Catechism of The Catholic Church

Catechism of the Catholic Church
- Man's freedom
PART THREE
LIFE IN CHRIST
SECTION ONE
MAN'S VOCATION LIFE IN THE SPIRIT
CHAPTER ONE
THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
ARTICLE 3
MAN'S FREEDOM
God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a

person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed that
man should be 'left in the hand of his own counsel,' so that he might of
his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed
perfection by cleaving to him."26
Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will
and is master over his acts.27
I. FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to
do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's own
responsibility. By free will one shapes one's own life. Human freedom
is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its
perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.
As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate

good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good
and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning.
This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of
praise or blame, merit or reproach.
The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. There is no
true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. The
choice to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to "the
slavery of sin."28
Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they
are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis
enhance the mastery of the will over its acts.
Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even

nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate
attachments, and other psychological or social factors.
Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:
Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is this that
you have done?"29 He asked Cain the same question.30 The prophet
Nathan questioned David in the same way after he committed adultery
with the wife of Uriah and had him murdered.31
An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence

regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an
accident arising from ignorance of traffic laws.
An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for

instance, a mother's exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad
effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a
means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in
danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and
the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of
manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings. Every

human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be
recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this
duty of respect. The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in
moral and religious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity
of the human person. This right must be recognized and protected by
civil authority within the limits of the common good and public order.32
II. HUMAN FREEDOM IN THE ECONOMY OF SALVATION
Freedom and sin. Man's freedom is limited and fallible. In fact, man
failed. He freely sinned. By refusing God's plan of love, he deceived
himself and became a slave to sin. This first alienation engendered a
multitude of others. From its outset, human history attests the
wretchedness and oppression born of the human heart in
consequence of the abuse of freedom.
Threats to freedom. The exercise of freedom does not imply a right to

say or do everything. It is false to maintain that man, "the subject of
this freedom," is "an individual who is fully self-sufficient and whose
finality is the satisfaction of his own interests in the enjoyment of
earthly goods."33 Moreover, the economic, social, political, and cultural
conditions that are needed for a just exercise of freedom are too often
disregarded or violated. Such situations of blindness and injustice
injure the moral life and involve the strong as well as the weak in the
temptation to sin against charity. By deviating from the moral law man
violates his own freedom, becomes imprisoned within himself, disrupts
neighborly fellowship, and rebels against divine truth.
Liberation and salvation. By his glorious Cross Christ has won salvation
for all men. He redeemed them from the sin that held them in
bondage. "For freedom Christ has set us free."34 In him we have
communion with the "truth that makes us free."35 The Holy Spirit has
been given to us and, as the Apostle teaches, "Where the Spirit of the
Lord is, there is freedom."36 Already we glory in the "liberty of the
children of God."37
Freedom and grace. The grace of Christ is not in the slightest way a
rival of our freedom when this freedom accords with the sense of the
true and the good that God has put in the human heart. On the
contrary, as Christian experience attests especially in prayer, the more
docile we are to the promptings of grace, the more we grow in inner
freedom and confidence during trials, such as those we face in the
pressures and constraints of the outer world. By the working of grace
the Holy Spirit educates us in spiritual freedom in order to make us
free collaborators in his work in the Church and in the world:
Almighty and merciful God,

in your goodness take away from us all that is harmful,
so that, made ready both in mind and body,
we may freely accomplish your will.38
IN BRIEF
1743 "God willed that man should be left in the hand of his own
counsel (cf. Sir 15:14), so that he might of his own accord seek his
creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to
him" (GS 17 § 1).
1744 Freedom is the power to act or not to act, and so to perform

deliberate acts of one's own. Freedom attains perfection in its acts
when directed toward God, the sovereign Good.
1745 Freedom characterizes properly human acts. It makes the human

being responsible for acts of which he is the voluntary agent. His
deliberate acts properly belong to him.
1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished

or nullified by ignorance, duress, fear, and other psychological or
social factors.
1747 The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in religious and

moral matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of man. But
the exercise of freedom does not entail the putative right to say or do
anything.
1748 "For freedom Christ has set us free" (Gal 5:1).
26 GS 17; Sir 15:14.

