Incoming Brief - Minister For Home Affairs
Incoming Brief - Minister For Home Affairs
Incoming Brief - Minister For Home Affairs
Quick facts
History and structure of the Portfolio
The Home Affairs Portfolio was established on 19 December 2017 and finalised in May 2018, bringing together
the Department of Home Affairs, the ABF, the AFP, the ACIC, ASIO and AUSTRAC.
The Portfolio is focused on ensuring a more prosperous, secure and united Australia, with responsibility for
functions relating to Australia’s federal law enforcement, immigration, citizenship, multicultural affairs, national
and transport security, criminal justice, emergency management, and border-related functions.
• At least 115 Australian children have been exposed to the violence, training and doctrine of jihadist
groups.
• Drug importation referrals have increased 300 per cent since 2013-14.
• The increasingly networked nature of critical infrastructure, global databases and supply-chain
management means Australia’s national institutions are increasingly vulnerable to interference
through the cyber domain, including for criminal gain, economic espionage and foreign interference.
• AUSTRAC suspicious matter reports have increased 1,736 per cent since 2008-09.
• Threats to Australia’s social cohesion and our nation’s security are also posed by those seeking to
incite violence.
The Portfolio is structured to maintain the statutory independence of Portfolio agencies, while ensuring the
external accountability and oversight arrangements are appropriately retained, and powers are exercised
proportionally and lawfully.
The ABF, while established within the Department for budgetary, employment and administrative purposes, is
operationally independent.
• co-locates policy, operational, program and service delivery responsibility within one Portfolio and
Department, maximising the potential for horizontal and vertical collaboration;
• establishes key touch points for leadership on cross-cutting issues to enable agile work practices,
including through joint or taskforce approaches; and
• creates opportunities for synergy and efficiency through shared services by clustering related lines of
work, which also provides clear lines of accountability and decision making authority.
Groups
• Immigration and Citizenship Services – delivers citizenship, temporary and permanent migration
programs, and manages the refugee humanitarian programs.
• Policy – provides comprehensive policy, strategy and planning development at strategic and
operational levels.
• Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs – delivers key security, emergency management,
border facilitation and revenue programs with industry, State and Territory partners.
• Executive – drives and monitors enterprise strategy, risk, performance and assurance; provides
integrated, coordinated and timely support to the Executive; delivers strategic research and
communication services; and, provides the Department’s intelligence services and products.
• Corporate and Enabling – provides integrated support services that allow the Department and the
ABF to function effectively, including specialist corporate, people, finance and legal advice and
assistance.
• Technology and Major Capability – manages technology and major capability development
programs.
Coordinators
• Commonwealth Transnational Serious and Organised Crime Coordinator – leads the national
effort to combat transnational, serious and organised crime affecting Australia, with a focus on
strategy, capability and policy.
• National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator – delivers an effective, efficient and consistent
national response to foreign interference by coordinating policy and program development.
Achievements
The Department is responsible for centrally coordinated strategy and policy leadership in relation to
immigration, citizenship and multicultural affairs, domestic and national security arrangements, law
enforcement, emergency management, counter-terrorism, social cohesion, the protection of our sovereignty,
the integrity of our border, and the resilience of national infrastructure.
• establishing or co-locating within the Department, the National Coordinator roles for Counter-
Terrorism, Countering Foreign Interference, and Transnational and Serious Organised Crime. These
positions provide national leadership and coordination points for addressing the complex challenges
in these fields, for example in response to the Christchurch terrorist attack.
• managing the Migration, Humanitarian and Citizenship Programs, and building our successful
multicultural society;
o improving the ability of agencies to operate around encryption, and allowing law enforcement
and national security agencies to work more effectively in the increasingly complex digital
environment; and
o expanding powers to enable the AFP to take proactive measures at airports where individuals
pose a criminal or security threat (introduced to Parliament in September 2018).
o security arrangements for high profile events including the Gold Coast Commonwealth
Games, Invictus Games and ANZAC commemorative events;
o developing the new Cyber Incident Management Arrangements through the Council of
Australian Governments; and.
• supporting the ABF’s border management role and facilitating the movement of people and goods
across the border.
Outlook
The Portfolio has established solid strategic, structural, governance and delivery foundations for promoting a
prosperous, secure and united Australia.
Australia prospers significantly from being open, engaged and connected to the rest of the world. The
Portfolio’s focus is to identify and proactively attend to the vulnerabilities that come with global
interconnectedness, ensuring that Australia continues to reap the benefits of globalisation. The threats that
have been identified for immediate priority focus are:
• security of borders;
• terrorism;
• foreign interference;
• cyber security;
• child exploitation;
• integrity of trade and travel while enhancing the effectiveness of Australia’s migration program; and
Capability
The Portfolio has a strategic planning framework to provide for the development of the Home Affairs Portfolio,
and the assessment of the capabilities required to meet future security challenges.
The Portfolio Strategic Planning Framework (the Framework) provides a strategy to realise the Portfolio’s
vision. The ‘Enduring Principal Tasks’ are the practical application of the strategy, and engage all the Portfolio’s
agencies and the Department of Home Affairs.
The Framework articulates a number of Portfolio capabilities that must be delivered collectively to ensure that
the current and future threats to the Australian society and economy are adequately addressed.
A rigorous strategy led approach to capability management enables the Portfolio to identify capability gaps
and opportunities, and plan for the future capability needs. It also enables the Portfolio to anticipate, plan and
resource capability development and investments, and provides the basis for making trade-offs within and
between capabilities, and for divesting capabilities that are no longer serving the Portfolio, or are poorly aligned
to strategy and the Enduring Principal Tasks.
• The total forecast ASL for the Portfolio for 2018-19 was 23,522 and in 2019-20 is 24,525:
2018-19
Entity 2019-20 Change
Estimate
Department of Home Affairs 14,120 14,545 425
AFP 6,459 6,771 312
ACIC 741 849 108
AIC 19 35 16
AUSTRAC 333 368 35
ASIO 1,850 1,957 107
Grand Total 23,522 24,525 1,003
Note: ASL reflects published data from the 2019-20 PBS.
Outlook
• As at the 2019-20 PBS, the Department is forecast to generate administered revenue of $25.6 billion in
2019-20 and $99.6 billion over the forward estimates from 2019-20.
Departmental Expenses
• Total departmental expenses (excluding depreciation and amortisation and other expenses not requiring
an appropriation), as at the 2019-20 PBS, are $2.8 billion in 2019-20 and $10.5 billion over the forward
estimates from 2019-20.
• There is significant reduction in departmental resourcing, averaging $260 million per year over four years
from 2019-20, compared to 2018-19, as can be seen in Table 3. The decline in funding is primarily due to
the cumulative impact of efficiency dividends and savings applied to the Department over an extended
period of time.
Table 3: Departmental expenses (excluding depreciation, amortisation and other expenses not
requiring an appropriation) as at the 2019-20 PBS
2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2022-23
($'million) TOTAL FE
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Outcome 1
1.1: Border Enforcement 993.8 1,041.5 926.3 914.1 921.7 3,803.6
1.2: Border Management 242.1 259.3 249.1 255.1 260.0 1,023.5
1.3: Onshore Compliance and Detention 419.6 377.4 358.9 357.0 360.1 1,453.5
1.4: IMA Offshore Management 32.4 28.0 28.1 28.4 28.6 113.2
1.5: Regional Cooperation 18.4 18.5 14.9 14.8 14.9 63.1
1.6: Transport Security 48.8 48.4 48.4 48.4 48.9 194.0
1.7: National Security and Criminal Justice 114.2 110.7 100.3 94.4 95.9 401.2
1.8: Cyber Security 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 6.5
1.9: Counter Terrorism 3.0 4.8 3.0 3.0 3.1 13.9
1.10: Australian Government Disaster
Financial Support Payments - - - - - -
Outcome 1 1,874.0 1,890.2 1,730.6 1,716.9 1,734.9 7,072.6
Outcome 2
2.1: Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship 69.1 69.2 70.1 67.0 67.5 273.8
2.2: Migration 270.2 247.5 228.9 216.4 218.3 911.1
2.3: Visas 431.3 389.7 330.5 325.5 330.4 1,376.0
2.4: Refugee & Humanitarian Assistance 114.8 112.2 96.2 96.2 97.0 401.6
Outcome 2 885.3 818.5 725.7 705.1 713.3 2,962.6
Outcome 3
3.1: Border-Revenue Collection 65.3 59.7 59.8 59.8 59.7 239.0
3.2: Trade Faciliation and Industry
Engagement 56.5 53.9 51.0 50.9 51.2 207.1
Outcome 3 121.8 113.6 110.8 110.8 111.0 446.1
Note: excluding depreciation, amortisation and other expenses not requiring an appropriation. 2018-19 and the forward estimates include section 75 appropriation transfers to the
Department.
Administered Expenses
• The total administered expenses (excluding depreciation, amortisation and other expenses not requiring
an appropriation), as at the 2019-20 PBS, are $1.4 billion in 2019-20 and $4.6 billion over the forward
estimates from 2019-20.
• The significant reduction in administered resourcing between 2018-19 and 2019-20 is attributable to
Program 1.3 (closure of Christmas Island Immigration Detention Centre on 30 June 2019) and 1.4 (6
months funding for Offshore Regional Processing Arrangements until 31 December 2019).
Table 4: Administered expenses (excluding depreciation, amortisation and other expenses not
requiring an appropriation) as at the 2019-20 PBS
Capital Resourcing
• ASL reflects the average number of employees receiving salary or wages over the financial year, including
adjustments for casual and part-time staff, to show the full-time equivalent employment levels. The total
forecast ASL for the Department in 2018-19 is 14,120.
• The total forecast ASL for the Department in 2019-20 is 14,545, representing an increase of 425 ASL from
the total ASL for 2018-19 primarily due to the impacts from government decisions.
Internal Budget
• As at 31 March 2019, the Department‘s year to date departmental operating expenditure is $2.1 billion of a
total revenue budget of $2.9 billion (exclusive of depreciation and amortisation).
• The March year to date administered operating expenditure is $1.4 billion of full year administered operating
budget of $2.4 billion. The majority of year to date expenditure stems from Illegal Maritime Arrival Offshore
Management ($656 million of a full year budget of $1,078 million) and Onshore Compliance and Detention
($497 million of a full year budget of $815 million).
• The March year to date departmental capital expenditure is $200 million against a full year capital budget
of $323 million (including $66 million movement of funds). The year to date administered capital expenditure
is $32 million against a full year capital budget of $75 million (including
$48 million movement of funds).
• The March year to date administered income (excluding GST collected) is $14.8 billion against an external
budget of $20.9 billion for 2018-19.
• Total departmental operating funding for the Department is programmed to reduce in 2019-20 due to a $50
million reduction in revenue from Government. Total departmental capital funding is programmed to reduce
by $55 million.
Property Footprint
Attachments
A: Home Affairs Portfolio funding as at the 2019-20 PBS
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Attachment A
Home Affairs Portfolio funding as at the PBS 2019-20
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. Own-source revenue (S 74) excludes resources received free
of charge.
1. Reflects published data from the 2019-20 PB Statements for 2019-20 and the forward estimates.
Mr Pezzullo was previously Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, a position to
which he was appointed on 13 October 2014. In this role, he oversaw the integration of the Department with
the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) on 1 July 2015, including the standing-up of
the Australian Border Force as the Department’s operational arm.
Prior to this, Mr Pezzullo was Chief Executive Officer of the ACBPS from February 2013, having joined the
Service as its Chief Operating Officer in July 2009. As CEO, Mr Pezzullo was charged with implementing and
overseeing reforms in ACBPS’s business processes and systems, and its workforce culture and capability.
From September 2013, he was the senior official who oversaw Operation Sovereign Borders and the related
Joint Agency Task Force.
Before joining ACBPS, Mr Pezzullo was Deputy Secretary, Strategy in the Department of Defence, having
been appointed to that position in January 2006. Here, he was responsible for defence strategy and planning,
force structure development, the strategic policy aspects of Australian Defence Force operations, Defence's
international security relationships, and the delivery of national security programs in areas such as export
controls, counter-proliferation and Defence cooperation with other countries. He also had oversight of the
Department’s ministerial support and public affairs programs.
Mr Pezzullo joined the Department of Defence as a graduate in 1987. He worked in Defence until 1992 in a
variety of strategic policy and intelligence positions. He then transferred to the Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, where he worked in the International Division.
In March 1993, he joined the staff of the Foreign Minister, Senator the Hon Gareth Evans QC. He remained in
Parliament House until December 2001, including serving four years as Deputy Chief of Staff to the Leader of
the Opposition, the Hon Kim Beazley MP.
In February 2002, he re-joined the Department of Defence as an Assistant Secretary in the Corporate Services
and Infrastructure Group. In March 2004, he was promoted to the position of Head Infrastructure. In July 2004,
he was transferred into the newly formed role of Chief Of Staff Australian Defence Headquarters and Head of
Coordination and Public Affairs Division. Between February 2008 and May 2009, he led the Defence White
Paper team and was also the principal author of the 2009 Defence White Paper.
Mr Pezzullo has a BA (Hons) in History from Sydney University. He enjoys spending time with his family,
watching cricket and rugby league, and reading (particularly on military history, international relations,
intelligence, and political biographies).
Rachel Noble,
Deputy Secretary Executive
Rachel Noble PSM is the Deputy Secretary Executive Group in the Department of
Home Affairs. The Group is responsible for enterprise strategy, risk, assurance,
security and ministerial, media and intelligence services.
Immediately prior to this, Rachel led the Portfolio’s Home Affairs Implementation
Team to stand up the Home Affairs Portfolio.
In 2014, Rachel was promoted to Deputy Secretary Policy Group in the Department
of Immigration and Border Protection which included responsibility for trade,
customs, immigration and international policy.
Rachel joined the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS) in
May 2013 as the National Director Intelligence and Chief Information Officer. Her
previous role was as First Assistant Secretary Ministerial and Executive
Coordination and Communication, at the Department of Defence, where Rachel was responsible for providing
advice on Parliamentary, media, information management, records management policy, FOI and executive
coordination issues.
Prior to re-joining Defence, Rachel was the National Security Chief Information Officer and Cyber Policy
Coordinator in Prime Minister and Cabinet, responsible for improving information sharing among the national
security community and coordinating Whole-of-Government policy on cyber issues. Rachel received a Public
Service Medal for this work.
Rachel previously held several SES positions in the Department of Defence including Assistant Secretary
Governance, responsible for the overall governance and assurance framework for Defence; Assistant
Secretary Americas, North and South Asia, Europe in the International Policy Division, and Deputy Chief of
Facility at the Joint Defence Facility Pine Gap.
Rachel has also worked for the Bureau of Meteorology on international policies to address global climate
change and started her career in private industry working for Optus.
Rachel has a Masters of Business Administration in Technology Management and a Bachelor of Science with
Honours.
Marc Ablong,
Deputy Secretary Policy
Marc Ablong PSM was appointed Deputy Secretary Policy at the Department of
Home Affairs on 11 October 2018. Prior to this appointment, Marc filled the position
of First Assistant Secretary Strategy and Capability, Department of Home Affairs,
on secondment from the Department of Defence.
Among these positions were roles as Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy, Chief of
Staff of the White Paper Team that developed the 2009 Defence White Paper,
Assistant Secretary Strategic Issues Management, and First Assistant Secretary Ministerial and Executive
Coordination and Communication. Marc also worked with Doctor Rufus Black on the 2011 Review of the
Defence Accountability Framework.
In February 2014, Marc was appointed First Assistant Secretary White Paper, to lead the development of the
2016 Defence White Paper, Integrated Investment Program and Defence Industry Policy Statement, which
were released by the Government on 25 February 2016. Following the release of the 2016 Defence White
Paper, Marc was appointed as the inaugural First Assistant Secretary Contestability. Marc subsequently held
roles as First Assistant Secretary Naval Shipbuilding Taskforce and First Assistant Secretary Defence Industry
Policy (which he undertook concurrently with his role as leading the Naval Shipbuilding Taskforce). From
October 2017 to April 2018, Marc acted as the Deputy Secretary Strategic Policy and Intelligence.
Marc has attended the Joint Services Staff College, the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies and
completed the Advanced Management Program 190 at the Harvard Business School. Marc was awarded the
Public Service Medal in the Australia Day Honours 2018.
Cheryl-anne Moy,
Deputy Secretary Corporate and
Enabling
Cheryl-anne Moy was appointed Deputy Secretary in the Department of Home
Affairs in September 2018. As Deputy Secretary Corporate and Enabling, Cheryl-
anne has responsibility for delivering strategic and tactical corporate capabilities to
the Department and the Australian Border Force.
As First Assistant Secretary Integrity, Security and Assurance and Chief Audit Executive in Home Affairs
Cheryl-anne was accountable for the Department's and Australian Border Force's Integrity and Professional
Standards program; protective and physical security; and Audit and Assurance of all departmental programs,
including the ABF. Cheryl-anne was responsible for the development and implementation of Operation Arete
in 2017. Arete is an enduring operation to strengthen the Department’s integrity framework and embed a
positive integrity culture within the Department.
Malisa Golightly,
Deputy Secretary Immigration and
Citizenship Services
Malisa Golightly PSM joined the Department in August 2017 and is currently the
Deputy Secretary of Immigration and Citizenship Services Group, with end-to-end
responsibility for visa and citizenship programs, including service delivery and
decision-making spanning the visa and citizenship life cycle, from pre-lodgement,
application, visa grant or refusal, visa cancellation, and conferral and revocation of
citizenship. Malisa is also responsible for the administration of the Refugee and
Humanitarian Program and the Department's visa delivery transformation.
Prior to joining the Department, Malisa was in the Human Services Portfolio for over
seven years and held a variety of Deputy Secretary roles in relation to effective and
efficient administration and delivery of social services and health programs.
Prior to this, Malisa held senior positions within the Australian National Audit Office
and the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, including the position of Deputy
Secretary Employment from 2004 to 2010.
Malisa has a Bachelor of Business Degree and is a fellow of CPA Australia. Malisa was awarded a
Public Service Medal in the Queens Honours List on 14 June 2010 for outstanding public service in leading
the successful implementation of Job Services Australia.
Paul Grigson,
Deputy Secretary Infrastructure,
Transport Security and
Customs/Deputy Comptroller-General
Paul Grigson commenced in the role of Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport
Security and Customs Group on 19 February 2018. Paul is also the Deputy
Comptroller-General of Customs. Paul joined the Department’s Portfolio leadership
team from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where Paul was Australia’s
Ambassador to Indonesia from January 2015.
Paul was a senior career officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
and was appointed Deputy Secretary of the Department in September 2010. In 2014
Paul was Australia’s Special Representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Before
this, Paul was Ambassador to Thailand (2008-2010). Paul has also served overseas
as Ambassador to Burma (Myanmar) (2003-2004); Chief Negotiator of the Peace
Monitoring Group in Bougainville (2000); and Counsellor later Deputy Head of
Mission at the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh (1993-1995).
From 2007 to 2008, Paul served as Chief of Staff to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Other roles with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade include First Assistant Secretary, South East
Asia Division (2004-2007); Assistant Secretary, Maritime South-East Asia Branch (2000-2003); Director,
Parliamentary Liaison and Freedom of Information Section (1992-1993); Adviser, Office of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs (1992); and Media Liaison Officer (1991-1992). Paul also served as Senior Adviser,
International Division in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (1997-2000).
Paul holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology and Journalism from the University of Queensland, a
Bachelor of Letters from the Australian National University and a Graduate Diploma in Applied Finance from
the Securities Institute of Australia. Paul is married with two children.
Linda Geddes,
Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism
Coordinator
Linda Geddes was appointed the Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator in
September 2018 and is responsible for coordinating Australia’s
Counter-Terrorism arrangements and leading the development and implementation
of counter-terrorism strategies and policy. In this role, Linda works in close
partnership with Commonwealth and State and Territory agencies as well as
international partners.
Most recently, Linda was the Deputy Secretary for Policy in the Department of Home
Affairs. In this role, Linda led a diverse workforce in the design and development of
national security and law enforcement policy, immigration, citizenship and
multicultural affairs policy and international policy.
Chris Teal,
National Counter Foreign Interference
Coordinator
Chris Teal has been appointed Australia’s inaugural National Counter Foreign
Interference Coordinator.
As the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator, Chris holds the position
of Deputy Secretary in the Department of Home Affairs and is seconded from the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation where Chris has had over 20 years of
experience in national security.
Karl Kent,
Commonwealth Transnational Serious
and Organised Crime Coordinator
On 1 May 2018, Minister for Home Affairs the Hon Peter Dutton MP announced the
appointment of Australian Federal Police (AFP) Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent
OAM as Australia's first Commonwealth Transnational, Serious and Organised
Crime (TSOC) Coordinator.
As the Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator, Karl's role is to lead the national effort to
combat the rapidly evolving threat posed by TSOC, including child exploitation, illicit
drugs, illicit firearms and money laundering.
Karl has a distinguished career in policing and national security operations, in both the AFP and Victoria Police.
Karl has served the community for more than 30 years, in Australia and overseas. Karl was awarded a Medal
of the Order of Australia for his contribution to the investigation into the Bali bombings in 2002. In 2004, Karl
led an Australian Police Disaster Victim Identification team to Thailand in response to the Indian Ocean
Tsunami disaster. Karl was subsequently elected as Joint Chief of Staff during the crisis, and later awarded a
Humanitarian Overseas Service Medal for his contribution to the operation.
Karl specialises in close operational support, organisational reform, and delivery of new capabilities and
services. Karl is a strong champion for innovation, process improvement and change. Karl has a Bachelor of
Science from the University of New South Wales and an Advanced Diploma of Forensic Investigation from the
Canberra Institute of Technology.
Michael Milford,
Group Manager Technology and Major
Capability
Mike Milford AM is the recently appointed Group Head of the Technology and Major
Capability Group of Home Affairs. This newly established Group increases Home
Affairs’ focus on ICT and other capabilities as critical enablers of the business
operations of the Portfolio.
Mike joined the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in 2015 and since
then has held the roles of First Assistant Secretary, Major Capability Division,
responsible for the design, coordination and project management for all new major
capabilities, and Chief Information Officer, responsible for ICT service delivery to the
Department.
Mike’s prior career was in the Army, from which Mike retired in 2015 as a Major
General, and Head of ICT Operations at Defence. During his time in the CIO Group,
Mike held a number of roles including Chief Technology Officer, and had responsibility for the Defence Single
Information Environment, global terrestrial and satellite communications, and international engagement on
military communications.
Mike is married s22(1)(a)(ii) and they have three children, s22(1)(a)(ii) . Mike is an avid reader
and fisherman.
Ministerial Forums
Key Highlights
You are currently involved in six forums which deal with a broad range of matters within your Portfolio.
Membership: 12
Purpose: AMC is a ministerially appointed body that provides advice to Government on multicultural
affairs, social cohesion and integration policy and programs. The Council has a focus on
strengthening public understanding of a shared Australian identity and harnessing the
economic and social benefits of our diverse population.
Outlook: The next AMC meeting has yet to be scheduled. Current membership is not due to expire until
17 June 2021.
Term: Ongoing
Membership: Homeland Security, Public Safety and Immigration Ministers from Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
Purpose: The Five Country Ministerial is a Ministerial-level forum to discuss common national security
issues.
Outlook: The forum meets annually and the next ministerial meeting will be in Manchester, United
Kingdom from 29-30 July. The focus of the 2019 meeting will be on emerging threats including
the three broad themes; online harm, hostile state activity and emerging technology.
Term: Ongoing
Membership: MCPEM consists of Ministers for Police and Emergency Management from the
Commonwealth, each state, territory and New Zealand. The President of the Australian Local
Government Association is also a member.
Purpose: MCPEM will focus on broad themes of law enforcement reform and emergency management
including increased collaboration across these themes. Members consider issues that will
benefit from a nationally consistent approach in the areas of criminal law, law enforcement,
family violence and national security.
Outlook: The Council is expected to meet twice a year, with further work to be progressed out-of-
session. The next MCPEM meeting will be held on 28 June 2019 in Adelaide.
Term: Ongoing
Membership: Nine – MACSM has two current appointees whose current terms end on 30 June 2019. Seven
positions are currently vacant.
Purpose: MACSM is a tripartite body comprising industry, union and government representatives, which
provides advice to you as Minister for Australia’s temporary and permanent skilled migration
programs and associated matters.
Outlook: It is a legislative requirement that you as Minister take all reasonable steps to ensure that
MACSM have members from industry, union and government representatives. Options to
recruit to this Council are under way.
Term: Ongoing
Membership: SMOG members include departmental officials and senior representatives from
Commonwealth and State/Territory Governments. At the meeting held on 26 March 2019, 39
participants were invited.
Purpose: The SMOG was established to provide a forum for the Commonwealth and State/Territory
Governments to discuss proposals and new initiatives, share information, consider issues and
develop strategies in relation to skilled migration. This forum also supports the work of the
MACSM.
Outlook: Meetings are held quarterly, or more frequently if required, and are chaired by senior
Departmental officials.
Term: The former Council completed its term in April 2018. Previous Councils terms were for a period
of three years.
Purpose: MCASD will have a revised mandate and will focus on challenges and opportunities to
strengthen Australia’s humanitarian program and the management of asylum seekers.
Outlook: Your agreement will be sought to re-establish the Minister’s Council on Asylum Seekers and
Detention with a proposed term of three years, updated terms of reference, and agreement to
seven members, including a nominated Chair.
Contact Details
Name: Kylie Scholten, First Assistant Secretary Executive Coordination Division
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Portfolio Statistics
Key Highlights
The Portfolio Statistics reports prepared by Data Division within the Department provide a regular snapshot
of metrics and trends covering certain key aspects of the Department. The reports will also highlight
emerging or prominent issues.
These reports will be emailed to your office each week. They are not for further distribution.
Contact Details
Name: Cheryl-anne Moy, Deputy Secretary Corporate and Enabling
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
A selection of personal powers under a selection of Acts administered by the Department are provided below.
All legislation administered by the Department is included in the Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO). If
two or more Ministers (including Assistant Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries) are jointly commissioned
to administer a Department, then each Minister is ‘the Minister’ under the legislation administered by the
Department, as specified in the relevant AAO.
The Migration Act contains personal powers the Minister exercises in the public or national interest including:
• non-compellable powers to substitute a more favourable decision than one made by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) (public interest - ss 351, 417 or 501J);
• lifting the bar preventing a person making a valid visa application (public interest - ss 48B, 46A, 46B);
• designate that a country is a regional processing country (national interest - s 198AB); and
The Minister must also personally approve, or refuse to approve, a legacy minor or relevant transitory person’s
transfer to Australia in certain circumstances (ss 198D(2), 198E(3)). There are also personal powers in ss 72,
91Q, 91L, 133A, 133C, 133F, 197AD, 198AD. 198AE, 336L, 501A, 501BA, 198F.
The Citizenship Act includes several personal powers of the Minister including providing alternative special
residence requirements for certain citizenship applicants (ss 22A(1A) and 22B(1A)), the power to revoke a
person’s citizenship in certain circumstances (s 34A(1)) and personal powers in ss 35, 35AA and 35A.
Under the Customs Act, the Minister has the following personal powers:
• order a Collector to detain goods specified in the order if it is in the public interest (s 77EA(1));
• authorise the delivery into home consumption of detained goods (s 77ED(1)); and
• authorise the export of detained goods (ss 77EE(1)) and the export of goods that have not, under the
Minister’s authority, been delivered into home consumption or exported (s 77EF(2)).
The Maritime Powers Act has non-delegable powers, exercisable in the national interest by the Minister. These
include the power to determine that maritime powers may be exercised between Australia and another country
in specific circumstances (s 75D) and a power to give specific and general directions about the exercise of
powers in ss 69, 71 and 72 to detain and move vessels and persons (s75F). There is also a power in s 75H to
exempt certain vessels involved in maritime operations from the application of certain Acts.
A reference in the ABF Act to the Minister doing something is a reference to the Minister acting personally.
The Minister has a number of personal powers including prescribing a kind of information for the purposes of
the definition of ‘Immigration and Border Protection Information’ (s 4(7)). There are also personal powers
included in ss 14, 17, 18, 22, 23 and 58.
• issuing guidelines to the Director-General of ASIO under s 8A of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act);
• determining whether a security assessment should be withheld from a person for security reasons
under s 38 of the ASIO Act;
• issuing a public interest certificate to withhold certain information relating to the review of an ASIO
security assessment under s 39B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975;
• issuing a security notice to stop an individual receiving welfare payments under the Paid Parental
Leave Act 2010, Social Security Act 1991 and A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999;
• consenting to requests for interim control orders under the terrorism provisions in Part 5.3 of the
Criminal Code Act 1995 (the Criminal Code); and
• other powers and functions including under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, Intelligence Services Act
2001, AusCheck Act 2007 and Aviation Transport Security Act 2004.
The Attorney-General and the Minister for Home Affairs share both administrative and policy responsibility for
the Crimes Act 1914, and while the Attorney-General administers the Criminal Code, the Minister for Home
Affairs has primary policy responsibility. In practice what this means for the Criminal Code is that:
• the Attorney-General ‘owns’ the Criminal Code and responsibility for amendments to it; and
• the Minister for Home Affairs develops policy for offences, working with the Attorney-General.
Contact Details
Name: Pip de Veau, First Assistant Secretary, Legal
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
The Department is committed to providing you with advice that is timely, succinct, evidence-based and
impartial. Our advice is apolitical and intended to support you to deliver the Government’s policy agenda and
priorities.
Our advice will be provided to you in written format and will provide information to assist you in decision making.
There will be times when there is value in having oral discussions and in support of this the Department will
provide you with such advice in writing to allow for transparent decision making.
Executive Coordination Division provides direct support to you and all Portfolio Ministers through the
management and coordination of advice to Ministerial Offices, including:
Cabinet Submissions
A Cabinet Submission is a proposal that seeks agreement from the Cabinet to take a particular course of
action. Submissions must be sponsored by the relevant Cabinet Minister with portfolio responsibility, and may
be jointly sponsored by more than one Minister across one or multiple portfolios. Whole-of-Government
consultation on a Submission occurs through the circulation of an Exposure Draft—where policy comment and
drafting suggestions are sought—and through the circulation of the Co-ordination Final—where affected
agencies provide a formal comment on their support for the proposal.
Ministerial Submissions
A Ministerial Submission is a formal document that provides you with advice or information on a particular
subject or case. A Ministerial Submission provides you with a recommendation that requires you to make a
decision, for example: Note, Approve, Sign or Agree. Each Submission must be signed by you as the Minister.
Ministerial Submissions are generally initiated by the Department.
Ministerial Briefs
A Ministerial brief provides you with advice or information regarding an upcoming event or meeting, an
individual case (visa, citizenship, detention etc.) or any other matter on which you have requested information.
Ministerial brief requests are usually initiated by your office. Ministerial briefs are provided for information only.
There is no recommendation or decision and the document is not required to be signed.
Ministerial Correspondence
Ministerial correspondence is any hard copy or electronic correspondence sent to you. Your electronic
correspondence will be managed through a web-form. All Portfolio-related Ministerial correspondence is
registered in the Whole-of-Government Parliamentary Document Management System (PDMS) where a high
priority is placed on the development of responses for your signature or departmental delegate.
Email Advice
It is Departmental policy that all written advice provided to Ministerial Offices be submitted via a Ministerial
Submission or brief and be recorded in PDMS. Urgent advice will be provided via email as required.
Contact Details
Name: Kylie Scholten, First Assistant Secretary Executive Coordination
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Under Legislation, the following entities are enabled to examine and scrutinise the functions of the Department:
ACLEI - The Office of the Integrity Commissioner supported by ACLEI was established by the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (LEIC Act). The Integrity Commissioner is responsible for
detecting, investigating and preventing corrupt conduct in law enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction;
including the Department of Home Affairs.
The LEIC Act requires the Department to refer all allegations or information regarding corruption issues to the
Integrity Commissioner. On 1 March 2018, the Integrity Commissioner entered into an agreement with the
Secretary of Home Affairs under s17 of the LEIC Act, which permits the Department to investigate non-
significant corruption issues within the Department. The AFP is the only other agency where such an
agreement exists.
The Department’s Professional Standards and Integrity Framework compels reporting of serious misconduct,
corrupt conduct and criminal activity. Key elements of the Framework include the Secretary’s Direction on
Integrity Measures made under subsection 55(1) of the Australian Border Force Act 2015 (ABF Act) and the
Mandatory Reporting policy.
The Secretary’s Direction on Integrity Measures requires Immigration and Border Protection (IBP) workers (as
defined by subsection 4(1) of the ABF Act) to comply with mandatory reporting of IBP workers who are
reasonably believed to be engaging in serious misconduct, corrupt conduct or criminal activity. The Mandatory
Reporting policy provides detail about these obligations and defines conduct that must be reported and how
this should be reported. The Department assesses all reports of serious misconduct, corruption or criminal
activity and refers all corruption issues that are raised to ACLEI.
ANAO - The Australian National Audit Office (Auditor-General Act 1997) supports improvement to public sector
performance, accountability and transparency in the Australian Government sector through independent
reporting to the Parliament, the Executive and the public.
The ANAO is currently conducting four audits relevant to the Home Affairs Portfolio: (additional detail on these
audits and the progress on the implementation of recently completed audits, in relation to the Department and
ABF, can be found at Attachment A).
On 11 February 2019, the ANAO provided a draft work program outlining audits they are considering
conducting in the 2019-20 financial year. This included the following relevant to the Department:
The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Office (Ombudsman Act 1976) undertakes three major statutory roles:
complaint investigations, own motion investigations, and compliance auditing. Under section 4(4) of the Act,
the Ombudsman is conferred the title of Immigration Ombudsman including for immigration detention matters.
Following the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (OPCAT) in June 2017, the Ombudsman was also appointed as the
Inspector of Commonwealth Places of Detention.
The Australian Human Rights Commission (Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986) is an independent
statutory body and reports to Parliament through the Attorney-General. The AHRC manages and assists with
the resolution of human rights complaints. If the AHRC considers that the complaint should be investigated, a
delegate of the President of the AHRC will write to the Secretary initiating a formal inquiry.
The Department also responds to scrutiny requests from the Australian Red Cross (ARC) and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which act as humanitarian observers. The ARC monitors the conditions
of detention and the treatment of people within immigration detention centres, and the ICRC observes
transitory persons in regional processing countries. The Department provides responses to reports and
individual case escalations, coordinates meetings as required, and responds to requests for information from
the ARC and ICRC.
When appropriate, the Department refers matters for prosecution to the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions. The Department also works closely with international and state law enforcement agencies.
Legislative Framework
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986
Outlook
In July 2017, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet published a report of the 2017 Independent
Intelligence Review (IIR).
Recommendation 21 of the IIR recommended that oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security (IGIS) be expanded to the intelligence function of all ten agencies within the NIC.
The Government did not release a formal response to the IIR, but stated that it accepted the recommendations
‘as a sound basis to reform Australia’s intelligence arrangements’, and has been progressively implementing
them.
Legislation defining the IGIS’s remit over the Department of Home Affairs, Australian Federal Police, Australian
Criminal Intelligence Commission and AUSTRAC is yet to be introduced to Parliament. It was a
recommendation from the 2017 Independent Intelligence review, led by PM&C.
If this legislation progresses in a new term of Parliament we wish to ensure that the remit of the IGIS does not
include non-intelligence functions within the Department and ABF which are the customers of intelligence
products. Nor should it include the information collection functions which enable us to collect and analyse
information to make visa and citizenship decisions and for the ABF to intervene with people and goods at the
border. This would be adding oversight functions without taking any away as these functions are already
subject to extensive oversight arrangements.
We could define the bounds of the Inspector-General’s oversight to the organisational entity within the
Department of Home Affairs known as the Intelligence Division. This is the simplest and most elegant solution,
akin to the model that Defence has for DIO, that will ensure that this oversight is limited to the performance of
classical intelligence functions.
In December 2018, your Government announced you would establish a Commonwealth Integrity Commission
(CIC). However, there are differing views on its design and operating model. The proposed CIC would comprise
a ‘law enforcement integrity division’ incorporating the existing structure, jurisdiction and powers of ACLEI and
a new ‘public sector integrity division’. The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) is responsible for
administration of the LEIC Act and leading the establishment of the CIC. The Department will work closely with
AGD to support the effective establishment of a robust CIC.
Attachments
A: Key ANAO Audits for the Department of Home Affairs and Australian Border Force.
Contact Details
Name: Rachel Noble, Deputy Secretary Executive
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Attachment A
Significant ANAO audits
o On 8 April 2019, the draft report was provided to the Department for consideration and
comments. The Department will provide a response to the ANAO by 15 May 2019. It is
unknown when the report will be tabled, however the ANAO have advised it will be following
caretaker period.
• Tourist Refund Scheme audit is a cross-entity audit involving the Australian Border Force and the
Australian Taxation Office (ATO). The objective of the audit is to examine whether the Tourist Refund
Scheme is being effectively administered, with the appropriate management of risks.
o Fieldwork has commenced and the proposed date for the tabling of the final report is June
2019.
• Commonwealth Resource Management Framework and the Clear Read Principle audit is
examining the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the clear read principle under the
Commonwealth Resource Management Framework, including whether selected entities have
addressed Parliamentary expectations and established a clear read through of their 2017-18
performance measurement and reporting.
o On 19 March 2019, the ANAO notified the Department that the Auditor-General decided to
include the Department in the cross-entity audit. An entry interview was held on 9 April 2019.
The ANAO have commenced the fieldwork for this audit. The final report is expected to be
tabled by September 2019.
• Procurement of Garrison Support and Welfare Services audit is examining whether the
Department has appropriately managed the procurement of garrison support and welfare services in
regional processing countries.
o On 28 March 2019, the ANAO notified the Department that the Auditor-General decided to
conduct an audit on the procurement of garrison support and welfare services contracts.
An entry interview was held on 5 April 2019. The ANAO have commenced the fieldwork for
this audit. The final report is expected to be tabled by January 2020.
Cape Class Patrol Boat – In Service Support Arrangements – tabled 18 December 2018
• On 20 December 2018, several media outlets reported that the Department had sought to redact parts
of the ANAO report into the Cape Class Patrol Boat – In Service Support Arrangements.
• This was in relation to a letter sent on 4 October 2018 by the Chief Audit Executive of the Department
to the Auditor-General in response to the review of the Report Preparation Paper (RPP) for the Cape
Class Patrol Boat – In Service Support Arrangements audit.
• In the letter, the Department raised concerns that the RPP contained material that, if made public in
the final report, may have prejudiced national security and Commonwealth commercial interests.
• In the letter, the Department noted that it may consider making an application for an Attorney-General’s
certificate under section 37 to protect that information.
• The Department considers any potential risks to national security and Commonwealth commercial
interests identified in the RPP were sufficiently dealt with in the final report.
• No parts of the final report were redacted or sought to be redacted at any stage by the Department.
Efficiency of the Processing of Applications for Citizenship by Conferral – tabled 11 February 2019
• On the 11 February 2019, the ANAO published the audit Efficiency of the Processing of Applications
for Citizenship by Conferral with rejoinders to the Department’s responses to the audit.
• The continued reform program and enhanced integrity measures adopted by the Department over the
last three years to protect Australia’s national security and community safety are delivering results.
The Department will always prioritise these efforts over speed.
Audit report
• This report assessed the effectiveness of the Australian Government’s personnel security
arrangements for mitigating insider threats against two criterion. The Department was assessed
against Criterion two – are selected entities complying with personnel security requirements. The
entities assessed included:
• The ANAO noted that the Department has plans, policies and procedures in place for personnel
security.
• ANAO concluded that all entities undertake an annual health check for clearance holders and their
managers, as well as implement a quality assurance mechanism to reconcile their personnel records
with AGSVA’s clearance holder records.
Workplace Determination
Key Highlights
Terms and conditions of employment for non-Senior Executive Service (SES) staff in the Department,
including the Australian Border Force (ABF), are provided in a Workplace Determination (WD) that was made
by a Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission (FWC) on 8 February 2019 and has a nominal expiry date of
8 February 2021.
Overview
The WD delivers general wage increases of between 7 and 13 per cent through a combination of general pay
increases and access to increments, payable in two instalments. Other key elements include:
• New salary ranges adopting the higher of the maximum salary under either the previous Department
of Immigration and Citizenship Enterprise Agreement 2011-2014 (DIAC EA) or Australian Customs
and Border Protection Enterprise Agreement 2011-2014 (ACBPS EA).
• Annual performance based salary advancement (increments) of 3 per cent, subject to satisfactory
performance.
• A 7:30 hour working day (37.5 hour week), or average thereof, applying to all non-SES employees;
replacing a 7:21 working day that applied to former ACBPS employees.
• Some former ACBPS allowances that have been carried forward in the WD and will now be applied to
all employees performing the same function in the Department or the ABF. All but one of these
allowances will remain at the time of expiry of the WD. A Work Location Allowance will initially expand
to all eligible employees before it is phased out over two years to 2021.
• The determination of remoteness. Under the WD, eligibility for remote locality allowances will be
determined based on the method prescribed in the APS Modern Award 2015. Allowances at locations
that are no longer assessed as ‘remote’ will be phased out over 2 years.
• Several allowances have ceased, including allowances for processing Illegal Maritime Arrivals (IMAs)
and for working at airports.
• The salary structure and advancement regime provided for in the draft WD will, by 2021, deliver pay
outcomes that are broadly comparable to those that would have been achieved by most employees
had the 2016 EA ballot been successful. Under the Department’s 2016 EA offer, similar outcomes
would have been achieved by a majority of employees by 2018.
On average, by 2021, employees in the Department and the ABF will have received around 5 per cent less in
general pay increases when compared with other agencies that agreed EAs in 2015.
Current Situation
The Department is mid-way through implementation of the WD. Most aspects involving payments to staff have
been implemented. These include payment of wage increases, adoption of new [higher] salary ranges,
changes to remote locality district allowances rates, and cessation of those allowances not provided for in the
WD. Eligibility for some allowances that apply to a small number of employees are in the process of being
determined.
Policies and procedural instructions that will support the WD are being developed and progressively released
for consultation and input from staff and staff representatives. This process is likely to continue for the next 10
to 12 weeks to ensure that all policies and procedures are fully consulted before being finalised.
Legislative Framework
The WD has the same status as an Enterprise Agreement (EA).
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department and the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) have been participating in discussions
before a Deputy President of the FWC regarding policy implementation and consultation.
Outlook
The WD has a nominal expiry date of 8 February 2021. The Department will be seeking to commence
bargaining for a new EA in early-2020—reflecting the fact that bargaining for a new EA is likely to be complex
and contentious. Previous rounds of bargaining, under successive governments, have required multiple offers
and have seen extensive Protected Industrial Action (PIA).
In addition to limitations mandated by the Government’s APS Bargaining Policies, claims put forward by
bargaining representatives during bargaining rounds between September 2015 and November 2016 were far
in excess of what the Department could afford, without having to resort to unsustainable staffing reductions of
up to 1,200 staff to offset costs.
The WD, which was determined through arbitration before a Full Bench of the FWC, followed three
unsuccessful EA ballots between September 2015 and November 2016. Arbitration was triggered on 5 October
2016, following a decision by the FWC under section 424(1) of the Fair Work Act 2009 to terminate PIA that
was occurring in the Department during EA negotiations. Arbitration hearings before the Full Bench concluded
on 17 April 2018.
Contact Details
Name: Cheryl-anne Moy, Deputy Secretary Corporate and Enabling
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
The Department is responsible for leading Whole-of-Government policy and programs relating to immigration,
citizenship, multicultural affairs and social cohesion. This includes administering visas for temporary entry as
well as permanent residence through the Permanent Migration (Skilled, Family, Child and Special Eligibility)
and Humanitarian programs (Refugee, Special Humanitarian, Onshore Protection and Community Support).
A full list of visas is in the Visa subclass matrix at Appendix 4. The immigration function is delivered in 38
locations across 36 countries overseas and in all State and Territory capitals in Australia. There are
approximately 4,100 staff involved in visa and citizenship processing and direct program enabling activities
globally.
The size of the Migration Program and the Humanitarian Program are determined by Cabinet taking account
of Whole-of-Government impacts of these programs (see separate briefs on the Migration Program and
Humanitarian Program). Any changes to visa settings for skilled work and students are made in consultation
with the Employment and Education ministers.
Immigration contributes to taxation revenue from Visa Application Charges (VAC). Revenue raised through
VACs is expected to increase to over $2.541 billion in the 2018–19 Financial Year.
Current Situation
Most of the temporary visa categories are uncapped. The Migration Program has a ceiling of 160,000 places
for 2019-20, with approximately two thirds of places allocated to skilled migrants. The Humanitarian Program
for 2019-20 comprises 18,750 places, with over 90 per cent of places allocated to people in need of
resettlement overseas and a strong focus on women and children.
The rising volumes of visa applications, changing risk profiles for national security, criminality and fraud risks,
complexity of the visa framework and reliance on aged and manual processing systems has created significant
pressure on the immigration program. The program is experiencing continuous growth in visa applications,
forecast to reach almost 10 million applications in 2018-19 and 13 million by 2026-27.
Responding to this growth and changing environment requires continual refinement of our intelligence and
risk-informed approach to ensure facilitation of legitimate travellers and migrants and identification of those
who pose a risk to Australia or to the national interest. The complexity of the current visa framework, and aged
ICT systems and manual processes produces increased risks for the community and the Government. In
addition, it is difficult for the public to navigate; it is expensive for the Department to administer; and
implementing changes to Government policy is costly and requires long lead times.
More detail on the Department’s current approach to administration of the Immigration Program is included at
Appendix 5. Key immigration statistics are at Appendix 6.
Legislative Framework
The visa framework is governed by the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration Regulations 1994 and supported
by ministerial directions, instruments and procedural advice manuals. Other enabling legislation includes the
Immigration (Guardianship of Children) Act 1946, Migration Agents Registration Application Charge Act 1997,
Migration (Health Services) Charge Act 1991, Migration (Sponsorship Fees) Act 2007 and Migration (Visa
Application) Charge Act 1997.
Applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against applicable criteria. Most onshore visa decisions
and sponsored visa decisions are merits reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, and may also be
subject to judicial review. The number of people seeking merits and judicial review of a visa decision is
significant. As at 30 April 2019, the Migration and Refugee Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
(AAT) had over 57,000 active matters across the Migration and Refugee caseloads. The Department is
managing a litigation caseload of over 9,700 matters in the courts and the General and Other Division of the
AAT.
Stakeholders / Forums
Key stakeholders include: business; industry; unions; academia; Australian Government departments, State,
Territory and Local Governments; governments of other countries; multicultural, refugee and other community
organisations; and people seeking to travel to Australia and their representatives.
Outlook
Reducing complexity in the visa framework and modernising service delivery arrangements for the Immigration
Program will result in a more efficient and effective program and better support the Government’s policy intent
with respect to the regulation of temporary entry, migration and associated visa pathways.
You will be provided with options and timings to deliver on the Government’s commitment to simplify the
temporary visa framework in line with the delivery of the Global Digital Platform (see separate brief).
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy Group
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
A wide range of factors are considered in setting the size and composition of the permanent Migration Program,
including Commonwealth Government stakeholder views, State and Territory Government views, immediate
and forecast long-term social and economic trends (including trends in the workforce) and the family reunion
needs of Australians.
Permanent migration brings significant economic and social benefits and supports a wide variety of Whole-of-
Government policy objectives. Migration contributes to higher levels of Gross Domestic Product growth per
capita and improves labour productivity. Migrants also increase consumption by enlarging and diversifying the
pool of consumers, and encouraging personal and business capital flows.
Current Situation
The permanent Migration Program has been set at a planning ceiling of 160,000 places for the year 2019-20.
s47C
• Skill stream – improves the productive capacity of the economy and fills skill shortages in the labour
market, including those in regional Australia. The Skill stream planning ceiling for 2019-20 is 108,682
places.
• Family stream – allows Australian citizens and permanent residents to reunite with close family
members, including partners, and certain dependent relatives. The Family stream planning ceiling for
2019-20 is 47,732 places.
• Special Eligibility stream – provides visas for those in special circumstances, including former
residents. The Special Eligibility stream planning ceiling for 2019-20 is 236 places.
The Child category is not subject to a ceiling but is estimated at 3350 places for the year 2019-20.
The permanent Migration Program has a number of visas that require State or Territory Government
nomination:
• Regional category, specifically the Skilled Work Regional (Provisional) visa (14,000 places); and
• States and Territory nomination is also available under the Business Innovation and Investment
Program category (6,862 places).
The composition of the permanent Migration Program ensures that the proportion of skilled migration does not
fall below two-thirds of the overall program. The permanent Migration Program has been predominantly skilled
migration since the mid-1990s.
Since the 2014-15 program year, the permanent Migration Program planning level has been treated as a
ceiling rather than a target. The Department does not lower standards or move places between categories in
order to reach the ceiling.
Legislative Framework
Section 85 of the Migration Act 1958 provides that the Minister may, by legislative instrument, determine the
maximum number of visas of a specified class or classes that may be granted in a specified financial year.
This section is also is known as the 'cap and queue' power, and enables the Minister to manage the permanent
Migration Program more efficiently by limiting the number of visas of a specific class that may be granted.
Additional applications that satisfy the criteria for grant will be queued for possible grant in a future financial
year.
The Parent, Contributory Parent and Other Family visas are capped at their respective planning levels in each
financial year. This is due to the large number of on-hand applications that exceeds the number of places
available under the permanent Migration Program.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department conducts an annual consultation process on the size and composition of the permanent
Migration Program. Input is sought from:
• State and Territory Governments, and local governments via the Australian Local Government
Association;
To support the consultation process, a discussion paper is published on the Department’s website.
State and Territory Governments also provide submissions on the number of applicants they would like to
nominate within the State or Territory nominated components of the Skill stream.
