Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.

ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics

1. What is Natural Law?

Natural Law – What is Law?
Natural Law is a broad and often misapplied term tossed around various schools of philosophy, science,
history, theology, and law. Indeed, Immanuel Kant reminded us, 'What is law?' may be said to be about
as embarrassing to the jurist as the well-know question ‘What is Truth?’ is to the logician.

 Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling
authority, and having binding legal force. That which must be obeyed and followed by citizens
subject to sanctions or legal consequences is a law (Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p.
884).
 Jurisprudence is the philosophy of law and how the law developed.

Natural Law – A Moral Theory of Jurisprudence

Natural Law is a moral theory of jurisprudence, which maintains that law should be based on morality and
ethics. Natural Law holds that the law is based on what’s “correct.” Natural Law is “discovered” by
humans through the use of reason and choosing between good and evil. Therefore, Natural Law finds its
power in discovering certain universal standards in morality and ethics.
Natural Law – The History
The Greeks –
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle emphasized the distinction between "nature" (physis, φúσις) and "law,"
"custom," or "convention" (nomos, νóμος). What the law commanded varied from place to place, but
what was "by nature" should be the same everywhere. Aristotle (BC 384—322) is considered by many to
be the father of “natural law.” In Rhetoric, he argues that aside from “particular” laws that each people
has set up for itself, there is a “common law” or “higher law” that is according to nature
(Rhetoric 1373b2–8).

The Stoics -- The development of natural law theory continued in the Hellenistic school of philosophy,
particularly with the Stoics. The Stoics pointed to the existence of a rational and purposeful order to the
universe. The means by which a rational being lived in accordance with this cosmic order was considered
natural law. Unlike Aristotle’s “higher law,” Stoic natural law was indifferent to the divine or natural
source of that law. Stoic philosophy was very influential with Roman jurists such as Cicero, thus playing
a significant role in the development of Roman legal theory.

The Christians -- Augustine (AD 354—430) equates natural law with man's Pre-Fall state. Therefore,
life according to nature is no longer possible and mankind must instead seek salvation through the divine
law and Christ’s grace. Gratian (12th century) reconnected the concept of natural law and divine law. “The
Human Race is ruled by two things: namely, natural law and usages (mos, moris, mores). Natural law is
what is contained in the law and the Gospel. By it, each person is commanded to do to others what he
wants done to himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want done to himself.”
(Decretum,D.1 d.a.c.1; ca. 1140 AD)

Natural Law – The Conclusion

In the end, where does law come from? The Theory of Natural Law maintains that certain moral laws
transcend time, culture, and government. There are universal standards that apply to all mankind
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
throughout all time. These universal moral standards are inherent in and discoverable by all of us, and
form the basis of a just society.

What is Natural Law Theory?

Have you ever told a lie? Or taken something that didn't belong to you? If so, you probably weren't proud
of how you acted in those moments. But why? What was it about doing something 'wrong' that made you
feel bad deep, down inside?
Natural law theory is a legal theory that recognizes law and morality as deeply connected, if not one and
the same. Morality relates to what is right and wrong and what is good and bad. Natural law theorists
believe that human laws are defined by morality, and not by an authority figure, like a king or a
government. Therefore, we humans are guided by our human nature to figure out what the laws are, and
to act in conformity with those laws.
The term 'natural law' is derived from the belief that human morality comes from nature. Everything in
nature has a purpose, including humans. Our purpose, according to natural law theorists, is to live a good,
happy life. Therefore, actions that work against that purpose -- that is, actions that would prevent a fellow
human from living a good, happy life -- are considered 'unnatural', or 'immoral'.
Laws have a purpose too: to provide justice. From a natural law perspective, a law that doesn't provide
justice (an unjust law) is considered 'not a law at all.' Therefore, a law that is flawed is one that no one
should follow. In short, any law that is good is moral, and any moral law is good. Legal positivism is a
legal theory that is the opposite of the natural law theory. Legal positivists believe that a law can be
deeply flawed, and yet still be considered a law.

Ethics
The concept of morality under the natural law theory is not subjective. This means that the definition of
what is 'right' and what is 'wrong' is the same for everyone, everywhere.
The natural law approach to solving ethical dilemmas begins with the basic belief that everyone has
the right to live their life. From there, natural law theorists draw a line between an innocent life and the
life of an 'unjust aggressor.' The natural law theory recognizes the legal and moral concept of self-
defense, which is often used to justify acts of war.
Natural law theory is not always a simple school of thought. It should come as no surprise that the ethics
associated with natural law are equally complicated. The idea that the definition of what is 'right' and
what is 'wrong' is the same for 'every person' is sometimes difficult to apply to complex ethical dilemmas.

Example
Consider the following example
Example 1:
You are a passenger on a ship sailing across the ocean. Suddenly, your ship is overtaken in a powerful
storm. You escape to a lifeboat with 25 other passengers. You notice that four of the passengers are badly
injured, and unlikely to survive for more than a week. You also know that the lifeboat only has enough
food and water to sustain 22 passengers. Some of the other passengers are considering throwing the four
injured passengers overboard in order to save the other survivors. If you were a natural law theorist, how
would you solve this ethical dilemma?
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
What is Natural Law

Natural law is a philosophy that is based on the idea that “right” and “wrong” are universal concepts, as
mankind finds certain things to be useful and good, and other things to be bad, destructive, or evil. This
means that, what constitutes “right” and “wrong,” is the same for everyone, and this concept is expressed
as “morality.” As an example of natural law, it is universally accepted that to kill someone is wrong, and
that to punish someone for killing that person is right, and even necessary.

To solve an ethical dilemma using natural law, the basic belief that everyone is naturally entitled to live
their own lives must be considered and respected. From there, natural law theorists determine what an
innocent life is, and what elements comprise the life of an “unjust aggressor.”
The natural law theory pays particular attention to the concept of self-defense, a justification often relied
upon in an attempt to explain an act of violence. As has been the case with self-defense claims throughout
history, it is often difficult to apply what seems to be a simple concept (right vs. wrong) to issues that are
actually complex in nature.

For example, acts of violence, like murder, work against people’s natural inclination to live a good and
innocent life. Therefore, in a situation where “the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few,” and
an act of violence is committed against the smaller group of people in order to save the larger one, the act
still goes against human nature.
Killing another person is forbidden by natural law, no matter the circumstance, as it goes against the
human purpose of life. Even if someone is, say, armed and breaking into another person’s home, under
natural law the homeowner still does not have the right to kill that person in self-defense. It is in this way
that natural law differs from actual law.

2. Who is Thomas Aquinas?

Italian Dominican theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas was one of the most influential medieval thinkers of
Scholasticism and the father of the Thomistic school of theology.

Synopsis
Philosopher and theologian Saint Thomas Aquinas was born circa 1225 in Roccasecca, Italy. Combining
the theological principles of faith with the philosophical principles of reason, he ranked among the most
influential thinkers of medieval Scholasticism. An authority of the Roman Catholic Church and a prolific
writer, Aquinas died on March 7, 1274, at the Cistercian monastery of Fossanova, near Terracina, Latium,
Papal States, Italy.

Early Life
The son of Landulph, count of Aquino, Saint Thomas Aquinas was born circa 1225 in Roccasecca, Italy,
near Aquino, Terra di Lavoro, in the Kingdom of Sicily. Thomas had eight siblings, and was the youngest
child. His mother, Theodora, was countess of Teano. Though Thomas's family members were
descendants of Emperors Frederick I and Henry VI, they were considered to be of lower nobility.
Before Saint Thomas Aquinas was born, a holy hermit shared a prediction with his mother, foretelling
that her son would enter the Order of Friars Preachers, become a great learner and achieve unequaled
sanctity.

Following the tradition of the period, Saint Thomas Aquinas was sent to the Abbey of Monte Cassino to
train among Benedictine monks when he was just 5 years old. In Wisdom 8:19, Saint Thomas Aquinas is
described as "a witty child" who "had received a good soul." At Monte Cassino, the quizzical young boy
repeatedly posed the question, "What is God?" to his benefactors.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Saint Thomas Aquinas remained at the monastery until he was 13 years old, when the political climate
forced him to return to Naples.

Education

Saint Thomas Aquinas spent the next five years completing his primary education at a Benedictine house
in Naples. During those years, he studied Aristotle's work, which would later become a major launching
point for Saint Thomas Aquinas's own exploration of philosophy. At the Benedictine house, which was
closely affiliated with the University of Naples, Thomas also developed an interest in more contemporary
monastic orders. He was particularly drawn to those that emphasized a life of spiritual service, in contrast
with the more traditional views and sheltered lifestyle he'd observed at the Abbey of Monte Cassino.
Circa 1239, Saint Thomas Aquinas began attending the University of Naples. In 1243, he secretly joined
an order of Dominican monks, receiving the habit in 1244. When his family found out, they felt so
betrayed that he had turned his back on the principles to which they subscribed that they decided to
kidnap him. Thomas's family held him captive for an entire year, imprisoned in the fortress of San
Giovanni at Rocca Secca. During this time, they attempted to deprogram Thomas of his new beliefs.
Thomas held fast to the ideas he had learned at university, however, and went back to the Dominican
order following his release in 1245.

From 1245 to 1252, Saint Thomas Aquinas continued to pursue his studies with the Dominicans in
Naples, Paris and Cologne. He was ordained in Cologne, Germany, in 1250, and went on to teach
theology at the University of Paris. Under the tutelage of Saint Albert the Great, Saint Thomas Aquinas
subsequently earned his doctorate in theology. Consistent with the holy hermit's prediction, Thomas
proved an exemplary scholar, though, ironically, his modesty sometimes led his classmates to misperceive
him as dim-witted. After reading Thomas's thesis and thinking it brilliant, his professor, Saint Albert the
Great, proclaimed in Thomas's defense, "We call this young man a dumb ox, but his bellowing in doctrine
will one day resound throughout the world!"

Theology and Philosophy

After completing his education, Saint Thomas Aquinas devoted himself to a life of traveling, writing,
teaching, public speaking and preaching. Religious institutions and universities alike yearned to benefit
from the wisdom of "The Christian Apostle."

At the forefront of medieval thought was a struggle to reconcile the relationship between theology (faith)
and philosophy (reason). People were at odds as to how to unite the knowledge they obtained through
revelation with the information they observed naturally using their mind and their senses. Based on
Averroes's "theory of the double truth," the two types of knowledge were in direct opposition to each
other. Saint Thomas Aquinas's revolutionary views rejected Averroes's theory, asserting that "both kinds
of knowledge ultimately come from God" and were therefore compatible. Not only were they compatible,
according to Thomas's ideology, but they could also work in collaboration: He believed that revelation
could guide reason and prevent it from making mistakes, while reason could clarify and demystify faith.
Saint Thomas Aquinas's work goes on to discuss faith and reason's roles in both perceiving and proving
the existence of God.

Saint Thomas Aquinas believed that the existence of God could be proven in five ways, mainly by: 1)
observing movement in the world as proof of God, the "Immovable Mover"; 2) observing cause and
effect and identifying God as the cause of everything; 3) concluding that the impermanent nature of
beings proves the existence of a necessary being, God, who originates only from within himself; 4)
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
noticing varying levels of human perfection and determining that a supreme, perfect being must therefore
exist; and 5) knowing that natural beings could not have intelligence without it being granted to them it
by God. Subsequent to defending people's ability to naturally perceive proof of God, Thomas also tackled
the challenge of protecting God's image as an all-powerful being.

Saint Thomas Aquinas also uniquely addressed appropriate social behavior toward God. In so doing, he
gave his ideas a contemporary—some would say timeless—everyday context. Thomas believed that the
laws of the state were, in fact, a natural product of human nature, and were crucial to social welfare. By
abiding by the social laws of the state, people could earn eternal salvation of their souls in the afterlife, he
purported. Saint Thomas Aquinas identified three types of laws: natural, positive and eternal. According
to his treatise, natural law prompts man to act in accordance with achieving his goals and governs man's
sense of right and wrong; positive law is the law of the state, or government, and should always be a
manifestation of natural law; and eternal law, in the case of rational beings, depends on reason and is put
into action through free will, which also works toward the accomplishment of man's spiritual goals.

Combining traditional principles of theology with modern philosophic thought, Saint Thomas Aquinas's
treatises touched upon the questions and struggles of medieval intellectuals, church authorities and
everyday people alike. Perhaps this is precisely what marked them as unrivaled in their philosophical
influence at the time, and explains why they would continue to serve as a building block for contemporary
thought—garnering responses from theologians, philosophers, critics and believers—thereafter.

Major Works

A prolific writer, Saint Thomas Aquinas penned close to 60 known works ranging in length from short to
tome-like. Handwritten copies of his works were distributed to libraries across Europe. His philosophical
and theological writings spanned a wide spectrum of topics, including commentaries on the Bible and
discussions of Aristotle's writings on natural philosophy.

While teaching at Cologne in the early 1250s, Saint Thomas Aquinas wrote a lengthy commentary on
scholastic theologian Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences, called Scriptum super libros
Sententiarium, or Commentary on the Sentences. During that period, he also wrote De ente et essentia,
or On Being and Essence, for the Dominican monks in Paris.

In 1256, while serving as regent master in theology at the University of Paris, Aquinas
wrote Impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, or Against Those Who Assail the Worship of God and
Religion, a treatise defending mendicant orders that William of Saint-Amour had criticized.

Written from 1265 to 1274, Saint Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica is largely philosophical in nature
and was followed by Summa Contra Gentiles, which, while still philosophical, comes across to many
critics as apologetic of the beliefs he expressed in his earlier works.

Saint Thomas Aquinas is also known for writing commentaries examining the principles of natural
philosophy espoused in Aristotle's writings: On the Heavens, Meteorology, On Generation and
Corruption, On the Soul, Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics, among others.

Shortly after his death, Saint Thomas Aquinas's theological and philosophical writings rose to great public
acclaim and reinforced a strong following among the Dominicans. Universities, seminaries and colleges
came to replace Lombard's Four Books of Sentences with Summa Theologica as the leading theology
textbook. The influence of Saint Thomas Aquinas's writing has been so great, in fact, that an estimated
6,000 commentaries on his work exist to date.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Later Life and Death

In June 1272, Saint Thomas Aquinas agreed to go to Naples and start a theological studies program for
the Dominican house neighboring the university. While he was still writing prolifically, his works began
to suffer in quality.

During the Feast of Saint Nicolas in 1273, Saint Thomas Aquinas had a mystical vision that made writing
seem unimportant to him. At mass, he reportedly heard a voice coming from a crucifix that said, "Thou
hast written well of me, Thomas; what reward wilt thou have?" to which Saint Thomas Aquinas replied,
"None other than thyself, Lord."

When Saint Thomas Aquinas's confessor, Father Reginald of Piperno, urged him to keep writing, he
replied, "I can do no more. Such secrets have been revealed to me that all I have written now appears to
be of little value." Saint Thomas Aquinas never wrote again.

In January 1274, Saint Thomas Aquinas embarked on a trip to Lyon, France, on foot to serve on the
Second Council, but never made it there. Along the way, he fell ill at the Cistercian monastery of
Fossanova, Italy. The monks wanted Saint Thomas Aquinas to stay at the castle, but, sensing that his
death was near, Thomas preferred to remain at the monastery, saying, "If the Lord wishes to take me
away, it is better that I be found in a religious house than in the dwelling of a layperson."

Often called "The Universal Teacher," Saint Thomas Aquinas died at the monastery of Fossanova on
March 7, 1274. He was canonized by Pope John XXII in 1323.

Thomas Aquinas is a theologian some Protestants love to hate, others love to love, but he is
always respected. Though he was rarely condemned outright by early Protestants, there has always been a
certain uneasiness about his teachings as they connect to his ideas on grace, justification, sacraments, and
the church. They blow hot and cold on his borrowing of Aristotle, too, which was always Luther’s major
complaint.

But there is a tension within any attempt to outright reject Aquinas: it’s not part of the Protestant heritage.
Within a generation of Luther’s reformation, most Protestant training centers for pastors, including
Wittenberg, used at least some of Aquinas’s writings in their curriculum, even if they did not embrace all
of his teachings. This is true in modern seminaries and bible colleges, too. Those interested today, for
example, in arguments for God’s existence always turn to Aquinas’ ‘5 Ways,’ or 5 methods of argument,
for coming to a rational conclusion that God exists (though never fully apart from faith, as Aquinas would
point out).

Our opinion of Aquinas, then, forms a microcosm of the Reformation’s use of medieval theology:
Protestants do not reject everything, but they have grave concerns about some of its teachings.
It would be helpful then to give a few thoughts on why Aquinas is so influential to land in a Top 5 list of
historical figures.

AQUINAS’S LIFE AND TIMES

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) was born with a silver spoon in his mouth, as he was the son of the Duke of
Aquino in Italy. In keeping with medieval names, ‘Aquinas’ is not actually his last name, but a reference
to the landed estate of his family in Aquino (for this reason it’s not called ‘Aquinoism’ but ‘Thomism’).
Thomas would have been thoroughly educated to read and write and think, and all the opportunities for
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
his life would have been unthinkable to an average peasant. His second cousin, in fact, was the Holy
Roman Emperor at the time, which means he was not only born into money but into power.
Thomas’s first rebellious act was to reject the luxurious church job his family had planned for him. His
father had wanted a priestly office for his son at the wealthy monastery at Monte Cassino—the first such
monastery in Europe, though it had since grown lazy in its monastic rigor. The monastery was also
politically and culturally powerful, so his father wanted an ‘inside man’ there.

Thomas told his father he was instead joining the Dominicans—at which point his brothers kidnapped
him, locked him in his room, tempted him with a prostitute, and vowed not to let him leave—until his
mother chose to leave a window open for him one evening in order to escape.

Joining the Dominicans was a bit like joining the Jesus Freaks in the 1960s: they were a radical
expression of the faith that made church leaders nervous. The Dominicans believed ‘radical’ ideas such as
the notion that Jesus was not a wealthy aristocrat living in luxury, but rather a poor man without a place to
rest his head. The Dominican order wanted to live this type of radical life and were known as one of the
new ‘begging orders,’ since the monks would hold no wealth at all and live on hand-outs from others.
After gaining his freedom, Thomas travelled eventually to Paris, the intellectual heart of Europe, and
there began to study theology and the Bible.

Thomas Aquinas - History

Thomas Aquinas’ rather brief life (1225 to 1274) began at a hilltop castle known as Roccasecca, located
between Rome and Naples. At age five, Aquinas entered the not distant Benedictine abbey of
Montecassino where he began his education. Later on, Aquinas transferred to the University of Naples
where he came into contact with a new group called the Order of Preachers or Dominicans. He ultimately
became a Dominican much to the displeasure of his family. Aquinas went on to study in Cologne with
Albert the Great -- it was this association that led him deeply into his embracing of Aristotelian
philosophy. Aristotelian philosophy was something that Aquinas was predisposed to. He sought to
employ rational argumentation in defense of Christian theology. He espoused the metaphysical teachings
of Aristotle, which were a change from the Augustinian tradition of the Middle Ages.

Thomas Aquinas – Religious Reasoning

Aristotle sought to develop a universal method of reasoning of which it would be possible to learn
everything there is to know about reality. Thomas Aquinas found no contradiction in applying this type of
reasoning to religion. While he allowed that it was certainly possible for a person to accept religious
teachings by faith alone and that this was indeed the best method, he asserted that theology was a science
in which careful application of reason would yield observable proof of theoretical knowledge.

Aquinas was given the name, “the angelic teacher” due to his defense of theology and was considered a
professional theologian. Nevertheless, among his writings are works easily recognizable as philosophy.
He also wrote several commentaries on Aristotle which have garnered the respect and admiration of
Aristotelian scholars. Thomas Aquinas sought to make a distinction between philosophy and theology:

“. . .the believer and the philosopher consider creatures differently. The philosopher considers what
belongs to their proper natures, while the believer considers only what is true of creatures insofar as they
are related to God, for example, that they are created by God and are subject to Him, and the like”
(Summa contra gentiles, bk II, chap. 4).
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Aquinas went on to explain that theological arguments or discourse were dependent upon starting points
or principles that are held true on the basis of faith. Philosophical discourses begin with ideas that are
accepted -- part of the public domain, things that everyone knows from all of the various sciences.

“. . .it should be noted that the different ways of knowing (ratio cognoscibilis) give us different sciences.
The astronomer and the natural philosopher both conclude that the world is round, but the astronomer
does this through a mathematical middle that is abstracted from matter, whereas the natural philosopher
considers a middle lodged in matter. Thus there is nothing to prevent another science from treating in the
light of divine revelation what the philosophical disciplines treat as knowable in the light of human
reason” (Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 1, a., ad 2).

Thomas Aquinas – Existence of God

Thomas Aquinas applied this philosophical discourse to his Five Ways to Prove the Existence of God: 1)
Motion; 2) Causation; 3) Contingency; 4) Goodness; 5) Design.

The first way was clearly indicative of his reasoning:

 There is something moving

 Everything that moves is put into motion by something else.
 But this series of antecedent movers cannot reach back infinitely.
 Therefore, there must be a first mover (which is God.)

Thomas Aquinas devoted much attention to the operation of nature believing that through nature God can
be known analogically through the created world.

3. What are Thomas Aquinas’ four types of Law?

Natural Law and Thomas Aquinas

ANSWER:
Thomas Aquinas (1225—1274) returns to the view that natural law is an independent reality within a
system of human reason approaching (but never fully comprehending) God’s eternal law (and thus
needing supplementation by God’s divine law).

Natural Law in Summa Theologica

In Summa Theologica, Aquinas identifies four types of law: (1) eternal; (2) natural; (3) human; and (4)
divine.
The eternal law is the ideal type and order of the universe (kosmos) pre-existing in the mind of God
(Logos).

The natural law is “the rational creature’s participation in the eternal law.”

"It is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its
being imprinted on them... Wherefore it (human nature) has a share of the Eternal Reason,
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal
law in the rational creature is called the natural law."

The human law refers to “the more particular determinations of certain matters devised by human
reason.”

The divine law refers to Special Revelation -- the will of God as revealed in the Scriptures of the Old and
New Testaments. This law was necessary for four reasons: (1) humans need explicit divine guidance on
how to perform proper acts; (2) uncertainty of human judgment needs a check; (3) humans need divine
insight on issues on which they are not competent to judge; and (4) it proves that God will punish some
deeds that even go beyond the ability of human law to punish.

The strongest construction of the Overlap Thesis forms the foundation for the classical naturalism of
Aquinas and Blackstone. Aquinas distinguishes four kinds of law: (1) eternal law; (2) natural law; (3)
human law; and (4) divine law. Eternal law is comprised of those laws that govern the nature of an eternal
universe; as Susan Dimock (1999, 22) puts it, one can "think of eternal law as comprising all those
scientific (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, etc.) 'laws' by which the universe is ordered."
Divine law is concerned with those standards that must be satisfied by a human being to achieve eternal
salvation. One cannot discover divine law by natural reason alone; the precepts of divine law are
disclosed only through divine revelation.

The natural law is comprised of those precepts of the eternal law that govern the behavior of beings
possessing reason and free will. The first precept of the natural law, according to Aquinas, is the
somewhat vacuous imperative to do good and avoid evil. Here it is worth noting that Aquinas holds a
natural law theory of morality: what is good and evil, according to Aquinas, is derived from the rational
nature of human beings. Good and evil are thus both objective and universal.

But Aquinas is also a natural law legal theorist. On his view, a human law (that is, that which is
promulgated by human beings) is valid only insofar as its content conforms to the content of the natural
law; as Aquinas puts the point: "[E]very human law has just so much of the nature of law as is derived
from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a
perversion of law" (ST I-II, Q.95, A.II). To paraphrase Augustine's famous remark, an unjust law is really
no law at all.

