August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE

LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO
DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as
represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA,
as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented
by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of the curfew
1

ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents
Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective
local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these
issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's
ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344, or the "Juvenile
2

Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear
their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide

curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known
as part of "Oplan Rody." 3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents:
(a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02, dated August 26, 1999,
4

entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing

Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13, dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b)
5

City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 8046 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
6

from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for
Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor;
and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City,
through Ordinance No. SP- 2301, Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
7

Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing
Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July
31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances). 8

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an

9

association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in
particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this
10
present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because
they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void
for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process. In addition, petitioners
11

assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630. 12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how
law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators. They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his
13

physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator. 14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not
cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be
out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during
curfew hours. 15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for
16

employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose. They argue that the
17

prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote
the social and moral welfare of children of the community. 18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 4 thereof,
19

contravenes Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
20

imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They

contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no
penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations. 21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews
contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less
restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive
street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets,
and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children
and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more
reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too
harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours. 22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents
seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts
doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review. 23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
24

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the
concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional
ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were legally
demandable and enforceable." 25

In Araullo v. Aquino III, it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before
26

the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may
be determined under the Constitution." It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court,
27

x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized
by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc., it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific
29

procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition
of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a
ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
- based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for
petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative
councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative
powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their
children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act
is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. " In light of
31

the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or
quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved
is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]" This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
32

constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount

importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the people," as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
33

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the

constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case." In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
34

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded
setting - is the presence of an actual case or controversy." "[A]n actual case or
35
controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence." According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its
36

expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by
merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act." 37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of."
38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy
in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the
Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations,
petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to
exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering
that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the
TRO enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore,
39

not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether
those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to
the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate
danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of
the challenged governmental act." "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be
40

material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as
distinguished from being merely incidental or general." 41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing." 42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)

constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective
localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is
the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the
Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal
standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel, because: (a) she was still a
43

minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court, and, hence, a proper subject of
44

the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at
night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in
the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage.
Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base
any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances
violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has
been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the
alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative
of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal

personality to bring an action in court. Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
45

SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members
who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the
controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar
as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards
the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed,
when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the
petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any
other government act." 46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew

ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the
impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of
minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to
regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to
rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew
Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing
sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled
discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in
these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though
they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended
the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus,
acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the
said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to
show his age. 47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle." 48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and
notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly. The
49

void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are
absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty,"

which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and
"substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure
that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as
well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition
encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates
the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars
statutes that are "void-for-vagueness." 50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however,
matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve.
Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a
void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of
unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not
prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process
because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, it was ratiocinated that:
51

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,

judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and
vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on
individual impressions and personal predilections.
52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age
of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague
legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to
identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically,
RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In
the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child
and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory
law. Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630, minors caught
53 54

in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its
provisions. It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the
55

essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance." Hence, by necessary

56

implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related

statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was
perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the
application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of
identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which -
needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances.
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action
against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is
denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive
parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive
due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine
whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late
outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the
State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling. 57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the
rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the
"youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized
not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not
only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally
obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a
reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually
grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is
during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he
duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the
inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship." "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
58

example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."
59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over
one's children." In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court of the United States (US)
60 61

remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
the structure of our society." As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to
62

rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of
their children. The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their
63

children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti), as follows:
64

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies

limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its
youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors. But an additional and more important justification for state
deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a)
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
 prepare him for additional obligations." (Emphasis and underscoring
65

supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being
of the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests." Thus, "[i]n 66

cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children." 67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the
exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo, this Court 68

acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is

cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who
because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their
welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, x x x." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
69

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the
moral development of their children, and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents
70

to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude
that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility." 71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations
on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm
by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise
imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time. 72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's
deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's
conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. In this respect, the ordinances neither
73
dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor
force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors'
activities. As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable
74

- infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children
to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better
opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer), the US court observed that the city government "was entitled
75

to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's

upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from
the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children." Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend
76

time on their studies than on the streets." Reason dictates that these realities observed
77

in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional
reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the
parents' right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the
minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that
even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime
and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for
achieving the government's interest. In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
78

suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during

curfew hours. 79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free
speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere), this Court explained that
80

"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases," viz.:
81

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a

facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied
to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks

an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation.
Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
 unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications
on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted
to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to
raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
"on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
82

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to
free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment, and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
83

involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v.
Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law
84

or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct.

Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression. "' 85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr., it was opined that "[f]acial
86

challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on

vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of
due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth
and limited to the realm of freedom of expression." 87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this
case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. It is a right embraced within the general
89

concept of liberty. Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of

90

locomotion and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to
91

live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life. 92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and

exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression,
 assembly, association, and religion. The inter-relation of the right to travel
93

with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa

v. Russell, as follows:
94

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,

assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement
must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First

Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is
equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently pointed
this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the

First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any
reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to
worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the
meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a
community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply
limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with freedoms
set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions

even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one
place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987
95

Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
96

provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2) are provided by law. 97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile
safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability
of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to
the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e.,
RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775 RA 9262 RA 9851 RA 9344 RA 10364 RA
98 99 100 101 102 103

9211 RA8980, RA9288, and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, as amended.

104 105 106 107

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children.
It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by
local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall
devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution -
to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors
are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court
recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights, but 108

the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of

adults. They are always subject to the authority or custody of another,
109

such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State. As parens

110

patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors'
exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to
vote, the right to execute contracts, and the right to engage in gainful
111 112

employment. With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by

113

law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and

Development before they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or
with a person other than their parents. These limitations demonstrate
114

that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults, and overall, reflect the State's general interest in
115

the well-being of minors. Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
116

minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally

apply to adults.

In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
117

treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability
of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and
mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing: 118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal
system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental
to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from
their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the

parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full
 growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
119

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the US Supreme Court acknowledged the

120

heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most
appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially
in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the
diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate
contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways.
But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in
other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be
magnified. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
121

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of
their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications. The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification
122

either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes. The intermediate
123

scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy. Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not
124

covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed
no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test is the applicable test. At this juncture,
126 127

it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the
fact that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
application of a lower level of scrutiny. In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez), the US
128 129

court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the
fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for
minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
1â wp hi1

the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has
long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities
of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of
adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the infringement
of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant
differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x
x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the
constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling
state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors

differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x. (Emphases

130

supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty
as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State
interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government
131

has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest. 132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared

policies. This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
133

protect and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
134

individual liberties must give way. As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows
135

that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on
adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling
interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off
of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm,
and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State,
in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their

proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead]
them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at
the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,

unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs
who stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
 other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are
the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances
and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,

there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of
youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face
of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activities[.]
136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer, as regards the information gathered by

137

the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may
serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer,
the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer
community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially
life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew

would materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile
violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information
from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police
department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United
States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports
from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are
entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the
streets late at night will make for a safer community. The same
streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at
night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face
a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug
dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may
pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these
criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal
conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is
beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of
their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its
curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal
influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of
 reducing juvenile violence and crime. (Emphases and underscoring
138

supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and
Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their
respective localities. 139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances
pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause. In this light, the Court
140

thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted
to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to
minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of
the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise
that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of
their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal
or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on
minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
whether it be social, religious, or civic. Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances
142

must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to
travel but also on their other constitutional rights.
143

In In Re Mosier, a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for

144

not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely
exercise their religion and to free speech. It observed that:
145

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone

Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or
Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It
would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch
services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents,
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives
of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not
even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they
 frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to
freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra

note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with
eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass
constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a
direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that
only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the
Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew,
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or
guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night. 146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the
curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians,
or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents,
calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night
before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy
Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday. 147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to
gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work. However, even with
148

those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance
still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free
exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample
upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient
safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them
from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to
and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears
stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet,
such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas
Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious
activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the
scenario depicted in Mosier. This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to
149

freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in
political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities
outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in
these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the
State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such
as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely
hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited
exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence of any 150

separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following
exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following

circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,

religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their school
or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the
proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such

as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers
encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or

going to or returning home from the same place of employment activity
without any detour or stop;
 (e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by
an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official

school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school,
or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when
the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without
any detour or stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student
and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a
working student. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
152

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association,
free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association
by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of
their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given
that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance,
the right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City
Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In
relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to
and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous
exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and
loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child
to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding
curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and
Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental
permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as
accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception
so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State
interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as
the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural
but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these

ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be
incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import
and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
 A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on
the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize
the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable
to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity,
and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon
City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the
State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to
further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under
Section 8 thereof, does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
154

Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social
civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the
minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed
therein. Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor
155

based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating
this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction
shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and
ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising
parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18)
years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a

warning about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of

one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That
the complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the
City Prosecutor. (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
156
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors
these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and
(d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew
violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or

not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by

local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but
not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience,
anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering,
public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children.
No penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they
shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at
the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in
such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and
not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities
for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the
conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of
curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not
violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty" is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of

157

imprisonment or fine"; "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who
158

commits a deliberate or negligent act." Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction -

159

such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed

against a person who has violated the law." 160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of
the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs recognized under Section 54 of the same law.
161 162

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the
community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma
caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law
and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive
members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a
"gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight." The Black's
163

Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or

censure"; while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a
164

mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an

expression of authoritative advice or warning." Notably, the Revised Rules on
165

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in

administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty." 166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition

are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to
formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must
be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined
as "a severe or formal reproof." The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of
167

lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law"; while the
168

Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is
more than just a warning or admonition." In other words, reprimand is a formal and
169

public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply

criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including
the public against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In
fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a
penalty, hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
170

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as

provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It

states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of]
juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila
Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.

CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong
of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling
interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities,
only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as
it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate
exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose.
Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", has also been construed to include parental permission as a constructive form
of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner
of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null
and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions
imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with
the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance

No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by
the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID;
while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the
Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 See separate opinion
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice