Small Vessel Security Strategy: Department of Homeland Security
Small Vessel Security Strategy: Department of Homeland Security
SMALL VESSEL
SECURITY STRATEGY
APRIL 2008
i
Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy
FOREWORD
i
Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD................................................................................................................................................................................. i
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................................................iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................................................................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................................................ 1
SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................................................ 1
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT................................................................................................................................................. 4
RISK MANAGEMENT............................................................................................................................................................. 22
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................................................................... 31
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Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy
a maritime security threat; and enhance work sites that could uncover and ultimately help
cooperation among international, Federal, state, disrupt terrorist activity.
local, and Tribal partners and the private sector
(e.g., marinas, shipyards, small vessel and The private sector is also a critical partner in
facility operators), and, in coordination with the rebuilding critical infrastructure and key
Department of State and other relevant federal resources affected by a catastrophic incident as
departments and agencies, international partners. well as in fielding scientific and technological
This strategy lays out the appropriate way advancements that can help secure the United
forward in managing and controlling risks posed States. Due to the multiple and essential roles the
by the potential threat and possibly dire private sector plays across all areas of homeland
consequences of small vessel exploitation. security, continued collaboration and
engagement with the private sector to strengthen
The private sector performs a central role in small vessel security is imperative.
Homeland Security and can assist authorities in
reducing each of the components of risk (threat, It is understood that the vast size of the small
vulnerability, and consequence). vessel community makes the efforts to manage
and reduce the overall risk in the maritime
Small vessel operators can be effective partners domain difficult. Yet, it is clear that an effective
in detecting threats in our ports and on our partnership through the layers of stakeholders
waterways. The large number of small vessel and government authorities involved in security
operators and their familiarity with the local area operations, and commercial and recreational
and patterns of waterway use make it possible pursuits, comprises one of the nation’s greatest
that small vessel operators will be the first to assets for reduction of small vessel related risks.
recognize suspicious behavior. DHS must
promote and strengthen their effectiveness
through public dialogue regarding their role in
homeland security and specialized programs
such as America’s Waterway Watch. Non
governmental organizations are key partners in
keeping this dialogue going.
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Department of Homeland Security Small Vessel Security Strategy
INTRODUCTION
Terrorist Travel
METHODOLOGY
• 2007 National Strategy for Homeland
Security A DHS working group developed the SVSS and
applied risk management principles to address
Specifically, SVSS incorporates the indicated four key risk scenarios from small vessels
guidance contained in the following: (enumerated in the Strategic Environment
section). It built upon prior efforts such as the
• the use of risk-based decisions to
U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) Small Vessel
prioritize DHS resource investments
Information Gap Analysis, 2 the Small Vessel
embodied in the National Strategy for
Risk Task Force Report, and the U.S. Customs
Homeland Security and the DHS
and Border Protection (CBP)/USCG Joint Small
Strategic Plan
Vessel Security Risk Strategic Principles. These
• the principles of the National Security documents and other precursor studies and
Presidential Directive-41/Homeland analyses, along with the inputs from the June
Security Presidential Directive-13 2007 National Small Vessel Security Summit
(NSPD-41/HSPD-13), which underscore held in Arlington, Virginia, were critical in
the importance of securing the maritime developing the SVSS.
domain
• identifying threats as early and as distant
from U.S. shores as possible per the
KEY DEFINITIONS
National Plan to Achieve Maritime
The following definitions do not constitute, and
Domain Awareness
are not intended to be, an exhaustive list of
• using existing capabilities to analyze and terms, nor is it to be understood to express a
disseminate all available intelligence comprehensive, legally-binding view. These
regarding potential threats to U.S. characterizations are provided to assist in
interests in the maritime domain understanding the application of risk assessment
according to the Global Maritime methodology to the small vessel security
Intelligence Integration Plan environment for the purpose of this strategy.
• coordinating the Federal Government’s
response to threats and delineating roles Small vessels are characterized for the purposes
and responsibilities consistent with the of this strategy as any watercraft—regardless of
Maritime Operational Threat Response method of propulsion—less than 300 gross tons,
Plan and used for recreational or commercial
purposes. Small vessels can include commercial
• providing the framework coordinating all
fishing vessels, recreational boats and yachts,
maritime security initiatives undertaken
towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels,
with foreign governments, international
and any other personal or commercial vessels
organizations, and private corporations
involved in U.S. or foreign voyages.
overseas in keeping with the
International Outreach and Coordination
Strategy, and
• improving the security of the marine 2
Conducted as part of the USCG’s Combating Maritime
transportation system consistent with the Terrorism Campaign Plan.
Maritime Domain is all areas and things of, on, succeed against a particular target or class of
under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a targets. 4
sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway,
including all maritime related activities, Consequence of an attack is the magnitude of
infrastructure, people, cargo, vessels, and other the adverse impact of a successful attack. The
conveyances. outcome of an attack may include many forms,
such as the loss of life, economic costs, and any
Risk is typically defined as a function of adverse impacts on U.S. national security.
frequency and consequence of an undesirable
event. When assessing the risk of terrorism, the State government, for the purposes of this
frequency factor of risk is often broken down strategy, means any state of the United States,
into the elements of threat and vulnerability. the District of Columbia, the U.S. territories of
When assessing operational risk, frequency often Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
includes the elements of probability (likelihood American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the
that an event will occur) and exposure (amount Northern Mariana Islands, or the Trust Territory
of time, people, or equipment involved). of the Pacific Islands.
Risk Management is a continuous process of Local government means any county, city,
assessing risks and implementing mitigating village, town, district, or other political
actions, with its primary goal being to reduce the subdivision of any state, and includes any rural
potential that an adverse event will occur. Risk community or unincorporated town or village or
management addresses initial risk of an any other public entity for which an application
identified threat, and manages the residual risk for assistance is made by a state or political
after countermeasures are implemented. It has subdivision thereof. 5
been used in the private sector (insurance,
engineering, and banking and finance) and public
sector (Food and Drug Administration,
Environmental Protection Agency, and
Department of Defense) for decades, but its
application for Homeland Security and
combating terrorism is relatively new without a
precedent framework.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
MARITIME GOVERNANCE
ARITIME
13
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
14
Protection (Homeland Security Presidential Directive–7). Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, p. 25.
Overall Vulnerability
15
Risk Management, GAO-06-91, December 2005, p. 25.
Figure 2, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) Risk Management Framework
passenger craft, large commercial or cargo economy for the first five days of this closure at
vessels, military warships, major bridges, critical $4.7 billion and increased exponentially after
waterfront industries, and other maritime that. The consequences of a WMD release via
infrastructure. The exact number of all small small vessel would be worse.
vessels operating in proximity of maritime
infrastructure at any given time is also a key Coastal waters and adjacent lands are some of
factor in CIKR vulnerability. the most productive and active areas of the
United States. U.S. coastal communities are
In 2007, the USCG Research and Development major population and economic centers, which
Center sponsored a study of nine U.S. ports and generate over 60 millions jobs and about half of
determined that there were approximately 3,000 U.S. GDP—approximately $4.5 trillion.
small commercial vessels, 3,000 fishing vessels, According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 53% of
and 400,000 recreational vessels that either must Americans live in coastal watershed counties.
or are likely to operate in the vicinity of Additionally, 85% of Americans live within 100
important maritime infrastructure within those miles of the nation’s coasts. In 2004, close to 75
ports. 16 million Americans were directly involved in on
the-water activities and 90 percent of
Overall Consequence international trade by weight was carried by sea.
Much of the U.S. critical infrastructure and key
As defined earlier, consequence of a terrorist resources is located near the maritime domain.
attack is the magnitude of the adverse impact of The great diversity and redundancy of the
a successful attack. Depending on its magnitude, nation’s CIKR provide for significant physical
consequence can easily be a dominant driver in and economic resilience in the face of terrorist
the overall risk calculation for many threats. attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies,
and contribute to the strength of the nation’s
The primary consequence of a terrorist incident economy. However, this vast and diverse
(as well as other Transportation Security Incident aggregation of highly interconnected assets,
(TSI) 17 ) arising from the use of a small vessel systems, and networks present an attractive array
with conventional weapons could be devastating of targets to terrorists.
for the U.S. economy if it damaged CIKR or
resulted in closure of the port. A 10-day labor Any large-scale incident would also create other
dispute closed West Coast seaports in 2002. One long-term, cascading, adverse effects. By way of
estimate 18 placed the cost to the national example, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
large segments of the population moved away
from the Gulf Coast — particularly in New
Orleans — thereby causing a secondary
16
An Assessment of Small Vessel Populations in U.S. consequence. The loss of population further
Waters, prepared for the U.S. Coast Guard Research and harmed the Gulf Coast’s economy as a tertiary
Development Center by Potomac Management Group, consequence. The direct loss of power also
Inc., June 2007. disabled pumps in the petroleum pipelines across
17
Section 70101(6) of Maritime Transportation Security the southern United States. This negatively
Act of 2002 impacted gasoline stocks throughout the nation.
18 One can imagine the multifold consequences of a
Zeigert, Amy, et. al. “Port Security: Improving
Emergency Response Capabilities at the Ports of Los terrorist attack using a weapon of mass
Angeles and Long Beach.” California Policy Options
2005. University of California Los Angeles, School of
Public Affairs (Los Angeles, Calif. 2005).
10
destruction (WMD), including the mass The USCG Intelligence Coordination Center
casualties, devastation to infrastructure, and provided information to this strategy regarding
environmental fallout. A 2006 study 19 examined the viability of various threats from the
the potential effects of a 15-day port closure at exploitation of small vessel characteristics.
Los Angeles-Long Beach due to a radiological Overseas terrorists have demonstrated the ability
bomb. It estimated the economic impact at $34 to combine the elements of capability,
billion. opportunity, and intent on several occasions, as
noted in the list of attacks below on maritime
assets and personnel.
Specific Risk Scenarios
Small vessel risks have been assessed at the a. Domestic Use of Waterborne Improvised
national level through various studies and have Explosive Devices (WBIEDs)
helped drive strategic decisions and planning
efforts. The USCG’s National Maritime Security There are numerous examples overseas of the
Risk Profile (2003-2004) and National Maritime use of small vessels as a waterborne improvised
Security Risk Assessment (of 2004 and 2006) are explosive device (WBIED) to attack maritime
two prominent examples. However, the security- targets. These tactics could be applied against the
sensitive or classified nature of the details of United States and its interests to attack vessels,
these studies and of the components that infrastructure, and industry (such as refineries
determined the overall risk levels precludes and chemical plants) in the maritime domain.
detailed discussion in this strategy. While not an exhaustive list, the following
represents a range of high-profile tactics and
The four scenarios of gravest concern in using targets that could be replicated in the United
small vessels in terrorist-related attacks have States.
been identified as:
• In August 2005, Turkish authorities
a. Domestic Use of Waterborne Improvised arrested Louai Sakka, a senior al-Qaeda
Explosive Devices (WBIEDs); operative when a one-ton bomb he
designed detonated prematurely. Sakka
b. Conveyance for smuggling weapons had intended to place the bomb on a
(including WMDs) into the United States; yacht and ram a cruise ship carrying
vacationing Israeli and U.S. soldiers on
c. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into rest and recreation in Antalya, Turkey.
the United States; and • In April 2004, terrorists using two fishing
dhows packed with explosives attacked
d. Waterborne platform for conducting a an Iraqi offshore oil terminal in the North
stand-off attack (e.g. Man-Portable Air- Arabian Gulf, killing one U.S. Coast
Defense System (MANPADS) attacks). Guardsman and two U.S. Navy sailors
protecting the terminal as they prepared
to search one of the boats.