27 St. Irenaeus, Adv. haeres. 4,4,3:PG 7/1,983.
28 Cf. Rom 6:17.
29 Gen 3:13.
30 Cf. Gen 4:10.
31 Cf. 2 Sam 12:7-15.
32 Cf. DH 2 § 7.
33 CDF, instruction, Libertatis conscientia 13.
34 Gal 5:1.
35 Cf. Jn 8:32.
36 2 Cor 17.
37 Rom 8:21.
38 Roman Missal, 32nd Sunday, Opening Prayer: Omnipotens et
misericors Deus, universa nobis adversantia propitiatus exclude, ut,
mente et corpore pariter expediti, quæ tua sunt liberis mentibus
exsequamur.
PART THREE
LIFE IN CHRIST
SECTION ONE
MAN'S VOCATION LIFE IN THE SPIRIT
CHAPTER ONE
THE DIGNITY OF THE HUMAN PERSON
ARTICLE 4
THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS
Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, man

is, so to speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that is, acts that are
freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can be
morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.
I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY
1750 The morality of human acts depends on:
- the object chosen;
- the end in view or the intention;
- the circumstances of the action.
The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the

"sources," or constitutive elements, of the morality of human acts.
The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs
itself. It is the matter of a human act. The object chosen morally
specifies the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and judges it
to be or not to be in conformity with the true good. Objective norms of
morality express the rational order of good and evil, attested to by
conscience.
In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it
by its end, intention is an element essential to the moral evaluation of
an action. The end is the first goal of the intention and indicates the
purpose pursued in the action. The intention is a movement of the will
toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of the activity. It aims at
the good anticipated from the action undertaken. Intention is not
limited to directing individual actions, but can guide several actions
toward one and the same purpose; it can orient one's whole life toward
its ultimate end. For example, a service done with the end of helping
one's neighbor can at the same time be inspired by the love of God as
the ultimate end of all our actions. One and the same action can also
be inspired by several intentions, such as performing a service in order
to obtain a favor or to boast about it.
A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does

not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and
calumny, good or just. The end does not justify the means. Thus the
condemnation of an innocent person cannot be justified as a legitimate
means of saving the nation. On the other hand, an added bad intention
(such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of itself, can be good
(such as almsgiving).39
The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary

elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing
the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of
a theft). They can also diminish or increase the agent's responsibility
(such as acting out of a fear of death). Circumstances of themselves
cannot change the moral quality of acts themselves; they can make
neither good nor right an action that is in itself evil.
II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS
1755 A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the
end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the
action, even if the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting
"in order to be seen by men").
The object of the choice can by itself vitiate an act in its entirety. There
are some concrete acts - such as fornication - that it is always wrong
to choose, because choosing them entails a disorder of the will, that
is, a moral evil.
It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by

considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances
(environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which
supply their context. There are acts which, in and of themselves,
independently of circumstances and intentions, are always gravely
illicit by reason of their object; such as blasphemy and perjury, murder
and adultery. One may not do evil so that good may result from it.
IN BRIEF
1757 The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the
three "sources" of the morality of human acts.
1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing

accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.
1759 "An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good

intention" (cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). The end does not
justify the means.
1760 A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its
end, and of its circumstances together.
1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose,

because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One
may not do evil so that good may result from it.
39 Cf. Mt 6:24.

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God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a

As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate

Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even

Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:

An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence

An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for

Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings. Every

II. HUMAN FREEDOM IN THE ECONOMY OF SALVATION

Threats to freedom. The exercise of freedom does not imply a right to

Almighty and merciful God,

1744 Freedom is the power to act or not to act, and so to perform

1745 Freedom characterizes properly human acts. It makes the human

1746 The imputability or responsibility for an action can be diminished

1747 The right to the exercise of freedom, especially in religious and

1748 "For freedom Christ has set us free" (Gal 5:1).

26 GS 17; Sir 15:14.

Freedom makes man a moral subject. When he acts deliberately, man

I. THE SOURCES OF MORALITY

1750 The morality of human acts depends on:

- the object chosen;

- the end in view or the intention;

- the circumstances of the action.

The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the

In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject.

A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does

The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary

II. GOOD ACTS AND EVIL ACTS

It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by

1758 The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing

1759 "An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good

1761 There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose,

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