Q.

SELF-INCRIMINATION temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier

issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
1. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders.
FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare ISSUES:
several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, 1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1)
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
unconstitutional and void. required of laws that interfere with the
fundamental rights of the people. Is Section
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional.
and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a
boon to the need of a current generation for 2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers
greater information and facility of from overbreadth in that, while is seeks to
communication. But all is not well with the discourage data interference, it intrudes into the
system since it could not filter out a number of area of protected speech and expression,
persons of ill will who would want to use creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these
cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. guaranteed freedoms.
One of them can, for instance, avail himself of
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of 3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-
another or bully the latter by posting squatting violates the equal protection clause in
defamatory statements against him that people that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a
can read. user using his real name to suffer the same fate
as those who use aliases or take the name of
And because linking with the internet opens up another in satire, parody, or any other literary
a user to communication from others, the ill- device.
motivated can use the cyberspace for
committing theft by hacking into or 4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or the constitutional rights to due process and to
credit card or defrauding him through false privacy and correspondence, and transgresses
representations. the freedom of the press.

The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit 5 Petitioners claim that cybersex violates
trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography the freedom of expression clause of the
guileless children who have access to the Constitution.
internet.
6. Petitioners are wary that a person who
For these reasons, the government has a merely doodles on paper and imagines a sexual
legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for
and contain and punish wrongdoings. The producing child pornography but one who
government certainly has the duty and the right formulates the idea on his laptop would be.
to prevent these tomfooleries from happening
and punish their perpetrators, hence the 7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for
Cybercrime Prevention Act. penalizing the transmission of unsolicited
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by commercial communications?
the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their 8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality
constitutional rights. of both the penal code provisions on libel as well
as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues Act on cyberlibel.
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013,
the Court extended the original 120-day
9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Section 5 that renders criminally liable any 19. Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice
person who wilfully abets or aids in the valid and constitutional?
commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers 20 Is Section 24 on Cybercrime
from overbreadth, creating a chilling and Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC)
deterrent effect on protected expression. valid and constitutional?

10. Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree 21. Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and
higher constitutional? functions valid and constitutional?

11. Is Section 7 on the prosecution under HELD:

both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and RA 1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an
10175 constitutional? American constitutional construct, is
useful in determining the
12. Is Section 8 valid and constitutional? constitutionality of laws that tend to
target a class of things or persons.
13. Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of According to this standard, a legislative
traffic data valid and constitutional? classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement fundamental right or operates to the
agencies of the power to collect or record traffic peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
data in real time as tending to curtail civil class is presumed unconstitutional. The
Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1)
liberties or provide opportunities for official
that calls for the application of the strict
abuse. They claim that data showing where scrutiny standard since no fundamental
digital messages come from, what kind they are, freedom, like speech, is involved in
and where they are destined need not be punishing what is essentially a
incriminating to their senders or recipients condemnable act – accessing the
before they are to be protected. Petitioners computer system of another without
right. It is a universally condemnable
invoke the right of every individual to privacy
act.
and to be protected from government snooping
into the messages or information that they send 2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a
to one another*** proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state
14. Is Section 13 on preservation of regulation, may not be achieved by
computer data valid and constitutional? means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the
15. Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer area of protected speech. Section 4(a)(3)
data valid and constitutional? does not encroach on these freedoms at
all. It simply punishes what essentially
16. Is Section 15 on search, seizure and is a form of vandalism, the act of
examination of computer data valid and wilfully destroying without right the
constitutional? things that belong to others, in this case
their computer data, electronic
17. Is Section 17 on destruction of computer document, or electronic data message.
data valid and constitutional? Such act has no connection to
guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no
18. Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking freedom to destroy other people’s
access to computer data valid and computer systems and private
constitutional? documents. All penal laws, like the
 cybercrime law, have of course an circumstance is present to negate intent
inherent chilling effect, an in to gain which is required by this Section.
terrorem effect, or the fear of possible
prosecution that hangs on the heads of 5. The Court will not declare Section
citizens who are minded to step beyond 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands
the boundaries of what is proper. But to a construction that makes it apply only
prevent the State from legislating to persons engaged in the business of
criminal laws because they instil such maintaining, controlling, or operating,
kind of fear is to render the state directly or indirectly, the lascivious
powerless in addressing and penalizing exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
socially harmful conduct. activity with the aid of a computer
system as Congress has intended.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The law is 6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is
reasonable in penalizing the act of not successfully challenged. The law
acquiring the domain name in bad faith makes the penalty higher by one degree
to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or when the crime is committed in
deprive others who are not ill-motivated cyberspace. But no one can complain
of the rightful opportunity of registering since the intensity or duration of penalty
the same. It is the evil purpose for which is a legislative prerogative and there is a
one uses the name that the law rational basis for such higher penalty.
condemns.
7. Yes, because to prohibit the
4. No. In assessing the challenge that the transmission of unsolicited ads would
State has impermissibly intruded into deny a person the right to read his
these zones of privacy, a court must emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
determine whether a person has addressed to him. Commercial speech is
exhibited a reasonable expectation of a separate category of speech which us
privacy and, if so, whether that not accorded the same level of
expectation has been violated by protection as that given to other
unreasonable government intrusion. constitutionally guaranteed forms of
The law punishes those who acquire or expression but is nonetheless entitled to
use identifying information without protection. The State cannot rob him of
right, implicitly to cause damage. this right without violating the
Petitioners fail to show how constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
government effort to curb computer- expression. Thus, unsolicited
related identity theft violates the right to advertisements are legitimate forms of
privacy and correspondence as well as expression.
the right to due process. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s 8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the
personal right. The Court has defined cybercrime law, mainly target libel
intent to gain as an internal act which against private persons, the Court
can be established through overt acts of recognizes that these laws imply a
the offender, and it may be presumed stricter standard of malice to convict the
from the furtive taking of useful author of a defamatory statement where
property pertaining to another, unless the offended party is a public figure.
special circumstances reveal a different The elements of libel are: (a) the
intent on the part of the perpetrator. As allegation of a discreditable act or
such, the press, whether in the quest of condition concerning another; (b)
news reporting or social investigation, publication of the charge; (c) identity of
has nothing to fear since a special the person defamed; and (d) existence
of malice.There is actual malice or
 malice in fact when the offender makes 10. Yes, because there exists a substantial
the defamatory statement with the distinction between crimes committed
knowledge that it is false or with through the use of information and
reckless disregard of whether it was communication technology and similar
false or not. The reckless disregard crimes committed using other means. In
standard used here required a high using the technology in question, the
degree of awareness of probable falsity. offender often evades identification and
There must be sufficient evidence to is able to reach far more victims or cause
permit the conclusion that the accused greater harm.
in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of the statement he published. 11. The Court resolves to leave the
Gross or even extreme negligence is not determination of the correct application
sufficient to establish actual malice. The of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution
defense of absence of actual malice, of the offender under both the Revised
even when the statement turns out to be Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to
false, is available where the offended actual cases, with the exception of the
party is a public official or a public crimes of:
figure. But, where the offended party is
a private individual, the prosecution 1. Online libel as to which,
need not prove the presence of actual charging the offender
malice. For his defense, the accused under both Section
must show that he has a justifiable 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
reason for the defamatory statement 10175 and Article 353 of
even if it was in fact true. the Revised Penal Code
constitutes a violation
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks of the proscription
to regulate the use of cyberspace against double
communication technology to protect a jeopardy; as well as
person’s reputation and peace of mind, 2. Child pornography
cannot adopt means that will committed online as to
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, which, charging the
invading the area of protected freedoms. offender under both
If such means are adopted, self- Section 4(c)(2) of
inhibition borne of fear of what sinister Republic Act 10175 and
predicaments await internet users will Republic Act 9775 or
suppress otherwise robust discussion of the Anti-Child
public issues. Democracy will be Pornography Act of
threatened and with it, all liberties. 2009 also constitutes a
Penal laws should provide reasonably violation of the same
clear guidelines for law enforcement proscription, and, in
officials and triers of facts to prevent respect to these, is void
arbitrary and discriminatory and unconstitutional.
enforcement. The terms “aiding or
abetting” constitute broad sweep that 12. Valid and constitutional, because the
generates chilling effect on those who matter of fixing penalties for the
express themselves through cyberspace commission of crimes is as a rule a
posts, comments, and other messages. legislative prerogative.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law
that punishes “aiding or abetting” libel
on the cyberspace is a nullity. 13. The first question is whether or not
Section 12 has a proper governmental
purpose since a law may require the
disclosure of matters normally or receiver and what the data contains.
considered private but then only upon This will unnecessarily expose the
showing that such requirement has a citizenry to leaked information or,
rational relation to the purpose of the worse, to extortion from certain bad
law, that there is a compelling State elements in these agencies.
interest behind the law, and that the
provision itself is narrowly drawn. In 14. Valid and constitutional, because the
assessing regulations affecting privacy user ought to have kept a copy of that
rights, courts should balance the data when it crossed his computer if he
legitimate concerns of the State against was so minded. There was no undue
constitutional guarantees. deprivation of property since the data
that service providers preserve on
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling orders of law enforcement authorities
interest in enacting the cybercrime law are not made accessible to users by
for there is a need to put order to the reasons of the issuance of such orders.
tremendous activities in cyberspace for
public good. To do this, it is within the 15. Valid and constitutional, because what
realm of reason that the government Section 14 envisions is merely the
should be able to monitor traffic data to enforcement of a duly issued court
enhance its ability to combat all sorts of warrant. Disclosure can be made only
cybercrimes after judicial intervention.

Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of 16. Valid and constitutional, because

which the collection or recording of Section 15 merely enumerates the duties
traffic data is a part, aims to provide law of law enforcement authorities that
enforcement authorities with the power would ensure proper collection,
they need for spotting, preventing, and preservation, and use of computer
investigating crimes committed in system or data that have been seized by
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state virtue of a court warrant.
business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno
points out, the Budapest Convention on 17. Valid and constitutional, because it is
Cybercrimes requires signatory unclear that the user has a demandable
countries to adopt legislative measures right to require the service provider to
to empower state authorities to collect have that copy of data saved
or record "traffic data, in real time, indefinitely for him in its storage
associated with specified system.
communications." And this is precisely
what Section 12 does. It empowers law 18. Void and unconstitutional, because
enforcement agencies in this country to Section 19 not only precludes any
collect or record such data. judicial intervention but it also
disregards jurisprudential guidelines
However, it is still void and established to determine the validity of
unconstitutional because the authority restrictions on speech.
that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks 19. Valid and constitutional insofar as it
restraint While it says that traffic data applies to the provisions of Chapter IV
collection should not disclose identities which are not struck down by the Court.
or content data, such restraint is but an
illusion. Admittedly, nothing can 20. Valid and constitutional, because
prevent law enforcement agencies cybercrime law is complete in itself
holding these data in their hands from when it directed the CICC to formulate
looking into the identity of their sender and implement a national cybersecurity
 plan. The law gave sufficient standards Accused sought the quashal of the latter charge
for the CICC to follow when it provided on the apprehension that she is in danger of
a definition of cybersecurity. being condemned for an identical offense.

