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VOL. 205, JANUARY 27, 1992 529

Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 98028. January 27, 1992.

GREGORIO CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and ALBERTO IGNACIO, respondents.

Labor Law; Agrarian Law; The agrarian court's findings of

fact which went beyond the minimum evidentiary support
demanded by law, that is supported by substantial evidence, are
final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate
tribunal.—After painstakingly going over the records of the.
petition, we find no strong and cogent reason which justifies the
appellate court's deviation from the findings and conclusions of
the trial court. As pointed in Hernandez v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in agrarian cases, all that
is required is mere substantial evidence. Hence, the agrarian
court's findings of fact which went beyond the minimum
evidentiary support demanded by law, that is supported by
substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and cannot be
reversed by the appellate tribunal.
Same; Same; Personal Cultivation; Absent the element of
personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so
designated in the written agreement of the parties.—Anent the
element of consent, the petitioner contends that the best evidence
and imperishable proof of the relationship of the parties is that
shown in the complaint filed by private respondent with the
barangay captain Tomas Mercado that he is a mere "magsisiga" of
the mango trees on the subject parcel of land. On the other hand,
the respondent appellate court said that the best proof of the
existence of tenancy relationship is the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C")
and that under Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court,
'when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself,' subject only to certain exceptions. Inasmuch as substantial
evidence does not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of
evidence (Berenguer, Jr. v. CA, 164 433 [1988] citing Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]), we rule that
there is no

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_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

concrete evidence on record sufficient to estabish that the element

of consent is present. But even assuming arguendo that the
element of consent is present, we declared in De los Reyes v.
Espineli (30 SCRA 574 [1969]) that absent the element of
personal cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so
designated in the written agreement of the parties.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Meaning of the term "res
inter alios acta altere nocere non debet"; The right of a party
cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.
—With respect to the requisite of sharing the harvests, the
respondent appellate court considered the receipt (Exhibit "E")
signed by the petitioner's son Walderado Castillo as its evidence.
On this point, the petitioner has correctly argued that the receipt
is inadmissible on the ground that he did not participate in its
execution. The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non
debet," found in Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court applies, for
as stated in Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA
201 [1990]) the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another.
Same; Same; Tenancy Relationship; Well-settled is the rule
that all the requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant.—Also in pari materia
is Caballes v. Department of Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247
[1988]), that the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish
a tenancy relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the
requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites do
not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he
is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land
Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

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(Qua v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of

Appeals, 130 SCRA 482 [1984]).
Legal Ethics; Attorney's fees; The award of attorney's fees by
the trial court is unwarranted since the action appears to have
been filed in good faith. There should be no penalty on the right to
litigate,—However, with respect to the award of attorney's fees by
the trial court, the award of P1 0,000.00 is unwarranted since the
action appears to have been filed in good faith. There should be no
penalty on the right to litigate. (Ilocos Norte Electric Company v.
Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989] citing Espiritu v. Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 50

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VOL. 205, JANUARY 27, 1992 531

Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

[1985])

PETITION for review from the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Sumulong Law Offices for petitioner.
          Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance for private
respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals

decision which reversed and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 8302-M and
declared respondent Alberto Ignacio as agricultural tenant
of the petitioner.
On July 18, 1985, a complaint for injunction was filed by
private respondent Alberto Ignacio against petitioner
Gregorio Castillo with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan.
It is alleged in the complaint that the respondent is the
agricultural tenant of the petitioner in the latter's parcel of
land consisting of 9,920 square meters with fruit-bearing
trees situated in Cut-cut, Pulilan, Bulacan; that sometime
in April 1985, the petitioner requested the respondent to
allow him to construct a resthouse in said land, and as a
token of goodwill, the respondent agreed, which agreement
is embodied in a "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") between them;

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that in violation of said agreement, the petitioner started to

cut fruit-bearing trees on the land in question and filled
with adobe stones the area devoted by the private
respondent to the planting of vegetables.
The complaint asked for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from further
cutting fruitbearing trees and from committing further acts
of dispossession against the private respondent. The
injunction was granted.
The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that the
private respondent is not his agricultural tenant; that
respondent Alberto Ignacio is merely a "magsisiga"
(smudger) of the landholding in question; that he did not
ask permission from the private respondent to construct a
rest house on subject land, since as owner thereof, he had
the right to do so; that he was merely exercising his right of
ownership when he cut certain trees in the subject
premises; that when the barangay captain