4. What is the meaning of Essence of Law?

Summa Theologica:
Selected Questions on Law and Justice

THOMAS AQUINAS (~1225-1274)

LAW: QUESTION #90
Of the Essence of Law
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics

Article 1:
Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rm.
7:23): “I see another law in my members,” etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since
the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.
Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power
itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the
intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q57). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then
law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is
nothing pertaining to reason.
Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the
will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Q9:1). Therefore law pertains, not to the
reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist: “Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force
of law.”
On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as
stated above (Q17:1). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from
acting: for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what
has been stated above (Q1:1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first
principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher. Now that which is the principle in any
genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first
movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First,
as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is
in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those
things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law,
may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the
members to concupiscence is called “the law of the members.”
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for
instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself
of reason, i.e., to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the
speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or
argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done,
as stated above (Q13:3; Q76:1) and since as the Philosopher teaches; hence we find in the practical reason
something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the
proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that
are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual
consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (Q17:1): for it is due
to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the
end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in
accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the
sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of lawlessness rather than of
law.

Article 2:
Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it
belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.
Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular
matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.
Objection 3. Further, Isidore says: “If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a
law.” But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that
which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the
private good of an individual.
On the contrary, Isidore says that “laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of
the citizens.”
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
I answer that, As stated above (1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is
their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something
which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must
needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason,
is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q2:7; Q3:1).
Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every
part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect
community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the
Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he
says that we call those legal matters “just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its
parts for the body politic”: since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to
that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in
mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the
law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must
needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law
is ordained to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now
the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way
commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters
are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause,
according as the common good is said to be the common end.
Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which
is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical
reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in
this sense, has the nature of a law.

Article 3:
Whether there is a human law?
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the
eternal law, as stated above (Q90:2). Now through the eternal law all things are most orderly, as
Augustine states. Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently
there is no need for a human law.
Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (Q90:1). But human reason
is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate
from human reason.
Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of
human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wisdom 9:14: The thoughts of mortal
men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.
On the contrary, Augustine distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he
calls human.

I answer that, As stated above (Q90:1 ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be
observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each
proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (Q90:1). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in
the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the
various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of
reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles,
that the human resaon needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These
particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential
conditions of law be observed, as stated above (Q90:2-4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric that
justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility;
afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by
fear and reverence for the law.

Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine
Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative
reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general
principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so
too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to
certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are,
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction
them by law.
Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it
by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural
reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.
Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and
contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore
human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it
necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its
own particular genus.
Article 4:
Whether promulgation is essential to a law?
Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has
the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that
it be promulgated.
Objection 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the
obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others.
Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.
Objection 3. Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since “laws are binding in
matters of the future,” as the jurists say. But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is
not essential to a law.
On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that “laws are established when they are
promulgated.”

I answer that, As stated above (1), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule
or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in
order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men
who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation.
Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s
mind so as to be known by him naturally.
Reply to Objection 2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the
law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.
Reply to Objection 3. The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the
durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says that
“lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written.”

Question 90: The Essence of Law

By Thomas Aquinas

[Aquinas, Thomas. “The Essence of Law.” The Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the
English Dominican Province. Second and Revised Edition. 1920. First Part of the Second Part, Question
90. http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2090.htm. Used with the permission of Kevin Knight and New
Advent.]

ARTICLE 1. WHETHER LAW IS SOMETHING PERTAINING TO REASON?

Objection 1. It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle [Paul] says
(Romans 7:23): “I see another law in my members,” etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the
members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something
pertaining to reason.

Objection 2. Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the
power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the
intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Part I-II, Question 57). Nor again is it an act of
reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.
Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Objection 3. Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to
the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above (Part I-II, Question 9, Article 1).
Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist [Ulpian]
(Pandectarum Justiniani[Pandects of Justinian], 1.4, De Constitutionibus Principum, preface):
“Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law.”

On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command,
as stated above (Part I-II, Question 17, Article 1). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from
acting: for “lex” [law] is derived from “ligare” [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and
measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what
has been stated above (Part I-II, Question 1, Article 1, Reply 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to
the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher [Aristotle]
(Physics, Book 2). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently
it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Reply to Objection 1. Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First,
as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is
in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those
things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law,
may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the
members to concupiscence is called “the law of the members.”

