 March 2003), worked extremely closely with the
Israeli Defense Forces prior to their attacks to glean all the latest tips
on fighting in urban areas. They exchanged many training visits and
sent special observers to actually watch the battle of Jenin as it
progressed. They built mock “Muslim” cities (replete with “mosques”,
washing lines, and typical “Arab” houses) for joint exercises with
16 Antipode

Israeli soldiers. And they even bought 12 of the 60 ton D-9 bulldozers
that the Israelis use so brutally (as at Jenin) to simply “deurbanise” the
built spaces that they feel compromise their verticalised military omnipo-
tence in the occupied territories (Graham 2003; Weizmann 2002).
With the benefit of hindsight, however, widespread predictions of a
“new Stalingrad” in and around Baghdad now seem faintly absurd
(Norton-Taylor 2003). For this war was one of the most one-sided in
history (with the possible exception of the one in Afghanistan six
months before). The mass destruction and aerial killing that rained
down on Iraqi civilians and military alike within their cities meant that
very little sustained resistance was actually likely to occur whilst US
forces invaded and occupied the city. Whilst the US military main-
tained its full, furious, coordinated killing power over the skies and
the ground of Iraq—and as Iraqi systems of infrastructure were
progressively broken down—even in the cities there was little space or
scope to offer meaningful and sustained resistance.
Post-attack, US analysts have already celebrated the victory of
their IT-based killing, which allowed targets to be destroyed almost
as quickly as they were identified—that is, in “real time”. (Even in the
first Gulf War, this could take hours because coordination, whilst
computerised, was still not automated; see Cain 2003). This “success”
was further supported by a relaxation of both the rules of engagement,
and the laws of war, to allow the full targeting of major cities with both
“precision” and unguided weapons, including cluster bombs, “bunker
busting” bombs and depleted uranium munitions, irrespective of the
civilian carnage that inevitably followed (Smith 2002).
The implication of Baghdad, then, is that the urbanisation of terrain
may not necessarily inhibit US military and geopolitical hegemony as
much as was thought—at least not in the formal times and spaces of
war when the systems for distanciated, verticalised killing are in full
murderous flow. However, now that Basra, Baghdad and other Iraqi
cities are occupied, the US and British military have now emerged,
ironically, as much more vulnerable targets. Now that they are forced
to occupy the streets of Baghdad—a “megacity” of six million people
—and other Iraqi cities over an extended period, the US military have
to overcome their first instincts to project power and kill at a distance
that is safe (that is, safe for them). They have to control, and support
logistically, complex and often unknowable urban spaces from within,
over extended periods of time. At the same time they must at least
start to address the complex challenges of humanitarian, infrastructural
and political reconstruction (at least of a US-friendly regime).
Inevitably in this process distanciation becomes proximity. Skies
and armour plate must be withdrawn from, for at least part of the
day. Feet must be put on the ground. This exposes the US and British
military as targets for a myriad of fighters, ex-militia and civilians
Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After 17