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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

failed to settle the conflict and the matter was referred to

the MAR-BALA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform-Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance) Office in Malolos, Bulacan,
Atty. Benjamin Yambao of the MAR (Ministry of Agrarian
Reform) prepared the "Kasunduan" attached to the
respondent's complaint, but when he (petitioner) said that
he had some misgivings about some words therein, Atty.
Yambao assured him that he need not worry because the
respondent could not be a "kasamang magsasaka" of his
mango land because there is nothing to cultivate or till in
said land, but he still corrected the last part of par. 4 of
said "Kasunduan" by making it read "sa kanilang
matiwasay na kaugnayan" before signing the same. On
September 28, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment
declaring that no tenancy relationship exists between the
petitioner and the private respondent. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered:

a) dismissing the above-entitled case, with costs against the

plaintiff;

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b) lifting the preliminary injunction issued on September 18,

1985 and declaring the same legally inefficacious
henceforth; and
c) directing the plaintiff to pay unto the defendant the
amount of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees."

From the above decision, the private respondent appealed

to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. The respondent appellate court
declared that there exists a tenancy relationship between
Alberto Ignacio and Gregorio Castillo and permanently
enjoined the latter from disturbing the respondent's
peaceful possession as tenant of said land.
Hence, the instant petition was filed, with the petitioner
assigning the following errors as the issues raised to us:

The Court of Appeals (Fourth Division) committed clear and

patent error in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which is fully supported not only by substantial evidence but by
overwhelming

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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

evidence.

II

The Court of Appeals committed clear and reversible error and

grave abuse of discretion in declaring that "the relationship
between plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee over the
mango land in question as one of agricultural tenancy" despite the
patent judicial admission of respondent Ignacio that he is merely
a "magsisiga" of the mango land under litigation.

III

The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in

permanently enjoining petitioner "from disturbing plaintiff-
appellant's peaceful possession as tenant of said land," although
private respondent is not in physical possession of the land,
respondent Ignacio being merely and admittedly a "magsisiga" of
the mango land in question.

IV

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The Court of Appeals committed clear and patent error in not

ordering the termination of any and all relationships between
petitioner and private respondent, the latter having failed to
perform the work of "magsisiga" on the subject parcel of land and
instead he obstructs the driveway by scattering rubbish, dry
leaves, dirt and other rubbish, preventing the petitioner from
proceeding to the premises of the land by putting up a barb wire
fence which are acts of harrassment, disturbing the peaceful
possession of petitioner and which acts are inimical to the
continuation of any kind of relationship between Gregorio Castillo
and Alberto Ignacio."

The issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether

or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
The Agricultural Tenancy Act defines "agricultural
tenancy" as—

"x x x the physical possession by a person of a land devoted to

agriculture belonging to or legally possessed by, another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the
members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of
which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to
pay a price certain, either in produce or in money, or in both."
(Sec. 3, RA. No. 1199; 50

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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

O.G. 4655-56).

As held in the case of Qua v. Court. of Appeals (198 SCRA

236 [1991]), the essential requisites of tenancy relationship
are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2)
the subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is
agricultural production; (4) there is consideration which
consists of sharing the harvest; (5) there is consent to the
tenant to work on the land and (6) there is personal
cultivation by him.
From the foregoing definition, the petitioner insists that
for a person to claim tenancy relationship, he must be an
occupant or must be in physical possession of the
agricultural land. He alleges that, Alberto Ignacio, being a
mere smudger (magsisiga) of the mango land, no tenancy
relationship can exist between them absent the element of
physical possession.
In Gagola v. Court of Agrarian Relations (18 SCRA 992
[1966]), the Court held that a tenant has possession of the
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land only through personal cultivation. Thus, in the instant

case, the key factor in ascertaining the existence of a
landowner-tenant relationship is whether or not there is
personal cultivation of the land by the private respondent.
The trial court noted that:

"Let alone or notwithstanding the use of the phrase "kasamang

magsasaka" in the Kasunduan (Exhibit C) relied upon by the
plaintiff, there is no dispute that the actual role ever played by
the plaintiff visa-vis the land in litigation was that of a mere
"magsisiga" (smudger). Stated differently, plaintiff has never
performed on the property in question any of the acts of
cultivation contemplated by the law as essential to the creation of
an agricultural tenancy relationship. In fine, it is the sense of the
Court that absent the important factor of cultivation, no tenancy
relationship has ever existed between the plaintiff and the
defendant over the property involved in the instant case. At most
and at best, the contractual relationship between them was
purely civil in nature consisting solely of the seasonal engagement
of plaintiff 's services as a "magsisiga" or "taga-suob."

On this matter, the respondent appellate court disagreed

and noted instead that personal cultivation by respondent
Ignacio of petitioner's land is clearly spelled out or
admitted in the "Kasunduan" (Exhibit "C") in view of the
aforementioned provi-
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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

sion therein that nobody except petitioner and the

members of his family could enter said land without said
petitioner's written permission.
We agree with the trial court that the element of
personal cultivation is absent. The main thrust of the
petitioner's argument is that the respondent Court of
Appeals is mandated by law to affirm the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, acting as an Agrarian Court, if the
findings of fact in said decision are supported by
substantial evidence and the conclusions stated therein are
not clearly against the law and jurisprudence. Op. the
other hand, the private respondent contends that the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and
conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court.
After painstakingly going over the records of the
petition, we find no strong and cogent reason which

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justifies the appellate court's deviation from the findings

and conclusions of the trial court. As pointed in Hernandez
v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA 758 [1990]), in
agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial
evidence. Hence, the agrarian court's findings of fact which
went beyond the minimum evidentiary support demanded
by law, that is supported by substantial evidence, are final
and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate
tribunal.
Moreover, and as significantly held in Qua v. Court of
Appeals (supra), the fact that the source of livelihood of the
private respondents is not derived from the lots they are
allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural
tenancy relationship.
Under the facts obtaining in the case, respondent
Ignacio is a businessman by occupation and this is his
principal source of income. He manufactures hollow blocks.
He also has a piggery and poultry farm as well as a
hardware store on the land adjoining the subject land. To
add to that, the respondent farms the riceland of one Dr.
Luis Santos. It is thus evident that the working hours of
the respondent as a businessman and his other activities
do not permit him to undertake the work and obligations of
a real tenant. This is further supported by the undisputed
fact that the respondent cannot even personally perform
the work of a smudger because on October 22,1986, the
respondent hired some 20 people who are not members of
his
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Castillo vs. Court of Appeals

family to cut and burn the grass in the premises of the

subject land.
Anent the element of consent, the petitioner contends
that the best evidence and imperishable proof of the
relationship of the parties is that shown in the complaint
filed by private respondent with the barangay captain
Tomas Mercado that he is a mere "magsisiga" of the mango
trees on the subject parcel of land. On the other hand, the
respondent appellate court said that the best proof of the
existence of tenancy relationship is the "Kasunduan"
(Exhibit "C") and that under Section 7, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, 'when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself,' subject only to
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certain exceptions. Inasmuch as substantial evidence does

not only require the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence
(Berenguer, Jr. v. CA, 164 SCRA 433 [1988] citing Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940]),
we rule that there is no concrete evidence on record
sufficient to establish that the element of consent is
present. But even assuming arguendo that the element of
consent is present, we declared in De los Reyes v. Espineli
(30 SCRA 574 [1969]) that absent the element of personal
cultivation, one cannot be a tenant even if he is so
designated in the written agreement of the parties.
With respect to the requisite of sharing the harvests, the
respondent appellate court considered the receipt (Exhibit
"E") signed by the petitioner's son Walderado Castillo as its
evidence. On this point, the petitioner has correctly argued
that the receipt is inadmissible on the ground that he did
not participate in its execution.
The maxim "res inter alios acta altere nocere non debet,"
found in Section 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court applies, for as
stated in Gevero v. Intermediate Appellate Court (189 SCRA
201 [1990]) the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another.
Also in pari materia is Caballes v. Department of
Agrarian Reform (168 SCRA 247 [1988]), that the fact of
sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Well-settled is the rule that all the requisites
must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship
between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto
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VOL. 205, JANUARY 27, 1992 537

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

tenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is

so because unless a person has established his status as a
de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is
he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. (Qua v. Court of
Appeals, supra citing Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130
SCRA 482 [1984]). However, with respect to the award of
attorney's fees by the trial court, the award of P1 0,000.00
is unwarranted since the action appears to have been filed
in good faith. There should be no penalty on the right to
litigate. (Ilocos Norte Electric Company v. Court of
Appeals, 179 SCRA 5 [1989] citing Espiritu v. Court of
Appeals, 137 SCRA 50 [1985]).
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WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision

of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of attorney's fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

          Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ.,

concur.

Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.

——o0o——

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