2. UNITED STATES v. BALSYS Respondent judge granted the mtion to quash.

FACTS: Aloyzas Balsys was subpoenaed by the ISSUE: W/N the private respondent was in
Justice Department's Office of Special danger of being convicted twice for the same
Investigations (OSI) to testify about his wartime criminal act.
activities between 1940 and 1944 and his
HELD: NO. The mere filing of two informations
subsequent immigration to the United States.
charging the same offense is not an appropriate
Fearing prosecution by a foreign nation, Balsys basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since
refused the subpoena by claiming his Fifth the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. conviction, acquittal or termination of the cae
On appeal from an appellate court's reversal of a without the consent of the accused.
district court ruling granting OSI's subpoena
Moreover, it appears that private respondent
enforcement petition, the Supreme Court
herein had not yet been arraigned in the
granted the United States certiorari previous case for estafa. Thus, there is that other
missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar
ISSUE: Is fear of foreign prosecution sufficient
which was precisely the same reason utilized by
grounds to justify the invocation of the Firth Justice Davide, Jr. in Lamera vs. Court of
Amendment privilege against self- Appeals
incrimination?
J. Regalado, dissent:
HELD: No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he
that although resident aliens are entitled to the mere filing of two informations charging the
same Fifth Amendment protections as citizen same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
invocation of double jeopardy since the first
"persons" the risk of their deportation is not
jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous
sufficient to sustain a self-incrimination conviction, acquittal or termination of the case
privilege intended to apply only to the United without the consent of the accused." This would
States government. The Court explained that be correct if what had transpired was the mere
since the Fifth Amendment does not bind filing of the two informations charging identical
foreign governments, and that would not be offenses, but what about the situation where the
subject to domestic enforcement of immunity- accused has already entered a plea to the first
charge and is now confronted with a second
for-testimony deals, one could not assert a self-
charge for the same offense? To this, the
incrimination protection against possible majority ripostes that "in order for the first
prosecution at their hands. jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the
charge must be coupled with either conviction,
R. DOUBLE JEOPARDY acquittal, or termination of the previous case
without his express consent thereafter."
1. PEOPLE v. PINEDA
In fine, what the majority posits is that the
FACTS: Accused was charged estafa and doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only
thereafter, falsification of documents, each one if there was a previous conviction, acquittal, or
filed with separate courts. unconsented dismissal in the first case against
the accused and he is now charged again with
the same offense. Ergo, even if he was already
arraigned on the first charge, or even if he was
undergoing trial therein when the same offense time the trial commences, and if
is made the subject of a second charge, he the trial is to a jury, the trial
cannot, for lack of a prior conviction, acquittal or commences when the jury are
unconsented dismissal in the first charge, move impaneled and sworn, and thus
to quash the second identical indictment on the it is said that jeopardy attaches
ground of double jeopardy since putatively when the jury are impaneled
there is still no first jeopardy to speak of. and sworn. If the trial is to the
court without a jury, it is well
This will necessitate an inquiry into and require settled that, for the purpose of
clarification as to stage of or point in time in the determining when the jeopardy
criminal proceedings when an accused is attaches, the trial begins at the
considered as already in legal jeopardy or in time of the commencement of
danger of conviction either for the first or the taking of testimony, that is,
second time. Since our basic rules on double when the first witness is duly
jeopardy are admittedly of American judicial sworn, and, accordingly, in such
origin, the rulings in that jurisdiction would be a case, jeopardy begins after
instructive. We find these annotations in Corpus accused has been indicted,
Juris Secundum: arraigned, and has pleaded, and
the court has begun to hear the
The general rule established by evidence, or the trial has begun
the preponderance of judicial to hear the evidence, or the trial
opinion and by the best has begun by the reading of the
considered cases is that, when a indictment to the court. In the
person has been placed on trial application of these principles it
on a valid indictment or is assumed that there has been a
information before a court of plea of not guilty, and that the
competent jurisdiction, has been court has
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jurisdiction. (Emphasis
jury has been impaneled and supplied)
sworn, he is in jeopardy, but
that, until these things have The doctrine above discussed to the effect that
been done, jeopardy does not the accused is in legal jeopardy from the
attach. moment he enters a valid plea to the indictment
xxx xxx xxx is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction.
If jeopardy is considered to
attach when the jury are sworn As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the
or when the first witness is then Code of Criminal Procedure which was
heard, it is not ordinarily substantially incorporated in Section 9, Rule 117
necessary that the prior trial shall of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7, Rule
have resulted in a valid judgment 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure),
either of conviction or acquittal: it this Court, with minor allowances for our
is sufficient if the prisoner was procedural differences with criminal
actually placed in jeopardy in that proceedings in American jurisdiction,
he was in danger of having a valid substantially reiterated the above-quoted
judgment pronounced as the result doctrines as a basic proposition of law.
of the trial: it is not the verdict or
judgment which places a prisoner It seems clear that under the
in jeopardy. foregoing provisions of law, a
defendant in a criminal
In those jurisdictions which prosecution is in legal
follow the generally recognized jeopardy when placed on trial
rule, jeopardy attaches at the under the following conditions:
 (1) In a court of competent acquittal or conviction of the
jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid accused, or the dismissal or
complaint or information; (3) termination of the case without
after he has been arraigned; and his express consent
(4) after he has pleaded to the constitutes res adjudicata and,
complaint or information. therefore, a bar to another
Tested by this standard, we are prosecution for the offense
of the opinion that the appellee charged, or for any attempt to
has been once in jeopardy for commit the same or frustration
the offense for which she is now thereof, or for any offense
prosecuted. . . . All that the law which necessarily includes or is
requires is that the accused has included therein.
