Moncupa v. Ponce-Enrile (Habeas Corpus)

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MONCUPA V. PONCE-ENRILE, GR NO.

L-63345

FACTS: Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on 22 April 1982 at about 10:50 p.m. at
the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa was brought to MIG-15
Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On 23 April 1982, on the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was
issued against him and 8 other persons. After two separate investigations, conducted first, by
Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and
second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that Moncupa was
not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of
Moncupa only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under
Presidential Decree 33. Consequently, two separate information’s were filed against Moncupa, one, for
illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of PD
33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for
violation of PD 885 as amended. Moncupa was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-
Subversion Law. Moncupa's arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued, and yet,
Moncupa's motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Moncupa filed a petition for the writ of
habeas corpus. Juan Ponce Enrile, Fabian C. Ver, Galileo Kintanar, Fernando Gorospe, and Jose
Castro contend that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied, as
Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell (i.e. temporary release).

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the writ of habeas corpus has become moot and academic in
view of Moncupa's temporary release.

RULING: No. Attached to Moncupa's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him, i.e. (1) His
freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for
any travel outside Metro Manila. (2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence. (3) His freedom
of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any
local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to
the interest of national security." (4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives. The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary
release constitute restraints on the liberty of Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement
of Moncupa.

It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. In the light of the
ruling in Villavicencio vs. Lukban, which held that "a prime specification of an application for a writ of
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient," the
present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A release that renders a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional
freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in
the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

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