• In October 2002, Al-Qaeda directed an
attack by an explosive-laden small boat
19
“The economic impact of a terrorist attack on the twin against the French oil tanker M/V
ports of Los-Angles-Long Beach” in The Economic LIMBURG off the coast of Yemen. The
Impacts of Terrorist Attacks (2006). attack resulted in fires on board the
11
tanker, a large oil spill, and killed one supplies, and military units, depending on the
and injured four crew members. intensity of the strike. As shut downs of certain
West Coast ports during a labor dispute
• In October 2000, Al-Qaeda attacked the
demonstrated, the impacts of even a temporary
USS COLE and killed 17 U.S. Navy
disruption of the maritime transportation system
sailors by navigating an explosive-laden
can be substantial.
small boat alongside the destroyer as it
was refueling pier side in Aden, Yemen. b. Conveyance for smuggling weapons
• The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (including WMDs) into the United States
(LTTE) have conducted numerous
successful suicide attacks using small One of the gravest maritime risks facing the
boats against the Sri Lankan Government nation is the potential for a terrorist group to
and its assets. Their attacks have obtain a WMD and detonate it within the
destroyed or damaged several civilian confines of a major U.S. port city, military
and military vessels. installation, or industrial facility. Closely aligned
with this is the potential for the maritime domain
Significant naval assets, CI, and KR such as to be used as a transportation system for such a
offshore oil platforms, merchant vessels weapon, weapon materials, or its components,
(including oil and chemical tankers), and with an eventual target further inland.
passenger vessels (such as ferries and cruise
ships) operate in areas that are frequented by The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
small vessels. Small vessels may easily blend or “assesses that al-Qaeda will continue to try to
disappear into other vessel traffic in ports and the acquire . . . radiological and nuclear material and
coastal maritime environment, and are usually would not hesitate to use them if it develops
subject to less scrutiny than larger vessels in what it deems is sufficient capability.” While
these areas. They are often inconspicuous, fast, there is no evidence that they possess WMDs at
highly maneuverable, and able to quickly this time or that they intend to use small vessels
relocate via roads and surface transportation, as a means of transport to the United States, the
making them particularly dangerous and lethal if use of small vessels to smuggle drugs and other
used as WBIEDs. Additionally, operators do not contraband into the United States is instructive
require extensive training or large crews, and as to our vulnerability to the exploitation of
these vessels can be acquired relatively easily small vessel characteristics to smuggle WMDs
and inexpensively, thereby making them a very into the United States.
attractive and available mode of attack.
A nuclear weapon could be concealed on many
The use of a small vessel as a WBIED also has vessels that meet the small vessel criteria. For
potential consequences that would exceed the instance, an improvised nuclear device (IND), 20
immediate casualties or damage caused by the which might be smaller and less cumbersome
attack. For instance, the U.S. military relies than a nuclear weapon, presents an even more
heavily on the maritime transportation system plausible scenario for transport via a small
(MTS) to deliver equipment and supplies to vessel. Furthermore, a terrorist organization
forces abroad, as most of American military would not necessarily have to transport a fully
power is transported by sea through Department
of Defense (DOD) facilities at 15 key seaports. A
successful WBIED attack, particularly at one of 20
Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)—essentially a cruder
these military ports, has the potential to seriously version of a nuclear weapon fabricated by a terrorist
disrupt movement of arms, ammunition, military organization or rogue nation.
12
assembled weapon. The parts and technology, resident who sold it in 2002 and had not been
required for assembling an IND could be well registered since. 22
hidden on a small vessel. Additionally, the small
vessel itself could readily serve as a platform Undocumented maritime migration and
from which to detonate a nuclear weapon, IND, smuggling threatens the United States from all
or radioactive dispersal device (RDD)— sides. Illegal landings have occurred along the
commonly referred to as a “Dirty Bomb.” entire Eastern and Western seaboards, as well as
from every U.S. territory. Since 1980, the
Fissile material is the most difficult component USCG, working with other Federal, state, and
of a nuclear weapon to obtain. Because the local law enforcement authorities, has interdicted
material is better secured in U.S. facilities, it over 320,000 illegal maritime migrants from 47
more probably would be acquired by a terrorist different countries. In 2004, there were
organization overseas where some of the larger approximately 5,000 successful arrivals of illegal
and less well secured potential sources for maritime migrants. 23 These numbers are
nuclear weapons and materials exist. These primarily from small vessel arrivals as opposed
weapons or materials would be more likely to be to absconders from large commercial vessels.
transported via maritime modes. Small vessels Any one of these arrivals could potentially be a
provide a clear opportunity for terrorists to retain terrorist.
control of the WMD and activate it at the
optimum times. The number of people entering the country
illegally between ports of entry, and the
The consequences of a WMD attack anywhere in concomitant proliferation of human and drug
the United States could be catastrophic, and smuggling networks, present clear risks to U.S.
potentially include millions of people killed and national security due to the ever-present threat of
injured, billions of dollars in direct and indirect terrorism. Terrorists and terrorist organizations
economic losses, and adverse environmental could leverage these illicit networks to smuggle
effects including the contamination of the impact operatives into the United States, while the large
area with subsequent loss of its use for number of aliens attempting to enter the country
decades. 21 While an RDD would likely result in illegally could potentially provide cover for the
far less casualties than a nuclear weapon/IND, it terrorists. A particular concern has been that
could also easily cause economic disruption in terrorists may take advantage of numerous
the billions of dollars coupled with a devastating criminal networks and exploit small vessels as
psychological effect on the nation. low-profile modes of transportation to smuggle
dangerous people and materials into the United
c. Conveyance for smuggling terrorists into States, thereby circumventing more-stringent
the United States land border security measures. Additionally, the
proceeds from these smuggling networks could
In September 2007, 10 people dressed in black potentially be used to finance terrorist activities.
arrived in San Diego, California aboard a 20-foot
skipjack, which they abandoned at Wipeout
Beach. The boat was registered to a San Diego
22
Baker, Debbi Farr. The San Diego Union Tribune,
September 5, 2007.
21 http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20070905
Abt, Clark C. “The Economic Impact of Nuclear
0841-bn05boat.html
Terrorist Attacks on Freight Systems in an Age of Seaport
23
Vulnerability,” (Cambridge, MA, 2003), pp. 3-4. GAO-05-364T Coast Guard Budget Priorities, p. 31.
13
24
Defense Intelligence Agency/Missile & Space
Intelligence Center response to PR R205-08-0005-S dated
31 January 2008.
14
STRATEGIC VISION
GUIDING PRINCIPLES
In pursuing the strategic goals, DHS is guided by
the following principles. These are underlying
concepts that will inform and frame development
and implementation across all goals, priorities,
objectives, and action plans.
• Risk based decision making will be
necessary to best channel actions and
finite resources.
• Efforts to enhance security may improve
small vessel safety and operator
education, thus the security strategy
builds on existing safety frameworks and safety due to the diversity of the
maritime domain and the heterogeneity of
• Risk mitigation efforts must be designed the small vessel community. These
so as to strike the delicate balance and complexities require the implementation
tradeoffs between personal freedom, of a national framework, within the scope
national security, and commerce. of international standards, which can be
o Small vessel risk reduction efforts properly tailored to local situations.
should not impede the lawful use of • Maritime security and safety depends
the maritime domain or the free flow upon the successful implementation of an
of legitimate commerce. interlocking system of governance
o Small vessel risk reduction efforts comprised of maritime regimes, domain
will include ongoing engagement awareness, and operational capabilities.
with the small vessel community, as
• Authorities at every level will be able to
well as other key stakeholders in
identify shore vulnerabilities and
order to ensure that potential
potential targets, and work with private
solutions reflect their interests and to
entities to establish appropriate protection
benefit from the collected wisdom of
plans to ensure shore security.
the small vessel community in
crafting solutions. • Technology will serve as an important,
complementary component to enhance
o Successful small vessel risk reduction
subsequent plans, initiatives, and actions
will require close coordination and
(such as increasing MDA), but it is not
cooperation between Federal
the sole answer to ensure small vessel
agencies, state, local, and Tribal
security. Additionally, leveraging
governments, as well as private and
technology will mitigate risks but should
international partners.
also minimize impacts to small vessel
• A one-size-fits-all approach cannot operators.
adequately ensure U.S. maritime security
15
16
i. Provide opportunities and adequate venues for an ongoing dialogue with the small vessel
community to encourage the free flow of information and ideas between the private sector, the
Federal Government, and state, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities.
ii. Expand local-level constituent relationships with other maritime organizations such as paddle
sports, sport fishing associations, and port authorities.
iii. Move towards a knowledgeable small vessel community through a common, efficient,
accessible, and easy to use lessons-learned system from exercises, real life events, peer
review, and formal––but simple and inexpensive––instruction.
iv. Leverage existing education and outreach programs, such as those provided to the small
vessel community by the USCG Boating Safety Division, USCG Auxiliary and partnerships
with the U.S. Power Squadrons to provide both security and safety training.
v. Increase public awareness of how to report suspected terrorist activity via America’s
Waterway Watch (AWW).
17
of trends and fusing of potential intelligence departure will enable consistent enforcement
related to the small vessel operator population prioritizations and responses. These simple
and related security risks. Improving information reporting requirements will also improve the
analysis and sharing––especially between the effectiveness of risk assessment efforts.
law enforcement and intelligence communities
and, in coordination with the Department of A layered innovative approach does not
State, with foreign governments––will enable necessarily mean all risk-mitigation actions will
authorities to specifically target threats related to be technologically based. Many times, the simple
WMDs or WBIEDs. Overall, this will improve expedient of installing effective barriers around
capabilities at the operational and tactical levels critical infrastructure and key resources will
and allow better allocation of resources, eliminate most vulnerability to terrorist use of
particularly in emergency situations. small vessels as a WBIED. In order to develop
and maintain effective layered security, Federal,
Additionally, improving reporting procedures is state, local, and Tribal officials must work in
essential to increasing reporting compliance and conjunction with their international counterparts
gathering data for risk-based efforts. As such, and private sector representatives to provide
obtaining advance data for international traffic, adequate security for CIKR.
such as the 96-hour Notice of Arrival rule, will
allow the USCG and CBP to conduct the
necessary risk-based analysis, gain situational
awareness of small vessels, and improve the
overall MDA. The submission of basic—but
essential—information on recreational vessel
operators in advance of U.S. arrival and
i. Improve detection and tracking capabilities to better identify small vessels operating in or
near U.S. waters.
ii. Develop a robust layered defense by expanding and enhancing maritime radiological/nuclear
detection capabilities to international, Federal, state, local, Tribal, and private stakeholders.
iii. Implement basic procedures on advanced data submission and increase reporting compliance
to improve situational and maritime domain awareness.
iv. Improve efforts to gather and share data on small vessels and their operators.
v. Improve data analysis capabilities to target high-risk small vessels.
vi. Assess, develop, and improve layered security for critical infrastructure and key resources.