been brought to trial "in a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon In other words, the concurrence of the three
a valid complaint or conditions above enumerated having placed the
information or other formal accused in legal jeopardy, he can invoke the
charge sufficient in form and ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117;
substance to sustain a and after judgment has been rendered therein,
conviction, after issue properly the ground for quashal is furnished by Section 7
joined." Under our system of of the same rule which speaks
criminal procedure, issue is of previous conviction, acquittal or unconsented
properly joined after the accused dismissal. Parenthetically, the overriding
has entered a plea of not significance of a plea is underscored when we
guilty. The mere calling of a recall that after a plea has been entered, there
witness would not add to the can be no amendment in substance of the
danger, annoyance, and information or complaint, but only in form and
vexation suffered by the this by leave and at the discretion of the court if
accused, after going through the it can be done without prejudice to the
process of being arrested, accused. 10 And, of course, it is fundamental that
subjected to preliminary there can be no valid judgment without a valid
investigation, arraigned and standing plea to the charge.
required to plead and stand
trial.8 (Emphasis mine.) It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to
an indictment appears to have been denigrated
This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized in our decisional rulings on double jeopardy.
authority who explains that legal jeopardy exists While in almost all cases decided by the Court
from the moment the accused has pleaded to the double jeopardy was sustained because of a
charge, and that the disposition of his case previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the
thereafter is merely the consequence of the case without the consent of the accused, these
former as to constitute a bar to another were so because the facts thereof really made
prosecution, thus: out in each a case of autrefois aquit or autrefois
. . ., legal jeopardy does not exist convict. In addition, with the specific provision
and a plea to that effect is not of then Section 9 (now Section 7) of Rule 117
accordingly available but under the providing for the requirements, and under the
following conditions: (a) upon a heading of "Former conviction or acquittal or
valid complaint or informations: (b) former jeopardy" (now rephrased as such
before a court of competent epigraph reading "Former conviction or
jurisdictions: and (c) after he has acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression
been arraigned and has pleaded to created was that the doctrine of double jeopardy
the complaint or information. can be invoked only if there was prior
When all of these conditions are conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case
shown to exist, the subsequent involving the same offense of which the accused
is charged again. The writer respectfully submits jeopardy requires, aside from the other
otherwise. requisites, at least two cases involving identity
of offenses but wherein the accused is in legal
It has long been my position that the issue of jeopardy in at least one of them, this
double jeopardy arises in three different ways, consequently envisages the situation where the
that is, when: (a) the accused is charged with the accused, who has already entered a plea to the
same offense in two separate pending cases, in first charge but wherein no final adjudication
one of which he has validly pleaded; (b) The has yet been rendered, is again charged with the
accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the
after he has been previously convicted or American expression quoted in the main
acquitted thereof or the charge therefor had opinion, a proper case of "litis pendentia in prison
been dismissed without his consent; or (c) the grey" and wherein quashal of the second case
prosecution makes a legally may accordingly be sought pursuant to said
unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the Rule.
same case. The first instance is contemplated in
then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said
Rule 117; the second is covered by Section 7 of paragraph (h) actually provides for two modes
the same Rule; and the third is governed by constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a
Section 2, Rule 122. second indictment for the same offense.
Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the
That the first and the third instances are rarely first mode allows quashal where the accused has
involved in cases or found in our jurisprudential been previously convicted or acquitted of the
annals is to the credit of our prosecutorial same offense with which he is again presently
agencies which, with respect to the first instance, charged and in danger of a second conviction.
can seldom be faulted with simultaneously or This would correspond, in civil procedure, to res
successively charging the same person twice judicata as a ground for dismissal. The second
with the same offense in separate cases and, mode stated in the same paragraph
regarding the third instance, of scrupulously contemplates the situation where the accused is
avoiding the proscribed appeals. Evidently, this only in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in
is not to be construed to mean, however, that the first case, since no judgment or final order
only the second instance, or "former jeopardy," has yet been rendered therein, and he is now
can be the basis of a motion to quash. charged anew with the same offense. This is
equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter
Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a action pendant, likewise a ground for dismissal.
motion to quash and, just like the provisions of Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant
the 1964 Rules of Court, includes therein as grounds are provided for in a single paragraph
paragraph "(h) That the accused has but definitely not as identical, but alternative
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of and discrete, grounds although embraced in the
being convicted or acquitted of the offense same concept of double jeopardy. While the
charged." Indisputably, the first part of this censorious would prefer a more felicitous term
paragraph regarding previous conviction refers for the second mode, instead of also referring to
to the "former jeopardy" embraced in the present it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly
Section 7 of this Rule. addressed to the framers of the rule or law
thereon. I can very well live with that term since,
Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second whether or not the liability of the accused has
part therein as faulty drafting or linguistic been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in
surplusage, that second part referring to the the first prosecution, what is sought to be
accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or avoided is his subjection to another danger or
acquitted of the offense charged" necessarily jeopardy or being again convicted and
presupposes that he has not yet been convicted sentenced for an identical offense.
or acquitted of an offense identical to that with
which he is again indicted. Since double