armed with very ordinary weapons. The techno-fetishising rhetoric of

the “Revolution in Military Affairs” or “Network Centric Warfare”,
with their implication, as Mike Davis puts it, that “the ‘fog of war’—
the chaos and contingency of the battlefield—can be dispelled by
enough sensors, networks, and smart weapons” (2003:2), must seem
highly remote to a GI patrolling a Baghdad street in the middle of the
night.
Given that there are no signs yet (at mid-November 2003) of with-
drawal, and even fewer of the construction of a viable state, the reality
of nightmarish urban warfare, for the US and the British, is just
beginning—at least in the parts of Iraq where their occupation is
widely seen to be illegitimate. This nightmare is turning out to be slow
and attritional rather than massive and rapid. In mid-May 2003 Bush
declared the war “over”. By 10 November the US armed forces had
sustained 151 combat deaths (out of 266 overall combat deaths since
the invasion). About 26 guerilla style attacks were occurring every day.
This is the result of US and UK forces now being surrounded con-
tinuously by many people who (not surprisingly) are extremely angry at
the carnage that they have been forced to endure, in their home city, at
the hands of the aggressor that now sits before them (an aggressor
that many see as illegitimate).
In sum, we are thus facing the prospect of the “Palestinianlisation”
of Iraq (Khoury-Machool 2003). No amount of “full spectrum domin-
ance” and aerial “shock and awe” can address the deep-seated hatred
and resentment that fuel such attacks. No measure of high-tech
dominance can stop such local resistance amongst Iraqi people—both
Saddam supporters and others—many of whom feel violated, humiliated
and passionately angry about the invasion, occupation and devastation
of their homeland; the brutal (and ongoing) killing and incarceration
of thousands of their compatriots (whether military or civilian); and
the immiserated and repressed existence they are now forced to endure.
Whilst the mainstream Western media have recently largely ignored
civilian deaths, Iraqbodycount.net estimates that, by 11 November
2003, between 7840 and 9688 Iraqi civilians had died in the war (http://
www.iraqbodycount.net). Virtually every day more were being added
as trigger-happy US forces continued their search for senior Ba’ath
party members and for those undertaking guerilla attacks (on 28 July
five innocent civilians were killed in one such raid at Mansur). In
addition, tens of thousands of Iraqis have been terribly injured and
maimed. The numbers of young conscripts killed will never be known
(but must also run into many tens of thousands). We should also not
forget that between 3070 and 3390 Afghanis have also been killed by
the “war on terror” (see http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/).
There is a brutal, inescapable fact to realise here. In forcing “regime
change” through “full spectrum dominance”, the inevitable messy
18 Antipode

carnage and mass killing is always going to fuel the deep hatreds and
resentments, even when a brutal dictator is deposed. This will fuel
guerilla resistance to occupation and installation of US friendly regimes
for many years to come, and not just from fanatical supporters of the
previous regime.
Above all, no amount of PR spin, propagandist journalism, or
“informational warfare” can obscure three realisations that are now
spreading from critics of the war to many who previously supported it.
First, this war is an essentially neocolonial, racist, hegemony-grabbing,
killing spree, pitching the world’s greatest power against a militarily
very weak one. Second, the war was organised and executed with little
or no legal basis and using spurious and manipulated evidence on
“weapons of mass destruction” to achieve geopolitical goals that were
defined by key members of the Bush regime prior to 9/11. And third,
the war is being prosecuted with absolute contempt for all the prin-
ciples of multilateral international politics developed so painstakingly
over the previous half century. As Mike Davis argues, “for all the
geekspeak about networks and ecosystems, and millenarian boasting
about minimal robotic warfare, the United States is becoming a terror
state pure and simple: a 21st century Assyria with laptops and modems”
(2003:3). The UK, meanwhile, is an ally that, in so obsequiously
following this terror state, is rapidly destroying its own international
credibility and domestic sovereignty, as it becomes little more than a
client state to the US (Leigh and Norton-Taylor 2003).

Deepening Verticalisation: From the City to the

Urban Underground
The instinct to technologise and distanciate their killing power—to
deploy their technoscientific dominance to destroy and kill safely from
a distance in a virtualised “joystick war”—has been the dominant
ethos of US military culture and politics for a century or more (see
Franklin 1988). We should not be surprised, then, that ongoing US
casualties in the emerging guerilla war in Iraq have failed to knock
what Sherry calls this deep “technological fanaticism” off course
(1987, ch 8). For the US military’s fears, and denials, of an urbanising
modernity in majority world conflict zones are paralleled by a further,
intensified, verticalisation of geopolitics. This time, however, the key
connection is between trans-global, near instantaneous killing power,
operating on the fringes of outer space, and deep, subterranean, ter-
restrial space. As an attempt to back up its “full spectrum dominance”
and its absolute superiority in the technologies of vertical surveillance
and distanciated killing, the US military industrial complex is now
planning a possible nuclear assault on the last vestige of concealment:
the urban underground.
Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After 19

George Bush’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review suggests that the US

will soon restart nuclear testing and that it is also considering a first
strike nuclear policy (Squitieri 2003). Frustrated that their conventional
“bunker busting” bombs cannot penetrate deep into the protected
underground spaces built deep into the bedrock within alleged “rogue
nations”, the US regime is planning a new range of nuclear weapons.
These are designed to bring even these deep spaces within the destruct-
ive orbit of US air and space hegemony. The discourse generated by
the announcement of these weapons resonates with the wider one
surrounding urbanisation: how unfair for the enemy to withdraw into
protected capsules deep underground when the United States has so
expensively developed the technologies of geosynchronised annihila-
tion for surface and open warfare! (The fact that the US is the bunker-
builder par excellence seems to escape this analysis.)
“Without having the ability to hold those [underground bunker]
targets at risk”, suggested J D Crouch, Bush’s assistant Secretary of
Defense, in February 2002, “we essentially provide sanctuary” (quoted
in Squitieri 2003:2A). USA Today reports that deep bunkers “have
become rogue nations’ weapon of choice for putting their weapons
beyond the reach of the world’s mightiest military force” (quoted in
Squitieri 2003:2A). The inability of the US to destroy Saddam Hussein’s
deep bunkers during Gulf War II is clearly a powerful driver of this sense
of palpable anger that globe-spanning US power can be defeated by
the simple act of digging and pouring concrete.
With such legitimisation a major R&D programme is now in full
swing to develop nuclear “bunker busting” bombs that will allow the
instant annihilation of any (alleged) bunker complex, anywhere in the
world, within a very short time of targeting. In spring 2003 the House
of Representatives and the Senate approved the development of a
“Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” and are trying to settle their
differences on over-turning a long-standing ban on the develop-
ment of nuclear warheads of 5 kilotons or less. A specific target is
North Korea where advanced tunnelling technologies and equip-
ment are allegedly being used to construct massive underground
complexes which are currently immune to US surveillance and
weaponry.
The spectre of such weapons brings with it a complete reversal of
the nuclear test ban; a worrying level of hypocrisy in these times of
nuclear proliferation; and the frightening prospect of routine nuclear
first use by the US. There are obviously also huge risks that they will be
targeted mistakenly. But such weapons, and the surrounding doctrine,
bring further nightmarish dangers. To actually destroy a military
complex 1000 ft underground, for example, the Stanford physicist
Sidney Drell has estimated that a “bunker busting” nuclear warhead
would need to be at least 100 kilotons in size (or more than six times
20 Antipode

the size of the Hiroshima bomb). Even if it was exploded deep under-
ground, such a bomb would release over 1.5 million tons of radio-
active fallout into the atmosphere with a capacity to kill or devastate
a huge urban population.
These fantasies of verticalised omnipotence must be understood
within the context of the longer-term military strategy of the Pentagon.
The planning now driving air and space doctrine in Washington envis-
ages, within the next 25 years, complete and near-instantaneous global
reach of a whole arsenal of automated, remotely piloted, killing systems
from bases within the continental USA (Borger 2003). For example, in
the “Falcon” project—short for “Force Application and Launch from
the Continental United States”—major defence corporations have
already placed bids to undertake design work on a range of unmanned
aerial and space vehicles that would be the new automated near-space
strike force. Such remotely piloted vehicles, it is projected, will fly at
ten times the speed of sound and deliver 12,000 pounds of weapons—
including the possible nuclear bunker-killing bombs—anywhere in
the world within two hours from the “home” US territory. At a stroke
such technologies would take away the need for the United States to
have air bases anywhere outside the boundaries of the US.
These systems scale up the model of the unmanned, low-altitude
“Predator” aircraft that are already being used to assassinate alleged
“terrorists” (and whoever happens to be close by) in the Yemen,
Afghanistan and Iraq whilst being “piloted” from a Florida airbase 8 or
10,000 miles away. This video game-like killing, without the “pilot”
even leaving the ground, is the logical extension of US military strategy
in which entertainment, simulation and high-tech killing blur into an
inseparable whole (Der Derian 2001). This approach also has clear
advantages for US military personnel. “At the end of the work day”,
one Predator operator recently boasted during Gulf War II, “you walk
back into the rest of life in America” (quoted in Newman 2003).

