CASE # 1

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as
Mayor of Manila, THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil
Service, EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City
Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO, FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR LUCERO,
PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO, FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO
MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN, EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO
VILLACORTA, PABLO OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in
their capacities as members of the Municipal Board, respondents.

Statutes; Enactment; 1935 Constitution does not indicate proof of due enactment of bill.—The (1935)
Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the presiding officers
to certify to the same.

Same; Same; Enrolled bill theory; Basis.—The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal
and independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated.”

Same; Same; Certification of bill by presiding officers of Congress; Effect of.—As far as Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing sacrosanet in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of
authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification
does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval
by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very
bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President.”

Same; Same; In the absence of attestation, courts may resort to journals of Congress for proof of statute’s due
enactment.—Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required for
the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.

Same; Same; Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress; Case at bar.—This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal
for that purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and
approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court
is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare
that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Artemio V. Panganiban & Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for petitioner.

Paredes Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Antonio Barredo for respondent Mayor of Manila.

Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila, etc., et al.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor

General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents The Executive
Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.

Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, “An Act
Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections
Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila.”

The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by
Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section I1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by
the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as
having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 “with amendments.” Attached to the letter was a certification of
the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the
ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No.
9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested
by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate
and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon
became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor
drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the
President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his
signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further
clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it
did not make the bill a valid enactment.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that “it would be untenable and against public
policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress.”

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business establishments
in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act
4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with
this Court on September 7, 1964 for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction” to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil
Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Respondents’ position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually
passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in
the resolution of the issue.

On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was then going abroad on an official trip, this Court
issued a restraining order, without bond, “enjoining the petitioner Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of
the powers of an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of Manila under the so-called Republic Act
4065 and not otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law until further orders from this Court.”

The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila.
Attorneys Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have
filed extensive and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.

Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal
and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether the “enrolled bill” doctrine or the “journal entry” rule
should be adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the
case of Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil. Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that
case applied the “enrolled bill” doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the question has been laid to rest and that the decision
therein constitutes a binding precedent.

The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to
the (1935) Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-called parity rights provision) had been passed by
“a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives” pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution.

The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F.
Pablo and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political question which was not within the province of the
judiciary in view of the principle of separation of powers in our government. The “enrolled bill” theory was relied upon
merely to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that “if a political question conclusively
binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under
the ‘enrolled bill rule’ born of that respect.”

Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had
jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that “the enrolled copy of the resolution and
the legislative journals are conclusive upon us,” specifically in view of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210.
This provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on
which the “enrolled bill” theory rests. It reads:

“The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures
of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the approved bill.2 It has been held that this
procedure is merely a mode of authentication,3 to signify to the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not
of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided
for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers
the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the contrary6 There is less reason to make the attestation a
requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the
bill before it is submitted to the President.

In one case in the United States, where the (State) Constitution required the presiding officers to sign a bill and
this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment.7 Another case however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding officers on
a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the United States
are thus not unanimous on this point.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:

“The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an
enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by
the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the
sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act
in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner
stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.”

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect due to co-equal and independent
departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated.” Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is not required
for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due
enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of decisions,10 although they are silent as to whether the
journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.

The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require
the presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said Constitution does contain the following provisions:

Sec. 10 (4). “Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may in its judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, be entered in the Journal.”

Sec. 21 (2). “No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to
the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the
question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.”

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,11 is neutralized in this
case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a
reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers.
It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses,
and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other
words it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935)
Constitution says that “[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President.”12
In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution, said
that the same “makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully
enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof that it has ‘passed both houses’ will satisfy the
constitutional requirement.”

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would
not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This
argument begs the issue. It would limit the court’s inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect
of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of
the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or
not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While
it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is
irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief
Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
admittedly is a risky undertaking,13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures
therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous
bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled
“AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA” is declared not to have been duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar (Chairman) and Fernando, JJ., took no part.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Makasiar, J., is on official leave.

Petition denied.

Notes.—

a) Enactment of laws.—Enactment of law by legislative inaction is not countenanced in this jurisdiction (Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. v. Sabugo, L-16017, August 81, 1961).

b) Enrolled bill theory.—The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President; if a mistake as in fact made in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Chief Executive, the remedy is by amendment or corrective legislation,
not by judicial decree (Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28, 1963). It has been declared
that the rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a co-equal and independent
department of the government, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very
delicate power, the frequent exercise of which must lead to endless confusion in the administration of the law. The rule
is also one of convenience, because courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look
beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments which might be found after
the adjournment of the legislature. Otherwise, after relying on the prima facie evidence of the enrolled bills, authenticated
as exacted by the Constitution, for years, it might be ascertained from the journals that an act therefor enforced had never
become a law. In this respect, it has been declared that there is quite enough uncertainty as to what the law is, without
saying, that no one may be certain that an act of the legislature has become such until the issue has been determined by
some court whose decision might not be regarded as conclusive in an action between the parties (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito,
L-1123, March 5, 1947).

CASE # 2
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW,
WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P.
PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S.
TATAD, LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R. VELOSO, petitioners, vs. THE SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; The Constitutional provision clearly mandates
the participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.—It seems
quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of
the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “Judicial” and “legislative” components commonly share the duty
and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The respondent
Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear expression of an
intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that Chamber
are represented.” The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the participation
in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.—Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where
he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as
such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

FELICIANO, J.: Concurring

Constitutional Law; Composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; Quorum; Should any three (3) Senator-
Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the
proceedings, a tribunal, resulting to a balance between three (3) Justices and three (3) Senators as members, still
constitute more than a quorum.—Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily
inhibit or disqualify themselves from participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that
would be balanced between the three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more
than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the
constitutional intent above noted concerning the mixed “judicial” and “legislative” composition of the Electoral Tribunals
would appear to be substantially met and served. This dénouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not
compelled by certiorari.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated
February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners’ Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and
their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case
No. 002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate
Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile (who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the
Liberal Party and resigned as the Opposition’s representative in the Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion
for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-
87 on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene
A.V. Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition
to Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno,
another respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion
for disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the
respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the respondent Tribunal in both SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another
contest filed by Augusto S. Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his
personal involvement as a party in the two cases.

The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable, namely; the amendment of the respondent Tribunal’s Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest
being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal’s Rules (Section 24)—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for
the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature—is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three Members
who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

We do not agree with petitioners’ thesis that the suggested device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the
Constitution. We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and
defines its jurisdiction and powers.

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.”

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court
and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those “judicial” and “legislative” components commonly
share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this proposition when it held that said provision “x x x is a clear expression
of an intent that all (such) contests x x x shall be resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators’) peers in that
Chamber are represented.”1 The other part, of course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.

Said intent is even more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1—an unmistakable indication that the “legislative component” cannot
be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution.

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by
any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute’s competence, the
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty
which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its
being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could not have been
unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon, Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once
more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode
for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification
may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense
of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership
of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred
to must therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for
disqualification or inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.

Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., no part.

Feliciano, J., see separate concurring statement.

FELICIANO, J.: Concurring

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward
however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate paragraph of his opinion.

Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the three
(3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a Tribunal,
both the considerations of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted
concerning the mixed “judicial” and “legislative” composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially
met and served. This dénouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—

The legislature as creator of corporations can define the extent of their powers and can deny the power to own lands.
(Director vs. Lood, 124 SCRA 460.)

Judiciary has to refer to legislative discretion in the view of programs for economic development and social progress.
(Heirs of Juancho Ardana vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220.

CASE # 3

Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal

 CARMELO F. LAZATIN, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Election Contests; Jurisdiction; The 1987 Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the Senate and House of Representatives
in the respective Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction of the Comelec under the 1987 Constitution.—That Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the Batasang
Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang
Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the
Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members
of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests pertaining to elective regional, provincial
and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals’ constitutional functions may not
be prescribed by the Omnibus Election Code.—An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders
specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within
which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the
rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals’ constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The Court is of the
considered view that it may not.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Powers of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, flows from the general
power granted it by the Constitution.—The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative
to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-
making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in
the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139 [1936]), where the Court, speaking through Justice
Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms: x x x [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth
ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in
filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the
jurisdiction conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal.—Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of
being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative
body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. The use of the word “sole”
emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra, at 162]. The
exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as “intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature” [Id. at 175.] Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as “full, clear and complete” [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L-25379,
September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under
the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three
branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for
that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and
the Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving
members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections
for all elective national and local officials.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Injunction; To issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the
pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET.—The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer
for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRET’s sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where
the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent’s electoral protest, this Court said: The alleged invalidity
of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering
the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Abuse of Discretion; The judgment rendered by the Electoral Commission in
the exercise of such sole power is beyond judicial interference; Exceptions.—Moreover, private respondent’s attempt to
have the Court set aside the HRET’s resolution to defer action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature,
considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to
review or annul and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, any final
action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier,
the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and “excludes the exercise of any authority on the
part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it or even affect the same.” [Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As
early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar, [66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)], the Court declared that “[t]he judgment rendered by the
[Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process
of law.”

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the resolutions of the House Electoral Tribunal.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTÉS, J.:

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of Pampanga during
the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent objected to the inclusion of certain
election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the
Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC
ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May
27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to
declare petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from
assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30,
1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the
COMELEC resolution before this Court in a petition entitled “Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections, Francisco
R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol,” docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on January 25, 1988, the Court
set aside the COMELEC’s revocation of petitioner’s proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “HRET”) an election protest, docketed as Case No.
46.

Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent’s protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing Sec. 250 of the
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET ruled that the protest had been filed on time in accordance
with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this
Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over the protest filed by private respondent.

A. The Main Case

This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/
or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case
No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been filed on time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The
Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed his comment with a motion to
admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved to give due
course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for
decision.

Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in the HRET.
Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent’s election protest would have been
filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely.
Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not private respondent’s protest had been seasonably filed.

To support his contention that private respondent’s protest had been filed out of time and, therefore, the HRET
did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides:

Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices.—A sworn petition contesting the
electionof any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the
Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. [Italics supplied.]

Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the pendency of the
petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987
and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to
annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the period was suspended and began to run again on January 28, 1988 when
private respondent was served with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 80007; that private respondent
therefore only had nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent
filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.

On the other hand, in finding that the protest was filed on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to wit:

Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal
or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12)
legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on
November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same
may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987
Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman
of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the Tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of
filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Italics supplied.]

Thus, ruled the HRET:

On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from November 22, 1987,
or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the COMELEC, acting upon a petition filed by the
Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This
resolution had the effect of nullifying the proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant
received a copy of the Supreme Court’s decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents
and purposes, therefore, Protestee’s (petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28, 1988, and the
fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date. Protestant filed his protest on
February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest, therefore, was filed well within the reglementary
period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p. 129.]
The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired jurisdiction over it.

Petitioner’s reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in unambiguous
terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the COMELEC contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read
together with Sec. 249 of the same code which provides that the COMELEC “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city
officials,” reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973 Constitution
there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests involving Members of the Batasang
Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.

That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and qualifications
of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the 1987 Constitution is readily
apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the legislative power is now vested in a bicameral
Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art.
VI, Sec. 17]. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests
pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving municipal and
barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of the election
were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be emphasized, however, that
such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said code to each and every aspect of that particular
electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws
governing said elections.**

An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987
congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the
respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the
Tribunals’ constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute.

The Court is of the considered view that it may not.

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction,
including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from
the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

. . . [T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the
absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must
be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; italics supplied.]

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative branch has been exclusively
granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate
and the House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and
nonpartisan body attached to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral
Tribunals under the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].

Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it
in this wise:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 162]. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as “intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature” [Id. at 175].
Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as “full, clear and complete” [Veloso v.
Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v.
Yap, G.R. No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three branches of
government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and specially created for that
singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate,
supra]. It was only under the 1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and the
Legislature was blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members
of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all
elective national and local officials.

That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to the
separation of powers of the three branches of government under the presidential system, is too evident to escape
attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained the COMELEC’s purely administrative powers, namely, the
exclusive authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to
deputize law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political parties
and accredit citizens’ arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate,
violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to
these areas of election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific
legislation provides otherwise. But the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and
decide election contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution vested
the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution,
while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)], expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the
period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence
but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.

Consequently, private respondent’s election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET,
the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

B. Private Respondent’s Counter/Cross Petition

Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the Representative of the first district
of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5, 1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said
prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration, but this was denied by the HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court
annul and set aside these two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
on the premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted.

The relief prayed for in private respondent’s counter/cross petition is not forthcoming.

The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the pendency
of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily, the determination of whether or not there
are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRET’s sound
judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007, where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent’s electoral
protest, this Court said:

The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged
irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is
also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

Moreover, private respondent’s attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET’s resolution to defer action on his prayer
for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not yet taken any final action with regard to
his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or annul and set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution
grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as
a rule, not be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and “excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it
or even affect the same.” [Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero v. Bocar [66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)],
the Court declared that “[t]he judgment rendered by the [Electoral] Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged
power is beyond judicial interference, except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of
the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law.” Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court’s authority
is made explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty “to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere
with the HRET’s judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since
no grave abuse of discretion that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed for has been clearly shown.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent’s Counter/Cross Petition is likewise DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Notes.—

Where the law authorizing the holding of a plebiscite is unconstitutional, the court cannot authorize the holding of a new
one. (Tan vs. Comelec, 142 SCRA 727.)

The challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional as it excluded the voters of the mother province from
participating in the plebiscite. (Tan vs. Comelec, 142 SCRA 727.)

CASE # 4?

CASE # 5

Bondoc vs. Pineda

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner, vs. REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL.
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative Juanito G.
 Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

Political Law; Separation of powers; Judicial review of acts of the other branches of government.—Since “a
constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided For as to what may be done and
how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two
coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law The question thus posed is Judicial rather
than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld” (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59
SCRA 183, 196). That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

Same; Same; Same.—The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the
executive and legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and
the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk “the irksome task” of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts
by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. lt is—"a plain exercise of the judicial
power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. x x x It is simply a necessary
concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the determination
of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.” (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)

Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions.—The use of the word “sole” in both Section
17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal
was created to function as a nonpartisan court although twothirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political
body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be
independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.

Same; Same; Grounds for removal; Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of membership.—As
judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
“disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. ln expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members of the HRET, as “sole
judge” of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 198? Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional
term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal
affiliation with another political party, or removal for-other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political group. As the
records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political
party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of
tenure.

PETITION for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the ‘Court,

 Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.

Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.

Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party’s representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision
freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that
action of the House?

Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had
hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the Government, finding it
“peculiarly irksome as well as delicate” because it could be considered by some as “an attempt to intrude” into the
affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their prerogatives.

In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing
to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like in the sands of the
“political question” doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that “where the matter involved is left to a decision by
the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or both the legislative or executive
branch of the government, it is beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against
was either the President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act.” (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)

In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive
action, especially when private rights are affected, came to be recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino
case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since “a
constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and
how it is to be accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two
coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld” (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59
SCRA 183, 196).

That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as both authority and duty of the courts “to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

The power and duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and legislative
branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does
mean though that the judiciary may not shirk “the irksome task” of inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of
legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been
aggrieved or prejudiced by. such action, as in this case. It is—

“a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law.
x x x x x x It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before
the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.” (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.
192, 203.)

In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each received the following votes in the canvass
made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:

Marciano M. Pineda ............................................................................................31,700 votes

Emigdio A. Bondoc ..............................................................................................28,400 votes

Difference ............................................................................................................3,300 votes

On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No. 26)
in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of
whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:

AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member

Associate Justice

Supreme Court

HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member

Congressman

1st Dist., Benguet

LDP

DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member

Congressman

1st Dist., Palawan

LDP

SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member

Congressman

2nd Dist., Nueva Ecija

LDP

JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member

Congressman

1st Dist., Davao del Sur

LDP

JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Congressman

4th Dist., Batangas

LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member

Congressman

2nd Dist., Zamboanga del Sur

(formerly GAD, now NP)

After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda, Bondoc’s protest was
submitted for decision in July, 1989.

By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three
(23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in
some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the finalization of the decision in the case.

The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc’s lead over Pineda to 107
votes, Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.

Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his “Chief,” Congressman
Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for
Bondoc “consistent with truth and justice and self-respect,” and to honor a “gentlemen’s agreement” among the
members of the HRET that they would “abide by the result of the appreciation of the contested ballot"1 Congressman
Camasura’s revelation stirred a hornets’ nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to
neutralize the pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.

On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14,1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET
Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc’s counsel on March 6,1991.

On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed
Congressman Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur,
by Resolution No. 03–91, had already expelled him and Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having-
allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP
members in Davao del Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are “not only inimical, uncalled for, unethical
and immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a meeting on March
12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two
congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to take note of it “especially
in matters where party membership is a prerequisite."4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4,1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M. Herrera,
received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives,
during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:

13 March 1991

“Honorable Justice Ameurfina

Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills
Quezon City

“Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:

“I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of Representatives during its
plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-explanatory and copies
of which are hereto attached.

“Thank you.

For the Secretary-General

"(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon
“Officer-in-charge
Operations Department”

(p. 10, Rollo.)

Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this “distressing development” and asked to be relieved from their assignments in the HRET because—

“By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest entitled
“Bondoc v. Pineda” (HRET Case No. 25), previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777–78, promulgated 12
September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to
4 vote may now be confidently expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which
would have been defeated.

“The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of
the decision had to be deferred by at least 4 months.

With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc,
and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano. and
Congressmen Juanito G. Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with Congressmen
Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon, Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.

“Congressman Camasura’s vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was in our view, a conscience vote, for which he
earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the confidence of the leadership of his party.

“Under the above circumstances, an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to continue
with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve its integrity and credibility as a constitutional body
charged with a judicial task. It is clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented
at all costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its constitutional function by
factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it,

“In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, should be amended to provide instead for a return to
the composition mandated in the 1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party having the second largest number
of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three (3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition
of parties can dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.

“In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal could sit as the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there
should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the resolution of election contests.

“We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon designation to membership in
the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties,
to insure their independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.

“There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been promulgated
today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and
Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.

“But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal well
ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.

“Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership in
the Tribunal.

“xxx xxx xxx.”

At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91–0018 cancelling
the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:

“ln view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 this morning from the House of Representatives that at its
plenary session held on March 13, 1991 , it it had voted ‘to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,’ the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon, This is because,
without Congressman Camasura’s vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of
the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.

“The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion that this
development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they
have asked the Chief Justice, in a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.

“The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to resign as a member of
the Tribunal

“The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention.” (p. 37, Rollo.)

On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,
resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed that:

“x x x in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the ‘sole judge’ of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately
guided only by purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the contemplation of the
Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as
representatives of their respective political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further
bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be legally terminated except only by death, resignation,
permanent disability, or removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.

“ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to be
relieved from their membership in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to
resume their duties therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the proceedings of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion
of legislators in its membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral Tribunals,
including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and cannot be terminated at
will but only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal ‘to submit the issue to the said
Tribunal in the first instance.

“Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: ‘I concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should be
allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.’
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ. took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.”

On March 21,1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanito G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who
may be appointed Vice Representative Juanito G. Camasura Jr., and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
praying this Court to:

1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, “to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Representative Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

2. Issue a writ of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;

3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge his functions
as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such. other relief as may be just and equitable.

Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to comment5 on the
petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET “from reorganizing and allowing participation in its
proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to replace Honorable Juanito G. Camasura in
said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of
the election of said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this
Court, or until otherwise ordered by the Court.” (p. 39, Rollo J Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.

Congressman Marciano M. Pineda’s plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress’ being the sole
authority that nominates and elects from its members, Upon recommendation by the political parties therein, those
who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and in the Commission on Appointments as well),
hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House or Senate is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the
political party;6 that a Tribunal member’s term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,7 for if a member of
the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the constitutional provision mandating
representation based on political affiliation would be completely nullified;8 and that the expulsion of Congressman
Camasura from the LDP, is “purely a party affair” of the LDP9 and the decision to rescind his membership in the House
Electoral Tribunal is the sole prerogative of the House of Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question beyond
the reach of judicial review.10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of
action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in the HRET.11 Moreover, the
petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET,
that withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura’s membership in the HRET.12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the HRET as a
party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does
not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he assails is the act of the House of
Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Juanito Camasura as a
member of the HRET.13

Replying to the Solicitor General’s Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed had
nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that decision by cancelling the
promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc’s) prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be
an indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for
“in the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court’s
decision as to whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is
valid."15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol’s Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol was
impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives had announced the
termination of Congressman Camasura’s membership in the HRET, several newspapers of general circulation reported
that the House of Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura’s
seat in the Tribunal.

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of
an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the’ ruse of “reorganizing” the representation in the tribunal
of the majority party?

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:

“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
Judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice., and the remaining six.shall be Members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”

Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the
main political parties in the tribunal which is now based on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:

“Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief
Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of
the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.” (1935 Constitution of the Philippines.)

Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, and it was impossible for any political party to control
the voting in the tribunal.

The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.

The use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had
earlier said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:

“The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer
to that tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members.

‘The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election and qualification of
members s of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained in the
legislature.”

‘The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution as special tribunals to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and as
such, are independent bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and 16 supervise and control
them, without any legislative interference.” (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)

To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

“The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government. it is to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature.

xxx xxx xxx

‘The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of determining contests
relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the
judiciary when and while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the election and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.” (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)

The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
attest:

“MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you. “My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the
electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional
creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which are created by
mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?

“MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.

“MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral
Tribunal is a constitutional body?

“MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.

“MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?

“MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.

“MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera us. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be
applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the -government: Would that ruling still be valid?

“MR. AZCUNA. Yes’, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.

“MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are “not separate departments of government, I would like to know again if the
ruling in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies we are
deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of
partisan influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals,

“MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they are not a separate branch of government.

“MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of. their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which takes care of this particular controversy.

“Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because apparently
we have an independent electoral tribunal?

“MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will notice that the
wordings say: “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal'.' It is still the
Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal So, technically, it is the tribunal of the House and
tribunal of the Senate although they are independent.
“MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are independent from both bodies?

“MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.

“MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say that these bodies are independent when
we still have six politicians sitting in both tribunals?

“MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam Presi-dent.

“MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the Executive, there
was a comment by Chief Justice Concepcion—Commissioner Concepcion—that there seems to be some incongruity
in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the
ruling in the case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral Tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from all political considerations. That is why I am
asking now for the record how we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting there.

“MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling
competence, shown independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also trust that the members
of the tribunals will be independent.” (pp. .111–112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22,1986, Italic ours.)

Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.—

The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives, or the majority party therein, may
shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the
interests of the , party in power.

The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral
Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party’s candidate, Bondoc, is a
clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election
contest between Pineda and Bondoc,

To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would
reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP) which the three justices of the
Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon
all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.

Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.—

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan; They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
“disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.—

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or
removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for “party disloyalty”
short of proof that he has, formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and
from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.

There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not
entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed
before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office
of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. lt should be
stressed, however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at all unlike
the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief Justice Fernan to resign from
the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go 011 a leave of absence. They acted on their own free will, for valid reasons,
and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.

The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for “party
disloyalty” after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of
the “expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in the Bondoc case so that the HRET’s decision may not
be promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman
Camasura in the Tribunal. That strategem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute
Congressman Camasura’s vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.

The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against the strong
arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent
to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman
Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal, He calls upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its
judicial power and discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the- action of the House. The Court
must perform its duty under the Constitution “even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the
Government itself (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo: in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).

Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal’s disposition of ‘the
Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal’s decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the “sole judge” of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore,
declare null and void the resolution dated: March 13, 1991 of the House of ‘Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case,

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and void abinitio for being violative of the Constitution,
and Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91–0018 dated March 14,1991, cancelling the promulgation
of the decision in HRET Case No. 26 (“Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda”) is also set aside. Considering the
unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution’ of
electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise .of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice, hereby declares the said
decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the
Tribunal Costs against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

SO ORDERED.

Note.—

The power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the
part of the Court that would in any wise restrict or curtail it x x x except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law. (Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal, 168
SCRA 391.)

CASE # 6

Gonzales vs. Hechanova

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA,JR., as
 Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and
Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Parties; Real party in interest; Sufficiency of petitioner’s interest as rice planter and taxpayer to seek restraint
of allegedly illegal rice importation.—The status of petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,
entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the
purchase of the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives said petitioner sufficient interest
to file the instant petition seeking to restrain the allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds to import rice from
abroad.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Exceptions applicable to case at bar.—The

principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable: (1) where the question in
dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the
President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule.

Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Illegal importation where conditions for importation not complied with.—
Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452) set conditions for the importation of rice,
and in the case at bar conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the proposed importations are illegal.

Same; Importations “made by the government itself.—The provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any “government agency”, apply likewise to importations “made by the
Government itself”, because each and every officer and employee of our Government, is a government agency and/or
agent.

Same; Protection of local planters of rice and corn to foster self-sufficiency in local production.—The
protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local
production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency.

Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; An executive officer cannot disregard the law even if he believes that
compliance mill not benefit the people.—Respondents’ trend of thought, that, if an executive officer believes that
compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejected—we still
live under a rule of law.

Same; Same; President may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by
statutes enacted prior thereto.—Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a
transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Same; Same; Main function of Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat same.—Under
the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. Statutory Construction; Theory that in
a conflict between treaty and statute the latest in point of time shall prevail, not applicable to executive agreements;
Case at Bar.—The American theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in
point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the
contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United
States is a signatory require the advice and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department.
No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without
completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

Courts; Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties.—The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of
whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question.” In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:

Rice Importation; Injunction not granted despite illegality of importation where arrangements already
concluded with foreign governments; Reasons.—Respondents, despite their lack of compliance with the Rice
Importation Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the record has
been authorized to be imported on government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect
has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its implementation. Had the writ been issued, our government
would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face.

Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Civil authority supreme over the military.—The injunction embodied in
the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1) that the civil authority shall always be supreme, can only mean that
while all precautions should be taken to in-sure the security and preservation of the State and to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil
authority.

Barrera, J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Supremacy of civil authority; Theory that the military may disregard rice importation laws
is dangerous.—The theory that rice can be legally imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its
future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a dangerous trend. To
adopt this theory, is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or classes: the producers, the
consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effort to equate the army with the
Government itself.

Same; Executive Powers; National Security Council; Function to deliberate on existence of emergency.—It is
not for the Department of National Defense to unilaterally determine the existence of a threat of emergency, but for the
National Security Council to do so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate in any region of the world is apt to be
taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to override our laws and
legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization
measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state.

Same; Same; Theory of “the end justifies the means” rejected.—Adoption as a government policy of the theory
of “the end justifies the means” brushing aside constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with
the end of freedom.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of
67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed
of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or on September
25, 1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales—a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn—filed the petition herein,
averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents “are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because Republic Act No. 3452—which allegedly repeals or
amends Republic Act No. 2207—explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency”; that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties
during the pendency of this case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed,
therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondents, their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the
aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioner’s prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at which both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a
memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said
incident may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits soon thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although
counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioner’s interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the
petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn “by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency”, Republic Act No.
3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that “the policy of the Government” is to “engage in the purchase of these basic
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of
their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment, x x x.”
Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to
sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have
to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must
necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view
to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner’s right to the reliefs prayed for because he “has not exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him before coming to court”. We have already held, however, that the principle requiring the previous
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable “where the question in dispute is purely a legal one”,3 or where
the controverted act is “patently illegal” or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,4 or where the
respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval
of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.7 The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents’
contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioner’s cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner’s cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in
question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-in-
Chief “for military stock pile purposes” in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
1;8 that in cases of necessity, the President “or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration
of good order and maintenance of peace”; and that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, “the President x x x is
duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any special authority”.

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner
herein—on which our view need not be expressed—we are unanimously of the opinion—assuming that said Republic
Act No. 2207 is still in force—that the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the
language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the
Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, “it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or
government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines”, although, by way of exception, it adds that
“the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any government agency
that he may designate”, if the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly. Republic Act No. 3452
explicitly enjoins “the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency” from importing rice and corn.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the
importation of rice and corn by any “government agency”, do not apply to importations “made by the Government
itself”, because the latter is not a “government agency”. This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National
Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and
employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to
importations by the Government, as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:

1.The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by “the President of the Philippines”’ and,
hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2.Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn Administration and any other government agency from importing rice
and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds “that the importation of rice and corn is left, to private parties upon
payment of the corresponding taxes”, thus indicating that only “private parties” may import rice under its provisions;
and

3.Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,-000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for those
who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant thereto,
Section 15 of said Act provides that “if the offender is a public official and/or employees”, he shall be subject to the
additional penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers
or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the
Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more
explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any “officer or employee of the Government” who
“violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision” of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to
transactions made by the very government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act
No. 138, entitled “An Act to give native products and domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the
Government.” Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:

“The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and employees of the
municipal and provincial governments and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards,
commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-
owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and
supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials x x x produced x x x in the
Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified.” (Italics
supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces,
preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates
this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security—predicated upon the
“worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam”, and “the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem”—and the alleged
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National
Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a
manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor
that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of
such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made
as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purposes of national security and/or national emergency is within
the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration “to
accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies”. Moreover, it ordains that “the buffer stocks held as a national reserve x x x be deposited by the
Administration throughout the country under proper dispersal plans x x x and may be released only upon the occurrence
of calamities or emergencies x x x”. (Italics supplied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not
self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those
objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, t’he conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated
in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1.
Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured
by the Government of the Philippines, but only “during a national mobilization”,9 which does not exist. Inferentially,
therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may
by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and
Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows
that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during “war time”11 or when he has placed the country or a part
thereof under “martial law”.12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that
respondents’ theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the
Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it
should, nevertheless, be permitted because “it redounds to the benefit of the people”. Salus populi est suprema lex, it is
said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of
this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is
avowedly for stockpile of the Army—not the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents’ trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the
surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people,
he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected—we still live under a rule of law.

And then, “the people” are either producers or consumers. Now—as respondents explicitly admit—Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people,
it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts. It is not for respondent
executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those
Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation—but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should
be complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma—

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase
of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute
valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon the
signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty
and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolved—under the American jurisprudence—in
favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative
to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have
already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein
through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even
assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited
by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the
exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly
repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist
that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the
United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative
department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional setup and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say
that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII
thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived ‘‘of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in—(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or
regulation is in question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case
academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but
from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has
two (2) main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters,
growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to
private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importation—which has not been consummated
as yet—is legally feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the
performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from
the fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed
importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be
enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed importation. However, the majority favors the negative
view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power
to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said
importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the
injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur separately.

Notes.—

Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, brought into play in the above Gonzales case, were subsequently construed and
applied in Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Assn. v. Feliciano, et al., L-24022, March 3, 1965. In this later case, it was held that
Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation of rice during normal times, but when there is a national emergency,
Republic Act No. 2207 applies. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent with each other.

The Flag Law (CA. No. 138), also involved in the Gonzales case, was subsequently amended by Commonwealth Act No.
541 and Republic Acts Nos. 912, 4858 and 5183. Republic Act 4858 authorizes the President to allow the procurement of
supplies necessary for the rehabilitation of a project as an exception to the restrictions and preferences provided for in
Republic Act No. 912 and Commonwealth Act No. 138 (Cf. C & C Commercial Corp. v. NAWASA, L-27275, Nov. 18, 1967,
21 SCRA 984).

CASE # 7

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Taxation; Origin of revenue bills; A bill originating in the House of Representatives
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole; As a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced and to insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the
House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.”—Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was adopted
from the American Federal Constitution, it is notable in two respects: the verb “shall originate” is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as on other bills” in the American version is omitted. This means,
according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence
of H. No. 11197. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law—but the revenue bill—which is
required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting
of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute—
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law—must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to
“propose amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in
fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a Senate
and a House of Representatives,” not in any particular chamber.—The contention that the constitutional design is to
limit the Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-
ratifying power and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared
are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular
chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of Represen-tatives.” The exercise of
the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power.
There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of
the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never
been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.

Same; Same; Same; Same; There is really no difference between the Senate preserving the House Bill up to the
enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter.—It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in
substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely
to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which,
it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill
of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply means that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives and that it does not prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of
the bill from the House.—Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected
to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

Same; Same; Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days.—The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not
only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become
a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed
three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause,
because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing
with the second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would
not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of
securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is
only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any
use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and
distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of
an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a
law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.

Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaration of martial law is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard,
the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed
to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.—
It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the
condition stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country. It is
noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the
contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President’s
certification. Should such certifi-cation be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that,
because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were
deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the factual basis of the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national
emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial
review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which
involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of
Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; A third version of the bill may result from the conference
committee, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only requirement being that the third
version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.—As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging
out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained: Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees
are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses
have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one
house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and
substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a
conference committee to draft essentially a new bill . . . . The result is a third version, which is considered an “amendment
in the nature of a substitute,” the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of
the House and Senate bills.

Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department.—Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a
conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the
Senate bill. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it
cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as
such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed
the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this
case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports
include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee, and if a change is desired in
the practice, it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only
an internal rule of each house.—To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of
conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that “If there is no Rule applicable
to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement
of these, the Rules contained in Jefferson’s Manual.” The following is then quoted from the Jefferson’s Manual: The
managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include subjects
not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case
there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson’s Manual is resorted to only as
supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which, though
germane, have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in
G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson’s Manual
must be considered to have been modified by the legislative practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be
sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each
house. Thus, Art. VI, §16(3) of the Constitution provides that “Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . .
.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bill-Drafting; The use of brackets and capital letters to indicate changes is a standard
practice in bill-drafting; The Supreme Court’s concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the
enactment of laws, not the enforcement of internal Rules of Congress since “parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern.”—This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules
of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the
Report did not contain a “detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject
measure.” The Report used brackets and capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting.
We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have
already ruled, “parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.” Our
concern is with the procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements
are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The three-reading requirement refers only to bills introduced for the first time in
either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.—Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as
referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee report.
For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that
H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then
referred to a committee of that body; that although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted
a version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by “taking into consideration” the House bill; that for its part the Conference
Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was
thereafter approved by the House and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say
that, as a matter of fact, the members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that
the Conference Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Enrolled Bill Doctrine; An enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions
but also of its due enactment.—Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must
be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only
of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been
“smuggled” in the printing of the bill have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of
the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the “enrolled bill” rule is not absolute, the Supreme Court should decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
“surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared.—No claim is here made that the “enrolled bill”
rule is absolute. In fact in one case we “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself,
who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an
enrolled bill to consider. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions
into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.

Same; Same; Titles of Bills; The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to
inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it.—The question is whether
this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made
therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose
of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the
exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to § 103 of the
NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation
so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes,
although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of
Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and yet no
mention is made of its tax exemption.

Same; Same; Same; The trend is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not
unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation.—The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional
requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere with the enactment of necessary legislation and to
consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the statute and all its provisions are germane to the
general subject thus expressed.

Same; Same; Public Utilities; Franchises; The grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject
to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.—In contrast, in the case at bar,
Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL’s franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically excepting from the grant of
exemptions from the VAT PAL’s exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of Congress to do under Art. XII,
§ 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a public utility is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

Same; Taxation; Expanded Value Added Tax Law; Bill of Rights; Freedom of Expression; Even with due
recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic society, the press is not immune from general regulation
by the State.—To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom.
The PPI’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its
high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; The VAT law would perhaps be open to the charge of
discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.—What it contends is that
by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving printing, publication, importation
or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for discriminatory treatment and that within the
class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving broadcast media favored treatment. We have
carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential treatment of the press by the law, much less
any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is
not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special treatment but only because of the removal of the
exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other
transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the
scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege
withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is not the case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is a reasonable basis for the classification and different treatment
between print media and broadcast media.—Nor is impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and
broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving printing and publication, which
are different from the transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Religion; The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing
a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.—What has been
said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or
importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of thought
and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The VAT registration fee is a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right.—In this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed
for the exercise of a privilege but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration
requirement is a central feature of the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person
who is subject to the payment of the VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services
rendered. The registration fee is thus a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less
a constitutional right.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Hierarchy of Values; When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it
is freedom that commands a momentum of respect and when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers’ judgment that
commands respect.—There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom
of speech, press and religion. The possible “chilling effect” which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and
conscience and the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand
the exercise of this Court’s power of review. There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law
also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to due process and the equal
protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on
constitutional law thus: “[W]hen freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of
respect; when property is imperiled it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not
precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of
values within the due process clause.”

Same; Same; Same; The legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the subject
of taxation.—On the other hand, the CUP’s contention that Congress’ withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives,
marketing cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes
against the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies
such cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere
to a policy of “all or none” in choosing the subject of taxation.

Same; Same; Same; Regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce since what Congress is required
by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”—Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard
for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of
human dignity and the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the
right to “quality education” (Art. XIV, § 1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation,
not as judicially enforceable rights.

Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause; Contracts; Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix
obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts
as a basic postulate of the legal order.—Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of
CREBA that the imposition of the VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the
effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.” It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter
the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations
as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic
postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a
government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Contract Clause is not a limitation on the power of taxation save only where
a tax exemption was granted for a valid consideration.—In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a
limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its
position, as discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific,
law.

Same; Judicial Review; Public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they
meet the standing requirement of the Constitution; There must be before the Court a fully developed factual record that
alone can impart to its adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well-
grounded.—The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of
the lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by “non-
Hohfeldian” or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the Constitution;
that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a “special function” of vindicating constitutional rights. Nonetheless the feeling
cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record that alone can impart to
our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say,
we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect
we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having done in these cases—to sit as a
third legislative chamber to review legislation.

Same; Same; The duty of the Court to exercise its power of judicial review must still be performed in the context
of a concrete case or controversy; That the other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse
of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising the Court’s power.—It does not add anything, therefore, to
invoke this “duty” to justify this Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case that at best is not ripe for adjudication.
That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our
jurisdiction in terms of “cases,” and nothing but “cases.” That the other departments of the government may have
committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential
limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run only result in undermining our authority as a
court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is judgment according to law, not according to what may
appear to be the opinion of the day.

MENDOZA, J.:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.

These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various
grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:

I. Procedural Issues:

A.Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution?

B.Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?

C.What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?

II. Substantive Issues:

A.Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?

1.§ 1

2.§ 4

3.§ 5

4.§ 10

B.Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?

1.Art. VI, § 28(1)

2.Art. VI, § 28(3)

These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these questions
are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially
enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution,
especially the provisions relating to them.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress
violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not
passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to
produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of
the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of
Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:

Art. VI, § 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

Id., § 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills1 were introduced in the House
of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-
added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval
a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF
TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF
TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED

The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was
approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.

It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.

On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630,
entitled

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE
IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

It was stated that the bill was being submitted “in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res.
No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.”

On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and
approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the
affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.

H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after
meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that “House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with
Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the
conferees.”

The Conference Committee bill, entitled “AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES,” was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2,
1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became
Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation
and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for
the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped
because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.
 First. Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not “originate exclusively” in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, § 24 was
adopted from the American Federal Constitution,2 it is notable in two respects: the verb “shall originate” is qualified in
the Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as on other bills” in the American version is
omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716
must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.

This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law—but the revenue bill—which is required by
the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a
bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is
important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute—and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law—must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments”
but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power3 and thereby equalize its powers and those of the
House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power
which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of
“a Senate and a House of Representatives.”4 The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative
power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the
legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the
Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate5 has never been thought of as giving it more legislative
powers than the House of Representatives.

In the United States, the validity of a provision (§ 37) imposing an ad valorem tax based on the weight of vessels,
which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that the provision was a
revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution.6 Nor is the power to
amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far
as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it
struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House
subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the
Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision
bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922.7 Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose
amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.

It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill
(S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in
enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause
and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment
by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either
case the result are two bills on the same subject.

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to
be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws.

Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court
cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House
passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever
considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of
legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the
submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the
priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was
first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and
H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.

Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We
now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required
by the Constitution8 because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was
because on February 24, 19949 and again on March 22, 1994,10 the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, §
26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on
separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the two are really
coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing with the second
requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate
the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of securing the
immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the
printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in
insuring imme-diate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and
distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of
an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a
law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.11

That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill
defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No.
5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after
the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.12

There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the
requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of
three readings on separate days, also.

It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency,
the condition stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being an unusual condition in this country.

It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the
certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate
accepted the President’s certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no
evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the
members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law
under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the
President under Art. VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the
factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to
insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.

Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is
because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the President
likewise certified H. No. 9210 then pending in the House.

Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference
Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report
included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were “surreptitiously”
inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and
25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result
of the give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.

Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive
sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the
conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a
cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of their “secret meetings” on April 21 and 25,
1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by
ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer’s own limitations or to the incoherence that
sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past
Presidents of the United States.

In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions with
only the conferees and their staffs in attendance.13 Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open
sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber’s conferees may vote in public to close the meetings.

As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:

Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change
in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new
provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating
in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an
entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a
new bill . . . .

The result is a third version, which is considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only requirement for
which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.16

Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.17 If the committee can propose an
amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of
the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to
become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a
third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a conference
committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the
Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in
support of this contention:

Rules of the Senate

Rule XII:

§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint
resolution, the differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which shall meet within ten days
after their composition.

The President shall designate the members of the conference committee in accordance with subparagraph (c),
Section 3 of Rule III.

Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in
or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report has been filed with the Secretary of the
Senate and copies thereof have been distributed to the Members.

(Emphasis added)
Rules of the House of Representatives

Rule XIV:

§ 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the amendments
to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both Chambers.

The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in order, except when the journal is being read,
while the roll is being called or the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports shall be signed
by the conferees. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to
the subject measure.

The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided,
That in the last fifteen days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of the report, signed as
above provided, are deposited in the office of the Secretary General.

(Emphasis added)

To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV,
§ 112 of the Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that “If there is no Rule applicable to a specific case the precedents
of the Legislative Department of the Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules contained
in Jefferson’s Manual.” The following is then quoted from the Jefferson’s Manual:

The managers of a conference must confine themselves to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include
subjects not within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue.