Judicial proceedings and determinations should would be a judicial travesty that for lack of a
never be the victims of the tyranny of labels. final disposition in said case he cannot be
What should control is the legislative allowed to move to quash the other two pending
intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If cases on the ground of double jeopardy, in the
we were to be squeamish about terminology, we hearing of which motion the identity of the
need merely note that improper venue is not a offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the
ground for a motion to quash. Its counterpart in other two actions could accordingly be ordered.
criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over the offense charged, under Again, since the majority insists that a final
Section 3(b) of Rule 117, since in criminal cases judgment in the first case is a sine qua non for a
venue is jurisdictional as the court has no motion to quash the other two cases, if the
jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside accused was convicted in the first case and said
its territorial jurisdiction. 12 Yet, we still have to conviction is brought on appeal where it may
hear any strident objection to the practice remain pending for years, what happens to the
equating both terms as virtually synonymous other two cases? Shall they instead be
objections to the validity of a criminal consolidated for trial with the inevitable
prosecution. inconvenience and expenses necessitated by
transfer of venue and production of witnesses
Coming back to my preceding disquisition on from a different vicinage, not to speak of the
double jeopardy, I humbly submit that a view awkward and improbable situation of two of the
contrary thereto could be productive of same cases being each consolidated with itself
mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, and with the court having to resolve all? Shall
as earlier observed, it is a little remote for the they be allowed to proceed on independent trial
same authority to charge the same accused with utilizing the same evidence or shall the
two criminal suits involving the same offense, proceedings therein be indefinitely suspended
this is not an absolute improbability, as witness to await the ultimate outcome of the first?
politically-motivated harassment prosecutions.
It is also possible that duplicity of suits on The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily
identical offenses may be brought about by acts confronted with the aforesaid options is further
of different authorities in separate local underscored by the fact that howsoever the first
jurisdictions. case is disposed of, the other two cases would be
barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of
Thus, to illustrate, if forcible abduction is Rule 117, hence the independent proceedings
committed and commenced in Manila and the that may have been conducted or the suspension
victim is taken to Tarlac and thence to Cagayan, thereof in those two cases would be completely
being a continuing crime the criminal action pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the
therefor may be instituted in the proper court of accused to move to quash the said two cases
any province in which the offense is continued. after he had pleaded to the first would have
If, by error or design, three cases involving the obviated the impasse created by requiring a
same parties and offense are lodged in Manila, prior final decision and spared him the vexation
Tarlac and Cagayan, either categorized under and expenses for fees and bail in the other two
the same offense of forcible abduction or with improvident prosecutions.
two of them dissembled as different offenses of
arbitrary detention or grave coercion through 2. PEOPLE v. VELASCO
the expedient of variations in the particulars of FACTS: There was a shooting in San Ildefonso,
the indictment, we would have the not Bulacan. The shooting claimed the life of Alex
improbable scenario of the same accused Vinculado and seriously injured his twin brother
enmeshed in three different criminal actions Levi. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also
which actually involve the same offense. shot. Three (3) criminal Informations - one (1)
for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide
Where, thereafter, the accused upon were initially filed against Honorato Galvez,
arraignment pleaded not guilty in Manila, it Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego,
the alleged bodyguard of the mayor. However, ISSUE: Whether a review by the Supreme Court
the charges were withdrawn and a new set was of a judgment of acquittal in light of the
filed against the same accused upgrading the constitutional interdict against double jeopardy
crimes to murder and frustrated murder. Mayor is permissible
Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation
of PD 1866 for unauthorized carrying of firearm HELD: NO. It must be explained that under
outside his residence. existing American law and jurisprudence,
appeals may be had not only from criminal
The trial court found the accused Godofredo convictions but also, in some limited instances,
Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes
crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long
However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez as the judgments of dismissals do not involve
of the same charges due to insufficiency of determination of evidence. It must involve
evidence. It also absolved him from the charge questions of law or matters unrelated to a
of illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding factual resolution of the case which
that the act was not a violation of law. consequently, on appeal, will not involve a
review of evidence.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez was
challenged by the Government before this Court United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if
in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the an acquittal was based on an appreciation of the
Rules of Court. Allegedly, in holding in favor of evidence adduced, no appeal would lie. In the
Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully case at bar, the records show that respondent
disregarded certain facts and evidence on record trial judge based his finding of acquittal, no
which, if judiciously considered, would have led matter how erroneous it might seem to
to a finding of guilt of the accused beyond petitioner, upon the evidence presented by both
reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes that this parties. The judgment here was no less than a
patently gross judicial indiscretion and factual resolution of the case.
arbitrariness should be rectified by a re-
examination of the evidence by the Court upon a The doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after
determination that a review of the case will not the defendant had been acquitted by the court in
transgress the constitutional guarantee against a bench trial is a new trial, is applicable in this
double jeopardy. It is urged that this is case.
necessary because the judgment of acquittal
should be nullified and substituted with a Requisites for invoking double jeopardy:
verdict of guilt. (a) a valid complaint or information;
(b) before a competent court before which the
Petitioner invokes the constitutional doctrine in same is filed;
the United States that the Double Jeopardy (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge;