Conclusion: Inscribing a “Geopolitics of Verticality”

As “Full Spectrum Dominance” meets global urbanisation, a clear
rethinking of the nature of US “hyperpower” is now required as an
element within the broader re-theorisation of strategic power. Instead
of the classical, modern formulation of Euclidean territorial units jostling
for space on contiguous maps, geopoliticians now need to build on the
work of Virilio and Deleuze, to further inscribe the vertical into their
notions of power. Such a (geo) “politics of verticality” (a term developed
by the architect Eyal Weizmann in 2002 to describe the architecture of
the Israeli–Palestinian war) would face at least four challenges.
First, adopting a fully three-dimensional view of space–time, it
would need to place the globe-spanning and real-time killing power
of “network centric warfare” into the context of the verticalisation of
Vertical Geopolitics: Baghdad and After 21

territory that comes with urbanisation and the growth of underground

complexes. As Paul Virilio (1992) has argued, the city and warfare have
mutually constituted each other throughout urban and geopolitical
history. Now, however, this occurs as electronic technologies of instant-
aneous, verticalised power interpenetrate and (attempt to) control
or destroy urban territories from afar—a process that seems to bring
with it a new age of the (underground) urban fortress or bunker. We
should remember, however, that even within the US military, these
strategies are always contested. Many within the “grunt culture” of
the US Marines and Army, for example, are sceptical about the useful-
ness of high-tech, distanciated warfare. And, as US casualties mount
in Iraq, and the vast cost and scale of occupation becomes increasingly
clear, complex institutional and political battles are underway which
may even make the position of the architect of the invasion, US
Defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, untenable.
Second, it would need to inscribe the contemporary geopolitical
imagination with a paradigm which addresses the ways in which global
air and space power are used to marshal geopolitical access to, and
control over, key underground resources (Iraqi and central Asian oil,
Palestinian water, etc) to fuel the ecological demands of Western urban
complexes.
Third, a vertical geopolitical imagination would need to address the
ways in which the distanciated verticalities of surveillance, targeting
and real-time killing confront the corporeal power of resistors to
US hyper-power in ways that break down and implode conventional
separations of “national” and “international”, “military” and “civil”,
“domestic” and “foreign”. Here geopolitical verticalisation meets an
intense telescoping of spatial scales, as the body interpenetrates with
the globe (Smith 2002). After all, post 9/11, Predators now fly over US
cities as well as Middle Eastern ones (Bishop and Phillips 2002). The
US military practice urban warfare in US cities, as well as in Kuwait
and Israel, so that they can react against mass, urban unrest in the
“Homeland”, as they did in the 1992 LA. Riot.3
Finally, a geopolitics of verticality would need to analyse the ways in
which the full might of US military communications, surveillance and
targeting systems are now being integrated seamlessly into American
civil and network spaces, as well as into transnational ones, as part of
the “Homeland Security” drive. The evaporation of the line between
law enforcement and military power associated with Bush’s “war
on terror” means that anti-globalisation protestors, Internet-based
social movements and civil demonstrators now face the same kind of
verticalised and virtualised electronic and military power and surveil-
lance that is such a key feature of the US geopolitical expansion strategy
in Afghanistan, Iraq (and who knows where else as the “permawar”
rolls on and on …) (see Warren 2002; York 2003).
22 Antipode

Acknowledgement
Thanks to Gearóid Ó Tuathail for comments on an earlier draft.

Endnotes
1
Presumably “sanitary” here must refer to the point of view of the US military; the
experience of the War was far from “sanitary” for the 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and 3000
Iraqi civilians who got in the way of the cross hairs and were killed; see Virilio (2002).
2
See also Rosenau (1997) and Spiller (2000). A hypothesis worth testing is whether
this antiurbanism amongst the US military reflects the wider antiurbanism which is
endemic within US culture and society.
3
Perversely, such exercises have even been proposed as local economic development
initiatives; it has even been suggested that certain decaying central cities might be
taken over as permanent urban warfare training sites “populated” by prisoners.

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