18
19
i. Expand research into and invest in prototyping low-cost, non-intrusive, small vessel
identification systems, such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, adaptable
miniature transponders, portable Global Positioning System (GPS) devices, or cell-phone
based recognition systems.
ii. Expand research into and invest in anomaly detection instruments and other decision aids such
as automated scene understanding tools.
iii. Expand research into methods of protecting critical infrastructure and key resources, especially
at shorelines, through means such as small boat barriers, unambiguous warning devices, and
non-lethal deterrents such as sonic canons.
iv. Improve maritime domain awareness capabilities to adequately distinguish between and
respond to intentional and innocent intrusions into security and safety zones.
v. Expand research into and invest in advanced maritime radiation/nuclear detection technology
for human portable radiation detection equipment, mobile standoff radiation detectors, and
fixed detectors that could be deployed on or near the waters in the vicinity of small vessels.
20
operator associations, etc.) as well as private In addition, DHS will continue to work with our
entities share many of the same concerns and foreign counterparts to coordinate enforcement
responsibility for protecting CIKR and the MTS. operations, and will continue to work with
These private actors have intimate knowledge of international maritime organizations such as the
their own facilities and sphere of influence. International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
Working with the various non-governmental World Customs Organization (WCO) to develop
organizations is more effective than trying to international standards applicable to small
work with individual small vessel community vessels.
members. The various non-governmental
organizations provide a centralized point of
contact on behalf of their members and have the
ability to efficiently communicate with them.
21
RISK MANAGEMENT
Given the size and complexity of the maritime
domain, risk-based decision making is the only
feasible approach to prevention, protection,
response and recovery related to small vessel
threats. This risk-based SVSS will be applied
across the maritime domain, the high seas, and
foreign ports. The success of this strategy will
hinge upon the informed and effective
employment of risk management, which will
also inform decisions about resources and
investments in risk-mitigation actions. o Make adjustments in DHS resources
and investments to better attain
Maritime security partners will mitigate a risk performance objectives.
posed by terrorist use of small vessels by o Consider new risk mitigation actions.
conforming to the following five phases of the
GAO risk management framework: Within this construct, maritime security partners
should continue to undertake activities and
1. Strategic Objectives and Constraints
initiatives aimed at mitigating risks associated
o Ensure all actions are firmly aligned with small vessels. Coordinating and achieving
with articulated goals and objectives, synergy among these efforts will reap benefits
keeping a clear focus on the desired and should include:
“end state.”
o Identify high-risk scenarios and/or Maritime Regimes
locations.
2. Risk Assessment • Update Area Maritime Security Plans
(AMSP), and Vessel and Facility
o Assess current and forecast threats,
Security Plans as required by the
vulnerabilities, and consequences.
Maritime Transportation Security Act of
3. Alternative Evaluation 2002 (MTSA) to reflect small vessel
o Develop various risk mitigation security issues.
actions, coordinating efforts, where • Assess the benefits and costs of
prudent. legislative and regulatory options
o Develop quantifiable performance pertaining to enhanced registration and
objectives for each risk-mitigation reporting of small vessels.
action under consideration. • Tailor domestic and international
4. Management Selection
security.
22
23
COORDINATION
24
25
26
To assist the private sector in preparing for this the private sector may perform was developed as
role, DHS advocates, in accordance with the part of the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery
Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan the Plan, and is applicable within the framework of
following: this strategy:
• Private sector owners and operators of • Participate in various maritime industry
vessels and facilities subject to United stakeholder professional organizations
States Government regulation are and advisory committees such as the
encouraged to expand their business AMSCs.
continuity plans to include security
• Engage in exchange of information about
incident prevention, detection and
recovery operations plans with other
recovery operations as part of required
potentially affected private sector entities
planning pursuant to Federal regulations.
and the Federal Government to mitigate
• Owners and operators of vessels and potential congestion at non-incident site
facilities not subject to United States ports following the diversion of vessel
Government regulation are encouraged to traffic.
establish security incident prevention,
• Assist in the assessment of economic
detection and recovery operations and
impact.
business continuity plans, in coordination
with appropriate trade partners. • Assist in the identification of prevention
and recovery resources and assets.
• All private sector security incident
prevention, detection and recovery • Provide resources to assist in security and
operation plans should include safety activities, as appropriate.
notification of appropriate local, state,
• Participate in pilot programs to test the
and Federal government agencies. Plans
effectiveness of the Federal Government
should be industry specific and include:
to communicate security activities to the
(1) a plan for reducing vulnerability to
private sector.
attacks; (2) a plan for evacuation or
remaining, (3) adequate communications • Using existing information-sharing
capabilities, and (4) a plan for business mechanisms such as the National
continuity, and any other area or industry Infrastructure Coordinating Center
specific concerns. (NICC), AMSCs, Transportation Sector
Coordinating Councils and Information
It is anticipated that the private sector will Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC),
implement business continuity plans/operations communicate situational and operational
plans on their own accord, based on information information as well as physical asset
provided by the Federal Government. capabilities for mitigation management.
Information that may influence the decision to
implement contingency plans and divert or • In conjunction with Federal, state, local
redirect cargo and/or the conveyances include: and Tribal authorities, assist in providing
national priorities; military requirements; MTS security for critical infrastructure and key
restrictions; and the expected duration of those resources.
restrictions.
27
AUTHORITIES
The maritime domain, given its complex set of
interlocking jurisdictions and authorities, is
subject to a vast collection of laws and
regulations at the Federal, state, local, and Tribal
levels. Appendix B contains some of the primary
laws which provide the Federal government and
its agencies with authority to act in the maritime
domain.
EXISTING INTERAGENCY
INSTITUTIONS
Interagency cooperation has long been a
cornerstone of effective governance. Multiple
28
29
30
CONCLUSION
I will guarantee you one thing—the enemy is not wasting time. … Remind yourself about The
Sullivans. Remind yourself about the Cole. Remind yourself about that French tanker, the Limburg.
This attack technique … is one they have used before. It is one that they will likely use again. Let us
work together to make our protections against this as robust as they can be in a way that preserves
the traditional freedom of the seas, our economic mobility and our continued pleasure and boating
on our oceans and in our waterways.
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff
National Small Vessel Security Summit
June 19, 2007
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GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
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The USCG provides unique benefits to the Nation because of its distinctive blend of military,
humanitarian, and civilian law-enforcement capabilities.
The USCG routinely inspects and assesses the security of U.S. ports in accordance with the
MTSA of 2002, the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, and other pertinent legislation. Every
regulated U.S. port facility is required to establish and implement a comprehensive security plan
that outlines procedures for controlling access to the facility, verifying credentials of port
workers, implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), inspecting
cargo for tampering, designating security responsibilities, training, and reporting of all breaches
of security or suspicious activity, among other security measures. Working closely with local
port authorities and law enforcement agencies, the USCG regularly reviews, approves, assesses,
and inspects these plans and facilities to ensure full compliance. In addition, also as required by
the MTSA, the USCG assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures at foreign ports.
The USCG:
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o Controls access to the operations of facilities under, in, or adjacent to waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
• Facilitates efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness
o Tracks Notice of Arrival (NOA) information from ships entering U.S. waters and
ensures changes to NOAs are provided to the appropriate USCG and CBP officials at
alternate ports of entry.
o As part of AMSCs, and in coordination with appropriate stakeholders and other
government agencies, monitors all vessels and other inter-modal operations within the
respective area of responsibility.
o Collects, integrates, and analyzes maritime intelligence concerning threats to vessels,
ports and maritime infrastructure.
o Coordinates post-incident assessments and the reporting of maritime CIKR status and
intermodal linkages.
• Provides operational capabilities to deter, respond to, and mitigate small vessel related
attacks.
o Actively manages risks to ports by directing the movement of vessels, as necessary.
o Furnishes available personnel, equipment or other resource support as requested,
consistent with overriding mission responsibilities and within the capabilities of
assigned resources.
o Provides port security measures to reduce potential threats and to ensure integrity of
the existing infrastructure system, including boarding of certain high-risk vessels
prior to port entry.
o Ensures the safety of navigation and security of an Area of Responsibility (AOR).
CBP is the only agency authorized to make final admissibility determinations regarding cargo
and persons arriving from a foreign port or place. With regard to small vessel operations, CBP
enforces applicable requirements for commercial vessel operations without regard to the size of
the vessel. Therefore, commercial vessel operators must comply with CBP requirements to
provide inbound and outbound cargo declarations and passenger manifests, and provide entry
and clearance notifications.
Pursuant to 19 CFR 4.2, operators of small pleasure vessels, arriving in the United States from a
foreign port or place to include any vessel which has visited a hovering vessel or received
merchandise outside the territorial sea, are required to report their arrival to CBP immediately
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upon arrival. CBP also requires a face-to-face inspection unless the operator and passengers
qualify for one of four alternate inspection systems.
In addition to enforcing reporting requirements, CBP searches for narcotics and other
contraband, and undocumented migrants. CBP enforcement of small vessel requirements
includes officers assigned to stationary designated inspection sites and agents on patrol using an
array of over 260 fixed, rotary wing and unmanned aircraft, and nearly 200 marine enforcement
vessels of all types.
CBP:
• Employs all available resources to identify and interdict terrorists and terrorist’s weapons
(WMD) as far from the U.S. shores as possible
• Coordinates with Federal, state, local, Tribal and international law enforcement partners
to stop illegal migrants, drugs, and other criminals from entering the U.S. via the
maritime domain
• Employs the widest possible information sharing practices with other law enforcement
agencies and other partners
• Employs risk management practices when analyzing information and targeting possible
high-risk persons, vessels, and cargo for enforcement actions
• Continues to leverage the latest state-of-the-art technology solutions for situational
awareness and non-intrusive screening and inspection, whenever possible
• Ensures enforcement actions do not unnecessarily impede the legitimate flow of
commercial maritime trade and the freedom of recreational boaters operating in the
maritime domain
DNDO:
• Develops the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture;
• Develops, acquires, and supports the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system;
• Fully characterizes nuclear detector system performance before deployment;
• Establishes situational awareness through information sharing and analysis;
• Establishes operation protocols to ensure that nuclear detection leads to effective
response;
• Conducts a transformational research and development program in nuclear detection; and
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ICE Attachés work within U.S. Embassies to implement and support multiple maritime security
initiatives in foreign countries.
• Cooperates with foreign governments in the coordination of DHS foreign investigations,
and provides homeland security intelligence to the DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A), other government entities, and our state, local, and private sector
partners.
• Works with foreign counterparts to combat transnational crimes involving national
security by conducting investigations of entities that pose a risk of terrorism and/or
criminal activities before they arrive at U.S. ports of entry.
• Participates in Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs) and Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBETS), with foreign government counterparts to increase
capability to detect and interdict harmful goods and materials.
• Serves as a point of contact in Canada and Mexico in the Security and Prosperity
Partnership (SPP) and the Secure Border Initiative (SBI).
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DOJ controls all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the United States has an interest.
Under the direction of the Attorney General, 93 United States Attorneys serve as the nation's
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principal litigators, conducting most of the trial work in which the United States is a party,
including the prosecution of criminal cases brought by the Federal government; the prosecution
and defense of civil cases in which the United States is a party; and the collection of debts owed
the Federal government which are administratively uncollectible.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is a principal law enforcement
agency within the DOJ dedicated to preventing terrorism, reducing violent crime, and protecting
our Nation. The men and women of ATF perform the dual responsibilities of enforcing Federal
criminal laws and regulating the firearms and explosives industries.
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STATUTES/ACTS
The PWSA grants the USCG broad authority to take action in response to safety and security
issues within the port. For example, the USCG is authorized to establish safety or security zones
both on land and water. Only authorized persons, vehicles, or vessels may enter a safety or
27
Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002) as codified at 6 U.S.C. §101 et seq.
28
Public Law 92–340, §2, formerly Title I, § 101, 86 Stat. 424 (Jul. 10, 1972), renumbered and amended Public Law
95–474, § 2, 92 Stat. 1471 (Oct. 17, 1978); Public Law 107–295, Title IV, § 443(1), 116 Stat. 2132 (Nov. 25, 2002),
as codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq.
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security zone. Persons within a zone must obey the lawful orders of the Captain of the Port
(COTP). Further the PWSA implementing regulations authorize the COTP to control vessels and
facility operations to ensure the safety and security of vessels and waterfront facilities, as well as
to protect navigable waters and the resources therein.
This act amended the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, adding a new section—Port, Harbor and
Coastal Facility Security. This section authorizes the Secretary to carry out measures to prevent
or respond to an act of terrorism against an individual, vessel, or public or commercial structure
that is subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. and located within or adjacent to the marine
environment, or a vessel of the U.S. or an individual on board that vessel.
This Act provides the USCG with the authority to ensure the protection and security of vessels,
harbors, and waterfront facilities against sabotage or other subversive activities. It authorizes the
USCG to establish security zones to prevent damage or injury to any vessel or waterfront facility
and to safeguard ports, harbors, territories, or waters of the United States.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) is designed to protect the nation’s
ports and waterways from a terrorist attack. This Act directs initial and continuing assessments
of maritime facilities and vessels that may be involved in a TSI. It requires vessels and port
facilities to conduct vulnerability assessments and develop security plans that may include
passenger, vehicle and baggage screening procedures; security patrols; establishing restricted
29
Public Law 99–399, title IX, 100 Stat. 889 (Aug. 27, 1986), as codified in 33 U.S.C. 1226.
30
Public Law 95–474, 92 Stat. 1471 (Oct. 17, 1978)
31
50 U.S.C. §191.
32
Public Law 107–295, codified at 46 U.S.C. Subtitle VI, Chapter 701.
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Developed using risk-based methodology, the MTSA security regulations focus on those sectors
of maritime industry that have a higher risk of involvement in a TSI, including various tank
vessels, barges, large passenger vessels, cargo vessels, towing vessels, offshore oil and gas
platforms, and port facilities that handle certain kinds of dangerous cargo or service the vessels
listed above.
MTSA also required the establishment committees in all the nation’s ports to coordinate the
activities of all port stakeholders, including other Federal, local and state agencies, industry and
the boating public. These groups, called Area Maritime Security Committees, are tasked with
collaborating on plans to secure their ports so that the resources of an area can be best used to
deter, prevent and respond to terror threats.
Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port
Act) 33
In an effort to further the progress made through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act) was passed and
became effective in October 2006. The SAFE Port Act created and codified new programs and
initiatives, and amended some of the original provisions of MTSA. The SAFE Port Act includes
provisions that:
• Codified the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT);
• Established port security interagency operational centers at all high-risk ports;
• Set an implementation schedule and fee restrictions for TWIC;
• Required that all containers entering high volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation
sources by December 31, 2007;
• Required additional data be made available to CBP for targeting cargo containers for
inspection; and
• During a TSI on or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the
Coast Guard Captain of the Port acts as the incident commander, unless otherwise
directed by the President.
33
Public Law 109–347, 120 Stat. 1884 (Oct. 13, 2006), as codified at 6 U.S.C. §901, et seq.
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Enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act, this Act creates a framework that enables
members of the private sector to voluntarily submit sensitive information regarding the Nation’s
Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources to DHS with the assurance that the information, if it
satisfies certain requirements, will be protected from public disclosure.
The Stafford Act provides comprehensive authority for response to emergencies and major
disasters—natural disasters, accidents, and intentionally perpetrated events. It provides specific
authority for the Federal government to provide assistance to state and local entities for disaster
preparedness and mitigation, and major disaster and emergency assistance.
The Patriot Act outlines the domestic policy related to deterring and punishing terrorists, and the
United States policy for Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource protection. It also provides for the
establishment of a national competence for National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center and outlines the Federal government’s commitment to understanding and protecting the
interdependencies among critical infrastructure.
34
Public Law 107–296, Title II, §212, 116 Stat. 2150 (Nov. 25, 2002), as codified at 6 U.S.C. 131 et seq. Presented
35
Public Law 107–71, 115 Stat 597 (Nov. 19, 2001), as codified at 49 U.S.C. §40101, et seq.
36
Public Law 93–288, 88 Stat. 143 (May 22, 1974), as amended, codified at 42 U.S.C. §5121 et seq.
37
Public Law 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), as codified at 18 U.S.C. §1, et seq.
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The OCS Lands Act, and subsequent amendments, outlines the Federal responsibility over the
submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf. Additionally, it authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to lease those lands for mineral development. It is the role of DOI to ensure that the U.S.
government receives fair market value for acreage made available for leasing and that any oil
and gas activities conserve resources, operate safely, and take maximum steps to protect the
environment.