State Migration Plans are the current mechanism for articulating skilled and business migration settings for
State and Territory Governments. All States and Territories have an agreement in place, which have been
active since mid-2014.
State and Territories are also consulted through the Skilled Migration Officials Group, which discusses
proposals and new initiatives in relation to skilled migration.
Outlook
Your Government has agreed to the Migration Program planning ceiling remaining at 160,000 places over the
forward estimates as announced at Budget 2019-20.
Attachments
A: 2019-20 Migration Program
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Skill Stream
Family Stream
Partner 39,799
Parent 7,371
Attachment B – Migration and Humanitarian Program outcome 1996–2018 and Net Overseas
Migration
Year Family Skill Special Child Total Migration Skill as % of Humanitarian Net Overseas
Eligibility Program Total Program Migration 1
Outcome
3
2017-18 47,732 111,099 236 3,350 162,417 68% 16,250 236,700
1
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics, ABS. Cat. No. 3101.0. NOM measures the balance of usual residence, which
is determined by the 12/16 month rule:
• If a person is present in Australia for 12 out of 16 months, they are considered to be a ‘usual resident’. If a person has been outside of
Australia for 12 out of 16 months, they have ceased to be a ‘usual resident’.
• NOM counts any person who satisfies the 12/16 month rule, including longer term temporary entrants (such as international students
and temporary skilled business entrants), citizens returning to Australia after long periods overseas, and the movements of New
Zealand citizens under the Trans-Tasman Agreement.
2
In the mid-80s, the Government established the size of the Humanitarian Program at 11,000-12,000. This size remained at around 13,000 until
2017-18, with several exceptions––for example, higher numbers of humanitarian visas were granted in 2001-01 due to a wave of boat arrivals with
asylum seekers from the Middle East. In 2017-18, the planning level shifted up to 16,250 places, in the Program year 2018-19 – to 18,750.
3
2017-18 estimate is a preliminary estimate.
Overview
Globally there are 25 million refugees, with 1.4 million identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees as in need of resettlement. Australia’s Humanitarian Program (the Program) is an expression of
Australia’s commitment to working with United Nations agencies and the international community to find
solutions to the plight of refugees and displaced people. The Program comprises:
• a large offshore component (about 90 per cent) for refugees and other displaced people outside Australia
who are in need of resettlement, including those referred by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and those proposed by close family through the Special Humanitarian Program, or the
Community Support Program, a private sponsorship program for humanitarian entrants with good
employment prospects;
• a smaller onshore protection component (about 10 per cent) for people who have arrived lawfully and
engage Australia’s international protection obligations. The onshore component includes people granted
a Permanent Protection visa in Australia.
The Program does not include places for people who arrived as illegal maritime arrivals by boat or air and
excludes people transferred to regional processing centres (see separate briefs for information on these
issues).
Current Situation
The Program has been set at 18,750 places in 2018-19 (historical information is at Attachment A). Demand
for resettlement in Australia has long been well in excess of the number of available places. The offshore
component of the Program has had a longstanding focus on women, children and persecuted minorities. The
Program has been adjusted over time to take account of settlement outcomes and international needs. In
2018-19 the focus is on entrants from priority regions from the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Americas.
About 40 per cent of entrants through the offshore component will be settled in regional Australia. In 2019-20,
the Program has again been set at 18,750 places, with 1,000 places allocated to the Community Support
Program.
The onshore protection stream of the Program has been subject to growing exploitation by individuals from
countries with facilitated travel arrangements. These individuals lodge unfounded protection claims and
engage in protracted merits and judicial review processes to prolong stay in Australia, often with permission
to work. In 2017-18, 27,931 Permanent Protection visa applications were lodged and 1,425 Permanent
Protection visas were granted. Since 2014, lodgements of Permanent Protection visa have increased by 225
per cent.
Legislative Framework
The five visa subclasses of the offshore component of the Program are contained in the Migration Regulations
1994 (Cth). Section 35A of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act) specifies classes of protection visas with the core
criteria enshrined in Section 36 of the Act. The additional requirements for the grant of these visas are
legislated in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
Stakeholders / Forums
The composition of the Humanitarian Program is informed by community consultations held by you and by a
public consultation process facilitated by the Department. The Department also hosts the Home Affairs
Non-Government Organisations Dialogue, which brings together senior representatives from government,
non-government organisations and peak refugee bodies to discuss issues affecting asylum seekers and
refugees.
The Department engages closely with global fora on refugee and resettlement solutions, including through
bodies such as the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement, United Nations Core and Contact Groups,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Committee meetings, and the Intergovernmental
Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees. We also engage through multilateral and regional fora such
as the Bali Process and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
The Department’s regular engagement with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, including
through its Canberra-based regional representative, supports the delivery and integrity of Australia’s
Humanitarian Program. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provides advice annually on
global refugee resettlement needs and priorities, which helps inform the composition of the Program. The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ assistance with identity management, including biometrics
collection and character screening under the Refugees Convention, forms an important part of the
Department’s visa assurance framework. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees also provides
practical assistance to support the Department’s processing of cases from remote locations.
Outlook
High demand for places under the Humanitarian Program will continue in the context of record levels of forced
displacement and diminishing resettlement opportunities following significant reduction in the United States’
program. In December 2019, there will be an opportunity to attend the ministerial-level Global Refugee Forum
in Geneva, which will include member state pledges and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’
presentation of its three-year strategy on resettlement and complementary pathways. Improving integration
and employment outcomes for humanitarian entrants will continue to be a challenge requiring a
Whole-of-Government response.
s47C
The Department expects to initiate shortly a request for tender for the Assisted Passage Services, a
longstanding program that facilitates medical assessments, travel and associated services for humanitarian
applicants and visa holders on their journey to being resettled in Australia. The existing contract ends in
December 2019 with no options to extend.
In relation to the onshore protection program, we will brief you on options to enhance and expedite assessment
and decision making for this caseload, including deterring the lodgement of unfounded protection visa claims.
Attachments
A: Humanitarian Program historical grants 1985-86 to 2017-18
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Categories of Australian Citizenship
For people not eligible for Australian citizenship by birth, there are four ways to obtain Australian citizenship
by application:
Conferral Persons who migrated to Australia and meet the eligibility requirements can apply
for Australian citizenship by conferral (grant). For most applicants, this is a two-
stage process. After being approved for conferral of Australian citizenship, most
applicants aged 16 years and over must make a pledge of commitment at a
citizenship ceremony to become a citizen.
Descent Persons born overseas to an Australian parent can apply for citizenship by
descent.
Adoption Some people adopted overseas, in accordance with the Hague Convention on
Inter-country Adoption or a bilateral arrangement, may be eligible for Australian
citizenship by adoption.
Resumption Persons who lost or gave up their Australian citizenship can apply to resume
citizenship.
The Department also manages applications for evidence of citizenship supporting the issuance of Australian
passports and other purposes and requests to renounce Australian citizenship.
Citizenship Ceremonies
The Australian Citizenship Ceremonies Code (the Code) sets out the requirements for the conduct of
ceremonies, which are most commonly hosted by local government councils. You authorise who can perform
the formal legal aspects at citizenship ceremonies (the Presiding Officer). Where there are breaches of the
Code, you may also revoke this authorisation. Your message on behalf of the Australian Government is read
out at the ceremony. At the conclusion of the ceremony, new citizens are also generally presented with their
official Australian citizenship certificate bearing your signature.
Current Situation
Between 2010-11 and 2017-18, the number of people applying to become citizens (by conferral) increased by
177 per cent. This was exacerbated by atypical peaks in lodgements in response to proposed legislative
changes to eligibility requirements, with around 89,000 applications received in just three months. An
associated increase in applications requiring complex identity assessments occurred during the same period
(predominantly applications from former Illegal Maritime Arrival (IMAs) and humanitarian entrants with few
identity documents or higher rates of identity fraud). In response to a changing national security environment,
enhanced integrity checking has been applied to all citizenship applications since July 2017.
The cumulative impact of these factors has increased the number of applications on-hand and average
processing times. The resulting increased processing times has received significant external scrutiny and we
are conscious of the significant interests of all members of Parliament and the Australian public in the
Citizenship Program.
The Department is implementing reforms to its processes to respond to growth and improve processing times
without compromising on integrity. This includes automation of some client communications; increased access
to online lodgements; automation and streamlining of business processes; centralisation of cases with similar
complex characteristics; and an investment in the recruitment and training of additional citizenship processing
officers.
The general managers of two councils, City of Yarra Council and Darebin City Council, have had their
authorisation to preside at citizenship ceremonies revoked for breach of the Code. The Department is
conducting regular ceremonies in these locations to help ensure clients are not adversely impacted by this
decision.
Legislative Framework
The citizenship framework is governed by the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 and Citizenship Regulations
2016. The Department assesses each citizenship application individually and on its own merits. For most adult
applicants for citizenship by conferral to be approved they must:
Most decisions to refuse an application for citizenship are merits reviewable by the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal, but such refusals do not constrain the person from re-applying for Australian citizenship. Applications
may also be subject to judicial review.
The Citizenship Act also includes provisions for the revocation of citizenship where it was obtained by
fraudulent means or the applicant had not declared a serious criminal offence prior to citizenship being
acquired. These cases will be referred to you on an individual basis for decision.
Outlook
s47C
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Conferral* 225,044
Descent 2,584
Adoption 5
Resumption* 74
Evidence 712
Renunciation** n/a
* includes counts of children under 16 years of age who were included on a
responsible parent's application form.
** the number of renunciation applications onhand is not reportable due to
system constraints.
Table 3: Number of citizenship applications decided
2018-19 (to 30
Application type 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
April)
Conferral* 189,841 167,668 153,879 101,422 129,002
Descent 20,131 20,924 20,977 20,931 16,438
Adoption 46 87 95 105 108
Resumption* 200 178 223 183 135
Evidence 32,309 39,821 51,719 43,116 38,804
Renunciation** 152 132 167 206 214
* includes counts of children under 16 years of age who were included on a responsible parent's application form.
** approved renunciation applications only (other decisions are not reportable due to system constraints).
Table 6: Percentile processing time for conferral applications (from approval to acquisition*)
Month/Year 75% of applications processed in 90% of applications processed in
Mar-19 4 months 6 months
The top ten countries of birth of clients who acquired citizenship by conferral in 2018-19, to 30 April, were
India, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, China*, Sri Lanka, Australia**, Vietnam, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran.
* ‘China’ denotes mainland China only and does not include the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.
** Clients whose country of birth is reported as ‘Australia’ are mainly those who did not become Australian citizens at birth, due to being born in
Australia on or after 20 August 1986 without a parent who was an Australian citizen or permanent resident.
Attachment B
Overview
Australia is a successful multicultural nation. Our success relies on our ability to harness the richness and
diversity of our population, manage differences and rally around shared values. Efforts to promote an
inclusive national identity that embraces all Australians matter: they strengthen our resilience as a nation in a
dynamic and challenging security environment. They make us more resilient against those who seek to
divide and weaken multicultural Australia by exploiting differences, promulgating violent extremism, or
promoting ethno-religious intolerance.
Current Situation
While studies show that trust in all four key institutions – media, business, government and non-government
organisations – is in decline, Australia has a set a social constructs that embrace our cultural diversity,
underpinned by our shared values of respect, equality and freedom.
Since the 1980s, Australian Governments have articulated multicultural policy through official statements
released periodically. Australia’s latest multicultural statement ‘Multicultural Australia: United, Strong,
Successful’ was launched in March 2017. It reaffirms the nation’s commitment to multicultural Australia and
focuses on three strategic directions to guide programs and policies:
The Multicultural Access and Equity Policy complements but operates independently of the multicultural
statement. The Department of Home Affairs has responsibility for coordinating multicultural access and equity
reporting across Australian Government departments and agencies to ensure government programs and
services meet the needs of all Australians, regardless of their cultural and linguistic backgrounds.
The annual Harmony Week celebrates the cohesive and inclusive nature of the nation and promotes the
benefits of cultural diversity through events hosted by schools, community groups and organisations across
Australia.
The National Settlement Framework (currently overseen by the Department of Social Services) is a high
level structural blueprint for the three tiers of government to work in partnership to effectively plan and deliver
services that support the settlement and integration of migrants, including refugees.
Legislation Framework
There is no Multicultural Act or other multicultural legislation at the Commonwealth level.
To counter online violent extremist material and the threat it poses to social cohesion, on 6 April 2019 the
Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019 introduced two new criminal
offences for social media and internet content hosting platforms that do not remove ‘abhorrent violent material’
expeditiously, or fail to refer it to the AFP within a reasonable time.
The offences are limited to audio-visual material produced by the perpetrator or their accomplice that captures
actual acts of murder, rape, torture, terrorism involving physical harm and/or violent kidnapping.
Given the difficulties in the implementation of this legislation, including conflicting legislative requirements for
industry, this legislation would benefit from comprehensive review. Implementation of the offences is being
closely monitored including fiscal implications for the Australian Federal Police.
There are currently a number of social cohesion initiatives being managed by the Home Affairs, Social
Services and Health portfolios. This includes the National Youth hubs program; Fostering Integration Grants;
Implementing Sport 2030; Community Languages Schools Multicultural Grants; Strong and Resilient
Communities Activity; Greek Centre Hub and Helenic Chair in Global diasporas; as well as digital initiatives
to help young people understand and counter online hate.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Australian Multicultural Council is a ministerially appointed body of 12 members who represent a
broad cross-section of Australian interests and provide independent advice to Government on multicultural
affairs, social cohesion and integration policy and programs.
The Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia is the peak body representing Australia’s
culturally and linguistically diverse communities. It provides ongoing support for the Government’s Multicultural
Access and Equity Policy by collecting community feedback on the performance of Government departments
and agencies, and informs Government on current policy and practice in migrant integration in Australia, as
well as supporting the promotional work that the Government is doing in this area.
The Department’s Regional Directors and network of 29 Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) drive
engagement with a wide range of cultural, religious and ethnic communities around the country. They engage
with communities around Australia about the Department's key priorities of:
Key stakeholder bodies advising on migrant settlement and integration issues (currently overseen by the
Department of Social Services) include:
• the Settlement Services Advisory Council – a ministerially appointed body of 11 members who
provide advice to government on migrant settlement, including humanitarian settlement.
• the Senior Officials Settlement Outcomes Group – a cross-jurisdicational group that supports the
National Settlement Framework, enhanced information sharing and coordination across the three tiers
of government
• the Settlement Council of Australia – representing the majority of agencies providing settlement
support across Australia to recently arrived migrants, including those from a refugee background
• the Multicultural Youth Advocacy Network – an advocacy non-profit body that provides advice to
government to promote the rights and interests of young people from refugee and migrant
backgrounds
• the Migration Council Australia – an independent, non-profit body established to enhance the
productive benefits of Australia’s migration and humanitarian programs.
Outlook
Australia is not exempt from tensions being experienced by other liberal democracies including: increasing
public distrust in democracy and a government’s ability to govern, heightened cultural and religious bias
creating societal divisions and criminal activity; and countering terrorism while preserving civil liberties.
Recent global events like the Christchurch terrorist attacks have heightened the need to be proactive in
anticipating and responding to domestic challenges.
The addition of migrant services, including for English language, will allow Home Affairs to improve the end-
to-end immigration experience, with a view to strengthening integration outcomes, and ensuring that
Australia builds on its cohesive social and civic foundations.
The Portfolio will continue internal collaborations to shape, drive and manage Australia’s social cohesion.
There are several critical policy intersections within the Portfolio involving multicultural affairs, citizenship,
migration planning, and how Australia counters violent extremism, terrorism and foreign interference. s47C
Contact Details
Overview
The key drivers for fundamental reform to the service delivery model include:
• evolution of the global threat environment and increasingly agile and sophisticated transnational
terrorism and organised crime actors seeking to exploit vulnerabilities;
• the need to strengthen confidence and assurance about an individual’s identity to ensure we know who
is entering the country, applying for visas and citizenship;
• exponential increases in visa applications. In 2017-18, 9.5 million visa applications were received––a
21 per cent increase over 2014-15. Over the next decade, application volumes are forecast to increase
by 35 per cent to 13 million; and
• the Department’s legacy IT systems are ageing and failing. Current systems were designed and built to
accommodate much smaller volumes and a less sophisticated risk environment.
Replacing multiple aging legacy ICT systems with a single workflow system and integrated service model is
key to ensuring the integrity of the Immigration and Citizenship Programs into the future. The Department has
engaged with the market, including significant periods of co-design, to leverage expertise and technological
advancements.
Current Situation
The Global Digital Platform (Platform) Phase Two Request for Tender (RFT), released on 5 April 2019, is for
an end-to-end visa processing system that includes lodgement, assessment and rules-based decision-making
capabilities. The Department will retain responsibility for business rules that determine what the Platform does,
and accountability for sovereign functions including decision making, security, and risk assessment.
This procurement process is being conducted in accordance with strict probity requirements and the
Commonwealth Procurement Rules. In this light, the Department has not publicly announced the names of the
two tendering consortia.
Legislative Framework
The commercial model resulting in the Platform being self-funded via collection of fees and taxes by the
successful tenderer on behalf of the Commonwealth will likely require new supporting legislation.
Outlook
The RFT states the Department’s intention is to provide the first visa on the Platform in the first half of 2021,
with additional visas rolled out progressively. s47C
The
proposed term of an agreement is 10 years with an option to extend.
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
The following statistics comparing 2015-16 to 2018-19 (as at 30 April 2019) highlight the success of the
Department’s efforts to meet client expectations of a better digital experience.
2.07 million applications lodged online 3.85 million applications lodged online 86.0 increase
Average call wait time of 17.17 Average call wait time of 4.23 74.7 decrease
Current Situation
A summary of recent client service initiatives are outlined below.
The Onshore Service Centre is a privately-provided phone enquiry service for clients from Australia, Europe
and the Americas, with longer opening hours and reduced wait times.
The Translating and Interpreting Service (TIS National) assists non-English speakers to communicate with
Government agencies, healthcare service providers, schools, police and '000' emergency services, utilities,
banks and other private businesses. Available anywhere in Australia, TIS National provides telephone
interpreting services 24 hours a day, every day of the year, as well as on-site interpreting services by
appointment. TIS National also supports regional processing arrangements in Nauru and Christmas Island.
TIS has introduced an online self-service platform––TIS Online––that allows clients to self-publish onsite
interpreting job requests and interpreters to self-select their work, with 93.4 per cent of on-site jobs allocated
within 72 hours of submission and 98.4 per cent of which are self-allocated by interpreters.
Website
The website has been completely redeveloped and simplified, improving the client experience and access to
information, resulting in a greater client uptake and ability to self-service.
ImmiAccount
Enhancements to the Department’s online application system, ImmiAccount, provide increased access to
range of services online, including:
• further digitisation of visa application processes such as the Medical Treatment visa;
• introduction of a range of email and SMS ‘Push’ messages to reduce the need for clients to contact
service centres, improve visa compliance, and provide important information such as status of a visa
application, visa conditions, or pending visa expiry.
Refurbished client service areas are providing enhanced safety and security and a better experience for our
clients and staff. Appointments will only be scheduled where the Department requires a client’s personal,
physical presence for integrity or status resolution reasons, or to progress their visa or citizenship application.
The model will eliminate the need for clients to queue or ‘take a ticket’ and allow the Department to better
prepare for, and comprehensively respond to, individual needs.
Stakeholders
Key stakeholders include the Department’s offshore service delivery partners.
Outlook
The Department is managing a number of future initiatives:
The Department has been progressively refurbishing the client service areas in its visa and citizenship offices
around Australia to enable a national appointment model. The remaining refurbishments are underway:
• The Hobart client-facing area of the office will be closed over an anticipated two week period
commencing 1 June 2019. Clients with scheduled appointments will continue to be seen by a
departmental officer at their designated date, time and place.
• Adelaide refurbishments will commence on 23 May 2019 and be completed by 28 May 2019, with no
disruption to existing services.
• The dates for Perth refurbishments are not yet confirmed, but are expected to be completed within
the current financial year, again with no disruption to existing services.
The new layouts represent the final key phase of work supporting the full transition to a national appointment
model.
The Department manages a network of four offshore service delivery partners (SDPs) that provide biometric
collection, assisted lodgement, and information services to departmental clients in 96 locations across 53
countries. To ensure we continue to provide high level of client service, we are in the process of consolidating
from four to three SDP providers, transitioning to VFS Global in 19 sites (in Africa, Europe and the Middle East)
from mid-May through to the end of June 2019.
The Department is working with the three remaining providers to develop an expanded service offer, including
increasing the number of service points, providing mobile and pop up facilities, expanding options for biometric
collection and increasing the share arrangements with Migration Five (M5) countries to deliver improved client
services and greater efficiencies.
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
IRREGULAR MIGRATION
Overview
OSB was established in 2013 as a Whole-of-Government enterprise to protect the integrity of the Australian
border, and prevent loss of life at sea by denying an irregular pathway to settlement in Australia, and deterring
vulnerable people from attempting dangerous maritime ventures.
The current Commander Joint Agency Task Force (JATF) OSB is Major General Craig Furini AM CSC, who
coordinates the efforts of 16 contributing departments and agencies across the operational, intelligence and
policy domains, to deliver a coherent, multi-layered approach in achieving the denial and deterrence effects.
Fundamental to the success of the OSB mission are three pillars:
JATF OSB operationalises these pillars by coordinating the delivery of six core effects––deterrence, disruption,
detection, interception, return and resettlement. Delivery of these effects through a multi-layered, multi-agency
approach is achieved through the following activity streams:
a. Deterrence and Disruption – led by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), this stream aggregates the
efforts of the National Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies, in conjunction with
offshore partners, to disrupt and deter maritime people smuggling ventures in source and transit
countries. Disruption and deterrence activities are underpinned by an offshore communication
campaign focused on ensuring that vulnerable people considering engaging the services of people-
smugglers are aware of our strong border protection policies and the risks in undertaking such
journeys.
b. Detection, Interception and Transfer – the Detection, Interception and Transfer Task Group is led by
the Australian Border Force’s (ABF) Maritime Border Command (MBC), in cooperation with the
Australian Defence Force (ADF). It coordinates aerial surveillance and maritime patrols to detect
people smuggling vessels, and return the people aboard to their country of departure or country of
origin. The safety of Australian Government officers and those on intercepted vessels is a paramount
consideration during all operations, which are conducted in accordance with international obligations
and domestic law.
• an enforced turn-back––which involves the safe removal of a vessel from Australian waters;
• a takeback––where Australia works with a country of departure or origin to achieve the safe
return of passengers and crew; and
• assisted returns––in some circumstances Australian Government vessels may be called upon
to assist persons in a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) situation.
c. Regional Processing, Return and Resettlement – individuals who cannot be returned to their country
of departure or origin are transferred to a regional processing country where their protection claims
are assessed by that country. Those found to have valid protection claims will be resettled in a country
other than Australia. Third country resettlement has been undertaken with both Cambodia and the
United States. This effect is delivered by the Department.
Current Situation
The threat to the integrity of Australia’s borders and potential loss of life at sea posed by people smuggling
enterprises is suppressed but not defeated. Consequently, the risk of large-scale people smuggling restarting,
along with the loss of control of our borders, remains.
Since the commencement of OSB in September 2013, 23 people smuggling ventures carrying 1,309 people
were unable to be returned to their country of origin or departure. The last such arrival was in July 2014, at
which time all 157 persons on board were transferred to Nauru. The first people smuggling venture to reach
Australia in over four years occurred in August 2018, although all 17 persons on board were rapidly returned
to their country of departure.
Between 19 December 2013 and 28 April 2019, 827 people aboard 34 people smuggling ventures have been
returned to their countries of origin or departure. It has been over five years (December 2013) since the last
known death at sea en route to Australia. Furthermore, the deterrence and disruption effort continues with 80
disruptions since OSB commenced, meaning that 2,573 vulnerable people did not risk their lives at sea by
attempting dangerous maritime ventures to Australia.
• 347 transferees in Nauru, with a further 895 people on medical transfer from Nauru (in Australia, PNG
and Taiwan); and
• 528 transferees in Papua New Guinea (PNG), with a further 83 people from PNG on medical transfer
in Australia, who will be required to return to Nauru or PNG when the purpose for which they were
transferred is no longer valid.
As at 12 May 2019, the total number of transferees who have been resettled in the United States is 515.
JATF OSB Headquarters is made up of a core of 13 staff, augmented by additional staff dedicated to the
intelligence and strategic communications portfolios as required.
Legislative Framework
OSB operates in compliance with all domestic and international law obligations in the regulation of people
smuggling vessels and vulnerable people who undertake irregular maritime journeys, including international
human rights law, refugee law and the law of the sea, relying on advice from the Department’s Legal Division,
the Attorney-General’s Department and the Australian Government Solicitor. In specific relation to on-water
activities, OSB utilises the Maritime Powers Act 2013 for the interception, boarding and searching of vessels.
For activities within the migration zone, OSB operates under the Migration Act 1958 and the Customs Act
1901.
Stakeholders/Forums
OSB comprises representatives of the following 16 government departments and agencies: Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Defence; Department of
Home Affairs; Attorney-General’s Department; Australian Defence Force; Australian Border Force; Maritime
Border Command; Office of National Intelligence; Australian Signals Directorate; Australian Secret Intelligence
Service; Australian Security Intelligence Organisation; Australian Geospatial Intelligence Organisation;
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission; Australian Federal Police; and the Australian Maritime Safety
Authority.
Outlook
With more than 65 million people displaced globally, 2.9 million regionally4, and Australia remaining an
attractive destination, regular and irregular migration challenges will persist. While there has been a sustained
reduction in maritime people smuggling ventures reaching Australia since OSB was established, retaining the
OSB construct as an ongoing capability with effective interagency engagement, command coordination and
oversight will ensure our agility to respond to future people smuggling challenges.
Contact Details
Name: Major General Craig Furini AM, CSC Commander Joint Agency Taskforce Operation
Sovereign Borders
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
4
Sourced from UNHCR Statistics Database (as at 31 June 2018) – http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern
Overview
Nauru and Papua New Guinea were designated as regional processing countries in 2012 and arrangements
were agreed with both countries to receive illegal maritime arrivals from Australia for the regional processing
of their protection claims. Since 2012, 4,177 illegal maritime arrivals have been transferred to Nauru and Papua
New Guinea.
As at 30 April 2019, there are 1,852 transferees under current regional processing arrangements 5
(351 transferees in Nauru, 533 transferees in Papua New Guinea, and a further 968 transferees (including 262
minors) temporarily in Australia for medical treatment and related activities). Australia maintains medical
transfer arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Taiwan for transferees residing in Nauru.
Since 27 February 2019, there are no minors in regional processing countries. No one under regional
processing arrangements is in held detention.
Regional processing arrangements, and the management of individuals under those arrangements in Nauru
and Papua New Guinea, are the responsibility of the respective governments. Australia does not have effective
control over regional processing arrangements in Nauru or Papua New Guinea, but supports and assists the
Governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea to implement regional processing arrangements, including
through the engagement of specialist service providers, capacity building, mentoring and training.
• resettlement in the United States (at 30 April 2019, 515 refugees resettled);
• PNG-determined refugees may settle in Papua New Guinea (at 30 April 2019, approximately
57 refugees are recorded as settling in Papua New Guinea);
• voluntary return home or to a country to which they have right of entry, with assistance (since 2012,
823 individuals have returned home from a regional processing country).
Individuals who have been determined not to be in need of protection are expected to return to their home
country, or will be removed by the Governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea under their respective
domestic legislation. To date, Papua New Guinea has removed 20 individuals; Nauru has not undertaken any
removals.
Current Situation
Australia currently maintains a resettlement arrangement with the United States (announced in November
2016) for up to 1,250 refugees. It is a matter for the United States to determine who and how many refugees
resettle under the arrangement. The United States continues to interview refugees, hand down resettlement
5
Current cohort refers to illegal maritime arrivals arriving on or after 19 July 2013
decisions and effect departures of refugees to the United States from regional processing countries and
Australia.
s47C, s33(a)(iii)
In parallel, Australia is transitioning responsibility for the management of service delivery arrangements to the
Government of Papua New Guinea, s47C, s33(a)(iii)
Contract Arrangements
In Papua New Guinea, the Department holds the following contracts until 30 June 2019: Paladin Holdings for
garrison and welfare services; Pacific International Hospital for health services; NKW Holdings for facilities
management services at Manus Province accommodation sites; and JDA Wokman for case management and
settlement support services.
In Nauru, the Department holds the following contracts: Canstruct International for garrison and welfare
services to 31 July 2019; and International Health and Medical Services for health care until 30 June 2019.
Legal, financial, reputational and humanitarian risks may arise if the continuity of services to transferees in
Papua New Guinea and Nauru is affected.
Legislative Framework
The legislative framework for regional processing is embedded in the Migration Act 1958, which includes
powers to take an illegal maritime arrival to a regional processing country (section 198AD), transitory persons
provisions that provide for the taking (section 198B) and return of an individual to Australia for a temporary
purpose (section 198AH and 198AD), and the new medical transfer provisions that provide for the transfer of
an individual to Australia for medical or psychiatric assessment or treatment (sections 198C-J and 199A-E).
Stakeholders / Forums
Regional processing is subject to regular independent scrutiny by the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, the International Committee for the Red Cross, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Comcare and the
Australian National Audit Office. Regional processing arrangements have also been the subject of numerous
parliamentary inquiries, and independent reviews.
The Department holds regular senior officials meetings with senior Government officials from Nauru and Papua
New Guinea to progress arrangements.
Outlook
Regional processing, underpinned by third country resettlement, remains a key pillar of Operation Sovereign
Borders. s47C, s33(a)(iii)
s47C, s33(a)(iii)
New Zealand has offered to resettle 150 refugees from regional processing countries (initially 150 refugees
each year over three years). This offer is yet to be accepted out of concern over the impact on the much larger
United States resettlement arrangement, ease of access to Australia through existing visa pathways and the
potential people smuggling pull factor the arrangement may generate.
The Department continues to support the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to identify further
resettlement options for refugees under regional processing arrangements; s47C
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Between 2008 and 2013, approximately 50,000 IMAs arrived by boat. By the time Operation Sovereign Borders
was established on 18 September 2013, around 30,500 IMAs remained in Australia with an unresolved status
(see brief Operation Sovereign Borders). This residual group collectively became known as the ‘IMA Legacy
Caseload’. For regional processing arrangements see brief Regional Processing and Resettlement.
The size of the IMA Legacy Caseload continues to change as children born to IMAs in Australia become part
of the caseload, which is 32,449 as at 2 May 2019. Seventy-one IMAs did not lodge an application following
an announcement from the then Minister that IMAs seeking protection in Australia must lodge an application
for a Temporary Protection visa (TPV) or Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV) before 1 October 2017.
Current Situation
Good progress has been made with 75.5 per cent of the caseload having been assessed by the Department
and decided or otherwise resolved, including those who have departed Australia. Of those assessed, 56.8 per
cent have been primary grants and 43.2 per cent have been primary refusals (for more detailed statistics see
Appendix 7).
Assessing this caseload is complex, particularly in relation to identity matters, with a large number of IMAs
arriving undocumented, and evidence of potential identity fraud and criminality in some parts of the caseload.
In some cases, the circumstances in home countries have changed substantially since arrival and we have an
obligation to consider their claims against country information carefully on a case-by-case basis. Integrity
requirements include: assessing whether the IMA is a risk to Australia’s national security; undertaking criminal
history checks in Australia and overseas and, by working closely with other law enforcement agencies,
assessing whether IMAs may have links to organised criminal gangs or those who may conduct fraudulent
activities in the Australian community; assessing that the IMA is of good character; and assessing the IMA’s
identity and anchoring this identity with biometrics.
Once a primary decision has been made by the Department, the vast majority of refusals are automatically
referred for merits review to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA)—an independent authority within the
Migration and Refugee Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. This excludes on-hand applications
from IMAs who are not subject to fast track arrangements and can access merits review through the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal; and applicants that are excluded from merits review under the Migration Act.
As at 30 April 2019, there are 1,024 applications at merits review and 4,085 cases at Judicial Review. Based
on the limited capacity of the tribunals and courts and number of active matters before them, applications are
expected to be awaiting review for multiple years.
Eligible IMAs currently awaiting a primary decision of a TPV or SHEV application have already been assessed
for legal assistance through the Primary Application Information Service (PAIS) or Immigration Advice and
Assistance Scheme (IAAAS). IMAs seeking a subsequent TPV or SHEV do not have access to legal
assistance.
The Status Resolution Support Services (SRSS) assists IMAs in the community who need some assistance to
resolve their immigration status. Eligibility for this service is and the type of services offered are determined on
a case-by-case basis.
On 6 August 2018 in DBB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 178, the Full
Federal Court declared the 23 January 2002 appointment of the Western Lagoon of the Territory of Ashmore
and Cartier Islands as a proclaimed port is invalid.
The Department has identified all IMAs affected by the invalidity of the Appointment. The majority of affected
persons are prevented from making a valid visa application by various provisions in the Act. The Department
has commenced notifying affected persons of a decision to refuse to grant them a visa pursuant to s 66 of the
Migration Act 1958 and informing them that the decision is reviewable by the Migration Review Division of the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Department will be informing other affected persons of the appropriate
next steps based on their individual circumstances.
To allow affected persons to make a valid visa application you will need to exercise public interest powers
under ss48B and 91L.
Legislative Framework
Resolution of the IMAs in the legacy caseload is governed by the Migration Act 1958 and the Migration
Regulations 1994 and supported by ministerial directions, instruments and procedural instructions. The
Migration Act codifies Australia’s interpretation of its protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (the Refugees Convention) and other human rights treaties to
which Australia is a party. It also establishes a number of legislative bars that prevent people who arrive as
unauthorised maritime arrivals from making applications for visas in Australia. These bars may be lifted by you
where you consider it to be in the national interest. Removal of finally determined IMAs is also governed by
the Migration Act and supported by non-statutory assessment of any international obligations that may impact
on removal from Australia.
Stakeholders / Forums
There are multiple external stakeholders interested in the IMA Legacy Caseload, including the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and International Organization for Migration; non-government organisations;
refugee advocacy groups; the Law Council of Australia; clients and their legal representatives; State and
Territory Governments that provide various supports and services; Federal Government agencies, particularly
those administering services and benefits available to asylum seekers and in some cases law enforcement;
and Temporary Protection visa holders/applicants.
Outlook
On current resourcing levels, the vast majority of IMAs in the Legacy Caseload are expected to have been
assessed and received a primary decision from the Department, or otherwise finalised by end December 2020.
The remaining applications are expected to be IMAs with complex national security, character or identity
concerns.
IMAs who have been granted a TPV or SHEV have their visas in effect for three years (TPV) or five years
(SHEV). Holders must apply for a subsequent TPV, SHEV or relevant pathway visa (where eligible) before
their current visa ceases. Those who make a valid subsequent TPV or SHEV application while holding their
initial visa will have the visa remain in effect until the subsequent application is finally determined.
All IMAs TPV holders affected by the s46A application bar had this bar lifted to enable them to submit a
subsequent application for a TPV or a SHEV, as long as they re-apply while holding their TPV. SHEV holders
have not had the s46A application bar lifted to re-apply for a SHEV or TPV at this stage, as SHEVs will not
start ceasing until October 2020.
s47C
The Department is implementing an intelligence-informed, risk based approach to managing subsequent TPV
and SHEV applications. A full re-assessment of protection claims will only be undertaken if significant changes
to personal circumstances, claims or country information are evident. This includes cases involving identity
fraud, irregular travel history, criminality, or national security issues.
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
SRSS commenced in 2014, with a redesign in May 2018, replacing four distinct programs, to provide flexibility
and continuity in delivering services to support people seeking to resolve their immigration status. SRSS
provides short-term tailored support, through contracted service providers to individuals who are unable to
support themselves while they engage with the Department to resolve their immigration status.
Tiered services are provided to address barriers that may impede an individual’s ability to resolve their status–
either the grant of a substantive visa or departure from Australia. It is expected that individuals who have work
rights support themselves while actively engaging with the Department to resolve their immigration status.
Services provided
• Baseline Services: include work rights, access to Medicare and access to education for school-aged
children.
• Additional Services: provided to people with a genuine need or where there is a specific barrier
preventing resolution. An individual risk and vulnerability assessment informs eligibility for these
services.
• Transitional Services: assist individuals and families to integrate into the Australian community from
held or community detention.
• Supported Living Services: provided to people with a permanent impairment or condition, or subject
to a Residence Determination (community detention) arrangement. This includes all unaccompanied
minors.
SRSS continues to deliver support to those who are vulnerable and in need by providing targeted assistance,
such as specialised counselling, health or housing and individual support to bridge identified gaps or needs.
Current Situation
There are 5,888 individuals receiving SRSS as at 30 April 2019. As at 30 April 2019, SRSS support for a total
of 1,642 people ceased as they were assessed as no longer eligible.
Since May 2018, the updated program has been based on the following principles:
• individuals on a bridging visa with work rights are expected to work to support themselves and their
families;
• individuals found to have adequate income or assets (in Australia or overseas) will not receive support
services; and
• eligibility will be reassessed on a regular basis, according to identified barriers for status resolution.
Finally determined IMAs, unless with a known vulnerability, are managed on Bridging Visa Es (BVEs). BVEs
provide work rights, access to Medicare and education for school-aged children to meet the Department’s legal
and international obligations. These IMAs are progressively being transitioned to final departure BVEs as their
visas end and are re-granted. SRSS services are only available to finally determined IMAs where there is a
significant vulnerability which represents a risk to the Australian community, presents a barrier to departure,
or where not providing services would breach legal or international obligations.
An IMA is considered to be finally determined when a visa has been granted, or if refused, a decision has been
made by the Immigration Assessment Authority/Administrative Appeals Tribunal or the timeframe for review
has lapsed.
There are approximately 1,900 IMAs residing in the Australian community who cannot be granted a bridging
visa by the Department due to statutory bars or legislative restrictions. These persons are residing without a
lawful status, which means that they do not have access to Medicare or permission to work, and may require
support through the SRSS program. Resolving the status of these persons requires ministerial intervention or
would require legislative changes for the Department to manage them.
Funding
SRSS contracts commenced in 2014. They were extended in 2018 to 30 June 2020. There is a further option
to extend. s47C, s47 There are currently nine SRSS providers
throughout Australia.
Legislative Framework
SRSS is not specifically prescribed in the Migration Act 1958. However the program is a lever within the
broader statutory framework regulating the entry and stay of non-citizens in Australia. The financial spending
authority for SRSS is provided in Part 4 Schedule 1AB of the Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers)
Regulations 1997.
The program fulfils international obligations under several articles of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Stakeholders / Forums
The program engages with NGOs about SRSS through the Department’s NGO Dialogue forum. The program
also engages bilaterally with the Refugee Council of Australia and the Refugee Health Network of Australia.
SRSS providers engage with their local community service organisations and other stakeholders.
Outlook
As Temporary Protection visa applications from IMAs in the legacy caseload are assessed and finalised over
the next 18 months, there will be a decrease in clients eligible for SRSS. If there are no changes to SRSS
eligibility criteria, the SRSS program is foreshadowed to reduce in size.
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Within the Home Affairs Portfolio, the ABF is Australia’s Customs Service. The ABF Commissioner is the
Comptroller General of Customs. The ABF’s mission is to protect Australia’s border and enable legitimate
trade, including air and sea cargo, and international mail. The Department administers import and export
controls on behalf of over 30 government agencies, for a range of prohibited and restricted goods (such as
firearms, drugs and asbestos) that can cause environmental or economic harm, or are of national security
concern. Trade-related border revenue collected by the Department is the second largest source of
Commonwealth revenue, representing $19.3 billion in 2017-18.
Current Situation
The Department and the ABF work in a complex and dynamic environment. Trade volumes are increasing and
supply chains are becoming more complex. Over the next four years, we anticipate a 28 per cent increase in
air cargo and a 13 per cent increase in sea cargo imports to Australia.
Legitimate import and export trade is processed through the Integrated Cargo System. In facilitating trade, The
Department implements Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) at the border. FTAs reduce the amount of duty for
imported goods. The Department also administers other industry assistance schemes that enable importers to
obtain duty-free entry of imported goods into Australia. These include the Tariff Concession Scheme, Duty
Drawback Scheme, and Cheese and Curd Quota Scheme.
Generally, border prohibitions and restrictions are initiated by a policy agency, to give effect to Australia’s
international obligations (e.g. United Nations sanctions), or in response to public policy concerns. Current
border controls apply to a wide range of goods including objectionable materials, environmental products,
certain chemicals, drugs, guns and asbestos. The import and export of these goods is controlled unless
permission is provided by the relevant policy Minister, or delegate. To ensure supply chain security and
improved trade facilitation, the Department is responsible for the Australian Trusted Trader program and
Known Consignor Scheme.
Customs duty and Commonwealth taxes are imposed on certain goods when they are imported into Australia,
with the duty rate payable determined by the tariff classification of the goods. The Department and the ABF
ensure that import duties, taxes and charges are correctly assessed, reported and paid, and that revenue
concessions, exemptions and refunds are correctly applied. These charges include: Customs duty, Passenger
Movement Charge, Import Processing Charge, Goods and Services Tax, Luxury Car Tax, Wine Equalisation
Tax, and anti-dumping and countervailing duties.
Legislative Framework
The Customs Act 1901 (the Act) is the principal Act in Australia’s customs legislative framework. The Act
establishes a framework for regulating the movement of goods across Australia’s border. The Act also provides
for a wide range of other customs related matters including: powers of officers; offences; and licensing
schemes for customs brokers, depots and warehouses. Other key customs legislation and regulations include:
Customs Regulation 2015, Customs (International Obligations) Regulation 2015, Customs Tariff Act 1995, and
the Commerce (Trade Descriptions) Act 1905, and Commerce (Imports) Regulations 1940. The Customs
(Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 and Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 1958 set out the list of
prohibited imported and exported goods.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department manages several strategic, operational and tactical-level engagement forums for trade and
customs matters. These involve industry from a range of sectors, including importing and exporting sectors
and transport and infrastructure sectors (e.g. freight forwarders, depots operators, airlines, and services
providers). The National Committee on Trade Facilitation is Australia’s strategic Whole-of-Government forum
on trade and customs policy issues involving industry and government. The Home Affairs annual Industry
Summit is its premier engagement event. This summit enables government and industry to engage in strategic
dialogue about Portfolio issues.
Outlook
The Department’s priorities are to continue to refine our legislative and operational measures to facilitate
legitimate trade, prevent the movement of prohibited goods and enhance border revenue collection.
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Trade Modernisation
Key Highlights
Our vision is for a modernised international trade system for Australia that is digital, automated, seamless,
and secure. This system should be fair and provide a level playing field for Australian businesses by ensuring
that traders can easily comply with trade regulations. At the same time, the system needs to ensure that the
Australian community is protected from unlawful and harmful goods, and border threats.
Overview
The Department is leading the development of an agenda to modernise Australia’s international trade system
and border processes. This agenda seeks to increase the efficiency and integrity of our international trading
system. This would enhance facilitating legitimate trade across our border, and strengthen trade compliance
and enforcement.
Current Situation
Trade modernisation
Australia’s current trade regulatory environment is complex, and involves more than 30 different regulatory
agencies and 200 pieces of legislation. Over 51,000 Australian businesses are involved in international trade.
Trade modernisation will include a long-term multi-phased approach with initiatives to:
• enhance Australia’s competitiveness and bring our trade ecosystem in line with key trade partners and
competitors;
• strengthen the facilitation of legitimate cargo and goods, while making it harder for organised crime
and threats to national security to penetrate our networks;
• reduce, streamline or eliminate interactions between traders, government, service providers and third
parties; and
• reduce the costs of trade, and regulatory and administrative burden to both industry and government.
• harmonising and streamlining regulations and business processes to better facilitate international
trade;
• improving information sharing across government, and between government and business; and
Single window
Single window is a concept supported and promoted by the World Trade Organization (WTO), as a best
practice standard to simplify and harmonise trade environments. Australia’s Integrated Cargo System is a
‘customs single window’ for clearance of customs-related documentation, but it does not permit Australian
businesses to lodge all trade-related documentation through a single entry point. Over the last several years,
the Department, with other government agencies, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has
progressed initiatives to deliver an enhanced single window. However, legislation, regulation and processes
that facilitate trade across Australia’s border needs to be reviewed before an effective single window can be
implemented. Opportunities for future regulatory reform would be limited if government invests in technology
too soon.
In support of this work, the Department is leading the Whole-of-Government Border Permits Review to examine
legislative frameworks and business processes for imported and exported goods subject to border controls.
The review’s outcomes will be reported to Government by end-December 2019 and will inform trade
modernisation reforms.
Legislative Framework
The Customs Act 1901, and other related customs regulations.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department is developing the trade modernisation agenda with key partner government agencies. Industry
co-design and consultation is critical in developing this agenda. Key industry stakeholders include importers,
exporters, service providers, freight forwarders, banks and IT companies.
The National Committee on Trade Facilitation (NCTF) is the key forum for government and industry to discuss
strategic issues relating to international trade facilitation. Australia’s NCTF is required by the WTO Agreement
on Trade Facilitation.
Outlook
Looking over the next decade, we know that the traditional delivery of border services needs to change to
ensure the integrity and efficiency of our cross-border trade system. You have a major opportunity to plan for
and invest in a secure and globally competitive international trading system for Australia. This is vital to ensure
the progression of the modernisation of our international trade systems.
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Black Economy
Highlights
Black economy activities pose risks for Australia’s revenue and security interests. Illicit trade undercuts
legitimate revenue, which would otherwise be invested in public services and programs. This diversion of
revenue outside tax and regulatory systems in turn supports organised criminal behaviour. The Department
proposes to continue to refine our regulatory and enforcement options for countering black economy
activities in Australia. We also propose to further educate travellers and traders on the importance of border
compliance to support Australia’s security and prosperity.
Overview
The Black Economy Taskforce’s Final Report estimated the black economy (including both cash and criminal
components) could be as large as three per cent of GDP, equating to $50 billion in 2015-16 terms. This is a
significant diversion of revenue that could otherwise be used to fund essential programs and services to grow
the economy. As a lead policy agency for countering black economy activity in Australia, the Department
develops and supports Whole-of-Government messaging and enforcement action to change community
attitudes towards the black economy.
Our policy, regulatory and operational functions intersect with the major elements of black economy activity,
including our collection of border revenue; compliance action against illicit trade; administration of the migration
system; and intelligence-sharing and enforcement to counter non-compliance with Australian law (including
serious and organised crime).
Border revenue matters are the main focus of Home Affairs’ actions against the black economy. Black economy
actors seek to evade duties through fraudulent behaviours such as creating false documents, incorrectly
describing or undervaluing goods, tariff misclassification, and moving counterfeit goods. The illicit tobacco
trade remains the most prevalent and valuable example of such activities, and is a priority for Commonwealth
law and compliance reforms.
Current Situation
The Department leads the implementation of the Black Economy – combatting illicit tobacco package
announced in the 2018-19 Budget. This package combines operational and legislative reforms to target the
most serious elements of the illicit tobacco trade. On 1 July 2018, the Department established the multi-agency
Illicit Tobacco Taskforce (ITTF), led by the Australian Border Force (ABF), to identify, disrupt and dismantle
criminal groups engaged in the supply of illicit tobacco. The Department has also developed a suite of
legislative and regulatory measures, which enter into force on 1 July 2019, to reduce avenues for the diversion
of tobacco into the illicit market.
Legislative Framework
The Customs Amendment (Illicit Tobacco Offences) Act 2018 amended the Customs Act 1901 (the Customs
Act) to create two new offences for illicit tobacco based on ‘recklessness’, rather than ‘intention’ or ‘knowledge’.
It also extended the investigation and enforcement powers of ABF officers to new reasonable suspicion
offences introduced in the Taxation Administration Act 1953, which apply where the origin of illicit tobacco is
unknown.
Legislative and regulatory reforms impacting the movement of tobacco into Australia enter into force on 1 July
2019. These reforms include:
• prohibiting importation of tobacco without a permit. This will deter the trade in illicit tobacco by providing
the ABF with new enforcement options to infringe tobacco smugglers. It will also remove the
requirement for a warrant to seize tobacco following non-payment of duty.
• requiring tobacco importers to pay all duty liabilities when tobacco is imported into the country, rather
than when it leaves a licensed warehouse and enters the domestic market. This will reduce
opportunities for tobacco to unlawfully enter the illicit market.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department and the ABF are represented on the Australian Taxation Office-led Black Economy Standing
Taskforce, which is the peak forum for coordinating the Commonwealth Government’s counter-black economy
efforts. The Department is also represented at Deputy Secretary level on the Black Economy Advisory Board,
which brings together industry and government representatives to provide strategic advice on the
Commonwealth’s black economy agenda.
In March 2019, the Department’s Trade and Customs Division established the Black Economy Policy Unit to
oversee a whole of Portfolio strategic response to black economy issues.
Outlook
The Department’s immediate priorities are to continue to refine our legislative and operational measures and
to educate the public of the risks of black economy activities.
s47C
s47C
The Department will continue to assess the illicit tobacco measures as they are implemented. This will help
identify further opportunities to address illicit tobacco and other black economy activity.
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
ATT is open to all Australian businesses that import, export or provide services that support traders in the
international supply chain. The program implements innovative solutions to reduce red tape for Trusted
Traders at the border and improves certainty in export markets. In 2017, Trusted Traders saved an average
of 1,500 inspection hours––meaning their goods get to market faster. ATT is part of an internationally
recognised network of Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) programs and provides a mark of trust with
customs administrations globally.
ATT has ambitious targets of accrediting 1,000 Trusted Traders covering 30 per cent of the volume of trade
and 50 per cent of the value by 2020. ATT is experiencing a period of rapid growth. In the last two years both
the number of Trusted Traders and the value of benefits to industry have increased ten-fold.