Note that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule applicable, resort must be to the legislative
practice. The Jefferson’s Manual is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that conference
committee reports include new matters which, though germane, have not been committed to the committee. This
practice was admitted by Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral argument in these cases.
Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson’s Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any
constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, § 16(3) of the Constitution provides that
“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings . . . .”

This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the
preparation of the Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a “detailed and sufficiently explicit
statement of changes in, or amendments to, the subject measure.” The Report used brackets and capital letters to
indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols the
Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House. Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, “parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern.”19 Our concern is with the procedural requirements
of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied that they
have been faithfully observed in these cases.

Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report in these cases must have undergone three
readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation since each house may seek
modifications of the compromise bill. The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by each house on a
“take it or leave it” basis, with the only alternative that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference
committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still be a compromise measure that may not be wholly
satisfying to both houses.

Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to bills introduced for the first time in either
house of Congress, not to the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring three readings is to give
members of Congress time to study bills, it cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after three
readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading and then referred to a committee of that body; that
although the Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a version (S. No. 1630) which it had
prepared by “taking into consideration” the House bill; that for its part the Conference Committee consolidated the two
bills and prepared a compromise version; that the Conference Committee Report was thereafter approved by the House
and the Senate, presumably after appropriate study by their members. We cannot say that, as a matter of fact, the
members of Congress were not fully informed of the provisions of the bill. The allegation that the Conference
Committee usurped the legislative power of Congress is, in our view, without warrant in fact and in law.

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its
favor. Our cases20 manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its
provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid
because the requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained21 or that certain provisions of a statute had been
“smuggled” in the printing of the bill22 have moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch
of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the “enrolled bill” rule is absolute. In fact in one case23 we “went behind” an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the
Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake
and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee “surreptitiously” inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the
“enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government.

Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, § 26(1) which provides that “Every bill passed by Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” It is contended that neither H. No. 11197
nor S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was
made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.

The title of Republic Act No. 7716 is:

AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Among the provisions of the NIRC amended is § 103, which originally read:

§ 103. Exempt transactions.—The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory.

Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D.
No. 1590) from the payment of all “other taxes . . . now or in the near future,” in consideration of the payment by it
either of the corporate income tax or a franchise tax of 2%.

As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of the NIRC now provides:

§ 103. Exempt transactions.—The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:

....

(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529,
972, 1491, 1590. . . .

The effect of the amendment is to remove the exemption granted to PAL, as far as the VAT is concerned.

The question is whether this amendment of § 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. 7716,
although no mention is made therein of P.D. No. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since
the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its
base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P.D. No. 1590 be mentioned in the title of
the law, in addition to § 103 of the NIRC, in which it is specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill
should be a complete index of its content.

The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress and to inform the people of pending
legislation so that, if they wish to, they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before
that its exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason
other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed,
the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL’s own franchise under P.D. No. 1590, and
yet no mention is made of its tax exemption. The title of P.D. No. 1590 is:

AN ACT GRANTING A NEW FRANCHISE TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. TO ESTABLISH, OPERATE, AND MAINTAIN
AIRTRANSPORT SERVICES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

The trend in our cases is to construe the constitutional requirement in such a manner that courts do not unduly interfere
with the enactment of necessary legislation and to consider it sufficient if the title expresses the general subject of the
statute and all its provisions are germane to the general subject thus expressed.

It is further contended that amendment of petitioner’s franchise may only be made by special law, in view of § 24 of P.D.
No. 1590 which provides:

This franchise, as amended, or any section or provision hereof may only be modified, amended, or repealed expressly by
a special law or decree that shall specifically modify, amend, or repeal this franchise or any section or provision thereof.

This provision is evidently intended to prevent the amendment of the franchise by mere implication resulting from the
enactment of a later inconsistent statute, in consideration of the fact that a franchise is a contract which can be altered
only by consent of the parties. Thus in Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty,25 it was held that an Act of the U.S. Congress,
which provided for the payment of tax on certain goods and articles imported into the Philippines, did not amend the
franchise of plaintiff, which exempted it from all taxes except those mentioned in its franchise. It was held that a special
law cannot be amended by a general law.

In contrast, in the case at bar, Republic Act No. 7716 expressly amends PAL’s franchise (P.D. No. 1590) by specifically
excepting from the grant of exemptions from the VAT PAL’s exemption under P.D. No. 1590. This is within the power of
Congress to do under Art. XII, § 11 of the Constitution, which provides that the grant of a franchise for the operation of a
public utility is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress when the common good so requires.

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

A. Claims of Press Freedom, Freedom of Thought and Religious Freedom

The Philippine Press Institute (PPI), petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, is a nonprofit organization of newspaper publishers
established for the improvement of journalism in the Philippines. On the other hand, petitioner in G.R. No. 115781, the
Philippine Bible Society (PBS), is a nonprofit organization engaged in the printing and distribution of bibles and other
religious articles. Both petitioners claim violations of their rights under §§ 4 and 5 of the Bill of Rights as a result of the
enactment of the VAT Law.

The PPI questions the law insofar as it has withdrawn the exemption previously granted to the press under § 103
(f) of the NIRC. Although the exemption was subsequently restored by administrative regulation with respect to the
circulation income of newspapers, the PPI presses its claim because of the possibility that the exemption may still be
removed by mere revocation of the regulation of the Secretary of Finance. On the other hand, the PBS goes so far as to
question the Secretary’s power to grant exemption for two reasons: (1) The Secretary of Finance has no power to grant
tax exemption because this is vested in Congress and requires for its exercise the vote of a majority of all its members26
and (2) the Secretary’s duty is to execute the law. § 103 of the NIRC contains a list of transactions exempted from VAT.
Among the transactions previously granted exemption were:

(f) Printing, publication, importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or bulletin which appears at
regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription and sale and which is devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements.

Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the result that print media became subject to the VAT with
respect to all aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,
respondent Secretary of Finance issued Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the “circulation
income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of
freedom of the press, among others.” The exemption of “circulation income” has left income from advertisements still
subject to the VAT.

It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption granted is beyond the authority of the
Secretary of Finance to give, in view of PPI’s contention that even with the exemption of the circulation revenue of print
media there is still an unconstitutional abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT on the gross
receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on
the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to print media transactions, we find no violation of press
freedom in these cases.

To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face operates in the area of press freedom. The
PPI’s claim is simply that, as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with due recognition of its
high estate and its importance in a democratic society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by the
State. It has been held:

The publisher of a newspaper has no immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to
invade the rights and liberties of others. He must answer for libel. He may be punished for contempt of court . . . . Like
others, he must pay equitable and nondiscriminatory taxes on his business . . . .27

The PPI does not dispute this point, either.

What it contends is that by withdrawing the exemption previously granted to print media transactions involving
printing, publication, importation or sale of newspapers, Republic Act No. 7716 has singled out the press for
discriminatory treatment and that within the class of mass media the law discriminates against print media by giving
broadcast media favored treatment. We have carefully examined this argument, but we are unable to find a differential
treatment of the press by the law, much less any censorial motivation for its enactment. If the press is now required to
pay a value-added tax on its transactions, it is not because it is being singled out, much less targeted, for special
treatment but only because of the removal of the exemption previously granted to it by law. The withdrawal of
exemption is all that is involved in these cases. Other transactions, likewise previously granted exemption, have been
delisted as part of the scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The law would perhaps be open to
the charge of discriminatory treatment if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press. But that is
not the case.

The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No.
7716 subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the discriminatory purpose was clear either from
the background of the law or from its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American Press Co.,28 the law imposed a
license tax equivalent to 2% of the gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers which had a
circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week. Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone
but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in
Louisiana, leaving untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000 copies a week and 120 weekly
newspapers which were in serious competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well known that the
thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana responded
by taxing what Long described as the “lying newspapers” by imposing on them “a tax on lying.” The effect of the tax was
to curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted, the tax was “a deliberate and
calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the
constitutional guaranties.”29 The case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is the power to
destroy.

In the other case30 invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to have been singled out because everything was
exempt from the “use tax” on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on the sales of goods in that
state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a complementary tax on the privilege of “using, storing or consuming in that
state tangible personal property” by eliminating the residents’ incentive to get goods from outside states where the
sales tax might be lower. The Minnesota Star Tribune was exempted from both taxes from 1967 to 1971. In 1971,
however, the state legislature amended the tax scheme by imposing the “use tax” on the cost of paper and ink used for
publication. The law was held to have singled out the press because (1) there was no reason for imposing the “use tax”
since the press was exempt from the sales tax and (2) the “use tax” was laid on an “intermediate transaction rather than
the ultimate retail sale.” Minnesota had a heavy burden of justifying the differential treatment and it failed to do so. In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court found the law to be discriminatory because the legislature, by again amending the law
so as to exempt the first $100,000 of paper and ink used, further narrowed the coverage of the tax so that “only a
handful of publishers pay any tax at all and even fewer pay any significant amount of tax.”31 The discriminatory purpose
was thus very clear.

More recently, in Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,32 it was held that a law which taxed general interest
magazines but not newspapers and religious, professional, trade and sports journals was discriminatory because while
the tax did not single out the press as a whole, it targeted a small group within the press. What is more, by
differentiating on the basis of contents (i.e., between general interest and special interests such as religion or sports) the
law became “entirely incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”

These cases come down to this: that unless justified, the differential treatment of the press creates risks of
suppression of expression. In contrast, in the cases at bar, the statute applies to a wide range of goods and services. The
argument that, by imposing the VAT only on print media whose gross sales exceeds P480,000 but not more than
P750,000, the law discriminates is without merit since it has not been shown that as a result the class subject to tax has
been unreasonably narrowed. The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press alone but to all sales. Nor is
impermissible motive shown by the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated differently. The press is taxed
on its transactions involving printing and publication, which are different from the transactions of broadcast media.
There is thus a reasonable basis for the classification.

The cases canvassed, it must be stressed, eschew any suggestion that “owners of newspapers are immune from
any forms of ordinary taxation.” The license tax in the Grosjean case was declared invalid because it was “one single in
kind, with a long history of hostile misuse against the freedom of the press.”34 On the other hand, Minneapolis Star
acknowledged that “The First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press [and that] the States and the
Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating
constitutional problems.”35

What has been said above also disposes of the allegations of the PBS that the removal of the exemption of
printing, publication or importation of books and religious articles, as well as their printing and publication, likewise
violates freedom of thought and of conscience. For as the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization,36 the Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not prohibit imposing a generally
applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.

This brings us to the question whether the registration provision of the law,37 although of general applicability,
nonetheless is invalid when applied to the press because it lays a prior restraint on its essential freedom. The case of
American Bible Society v. City of Manila 38 is cited by both the PBS and the PPI in support of their contention that the
law imposes censorship. There, this Court held that an ordinance of the City of Manila, which imposed a license fee on
those engaged in the business of general merchandise, could not be applied to the appellant’s sale of bibles and other
religious literature. This Court relied on Murdock v. Pennsylvania,39 in which it was held that, as a license fee is fixed in
amount and unrelated to the receipts of the taxpayer, the license fee, when applied to a religious sect, was actually
being imposed as a condition for the exercise of the sect’s right under the Constitution. For that reason, it was held, the
license fee “restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their
exercise.”40

But, in this case, the fee in § 107, although a fixed amount (P1,000), is not imposed for the exercise of a privilege
but only for the purpose of defraying part of the cost of registration. The registration requirement is a central feature of
the VAT system. It is designed to provide a record of tax credits because any person who is subject to the payment of the
VAT pays an input tax, even as he collects an output tax on sales made or services rendered. The registration fee is thus
a mere administrative fee, one not imposed on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right.

For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No. 7716 on the ground that it offends the free speech,
press and freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without merit. For the same reasons, we find the
claim of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that the increase in the price of
books and other educational materials as a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the
government to give priority to education, science and technology (Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.

B. Claims of Regressivity, Denial of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Impairment of Contracts
There is basis for passing upon claims that on its face the statute violates the guarantees of freedom of speech, press
and religion. The possible “chilling effect” which it may have on the essential freedom of the mind and conscience and
the need to assure that the channels of communication are open and operating importunately demand the exercise of
this Court’s power of review.

There is, however, no justification for passing upon the claims that the law also violates the rule that taxation
must be progressive and that it denies petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection of the laws. The reason
for this different treatment has been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law thus: “[W]hen
freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is
imperiled it is the lawmakers’ judgment that commands respect. This dual standard may not precisely reverse the
presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
process clause.”41

Indeed, the absence of threat of immediate harm makes the need for judicial intervention less evident and
underscores the essential nature of petitioners’ attack on the law on the grounds of regressivity, denial of due process
and equal protection and impairment of contracts as a mere academic discussion of the merits of the law. For the fact is
that there have even been no notices of assessments issued to petitioners and no determinations at the administrative
levels of their claims so as to illuminate the actual operation of the law and enable us to reach sound judgment
regarding so fundamental questions as those raised in these suits.

Thus, the broad argument against the VAT is that it is regressive and that it violates the requirement that “The
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable [and] Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”42
Petitioners in G.R. No. 115781 quote from a paper, entitled “VAT Policy Issues: Structure, Regressivity, Inflation and
Exports” by Alan A. Tait of the International Monetary Fund, that “VAT payment by low-income households will be a
higher proportion of their incomes (and expenditures) than payments by higher-income households. That is, the VAT will
be regressive.” Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax on consumption goods of those who
are in the higher-income bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has been reduced, while basic
commodities, which before were taxed at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.

Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in
fact it distributes the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible particularly to those which are within the
reach of higher-income groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is thus equitable. The goods and
properties subject to the VAT are those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include real properties held
primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use industrial,
commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other
hand, small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than P500,000, are exempted. This, according to
respondents, removes from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business establishments. On the other hand, an
occasional paper43 of the Center for Research and Communication cites a NEDA study that the VAT has minimal impact
on inflation and income distribution and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is only P301 or
1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.

Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding these arguments, any discussion whether the
VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the “poor” and middle-income group in society harder than it will the “rich,”
as the Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) claims in G.R. No. 115873, is largely an academic exercise. On the
other hand, the CUP’s contention that Congress’ withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against
the constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of social justice (Art. XII, § 15) but also denies such
cooperatives the equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The legislature is not required to adhere to a
policy of “all or none” in choosing the subject of taxation.44

Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754,
that the VAT will reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any more concrete. It is a mere
allegation. On the other hand, the claim of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that the VAT will
drive some of its members out of circulation because their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for
their tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short
of the establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating the question whether the tax is oppressive and
confiscatory.
 Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to enforce. What Congress is required by the
Constitution to do is to “evolve a progressive system of taxation.” This is a directive to Congress, just like the directive to
it to give priority to the enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the reduction of social, economic
and political inequalities (Art. XIII, § 1), or for the promotion of the right to “quality education” (Art. XIV, § 1). These
provisions are put in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

At all events, our 1988 decision in Kapatiran45 should have laid to rest the questions now raised against the
VAT. There similar arguments made against the original VAT Law (Executive Order No. 273) were held to be
hypothetical, with no more basis than newspaper articles which this Court found to be “hearsay and [without]
evidentiary value.” As Republic Act No. 7716 merely expands the base of the VAT system and its coverage as provided in
the original VAT Law, further debate on the desirability and wisdom of the law should have shifted to Congress.

Only slightly less abstract but nonetheless hypothetical is the contention of CREBA that the imposition of the
VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered into prior to the effectivity of the law would
violate the constitutional provision that “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.” It is enough to
say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing
power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but
the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government which
retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.46

In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of
taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.47 Such is not the case of PAL in
G.R. No. 115852, and we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as discussed above, is that the
removal of its tax exemption cannot be made by a general, but only by a specific, law.

The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the
lack of a concrete record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate private cases; that public actions by “non-
Hohfeldian”48 or ideological plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing requirement of the
Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the Court has a “special function” of vindicating constitutional rights.
Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have before us in these cases a fully developed factual record
that alone can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality49 to insure that decision-making is informed and well
grounded. Needless to say, we do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having
done in these cases—to sit as a third legislative chamber to review legislation.

We are told, however, that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is duty imposed on this Court by the
Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look behind the barriers set
by the principle of separation of powers. Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 is cited in support of this view:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

To view the judicial power of review as a duty is nothing new. Chief Justice Marshall said so in 1803, to justify the
assertion of this power in Marbury v. Madison:

It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.50

Justice Laurel echoed this justification in 1936 in Angara v. Electoral Commission:

And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

This conception of the judicial power has been affirmed in several cases52 of this Court following Angara.
It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke this “duty” to justify this Court’s intervention in what is essentially a case
that at best is not ripe for adjudication. That duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or
controversy, as Art. VIII, § 5(2) clearly defines our jurisdiction in terms of “cases,” and nothing but “cases.” That the
other departments of the government may have committed a grave abuse of discretion is not an independent ground
for exercising our power. Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the
long run only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to render is
judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day.

In the preceding pages we have endeavored to discuss, within limits, the validity of Republic Act No. 7716 in its formal
and substantive aspects as this has been raised in the various cases before us. To sum up, we hold:

(1)That the procedural requirements of the Constitution have been complied with by Congress in the enactment of the
statute;

(2)That judicial inquiry whether the formal requirements for the enactment of statutes—beyond those prescribed by the
Constitution—have been observed is precluded by the principle of separation of powers;

(3)That the law does not abridge freedom of speech, expression or the press, nor interfere with the free exercise of
religion, nor deny to any of the parties the right to an education; and

(4)That, in view of the absence of a factual foundation of record, claims that the law is regressive, oppressive and
confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause are prematurely raised and do not
justify the grant of prospective relief by writ of prohibition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in these cases are DISMISSED.

Notes.—

Despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare
a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal
motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. (Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 [1990])

We start with the established principle that the exclusive nature of any public franchise is not favored. We may interpret
in favor of exclusiveness only when the statute grants it in express, clear, and unmistakable terms. In all grants by the
government to private corporations, the interpretation of rights, privileges, or franchises is taken against the grantee.
Whatever is not clearly and expressly granted is withheld. (Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 [1985])

CASE # 8

Lidasan vs. Commission on Elections

BARA LIDASAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent

Constitutional law; Constitutionality of statute; Title and subject matter of statute; Constitutional
limitations.—Section 21(1), Art. VI of the Constitution contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First, Congress is
to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second, the title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.

Same; Subject of statute to be expressed in the title of bill.—Of relevance here is the second directive. The
subject of the statute must be expressed in the title of the bill. Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval
in the House of Representatives, where the bill, being of local application, originated.

Same; Same; Purpose of such constitutional limitation.—The Constitution does not require Congress to employ
in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully indexed or catalogued, all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

Same; Same; Test of sufficiency of title.—The test of the sufficiency of a title whether or not it is misleading;
and, while technical accuracy is not essential and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly
inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
on indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance
rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.

Same; Same; Circumstances considered against the constitutionality of statute.—The baneful effects of the defective
title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not appraise the people in the towns of Bulden and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato
itself that part of their territory is being taken away from the towns and province and added to the adjacent province of
Lanao del Sur it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are
the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of R.A. 4700.

Same; Same; Title did not reflect transfer of a portion of territory from one province to another.—
Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the substantial diminution of the
territoral limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the boundary” of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away “need not
be expressed in the title of the law.” This posture—we must say—but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions
in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the other. This
is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.

Same; Separation of valid portion of statute from invalid parts; Exception to this rule.—But when the parts of
the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them.

Municipal corporations; Their twin functions.—Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly, they
serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government. Secondly, they act as an agency of
the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for
their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.

Constitutional law; Capacity to file suit challenging constitutionality of statute; Case at bar.—The right of
every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law so
created is not dismembering his place of residence “in accordance with the Constitution” is recognized in this
jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioner is a qualified voter. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was annexed to
a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in the town different from his actual residence.
Since his constitutional right to vote as citizen of that community is affected by the statute in question, he may become
a suitor to challenge its constitutionality.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Suntay for petitioner.

Barrios & Fule for respondent.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on Elections1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur”, but which includes barrios located in another
province—Cotabato—to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill” ? Comelec’s
answer is in the affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition for certiorari and prohibition.

On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in
dispute. The body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:

“SECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and
Magolatung, in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao del Sur, are separated from said
municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig.

SEC. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local officials.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”

It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato
and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its resolution of August IS, 1967, the pertinent portions of
which are:

“For purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
RESOLVED that pursuant to RA 4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise the barrios of
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung situated in the
municipality of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan situated in the municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.”

Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios—in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato—are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through the Assistant
Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until “clarified by
correcting legislation.”

Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute
“should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer
of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act
4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec’s resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement aforestated, that “[n]o bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”2

It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be “expressed in the title” of the bill.
This constitutional requirement “breathes the spirit of command.”3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact,
in the case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final
approval in the House of Representatives,4 where the bill, being of local application, originated.5

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And
this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.6

In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute conforms with the constitutional requirement,
the following, we believe, may be taken as guidelines:

“The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and
the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as
to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

x x x x

In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of
the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.”7

With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The title—“An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur”8—projects the impression that solely the province of
Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase “in the Province of Lanao del
Sur,” read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the
legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform
the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns
and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4790.

Respondent’s stance is that the change in boundaries of the two provinces resulting in “the substantial
diminution of territorial limits” of Cotabato province is “merely the incidental legal results of the definition of the
boundary” of the municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taken
away “need not be expressed in the title of the law.” This posture—we must say—but emphasizes the error of
constitutional dimensions in writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one
province to another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and income of the first and the corresponding
increase of those of the other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this
fact.

Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511, October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not
in focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads.: “An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao.” That title was assailed as unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions
of the law (Section 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the
title of the bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit “for, surely, an Act creating said provinces must be
expected to provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof”—which is “manifestly germane to the subject” of
the legislation, as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands altogether on a different footing. The lumping
together of barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of
the creation of the new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without
necessarily creating a new municipality and vice versa.
 As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648,
649. There, the statute in controversy bears the title “An Act to Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of
Muskegon.” The statute, however, in its Section 1 reads: “The people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following
described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa, Michigan, to wit: x x x be, and the same is hereby
constituted a village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport.” This statute was challenged as void by plaintiff,
a resident of Ottawa county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising jurisdiction and control, including taxing
his lands. Plaintiff based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State Constitution, which reads: “No law shall
embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.” The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The following, said in Hume,
may well apply to this case:

“It may be that words, ‘An act to incorporate the village of Fruitport,’ would have been a sufficient title, and that the
words, ‘in the county of Muskegon,’ were unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that the words last quoted
may, for that reason, be disregarded as surplusage.

xxx Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the purpose of
saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56 N J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to ‘challenge the attention of those affected by the act to its
provisions.’ Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan, 228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.

The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra: ‘The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is misleadin.”9

Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not
expressed in the title, were likewise declared unconstitutional.10

We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.

2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the
municipalities of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion thereof which took
away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of Buidon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.

We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of long standing, that where a portion of a statute is
rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.
Black, however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:

“x x x But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts
are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them,”

In substantially similar language, the same exception is recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:

“The general rule is that where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part is valid, the
valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid portion must be
so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if
they had supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. xxx Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent, xxx. The language used in the invalid part of the
statute can have no legal force or efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the legislative will
independently of the void part, since the court has no power to legislate, x x x.”12

Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine barrios
in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato, were to be excluded therefrom? The answer must be in the negative.

Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying
out the functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs.
It is in the latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the
State.

Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was
apparently these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill 1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking
of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:

“The territory is now a progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the collective income is sufficient
to maintain an independent municipality.

This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of
municipal autonomy.”

When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress, unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios—not nine
barrios—was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a number of questions, thus : Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective income sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality, still apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-one? Is it fair to assume that the
inhabitants of the said remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into a municipality, what with the
consequent duties and liabilities of an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on their own feet with the
income to be derived in their community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obligations?
This Court may not supply the answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain deaf to these problems,
or to answer them in the negative and still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute to Congress an
undeclared will. With the known premise that Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of progressive
community, large aggregate population and sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended to create
Dianaton with only nine—of the original twenty-one—barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured. For,
this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass
the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional
separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of the
originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.

Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.14

3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial
legal interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent’s pose is
that petitioner is not the real party in interest.

Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it violates the constitutional requirement that the
subject of the bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner’s substantial rights or
interests are impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has
been transferred to a different provincial hegemony.

The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to
asfcertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence “in accordance with the Constitution” is
recognized in this jurisdiction.15

Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before
it was annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his
actual residence. He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different communities which are formed into the
new town; he may prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights
and benefits he acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the new town; he may express a lack of
desire to vote for anyone of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the town before
dismemberment. Since by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in its title for the benefit,
amongst others, of the community affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the constitutional right to
vote on the part of any citizen of that community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge the constitutionality
of the Act as passed by Congress.
 For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and void, and to prohibit respondent
Commission from implementing the same for electoral purposes.

No costs allowed. So ordered.

CASE # 9

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of Inquiry;
Executive Privilege; Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation while Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.—
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they should not
be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while Section 22 pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are
different.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance
of executive officials under Section 22.—This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of
compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
22. The Court’s pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), is clear: When Congress merely seeks to be
informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is
not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states
that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
broad; To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.—The power of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has
limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases
where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President such as the
area of military and foreign relations.—In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744
(1998), this Court held that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters.” In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 360 SCRA 132 (2001),
there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in
closed-door Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the concept of presidential communications
privilege is fully discussed. As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of
the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of presidential communications privilege.—Nixon, In
Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit: 1)
The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 2) The
communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. 3) The presidential
communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that
the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.—Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of Congress or any of its committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right to public information.—The right of
Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right
to public information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people’s right to
information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information must be balanced with and should
give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts.—The members of respondent Committees should not invoke
as justification in their exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they
discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information
must be balanced with and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining
to delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous
decided cases.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.—We now proceed to the issue—
whether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked,
there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.” A
formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a “precise and certain reason” for preserving their
confidentiality. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is referring
to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was
even adjudged to be sufficient.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.—With regard to
the existence of “precise and certain reason,” we find the grounds relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific
enough so as not “to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged.” The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made “whether the information demanded
involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.” The particular ground must only be specified.
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.” The following statement of grounds satisfies the
requirement: The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential
nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details
of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. At any rate, as held further
in Senate v. Ermita, 481 SCRA 1 (2006), the Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a
matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent committees’ actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being
arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law.—A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling
witness. He manifested several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the
three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent
Committees to first rule on the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of
peremptorily dismissing his explanation as “unsatisfactory.” Undoubtedly, respondent Committees’ actions constitute
grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted
their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioner’s motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present
petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioner’s repeated request for an advance list of questions, if there be any
aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; The Court’s mandate is to preserve the constitutional principles at all times
to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds.—In this present crusade to “search for
truth,” we should turn to the fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government,
where the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it. They are considered
separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and
balances to prevent unwarranted exercise of power. The Court’s mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles
at all times to keep the political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective
powers and prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of our
democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Antonio R. Bautista, Paul Lentejas and Jose Mari Valez, Jr. for petitioner.

Pacifico A. Agabin, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and Carlos P. Medina, Jr. for respondents.

David Jonathan V. Yap for respondent Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institution & Currencies.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show cause Letter1 dated
November 22, 2007 and contempt Order2 dated January 30, 2008 concurrently issued by respondent Senate
Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,3 Trade and Commerce,4 and National Defense and
Security5 against petitioner Romulo L. Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA).

The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.$329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China.

In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows:

(1)P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE
OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS
OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF
ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS.

(2)P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled A RESOLUTION URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT
 (3)P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM
ZHING XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF
PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL
INTEGRITY.

(4)P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE
PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills in
the Senate, to wit:

1.Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT SUBJECTING TREATIES,
INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS, GOODS, AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE
PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

2.Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING SAFEGUARDS IN
CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; and

3.Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN ACT MANDATING
CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on
September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was
“out of town” during the other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the
Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to
convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He disclosed
that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his
approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,6 (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,7
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.8

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear
and testify on November 20, 2007.

However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested respondent
Committees to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the
letter reads:

“With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to appear and testify again on 20
November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and
exhaustively discussed the ZTE/NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September
2007.

Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for time to consult with his
superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
 Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege on the following
questions, to wit:

a)Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?

b)Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?

c)Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the
alleged bribe?

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence
between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of
conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The
expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective,
and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a
chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is
not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in
which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.

Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing,
wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege,
we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE/NBN project be dispensed with.”

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22, 2007,
the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. The Letter
reads:

“Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and Security require you to show cause why
you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.”

On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his intention
to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege, thus:

“It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with the task of the Senate in its
inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said
hearing, I answered all the questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive
privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after that
exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary
claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with.

Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during the 26 September 2007
hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to clarify, so that as a resource person, I may adequately
prepare myself.”

In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating, among
others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his conversation with
President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders
in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner’s request that he “be furnished in advance” as to
what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.

In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari assailing
the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.

Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for
advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:

ORDER

For failure to appear and testify in the Committee’s hearing on Tuesday, September 18, 2007; Thursday,
September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and
Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact
delayed, impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain
satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L.
NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make a return hereof within
twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.

SO ORDERED.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.9 He insisted that he has not
shown “any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest.” He emphasized his willingness to testify on new
matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also
mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter “through the issuance of declaration of contempt” and arrest.

In view of respondent Committees’ issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the
implementation of the said contempt Order.

On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees from
implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance
of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.

Petitioner contends that respondent Committees’ show cause Letter and contempt Order were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President
Arroyo are “candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions.” According to him, these discussions
“dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the country’s diplomatic relations and
economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.” He
also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid
down in Senate v. Ermita10 and United States v. Reynolds.11 Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing
communications made to him in official confidence under Section 712 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section 2413 (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioner’s testimony is material and pertinent
in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2) there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive
privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioner’s arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to court
with clean hands.

In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:

1.What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the principle of ‘executive privilege’?
1.a.Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by order of the President, to
cover (i) conversations of the President in the exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information,
which might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China?

1.b.Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his conversations with the President on
the NBN contract on his assertions that the said conversations “dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and
diplomatic matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines” x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita
(488 SCRA 1 [2006])?

1.c.Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the Constitution:

Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)

Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern)

Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)

Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)

and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?

2.What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3.Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of petitioner for non-compliance with
the subpoena?

After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24) hours if they are
amenable to the Court’s proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before the Senate
Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice to the decision on the merits of this
pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke executive privilege in the course of the Senate
Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered questions will be the
subject of a supplemental pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) questions subject of the present petition.14
At the same time, respondent Committees were directed to submit several pertinent documents.15

The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March 5, 2008. As to the
required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they would not be able to submit the
latter’s “Minutes of all meetings” and the “Minute Book” because it has never been the “historical and traditional
legislative practice to keep them.”16 They instead submitted the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of respondent
Committees’ joint public hearings.

On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached
Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:

(1)The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle of “executive privilege.”

(2)Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with the law-making body’s power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.

(3)Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-compliance with the Subpoena dated
November 13, 2007.

The Court granted the OSG’s motion the next day, March 18, 2008.

As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464
and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita17 when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
 First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order?

We grant the petition.

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold
strokes the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21
and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

“SECTION21.The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

SECTION22.The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon
the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other, they
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section
22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.19 Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct
inquiry, their objectives are different.

This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section
21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Court’s pronouncement in
Senate v. Ermita20 is clear:

“When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

CASE # 10

[No. L-3820. July 18, 1950]

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs. LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-Arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS,
Director of Prisons, respondents.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POWER OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY.—The power of inquiry,
with process to enforce it, is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY.—The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either
the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is
difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of legislative power.
3.ID.; POWER OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WITNESS FOR CONTEMPT.—No person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire.

4.ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the
investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION.—The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation.

6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.—Where the immateriality of the information sought by
the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the
contention. Although the legislative body has the power to make the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear
abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—Since the Court has no power to
determine what legislation to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness
which. is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not
within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after the
completion of the legislative investigation.

8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF
LEGISLATIVE SESSION.—There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to
the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. While the
existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so limited. The Senate is a
continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power
may constitutionally be exerted.

9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO ANSWER.—Testimony which is obviously false
or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be
so punishable.

10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is INCRIMINATORY.—It is not enough for the witness
to say that the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination
must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his
general 'Conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to
determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason
of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an. imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority. His constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly
established, must yield to that duty. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is
doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to live is one
of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas corpus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

J. C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.

Solicitor General Felix Bautista, Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Tañada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.

OZAETA, J:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to
which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads as follows:
"Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault
be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until
discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such
discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special
committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith."

The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as f ollows:

In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the
first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The
second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong
Estate.

The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held
a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years
counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering
to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the
accrued rentals amounting to P324,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.

On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a
down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P500,000 within one year and the remainder in annual installments of
P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of
his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind the sale to him. Aside from the down payment of
P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.

The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine
Trust Company sold said estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and promised to
pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive annual installments of P110,000 each.
The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's
having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold,
conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504
of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the
Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months.
Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of
a new one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine
Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration
and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:

"RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES
DEAL.

"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, has bought the
Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;

"WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista
Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios
Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;

"WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate
because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese
currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during the
occupation;

"WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by the Philippine Government by virtue of a deed of sale from the
Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 1947, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the
recession of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it

"RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be appointed
by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said
Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the
deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the
premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee
of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise
cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its
report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution."

The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which. the committee sought to
resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total
sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway
long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion
he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies,
Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the
desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:

"Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of funds, I take the position
that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been complied with. Here
also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from making answer which might later
be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am
certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my
position."

At a subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee, interrogated him as
follows:

"Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were legal?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.

"Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement, did not violate any law?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.

* * * * * * *

"Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were violated, how is it that
when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to
answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people.

* * * * * * *

"Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would be incriminated, or you
would be incriminating somebody?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a
result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it."

But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter
testified as follows:

"The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon
cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.

"The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount -of P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which you cashed on October 29,
1949?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.

"The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.

"The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you delivered this big amount
of P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.

"The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered this big amount on October 29,
1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?

"Mr. ARNAULT. No.

"The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask for a receipt?

"Mr, ARNAULT. I didn't ask.

"The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which
forms part of the P1-1/2 million paid to Burt?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.

"The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.

"The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?

"Mr.. ARNAULT. No.

"The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

"Mr. ARNAULT. No.

"The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.

"The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a certain person
whose name you do not like to reveal?

"Mr. ARNAULT. 1 have instruction to comply with the request of that person.

"The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction to you by Burt was verbal?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.

"The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here in the Philippines'

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?

"Mr. ARNAULT. No.

"The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you the verbal instruction?

"Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.

"The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.

"The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

"The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain person should receive
these P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.

"The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person without receipt?

"Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where I could meet him.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two cases involving the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have anything to do with the negotiation for the settlement of the two cases?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.

"The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?

"Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.

"The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.

"The CHAIRMAN. When you gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew already that person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.

"The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.

"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.

"The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.

"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is Spanish; can you remember the
first letter with which that family name begins?

Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.

"The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.

"The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. Several times?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

"The CHAIRMAN. When was the last time that you saw that certain person?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Sometime in December.

"The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never were able to find out
what was his name?

"Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we have not done
business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They say I am
'chiflado' because I don't know their names.

"The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or a female?

"Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.

"The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

"The CHAIRMAN. How old was he?

"Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 to 40 years, more or less.

"The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his complexion: light, dark
or light brown?

"Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Sen. abili), smaller- He walks very straight, with military
bearing

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the P440.000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.

"The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came to know his residence?

Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office

The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?

Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6."

On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was hauled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him the following
resolution:

"Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:

"That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious acts
committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to
probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate
propounded to him the following interrogatories:

"1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 on
October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because of the big amount of
money you gave to him without receipt, but also because by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when
General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt, and
the last time you saw him was in December 1949?"

Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the questions were
incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the
petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:

"Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that person to whom you
gave the P440, 000, you said that you can [could] not remember his name. That was your reason then for refusing to
reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440, 000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I understand
from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your
reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other
words, the question is this: What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave
the P440, 000: that you do not remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?

* * * * * * *

"Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should not be required to
testify unless he so desires.

"The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very clear. It does not
incriminate him.

* * * * * * *

"Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the first, second, and third
hearings to which I was made to testify. I stand by the statements that I have made in my letter to this Senate of May 2,
1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in those
statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do, to the best of my ability.

"The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the question.

"Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you, Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the investigation for not
revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging
because during the investigation you told us: 'I do not remember his name.' But, now, you are now saying: 'My answer
might incriminate me.' What is your real position?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second, and third hearings. I said
that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any answer that might be
incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the person has not been
included, it is an oversight.

"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or not the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember.

"Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that your answer might be
incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could your answer be self-
incriminating? What do you say to that?

"Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer those questions. That is
why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail
13 days without communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal
procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.

* * * * * * *

"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.

"The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate the witness.

* * * * * * *

"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making further answer,
please.

* * * * * * *

"Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the Senate, dated May 2,
1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a
public official you might render yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might
render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements when you cannot even tell us
whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual? We are giving you this
chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that your answers might incriminate you are given by
you honestly or you are just trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.

"The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question.

(The question is restated and explained.)

"Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2 was prepared by a lawyer for me and I signed it. That is all I can say how I stand
about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to
help me in my period of distress'."

In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit
information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner ref used to
reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions
concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the
postliberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the
Senate also made an attempt to elicit the desired information from the witness, as follows:

'The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or
for any consideration?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
"The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.

"The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that person?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.

"The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and, on the other hand,
you remember events that occurred during your childhood?

"Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain."

The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was
committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the contempt by
revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."

The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16), to wit:

"That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to continue its
investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue its
examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters
related therewith."

The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.

The case was argued twice before us. We have given it earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the
first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time this Court
is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt; and we
are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the future guidance of all
concerned.

Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general
principles of law which form the background of those issues.

Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three
independent but coordinate Departments—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the
Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two
thirds of all its Members, expel a Members (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States,
ours does not contain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for
contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared by and between the
Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other—the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the
States, respectively, or to the people—in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than
the Congress of the United States or any State Legislature.

Our f form of government being patterned after the American system—the framers of our Constitution having
drawn largely from American institutions and practices—we can, in this case, properly draw also from American
precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively? such power is so f ar incidental to the legislative f unction as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry—with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which
is not infrequently true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests
for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or
complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U. S., 135;
71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members
f or disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other
person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.)

But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required
in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.)

Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of
the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it may enter is
also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not
necessary for us to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.

In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the
Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a
questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which
Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation,
the investigating committee has recommended and the Senate has approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of
Justice or any other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached to his
own office, without previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of
the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government
is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are
appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed estates
at a price of P100,000 or more, and loans guaranteed by the Government involving P100,000 or more, shall not become
effective without previous congressional confirmation.1

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his contention
that his commitment is unlawful.

First. He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended
or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the
legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its report and has made all
its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to
force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge
Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be
dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending
that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and answer questions which will
definitely establish the identity of that person * * *." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and
argued the case for the respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information
from the witness. He said that the investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness,
his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution
No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16. his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more
particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the
House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily
all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.

Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think
the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject
of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer
must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a
question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question
that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the
materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single question.

In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to
determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that
jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction or the use of Congressional discretion;
and, it is insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not
subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As
was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was
with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N. Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N. E., 615, quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court of the United States in McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra.) Applying this principle to the question at hand, we
may concede that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the information sought from the witness is presumed to
be correct. But, as noted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is a
necessary deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the
matter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction,
the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to
make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that
power.

Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under
consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the
Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the
validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine
the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination—it is in fact the very thing
sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it
has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

The Court cannot determine, any more than it can direct Congress, what legislation to approve or not to
approve; that would be an invasion of the legislative prerogative. The Court, therefore, may not say that the information
sought from the witness which is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial to any proposed or
possible legislation.

It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the
uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave
the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower house and by the
President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found
unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other measures it may deem
necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or
imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by
the Senate to the witness.

The case of Re Chapman, 166 U. S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question was
conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to
corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which
would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the
stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena and was
asked, among others, the following questions:

"Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in
the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United States senator? "Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock
for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?"

He refused to answer those questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the Senate. Upon
being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of
the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case was whether the committee had the right
to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:

"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the committee
to inquire 'whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration
of the tariff bill now bef ore the Senate.' What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we
cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument,
but it is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations,
while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers."
(Italics ours.)

It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather
than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The petitioner has
not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to
determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due
performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the
other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for
the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of
the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila
will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall
have determined who those parties are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to
redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the
transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is a matter of public concern which it is the
duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S. E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)

The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In
that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a private real-estate pool
or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook & Company had had an interest in the pool but had become
bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United
States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts'
interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy
court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the
House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said
settlement, with the amount of property involved, in which Jay Cooke & Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to
be paid in said settlement, with power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of
the United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the
bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and
other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in
undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but
assumed a power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was
in its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress
possesses a "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually possessed is
limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully
may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be had only by judicial
proceeding, it is not within the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably to the constitutional
separation of governmental powers.

That case diff errs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of
the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of
Congress; while here it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a
questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate. (2)
There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke & Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was
pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot
be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible
are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to redress the wrong that may have
been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.

It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from
legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James
M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 214-
220.) We quote the following from Professor Landis' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by
the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it assumed
the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke & Co., with the Government, acting through the
House, attempting to override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before
the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy proceeding had already been instituted against Jay Cooke & Co. in a
federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired
jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of 'judicial power'! The broader aspect of the investigation
had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke & Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only
part of the great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the particular
failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts
connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such considerations
had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular investigation
and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in legislative practice.
Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry, placed in its proper background,
should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative
purpose was thus made the demand of the Court in Kilbourn. vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results
that may be achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract
speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their
possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their
presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress
nor the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of investigation."

The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S., 521; 61 L. ed., 881. The question
there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its authority, the
District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its
committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with
the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to
make inquiries and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the
House of Representatives had implied power to punish a person not a member f or contempt, but held that its action in
this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive
and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its f
unctions. This brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability
thereof to the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of
the committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the witness
to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make. But
in that case it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a person not a member for
contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the petitioner's) contention.

Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the opinion of
Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil.,
170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of
Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was
then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the sessions on that day and
those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By resolution of
the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and
ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twentyf our hours, That resolution was not complied
with because the session of the House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was
reiterated at the next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the
writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justices Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, on the ground that the term of
imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the body in which the
contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no
power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of
a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avanceña, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate
opinions, concurring with Justices Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the Legislature had inherent power to punish for
contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of commitment could only be executed during the particular
session in which the act of contempt was committed.

Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was
made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson vs. Dunn,
supra:

"And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of its
adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment."

as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:

"And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations which were
expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to subjects which justified
its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in
which the contempt occurred."

Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:

"From this doctrine it follows, in. my judgment, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of the
legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its existence and
not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the
right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative
body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace
to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which contempt was committed.

"If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it
is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until its final adjournment and the
election of its successor." Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported

by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice
Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where, as in the case 'before us, the members composing the legislative body against
which the contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against
the petitioner herein."

We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm are obiter
dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives of the
United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House,
brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The question
as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there presented was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempts committed against themselves, under any circumstances." The court
there held that the House of Representatives had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the
lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the
power under the Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt
of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court
held that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative
duty and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that
ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from
custody.
 The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the
Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate various
charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty
became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committte caused to be served on Mally S.
Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House,
Ohio, a subp?na commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the subject under
consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the
matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the Senate pro tempore issue his
warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M. S. Daugherty
wherever found, and to bring the said M. S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such
questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to
propound; and to keep the said M. S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being
arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The f ederal court granted
the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the
arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the
contentions of the witness was that the case had become moot because the investigation was ordered and the
committee was appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the
contention, the court said:

"* * * The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the period of the Sixty-
eight Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit
at such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: 'Neither House can
continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the consent of the
other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners for the particular purpose.' But the
context shows that the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by
the King.

The rule may be the same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single
Congress; but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are all elected for
a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each
Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or
resignation. "Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: 'The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its
committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;' and, after quoting the above statement from
Jefferson's Manual, he says: 'The Senate, however, being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the
recess after the expiration of a Congress.' So far as we are advised the select committee having this investigation in
charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has it been continued by an affirmative order.
Apparently its activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is certain that
the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and, if continued or revived, will have all its
orginal powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become moot in
the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to
enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission did not become moot through the
expiration of the order where it was capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our
judgment may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be
rendered as was done in the case cited.

"What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from custody be
reversed."

Like the Senate of the United States, the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are
elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-thirds
always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House
of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second
Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The
resolution of the Senate committing the petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which
began on the fourth Monday of January and ended on May 18, 1950.
 Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be
enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to
limit the power of a legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason f or the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is
to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that power is recognized in
the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to its legislative function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There
is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.

Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has
ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its
competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the ref usal of the petitioner as a witness to
answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue
the investigation during the recess. By ref using to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by
the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the witness
to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists as long as
the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it
may punish the witness for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize
the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for
its performance. Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the
adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and
repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed—an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.

As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate
will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this assumption, proper limitations
are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.

Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would
incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 because if that person be
a public official he (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter might
accuse him of oral defamation.

The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first
he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites had been
complied with; but at the same time he begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be used against
me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he ref used to answer questions concerning
them "because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people. * * * I simply stand on my
privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account
for any use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness
testified that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in
compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that, as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do
with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several
times before he gave him the ?440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three
times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5
feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. But the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts:
"I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."

We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, What is the name of that person
to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim bef ore the bar of the Senate that if he should
reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown.

"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of
Mason vs. U. S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a
charge of gambling against six other men, After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were
arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of
cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you were sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards
being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled
"that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the
witnesses." Mason was again called and he ref used to answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to
frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the
Supreme Court of the United States among other things said:

"In the present case the witnesses certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that so to
do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, 'I don't
know,' given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege."

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of
Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the
name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

"Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough
for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-
incrimmation must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as
well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of
the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. * * * The fact that the testimony of
a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the
constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment
for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person." (3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135, 1136.)

"It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N. E. [2d], 210 [111. App., 1939].) A witness is not
relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question." (Mason vs. U. S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)

As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank,
sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's
obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and
militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the
Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each
.other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the latter.
The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates
his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch
beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not less certain that the laws under which he
suffers were made for the security;" Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish
the restraint of his liberty pending the f ulfilment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which
his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.

From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.

Parás, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

CASE # 11
 G.R. No. 169777.* April 20, 2006.**

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader,
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, “COMPAÑERA” PIA
S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA “LOI” EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J.
GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S. LIM, M.A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMEÑA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR
ROXAS, petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Republicanism; Public Officers; Public Accountability and Transparency; Right to
Information; A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state; History has been a witness
to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zeal-ously.—A
transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican
thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished
delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.” History has been witness, however, to the
fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

Same; Judicial Review; Requisites.—Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial
review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464); Locus Standi; Legislators; The Senate, including its individual
members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail
the constitutionality of E.O. 464; Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.—That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right
essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation
is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is
crucial to law-making. Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the
outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are
allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Party-list representatives likewise are allowed to sue to question the
constitutionality of E.O. 464, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional
rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.—In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna),
Teodoro Casiño (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anak-pawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis),
and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that
an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation
of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights
and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A national political party likewise meets the standing requirement, provided
that it has obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in a national elections, which entitles it to participate
in the legislative process.—The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it
obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in
the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging
to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies
to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation. As Bayan Muna and
Representatives Ocampo, et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners
COURAGE and CODAL is rendered unnecessary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen Suits; It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct
and personal.—It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v.
House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 44, 136 (2003), this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Parties; The allegation that E.O. 464 hampers a political party’s legislative
agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only “generalized interest” which it shares with the rest of the political
parties; Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part
to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.—As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is
clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in
order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy,
petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is
vague and uncertain, and at best is only a “generalized interest” which it shares with the rest of the political parties.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it
in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not
suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Same; Same; Same; Case or Controversy Requirement; E.O. 464 does not require either deliberate withholding
of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before
Congress; It would be a sheer abandonment of duty if the Supreme Court would refrain from passing on the
constitutionality of E.O. 464.—The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent
or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or
controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or
an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. As the
implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of
petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present
case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing
on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Same; Presidency; Congress; Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; Power of Inquiry; Congress has
authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, and its power of inquiry extends to executive officials
who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.—Since Congress has authority to inquire into
the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to
executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the
power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If
the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that
subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure
thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation,
there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive
privilege.”—Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since this term figures prominently in the challenged
order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege
is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
 Same; Same; Executive Privilege; Words and Phrases; The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this
jurisdiction; Executive privilege has been defined as “the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress,” as well as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”—The phrase “executive privilege” is not
new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American
origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines it as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” Executive privilege is,
nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept.It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe, in fact, comments that
while it is customary to employ the phrase “executive privilege,” it may be more accurate to speak of executive
privileges “since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of
considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative
investigations.”

Same; Same; Same; Varieties of Executive Privilege.—One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state
secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such
nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s
privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations
of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has
been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

Same; Same; Same; In determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not
only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege
should be honored in a given procedural setting.—That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not,
however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a
claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.

Same; Same; Same; Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character; The extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.—From
the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction,
a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized
only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by
the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Question Hour; In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning—it is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold
the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period.—In the context of a parliamentary system of
government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold
the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in
the 1973 Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the
parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are
directly accountable to it. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential
system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The
moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed
the mandatory nature of appearance by department heads during the question hour in the present Constitution so as
to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.—The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the
mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully
to a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction,
departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in
a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in
all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of
duty, but when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87
Phil. 29 (1950); The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it
is performed in pursuit of legislation.—Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault. In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be
facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with
the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege—they are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads.—Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power—the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt
from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it
during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 1 of E.O. 464, in view of its specific
reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of
legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour
contemplated in said Section 22, but could not be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation; The requirement to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face.—Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22
of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as
possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Execu-tive privilege is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons; The reference in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. 464 to persons
being “covered by the executive privilege” may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in
possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section
2(a).—Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of
executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment
of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP,
and the National Security Adviser), are “covered by the executive privilege.” The enumeration also includes such other
officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2—“Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege”—, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision
is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court notes that
Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine.
Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to
categories of persons. In light, however, of Sec. 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being “covered by the executive privilege” may be read as an abbreviated
way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned,
privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the
challenged order.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue whether
executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA
152 (2002), that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even
against Congress, such as Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings.—While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be
invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152, 189 (2002), that certain
information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case
holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts,
or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.
(Emphasis and italics supplied) Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact
that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized
by the Order to determine whether it is valid.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the validity of claim of privilege must be assessed on a case to case
basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied
privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se; Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers
the requested information privileged; A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose
information, must be clearly asserted.—While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case
basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied
claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of
respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied
by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by
the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by
the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase “confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order.” Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that
it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first
impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly
blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim
of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Due respect for a co-equal branch of government
demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor.—Due respect for a co-equal branch of
government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the
following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S., 364 U.S. 372, 81 S.Ct. 138, 5 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1960): We think the Court’s decision in
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was
there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect
for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his)
reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an
opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. ‘To deny the
Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an
obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was “a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned
to produce papers before a congressional committee [, and] cannot be condoned.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.—Upon
the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. A useful analogy in determining the
requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S. declares: “The
witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself—
his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified,
and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon
interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to
guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.” x x x

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is
invalid per se since it is not asserted but merely implied.—The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation
to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under
the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b)
of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No infirmity can be imputed to Section 2(a) of E.O. 464 as it merely provides
guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege.—
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of
office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the
other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the
nature and scope of executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Right to Information; The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation
to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.—Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that,
once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow
the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to
the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to
information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain
informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; In light of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court
finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege, though she may authorize the Executive
Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is
“By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her.—In light of this highly exceptional
nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of
course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary
must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In
other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to
uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in
relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter
which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform
the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege.—When an official is being
summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be
afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider
whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the
President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the
official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 464; Section 3 of E.O. 464 is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated—that such authorization is partly motivated by
the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.—The Court
notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of
E.O. 464 is to ensure “respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.” That such rights
must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that “[t]he
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” In light of the above discussion of
Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it
must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not
change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Information; Power of Inquiry; There are clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.—There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one,
the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the
power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual
citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information which being presumed
to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern.—To the extent that investigations in aid of
legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress—opinions which they can then
communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their
freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989]: It is in the interest of the State that the
channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able
to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.(Emphasis and italics supplied) The impairment of the right of the people
to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of
the legislature’s power of inquiry.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Publication; Due Process; While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the
executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication—it is a matter of public
interest which members of the body politic may question before the Supreme Court; Due process requires that the
people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.—While E.O. 464 applies only to officials
of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for
publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986),
states: The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied) Although the above
statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the
publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question
before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was
implemented.

Republicanism; Right to Information; What republican theory did accomplish was to reverse the old
presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in
favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.—The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For “[w]hat republican theory did accomplish . .
. was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it
with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Italics supplied)” Resort to any
means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid.
Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government,
but we shall have given up something of much greater value—our right as a people to take part in government.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Orlando E. Mendiola for petitioners in G.R. No. 171246.

Francisco I. Chavez for and in his own behalf in G.R. No. 169660.

Melizel F. Asuncion, Raoul P. Barbarona, Raissa H. Jajurie, Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Ma. Lourdes Zerelda S. Pacuribot
and Marlon J. Manuel for petitioner ALG in G.R. No. 169667.

Luis Ma. Gil L. Gana for petitioners in G.R. No. 169834.

Neri Javier Colmenares for petitioners in G.R. No. 169659.

Pacifico A. Agabin for petitioner in G.R. No. 169777.

Aquilino LL. Pimentel III for petitioner in G.R. No. 169834.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

David Jonathan V. Yap for Senate of the Philippines.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican
thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished
delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”1

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse,
hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional.

In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has
come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once
the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the
Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of
the government that contravenes its mandates.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North
Rail Project.

The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22, 2005
to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon;
Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear
Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant
Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant,
Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing
scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on
June 6, 2005 entitled “Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral
Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005”; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26,
2005 entitled “The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World”; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon
delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled “Clear and Present Danger”; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria
Ana Consuelo Madrigal—Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in
Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called “Gloriagate Scandal”; and (5)
Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon—Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and
Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the WireTapping of the President of the Philippines.

Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement “due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his] utmost personal attention” while “some of the invited AFP officers are
currently attending to other urgent operational matters.”

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 “respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding
the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited” in order to “afford said
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the
Senate Committee on its investigation.”

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators “are unable to accede to
[his request]” as it “was sent belatedly” and “[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource
persons were completed [the previous] week.”

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or
cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been
secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, “ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES,”7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order
are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress.—In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of
the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall only be conducted in executive session.

SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.—

(a) Nature and Scope.—The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995, 244 SCRA 286). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the
public interest.

Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered
by this executive order, including:

i.Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order
(Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002,
384 SCRA 152);

ii.Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,
G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744).

iii.Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);

iv.Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716,
9 December 1998, 299 SCRA 744);

v.Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002,
299 SCRA 744).

(b) Who are covered.—The following are covered by this ex-ecutive order:

i.Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege;

ii.Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the
Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
iii.Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the ex-ecutive privilege;

iv.Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the execu-tive
privilege; and

v.Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress.—All public officials enumerated in Section 2
(b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O.
464, and another letter8 informing him “that officials of the Execu-tive Department invited to appear at the meeting
[regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to
[E.O. 464]” and that “said officials have not secured the required consent from the President.” On even date which was
also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him “that per instruction of [President
Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or
Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President” and “that no approval has been granted
by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005.”

Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.

For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings.

As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O.
464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit
Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department
of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department
of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza,
Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases
Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail
President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo,
Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casiño, COURAGE, an organization of government
employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CO-DAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of
justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of
the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that
respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be
prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to
congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from
fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party
entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as
members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation of laws; COURAGE alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and
threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL
alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to transparent
governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
 In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer
and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.

In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal
resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and
marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of
the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null
and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from
implementing it.

On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of
the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the
same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s
powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.

On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834,
alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented
through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues
need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him
and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga
replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that “[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters
requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing” and that “they will
attend once [their] request is approved by the President.” As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February
10, 2006 was cancelled.16

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on
October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda
Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R.
Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.

In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local Government
Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from
the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was
allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.

On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all
Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition
for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.

All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.

In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the
following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art.
VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or controversy
that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective
memoranda.
 After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda,
paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2)
assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the
NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22

Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in
G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246
did not file any memorandum.

Petitioners Bayan Muna, et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was
granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the
interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:

Art. VI, Sec. 21

Art. VI, Sec. 22

Art. VI, Sec. 1

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.

Sec. 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request
of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited
to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Art. XI, Sec. 133

Art. III, Sec. 734

Art. III, Sec. 435

Art. XIII, Sec. 1636

Art. II, Sec. 2837

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

34 Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

35 Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

36 Sec. 16. The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of
adequate consultation mechanisms.

37 Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
 Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita, et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38
on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.

The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:

1.Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2.Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3.Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the
requisites for a valid exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.

Standing

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667 make it
clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the investigations
called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its
different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain
that Representatives Ocampo, et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of
Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by
the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Muna’s alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and
that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the
Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties
“injured-infact.”40

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the
implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct
injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail
the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Invoking this Court’s ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the
enforcement of E.O. 464.44

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly
stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate,
including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the
proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47
 In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casiño (Bayan Muna), Joel
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to
sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of
Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being
sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in
the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack welldefined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo, et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the
standing of their co-petitioners COURAGE and CODAL is rendered unnecessary.49

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and
violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the
balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.52

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws,
presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.

As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues
raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded
standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is
public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a
more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54 The first and last determinants not being
present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and
specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its
allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a “generalized interest”
which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-
Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.

Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its
hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy.

Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually
withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely
communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President
prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September
28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the President’s consent was based on its role as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.

Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse
its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for
challenging the validity of E.O. 464.

The Court finds respondents’ assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of
the officials concerned immaterial in determining the exis-with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether
actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally
capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Laban’s alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with
legal standing.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the
information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information
violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the
power of inquiry, is in order.

The power of inquiry

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. (Italics supplied)

This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the
power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein—the Batasang Pambansa—and its committees.

The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950
under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.

Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the
controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the
senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senate’s
power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:

“Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such
power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry—with process
to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—which is not infrequently—
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are
often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.”59 . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)

That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the
same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters
which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows
that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is
the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, “also involved government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.”

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to
hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on
executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, “with process to enforce it,” is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices
is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and
the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called “McCarthy era,” however, the right of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may
thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.

For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid
of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions.
Parentheti-cally, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject
of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part
of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.

Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or House’s duly published rules of procedure,
necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.
Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an
imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected,
even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to
obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in
palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such
instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Ex-ecutive Branch to forestall these abuses may be
accorded judicial sanction.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege.” Since this term figures prominently in the challenged
order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive
privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Executive privilege

The phrase “executive privilege” is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the
1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as “the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress.”64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept.66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe,
in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase “executive privilege,” it may be more accurate to
speak of executive privileges “since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three
distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial
or legislative investigations.”

One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning
with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military
or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose
the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.68

Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:

“Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of
information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the
executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might
reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of
government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending
investigations. x x x”69 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on “executive privilege” is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the
doctrine.

“This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends
not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’
domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in
intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.”70 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that
case was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court
requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege
was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S.
Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court,
nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public
interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.

Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent
assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over
treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as
Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the
balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest
protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that
the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena.76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:

“The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of
all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to
express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution x x x ” (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized
that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in
substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.

In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
“governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters.”80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on
the right to information.
 Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend
to matters recognized as “privileged information under the separation of powers,”82 by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that
information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations
of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to
information.

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public,
is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Validity of Section 1

Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which
constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by
any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the
determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not
made to depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all.
Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has
been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22
which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either
House of Congress to “conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.” As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of
Congress.

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that
members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the
Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang
Pambansa—as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa—one of the most competent
inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is
the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional
investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.

I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet
ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does
not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it
comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is
allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?

MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for
that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant
to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to
Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of
department heads discretionary in the question hour.

So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in
recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the
original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following
exchange during the deliberations:

MR. GUINGONA.

[speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on
Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE.

Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as
Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.

What does the committee say?

MR. GUINGONA.

I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. MAAMBONG.

Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative
Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a
power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put
Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.

MR. DAVIDE.

The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the
application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG.

After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are
accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?

MR. DAVIDE.

Yes.84 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from the
same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners
understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries
during the question hour. Commissioner Davide’s only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be
placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical
functions of Congress.
 The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners’ alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
Maambong’s committee—the Committee on Style—shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions
of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on
the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.

In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the “question hour” has a definite meaning. It is a
period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their
acts and the operation of the government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There
was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers
mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the
ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.

“An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of
office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain
in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.”

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in
the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system.
That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature
is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory
question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative
function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:

“Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has
the right to obtain information from any source—even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive
branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain,
a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional
right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected
representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and
executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the
Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative
tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration
in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness
solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.”89 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation,
the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has
issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such
department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is “in aid of legislation” under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it
under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power—the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach
of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive
branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding
custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute,
as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.

Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to
pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference
to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in
the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule
of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department
heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim
of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

Validity of Sections 2 and 3

Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive
departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the
heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and
the National Security Adviser), are “covered by the executive privilege.”

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of
Section 2—“Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege”—, it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis,
the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under
executive privilege.

En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers
persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege,
the reference to persons being “covered by the executive privilege” may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that
the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as
defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is “covered by the
executive privilege,” such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the
same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
 Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the
President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by
executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative
investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination.
Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term “executive privilege,” amounts to an implied claim that
the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon
illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:

In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the
Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled “Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation
Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In
Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes.” Said officials have not
secured the required consent from the President. (Italics supplied)

The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested
to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly
state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.

Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the
invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a
determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses
information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination
has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not secured
the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition against their
appearance before Congress.

Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermita’s letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through
the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required
by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the
President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.

While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked
against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may
validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:

“There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts,
or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of
those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.”91
(Emphasis and italics supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of
executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine
whether it is valid.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked
therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it
invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above,
the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof
(e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.).
While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order,
Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase “confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order.”

Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It
does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and
that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression,
do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the
question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.

A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be
clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:

“The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private
party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department
which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect.”92 (Italics supplied)

Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it
falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be
respected.93 These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the
Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:

“[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible, thereby
preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs’ needs to determine whether to override any claims of
privilege.”96 (Italics supplied)

And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97

“On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its
objection to claimant’s interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by claimant
would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. The government has not
shown—nor even alleged—that those who evaluated claimant’s product were involved in internal policymaking,
generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the
privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that
the evaluation and classification of claimant’s products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in
which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.”98 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that “an agency must provide ‘precise and certain’
reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information.”

Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:

“A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents
within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is
impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit
now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim.
An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by
the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally
insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a
broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside
scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.”101 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating
the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102

“We think the Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions.
For it is as true here as it was there, that ‘if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the
association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have
required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given
the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the
records. ‘To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its
authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was “a patent evasion of the duty
of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned.” (Emphasis and
italics supplied; citations omitted)

Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity
as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful analogy in determining
the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:

“The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate
himself—his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is
justified, and to require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.’ However, if the witness,
upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to
guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.” x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is
merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with
an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine
whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the
power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of
office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the
other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the
nature and scope of executive privilege.

Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of
authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the
United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from
Congress.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information
is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the
official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing
the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment
of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive
privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally
consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is
even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere
silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or
the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive
privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt
to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President
under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure “respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of
legislation.” That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the
Constitution mandating that “[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to
ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.

Right to Information

E.O. 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the
hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present
controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information.

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a
citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as
a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens
are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before
Congress—opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through
the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:

“It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the people’s will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the
extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.”107(Emphasis
and italics supplied)

The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense
explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication

While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need
for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Tañada v.
Tuvera states:

‘The term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely
cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.’108 (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be
covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic
may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance
before it was implemented.

Conclusion

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information
without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible. For

[w]hat republican theory did accomplish . . . was to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine
right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular
sovereignty. (Italics supplied)109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be
presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations
of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value—our right as a people to take part in
government.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005),
“ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS, ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are,
however, VALID.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Puno, J., On Leave.

Petition partly granted.

Notes.—

Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, the right to information is a self-executory provision which can be invoked
by any citizen before the courts, though Congress may provide for reasonable conditions upon the access to information
such as those found in R.A. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethics Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.” (Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 [2000])
When the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and
the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the
accused must be preferred to win. (Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder
Case Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, 360 SCRA 248 [2001])

The twin provisions of the Constitution—right to information on matters of public concern and policy of full
transparency—seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as
provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. An informed citizenry is
essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152
[2002])

CASE # 12

G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.*

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L. GONZALEZ, REUBEN M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN
PAREDES SAN DIEGO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE,
respondents.

Constitutional Law; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; No question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.―The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most
important and, therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which
― involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.―By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only
when there is an actual case or controversy. This is embodied in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which
pertinently states that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x.” Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.” In other words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of
an actual case or controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for constitutional
scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”

Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the
antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel System.―The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the
“Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds
and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds
and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence,
there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will the
President’s declaration that he had already ― abolished the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the
issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or
annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress,
through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF,
the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms
undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that
respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose
for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already
“abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a
law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of
unconstitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries
the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”―The
“limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a
restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct.
691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he political branches are in the best position
not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents”
and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this stage.”

Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon
the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded
the Court to act upon.―A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of
government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present
Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed
therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”

Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the
executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.―It must also be borne
in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of
the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must
faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest
or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are
erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great branch of
government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems
of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.

Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has
no standing.” Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been
and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis
non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar
dispositions to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et
movere ([or simply, stare decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are
general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to
subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior
rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the
collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches
of government, including its members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and
legal history, the Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner
by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System
involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined
as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees,
are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or
practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel
since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second,
there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the
President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term
to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of
the three fundamental powers of government; To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the
power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws;
and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.―The principle of
separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the
celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution
has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make
laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial
branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have
been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance
of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute
or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make
or execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem from
the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the
division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To
achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one
branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest assertions of another or others.

Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any
of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is
bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions.―The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in
Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of
the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress’
law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget
begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the
Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of
powers and is thus unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined
to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.

Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification,
fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution; Towards this end, the
Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification
on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters
altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have
been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational aspects
of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and
release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in
Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers
Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the
conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’
reliance on the same falters altogether.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares the 2013
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.―The
Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield
any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional
oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed
as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout
the years has not been substantially disputed here.
 Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative
power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only
Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may
constitutionally wield legislative power and no other; Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,
legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular,
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body,
and the people, through the process of initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no
other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions
thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to
legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by
law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court observes that the 2013
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is lodged in Congress.―In the cases
at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
(Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation
as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.
Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article,
as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein
discussed, as unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would
be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by
Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime example of a constitutional check and
balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to
him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found
in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall
have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President,
wherein he may exercise his power of item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making
process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals
such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive
branch’s role in the budgetary process; It is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”―The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests
on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as
to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the
US Supreme Court characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to
guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which
may happen to influence a majority of that body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the
community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”

Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a
singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes.―What beckons constitutional
infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for
multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in
the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence,
without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or
approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state
that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to
determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing
determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect,
be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given
post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
“observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law; Clearly,
allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter before another office of
government ― renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.―The Court agrees with
petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among others the 2013 PDAF
Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on
activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment
authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested
financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during
his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene
in the various phases of project implementation — a matter before another office of government — renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly
not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of
“making equal the unequal.” In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators
and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receive
funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s
original intent which is “to make equal the unequal.” Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the
effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b)
allocates the same for a particular public purpose.―“An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount
and purpose stem from the very definition of the word “appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply
to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate
exists. As the Constitution “does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may —
according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to appropriate
may be gleaned from the same.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation precisely because it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article
cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier
stated, it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These
intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual
legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation
made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment
determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the
2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes
individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The Court agrees
with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds
for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview
of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to
be construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby
contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy
of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as unconstitutional as it
lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be
underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth
be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds
would be used — as it should be used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); Words and
Phrases; A Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), as defined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given
amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated
SARO are yet to be “released” under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website, is “[a]
specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period
for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or
regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority.” Based on this definition, it may be
gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO
does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In
fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the
other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA, which is subsequent to the issuance
of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments.

Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has been issued,
public funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only covered by obligated Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), and without
any corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined
and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public
funds should not be treated as funds which have been “released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013
PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of
this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.
Verily, in view of the declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto
cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an
unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released — meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” pursuant to
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional.
However, these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under
the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.―It must be stressed that
the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all
other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of
the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and
thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent
case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the doctrine merely
“reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether
or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice
then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.’ ”

Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in
view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.―The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error
which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System
as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has
allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget
execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the
power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as
it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has
diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an
aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again,
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority
infrastructure development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Eduardo V. Bringas and Alfredo B. Molo III, et al. for petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, et al.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

“Experience is the oracle of truth.”1

– James Madison

Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall theretofore
discuss the system’s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.

The Facts

I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.

“Pork Barrel” is political parlance of American-English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their famished
bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their well-fed master.4
This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal budgets in favor of
their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to
political bills that “bring home the bacon” to a legislator’s district and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, “Pork
Barrel” refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily
to bring money to a representative’s district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control
of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, “Pork Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive.

II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).

Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of “Congressional Pork Barrel” in the

Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to post-enactment legislator approval.

Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums appropriated for certain public works
projects”13 shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.” “[T]he committee from each House may [also] authorize one of its members to approve the
distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications.”14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the
same section provides that the said secretary, “with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members
thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this
Act to any other item hereunder.”

In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of
fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public works
act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce
and Communications to legislators. “For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of
Congress, they ‘being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local
officials or civil leaders.’ ”16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government councils, civil
groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions that were accommodated formed
part of a legislator’s allocation, and the amount each legislator would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened
by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public
Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the
bill until it was signed into law by the President — the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960’s, however, pork barrel legislation
reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18

B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).

While the previous “Congressional Pork Barrel” was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was
declared, an era when “one man controlled the legislature,”19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the Batasang
Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the “Support for Local
Development Projects” (SLDP) under the article on “National Aid to Local Government Units.” Based on reports,20 it was
under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman
receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of
Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of
Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman’s
locality. It has been further reported that “Congressional Pork Barrel” projects under the SLDP also began to cover not
only public works projects, or so-called “hard projects”, but also “soft projects”,21 or non-public works projects such as
those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22

C. Post-Martial Law Era:

Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration

(1986-1992).

After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, “Congressional Pork
Barrel” was revived in the form of the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the “Visayas Development Fund” which were
created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development
projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators
and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the “Countrywide Development Fund” (CDF)
which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of P2.3 Billion to cover “small local infrastructure and
other priority community projects.”

Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but “subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities.” Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each, without
any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such
as roads, bridges, and buildings to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27

D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration

(1992-1998).

The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the first time,
the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were allocated P12.5
Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund release as
found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was directed to
submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made
from the funds.

Under the 1997 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the implementing agency
concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded from their respective CDF
allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in
the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on
Appropriations, in the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the
DBM,35 “shall be the basis for the release of funds” and that “[n]o funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for
projects not included in the list herein required.”

The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the release
of CDF Funds.

The CDF was not, however, the lone form of “Congressional Pork Barrel” at that time. Other forms of
“Congressional Pork Barrel” were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called “Congressional Insertions” or
“CIs”) in order to perpetuate the administration’s political agenda.37It has been articulated that since CIs “formed part
and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor.”
Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well
as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd)
School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty
Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building Fund, particularly, “shall be made upon prior consultation
with the representative of the legislative district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how,
where and when these appropriations were to be spent.

E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).

In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the “Food Security
Program Fund,”43 the “Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,”44 and the “Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure
Program Fund,”45 all of which contained a special provision requiring “prior consultation” with the Members of
Congress for the release of the funds.

It was in the year 200046 that the “Priority Development Assistance Fund” (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of “prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District” before PDAF funds were directly
released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment
of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund
personal services and other personnel benefits. The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the re-
enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.

F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).

The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision ordering the
release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned, without further
qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an expansion of purpose
and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works
and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of
implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53

In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used “to fund priority programs and projects under
the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing agencies.” It also
introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies
from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-
enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was
consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.

Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be funded. In
contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget,
similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent
certain aspects of project implementation.

Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental organizations
(NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with
respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the
law stated that “the amount of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of
school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
and Industry, Inc. for its “Operation Barrio School” program[,] with capability and proven track records in the
construction of public school buildings x x x.”62 The same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009
GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued
Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and
regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a
memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that “an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be
specifically contracted out to NGOs.”69

G. Present Administration (2010-Present).

Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an express
statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President: Representatives were given
P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for “hard projects” and P30 Million for “soft projects”; while P200
Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million allocation each for “hard” and “soft
projects.” Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development,
Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign
PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project
category as the original project, for infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the
original scope of work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the “[i]dentification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency [(priority list
requirement)] x x x.” However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would choose and identify the
project from the said priority list.

Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF Articles;
but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In
addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical
capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for
assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the written
concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House.78Finally, any
realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds,
were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be.79

III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.

While the term “Pork Barrel” has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of Congress,
the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the term’s usage has expanded
to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In enacting the said law, Marcos
recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating
to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to
the energy-related activities of the government in the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the “Malampaya Deep
Water Gas-to-Power Project”,83 the special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.

On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by Marcos on
July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD 1993 on October 31,
1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social Fund has been described as a
special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President
provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.88

IV. Controversies in the Philippines.

Over the decades, “pork” funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to previous
Presidents who reportedly used the “Pork Barrel” in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in 1996 when the first
controversy surrounding the “Pork Barrel” erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo),
then an anonymous source, “blew the lid on the huge sums of government money that regularly went into the pockets
of legislators in the form of kickbacks.”91 He said that “the kickbacks were ‘SOP’ (standard operating procedure) among
legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything
from dredging, rip rapping, asphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings.”92 “Other sources of kickbacks
that Candazo identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money
trail became the banner story of the [Philippine Daily] Inquirer issue of [August] 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration
of a roasted pig.”93 “The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations of certain
lawmakers, including P3.6 [B]illion for a [C]ongressman, sparked public outrage.”

Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004
GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of “any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF
in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress,” the petition was
dismissed.95

Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using
funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.”96 The
investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation — “JLN”
standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) — had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects”
using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of
PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles’ private accounts.97 Thus, after its
investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs-
of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents
of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation99
covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.
The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF and the Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of these funds and the implementation of
projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several government-owned-and-controlled corporations
(GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF and P32.664 Billion in VILP,
representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made
nationwide during the audit period.102 Accordingly, the CoA’s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled “Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects
(VILP),” were made public, the highlights of which are as follows:

Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly exceeded their
respective allocations.

Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the Lower House.

Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009 GAAs.

Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to the government.

Significant amounts were released to [implementing agencies] without the latter’s endorsement and without
considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement projects.

Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the [implementing agencies] themselves but by
[NGOs] endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were transferred.

The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or ordinance.

Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.

Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects amount to
[P]6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious documents, or failed to liquidate in
whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.

Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services reportedly used in the
projects were not compliant with law.

As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation
of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy
[NGO].”104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this
writing, in the process of preparing “one consolidated report” on the Malampaya Funds.

V. The Procedural Antecedents.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional. To recount,
the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:

On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the “Pork
Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and
Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds for the
“Pork Barrel System,” in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases
pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.

On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante,
Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual “Pork
Barrel System,” presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the
Executive’s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the
Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon,
in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately cease any expenditure under the
aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to release to the CoA and to the
public: (a) “the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to
2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent
data thereto”; and (b) “the use of the Executive’s [lump-sum, discretionary] funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Fund[s] [and] remittances from the [PAGCOR] x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity
and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto.”108 Also, they pray for the “inclusion in
budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, [lump-sum], discretionary funds including, but not
limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Fund[s] [and] remittances from the [PAGCOR].”109 The Belgica Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110

Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August
23, 2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such
funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and approved by the
Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the Department of
Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic
Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.
 On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring
public respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing (1)
the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds under the
phrase “for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910 but not
for the purpose of “financ[ing] energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October 8, 2013.

On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of
even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court’s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be dismissed
for lack of merit.113

On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the
Comment.

Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September
30, 2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica, et al.
filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply dated
October 1, 2013.

On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for
the Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present cases,
incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the Oral
Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely answer
questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA Chairperson was
appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral Arguments.

On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court’s
resolution:

I. Procedural Issues.

Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b) the
issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have legal
standing to sue; and (d) the Court’s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, and 113888,
entitled “Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez”114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24, 2012 in G.R. No.
164987, entitled “Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management”115 (LAMP) bar the
re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” under the principles of res judicata and stare
decisis.

II. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel.”

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional
considering that they violate the principles of constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability
of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

III. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel.”

Whether or not the phrases (a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative
power.

These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.

The Court’s Ruling

The petitions are partly granted.

I. Procedural Issues.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119 and, therefore,
shall be discussed forthwith.

A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that “[j]udicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x.”
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which “involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or
dispute.”121 In other words, “[t]here must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the
basis of existing law and jurisprudence.” Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement
of “ripeness,” meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. “A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is
a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action.” “Withal, courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as
they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions.”

Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on
the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are
currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the
unconstitutional use of these public funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy
between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this description,
the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the controversy nor
diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s
declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive
branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the
annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the
Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the following exchange between Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments:126

Justice Carpio: [T]he President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

 Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF,
the President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, “I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects,” and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not
that … (interrupted)

Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to
stop the releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section [38] of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised
Administrative Code126 x x x. So at unconstitutional, can he just refuse to implement it?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF
because of the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even
outside, outside of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising
precisely the duty ….

xxxx

Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You’ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and
investigate, and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.

xxxx

Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal
it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)

Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that “the “moot and academic’ principle is
not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners — they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.

The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved — the
constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be
utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount public
interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws have never before been
magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the
government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF”130demonstrates
a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is also by this finding that the
Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by
the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. In Delos
Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA’s disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it
was emphasized that:

[T]he CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government’s, and ultimately the people’s, property. The
exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and
balance system inherent in our form of government.
 [I]t is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one
which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but
also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative
agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that
this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases,
the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.

The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling
on the system’s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that
thousands of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA
Report. In this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these
would eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the
expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be
guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.

Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage
of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues
before the Court does not cease with the passage of a “PDAF free budget for 2014.”134 The evolution of the “Pork
Barrel System,” by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners’
claim that “the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar.”135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the “capable of repetition but
evading review” exception in order “[t]o prevent similar questions from re-emerging.”137 The situation similarly holds
true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial review.

B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.

The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.”138 Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr,139
applies when there is found, among others, “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it” or “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against
this light, respondents submit that the “[t]he political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-
related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the
Court] not to impose a solution at this stage.”140

The Court must deny respondents’ submission.

Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are
within its province to resolve. A political question refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.”141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that
the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power.
More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but
essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer:
“The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It]
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded
concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as
follows:

To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when
it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the “thou shalt not’s” of the Constitution directed against
the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine
what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of
doing nothing. x x x (Emphases supplied)

It must also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert
any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the
executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.”144 To a great extent,
the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by
constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a
resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but, in
fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest
of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a
holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents’ plea
for judicial restraint.

C. Locus Standi.

“The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.”145

Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert
that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.”146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been
and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional
usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds
are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”148 The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls”149 amplifies, in addition
to the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute. 150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.

D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.

Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare
decisis] which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and LAMP.

The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous
case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not,
however, attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994
CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork
Barrel System.” Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality — and, thus, hardly
a judgment on the merits — in that petitioners therein failed to present any “convincing proof x x x showing that,
indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their
sole discretion” or “pertinent evidentiary support [to demonstrate the] illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
[and] has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress.” As such, the Court upheld, in view of the
presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw “no need to review or reverse
the standing pronouncements in the said case.” Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata principle, insofar as
the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.

On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under
Article 8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by
the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is
a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.

Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners’ posturing was that “the power given
to the [M]embers of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the [CDF] is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation of
the law” and that “the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and
amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution.”In deference to the foregoing
submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the “power of the purse,” belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers
problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On
the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF
Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of the issues and the
broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a
wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
conclusions of the case, Philconsa’s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify of
projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has been
constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority to identify
projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby lodged in
Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its individual Members; (b)
such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and, hence, should not be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the GAA, has the force of law and, hence,
cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug’s Concurring Opinion in the same case sums up the Philconsa quandary
in this wise: “Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to appropriate funds for such specific projects as it
may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid,
would be constitutionally impermissible.” As the Court now largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the
matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it
validated the post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely
recommendatory. This postulate raises serious constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the
ground that such mechanism is “imaginative as it is innovative.” Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case
of Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa’s allowance of post-enactment
legislator participation in view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the
Abakada rule will be discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.

As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set
any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare decisis
would not apply.

II. Substantive Issues.

A. Definition of Terms.

Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms “Pork Barrel
System,” “Congressional Pork Barrel,” and “Presidential Pork Barrel” as they are essential to the ensuing discourse.

Petitioners define the term “Pork Barrel System” as the “collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches of
government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its
distribution as political largesse.”156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel System: (a) lump-
sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer is given sole and
broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how to spend or use the
funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are intended to benefit a
definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the disbursing official by
yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two (2) kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as the PDAF;158 and,
second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential
Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159

Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds
of lump-sum discretionary funds:

First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and

Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall
delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.

B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.

1. Separation of Powers.

a. Statement of Principle.

The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers
of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
“Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and
the judicial departments of the government.”163 To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164
belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President,165 belongs the power
to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.”167 Thus,
“the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the
law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.”168 The principle of separation of powers and its
concepts of autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid
concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its
power over the other branches or the citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-
equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates.
Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self interest
assertions of another or others.

Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government
unduly encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of
powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, “[o]ne branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s performance
of its constitutionally assigned function”;171 and “[a]lternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch
assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another.”172 In other words, there is a violation of the principle
when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department’s functions.

The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution “covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting” and accordingly includes “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,” the
“regulation and release of funds” as well as all “other related activities” that comprise the budget execution cycle.174
This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a grant of all
powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should
exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided
under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.

In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates
an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may
be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the
GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself
with details for implementation by the Executive.”

The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.”177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of
checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined
to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions. As
the Court ruled in Abakada:178

[A]ny post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In

particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before
and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of
confirmation; and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the

power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
(Emphases supplied)

b. Application.
 In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel — among others, the 2013 PDAF Article —
“wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches” as it is designed to allow individual legislators
to interfere “way past the time it should have ceased” or, particularly, “after the GAA is passed.”179 They state that the
findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide “an illustration of how absolute and definitive the power of
legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional [principle of separation of
powers.]”180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the CDF to exist on the condition
that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they actually dictate their
implementation.181

For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains “ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA” and that he “retains the final discretion to
reject” the legislators’ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, “upheld the constitutionality of the
power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory.”183 As such, they claim that “[e]verything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article] follows
the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional.”

The Court rules in favor of petitioners.

As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would
be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.

At its core, legislators — may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 —
have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
identify projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second
paragraph of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as
evinced from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified
project falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the
implementing agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list,
standard or design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice.
The same provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the
representative of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects
refer to “projects to be identified by legislators”188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of
projects identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and
revision of the project identification “shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.” From
the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded post-enactment
authority to identify PDAF projects.

Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that “[a]ll request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance,
as the case may be”; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is contained in: first,
paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly states, among others, that “[a]ny realignment [of funds] shall be
submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement
to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be”; and, second, paragraph 1, also of Special Provision 4
which authorizes the “Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry190 x x x to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to [among others]
(iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.”

AClearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene
and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in — as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the
“regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law
violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said authority is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents — through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments — have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192

Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the
legislator be utilized?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.

Justice Bernabe: It cannot?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)

Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no
identification.

xxxx

Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without
the identification by the individual legislator?

Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I
would doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need [for] a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO
and the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.

xxxx

Solicitor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question,
“How can a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?” It is mandatory in the sense that he must
identify, in that sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his
district would not be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)

Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other
provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into
the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and
have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As pointed out
by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these cases:

Chief Justice Sereno:

 Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses
of Congress, if we enforces the initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research
made by my staff, that neither the Executive nor Congress frontally faced the question of
constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget process. In fact, the words you
have been using, as the three lawyers [of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress]
has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In
fact, I thought that what the 2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past
practice that [had] been done since 1991. In a certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the
PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.

2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.

a. Statement of Principle.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the
body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states
that such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency,197 or
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import
and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.198

Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rulemaking
authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).199The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren200 as follows:

The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation
of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate
legislation” calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of “the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law.”

xxxx

[Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that] [t]he rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended
to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that
subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)

b. Application.

In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification
authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed
to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress.

That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of
a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would
go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate
which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative
power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which
contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

3. Checks and Balances.

a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.

The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill
presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads
as follows:

Sec. 27. x x x.

xxxx

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.

The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of
item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” for law-passage as
specified under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the “submission
[of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.”205
Elaborating on the President’s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in Bengzon,
explained that:206

The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief
Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is
essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as
those the legislature must determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but
in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will
of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising
that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the
judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto [in the same
manner] as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases
supplied)

The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the
effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body
 CASE # 13

[No. 45459. March 13, 1937]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN Ruiz, respondent,

1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.—While, generally, prohibition as
an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * *
inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of
Civil Procedure.)

2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.—The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute
are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case,
which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction."

3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.—The statutory rule, therefore, in this
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits
of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the
writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922],
43 Phil., 304, 307.)

4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.—What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious

liberty, not mere religious toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of
profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.—The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps
in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty
thousand pesos for the cost of plates and' printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government."

6.ID.; ID.; ID.—Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question
by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling
to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the
Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.

7.ID.; ID.; ID.—The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2),
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of
the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

8.ID.; ID.; ID.—While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event
of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from
this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance -of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic
duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the
United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50
centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold.
The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case,
although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an
extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial
functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * *
inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without of in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of
Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction." The statutory
rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep
them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority.
Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and
Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirtythird International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that
this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of
the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without
the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our
history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for
occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of
their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in
the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and
Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy
both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath
to support and defend the Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed
by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and
is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored
"the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop
the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature
and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto;

Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public
schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928,
Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays
(sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law
allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

"No. 4052.—AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF
ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the
authority of the same:

"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in
the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs,
and other expenses incident thereto.

"SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

"SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

"SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

"Approved, February 21, 1933."

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage
stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and
"as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Govvernment". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in
question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1,
1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the
Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of
the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth
P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of
course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not
authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the
letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only
purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The
officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the
Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps' as actually designed and
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines
and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the
seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should
not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should
not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S.,
295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition.
Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should be taken that at this
stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution, But, upon very serious reflection,
examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in
weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap. exists which is yet
to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

CASE # 14

G.R. Nos. 147062-64. December 14, 2001.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
petitioner, vs. COCOFED, et al. and BALLARES, et al.,1 EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. and the SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), respondents.

Presidential Commission on Good Government; The government should be allowed to continue voting the
sequestered UCPB shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds—funds that are prima facie public
in character or, at the very least, are clearly affected with public interest.—Simply stated, the gut substantive issue to
be resolved in the present Petition is: “Who may vote the sequestered UCPB shares while the main case for their
reversion to the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan?” This Court holds that the government should be allowed to
continue voting those shares inasmuch as they were purchased with coconut levy funds—funds that are prima facie
public in character or, at the very least, are “clearly affected with public interest.”

Same; The general rule is that the registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the
privilege of voting—Principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as
a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion.—At the outset, it is necessary to restate the
general rule that the registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege of voting. This
principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator
cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares
registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-
tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr.

Same; Two clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote
the shares.—From the foregoing general principle, the Court in Baseco v. PCGG (hereinafter “Baseco”) and Cojuangco,
Jr. v. Roxas (“Cojuangco-Roxas”) has provided two clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is
granted the authority to vote the shares: (1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities
who/which registered them in their own names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with
public funds somehow landed in private hands.

Same; The sequestered UCPB shares having been conclusively shown to have been purchased with coconut
levies Court holds that these funds and shares are, at the very least, affected with public interest; Private respondents
even if they are the registered shareholders cannot be accorded voting rights.—Having conclusively shown that the
sequestered UCPB shares were purchased with coconut levies, we hold that these funds and shares are, at the very
least, “affected with public interest.” The Resolution issued by the Court on February 16, 1993 in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan stated that coconut levy funds were “clearly affected with public interest”; thus, herein private
respondents—even if they are the registered shareholders—cannot be accorded the right to vote them.

Same; The right to vote the UCPB shares is not subject to the “two-tiered test” but to the public character of
their acquisition which per Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan must first be determined.—In the present case, the
sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not with alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Hence, by parity of reasoning, the right to vote them is not subject to the “two-tiered test” but to the public character of
their acquisition, which per Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan cited earlier, must first be determined.

Same; The coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest they are in fact prima facie public
funds.—To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, this Court will even be more categorical and positive than its earlier
pronouncements: the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public
funds.

Same; Coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes.—Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of
taxes which, in general, are enforced proportional contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by
virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Sandiganbayan.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Mario E. Ongkiko for petitioners-intervenors.

 Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.

Estelito P. Mendoza for E. M. Cojuangco, Jr.

Catapang, Guzman, Tiongco & Torres for UCPB and 14 CIIF Holding Co.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for UCPB.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to vote sequestered shares of stock registered in the names of private individuals or entities and alleged to
have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth shall, as a rule, be exercised by the registered owner. The PCGG may,
however, be granted such voting right provided it can (1) show prima facie evidence that the wealth and/or the shares
are indeed ill-gotten; and (2) demonstrate imminent danger of dissipation of the assets, thus necessitating their
continued sequestration and voting by the government until a decision, ruling with finality on their ownership, is
promulgated by the proper court.

However, the foregoing “two-tiered” test does not apply when the sequestered stocks are acquired with funds that are
prima facie public in character or, at least, are affected with public interest. Inasmuch as the subject UCPB shares in the
present case were undisputably acquired with coco levy funds which are public in character, then the right to vote them
shall be exercised by the PCGG. In sum, the “public character” test, not the “two-tiered” one, applies in the instant
controversy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February 28, 2001 Order2 of the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan3 in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F. The pertinent portions of the assailed
Order read as follows:

“In view hereof, the movants COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. as well as Eduardo Cojuangco, et al., who were
acknowledged to be registered stockholders of the UCPB are authorized, as are all other registered stockholders of the
United Coconut Planters Bank, until further orders from this Court, to exercise their rights to vote their shares of stock
and themselves to be voted upon in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) at the scheduled Stockholders’ Meeting
on March 6, 2001 or on any subsequent continuation or resetting thereof, and to perform such acts as will normally
follow in the exercise of these rights as registered stockholders.

“Since by way of form, the pleadings herein had been labeled as praying for an injunction, the right of the movants to
exercise their right as abovementioned will be subject to the posting of a nominal bond in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) jointly for the defendants COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al., as well as all other
registered stockholders of sequestered shares in that bank, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., et al., to answer for any undue damage or injury to the United Coconut Planters Bank as may be
attributed to their exercise of their rights as registered stockholders.”

The Antecedents

The very roots of this case are anchored on the historic events that transpired during the change of government in 1986.
Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) Nos. 1,5 26
and 14.7

“On the explicit premise that ‘vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad,’ the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) was created by Executive Order No. 1 to assist the President in the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth thus accumulated whether located in the Philippines or abroad.”8

Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust
accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of
real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world.9

Executive Order No. 14, on the other hand, empowered the PCGG, with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor
General and other government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under EO Nos. 1 and
2.

Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional
takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal.

Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
registered in the names of the alleged “one million coconut farmers,” the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund
companies (CIIF companies) and Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. (hereinafter “Cojuangco”).

In connection with the sequestration of the said UCPB shares, the PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action
for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.

On November 15, 1990, upon Motion11 of Private Respondent COCOFED, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution12 lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares on the ground that herein private respondents—in
particular, COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies—had not been impleaded by the PCGG as parties-defendants in
its July 31, 1987 Complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The Sandiganbayan ruled
that the Writ of Sequestration issued by the Commission was automatically lifted for PCGG’s failure to commence the
corresponding judicial action within the six-month period ending on August 2, 1987 provided under Section 26, Article
XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The anti-graft court noted that though these entities were listed in an annex appended to
the Complaint, they had not been named as parties-respondents.

This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari docketed as GR No.
96073 in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft court ordered the holding of elections for the
Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining
the holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed with
the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares to be voted by their registered
owners.

The victory of the registered shareholders was fleeting because the Court, acting on the solicitor general’s
Motion for Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on February 16, 1993, declaring that “the right of petitioners
[herein private respondents] to vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded at this time.
That right still has to be established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be deemed
legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to vote them.”13 The dispositive portion of the said
Resolution reads as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court recalls and sets aside the Resolution dated March 3, 1992 and, pending
resolution on the merits of the action at bar, and until further orders, suspends the effectivity of the lifting of the
sequestration decreed by the Sandiganbayan on November 15, 1990, and directs the restoration of the status quo ante,
so as to allow the PCGG to continue voting the shares of stock under sequestration at the meetings of the United
Coconut Planters Bank.”14

On January 23, 1995, the Court rendered its final Decision in GR No. 96073, nullifying and setting aside the November
15, 1990 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which, as earlier stated, lifted the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares.
The express impleading of herein Respondents COCOFED, et al. was deemed unnecessary because “the judgment may
simply be directed against the shares of stock shown to have been issued in consideration of ill-gotten wealth.”15
Furthermore, the companies “are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is,
in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said case.”16

A month thereafter, the PCGG—pursuant to an Order of the Sandiganbayan—subdivided Case No. 0033 into
eight Complaints and docketed them as Case Nos. 0033-A to 0033-H.

Six years later, on February 13, 2001, the Board of Directors of UCPB received from the ACCRA Law Office a
letter written on behalf of the COCOFED and the alleged nameless one million coconut farmers, demanding the holding
of a stockholders’ meeting for the purpose of, among others, electing the board of directors. In response, the board
approved a Resolution calling for a stockholders’ meeting on March 6, 2001 at three o’clock in the afternoon.

On February 23, 2001, “COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.” filed the “Class Action Omnibus Motion”17 referred to
earlier in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F, asking the court a quo:

“1.To enjoin the PCGG from voting the UCPB shares of stock registered in the respective names of the more than one
million coconut farmers; and

“2.To enjoin the PCGG from voting the SMC shares registered in the names of the 14 CIIF holding companies including
those registered in the name of the PCGG.”18

On February 28, 2001, respondent court, after hearing the parties on oral argument, issued the assailed Order.

Hence, this Petition by the Republic of the Philippines represented by the PCGG.19

The case had initially been raffled to this Court’s Third Division which, by a vote of 3-2,20 issued a Resolution21
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo existing before the issuance of the questioned Sandiganbayan Order
dated February 28, 2001. On March 7, 2001, Respondent COCOFED, et al. moved that the instant Petition be heard by
the Court en banc.22 The Motion was unanimously granted by the Third Division.

On March 13, 2001, the Court en banc resolved to accept the Third Division’s referral.23 It heard the case on Oral
Argument in Baguio City on April 17, 2001. During the hearing, it admitted the intervention of a group of coconut
farmers and farm worker organizations, the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at Manggagawa ng
Niyugan (PKSMMN). The coalition claims that its members have been excluded from the benefits of the coconut levy
fund. Inter alia, it joined petitioner in praying for the exclusion of private respondents in voting the sequestered shares.

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:24

“A.

Despite the fact that the subject sequestered shares were purchased with coconut levy funds (which were declared
public in character) and the continuing effectivity of Resolution dated February 16, 1993 in G.R. No. 96073 which allows
the PCGG to vote said sequestered shares, Respondent Sandiganbayan, with grave abuse of discretion, issued its Order
dated February 28, 2001 enjoining PCGG from voting the sequestered shares of stock in UCPB.

“B.

The Respondent Sandiganbayan violated petitioner’s right to due process by taking cognizance of the Class
Action Omnibus Motion dated 23 February 2001 despite gross lack of sufficient notice and by issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction despite the obvious fact that there was no actual pressing necessity or urgency to do so.”

In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, the Court defined the issue to be resolved in the instant case simply as follows:

“Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the disputed Order allowing respondents to
vote UCPB shares of stock registered in the name of respondents?”

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit.

Main Issue:

Who May Vote the Sequestered Shares of Stock?

Simply stated, the gut substantive issue to be resolved in the present Petition is: “Who may vote the sequestered UCPB
shares while the main case for their reversion to the State is pending in the Sandiganbayan?”

This Court holds that the government should be allowed to continue voting those shares inasmuch as they were
purchased with coconut levy funds—funds that are prima facie public in character or, at the very least, are “clearly
affected with public interest.”

General Rule: Sequestered Shares

Are Voted by the Registered Holder

At the outset, it is necessary to restate the general rule that the registered owner of the shares of a corporation
exercises the right and the privilege of voting.25 This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the
government, over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of dominion.26 On the
other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares registered in the names of private persons and acquired
with allegedly ill-gotten wealth, if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo 27
and PCGG v. Cojuangco, Jr.,28 as follows:

(1)Is there prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and thus belong to the State?

(2)Is there an imminent danger of dissipation, thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the
PCGG, while the main issue is pending with the Sandiganbayan?

(NOTE)

25 Sec. 24 of the Corporation Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) provides as follows:

“SEC. 24. Election of directors or trustees.—At all elections of directors or trustees, there must be present, either in person or by representative authorized to act by
written proxy, the owners of the majority of the outstanding capital stock, or if there be no capital stock, a majority of the members entitled to vote. The election
must be by ballot if requested by any voting stockholder or member. In stock corporations, every stockholder entitled to vote shall have the right to vote in person or
by proxy the number of shares of stock standing, at the time fixed in the by-laws, in his own name on the stock books of the corporation, or where the by-laws are
silent, at the time of the election; and said stockholder may vote such number of shares for as many persons as there are directors to be elected or he may cumulate
said shares and give one candidate as many votes as the number of directors to be elected multiplied by the number of his shares shall equal, or he may distribute
them on the same principle among as many candidates as he shall see fit: Provided, That the total number of votes cast by him shall not exceed the number of shares
owned by him as shown in the books of the corporation multiplied by the whole number of directors to be elected: Provided, however, That no delinquent stock shall
be voted. Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation or in the by-laws, members of corporations which have no capital stock may cast as many votes
as there are trustees to be elected but may not cast more than one vote for one candidate. Candidates receiving the highest number of votes shall be declared
elected. Any meeting of the stockholders or members called for an election may adjourn from day to day or from time to time but not sine die or indefinitely if, for
any reason, no election is held, or if there are not present or represented by proxy, at the meeting, the owners of a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or if
there be no capital stock, a majority of the members entitled to vote.”

Sequestered Shares Acquired with

Public Funds Are an Exception

From the foregoing general principle, the Court in Baseco v. PCGG 29 (hereinafter “Baseco”) and Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas
30 (“Cojuangco-Roxas”) has provided two clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is granted
the authority to vote the shares:

(1)Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own
names, and

(2)Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private hands.

The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to truth; that public property
registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should
be given the privilege of enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership.

In Baseco, a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co. was placed under sequestration by
the PCGG. Explained the Court:

“The facts show that the corporation known as BASECO was owned and controlled by President Marcos ‘during his
administration, through nominees, by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his powers, authority, or
influence,’ and that it was by and through the same means, that BASECO had taken over the business and/or assets of
the National Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc., and other government-owned or controlled entities.”

Given this factual background, the Court discussed PCGG’s right over BASECO in the following manner:

“Now, in the special instance of a business enterprise shown by evidence to have been ‘taken over by the government of
the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos,’ the PCGG is given power and
authority, as already adverted to, to ‘provisionally take (it) over in the public interest or to prevent * * (its) disposal or
dissipation;’ and since the term is obviously employed in reference to going concerns, or business enterprises in
operation, something more than mere physical custody is connoted; the PCGG may in this case exercise some measure
of control in the operation, running, or management of the business itself.”32

Citing an earlier Resolution, it ruled further:

“ ‘Petitioner has failed to make out a case of grave abuse or excess of jurisdiction in respondents’ calling and holding of a
stockholders’ meeting for the election of directors as authorized by the Memorandum of the President * * (to the PCGG)
dated June 26, 1986, particularly, where as in this case, the government can, through its designated directors, properly
exercise control and management over what appear to be properties and assets owned and belonging to the
government itself and over which the persons who appear in this case on behalf of BASECO have failed to show any right
or even any shareholding in said corporation.”33 (Italics supplied)

The Court granted PCGG the right to vote the sequestered shares because they appeared to be “assets belonging to the
government itself.” The Concurring Opinion of Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, in which she was joined by Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, explained this principle as follows:

“I have no objection to according the right to vote sequestered stock in case of a take-over of business actually
belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from public funds but which, somehow, landed in the hands
of private persons, as in the case of BASECO. To my mind, however, caution and prudence should be exercised in the
case of sequestered shares of an on-going private business enterprise, specially the sensitive ones, since the true and
real ownership of said shares is yet to be determined and proven more conclusively by the Courts.”34 (Italics supplied)

The exception was cited again by the Court in Cojuangco-Roxas35 in this wise:

“The rule in this jurisdiction is, therefore, clear. The PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of sequestered
property. It is a mere conservator. It may not vote the shares in a corporation and elect the members of the board of
directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a business belonging to the government or whose
capitalization comes from public funds, but which landed in private hands as in BASECO.”36 (Italics supplied)

The “public character” test was reiterated in many subsequent cases, most recently, in Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan.37
Expressly citing Cujuangco-Roxas,38 this Court said that in determining the issue of whether the PCGG should be allowed
to vote sequestered shares, it was crucial to find out first whether these were purchased with public funds, as follows:

“It is thus important to determine first if the sequestered corporate shares came from public funds that landed in private
hands.”

In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged to have been
acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name
of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased
with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. Rather, the public
character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco, Jr. v. Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares.

UCPB Shares Were Acquired

With Coconut Levy Funds

In the present case before the Court, it is not disputed that the money used to purchase the sequestered UCPB shares
came from the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known, as the coconut levy funds.

This fact was plainly admitted by private respondent’s counsel, Atty. Teresita J. Herbosa, during the Oral Arguments held
on April 17, 2001 in Baguio City, as follows:

“Justice Panganiban:

“In regard to the theory of the Solicitor General that the funds used to purchase [both] the original 28 million and the
subsequent 80 million came from the CCSF, Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, do you agree with that?

“Atty. Herbosa:“Yes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

“Justice Panganiban:

“So it seems that the parties [have] agreed up to that point that the funds used to purchase 72% of the former First
United Bank came from the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund?

“Atty. Herbosa: “Yes, Your Honor.”40

Indeed in Cocofed v. PCGG,41 this Court categorically declared that the UCPB was acquired “with the use of the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund in virtue of Presidential Decree No. 755, promulgated on July 29, 1975.”

Coconut Levy Funds Are

Affected With Public Interest

Having conclusively shown that the sequestered UCPB shares were purchased with coconut levies, we hold that these
funds and shares are, at the very least, “affected with public interest.”

The Resolution issued by the Court on February 16, 1993 in Republic v. Sandiganbayan 42 stated that coconut levy funds
were “clearly affected with public interest”; thus, herein private respondents—even if they are the registered
shareholders—cannot be accorded the right to vote them. We quote the said Resolution in part, as follows:

“The coconut levy funds being ‘clearly affected with public interest, it follows that the corporations formed and
organized from those funds, and all assets acquired therefrom should also be regarded as ‘clearly affected with public
interest.’ ”43

xxx xxx xxx

“Assuming, however, for purposes of argument merely, the lifting of sequestration to be correct, may it also be assumed
that the lifting of sequestration removed the character of the coconut levy companies of being affected with public
interest, so that they and their stock and assets may now be considered to be of private ownership? May it be assumed
that the lifting of sequestration operated to relieve the holders of stock in the coconut levy companies—affected with
public interest—of the obligation of proving how that stock had been legitimately transferred to private ownership, or
that those stockholders who had had some part in the collection, administration, or disposition of the coconut levy
funds are now deemed qualified to acquire said stock, and freed from any doubt or suspicion that they had taken
advantage of their special or fiduciary relation with the agencies in charge of the coconut levies and the funds thereby
accumulated? The obvious answer to each of the questions is a negative one. It seems plain that the lifting of
sequestration has no relevance to the nature of the coconut levy companies or their stock or property, or to the legality
of the acquisition by private persons of their interest therein, or to the latter’s capacity or disqualification to acquire
stock in the companies or any property acquired from coconut levy funds.

“This being so, the right of the [petitioners] to vote stock in their names at the meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded
at this time. That right still has to be established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be
deemed legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to vote them.”44 (Italics supplied)

It is, however, contended by respondents that this Resolution was in the nature of a temporary restraining order. As
such, it was supposedly interlocutory in character and became functus oficio when this Court decided GR No. 96073 on
January 23, 1995.

This argument is aptly answered by petitioner in its Memorandum, which we quote:

“The ruling made in the Resolution dated 16 February 1993 confirming the public nature of the coconut levy funds and
denying claimants their purported right to vote is an affirmation of doctrines laid down in the cases of COCOFED v.
PCGG, supra, Baseco v. PCGG, supra, and Cojuangco v. Roxas, supra. Therefore it is of no moment that the Resolution
dated 16 February 1993 has not been ratified. Its jurisprudential bases remain.”45 (Italics supplied)

Granting arguendo that the Resolution is interlocutory, the truth remains: the coconut levy funds are still “clearly
affected with public interest.” That was the truth in 1989 as quoted by this Court in its February 16, 1993 Resolution,
and so it is today. Said the Court in 1989:

“The utilization and proper management of the coconut levy funds, raised as they were by the State’s police and taxing
powers, are certainly the concern of the Government. It cannot be denied that it was the welfare of the entire nation
that provided the prime moving factor for the imposition of the levy. It cannot be denied that the coconut industry is
one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the State’s concern to make it a strong and
secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population but also of export earnings the
sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability. The coconut levy funds are clearly affected
with public interest. Until it is demonstrated satisfactorily that they have legitimately become private funds, they must
prima facie and by reason of the circumstances in which they were raised and accumulated be accounted subject to the
measures prescribed in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, and 14 to prevent their concealment, dissipation, etc., which measures include
the sequestration and other orders of the PCGG complained of.”46 (Italics supplied)

To repeat, the foregoing juridical situation has not changed. It is still the truth today: “the coconut levy funds are clearly
affected with public interest.” Private respondents have not “demonstrated satisfactorily that they have legitimately
become private funds.”

If private respondents really and sincerely believed that the final Decision of the Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (GR
No. 96073, promulgated on January 23, 1995) granted them the right to vote, why did they wait for the lapse of six long
years before definitively asserting it (1) through their letter dated February 13, 2001, addressed to the UCPB Board of
Directors, demanding the holding of a shareholders’ meeting on March 6, 2001; and (2) through their Omnibus Motion
dated February 23, 2001 filed in the court a quo, seeking to enjoin PCGG from voting the subject sequestered shares
during the said stockholders’ meeting? Certainly, if they even half believed their submission now—that they already had
such right in 1995—why are they suddenly and imperiously claiming it only now?

It should be stressed at this point that the assailed Sandiganbayan Order dated February 28, 2001—allowing private
respondents to vote the sequestered shares—is not based on any finding that the coconut levies and the shares have
“legitimately become private funds.” Neither is it based on the alleged lifting of the TRO issued by this Court on February
16, 1993. Rather, it is anchored on the grossly mistaken application of the two-tiered test mentioned earlier in this
Decision.

To stress, the two-tiered test is applied only when the sequestered asset in the hands of a private person is alleged to
have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth. Hence, in PCGG v. Cojuangco,47 we allowed Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. to vote
the sequestered shares of the San Miguel Corporation (SMC) registered in his name but alleged to have been acquired
with ill-gotten wealth. We did so on his representation that he had acquired them with borrowed funds and upon failure
of the PCGG to satisfy the “two-tiered” test. This test was, however, not applied to sequestered SMC shares that were
purchased with coco levy funds.

In the present case, the sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies, not with
alleged ill-gotten wealth. Hence, by parity of reasoning, the right to vote them is not subject to the “two-tiered test” but
to the public character of their acquisition, which per Antiporda v. Sandiganbayan cited earlier, must first be
determined.

Coconut Levy Funds Are

Prima Facie Public Funds

To avoid misunderstanding and confusion, this Court will even be more categorical and positive than its earlier
pronouncements: the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in fact, prima facie public
funds.

Public funds are those moneys belonging to the State or to any political subdivision of the State; more specifically, taxes,
customs duties and moneys raised by operation of law for the support of the government or for the discharge of its
obligations.48 Undeniably, coconut levy funds satisfy this general definition of public funds, because of the following
reasons:

1.Coconut levy funds are raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State.

2.They are levies imposed by the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers.

3.Respondents have judicially admitted that the sequestered shares were purchased with public funds.

4.The Commission on Audit (COA) reviews the use of coconut levy funds.

5.The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), with the acquiescence of private respondents, has treated them as public funds.

6.The very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public character.

We shall now discuss each of the foregoing reasons, any one of which is enough to show their public character.

1. Coconut Levy Funds Are Raised Through

the State’s Police and Taxing Powers.

Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes which, in general, are enforced proportional contributions
from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all
public needs.49 Based on this definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution
from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support
of the government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the following reasons:

(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the coconut farmers requiring the payment of
prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No. 276, which created the Coconut Consumer Stabilization Fund (CCSF), mandated the
following:

“a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada or its equivalent in other coconut products, shall be
imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under RA 6260, effective at the start of
business hours on August 10, 1973.

“The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other government bank to the
account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general
fund of the government.”

The coco levies were further clarified in amendatory laws, specifically PD No. 96151 and PD No. 146852—in this wise:

“The Authority (Philippine Coconut Authority) is hereby empowered to impose and collect a levy, to be known as the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, on every one hundred kilos of copra resecada, or its equivalent in other
coconut products delivered to, and/or purchased by, copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of
copra or its equivalent in other coconut products. The levy shall be paid by such copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators
and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products under such rules and regulations as the
Authority may prescribe. Until otherwise prescribed by the Authority, the current levy being collected shall be
continued.”53

Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations by the people. They were enforced
contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:

“3. Any person or firm who violates any provision of this Decree or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder,
shall, in addition to penalties already prescribed under existing administrative and special law, pay a fine of not less than
P2,500 or more than P10,000, or suffer cancellation of licenses to operate, or both, at the discretion of the Court.”54

Such penalties were later amended thus:

“Whenever any person or entity willfully and deliberately violates any of the provisions of this Act, or any rule or
regulation legally promulgated hereunder by the Authority, the person or persons responsible for such violation shall be
punished by a fine of not more than P20,000.00 and by imprisonment of not more than five years. If the offender be a
corporation, partnership or a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed on the officer or officers authorizing,
permitting or tolerating the violation. Aliens found guilty of any offenses shall, after having served his sentence, be
immediately deported and, in the case of a naturalized citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall be cancelled.”55

(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper legislative authorities of the State.
Indeed, the CCSF was collected under PD No. 276, issued by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then
exercising legislative powers.56

(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that they were collected to advance
the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the
coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading
position among the country’s export products; that it gives employment to thousands of Filipinos; that it is a great
source of the State’s wealth; and that it is one of the important sources of foreign exchange needed by our country and,
thus, pivotal in the plans of a government committed to a policy of currency stability.

Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for the
rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the
police power of the State, as held in Caltex Philippines v. COA 57 and Osmeña v. Orbos.58 Even if the money is allocated
for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in character. In the case before us, the funds were even
used to organize and finance State offices. In Cocofed v. PCGG,59 the Court observed that certain agencies or
enterprises “were organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of
laws of the late dictatorship x x x with deposed Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief
beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry monopoly.”60 The Court continued: “x x x. It cannot be denied that the
coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is, therefore, the State’s concern to
make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a significant segment of the population, but also of
export earnings the sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability. x x x.”

2. Coconut Funds Are Levied for the Benefit

of the Coconut Industry and Its Farmers.

Just like the sugar levy funds, the coconut levy funds constitute state funds even though they may be held for a special
public purpose.

In fact, Executive Order No. 481 dated May 1, 1998 specifically likens the coconut levy funds to the sugar levy funds,
both being special public funds acquired through the taxing and police powers of the State. The sugar levy funds, which
are strikingly similar to the coconut levies in their imposition and purpose, were declared public funds by this Court in
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,62 from which we quote:

“The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax which is within the power of the State to impose for the
promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens (Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The
collections made accrue to a ‘Special Fund,’ a ‘Development and Stabilization Fund,’ almost identical to the ‘Sugar
Adjustment and Stabilization Fund’ created under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567. The tax collected is not in a pure
exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar
industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State. (Lutz vs. Araneta, supra)”

The Court further explained:

“The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special
purpose—that of ‘financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of
the domestic market including the foreign market.’ The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to
law is sufficient to constitute them as state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence v.
American Surety Co., 263 Mich 586, 294 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am. Jur., Sec. 2., p. 718). Having been levied for a special
purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, ‘administered
in trust’ for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be
transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (see 1987 Constitution,
Art. VI, Sec. 29[3], lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23[1]). (Italics supplied)

“The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the
Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[1], 1973 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 18[1]).

“That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the funds were channeled to the
purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fund for their benefit nor make
them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is
also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The investment in shares of
respondent Bank is not alien to the purpose intended because of the Bank’s character as a commodity bank for sugar
conceived for the industry’s growth and development. Furthermore, of note is the fact that one-half (1/2) or P0.50 per
picul, of the amount levied under P.D. No. 388 is to be utilized for the ‘payment of salaries and wages of personnel,
fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees of PHILSUCOM’ thereby immediately negating the claim that
the entire amount levied is in trust for sugar, producers, planters and millers.

“To rule in petitioners’ favor would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used
for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the
benefit of the entire sugar industry, ‘and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign
market,’ the industry being of vital importance to the country’s economy and to national interest.”
In the same manner, this Court has also ruled that the oil stabilization funds were public in character and subject to
audit by COA. It ruled in this wise:

“Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O.
137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a ‘trust liability account,’
the fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
comply with the constitutional description of a ‘special fund.’ Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.”65

In his Concurring Opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,66 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano explained that the funds raised by
the Online Lottery System were also public in nature. In his words:

“x x x. In the case presently before the Court, the funds involved are clearly public in nature. The funds to be generated
by the proposed lottery are to be raised from the population at large. Should the proposed operation be as successful as
its proponents project, those funds will come from well-nigh every town and barrio of Luzon. The funds here involved
are public in another very real sense: they will belong to the PCSO, a government owned or controlled corporation and
an instrumentality of the government and are destined for utilization in social development projects which, at least in
principle, are designed to benefit the general public. x x x. The interest of a private citizen in seeing to it that public
funds, from whatever source they may have been derived, go only to the uses directed and permitted by law is as real
and personal and substantial as the interest of a private taxpayer in seeing to it that tax monies are not intercepted on
their way to the public treasury or otherwise diverted from uses prescribed or allowed by law. It is also pertinent to note
that the more successful the government is in raising revenues by non-traditional methods such as PAGCOR operations
and privatization measures, the lesser will be the pressure upon the traditional sources of public revenues, i.e., the
pocket books of individual taxpayers and importers.”67

Thus, the coconut levy funds—like the sugar levy and the oil stabilization funds, as well as the monies generated by the
On-line Lottery System—are funds exacted by the State. Being enforced contributions, they are prima facie public funds.

3. Respondents Judicially Admit That

the Levies Are Government Funds.

Equally important as the fact that the coconut levy funds were raised through the taxing and police powers of the State
is respondents’ effective judicial admission that these levies are government funds. As shown by the attachments to
their pleadings,68 respondents concede that the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and the Coconut
Investment Development Fund “constitute government funds x x x for the benefit of coconut farmers.”

“Collections on both levies constitute government funds. However, unlike other taxes that the Government levies and
collects such as income tax, tariff and customs duties, etc., the collections on the CCSF and CIDF are, by express
provision of the laws imposing them, for a definite purpose, not just for any governmental purpose. As stated above part
of the collections on the CCSF levy should be spent for the benefit of the coconut farmers. And in respect of the
collections on the CIDF levy, P.D. 582 mandatorily requires that the same should be spent exclusively for the
establishment, operation and maintenance of a hybrid coconut seed garden and the distribution, for free, to the
coconut farmers of the hybrid coconut seednuts produced from that seed garden.

“On the other hand, the laws which impose special levies on specific industries, for example on the mining industry,
sugar industry, timber industry, etc., do not, by their terms, expressly require that the collections on those levies be
spent exclusively for the benefit of the industry concerned. And if the enabling law thus so provide, the fact remains that
the governmental agency entrusted with the duty of implementing the purpose for which the levy is imposed is vested
with the discretionary power to determine when and how the collections should be appropriated.”69

4. The COA Audit Shows the

Public Nature of the Funds.

Under COA Office Order No. 86-9470 dated April 15, 1986,70 the COA reviewed the expenditure and use of the coconut
levies allocated for the acquisition of the UCPB. The audit was aimed at ascertaining whether these were utilized for the
purpose for which they had been intended.71 Under the 1987 Constitution, the powers of the COA are as follows:
“The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities x x x.”72

Because these funds have been subjected to COA audit, there can be no other conclusion than, that they are prima facie
public in character.

5. The BIR Has Pronounced That the

Coconut Levy Funds Are Taxes.

In response to a query posed by the administrator of the Philippine Coconut Authority regarding the character of the
coconut levy funds, the Bureau of Internal Revenue has affirmed that these funds are public in character. It held as
follows: “[T]he coconut levy is not a public trust fund for the benefit of the coconut farmers, but is in the nature of a tax
and, therefore, x x x public funds that are subject to government administration and disposition.”73

Furthermore, the executive branch treats the coconut levies as public funds. Thus, Executive Order No. 277, issued on
September 24, 1995, directed the mode of treatment, utilization, administration and management of the coconut levy
funds. It provided as follows:

‘(a) The coconut levy funds, which include all income, interests, proceeds or profits derived therefrom, as well as all
assets, properties and shares of stocks procured or obtained with the use of such funds, shall be treated, utilized,
administered and managed as public funds consistent with the uses and purposes under the laws which constituted
them and the development priorities of the government, including the government’s coconut productivity,
rehabilitation, research extension, farmers organizations, and market promotions programs, which are designed to
advance the development of the coconut industry and the welfare of the coconut farmers.”74 (Italics supplied)

Doctrinally, acts of the executive branch are prima facie valid and binding, unless declared unconstitutional or contrary
to law.

6. Laws Governing Coconut Levies

Recognize Their Public Nature.

Finally and tellingly, the very laws governing the coconut levies recognize their public character. Thus, the third Whereas
clause of PD No. 276 treats them as special funds for a specific public purpose. Furthermore, PD No. 711 transferred to
the general funds of the State all existing special and fiduciary funds including the CCSF. On the other hand, PD No. 1234
specifically declared the CCSF as a special fund for a special purpose, which should be treated as a special account in the
National Treasury.

Moreover, even President Marcos himself, as the sole legislative/executive authority during the martial law years, struck
off the phrase which is a private fund of the coconut farmers from the original copy of Executive Order No. 504 dated
May 31, 1978, and we quote:

“WHEREAS, by means of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (‘CCSF’), which is the private fund of the coconut
farmers (deleted), essential coconut-based products are made available to household consumers at socialized prices.”
(Emphasis supplied)

The phrase in bold face—which is the private fund of the coconut farmers—was crossed out and duly initialed by its
author, former President Marcos. This deletion, clearly visible in “Attachment C” of petitioner’s Memorandum,75 was a
categorical legislative intent to regard the CCSF as public, not private, funds.

Having Been Acquired With Public

Funds, UCPB Shares Belong, Prima
Facie, to the Government
Having shown that the coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, but are in fact prima facie public
funds, this Court believes that the government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong to
it as the prima facie beneficial and true owner.

As stated at the beginning, voting is an act of dominion that should be exercised by the share owner. One of the
recognized rights of an owner is the right to vote at meetings of the corporation. The right to vote is classified as the
right to control.76 Voting rights may be for the purpose of, among others, electing or removing directors, amending a
charter, or making or amending bylaws.77 Because the subject UCPB shares were acquired with government funds, the
government becomes their prima facie beneficial and true owner.

Ownership includes the right to enjoy, dispose of, exclude and recover a thing without limitations other than those
established by law or by the owner.78 Ownership has been aptly described as the most comprehensive of all real
rights.79 And the right to vote shares is a mere incident of ownership. In the present case, the government has been
shown to be the prima facie owner of the funds used to purchase the shares. Hence, it should be allowed the rights and
privileges flowing from such fact.

And paraphrasing Cocofed v. PCGG, already cited earlier, the Republic should continue to vote those shares until and
unless private respondents are able to demonstrate, in the main cases pending before the Sandiganbayan, that “they
[the sequestered UCPB shares] have legitimately become private.”

Procedural and Incidental Issues:

Grave Abuse of Discretion,
Improper Arguments
and Intervenors’ Relief

Procedurally, respondents argue that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion, a demonstration required in every petition under Rule 65.80

We disagree. We hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it contravened the rulings of this Court
in Baseco and Cojuangco-Roxas—thereby unlawfully, capriciously and arbitrarily depriving the government of its right to
vote sequestered shares purchased with coconut levy funds which are prima facie public funds.

Indeed, grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence. In one case,81 this Court ruled that the lower court’s resolution was “tantamount to
overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court x x x and unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.”82

The Public Character of

Shares Is a Valid Issue

Private respondents also contend that the public nature of the coconut levy funds was not raised as an issue before the
Sandiganbayan. Hence, it could not be taken up before this Court.

Again we disagree. By ruling that the two-tiered test should be applied in evaluating private respondents’ claim of
exercising voting rights over the sequestered shares, the Sandiganbayan effectively held that the subject assets were
private in character. Thus, to meet this issue, the Office of the Solicitor General countered that the shares were not
private in character, and that quite the contrary, they were and are public in nature because they were acquired with
coco levy funds which are public in character. In short, the main issue of who may vote the shares cannot be determined
without passing upon the question of the public/private character of the shares and the funds used to acquire them. The
latter issue, although not specifically raised in the Court a quo, should still be resolved in order to fully adjudicate the
main issue.

Indeed, this Court has “the authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors closely
relate to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the determination of the
questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend.”83

Therefore, “where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented as long as the latter
issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has
the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them.”84
No Positive Relief
For Intervenors

Intervenors anchor their interest in this case on an alleged right that they are trying to enforce in another
Sandiganbayan case docketed as SB Case No. 0187.85 In that case, they seek the recovery of the subject UCPB shares
from herein private respondents and the corporations controlled by them. Therefore, the rights sought to be protected
and the reliefs prayed for by intervenors are still being litigated in the said case. The purported rights they are invoking
are mere expectancies wholly dependent on the outcome of that case in the Sandiganbayan.

Clearly, we cannot rule on intervenors’ alleged right to vote at this time and in this case. That right is dependent upon
the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of their action for the recovery of said sequestered shares. Given the patent fact that
intervenors are not registered stockholders of UCPB as of the moment, their asserted rights cannot be ruled upon in the
present proceedings. Hence, no positive relief can be given them now, except insofar as they join petitioner in barring
private respondents from voting the subject shares.

Epilogue

In sum, we hold that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and effectively
reversing existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which
are prima facie public in character.

In making tins ruling, we are in no way preempting the proceedings the Sandiganbayan may conduct or the final
judgment it may promulgate in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F. Our determination here is merely prima facie,
and should not bar the anti-graft court from making a final ruling, after proper trial and hearing, on the issues and
prayers in the said civil cases, particularly in reference to the ownership of the subject shares.

We also lay down the caveat that, in declaring the coco levy funds to be prima facie public in character, we are not ruling
in any final manner on their classification—whether they are general or trust or special funds—since such classification
is not at issue here. Suffice it to say that the public nature of the coco levy funds is decreed by the Court only for the
purpose of determining the right to vote the shares, pending the final outcome of the said civil cases.

Neither are we resolving in the present case the question of whether the shares held by Respondent Cojuangco are, as
he claims, the result of private enterprise. This factual matter should also be taken up in the final decision in the cited
cases that are pending in the court a quo. Again, suffice it to say that the only issue settled here is the right of PCGG to
vote the sequestered shares, pending the final outcome of said cases.

This matter involving the coconut levy funds and the sequestered UCPB shares has been straddling the courts for about
15 years. What we are discussing in the present Petition, we stress, is just an incident of the main cases which are
pending in the antigraft court—the cases for the reconveyance, reversion and restitution to the State of these UCPB
shares.

The resolution of the main cases has indeed been long overdue. Every effort, both by the parties and the
Sandiganbayan, should be exerted to finally settle this controversy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Order SET ASIDE. The PCGG shall continue voting the
sequestered shares until Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F are finally and completely resolved.
Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to decide with finality the aforesaid civil cases within a period of six (6)
months from notice. It shall report to this Court on the progress of the said cases every three (3) months, on pain of
contempt. The Petition in Intervention is DISMISSED inasmuch as the reliefs prayed for are not covered by the main
issues in this case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr. and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Melo, J., Please see dissenting opinion.

Puno, J., I join the Separate Opinion of J. Vitug.

 Vitug, J., Please see Separate Opinion.

Kapunan, J., Concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Melo.

Pardo, J., I join the result of the dissent.

Buena, J. This is to certify that Justice Buena voted with the majority in granting the petition. Davide, Jr., C.J.

Ynares-Santiago, J., I concur with the dissenting opinion of J. Melo.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., I join Justice Melo in his Dissent.

Note.—

It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his right or property he should first be informed of the claim
against him and the theory on which such claim is premised. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 515 [1997])