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES
• Domestic Incident Management (HSPD-5)
• Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD 7)
• National Preparedness (HSPD 8)
• Maritime Security Policy (HSPD 13/NSPD 41)
• Domestic Nuclear Detection (HSPD 14/NSPD 43)
NATIONAL STRATEGIES
• National Security Strategy (March 2006)
o Prevent enemies from threatening the Nation, U.S. allies, and friends with WMD.
• National Strategy for Homeland Security (October 2007)
• National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) (September 2005)
o Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts—Detect, deter, interdict, and
defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and
prevent its unlawful exploitation for those purposes.
o Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical Infrastructure—Protect
maritime-related population centers, critical infrastructure, key resources,
transportation systems, borders, harbors, ports, and coastal approaches in the
maritime domain.
• National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006)
o Deny WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies who seek to use them.
• National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for NSMS (October 2005)
o Enhance transparency in the maritime domain to detect, deter and defeat threats as
early and distant from U.S. interests as possible;
o Enable accurate, dynamic, and confident decisions and responses to the full spectrum
of maritime threats
• International Outreach and Coordination Strategy for NSMS (November 2005)
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o A coordinated policy for United States government maritime security activities with
foreign governments, international and regional organizations, and the private sector.
o Enhanced outreach to foreign governments, international and regional organizations,
private sector partners, and the public to solicit support for improved maritime
security.
• National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (February 2006)
o Prevent, dissuade, or deny WMD proliferation or possession.
• National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (February 2006)
o Deny terrorist networks the possession or use of WMD
o Establish conditions that allow partner nations to govern their territory effectively and
defeat terrorists
• Civil Support, DoD Joint Publication 3-28 (September 2007)
o DOD contributes to homeland security by conducting homeland defense operations
overseas and in the approaches to the US, and by providing civil support for disasters
and declared emergencies, to designated law enforcement agencies.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS/INITIATIVES
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
• Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, including the International Ship and Port
Facility Security Code
• Proliferation Security Initiative
• Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
• Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
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INSTITUTIONS
Each FMSC has formed an AMSC, comprised of Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as
members of the local maritime industry, in their areas of responsibility. The Committee process
enhances the exchange of communications between the USCG, local agencies, and maritime
stakeholders. This cooperative spirit facilitates the creation and maintenance of comprehensive,
coordinated AMSPs which provide for coordinated community-wide measures and support for
38
As implemented in 33 C.F.R. Part 103.200.
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incident management. The AMSPs and Committees serve as the cornerstone for developing and
maintaining the first lines of defense at our Nation’s ports.
During a response to an incident, the AMSCs may also serve as advisory groups, providing the
COTP/FMSC with critical information relating to the port, including recommendations and
guidance on prioritization of response operations and resumption/restoration activities.
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) core agencies are: the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CBP, ICE, and the USCG.
IBET agencies share information and work together daily with other local, state and provincial
law enforcement agencies on issues relating to national security, organized crime and other
criminality transiting the Canada/U.S. border between the official Ports of Entry (POE).
The Maritime Domain Awareness Stakeholder Board will be responsible for policy coordination,
alignment, synergy and issue resolution between the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration
(GMII) Enterprise and the Global Maritime Situational Awareness (GMSA) Enterprise. The
Stakeholder Board, through the co-chairs, will serve as a conduit to the Maritime Security Policy
Coordinating Committee (MSPCC). The Stakeholder Board’s efforts will focus on optimizing
and guiding information sharing and the development of capabilities related to the key functional
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aspects of Maritime Domain Awareness; collection, fusion, analysis and dissemination of data,
information, and intelligence.
The Director GMSA Enterprise is responsible for effective access to maritime information and
data critical to building the situational awareness component of Global MDA. The Director will
develop and recommend policy guidance for coordinated collection, fusion, analysis and
dissemination of GMSA information and products, as well as information integration policies,
protocols and standards across the GMSA Enterprise that are consistent with those established
under GMII Enterprise.
MDA Enterprise Hubs will be developed from within existing organizations with capabilities
that already make substantial contributions to MDA in one or more of the following subject
areas:
• Vessels;
• Cargo;
• People;
• Infrastructure; and
• Architecture Management.
Enterprise Hubs are intended to leverage their experience and expertise to provide leadership for
the community in a particular area, not to be the exclusive Federal provider of information and
products for that subject area.
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other resources that may be more effective if discussed and shared, as appropriate, in a
partnership setting.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) and the NIPP provide the overarching
framework for a structured partnership between government and the private sector for protection
of CIKR. This sector partnership structure details the formation of Sector Coordinating Councils
and Government Coordinating Councils as described below.
SCCs foster and facilitate the coordination of sector-wide activities and initiatives designed to
improve the security of the Nation's critical infrastructure. They are self-organized, self-led,
broadly representative of owners and operators (and their associations) within the sector, and are
focused on homeland security and critical infrastructure protection.
Each GCC brings together diverse Federal, state, local, and Tribal interests to identify and
develop collaborative strategies that advance critical infrastructure protection. GCCs serve as a
counterpart to the SCC for each CIKR sector. They provide interagency coordination around
CIKR strategies and activities, policy and communication across government, and between
government and the sector to support the Nation's homeland security mission.
The Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) provides the operational
mechanism for carrying out the sector partnership structure. The CIPAC provides the framework
for owner and operator members of Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) and members of
Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) to engage in intra-government and public-private
cooperation, information sharing, and engagement across the entire range of critical
infrastructure protection activities.
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APPENDIX D—ACRONYMS
AOR—Area of Responsibility
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