Reply to Objection 2. Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for
instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself
of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the
speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or
argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done,
as stated above (Part I-II, Question 13, Article 3; Question 76, Article 1), according to what(1) the
Philosopher [Aristotle] teaches (Nicomachean Ethics, 7.3); hence we find in the practical reason
something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the
proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that
are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual
consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Reply to Objection 3. Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (Part I-II, Question
17, Article 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards
things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of
law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying
that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of
lawlessness rather than of law.

ARTICLE 2. WHETHER THE LAW IS ALWAYS SOMETHING DIRECTED TO THE

COMMON GOOD?

Objection 1. It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it
belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.
Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.

Objection 2. Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular
matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.

Objection 3. Further, Isidore [of Seville] says (Etymologies, 5.3): “If the law is based on reason,
whatever is based on reason will be a law.” But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to
the common good, but also of that which is directed to private good. Therefore the law is not only
directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
On the contrary, Isidore [of Seville] says (Etymologies, 5.21) that “laws are enacted for no private profit,
but for the common benefit of the citizens.”

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts,
because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is
something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly
law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the
practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Part
I-II, Question 1, Article 7 [On the contrary](2); Question 3, Article 1). Consequently the law must needs
regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as
imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard
properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher [Aristotle], in the above
definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Nicomachean
Ethics, 5.1) that we call those legal matters “just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness
and its parts for the body politic”: since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Politics, 1.1.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to
that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in
mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the
law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must
needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law
is ordained to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1. A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now
the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way
commands are given even concerning particular matters.

Reply to Objection 2. Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters
are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause,
according as the common good is said to be the common end.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which
is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical
reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in
this sense, has the nature of a law.

ARTICLE 3. WHETHER THE REASON OF ANY MAN IS COMPETENT TO MAKE LAWS?

Objection 1. It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle [Paul]
says (Romans 2:14) that “when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of
the law, . . . they are a law to themselves.” Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make
a law for himself.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Objection 2. Further, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.1), “the intention of the
lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.” But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any
man is competent to make laws.

Objection 3. Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs
his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family
can make laws for his household.

On the contrary, Isidore [of Seville] says (Etymologies, 5.10): “A law is an ordinance of the people,
whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.”

I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now
to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the
viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or
to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of
anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Reply to Objection 1. As stated above (Article 1, Reply 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that
rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so
far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on:
“Who shows the work of the law written in their hearts.”

Reply to Objection 2. A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only
advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to
prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9).
But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to
inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Question 92, Article 2, Reply 3; Part II-II, Question 64,
Article 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.

Reply to Objection 3. As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the
state is a perfect community, according to [Aristotle’s] Politics, 1.1. And therefore, as the good of one
man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is ordained
to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can
indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.

ARTICLE 4. WHETHER PROMULGATION IS ESSENTIAL TO A LAW?

Objection 1. It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has
the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that
it be promulgated.
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics
Objection 2. Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the
obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others.
Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.

Objection 3. Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since “laws are binding in
matters of the future,” as the jurists say (Codex Justinianus, 1.14.7). But promulgation concerns those
who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals [of Pseudo-Isidore], dist. 4, that “laws are established
when they are promulgated.”

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now
a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it.
Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied
to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by
promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated.

Reply to Objection 1. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s
mind so as to be known by him naturally.

Reply to Objection 2. Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the
law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

Reply to Objection 3. The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the
durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore [of Seville]
says (Etymologies, 5.3, 2.10) that “lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written.”

References:
https://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/natural-law.htm
https://study.com/academy/lesson/natural-law-theory-definition-ethics-examples.html
https://legaldictionary.net/natural-law/
https://www.biography.com/religious-figure/saint-thomas-aquinas
https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/who-was-thomas-aquinas-and-why-was-he-important/
https://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/thomas-aquinas.htm
https://www.allaboutphilosophy.org/natural-law-and-thomas-aquinas-faq.htm
https://www.iep.utm.edu/natlaw/
https://lonang.com/library/reference/aquinas-summa-theologica/sum12090/
https://www.nlnrac.org/classical/aquinas/documents/question-90-the-essence-of-law
Rosales, Twinkle Anne G.
ChE-1303
GEd 107 Ethics