Clause permits a review of acquittals decreed by and,
US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or
retrial is required should judgment be the case against him dismissed or otherwise
overturned. Since Philippine concepts on double terminated without his express consent.
jeopardy have been sourced from American
constitutional principles, statutes and It bears repeating that where acquittal is
jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. concerned, the rules do not distinguish whether
United States and because similarly in this it occurs at the level of the trial court or on
jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the event appeal from a judgment of conviction. This
an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in
jeopardy should also be allowed to take the our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our
same directional course. laws and jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy,
whether it happens at the trial court level or unlawfully and feloniously appoint ORLANDO M.
before the Court of Appeals. TIAPE as a Municipal Administrator of San Vicente,
Palawan, accused Alejandro A. Villapando knowing
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial fully well that Orlando Tiape lacks the qualification
court of a judgment of acquittal brought before as he is a losing mayoralty candidate in the
the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had Municipality of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte during
unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine the May 1998 elections, hence is ineligible for
that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after appointment to a public office within one year (1)
trial" may apply only when the Court finds that from the date of the elections, to the damage and
the “criminal trial was a sham” because the prejudice of the government and of public interest.
prosecution representing the sovereign people
in the criminal case was denied due process. The Upon arraignment on September 3, 2002,
"remand of the criminal case for further hearing Villapando pleaded not guilty. Meanwhile, the
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts case against Tiape was dismissed after the
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, prosecution proved his death which occurred on
and does not expose the accused to a second July 26, 2000.
jeopardy.
After the prosecution rested its case, Villapando
3. PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.
FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections, The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division denied his
Villapando ran for Municipal Mayor of San motion but gave him five days within which to
Vicente, Palawan. Orlando M. Tiape (now inform the court in writing whether he will
deceased), a relative of Villapando's wife, ran for nonetheless submit his Demurrer to Evidence
Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del for resolution without leave of court. Villapando
Norte. Villapando won while Tiape lost. then filed a Manifestation of Intent to File
Thereafter, on July 1, 1998, Villapando Demurrer to Evidence, and was given 15 days
designated Tiape as Municipal Administrator of from receipt to file his Demurrer to Evidence.
the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. He filed his Demurrer to Evidence on October
28, 2003.
On February 4, 2000, Solomon B. Maagad and
Renato M. Fernandez charged Villapando and In a Decision dated May 20, 2004, the
Tiape for violation of Article 244 of the Revised Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division found
Penal Code before the Office of the Deputy Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence meritorious
Ombudsman for Luzon
Nonetheless, the petitioner contended that the
The complaint was resolved against Villapando interpretation of Sandiganbayan is tainted with
and Tiape and the following Information7 dated grave abuse of discretion.
March 19, 2002 charging the two with violation
of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code, for ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy.
"unlawful appointments", was filed with the
Sandiganbayan: HELD: YES. Although this Court held in the
case of People v. Sandiganbayan that once a
That on or about 01 July 1998 or sometime prior or court grants the demurrer to evidence, such
subsequent thereto, in San Vicente, Palawan, order amounts to an acquittal and any further
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this prosecution of the accused would violate the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, constitutional proscription on double jeopardy,
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO, a public officer, this Court held in the same case that such ruling
being then the Municipal Mayor of San Vicente, on the matter shall not be disturbed in the
Palawan, committing the crime herein charged, in absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
relation to and taking advantage of his official
functions, conspiring and confederating with accused Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition,
Orlando M. Tiape, did then and there wilfully, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
contemplation of law, as where the power is death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C.
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
by reason of passion and hostility. vehicle.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release
Division, in disregarding basic rules of statutory in both cases.
construction, acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Its interpretation of the term legal On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge
disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised on the first delict and was meted out the penalty
Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal of public censure. Invoking this conviction,
disqualification cannot be read as excluding petitioner moved to quash the Information for
temporary disqualification in order to exempt the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of
therefrom the legal prohibitions under the 1987 second punishment for the same offense of
Constitution and the Local Government Code of reckless imprudence.
1991. We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Basic is The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity
the rule in statutory construction that where the of offenses in the two cases.
law does not distinguish, the courts should not The petitioner elevated the matter to the
distinguish. There should be no distinction in Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
the application of a law where none is indicated. petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from
the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in
Further, the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division criminal case, including the arraignment his
denied Villapando's Motion for Leave to File arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Demurrer to Evidence yet accommodated
Villapando by giving him five days within Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC
which to inform it in writing whether he will proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
submit his demurrer to evidence for resolution petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
without leave of court. ordered his arrest.

Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
of discretion or without due process is void, denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
does not exist in legal contemplation and, thus, proceedings and postponing his arraignment
cannot be the source of an acquittal. until after his arrest.Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having petition, the motion remained unresolved.
acted with grave abuse of discretion in
disregarding the basic rules of statutory ISSUES:
construction resulting in its decision granting (1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and seek relief from his petition for certiorari when
acquitting the latter, we can do no less but the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-
declare its decision null and void. appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
4. IVLER v. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO for injuries sustained by respondent; and
FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in
August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) (2) Whether petitioner’s constitutional right
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the the same offense" protects him from, among
death of respondent Ponce’s husband. others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a
HELD: court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
1. The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for information.
certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
said petition arising from the MeTC’s order to submitting that the two cases concern the same
arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled
arraignment in the second offense. Thus, otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
without reaching the merits of the said petition, Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. entirely separate offense from Reckless
Petitioner sought reconsideration but this Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage
proved unavailing. to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court
to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting The two charges against petitioner, arising from
petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical penalizing quasi-offenses.
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less The provisions contained in this article shall not
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight species of crime, separately defined and
physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 penalized under the framework of our penal
for the homicide and damage to property. laws, is nothing new.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court The doctrine that reckless imprudence under
granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
motion not to file a comment to the petition as not merely a means to commit other crimes such
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
party and private respondent is represented by bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-
counsel. offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
appellant’s escape from custody or violation of Article 365.
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the
second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in These cases uniformly barred the second
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss Our ruling today secures for the accused facing
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign protection of their constitutional right under the
country during the pendency of the appeal." The Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
a suit to review judgments of convictions. sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than
2. The accused’s negative constitutional right not compensated by the certainty of non-
to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador,
consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so Consultant of the Fact-Finding Committee, and
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by representing the PCGG, filed with the
extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing Ombudsman a sworn complaint for violation of
formula of Article 48 so that only the most Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019,
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether against the respondents Mapa, Jr. et. al.
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on
quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule the ground of prescription. It stressed that
of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as originally enacted,
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should provides that the prescriptive period for
cushion the effect of this ruling. violations of the said Act (R.A. 3019) is ten (10)
S. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILL OF years. Moreover, the computation of the
ATTAINDER prescriptive period of a crime violating a special
law like R.A. 3019 is governed by Act No. 3326
1. SALVADOR v. MAPA which provides that prescription shall begin to
FACTS: On October 8, 1992 then President Fidel run from the day of the commission of the
V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 violation of law, and if the same be not known at
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding the time, from the discovery thereof and the
Committee on Behest Loans. Behest loans are institution of the judicial proceedings for its
loans granted by government banks or GOCC at investigation and punishment. Corollary
the behest, command, or urging by previous thereto, the Supreme Court in the case of People
government officials to the disadvantage of the vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp., 50, ruled
Philippine government. The Committee was that when there is nothing which was concealed
tasked to inventory all behest loans and or needed to be discovered because the entire
determine the courses of action that the series of transactions were by public
government should take to recover these loans. instruments, the period of prescription
commenced to run from the date the said
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated instrument were executed.
November 9, 1992, the functions of the
Committee were expanded to include all non- In the case at bar, the loans were entered into by
performing loans which shall embrace behest virtue of public documents (e.g., notarized
and non-behest loans. Said Memorandum also contracts, board resolutions, approved letter-
named criteria to be utilized as a frame of request) during the period of 1978 to 1981.
reference in determining a behest loan Records show that the complaint was referred
and filed with the Ombudsman on October 4,
Several loan accounts were referred to the 1996 or after the lapse of more than fifteen years
Committee for investigation, including the loan from the violation of the law. Therefore, the
transactions between Metals Exploration Asia, offenses charged had already prescribed.
Inc. (MEA), now Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc.
(PEMI) and the Development Bank of the Also pointed out was that the Presidential Ad
Philippines (DBP). The Committee determined Hoc Committee on Behest Loans was created on
that they bore the characteristics of behest loans, October 8, 1992 under Administrative Order No.
as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61 13. Subsequently, Memorandum Order No. 61,
because the stockholders and officers of PEMI dated November 9, 1992, was issued defining
were known cronies of then President Ferdinand the criteria to be utilized as a frame of reference
Marcos; the loan was under-collateralized; and in determining behest loans. Accordingly, if
PEMI was undercapitalized at the time the loan these Orders are to be considered the bases of
was granted. charging respondents for alleged offenses
committed, they become ex-post facto laws
which are proscribed by the Constitution.
 protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or
The Committee filed a Motion for a proclamation of amnesty.
Reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it
on July 27, 1998. The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex
post facto law generally prohibits the
retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are
ISSUE: W/N AO 13 and MO 61 are ex-post those acts of the legislature which prohibit
facto laws. certain acts and establish penalties for their
violations; or those that define crimes, treat of
HELD: No. The SC did not sustain the their nature, and provide for their punishment.
Ombudsman’s declaration that Administrative The subject administrative and memorandum
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 orders clearly do not come within the shadow of
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws this definition. Administrative Order No. 13
for ostensibly inflicting punishment upon a creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
person for an act done prior to their issuance Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its
and which was innocent when done. composition and functions. It does not mete out
penalty for the act of granting behest loans.
The constitutionality of laws is presumed. To Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a
justify nullification of a law, there must be a frame of reference for determining behest loans.
clear and unequivocal breach of the Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No.
Constitution, not a doubtful or arguable 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be
implication. Furthermore, the Ombudsman has characterized as ex post facto laws.
no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, 2. VALEROSA v. PEOPLE
therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in FACTS: Armed with warrant of arrest and
declaring unconstitutional the subject based on the probable reason to believe based
administrative and memorandum orders. on surveillance conducted in herein petitioners
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan and Bulacan, and
In any event, the SC held that Administrative when the petitioner is about to board a tricycle,
Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 he was then arrested and was charged in
are not ex post facto laws. violation of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under PD 1866, as amended.
An ex post facto law has been defined as one —
(a) which makes an action done before the The lower court imposed a penalty of prision
passing of the law and which was innocent correccional in its maximum period or from 4
when done criminal, and punishes such action; years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6
or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it years as maximum and to pay the fine in the
greater than it was when committed; or (c) amount of Php 15, 000.
which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to the Upon motion for reconsideration, the Court of
crime when it was committed; or (d) which Appeals rendered a decision with modification
alters the legal rules of evidence and receives of a period of 4 years and 2 months as minimum
less or different testimony than the law required up to 6 years as maximum.
at the time of the commission of the offense in
order to convict the defendant. This Court The petitioner herein was charged with the
added two (2) more to the list, namely: (e) that crime of illegal possession of firearms and
which assumes to regulate civil rights and ammunition under the first paragraph of Section
remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or 1 of PD No 1866, as amended. It provides that
deprivation of a right which when done was the penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL shall
lawful; or (f) that which deprives a person be imposed upon any person who shall
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
which he has become entitled, such as the dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition.

PD 1866 as amended,was the governing law at

the time the petitioner committed the offense/
however RA No 8294 amended PD No 1866
during the pendency of the case with the trial
court.

Section 1: Unlawful manufacture, sale,

acquisition, disposition or possession of
Firearms or ammunition or instruments used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of
firearms or ammunition. - the penalty of
PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than Php 15, 000
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfuly manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any low powered firearm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended PD 1866

imposing prisional correccional as punishment
shall be imposed to the petitioner in the case at
bar.

HELD: Yes. As a general rule, penal laws should

not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law. An
EXCEPTION to this rule, however is when the
law is advantageous of the accused.

A new law has a prospective, not retroactive,

effect. however penal laws that favor a guilty
person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
given retroactive effect. These are the rule, the
exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws.