Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW): How to

determine maximum and minimum penalties

(Act no 4103 as amended)

The Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory in all cases, EXCEPT if the accused will fall in any of
the following exceptions:

1. if sentenced with a penalty of death or life imprisonment

2. if convicted of treason, conspiracy, proposal to commit treason
3. if convicted of misprision of treason, sedition, rebellion or espionage
4. if convicted of piracy
5. if the offender is a habitual delinquent
6. those who escaped from prison or evaded sentence
7. those who violated the terms of conditional pardon of the chief executive
8. where the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year (important!)
9. if convicted by final judgement at the time of the effectivity of Act No. 4103
10. if penalized with suspension or distierro

If accused fall in any of the foregoing exceptions. DO NOT APPLY ISLAW!

ISLAW applies to offenses punished by Special Law and Revised Penal Code.

Why is ISLAW mandatory?

In the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the judge will get the maximum penalty and
likewise the minimum penalty. If the accused was already able to serve the minimum term of his
indeterminate sentence and upon the approval of the Board, the accused now becomes eligible for
parole. ISLAW is favorable to the accused.

If the accused was granted parole and violated some conditions of the parole, What will
happen?

A warrant of arrest will be issued by the court and the accused will be made to serve the rest of the
remaining or unexpired portion of his sentence. (But in probation you go back to number 1, serving of
sentence will be from the beginning)

Application of ISLAW:

How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Special Law:

1. The maximum penalty should NOT exceed the maximum provided for by that law.
2. The minimum penalty should NOT fall below the minimum provided by the law.

How to get maximum and minimum penalty in Revised Penal Code:

Example: In the crime of homicide, under the Revised Penal Code, the offender is sentenced to
reclusion temporal.

The maximum penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is reclusion temporal. But reclusion
temporal is a divisible penalty consisting of maximum, medium and minimum periods. Which period will
we place the maximum term of the Indeterminate Sentence?

Guide for determining the maximum penalty:

1. Determine the entire range of the penalty
2. Determine if there is mitigating or aggravating circumstance

Which period will the maximum penalty be placed?

In pursuant to art 64, when there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, it should be placed
at the medium period. Thus, the maximum penalty for the example above is reclusion temporal in the
medium period.
What is the minimum penalty now?
In getting the minimum penalty, the rule is to simply get the penalty one (1) degree lower from the
maximum penalty without taking into account the mitigating and aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
penalty one degree lower from reclusion temporal, without taking into account any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, is prision mayor. Prision mayor is now the minimum penalty for our example.

Important: If your maximum penalty is wrong, it follows that the minimum penalty will also be wrong.

Again, prision mayor is a divisible penalty. Which period can it be placed?

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it would depend upon the discretion of the court on which
period to place it. Thus, the minimum penalty is prision mayor in any of its period.

Factors that could affect the imposition of minimum penalty:

1. Age
2. Conduct during trial
3. Mental or physical condition

Suppose in the example above, 1 aggravating circumstance was proven. What is now the maximum
penalty?
It would still be reclusion temporal, but it shall be placed in the maximum period because of the
presence of 1 aggravating circumstance.

How about the minimum penalty?

It would still be 1 degree lower from reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor. In which period? It
shall be discretionary upon the court.

(More examples)

1 mitigating but NO aggravating

maximum penalty: reclusion temporal in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision mayor in any period

2 mitigating, NO aggravating (privileged mitigating)

maximum penalty: prision mayor in the medium period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period

The preceding example is an exception to the rule. If there is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we
take it into account first in order to obtain the proper maximum penalty. Then, from that maximum
penalty, we obtain the proper minimum penalty by getting the penalty 1 degree lower. Same rule applies
as to the period of the minimum penalty.

Remember: It will never become a privileged mitigating circumstance if there is an aggravating

circumstance present. 8 mitigating and 1 aggravating will never become privileged mitigating
circumstance.

3 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision mayor in the minimum period
minimum penalty: prision correctional any period

In the preceding example, there are 3 mitigating circumstance present and no aggravating
circumstance. The first two mitigating circumstance shall be a privileged mitigating circumstance. Thus,
the penalty will be reduced by 1 degree from reclusion temporal to prision mayor. The 3rd mitigating
circumstance shall place the penalty in the minimum period.

4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the medium period (2 privileged circumstance. Thus we
lower by 2 degrees)
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period
5 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period

At most we can only lower by 2 degrees. Thus, if there are 6 mitigating circumstance and NO
aggravating:
maximum penalty: prision correctional in the minimum period
minimum penalty: arresto mayor any period

How is Indeterminate Sentence Law applied in complex crimes (Article 48)?

A complex crime is punished by the most serious offense and shall be imposed in its maximum
period.

Example: Estafa through falsification of public documents.

Under the Revised Penal Code, falsification of public documents (Article 171) is a more serious offense
punished by prision mayor than estafa (Article 315), punished only by prision correctional.

Thus, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty for estafa through falsification
of public documents shall be prision mayor in the maximum period. Minimum penalty shall be prision
correctional, any period.

Suppose there was 1 mitigating circumstance proven. Maximum penalty would still be prision mayor in
the maximum period. In pursuant to Article 48, even if there is a mitigating circumstance present, it
should still be imposed at the maximum period.

How about if there are 2 mitigating circumstance and no aggravating?

The rule is, if it is a privileged mitigating circumstance, we lower by the penalty by one degree but still
place it at the maximum period. Thus, the maximum penalty shall be prision correctional in the
maximum period.

4 mitigating, NO aggravating
maximum penalty: arresto mayor in its maximum period

OTHERS: People v. Dela Cruz (2008)

1) Net Earning Capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at the time of death) x (Gross
Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses)

The records show that Elmer’s annual gross income was P136,800.00 computed from his
monthly rate of P11,400.00. His reasonable and necessary living expenses are estimated at 50%
of this gross income, leaving a balance of P68,400.00. His life expectancy, on the other hand, is
assumed to be 2/3 of age 80 less 38, his age at the time of death. Applied to the above
formula, these data yield the net earning capacity loss of P1,915,200.00. The RTC award
must thus be increased to this amount.

In the absence of supporting evidence, we cannot award loss of earning capacity to Nestor’s
heirs.

2) The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty. Though the penalty imposed on appellant was reduced
to reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity award remains at P75,000.00
 3) moral damages to the heirs of Elmer and Nestor, respectively, is not in accordance with
recent jurisprudence.97 We accordingly reduce the amounts to P50,000.00
4) exemplary damages to the heirs of Elmer and Nestor in the amounts of P500,000.00
and P50,000.00, respectively. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce these
amounts to P25,000.00 for each set of heirs.98
5) The RTC awarded P138,070.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Elmer. It appears that
out of this amount, only P61,635.00 was supported by receipts. The difference in the
amounts was based solely on the submissions by Elmer’s widow. For one too be entitled
to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by
the injured party.99 Hence, we reduce the awarded actual damages to P61,635.00.
6) We note that the RTC did not award actual damages to the heirs of Nestor for lack of
evidence. In People v. Abrazaldo,100 we held that where the amount of the actual
damages cannot be determined because of the absence of supporting receipts but
entitlement is shown under the facts of the case, temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 may be awarded. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, we award temperate
damages of P25,000.00 to the heirs of Nestor.
7) We affirm the order of the RTC to restitute the amount of P84,060.00 (Petrol products
stolen) to the 7-Eleven Convenience Store. This was the amount taken in the robbery as
proven by evidence. Since physical products cannot be returned, the amount must be
restituted. We delete, however, the interest that the RTC imposed.

OTHERS: People v. Regalario (2009)

The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no
longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying
circumstance. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and
limb, the necessity for the person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he
1avv phi 1

persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating
from the fray.

1) People v. Quiachon,29 we explained that even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed
on appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper. The award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the
death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.

2) consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is
death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the award of
moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.0032
3) while the award of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to
₱30,000.00.

OTHERS: People v Temporada

1) To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the
activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said
 Code (now Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same
against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

2) An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held

liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment

3) Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa. The elements
of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation

4) Life imprisonment = ONLY IN SPECIAL LAW (pls verify. 40 years max. equivalent of
reclusion perpetua in RPC but 30 years each count but 40 years max SENTENCE, but
imposed penalty may exceed 40)

5) Prescribed penalty = The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription
for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time

Imposable penalty = the modified “prescribed penalty” considering the attending or

modifying circumstances (in the RPC) which when present in the commission of a felony
affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. (ex: 1 AC, no MC,
imposable = prescribed in max period)

Pre-ISL: penalty actually imposed = from the imposable penalty, court chooses a
SINGLE FIXED PENALTY (aka straight penalty);
= PRISON TERM he has to serve ; no min or max term

Passage of ISL: penalty actually imposed = indeterminate sentence (aka prison term
with MIN and MAX term)
MAX Term = Pre-ISL/RPC imposable penalty OR penalty actually imposed
(considers the attending circumstances)
MIN Term = within the range of the penalty NEXT LOWER in DEGREE (NLD) to
the prescribed penalty (basis of NLD; not imposable penalty) in
RPC (do not consider attending circums)

OTHERS: Batistis v. People

1) The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate
sentence. The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses whether punishable by the
Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as
the Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty specified by the law must,
therefore, be deemed mandatory (except for the excepted cases).
2) We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a prosecution
for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is, Section 2692,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56 and Republic Act
No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years. There, the
Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day imposed by the trial court
(Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law would be unfavorable to the accused by lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we
cannot apply the Nang Kay exception herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a
special law like that in Nang Kay. Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay could well and
lawfully have given the accused the lowest prison sentence of five years because of the
mitigating circumstance of his voluntary plea of guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and
the CA did not have a similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused.
Secondly, the large number of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely,
241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador plastic
caps, and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that Batistis had
been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time, thereby deserving for
him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower, penalty.