Through better understanding the supply chains of compliant business, ATT provides a national security
benefit to Government. Separating low risk trade by accrediting Trusted Traders allows the Australian Border
Force (ABF) to focus on targeting higher risk trade. As Trusted Traders have a better understanding of their
supply chain security, we have also found that ‘tip offs’ from Trusted Traders are more likely to result in a
positive find of prohibited goods at the border than ‘tip offs’ from the general business population.
Current Situation
As of 30 April 2019, there were 383 accredited Australian Trusted Traders listed with 145 progressing towards
accreditation.
Benchmarking undertaken in 2017 found ATT was a global leader in AEO programs. Australia has AEO Mutual
Recognition Arrangements (MRA) with the People’s Republic of China, Canada, Hong Kong, the Republic of
Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. We are close to concluding AEO MRAs with Japan and
Thailand; and negotiations are well advanced with the US.
Benefits available to Trusted Traders include: simplified access to market, such as priority treatment of goods
at the border, or MRA with other economies; streamlining red tape, including duty deferral, streamlined cargo
reporting, and simpler access to the Temporary Skills Shortage visa or APEC travel card; and opportunities to
work in partnership with Government. An updated list of the benefits available to accredited businesses is
listed here https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/trustedtrader/benefits.
Legislative Framework
ATT is governed by the Customs (Australian Trusted Trader Programme) Rule 2015 and Explanatory Notes
and the Customs Act 1901. Each Trusted Trader and the delegate of the Comptroller-General of Customs
have a legal Agreement for the purposes of clause 176A of the Customs Act 1901. Internationally, ATT is an
AEO accredited under the World Customs Organisation’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards (SAFE
Framework), and AEO are mentioned in the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) 2017 Trade Facilitation
Agreement.
Stakeholders / Forums
Trusted Traders enjoy ‘a seat at the table’ to engage with Government on issues relating to trade crossing the
border. The ATT Symposium is the premier annual event, scheduled for 11 June 2019 in Brisbane. You will
be invited to attend to recognise newly accredited Trusted Traders. A quarterly ATT Industry Advisory Group
(IAG) offers a less formal opportunity to discuss the future design of the program with Trusted Traders (last
held 30 April 2019). Home Affairs also seeks regular feedback on ATT from peak industry bodies.
Outlook
ATT is in a period of significant growth, and is projected to continue to grow quickly toward 2020 targets. As a
cornerstone of the Trade Modernisation agenda, Trade and Customs Division is working to seek new benefits
for Trusted Traders which will reduce red tape for business and improve trade security.
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Future Traveller
Key Highlights
Australia has driven a progressive agenda to enhance the traveller experience and support our role as a tourism
and business hub regionally and globally, while continuing to strengthen national security. We have successfully
adopted cutting-edge technology to enhance the efficiency and integrity of border management and streamline
processes for travellers.
Overview
Growth in air and sea traveller movements continue to place considerable pressure on existing port
infrastructure and resourcing. In the three years to June 2018, passenger movements across Australia’s
borders increased by more than 20 per cent (from approximately 38 million to 46 million per annum).
The security environment remains fluid and unpredictable, with the travel network facing multiple and varied
threats. The threat of terrorism continues to evolve and become more sophisticated; as do methods for
circumventing border controls, security and immigration checks.
Multi-billion dollar infrastructure investment in new and existing ports is being planned now for 2020 and
beyond, with the new Brisbane International Cruise Terminal under construction and planning for Western
Sydney Airport well underway. A number of airports are planning redevelopments to extend the life of existing
infrastructure and offer an improved passenger experience. This is placing pressure on Government to be
responsive and adaptable in how we do our business.
Current Situation
As Australia’s primary border protection agency, the Department, including the Australian Border Force (ABF),
is responsible for policy and regulatory settings. As the operational arm ABF risk assesses and manages
border clearance of all travellers arriving and departing Australia.
The collection, transmission and use of Advance Passenger Processing (APP) information before travel is
central to Australia’s intelligence led, risk based approach to border security. APP, an interface between the
airline’s departure control system and Government databases, verifies that a person has authority to travel
(such as a valid visa) and enables early assessment of high-risk travellers.
SmartGates are a security measure with significant traveller experience benefits. They were introduced for
arriving travellers in 2007 and departing travellers in 2015 and have transformed the border from a largely
manual process to a predominantly automated one with use by almost 60 per cent of travellers. Advance
information, automation and the use of biometrics offers a higher level of assurance in identifying and
managing an increasing number of travellers, allowing officers to focus on higher value risk based activities.
The removal of the paper-based Outgoing Passenger Card in 2017 has reduced the burden on travellers to
provide the same information multiple times throughout the traveller pathway, returned one million hours back
to the travelling public and removed costs for industry associated with paper-based cards. The Department is
investigating options to facilitate removal of the Incoming Passenger Card, including leveraging existing data,
removal of questions and an integrated digital solution.
Border clearance processes for maritime, charter flights and seasonal services have remained manually
focused. Industry and travellers have increased their demands for international services at locations beyond
existing airports. Work is underway to review and modernise the border clearance model to ensure the
Department can sustainably meet demand, provide services based on expectations and maintain border
integrity.
Legislative Framework
The Customs Act 1901, Migration Act 1958 and Australian Border Force Act 2015 provide the primary
legislative framework for the movement of people and their related goods across the border. This framework
governs the activities of the Department and ABF in facilitating legitimate travel while undertaking relevant
compliance and enforcement activities.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department collaborates with a range of industry stakeholders including air and sea ports, airlines, cruise
lines and aviation, maritime and tourism industry groups. We engage through various forums including the
National Passenger Facilitation Committee and Future Traveller Working Group. The Department also
engages with international government administrations and organisations to drive innovation and influence
developments in traveller facilitation and enforcement.
Outlook
The Department’s immediate priority is to continue rollout out of next generation SmartGates for arriving
travellers, replacing our underlying traveller processing system and delivering new biometric capabilities. Work
continues with industry partners to make travel safer and more streamlined. This is important because Tourism
Research Australia predicts growth of 75 per cent in international visitors through to 2026-27 including a 168
per cent increase in Chinese visitors.
s47C
You will be asked to continue to support the establishment of international flights in late 2020 and AFP
presence at Hobart International Airport as announced by the Prime Minister on 24 February 2019 as part of
the Hobart City Deal.
You will be invited to lead engagement and development of innovative partnerships with key Australian and
global airports, airlines, and foreign governments to make travel easier and safer; and develop a modern
operating model for passenger border clearance at the brand new Western Sydney Airport which is scheduled
to open in 2026.
Attachments
Appendix 8 Traveller Pathway – Current and Future States
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Counter-Terrorism
Key Highlights
Protecting lives is our top priority. We work closely with State and Territory Governments, businesses and
the community to address the terrorist threat. Our efforts are focused on challenging violent extremist
ideologies; stopping people from becoming terrorists; shaping the global environment; disrupting terrorist
activity within Australia; and effective response and recovery arrangements.
Overview
You are the responsible minister for national counter-terrorism policy and legislation and have a leadership
role in the event of a domestic terrorist attack. Australia’s approach to counter-terrorism is intelligence led
(drawing upon the national security and intelligence community, and State and Territory police) to identify
emerging threats and inform appropriate responses. While existing arrangements have proven robust and
largely effective, there is a need to constantly review and refine policy and legal settings and capabilities at
home and abroad. The complex nature of the threat, overlayed on a federal system of government, requires
ongoing coordination efforts both within, and outside Australia.
Current Situation
The current National Terrorism Threat Level is PROBABLE; individuals or groups continue to possess the
intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. Since 2014, there have been seven attacks and
15 major disruptions in Australia, and 93 people have been charged as a result of 41 counter-terrorism
operations. Around 80 Australians are currently in Syria and Iraq and have fought for or otherwise supported
Islamist extremist groups. The military defeat of ISIL will present further security challenges as fighters,
sympathisers and their families disperse. Some 230 people in Australia are being investigated for actively
providing support to terrorist groups involved in the conflict. The impending release of a number of convicted
terrorist offenders presents a growing challenge.
Legislative Framework
Terrorist acts are crimes dealt with through the criminal justice system. Legislation criminalises terrorist acts
and associated activities, outlaws terrorist organisations, and provides powers to Australia’s law enforcement
and security agencies to counter the threat. You have policy and decision-making responsibility for aspects of
the Criminal Code, particularly in respect of terrorism-related offences, proscribing terrorist organisations,
control orders, preventative detention orders and continuing detention orders. When amendments to the
Defence Act 1903 take effect by 10 June 2019, you will become an alternative joint authorising minister for
expedited call-out of the Australian Defence Force, in circumstances where the Prime Minister, or either the
Attorney-General or Minister for Defence, is unavailable.
Stakeholders / Forums
Australia enjoys mature and effective counter-terrorism governance structures. The Commonwealth Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator coordinates cross-portfolio policy development and provides a single point of
awareness and coordination during a terrorism crisis.
The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) is the key forum under Council of
Australian Governments (COAG) for developing and coordinating consistent approaches to countering
terrorism between Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments, and the New Zealand Government. The
Australian Government provides approximately $15 million per year to ANZCTC for training, exercises and
equipment.
The Australian Government also works in cooperation with international partners on counter-terrorism, with a
particular focus on Indonesia and the Philippines. This includes not only engagement with our regional
neighbours, but also with Five Eyes partners to ensure that policies and capacity-building efforts in South East
Asia are aligned and not duplicative.
Outlook
Recent attacks in Melbourne, Christchurch and Sri Lanka demonstrate the immediacy and ongoing nature of
the threat to Australians and Australian interests at home and abroad. s47C
Contact Details
Name: Linda Geddes Deputy Secretary, Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
TSOC groups systematically target Australia and Australians for profit without any regard for the harm they
cause. Australia’s response to TSOC requires a coordinated national and international approach that connects,
shares and uses all the tools available across the spectrum of prevention, disruption and harm reduction.
In May 2018, Australian Federal Police Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent was appointed as the first
Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator to lead national counter-TSOC policy, strategy and capability.
The Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator is working across the Commonwealth, with States and Territories, the
private sector, academia and international partners.
Current Situation
The Department and its Portfolio agencies are at the forefront of the national effort to fight TSOC.
The Department, through the Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator developed the National Strategy to Fight
Transnational, Serious and Organised Crime (the National Strategy), which was endorsed by the Council of
Australian Governments in December 2018. It provides four pillars to guide national responses to TSOC:
• Integrated - deploy the right interventions at the right points to disrupt the criminal business model;
• United - strong, enduring partnerships are critical to Australia’s effort to combat TSOC and keep
Australia safe and secure;
The Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator leads on the Whole-of-Government and national implementation of
the National Strategy in partnership with the States and Territories.
Legislative Framework
Australia has an extensive legislative framework that enables the Department and its Portfolio agencies to fight
TSOC.
Stakeholders / Forums
There are a wide range of stakeholders and forums involved in the national effort to fight TSOC:
• The Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management is the policy and coordination forum
for police and emergency management ministers from all Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand. It
oversees implementation of the National Strategy, together with the Council of Attorneys-General;
• The Australian TSOC Committee (ATSOCC) provides national senior executive oversight of the
implementation of the National Strategy. It provides an important platform for the Commonwealth,
states and territories to engage in a national conversation about TSOC, and foster close cooperation
and collaboration. The ATSOCC focuses on enhancing strategic policy and capability, and driving
measures that include, and extend beyond, a law enforcement response. Standing membership
includes nominated Senior Officials from Commonwealth, State and Territory police and Justice and/or
Attorneys-General Agencies. The ATSOCC is co-chaired by the Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator;
and
• The Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Forum is chaired by the Secretary and comprises the
Secretary level equivalents from over 17 Commonwealth agencies. It provides strategic oversight and
guidance for the development of Whole-of-Government strategies, policies and coordinated activities
to combat TSOC and reduce its impact on Australia.
Outlook
The Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator, in implementing the National Strategy, will continue to work with
traditional and non-traditional partners across the Australian Government, private sector, civil society,
academia and the community to counter the threat of TSOC.
Contact Details
Name: Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent Commonwealth TSOC Coordinator
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cyber Security
Key Highlights
Cyber security is a critical enabler of Australia’s national security, innovation and prosperity. The Department
is focused on protecting Australia’s critical infrastructure and cyber ecosystem, and strengthening our
national cyber security footing. The Department is deepening our engagement with industry and ensuring
our strategic policy environment equips Australia to meet the dual challenges of the digital age—advancing
and protecting Australia’s interests online.
Overview
Australia and Australians are high-value targets for malicious cyber actors. Internet-connected systems of
national significance drive our economy, our critical infrastructure, and underpin our national security and social
wellbeing. The possible negative impacts stemming from malicious cyber activity range from the loss of
individuals’ personal information and data, identity theft, financial loss, the loss of essential services, to
potential loss of trust in Australia’s systems of governance and democracy. The 2019 compromise of the
Department of Parliamentary Services’ and political parties’ networks highlights the very real threat to critical
Australian systems, and gives an insight into the pervasive nature of the cyber threat environment. Attachment
A provides a summary of the most significant and consequential cyber incidents globally and affecting Australia
since 2007. Importantly, this list demonstrates the mix between the unauthorised release of personal
information and compromise of critical infrastructure.
Current Situation
Australia’s critical infrastructure, including the energy, telecommunications and transportation sectors, is reliant
on internet connected systems and devices. Broader systems of national significance that are not directly
connected to physical assets, such as the electronic payment system, financial and banking systems, health
systems, the traffic control ecosystem and Defence industry networks—are also vulnerable. International
incidents have disrupted power grids, degraded public health and transportation systems, and damaged
physical infrastructure. These risks, once thought to be possible but unlikely, are now being realised in Western
economies, including the UK and US. The compromise of any one of these systems has the potential to cripple
the economy, induce social unrest, or cause a loss of public confidence in Government.
Cybercrime remains a financially rewarding venture with relatively low risk for domestic and international
criminal networks. Cybercrime, including both crimes against computers and crimes against the citizens and
businesses that are enabled by technology, is one of the fastest growing and most prolific forms of crime
against Australians. One in four Australian adults were impacted by cybercrime in 2017. Identity crime is one
of the most common crimes in Australia with an economic impact estimated to exceed $2 billion. Identity crime
is also a key enabler of serious and organised crime that costs Australia around $36 billion annually. Despite
government efforts, traditional law enforcement and security approaches have struggled to make significant
headway against a threat that does not respect physical boundaries. Domestic and sophisticated international
cybercriminals have already outpaced our traditional operating models.
At the same time, nation states are growing more organised, aggressive, and sophisticated in their use of
offensive cyber capabilities. Nation states are investing in new capabilities and improving their proficiency.
These capabilities are being used for espionage, disruption and interference. Malicious cyber activity is also
supporting efforts to influence public opinion and democratic processes. Influence operations have been
observed overseas where adversaries spread a mix of genuine and false or misleading information through
social media platforms, news media and other online forums.
The ubiquitous use of social media and other online platforms has created new opportunities for nation states
and criminals to undertake malicious activity online. The dark web facilitates a range of criminal activity,
including firearms and drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking and online child abuse. Cryptocurrencies
are increasingly being accepted on dark web marketplaces and as part of cyber-related extortion attempts,
including through ransomware and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, allowing criminals to hide transactions.
New payment methodologies such as ApplePay, also allow for transactions to be hidden from traditional
scrutiny. Social media can be used as a platform for mass disinformation and political interference, scams,
extortion, espionage, and identity theft, sometimes targeted through the use of an individual’s personal data.
This convergence of malicious online activity necessitates macro change to secure citizens and businesses.
The Department has responsibility for national cyber security policy and strategy, and oversees the
implementation of the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy. More than $230 million has been provided over four years
to fund a package of 33 initiatives across Government under the Strategy, which has strengthened Australia’s
cyber security foundations. The Department’s cyber security policy team is co-located in the Australian Cyber
Security Centre with the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and is well placed to frame and prosecute
Government’s cyber agenda.
The Department plays a leading role in enhancing coordination and collaboration among cyber security
elements across all levels of government, and with industry and academia. This is an increasingly important
function as the role of external stakeholders in preserving cyber security is growing.
Legislative Framework
Australia’s operational cyber capability is owned and operated by ASD under the Intelligence Services Act
2001. The Australian Cyber Security Centre is part of the ASD and is responsible for leading Government
responses to serious cyber incidents; as well as providing cyber security advice and assistance to Australian
governments, businesses and individuals. Home Affairs Portfolio agencies, including the Australian Federal
Police (AFP), Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation (ASIO) all contribute to cyber security outcomes under their respective legislation. The
Department of Defence operates under its own legislation in times of armed conflict.
Stakeholders
The Department works in conjunction with ASD, relevant Home Affairs Portfolio agencies and other
stakeholders across Government, including the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Trade, in the
development of cyber security policy.
Outlook
The key cyber risk confronting Government is the dynamism of the threat environment and potential for a major
cyber incident. Such an incident could occur on systems of national significance or critical infrastructure, or at
a scale that has a significant adverse impact on Australia’s economic wellbeing.
This risk is exacerbated by the pace of technological development. New technologies continue to improve
productivity and innovation across Australia. As interconnected technologies become more common, our
dependence on their security and trustworthiness is growing. The scale and speed of the next wave of
technologies will pose fundamental challenges to current security approaches.
Your Government has committed to a $156 million cyber package announced on 29 April 2019, which includes
revising the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy to ensure it takes account of the changes that have occurred since
its release.
Attachments
A: Overview of significant cyber attacks since 2007
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
August 2008. Computer networks in Georgia were disrupted by a series of coordinated cyber attacks, which
occurred immediately prior to armed conflict with Russia.
March 2010. Australian authorities said that there were more than 200 attempts to hack into the networks of
the legal team for Rio Tinto executives being tried in China.
October 2010. Stuxnet, a complex piece of malware designed to interfere with Siemens Industrial Control
Systems, was discovered in Iran, Indonesia, and elsewhere, leading to speculation that it was a government
cyber weapon aimed at the Iranian nuclear program.
October 2010. The Wall Street Journal reported that hackers using ‘Zeus’ malware, available in cybercrime
black markets, were able to steal over $12 million from five banks in the US and UK.
May 2011. Cybercriminals masquerading as members of the hacktivist group ‘Anonymous’ penetrated the
PlayStation network. Sony estimated that personal information for more than 80 million users was
compromised and that the cost of the breach was over $170 million.
August 2012. A group called ‘Cutting Sword of Justice’ claimed it has used the ‘Shamoon’ virus to attack
Aramco, a major Saudi oil supplier, deleting data on 30,000 computers and infecting (without causing damage)
control systems. The attack also affected the Qatari company RasGas, a major LNG supplier.
July 2014. The Office of Personnel Management networks that contain information on thousands of applicants
for top secret clearances were breached.
July 2014. Malicious cyber actors in Eastern Europe breached energy sectors in the US, Spain, France, Italy,
Germany, Turkey, and Poland in a major cyber espionage campaign.
October 2014. Australian mining and natural resources companies and their associated legal and financial
advisors fell victim to cyber attacks during sensitive business negotiations.
November 2014. Sony Pictures Entertainment is attacked, with malware deleting data and the attackers
posting online employees’ personal information and unreleased films. An FBI investigation revealed North
Korea to be behind the attack.
January 2015. A report issued by Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security confirmed a German steel
mill was the second recorded victim of a cyber attack causing physical destruction.
December 2015. The Australian Bureau of Meteorology announced that it had been attacked by malicious
cyber actors in 2014.
December 2015. Security researchers say that power outages in Western Ukraine were the result of a
coordinated cyber attack on several regional distribution power companies. SCADA systems and system host
networks were targeted and damaged. Approximately 225,000 Ukrainians were affected and it took hours to
restore.
August 2016. A group calling itself ‘Shadow Brokers’ claimed to have penetrated the U.S. Government’s
National Security Agency (NSA) and published a collection of NSA tools. This is a significant compromise of a
classified network.
October 2016. The US Director of National Intelligence and Department of Homeland Security jointly identified
Russia as responsible for hacking the Democratic National Committee and using WikiLeaks to dump emails
obtained in the hack.
November 2016. The ‘Shamoon’ virus used against Saudi Aramco in 2012 was deployed against four Saudi
Arabian government agencies. The attack erased data on thousands of computers at Saudi’s General Authority
of Civil Aviation and other agencies.
December 2016. Yahoo revealed that its systems had been compromised in August 2013, with one billion
user accounts affected.
May 2017. A large-scale ransomware campaign known as ‘WannaCry’ affected over 300,000 computers
across the globe, including the UK’s National Health Service. This ransomware leveraged publicly known
vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows. It was followed by the variant ‘Petya’ in July which affected 16,500
computers.
June 2017. The ‘NotPetya’ ransomware attack shut down the port terminals of Danish shipping giant Maersk
for two days, causing an estimated $300 million in associated costs.
October 2017. The Australian Government confirmed malicious cyber actors compromised an Australian
national security contractor in 2016 and stole large amounts of data, including information related to the
development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
May 2018. An unknown group of hackers stole between $18 and $20 million dollars from Mexican banks by
exploiting the SWIFT transfer system, submitting a series of false transfer orders to phantom accounts in other
banks and emptying the accounts in dozens of branch offices.
July 2018. The Australian National University confirmed media reports that its IT infrastructure had been
infiltrated by a sophisticated cyber security capability.
March 2018. Facebook breached the trust of its millions of users through its lax data management practices,
revealed by the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
June 2018. PageUp revealed it had suffered a major data breach, which potentially affected hundreds of
thousands of Australians through the use of their website when applying for jobs.
July 2018. SingHealth, Singapore’s largest group of healthcare institutions, was compromised between 1 May
2015 and 4 July 2018 with 1.5 million patients’ personal data illegally accessed. Singapore confirmed
sophisticated state actors were behind the compromise.
September 2018. Facebook made public that 50 million Facebook accounts had been compromised with a
further 40 million vulnerable, due to a misconfiguration of the digital keys. Updated information released by
Facebook on 13 October indicated 30 million accounts were affected.
November 2018. Australian Defence company, Austal announced it had been the victim of a hack resulting in
the theft of unclassified ship designs.
December 2018. The US, Australia, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand, accused China of conducting a cyber
espionage campaign targeting the intellectual property of organisations across 12 countries. The cyber
intrusions were focused on large-scale Managed Service Providers which manage IT services and
infrastructure for many medium to large businesses globally. This compromise dates back to 2017.
February 2019. LandMark White announced that it had discovered a vulnerability in its Internet-facing
systems. Over 130,000 valuation records were made available on the dark web.
February 2019. On 8 February, the Presiding Officers for the Australian Parliament issued a statement about
a security incident on the parliamentary computing network. On 18 February, Prime Minister Morrison delivered
a statement to Parliament, which noted that the networks of the Liberal, Labor and National parties had been
affected.
Overview
Espionage and foreign interference activity against Australian interests includes growing interference in our
institutions of democracy and illicit attempts to access advanced technology and research.
‘Interference’ involves coercive, clandestine, corrupting or deceptive activities undertaken by, or on behalf of,
foreign actors. This differs from ‘influence’ by which foreign governments’ legitimately adopt open, legal and
transparent ways to promote their interests.
In April 2018, Chris Teal was appointed Australia’s inaugural National Counter Foreign Interference
Coordinator (NCFIC) to identify, assess and respond in an integrated and coordinated way to acts of foreign
interference. The NCFIC is working across government departments, States and Territories, with the private
sector, higher education and diaspora communities.
Current Situation
The NCFIC has developed a comprehensive approach to CFI. The five pillar approach (to enhance capability,
engage at-risk sectors, deter perpetrators, defend against acts of foreign interference and enforce CFI laws)
is designed to ensure that the cost of conducting foreign interference outweighs the benefits.
This overall approach is complemented by a communications strategy and a diplomatic strategy (developed
with DFAT), to share experiences and coordinate responses with likeminded countries.
Legislative Framework
Australia has passed new espionage and foreign interference legislation, which strengthens our ability to
successfully prosecute acts of espionage and specifically criminalises foreign interference. These include:
• The National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 criminalises
covert deceptive, or coercive activities of foreign actors (or a person acting on a foreign actors behalf) that
are intended to interfere with Australia’s institutions of democracy, or support the intelligence activities of
a foreign government;
• The Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 provides visibility of the nature and extent of foreign
influence in Australia’s government and political processes. The Scheme requires persons or entities that
engage in parliamentary lobbying, general political lobbying, communications activity or disbursement
activity on behalf of a foreign principal will have to register with the Australian Government;
• The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 introduces three key measures: a Register of Critical
Infrastructure Assets that gives the Government visibility of who owns and controls the assets, an
information-gathering power, and a Ministerial directions power;
• The Electoral Funding Act 2018 prohibits political donations from foreign governments and state-owned
enterprises; and
• The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2017 amended the Telecommunications
Act 1997 to impose security and notification obligations on regulated entities to ‘do their best’ to protect
networks and facilities from unauthorised interference or access.
Stakeholders / Forums
There are a wide range of stakeholders and forums delivering the CFI effort:
• The NCFIC leads a Deputy Secretary level CFI Board that meets quarterly;
• The NCFIC leads regular engagement between community groups, State and Territory Governments, and
academic and industry representatives to further a collaborative approach to CFI;
• An Electoral Integrity Assurance Board and Taskforce has been established under the joint chairmanship
of the Australian Election Commission and the Department of Finance to monitor and respond to threats
to the integrity of election processes ahead of the Federal election due in the first half of this year – the
NCFIC is a member of the Board; and
• s47C, s33(a)(iii)
Outlook
The NCFIC will continue to lead implementation of the national CFI Strategy.
Contact Details
Name: Chris Teal, National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Recognising critical infrastructure owners and operators are more exposed than ever to espionage, sabotage
and coercion, the Government established the Critical Infrastructure Centre (the Centre) in January 2017 to
develop a deeper understanding of these national security risks, and to implement mitigation strategies in close
collaboration with industry. The Centre is now a part of the Department within the Critical Infrastructure Security
Division. The Government enacted the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI) and the
Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR) to ensure it has the information it needs to undertake
risk assessments, and the power to issue directions if necessary.
The Department also provides clear, consolidated and early national security advice to inform the Treasurer’s
decisions on foreign investment proposals under the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) framework, and
works collaboratively with critical infrastructure owners and operators, and states and territories, primarily
through the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), to ensure the continued operation of critical
infrastructure in the face of all hazards.
Current Situation
The Department assessed over 280 critical infrastructure related FIRB cases in 2018; received 545
notifications under the SOCI Act (as at 30 April 2019); and is receiving approximately five TSSR notifications
a month from the telecommunications sector. All of these require analysis, assessment and in some cases
present challenging matters for Government to consider. While many matters are resolved within the
Department, key cases are escalated to the relevant Minister and/or to higher decision-making bodies. For
example, the Department led work in 2018 on the Government’s position on 5G telecommunications network
security and on the National Security risk elements in the proposed acquisition of APA Group, Australia’s most
significant gas transmission business.
There remain large sectors of critical infrastructure not covered by SOCI, TSSR or the Foreign Acquisitions
and Takeovers Act 1975 (FATA).
Legislative Framework
The Department manages risk in critical infrastructure in eight key sectors: Communications, Energy, Water,
Transport, Banking and Finance, Food and Grocery, Health, and the Commonwealth Government itself. This
is done through a range of regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms, including:
• Administering the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI), which manages risk in the
electricity, gas, water and maritime ports sectors;
• Administering the Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR) (which introduced new
provisions into the Telecommunications Act 1997), which manages risk in the telecommunications
sector;
• Providing national security risk advice on proposed acquisitions of critical infrastructure assets to the
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975
(FATA); and
• Building industry resilience and supporting it to take action on security risks, primarily through the
Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructure Resilience (TISN), which includes
membership across all critical infrastructure sectors.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department regularly engages with State and Territory government agencies, regulators and industry to
support their understanding and management of risk through the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN)
and the Resilience Expert Advisory Group (REAG). International engagement occurs with Five Eyes countries
through s47C, s33(a)(iii) Five Country Ministerial processes, as well as via bilateral
engagement.
Outlook
National security risks will continue to be present in Australia’s critical infrastructure. There are no relevant
election commitments which substantially alter the regulatory regimes currently in place. s47C
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Transport Security
Key Highlights
Australia’s transport sector remains a highly attractive target for terrorists. Coupled with increasing
passenger and trade volumes, terrorist attacks remain an ongoing threat. The Department’s Aviation and
Maritime Security Division takes an intelligence led, risk based approach to determine the minimum security
settings required to address the threat.
Our policy and regulatory approach is forward looking. We work closely with stakeholders across the
Portfolio and industry to ensure our security approaches align and integrate with other trade and border
management functions.
Overview
Aviation and Maritime Security Division within the Department is Australia’s transport security regulator for the
aviation, maritime and offshore oil and gas sectors. AMS sets security requirements through the Aviation
Transport Security Act 2004 and Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003, and industry
operators manage day-to-day operations to meet those requirements. Security requirements are set through
informed judgements about risk. The security framework is under continuous review to ensure security
measures are effective, proportionate, and targeted towards the highest risks.
Current Situation
Terrorist groups continue to demonstrate both the intent and the capability to threaten civil aviation, including
in Australia. An attack against aviation, air cargo, maritime or the offshore oil and gas sector could inflict mass
casualties, cause major economic damage, and instil public fear and anxiety.
Aviation Security
Following the disrupted terrorist attack in Sydney in July 2017, work is underway to further strengthen
Australia’s aviation security settings. This includes the introduction of next generation security screening
technology. Air cargo security was also strengthened, with piece-level screening requirements introduced for
all international destinations from 1 March 2019. These initiatives will ensure Australia remains a trusted
destination for trade and travel and a world-leader in aviation security.
Some of Australia's highest aviation security risks come from offshore airports where security practices are
developing, the terrorism threat is escalated, and Australian passenger numbers are high. The Department
delivers a Last Ports of Call program to assess the security applied to airports with direct international flights
to Australia.
Maritime Security
The Department is responsible for policy and regulation of the maritime transport and offshore oil and gas
industries; to safeguard against unlawful interference (including terrorism) with maritime security; and promote
economic prosperity. The Department requires the maritime transport and oil and gas sectors to identify
security risks in their operations and to prepare security plans to counter identified risks. Work is being done
to ensure this framework effectively addresses contemporary threats and facilitates industry operations.
Compliance
The Department delivers an extensive compliance program to provide assurance that industry is meeting its
security obligations. Transport Security Inspectors conduct audits, inspections and system tests (including
covert testing), under an annual National Compliance Plan.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department collaborates on transport security with a broad range of industry stakeholders including
airports, airlines, air cargo operators, seaports, cruise lines and offshore oil and gas facilities. Regular industry
forums are hosted across all transport sectors to share information on threats, risks and incidents. The
Department is an active participant internationally, including in the work of the International Civil Aviation
Organization—promoting global aviation security standards.
Outlook
Australia’s regulatory environment and industry practices are severely challenged by the threat of an act of
terrorism. Therefore it needs to stay ahead of the evolving threat of terrorism, and keep pace with our
international counterparts’ security regimes. Transport security risk assessments underpin policy formulation,
compliance activities, and strengthen industry’s understanding of, and response to, security risks. The
Department’s approach is informed by intelligence, international and domestic liaison with partners, and
analysis of compliance and security incident data.
• 1,548 compliance activities were scheduled under the National Compliance Plan.
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Enacted on 9 December 2018, the Act has equipped agencies with a range of necessary legislative tools and
investigatory powers to overcome the increasing reduction of visibility of communications, and subsequently,
the online activities of criminals, terrorists, and others threatening Australia’s national security. The Act does
not break encryption, or fundamentally undermine the privacy of innocent Australians, or the data security and
cybersecurity of devices and networks.
The Act is currently under review by both the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (due
to report on 13 April 2020) and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) (due to report
by 1 March 2020).
Legislative Framework
The Act amended Part 15 of the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) to introduce a technologically neutral
industry assistance framework. This framework facilitates Australian law enforcement and national security
agencies, and the communications industry working together to overcome technological impediments, and the
increasing digital sophistication of criminals, terrorists, and others threatening Australia’s national security,
which ultimately impacts the effectiveness of investigations and prosecutions.
The Act also amends a range of other legislation, including the Telecommunications (Interception and Access)
Act 1979 (TIA Act), Surveillance Devices Act 2004, Crimes Act 1914, Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979, and the Customs Act 1900 to modernise investigatory powers and procedural laws to
enhance agencies’ ability to investigate and prosecute terrorism and serious crime. This ensures agencies can
lawfully search for, and access, content and data at a stage where it is in a readable form (e.g. before data is
encrypted through device applications) without compromising the technologies that secure communications.
This framework is supported by safeguards and oversight arrangements which protects business interests and
the privacy of Australians, maintains the security of the digital ecosystem and ensures the Act are exercised
responsibly.
Current Situation
The Department is currently working with industry and agencies on the implementation of the Act. The
Department continues to deliver training and interim guidance material to agencies to ensure the measures
are understood clearly, used as intended, and with respect to the safeguards and limitations.
The Department continues to improve administrative guidance in consultation with key industry and
government stakeholders. The guidance ensures agencies use the industry assistance measures
appropriately and with respect to the safeguards and limitations in the Act.
In late 2018 and early 2019, agencies have used the industry assistance and computer access warrant powers
in the Act to support their lawful investigations and operations into serious crimes, terrorism, and other activities
threatening Australia’s national security. Agencies are currently working with providers under the industry
assistance framework to seek assistance for the investigation of serious and organised crime, cybercrime and
serious crimes against the person, and national security matters.
Stakeholders / Forums
The legislation has been subject to significant scrutiny throughout the development, passage and
implementation of the Act. This scrutiny has mostly been from the communications and technology industries,
and the media and advocacy groups. Industry are reporting that a negative perception of the legislation is
having a material impact on the domestic market. Much of the critical commentary has not taken into account
the legal effect of key measures, particularly the industry assistance framework. The Department has
developed a communications strategy in consultation with Commonwealth agencies and departments to
address these misconceptions and disseminate accurate information on the intended operation and effect of
the Act.
Outlook
The Department is developing submissions to support the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and
Security and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor reviews into the Act. Australia’s electronic
surveillance laws are failing to keep pace with technological changes. s47C
In its 2013 Inquiry into Potential Reforms of National Security Legislation, the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security recommended that the TIA Act be revised comprehensively.
At the end of the last Parliament, the Government introduced a Bill to expand the Act to included integrity and
oversight agencies as well as bring forward the reporting date for the review of the Independent National
Security Legislation Monitor. s47C
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Parliamentary Privilege
Key Highlights
Whilst the legitimate application of parliamentary privilege underpins a well-functioning democracy, a recent
Senate resolution on the seizure of material by executive agencies appears to give a more expansive reach
to parliamentary privilege than previously accepted by the executive government, or recognised by the
courts. s47C, s37(2)(b)
Overview
On 6 December 2018, the Senate passed a resolution about the interaction of parliamentary privilege with law
enforcement investigations. The Senate resolution called for the Attorney-General to develop a new protocol
to provide more guidance on how to manage this interaction and reflect the increasing use of covert powers—
such as telecommunications interception and surveillance device powers.
The Senate Standing Committee of Privileges also tabled reports in the 45th Parliament establishing a test for
the potential application of parliamentary privilege that includes circumstances where there is contemporary
or contextual evidence that documents were retained or intended for use in the course of, or for the purposes
of or incidental to, parliamentary business. This represents a departure from the historically regarded operation
of parliamentary privilege which sought to protect against the use of certain privileged material in court
proceedings, rather than preventing the gathering of material by executive agencies in all cases. s47C, (b)
s37(2)
Current Situation
s47C, s37(2)(b)
Legislative Framework
Pursuant to section 49 of the Constitution, the Parliament is afforded the same powers, privileges and
immunities conferred on the United Kingdom’s House of Commons, at the time of the Commonwealth being
established. The Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth) also declares the powers, privileges and immunities
of each House of the Parliament and of the members and committees of each House.
In executing search warrants in circumstances where claims of parliamentary privilege may arise, the
Australian Federal Police operates under the ‘Australian Federal Police National Guideline for the Execution
of Search Warrants where Parliamentary Privilege may be involved’ (the Guideline). The Guideline sits under
a 2005 Memorandum of Understanding between the then Minister for Justice and Customs, Attorney-General,
Speaker of the House of Representatives and President of the Senate.
s47C
s47C
s47C, s37(2)(b)
Outlook
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
In April 2013 the Government mandated that government entities implement the ASD Top Four Cyber Security
mitigation strategies by July 2014.
In June 2014, ANAO Report Number 50 2013/14 found that several agencies, including the then Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS), were non-compliant with the ASD Top Four.
The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) held a public hearing in October 2014 to examine
Report 50. Each of the agencies, including the ACBPS, committed to achieving compliance in 2016.
In March 2017, ANAO Report Number 42 2016/17 found that the then Department of Immigration and Border
Protection (DIBP) was non-compliant with three of the ASD Top Four.
In June 2017, DIBP gave evidence to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (JCPAA) Inquiry and
committed to achieving compliance with all mitigation strategies by June 2020.
Since June 2017 the Department has taken significant steps to improve its cyber security capability. Strategies
are now in place to improve compliance with the fourth mitigation strategy, application policy.
The Department has a defence in depth approach to cyber security which is supported by:
• An accredited and resilient secure gateway which manages any traffic into and out of our corporate
environment;
• The conduct of regular penetration tests and vulnerability assessments of our systems;
• Utilising our security accreditation framework to assess systems throughout their lifecycle;
• Governance controls including policies, procedures, and regular internal and external reviews of our
cyber security capability;
• The creation of a Cyber Risk Management Board with SES representation from key areas across the
Department. The Board has oversight of cyber security issues, risks, incidents, and tracks compliance
against the ASD Top Four and Essential Eight;
• The regular engagement of external parties to review our governance arrangements; and
These controls have been effective in preventing intrusions to departmental systems and avoiding the
compromise of information. The Department is continuously improving its cyber resilience and remains
cognisant of the evolving threat environment.
The primary barriers to achieving full compliance with the ASD Top Four mitigations have been resource
pressures and the challenges of consolidating legacy ICT environments following the merger of the former
Department of Immigration and Border Protection and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.
The most recent Machinery of Government changes as part of the establishment of the Department of Home
Affairs have placed additional pressure on achieving compliance.
Current Situation
The Department is now fully compliant with three of the Top Four mitigation strategies – application whitelisting,
operating systems patching and restricting administrative privileges. The Department is using a risk managed
approach to manage the fourth mitigation strategy, application patching.
Of the Top Four, the patching of applications is the most challenging. Agencies are required to adhere to a
tiered approach, commensurate with the assessed risk. The Department’s application patching strategy is
designed and implemented with consideration of the following risk managed approach:
• Due to the volume of applications managed by the Department, applications that carry a high risk of
being exploited are patched on a monthly basis; and
• Where our risk assessments indicate that an application is at critical risk of being exploited or is being
actively exploited, patches will be applied within 48 hours.
The Secretary and the Group Manager of Technology and Major Capability continue to focus on the outcomes
of the audits and cyber security activities more broadly with regular briefings to stay informed of any cyber
security incidents or threats.
Legislative Framework
Compliance with the ASD Top Four mitigation strategies is mandated for Australian Government entities by
the Protective Security Policy Framework, Section 10, Requirements 1 to 4.
Stakeholders / Forums
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit – Report No. 467 Cybersecurity Compliance.
Outlook
The Department of Home Affairs has implemented processes to ensure full compliance with the ASD Top Four
mitigation strategies by June 2020.
Contact Details
Name: Michael Milford, Group Manager Technology and Major Capability
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
COMMUNITY PROTECTION
Overview
Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens of character concern are allowed to enter
and/or remain in Australia. Increasing numbers of people moving across international borders and the
increasing sophistication of global organised crime and terrorists will likely result in the continued prevalence
of non-citizens posing a risk to the Australian community. Section 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act)
cancellation or refusal of visas if a person is assessed as failing the ‘character test’. General cancellation
powers also enable (primarily) temporary visas to be cancelled if a person is assessed to pose a risk to the
health, safety or good order of the community.
Current Situation
From 1 July 2018 to 30 April 2019, 41,934 visas have been cancelled under all powers available under the
Act. Since 11 December 2014, and as at 30 April 2019, 4,455 visas have been cancelled under section 501 of
the Act; an increase of over 700 per cent when compared to the previous four year period. This increase is
primarily linked to the introduction in 2014 of the mandatory cancellation power at section 501(3A) of the Act.
s47C, s47E(d)
Legislative Framework
The Act provides the legislative authority for cancellations and refusals. A non-citizen can fail the character
test for a number of reasons including, where they have a substantial criminal record or is reasonably
suspected of associating with, or being a member of, a group involved in criminal conduct. Section 501(3A) of
the Act requires that a person’s visa must be cancelled if they are serving a full-time term of imprisonment for
an offence committed in Australia; and they have, at any time, been sentenced to a period of 12 months or
more in prison or have been found guilty of a sexually based crime involving a child.
If a non-citizen’s visa is mandatorily cancelled, they may seek revocation within certain timeframes.
s47C, s47E(d)
Ministerial Direction no. 79 came into effect on 28 February 2019, and applies to decision-makers
[including the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT)] who are considering exercising discretion under section
501 of the Act. The Direction outlines considerations to be made in the character process, and includes the
need to protect the Australian community, the nature and seriousness of the conduct and the best interests of
minor children.
Non-citizens who do not hold a visa will be liable for detention and removal from Australia as soon as
practicable, subject to completion of any custodial sentence or other outstanding matters. Persons whose visas
are cancelled or refused by the departmental delegate can seek merits review, and may seek judicial review
if they believe that there is an error of law in the decision. The Minister can make decisions with or without
natural justice, and has powers to substitute a decision of the AAT or their delegate. Minister decisions are not
reviewable by the AAT, but can be subject to judicial review.
Stakeholders / Forums
s47C, s47E(d), s33(a)(iii)
Visa cancellation cases often attract substantial media and community attention.
Outlook
Two recent reports from the Joint Standing Committee on Migration focused on migrant settlement outcomes
and review processes associated with visa cancellations on criminal grounds. The Committee has made six
recommendations in its report regarding review processes associated with visa cancellations on criminal
grounds, which will be considered by the Government and a formal response tabled in Parliament.
s47C, s47E(d)
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Modern Slavery
Key Highlights
The Department leads Australia’s Whole-of-Government response to modern slavery. We are responsible
for implementing the Modern Slavery Act 2018 (the Act) and Australia’s National Action Plan to Combat
Human Trafficking and Slavery 2015-19 (the Plan). We support domestic and international engagement on
modern slavery issues.
Overview
Modern slavery is an umbrella term used to describe a range of serious exploitive practices, including human
trafficking, slavery, servitude, forced marriage, forced labour, and the worst forms of child labour. From 2015
to 2017, the estimated number of victims in Australia was between 1,300 and 1,900. The Department leads
Australia’s Whole-of-Community approach to combating modern slavery and coordinates responses to this
issue across government, civil society and business.
Current Situation
Modern Slavery Act 2018
The Act entered into force on 1 January 2019. This Act establishes a Modern Slavery Reporting Requirement
(Reporting Requirement) that requires over 3,000 business and other entities (such as large charities) to
prepare annual statements on their actions to address modern slavery risks in their global operations and
supply chains. The Reporting Requirement applies to businesses and other entities operating in the Australian
market with over AUD $100 million consolidated annual revenue. The Commonwealth Government is also
required to comply with the Act by preparing an annual consolidated statement covering all non-corporate
Commonwealth entities (Commonwealth agencies and departments). The first statements will be due from
April 2020 and will be published on a public-facing online register.
The Modern Slavery Business Engagement Unit in the Department is responsible for implementing the Act.
The unit advises and supports businesses to comply with the Act and undertakes compliance, education and
awareness raising to promote best practice. The unit also coordinates the Commonwealth statement and
manages the public-facing online register.
The Portfolio leads the Whole-of-Government criminal justice response to modern slavery, including:
• Australian Federal Police investigating criminal offences and referring victims to the Australian
Government-funded Support for Trafficked People Program;
• driving engagement with business and civil society through the National Roundtable on Human
Trafficking and Slavery; and
• funding for specialist civil society organisations to deliver projects to prevent and respond to modern
slavery issues.
The Department conducts international capacity building on modern slavery issues, including as co-chair of
the Bali Process Working Group on Trafficking in Persons. Since 2008, Government has awarded more than
$5.8 million to specialist Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) working to combat modern slavery. In
2018-19, the Department is administering funding for four specialist NGOs ($125,000 each).
Forced marriage
Australia’s response to forced marriage forms part of the broader Whole-of-Government strategy to combat
modern slavery. The Department leads the development of a proposed Commonwealth Forced Marriage
Protection Order scheme to complement existing criminal offences and provide a flexible civil remedy.
Stakeholder consultation on the proposed model is ongoing.
Legislative Framework
The Modern Slavery Act 2018 and Divisions 270 and 271 of the Criminal Code.
Stakeholders / Forums
An overview of key stakeholders and forums related to modern slavery is at Appendix 9.
Outlook
The Department’s immediate priorities are to continue implementation of the Act, and to progress policy and
stakeholder engagement initiatives that seek to prevent and deter modern slavery in Australia. You will be
invited to consider a draft of the final guidance for business on complying with the Act as an early priority. You
will also be invited to consider launching the guidance and delivering a keynote address at a major international
conference on modern slavery that the Department will host in Sydney from 26-27 June 2019.
s47C
You will also be invited to consider a draft of Australia’s next National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking
and Slavery 2020-24 and to approve the Department conducting national consultations on the Plan, with a
view to you launching the final plan in December 2019.
You will be invited to consider a draft model for a Commonwealth Forced Marriage Protection Order scheme,
and to approve The Department conducting consultations on the proposed model with the states and territories
and civil society.
You will be provided with options for chairing the next ministerial-level National Roundtable on Human
Trafficking and Slavery (due to be held in mid-2019).
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Exploitation of migrant workers in Australia is a serious and increasing problem:
• Temporary visa holders, in particular Student visa and Working Holiday Maker visa holders, are among
the main groups affected;
• The main industries exploiting workers are hospitality, agriculture and horticulture;
• Unscrupulous employers take advantage of temporary visa holders by not paying them a fair wage;
coercing them to work in breach of their visa conditions; threatening to report them for immigration
breaches if they complain; and claiming excessive benefits in return for visa sponsorship; and
• Serious forms of labour exploitation are captured by the human trafficking and slavery-like offences set
out in the Criminal Code Act 1995, and are referred to the Australian Federal Police (AFP).
The Government established the Migrant Workers Taskforce (MWT) on 4 October 2016, to ensure relevant
Government agencies collaborated to combat exploitation of migrant workers in Australia. The final report of the
MWT was released on 7 March 2019, and includes 22 recommendations, all of which the Government has agreed
in principle.
Current Situation
Initiatives implemented by the Department to address foreign worker exploitation include: increased
communication of workplace rights and entitlements for foreign nationals; and development of ‘push’ messaging,
via text messages, for Working Holiday Maker (WHM) visa holders.
Reforms to employer sponsored skilled visas through the Migration and Other Legislation Amendment (Enhanced
Integrity) Act 2018 came into effect in December 2018. The reforms enhance information sharing between the
Department and the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to identify employers underpaying migrant workers and
publishing of sanctioned sponsor’s details.
Taskforce Cadena was established in June 2015. It is a joint agency initiative between the Department, the ABF,
and the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), focussing on detecting and disrupting criminal syndicates that profit from
the serious exploitation of foreign workers and Australia’s migration system.
The Department also leads cross government work to combat migrant worker exploitation where it amounts to the
criminal offences of human trafficking, slavery, or slavery-like practices, including forced labour.
Legislative Framework
The Department and the ABF currently administer three sanction frameworks under the Migration Act that provide
a legislative basis to respond to the exploitation of migrant workers:
• Employer Sanctions—for employers who allow, or refer non-citizens for, illegal work in Australia without
taking reasonable steps to confirm that the non-citizen is a legal worker. Illegal work includes non-citizens
working in breach of their visa conditions, or unlawful non-citizens working;
• Sponsor Obligations—includes sanctions for sponsors who do not comply with legally binding sponsorship
obligations that aim to protect temporary visa holders in Australia from exploitation, including existing
subclass 457 and Temporary Skill Shortage visa holders; and
• Paying for Visa Sponsorship—sanctions for any person or business entity who asks for, receives, offers
or provides a benefit in return for visa sponsorship, or employment that requires visa sponsorship.
Penalties include administrative warnings, infringements and civil penalties, and criminal prosecution.
The Fair Work Act 2009 and Fair Work Regulations 2009 are the main statutes that govern workplace entitlements
in Australia. These statutes are overseen by the FWO and cover workplace conditions including minimum wage.
They do not cover workplace health and safety which is governed by State and Territory legislation.
Stakeholders / Forums
Initiatives to address migrant worker exploitation include participating in the following fora:
• The Migrant Workers’ Taskforce—chaired by Professor Allan Fels AO and administered by the
Department of Jobs and Small Business—aims to identify further proposals for improvements in law, law
enforcement and investigation, and other practical measures to more quickly identify and rectify any cases
of migrant worker exploitation;
• The Phoenix Taskforce—a joint agency initiative led by the ATO to identify new companies that have been
created to continue the business of a company that has deliberately liquidated to avoid paying its debts;
and
• The Black Economy Taskforce—chaired by Mr Michael Andrew AO was established to combat the black
economy in Australia. The Department has considered its recommendations about combatting the black
economy in Australia, which will help respond to the exploitation of migrant workers.
Outlook
The Department will continue to work closely with stakeholders across Government to strengthen our
legislative and operational response to migrant worker exploitation in Australia. This will include increased
protections for vulnerable workers, and enhanced deterrence and enforcement action against offending
employers.
Priority will be given to implementing measures to enhance existing sanctions frameworks, including: greater
enforcement of all tiers of the employer sanctions (including civil and criminal penalties); and issuing
infringements on-the-spot for allowing or referring non-citizens for illegal work.
The Department will support the Department of Jobs and Small Business to develop a communication strategy
targeting the information needs of migrant workers. It will encourage reporting of workplace exploitation and
aim to hinder the use of visa cancellation threats by employers.
s47C
Contact Details
Name: Andrew Kefford PSM, Acting Deputy Secretary Immigration and Citizenship Services
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Emergency Management
Key Highlights
Emergency Management Australia (EMA), a division of the Department, coordinates Australian Government
responses to crises, and administers programs to assist Australians to prepare for, and recover from
disasters. EMA also coordinates physical security arrangements for Australian High Office Holders and
coordinates national security arrangements for major events. Over the last decade more than $10 billion
has been drawn from the Federal budget for disaster recovery funding. A National Resilience Taskforce has
been leading national effort to focus on reducing disaster risk.
Overview
EMA is Australia’s national disaster management organisation. It executes the Australian Government’s crisis
management arrangements, and operates the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre (the CCC);
a 24/7, all-hazards, situational awareness facility, which also houses the National Security Hotline (NSH). EMA
is the Australian Government’s focal point for situational awareness, emergency preparedness, crisis
response, and disaster recovery. Alongside EMA, the Taskforce is delivering a range of measures to
systematically reduce Australia’s disaster risk.
Current Situation
The Department works with State and Territory Governments and other stakeholders to maintain and
strengthen Australia's emergency management, national security, crisis, and disaster recovery capabilities.
This includes administering a number of emergency management funding programs. Australia is a regional
and global leader in disaster management and EMA delivers a modest international outreach program.
EMA comprises:
• Disaster Preparedness: responsible for delivering national policy and strategic capability, funding
programs, management of Australia’s global engagement on disaster risk reduction efforts, and
oversight of the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience;
• Crisis Management: responsible for the CCC and NSH, the coordination of physical security
arrangements for Australian High Office Holders and the diplomatic community, and the coordination
of national security arrangements for major events; and
• Disaster Recovery: responsible for administering national disaster recovery arrangements and
payments to individuals.
Legislative Framework
The Commonwealth’s role during disasters and emergencies is governed by a number of plans and
frameworks, principally the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, and the Australian
Government Disaster Response Plan, neither of which have a legislative basis. Financial support provided via
the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements is given effect as part of the Inter-Governmental Agreement on
Federal Financial Relations and the Appropriation Act (No.2) 2018-19. The Commonwealth-only Disaster
Recovery Payment and Disaster Recovery Allowance are paid under the Social Security Act 1991.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department’s primary stakeholders in emergency management are the State and Territory emergency
management and emergency services agencies. Other key stakeholders include: local governments,
non-government organisations such as Australian Red Cross and the Australasian Fire and Emergency
Service Authorities Council, and private sector organisations, particularly insurance and banking.
Commonwealth stakeholders include central agencies, the Australian Federal Police, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, the North Queensland Livestock Industry Recovery Agency, the Bureau of Meteorology,
Geoscience Australia and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation. The
Department co-chairs the Australian Government Climate and Disaster Resilience Reference Group, which
includes all Australian Government departments. The key intergovernmental forums are the Ministerial Council
for Police and Emergency Management and the senior officials-level Australia-New Zealand Emergency
Management Committee.
Outlook
Life in Australia is increasingly disrupted by disasters. Australians will experience—as we did this summer—
more frequent and severe heatwaves, bushfires, floods and cyclones. These will increasingly occur
concurrently. Disasters cost the economy $18.2 billion per year, and this is expected to rise to $39 billion per
annum by 2050. This is placing significant pressure on governments to improve preparedness, disaster risk
reduction, resilience, response, and relief and recovery capabilities.
The Department will continue working with its stakeholders to reduce disaster risk and strengthen and maintain
Australia's emergency and crisis management capability. A particular focus will be the implementation of the
National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework and striking a National Partnership Agreement with the States
and Territories to implement the strategies in the Framework. The 2019-20 Federal Budget includes
$130.5 million in funding over five years to do this. The Department is also developing a national climate and
disaster risk information capability to enable Australians to make informed decisions to plan for the future.
The Federal Budget also included a commitment to establish an Emergency Response Fund (the Fund) from
1 October 2019, to fund natural disaster recovery and response initiatives above and beyond existing state
and federal programs. The initial size of the Fund will be approximately $3.9 billion, with up to $150 million
being made available per annum from 2019-20 to 2023-24 following a significant and catastrophic natural
disaster. EMA will work with key stakeholders to draft the enabling legislation as well as a funding plan, setting
out a consistent and transparent approach to funding projects across Australia.
Attachments
A: Overview of emergency management arrangements
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Attachment A
Overview of emergency management arrangements
In Australia, State and Territory Governments have primary responsibility for the protection of life, property and
the environment within their jurisdiction. Each State and Territory has emergency management legislation, risk
assessment processes, plans and arrangements to effectively respond to emergencies. The Australian
Government supports State and Territory Governments by coordinating national efforts in building resilience
through disaster research, information management, capability development, and mitigation policy and
practice. The Government can also provide support to State and Territory responses and provide financial
assistance for relief and recovery purposes
• arrangements for Australian Government responses to crises from all sources of threat and risk;
• Ministerial and Cabinet support functions by senior officials, via the Australian Government Crisis
Committee, and, where other jurisdictions are involved, the National Crisis Committee; and
• national plans and arrangements developed by relevant Australian Government agencies reflect the
roles and responsibilities set out in the AGCMF.
• natural disasters;
• health pandemics;
• animal diseases;
The AGCMF provides Ministers and senior officials with guidance on their respective roles and responsibilities.
It also sets out the arrangements that link Ministers and the work of key officials, committees and facilities.
The lead Minister for the Government on response and recovery is usually the relevant portfolio Minister. In
certain circumstances it may be necessary for two or more Ministers to co-lead the Australian Government’s
response to (and/or recovery from) a crisis—this depends on the effects of a crisis, and how these effects align
with Ministers’ respective portfolio responsibilities. As the incident evolves and circumstances become clearer,
responsibility for leading the Government response to (and/or recovery from) a crisis may transfer to a different
Minister as appropriate.
Minister for the Environment and Energy Domestic energy supply crises
Minister for Resources and Northern Incidents involving an offshore petroleum facility in
Australia Commonwealth waters
States and Territories are the first responders to any incident that occurs within their jurisdiction. Australian
States and Territories have legislation in place outlining the roles and responsibilities for agencies involved in
emergency management. This legislation also provides authority for relevant emergency management plans
and decision making. Whilst legislation differs across the country there are nationally consistent concepts and
principles.
The Australian Government provides support to States and Territories when coordinated assistance is
requested; jointly manages a crisis with States and Territories if the crisis has the potential to affect, or has
affected, multiple jurisdictions, the broader community or an Australian Government area of responsibility; and
manages a crisis that is not the responsibility of a State and Territory.
Note:
Daily information reports created and coordinated through the CCC are distributed throughout the Australian
Government, State and Territory agencies and key industry partners. The CCC also includes the National
Security Hotline (1800 123 400), providing a single point of contact for members of the public to report possible
signs of terrorism or other national security related activity. The CCC also has a key role in supporting the
Australian Government Crisis Committee and the National Crisis Committee during large scale events.
The CCC is directly connected to State and Territory emergency centres, and maintains situational awareness
on a 24/7 basis. With the exception of the National Security Hotline, the CCC does not have a publicly available
number and is not resourced to take calls from the public for crises or emergencies.
Aerial firefighting
The Australian Government supports aerial firefighting through the National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC).
Sharing highly specialised aircraft between the northern and southern hemisphere fire seasons makes good
sense, ensuring maximum use of the aircraft and reducing costs. Leasing is cost-effective and also offers
greater flexibility to adjust resourcing levels to the forecast risk and to introduce technological advancements.
NAFC facilitates the sharing of these aerial firefighting resources between states and territories during the fire
season. This ensures the optimum use of scarce, specialised resources and provides firefighters with valuable
access to surge capacity.
Recognising the potential cost burden of disasters on State Governments, the Australian Government provides
help with relief and recovery costs under the cost-shared Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA).
In addition, when a major disaster has significant impact on individuals, families, people’s ability to earn an
income, and where additional assistance above the DRFA is needed, the Australian Government may also
provide the Disaster Recovery Payment (DRP) or the Disaster Recovery Allowance (DRA)
Overview
The physical effects of climate change, population growth and urbanisation mean that without effective action
more Australians livelihood will be impacted by disasters into the future and the cost of those disasters will
continue to grow. The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2019 identifies extreme weather events,
failure of climate change mitigation and adaption, and natural disasters as some of the highest global risks.
Coordinated national action to drive efforts to reduce these risks and improve national resilience is required.
Current Situation
The Framework sets out the foundational work required nationally, across all sectors, to help manage existing
climate and disaster risk, minimise new risk, and deliver better climate and disaster risk information. The
Framework was publicly released on 5 April 2019. The 2019-20 Federal Budget includes $130.5 million in
funding over five years to assist States and Territories implement the strategies in the Framework. The
Framework and this funding is scheduled to be considered for endorsement by the Ministerial Council on Police
and Emergency Management (MCPEM) in mid-2019.
Decisions made across the built, natural, social and economic environments impact how Australians
experience disaster, and the residual risk that our emergency response capabilities are expected to bear.
Ultimately the costs are shouldered by the Commonwealth as the insurer of last resort, and more risk-informed
decision making will reduce the impacts and contain growing costs. Disasters currently cost the economy
$18.2 billion per year. Over the last decade more than $10 billion has been drawn from the Australian
Government’s budget into the reconstruction of essential public assets and critical infrastructure through the
disaster recovery funding arrangements. The broader social costs are estimated to be at least equivalent to
the physical costs—if not greater.
The Framework is being implemented across the Commonwealth and within States and Territories. The
Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee is seeking authority from MCPEM to drive
national implementation of the Framework across sectors and establishing an Industry Advisory Forum to
advise it. To meet the urgent demand for authoritative climate and disaster risk information, a pilot project is
underway within the freight sector to asses climate disaster risk information needs to inform long-term planning,
and translate scientific insights into decision useful information. The Taskforce is also developing strategic
guidance materials to help decision makers across all sectors reduce climate and disaster risks including
trialling the guidance in select Commonwealth initiatives.
Legislative Framework
The Commonwealth’s role—leading climate and disaster risk reduction—is not specifically enabled by
legislation. The cross-cutting nature of climate and disaster risk however means that there are heads of power
(for example banking, telecommunications, insurance, and meteorological observations) that could enable the
Commonwealth to legislate or regulate where appropriate.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Department’s primary stakeholders in emergency management are the State and Territory emergency
management and emergency services agencies. Other key stakeholders include: local governments, non-
government organisations such as Australian Red Cross and the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service
Authorities Council, and private sector organisations, particularly insurance and banking. Commonwealth
stakeholders include central agencies, the Australian Federal Police, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
the Bureau of Meteorology, Geoscience Australia and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organisation. The Department co-chairs the Australian Government Climate and Disaster Resilience
Reference Group, which includes all Australian Government departments. The key intergovernmental forums
are MCPEM and the senior officials-level Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee. Key
international stakeholders coalesce the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction.
Outlook
The cost of disasters across the economy is expected to rise to $39 billion per annum by 2050, without
accounting for an increased frequency and intensity of weather events due to climate change. Strong
governance and a cross-sectoral approach, led by the Commonwealth, is key to reducing climate and disaster
risk. The momentum, awareness and demand is growing—across government, industry and community—and
focused leadership is needed to continue embedding and driving this important agenda.
Strong national leadership is needed to implement the Framework and embed climate and disaster risk
reduction in decision making across the built, natural, social and economic environments. This includes
ensuring existing Commonwealth funding programs include risk reduction where appropriate, and ensure new
forms of disaster risk financing mature so that we can create successful commercial investment in climate and
disaster risk reduction. This could be a project trialled in a City or Regional Deal. A significant opportunity
exists to design the $3.9 billion Emergency Response Fund announced in the 2019-20 Budget context to also
deliver funding for risk reduction.
Contact Details
Name: Paul Grigson, Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security and Customs
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (the Act) establishes a scheme to confiscate proceeds of crime and provides
the means for returning the benefits of those confiscated funds to the community. Section 298 of the Act allows
the relevant Minister to approve programs of expenditure for crime prevention measures, law enforcement
measures, measures relating to treatment of drug addiction, and diversionary measures relating to illegal use
of drugs.
In addition to funding under the Act, the Government allocates Budget funding for grants programs, including
three of the five rounds of the Safer Communities Fund.
Current Situation
The Department is responsible for the policy development of programs and projects funded under section 298
of the Act. Successive governments have largely directed section 298 funding at Commonwealth law
enforcement agencies for one off national crime prevention and law enforcement activities, as well as grants
to local councils, religious and other community organisations for projects that aim to reduce crime.
The Confiscated Assets Account (the Account) holds funds confiscated under the Act. As at 30 April 2019 the
account balance was $140.16 million, and $48.68 million was available for distribution from the Account after
accounting for existing commitments.
The Department has established an annual, coordinated process whereby law enforcement agencies submit
expressions of interest for funding under section 298 of the Act, and recommendations are subsequently made
to the Minister to inform expenditure each financial year. Funding parameters and priorities are contained in
guidelines which are approved by the Minister and endorsed by the Finance Minister.
Six agencies have active projects between 2018-19 and 2021-22 as at 31 March 2019.
Grants programs
The Safer Communities Fund provides funding to address crime and anti-social behaviour through the
implementation of crime prevention and security initiatives such as CCTV and lighting. This includes
organisations working with children who face a risk of attack, harassment or violence stemming from racial or
religious intolerance, as well as funding for youth engagement activities. $160.081 million has been made
available across five funding rounds between 2016-17 and 2022-23. Rounds one to three are fully allocated,
with funding agreements executed.
Round four of the Safer Communities Fund is targeted at protecting children who face a risk of attack,
harassment or violence stemming from racial or religious intolerance. The round was originally launched with
available funding of $31.9 million (announced in the Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2018-19). On 18
March 2019 the Prime Minister announced an increase of $23.1 million (Budget 2019-20), reflecting the current
total available of $55 million. The round was opened to receive applications on 19 March 2019 and closed on
4 April 2019, with 690 applications received totalling $228.044 million. Applications are currently being
assessed The Department will provide further briefing on this round as a priority, including revised guidelines
reflecting the funding increase.
Round five of the Safer Communities Fund originally provided $35.1 million in funding from proceeds of crime
(announced in Budget 2019-20) to local government and community organisations to address crime and anti-
social behaviour by funding crime prevention initiatives and to protect schools, pre-schools and community
organisations that are facing security risks associated with racial or religious intolerance. During the election
campaign your government announced an additional $20 million towards round five to come from the proceeds
of crime.
A number of one-off crime prevention grants to community organisations have also been provided.
Legislative Framework
Commonwealth expenditure is governed by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.
Grants administration is also governed by the Commonwealth Grants Rules and Guidelines. Following the
Williams v Commonwealth of Australia decision into the funding of school chaplains, all grants programs are
subject to a legal and constitutional risk assessment.
Stakeholders / Forums
The heads of law enforcement agencies, local councils, the states and religious peaks have an interest in the
Australian Government’s approach to funding crime prevention and law enforcement initiatives.
Outlook
Your Government has made a number of commitments under the Safer Communities Fund during the election
campaign, including providing an additional $20 million in funding under round five of the Safer Communities
Fund and announcing a small number of specific projects. The Department will provide a submission as a
priority on progress to date with assessing applications under round four of the Safer Communities Fund,
including a list of eligible projects and revised program guidelines. The Department is working closely with the
grants hub provider and central agencies to deliver the program consistent with the Prime Minister’s
announcement on 18 March 2019.
Safer Communities Fund round five funding is available in 2020-21. Once round four has been finalised, work
will commence in 2019-20 to establish round five, including seeking policy authority for the additional $20
million in funding announced during the election campaign.
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Intelligence Capability
Key Highlights
The Department’s intelligence capability (enacted through Intelligence Division) services the intelligence
requirements of both the Department and the Australian Border Force (ABF). Intelligence Division’s mission
is to ensure the security of the border continuum by anticipating and assessing the threat, while supporting
the facilitation of legitimate movements. Intelligence Division provides strategic, operational and tactical
intelligence analysis and support across the full range of threats to the border. The Division provides direct
support to operations and decision-making across the Department and the ABF to ensure stakeholders are
aware of the key threats in their operating environments.
Overview
The Department and ABF’s intelligence capability (through Intelligence Division) addresses the priority
intelligence questions of the Government, National Intelligence Community (NIC), Department and ABF
concerning threats to the Australian border continuum, thereby supporting the Home Affairs Blueprint. As per
the Blueprint, the Portfolio seeks ‘an intelligence-informed model’ for decision-making and resource allocation,
and to develop capability to counter transnational and serious organised crime, national security and other
threats to the integrity of the border. To do this, its core competencies are:
• data analysis and the tradecraft to interpret the data available to the Department and ABF;
• intelligence analysis to assess the capability and intent of hostile and non-compliant actors;
• the skills to critically analyse these and communicate the threat implications effectively.
Current Situation
The Department’s Intelligence Division has five branches:
• Strategic Assessment and Intelligence Management Branch provides a strategic analysis capability
across the border threat spectrum to inform the policy, strategy and capability requirements of the
Department and Home Affairs Portfolio, and delivers several business enabling functions for
Intelligence Division;
• National Intelligence Branch is the operational intelligence hub, providing threat assessments and
advice across all key border threats at a national level, and input into policy and high-level planning;
• Border Intelligence Support to Operations Branch is responsible for delivering operational and tactical
intelligence support directly to the ABF;
• The Border Intelligence Fusion Centre is responsible for delivering tactical intelligence support directly
to ABF operational functions and Department decision-making functions, as well as other partner
agencies. The BIFC also manages the Border Watch program; and
• Intelligence Development Branch provides the majority of the Division’s technical and specialist
capabilities, and manages the definition and implementation of future intelligence capability.
Stakeholders / Forums
Intelligence Division’s key stakeholders include all Departmental Groups, the ABF, Home Affairs Portfolio
agencies, NIC agencies, and international partners and their peer agencies.
Intelligence Division is also a member of various departmental, Portfolio, NIC and international forums,
including NIC committees such as Heads of Intelligence Agencies Meeting, Intelligence Management
Committee, and Mission Intelligence Integration Groups.
Outlook
The Department and ABF’s intelligence function will continue to develop new enterprise intelligence
capabilities, while prioritising additional responsibilities that support the growing demand for its services within
the Home Affairs Portfolio. It will also lead the NIC’s efforts on maintaining secure borders and enhancing the
integrity and efficiency of trade and travel systems. Intelligence Division will require agility to remain capable
of supporting the increasing complexity of the Department and ABF’s activities across a range evolving threats,
in order to enable intelligence-informed risk based decision-making.
Contact Details
Name: Rachel Noble, Deputy Secretary Executive
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
Overview
The Department and each portfolio agency have a long history of capacity development in their respective
areas of expertise. Our international capacity building endeavour is focused on promoting international norms
and standards to support security outcomes consistent with Australia’s domestic interests; advancing
Australia’s good standing and capacity to influence internationally; and contributing to Australia’s foreign,
development, trade and economic policy goals.
The Department manages a number of international capacity building activities, which are designed to:
• strengthen cooperation with counterpart agencies to improve border management systems and secure
information sharing agreements;
• enhance legal frameworks and the capabilities of counterpart agencies to combat transnational crime,
human trafficking, people smuggling, money laundering, terrorism and the movement of illicit
substances and goods;
• lead border innovation, by assisting counterpart agencies to improve their border management
systems to better identify, detect and deter threats at the border; and
• improve the global management of refugees and displaced populations and stabilise possible illegal
immigrant populations in a variety of countries.
Current Situation
The Home Affairs International Capacity Building Program (the Program) under Program 1.5 of the Portfolio
Budget Statements provides an allocation of funding ($28.5 million in 2019-20) for activities that protect
Australia’s sovereignty, security, and safety by strengthening relationships with partner governments to
improve migration and border management capabilities and by working collaboratively with international
organisations to provide services for irregular migrants.
The Department’s international capacity building capability also includes a number of capacity building areas
not funded under administered Program 1.5. These include:
• the deployment of advisors and short-term missions to Papua New Guinea (PNG) Customs and
Immigration under the DFAT funded Institutional Partnerships Program;
• the DFAT funded, Department and AUSTRAC-delivered Supporting PNG’s Effective Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Reform Program to assist PNG reform its frameworks
(a three year program, 2017-20, capped at $1 million per year);
• Counter Terrorism Programs to strengthen the legal and policy frameworks of international partners,
primarily in South East Asia and the Middle East; and
• Emergency Management Australia engagement, together with DFAT, to improve the capacity of
national disaster management officials across the Asia- Pacific region.
Legislative Framework
The Program is authorised under section 417.021 - Regional Cooperation and Capacity Building of the
Financial Framework (Supplementary Powers) Regulations 1997.
Stakeholders / Forums
Whole-of-Government partners; international government agencies; industry; international organisations; and
multilateral forums.
Outlook
The Department is well placed to continue delivering these programs across the breadth of its agenda;
however there is scope to do more. Our regional environment is one that presents increasingly heightened
challenges, particularly around transnational, serious and organised crime, terrorism, child exploitation, foreign
interference and other national security threats. As these threats grow more complex and sophisticated in
nature, addressing them becomes increasingly difficult. As the line between ‘external security’ and ‘domestic
security’ becomes increasingly blurred, there is a growing need for our national security systems, processes
and capabilities to become more networked with international partners. With additional resources, the
Department could use its international capacity building effort to establish systems and processes of networked
capability and collaborative effort with key partners to improve our national security.
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
There are 191 Departmental and ABF officers deployed to 44 locations in 40 countries across the world (refer
to Appendix 10). These officers are supported by approximately 1,000 locally engaged staff, who play a key
role in supporting the Department’s activities, including visa processing, border management and engagement
with Home Affairs’ international counterparts. The Department’s posted officers work closely with, and are
supported by other Australian Government agencies offshore.
Of the 191 officers deployed, approximately 25 are Airline Liaison Officers. They are deployed at key
international airports to identify threats and manage risks before they reach the Australian border, working in
consultation with host governments.
The independent statutory agencies within the Home Affairs Portfolio, including the Australian Federal Police
(AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis
Centre (AUSTRAC), all have their own independently managed offshore footprints.
Current Situation
The Department and ABF’s posted officers are predominately in operational roles, giving effect to and enabling
Australia’s migration, humanitarian, and citizenship programs, and delivering border protection, national
security and capacity building outcomes. Over 70 per cent of officers currently offshore are in visa, citizenship,
and integrity roles.
The footprint, however, is changing to account for new risks, escalating visa volumes, the growing role of
service delivery partners, and movement towards a global visa processing model. The footprint is also evolving
to reflect Home Affairs’ changing priorities, allowing the Department to engage internationally across the
breadth of its agenda, including in relation to: countering terrorism and violent extremism; foreign interference;
transnational, serious and organised crime; cybercrime and cyber resilience; and enhanced integrity and
efficiency of trade and travel systems. This engagement can inform the development of Australian policy
responses to common challenges and influence the development of partners’ policy response in Australia’s
interest.
Legislative Framework
Offshore officers must comply with existing legislation applicable to domestic employees, including the Public
Service Act 1999 and the Australian Border Force Act 2015.
Stakeholders / Forums
There are eight Minister-Counsellors (Regional Directors) posted overseas by the Department. These Regional
Directors are the senior point of contact and engagement, providing leadership and management to their
region. There are a smaller number of officers performing transport security, legal, intelligence, and Papua
6
Figures as at 31 March 2019 including long term postings, secondments, short term missions and Airline Liaison Officer missions.
New Guinea advisor roles, who are accountable to either the ABF or specific Divisions in Canberra, and who
provide the Regional Directors with visibility of their activities.
Under the Prime Minister’s Directive, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is the managing
agency of overseas posts. The Department has a Service Level Agreement with DFAT for the provision of
services. A similar arrangement is in place for the two Austrade posts in Dubai and Auckland.
Outlook
The offshore footprint provides unique opportunities for better coordination and collaboration in our
international work, which is integral to achieving the vision for an Australia that is prosperous, secure and
united. The Department is currently reviewing its Offshore Network Capability to ensure it is best placed to
deliver outcomes for Australia. This review will be considered in parallel with ongoing consideration of how
visa services are delivered, with a view to optimising the offshore footprint to manage visa and integrity work.
The ABF is also undertaking a review to determine the capabilities and international footprint required to
address threats across the border continuum.
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
International Travel
Key Highlights
Overseas travel is a necessary part of your duties to advance Australia’s national security interests through
international engagement with priority countries and multilateral fora.
Overview
There are a number of existing ministerial level international engagements scheduled for 2019. This
information is subject to change and your office will be provided with updates as appropriate.
Current Situation
Attending international events such as those outlined below will build and maintain key international
relationships and positively shape global solutions in Australia’s interest.
Stakeholders / Forums
Five Country Ministerial – United Kingdom (Manchester) 29-30 July 2019
The Five Eyes partnership comprising Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States of
America represents the Department’s most significant multilateral relationship. There are a range of Five Eyes
fora that deal with specific themes such as cyber security, law enforcement and infrastructure. The Five
Country Ministerial is the preeminent forum of Ministers responsible for homeland security, public safety and
immigration. The forum meets annually and the focus of the 2019 meeting will be on emerging threats including
the three broad themes: online harm; hostile state activity; and emerging technology. Your attendance is
important because the Five Country Ministerial is the preeminent national and border security forum within the
Five Eyes structure.
United Nations agencies – Switzerland (Geneva) and Thailand (Bangkok) July/August 2019
A visit to Geneva in the margins of the Five Country Ministerial would present an opportunity for early
engagement with heads of the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. Further meetings with United Nations regional agencies could be arranged during
a stopover in Bangkok on the return trip to Australia. Meeting with these key partners on migration and global
displacement issues would strengthen existing relationships and Australia’s influence in international
discussions on irregular migration and global responsibility sharing.
s47C, s33(a)(iii)
The United States is a significant strategic partner. Travelling to the United States will present an opportunity
to demonstrate Australia’s commitment to the relationship and progress a more ambitious agenda outside the
Five Eyes framework. s47C
Australia – Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum – Papua New Guinea (city TBC) 4th Quarter 2019
The 27th Australia–Papua New Guinea (PNG) Ministerial Forum will be co-chaired by the Australian Minister
for Foreign Affairs and the PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. Other participating Ministers include:
the Minister for Defence; the Minister for Home Affairs; and the Minister for International Development and the
Pacific—along with their PNG counterparts. The 2018 forum discussions covered themes such as defence,
security cooperation, immigration and border management, economic and development cooperation,
humanitarian and climate change.
Australia’s delegation to the Ministerial level forum may be led by either the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the
Minister for Immigration. This will be an opportunity for Australia to demonstrate its response to the global
refugee crisis and calls from the international community for states to consider complementary pathways for
refugees. One year after the affirmation of the Global Compact on Refugees, the Forum will include member
states pledges and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ presentation of its three-year strategy
on resettlement and complementary pathways.
Contact Details
Name: Marc Ablong PSM, Deputy Secretary Policy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
Amendments made by the Assistance and Access Act empower law enforcement and national security
agencies to request, or compel, assistance from telecommunications providers, enable agencies to obtain
warrants to access data and devices, and amend search warrant frameworks to expand the ability of agencies
to collect evidence from electronic devices.
Amendments made by the Data Retention Act created a mandatory data retention regime to require carriers,
carriage service providers and internet service providers to retain a defined set of telecommunications data for
two years, ensuring that such data remains available for law enforcement and national security investigations.
Relevant provisions in the Citizenship Act provide that any dual citizen of Australia can, by operation of law,
lose their Australian citizenship if they engage in terrorism-related conduct which repudiates their allegiance
to Australia. The Minister may also determine a dual citizen’s Australian citizenship ceases if they have been
convicted of specified offence (including terrorism offences), and if a number of other requirements are met.
Current Situation
In its review of the Assistance and Access Act, the Committee will focus on the threshold, scope and
proportionality of powers provided for by the Act, authorisation processes and decision-making criteria, the
scope of enforcement provisions and the grant of immunities, interaction with intelligence agencies’ other
powers, interaction with foreign laws including the United States’ Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act,
impact on industry and competitiveness, and reporting obligations and oversight measures.
Concurrently, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (the INSLM) is reviewing the operation,
effectiveness and implementation of amendments made by the Assistance and Access Act.
In its review of the Data Retention Act, the Committee will focus on the continued effectiveness of the scheme,
taking into account changes in the use of technology since the passage of the Act, the appropriateness of the
dataset and retention period, costs, including ongoing costs borne by service providers for compliance with
the regime, any potential improvements to oversight including in relation to journalist information warrants, any
regulations and determinations made under the regime, the number of complaints about the scheme to
relevant bodies including the Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Inspector-General of Intelligence and
Security, security requirements in relation to data stored under the regime including in relation to data stored
offshore, any access by agencies to retain telecommunications data outside the framework of the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, such as under the Telecommunications Act 1997,
and developments in international jurisdictions since the passage of the Act.
In its review of the provisions in the Citizenship Act, the Committee will examine the operation (including the
process of renunciation by conduct or cessation), effectiveness (including citizenship loss as a response to the
threat environment, the use of the provisions, and comparisons with similar legislation in other countries) and
implications (including unintended consequences, for example for relatives and friends of individuals who have
lost their citizenship) of the provisions. The Committee will also examine whether the current oversight and
reporting requirements are appropriate.
In February 2019 the INSLM commenced a separate review of the operation, effectiveness and implications
of the terrorism-related citizenship loss provisions in the Citizenship Act. The INSLM will report by 15 August
2019 and their findings will inform the Committee’s review.
Legislative Framework
The reviews of the Assistance and Access Act and the Data Retention Act are required by section 187N of the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The Citizenship Act review is required by section 29
of the Intelligence Services Act 2001.
Stakeholders / Forums
For all three reviews, a number of stakeholders, including the Department, are expected to make submissions
to the Committee. It is anticipated that the Committee will hold hearings and invite the Department to attend,
once it is re-established in the 46th Parliament.
For the Committee’s review of the Data Retention Act, the Department is preparing a joint Portfolio submission
to the inquiry, and has been engaging with all Commonwealth and State agencies who access data via the
retention scheme. Some of the affected agencies will also prepare separate submissions.
Outlook
For all three reviews, the Committee is requesting submissions by 1 July 2019; however, submissions will not
be accepted until the Committee is re-established following the federal election. The Committee will report in
relation to the Assistance and Access Act and the Data Retention Act by 13 April 2020. For its review of the
Citizenship Act, the Committee is required to report by 1 December 2019.
Contact Details
Name: Pip de Veau, First Assistant Secretary, Legal
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
A Departmental Liaison Officer (DLO) is an Australian Public Service officer, employed by the Department,
who has the means to source current and accurate information from the Department, while acting as a central
liaison point in the Minister’s Office to assist with the two-way information flow and handling of ministerial
documentation. The Prime Minister determines the number of DLOs your office is entitled to as part of your
ministerial entitlements. The Department will provide you with a list of officers who are suitable in providing
assistance as DLOs.
Ministerial Entitlements
Your ministerial entitlements are outlined in the guidance material which will be provided to all Ministers by the
Ministerial and Parliamentary Services area of the Department of Finance. The guidance material will cover all
matters concerning the operation of your office from salary, accommodation and office facilities to travel, staff
matters and procedural matters.
Office Budget
The Department provides a modest budget to cover supplier expenses of your office. This includes funding for
services such as information technology, communication expenses and equipment, newspapers, stationery,
freight, taxi and vehicle expenses. The Department will process payments for these services where they are
not funded through your entitlements managed by the Department of Finance.
The Department will provide assistance with expenditure approvals, monitoring and reporting of office
expenses and are available to discuss further with your office when required.
• Stationery supplies can be ordered through your DLOs until a Complete Office Supplies (COS)
account has been established for your Office Manager.
• Business cards and arrangements for the delivery of newspapers, periodicals, and digital
publications to your ministerial office can also be organised through your DLOs.
• A courier service for the collection and delivery of items between your ministerial office in Australian
Parliament House (APH) and the Department’s offices is provided twice daily. The Department can
also organise a TNT Safehand Delivery account to transport documents between your APH Office,
Commonwealth Parliament Office (CPO) and Electorate Office (EO).
The Department will provide a connection to the Department’s IT network to your APH Office and an IT network
connection to your EO and CPO, if required. Ministerial staff at your offices will be provided with desktop
computers, printers and associated IT facilities (software and services) allowing them to support your role as
Minister.
The Department will provide you and ministerial staff with mobile phones, laptops and iPads for the purpose
of supporting your role of Minister. These devices will provide access to email, calendar appointments and
departmental systems, remotely as required.
The Department’s ICT Ministerial Support is a dedicated team responsible for providing service support for
Ministerial Offices and their staff during business hours. These services include system access, software
requirements, provision of IT equipment, ongoing ICT maintenance and priority resolution of IT issues. If and
when required, the team will also present onsite to deliver IT service support and can be contacted outside of
office hours via the PLATINUM IT Service. Contact details for these services will provided when you and your
staff receive your initial issue of IT equipment.
All media enquiries are coordinated through the Department’s Media Coordination Section for the Department
and ABF which operates seven days a week, with an on-call media officer on duty after hours and on
weekends.
We will work with your media advisors to determine personal preferences and priorities in relation to media
and public information support at their earliest convenience.
Final Cabinet Submissions are distributed electronically through the CabNet terminal in your office prior to
consideration by Cabinet.
The program of Cabinet and related meetings is available through CabNet. The Department will provide a
briefing to you on all Cabinet matters originating in your Portfolio and will provide a briefing on Cabinet items
originating in other agencies upon request.
The Department will provide your office with regular reporting on upcoming Cabinet items including those
originating from your Portfolio as well as Cabinet items of interest originating in other agencies.
All accountable Cabinet documents distributed to you through CabNet will be watermarked with a copy number
attributed to your office. Your office will be periodically required to undertake a stocktake of all accountable
documents printed by your office.
The CabNet terminal and service is provided and supported by PM&C’s Cabinet Division.
Contact Details
Name: Kylie Scholten, First Assistant Secretary Executive Coordination
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Overview
The Legal Division is a centralised in-house practice, headed by General Counsel, Pip de Veau. The Division
delivers high quality in-house legal services to the Department and provides strategic legal advice and support
to the Executive, Portfolio Ministers and the Attorney-General as First Law Officer.
The Division is comprised of six Branches that actively manage legal risk in a diverse environment. The work
ranges from issues concerning: national security; commercial law; employment law; law enforcement and
border protection; strategy, training and support; a large and dynamic legislative reform agenda; advice on the
Migration Act 1958, Citizenship Act 2007 and Australian Border Force Act 2015; and the highest litigation
caseload in the Commonwealth.
• certain decisions that only you can make because they require the exercise of non-compellable,
personal Ministerial powers; and
Accordingly, Legal Division will engage with you from time to time in relation to these matters. A separate brief
detailing your personal ministerial powers has also been prepared (see ‘Personal Ministerial Powers’ brief).
Litigation
The Department manages, on your behalf, a large and diverse litigation caseload. You are the most litigated
Minister in the Commonwealth. The two primary areas of litigation are:
Litigation matters can be high profile in terms of media and parliamentary scrutiny, both in terms of substance
and legal expenditure.
As at 30 April 2019, the Division was managing an active migration and citizenship administrative law litigation
caseload of 10,480 matters. These are matters where non-citizens are seeking review in the courts and the
General Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) of decisions made under the Migration,
Citizenship and FOI Act. The Department has maintained a high success rate of over 90 per cent over the last
four years. In 2017-18 less than 1 per cent of matters were commenced on your behalf. Consistent with the
Legal Services Directions 2017, appeals are only filed on your behalf where there is reasonable prospects of
success or the appeal is otherwise justified in the public interest. In most circumstances, these decisions are
made at a departmental level and reported in the Weekly Litigation Report provided to your office.
As at 30 April 2019, the Division was managing a civil litigation caseload of 780 matters. These are claims filed
in the courts for damages or where litigation has been foreshadowed, including injunction applications to
prevent removal from Australia, challenges to regional processing arrangements and departmental
employment matters. The majority of litigation or foreshadowed litigation, involving claims for compensation is
handled by Comcover within the Department of Finance, in accordance with the Department’s insurance
arrangements. While Comcover will consult with the Department in managing these claims, ultimately
Comcover provides the instructions and makes the decision on litigation strategy.
Pursuant to the Directions, the Department briefs external firms to conduct court litigation as solicitor on the
record. The Department reports to the Attorney-General on significant legal issues as described in the
Directions and seeks the Attorney-General’s agreement to settle litigation matters in accordance with the
requirements in the Directions.
Contact Details
Name: Pip de Veau, First Assistant Secretary, Legal
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Freedom of Information
Key Highlights
The Department receives approximately 40 per cent of the total FOI access requests processed by
Commonwealth agencies. Between 1 July 2018 and 30 April 2019, the Department received 14,743 FOI
requests and finalised 12,186.
Overview
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the Act) applies to Commonwealth agencies and official documents of
a Minister. Exceptions apply to specific intelligence agencies and documents subject to exclusions or secrecy
provisions.
Legislative Framework
The key functions of the Act include providing lawful access to documents held by an agency or Minister,
amendment of personal details within the entity held records and the provision to publish information.
Of the 14,743 FOI requests received, 13,956 related to the request for personal information (e.g. an individual’s
visa application, detention records, etc.) and 787 relate to non-personal information (e.g. requests for
information from members of parliament, journalists, academics, etc.).
As part of the standard consultation process, the Department will consult with the Minister’s Office as
appropriate on non-personal requests.
The Minister’s Office is a separate entity for the purposes of the Act and covers information that is in the
possession of the Minister due to their capacity as a Minister that relate to the affairs of an agency. FOI
requests addressed to the Minister or their Office will be provided to the Minister for action under the Act.
A decision on access to information held by the Minister must be made by a member of staff within the
Minister’s office authorised to make decisions. The Department will provide advice and administrative support
to manage the processing of any requests received by the Minister. In administering the Act, agencies and
Ministers are required to report quarterly to the Office of the Information Commissioner on the outcomes of
FOI requests and costs associated with these processes. The Department will include the Minster’s input in
the Department’s reports.
Stakeholders / Forums
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner is an independent statutory agency established under
the Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 which confers on the Information Commissioner the power
to perform FOI functions. This includes:
• monitor agencies’ and Minister’s compliance with the Act and compile FOI data.
Contact Details
Name: Cheryl-anne Moy, Deputy Secretary Corporate and Enabling
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Contact:
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Acronyms
AASB Australian Accounting Standards Board
AAT Administrative Appeals Tribunal
AATIC Austrade Australian Trade and Investment Commission
ABF Australian Border Force
ABFC Australian Border Force Cutter
ABIN Australian Ballistics Information Network
AC Audit Committee
ACBPS Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
ACC Australian Crime Commission
ACC Act Australian Crime Commission Act 2002
ACIC Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
ACID Australian Criminal Intelligence Database
ACLEI Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
ACORN Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network
ACSC Australian Cyber Security Centre
ACT Australian Capital Territory
ACTPol Australian Capital Territory Policing
ACVPA Australian Crime and Violence Prevention Awards
ADF Australian Defence Force
AE ASIO Employee
AEE ASIO Executive Employee
AFIN Australian Firearms Information Network
AFP Australian Federal Police
AFSA Australian Financial Security Authority
AGD Attorney-General’s Department
AGICC Australian Gangs Intelligence Coordination Centre
AGSVA Australian Government Security Vetting Agency
AHRC Australian Human Rights Commission
AIC Australian Intelligence Community
AIMPE Australian Institute of Marine And Power Engineers
AIPM Australian Institute of Police Management
ALEIN Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network
AML/CTF Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
AML/CTF
Act Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006
AMLC Anti-Money Laundering Council (The Philippines’ FIU)
APPENDICES
Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator FAS Enterprise Strategy, Risk and Performance FAS Aviation and Maritime Security
FAS Strategy and Capability FAS People FAS Immigration and Visa Services
Centre for CT Coordination Chief Risk Officer Executive Director Transport Security
Angus Kirkwood Murali Venugopal Peta Dunn
Michael Rendina (Greg de Somer desig) Dale Furse A/g Vanessa Holben
AS Enterprise Governance and Performance AS Capability Planning and Development AS Aviation Security
AS Counter-Terrorism Strategic Policy AS People Strategy AS Temporary Visa Program
Dale Furse (desig) Mathew Fox Alice Stanley A/g
Derek Bopping Leanne Blackley Gaye Lalor A/g
Sara Vrh A/g
AS Enterprise Strategy and Risk AS Strategy AS People Management AS Visa Business Optimisation AS Transport Security Operations
AS Counter-Terrorism Operational Brett Schuppan David Leonard Anna Lutz
Andrew Chandler Anita Langford
Coordination and Evaluation
Robert Jackson
SD Executive Governance and Support AS Strategy AS People Services AS Skilled and Family Visa Program
AS Air Cargo Security
Katie Gabriel Stefanie Cordina Abby Whiting Peter Richards
AS Counter-Terrorism Capability Matthew Pedler
David Chick
AS Strategy AS Payroll Services SD Employer Sponsored Program Management
FAS Executive Coordination Jane Annear Vidoshi Jana Sandra Jeffrey AS Risk and International
Kylie Scholten Richard Farmer
SD Priority Response Unit
National Counter Foreign Interference AS Ministerial and Parliamentary Cait Vignon FAS Finance ׀Chief Finance Officer FAS Refugee, Citizenship and AS Maritime, Training and Card Security
Coordinator Emily Grant Stephanie Cargill Multicultural Programs Leanne Loan
Chris Teal Luke Mansfield
FAS Immigration, Citizenship and
AS Media and Engagement AS Management Accounting
Multiculturalism Policy AS Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs Programs
Michael Burke Mark Saunders A/g Director General
Deputy Coordinator Richard Johnson Damien Kilner
Emergency Management Australia
National Counter Foreign Interference AS Financial Operations Rob Cameron
Cameron Ashe FAS Strategic Research & Communication AS Compliance and Community Protection Policy AS Humanitarian Program Operations
Sam Hatherly
Head CVE Centre Maria Dias A/g Frances Finney PSM AS Crisis Management
AS Policy and Implementation Lachlan Colquhoun
AS Procurement and Contracts Joe Buffone
Vacant AS Global Mobility
AS Strategic Partnerships Ian Laverock AS Humanitarian Program Capability
Lauren Monks Michael Willard Sally Macourt A/g AS Disaster Recovery
AS Outreach and Content AS External Budgets and Revenue John Gibbon
Neil Hawkins AS Programs and Research AS Integration, Citizenship and Social Cohesion Policy Sanandan Dasgupta RD NSW/ACT
Greg Cox Alice Ling Lesley Dalton AS Disaster Preparedness
SD Portfolio Costings Luke Brown
SD Community Engagement and Social Cohesion
FAS Integrity, Security and Assurance Herb May
Commonwealth Transnational Serious and Task Force RD North
Organised Crime Coordinator Chief Audit Executive Catherine Sullivan Steven Biddle
Deputy Commissioner Karl Kent OAM Mark Brown FAS Critical Infrastructure Security
AS Immigration Policy FAS Legal ׀General Counsel
Ben Biddington RD SA Pablo Carpay
AS Integrity and Professional Standards Pip de Veau
Belinda Gill Tania Gerlach
FAS Commonwealth Transnational Serious AS Legal Strategy and Services AS Telecommunications and Technology
FAS National Security and Law Enforcement Samuel Grunhard
and Organised Crime (CTSOC) AS Audit and Assurance Deputy General Counsel RD VIC/TAS
Policy
Anthony Coles Penny McKay Alicia Wright Rosemary Wilmot A/g
Hamish Hansford AS Assurance Risk and Engagement
AS Law Enforcement Policy AS Legislation Andrew Kiley
AS CTSOC Strategy and Capability AS Security RD West
Ciara Spencer Heimura Ringi
Gemma Smyth Megan Seccull Samantha Patuto A/g
AS Transnational Crime Policy AS Migration and Citizenship Law
Manager CTSOC Disruption and Engagement FAS Trade and Customs
FAS Intelligence Michael Burke (desig) Anton Bockwinkel
Daniel Mossop A/g FAS Immigration Integrity and Dr Bradley Armstrong PSM
Principal Intelligence Adviser Jenny Harders A/g
Community Protection
Richard Gray AS National Security Policy AS National Security and Law Enforcement Legal Justine Jones A/g AS Customs and Border Revenue
Andrew Warnes Steve Webber
AS Border Intelligence Support to Operations Matthew Duckworth
AS Status Resolution
Alison Rose
AS Civil, Commercial and Employment Law Greg Baker
FAS Strategic Initiatives Lisa Keeling AS Trade Modernisation and Industry Engagement
AS National Intelligence Christie Sawczuk
Brett Marshall Catherine Hawkins AS Character Assessment and Cancellations
Justine Jones (desig)
AS Migration and Citizenship Litigation
Sally Pfeiffer A/g AS Trusted Trader and Trade Services
Group Manager AS Intelligence Development FAS Cyber Security Policy
Cody Smith
Technology and Major Capability Jeff Carige Tim Fitzgerald
Greg Miller AS Immigration Integrity and Assurance
Michael Milford AM Special Counsel Rheannon Nicolson A/g
AS Border Intelligence Fusion Centre Ian Deane PSM AS Traveller
AS Cyber Security Policy Melissa Bennett A/g
Michael Thomas
Kendra Morony AGS Counsel SD Status Resolution Network
AS Business Engagement and PMO SD Strategic Assessments and Intelligence Wancy Lam Zoe Williams
Stephen Dryden Management
FAS International Policy FAS National Resilience Taskforce
Brad Malone
AS Cyber Risk Services David Wilden FAS Productivity and Compliance Mark Crosweller AFSM
Sean Hugo Ben Wright FAS Visa Delivery Transformation
Andrew Kefford PSM
AS Asia
Malcolm McAllister A/g AS FOI & Records Management FAS Identity and Biometrics
Deputy GM Caroline Sternberg AS Channel Management Andrew Rice A/g
Chief Information Officer AS Americas, Europe, Middle East and Africa Renelle Forster
Radi Kovacevic Tracey Mackay A/g AS Portfolio Efficiencies AS Identity and Biometrics Capability
Peter Manwaring A/g Mark Handley A/g
AS Market Partnerships
AS Intelligence, Identity and Biometrics Systems AS Pacific and Transnational Issues Tania Wilson
Tom Bryan Andrew Rose AS Administrative Compliance AS Identity and Biometrics Specialist
Agnieszka Holland Michael Minns
AS Visa, Citizenship and Digital Systems SD Immigration Reform Implementation Office
Policy Adviser to CJATF OSB
Renate Croker Andrew Lander AS AusCheck
Chad Hodgens
FAS Property and Major Contracts Jim Anderson
AS Traveller, Cargo and Trade Systems SAS Regional Processing Task Force David Nockels
Jennifer Bardsley AS Identity Security
Alana Sullivan Andrew Rice (desig)
AS Services Management
AS Corporate and Case Systems Claire Roennfeldt Duncan Anderson A/g
SD Regional Processing Task Force
Gavin Wallace A/g
Joe Feld
AS Property
AS Technology Operations and Support Ryan Summerton
Kirk Batty International
MC Geneva SD ACT Accommodation Program
AS Architecture and Innovation Steve McGlynn Darren Cordwell
Matt Jones
RD North Asia
AS NCIS Taskforce Teresa Conolan FAS Health Services Policy and Child Wellbeing
Jakub Bartkowiak RD Middle East and Africa Stephen Hayward
Fiona Andrew
AS Immigration Health
SAS Major Capability RD South East Asia Lila Caplice A/g
TBA Chris Waters
AS Data Governance
Susan McKeag
SD Data Science
Vacant
GM – Group Manager
FAS – First Assistant Secretary
CT – Counter-Terrorism
CVE – Countering Violent Extremism
SAS – Senior Assistant Secretary
AS – Assistant Secretary
RD – Regional Director
MC – Minister Counsellor
Manager – AFP AS or AFP Commander
FOI – Freedom of Information
PMO – Portfolio Management Office
SD – Senior Director
A/g – Acting
Desig - Designate
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FOI Document #1
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Commissioner Australian Border Force
Michael Outram APM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
CEO Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission
Michael Phelan
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Commissioner Australian Federal Police
Andrew Colvin APM, OAM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
CEO Australian Transaction Reports & Analysis Centre
Nicole Rose
s22(1)(a)(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS EXECUTIVE
Deputy Secretary Executive
Rachel Noble PSM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Deputy Secretary Policy
Marc Ablong PSM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Deputy Secretary Corporate & Enabling | COO
Cheryl-anne Moy
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Deputy Secretary Immigration & Citizenship Services
FAS Andrew Kefford PSM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Deputy Secretary Infrastructure, Transport Security & Customs
Paul Grigson
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Deputy Secretary Commonwealth Counter-Terrorism Coordinator
Linda Geddes
s22(1)(a)(ii)
National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator
Chris Teal
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Commonwealth Transnational Serious & Organised Crime Coordinator
Karl Kent OAM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Group Manager Technology and Major Capability
Michael Milford AM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
OPERATION SOVEREIGN BORDERS - JOINT AGENCY TASK FORCE
OSB JATF Commander
MAJGEN Craig Furini AM, CSC
s22(1)(a)(ii)
DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS KEY CONTACTS
Emergency Management Australia (EMA)
Director General Rob Cameron
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Aviation & Maritime Security
FAS Vanessa Holben
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Criticial Infrastructure Security
FAS Pablo Carpay
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Special Counsel
Ian Deane PSM
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Integrity, Security & Assurance / Chief Audit Executive
FAS Mark Brown
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Enterprise Strategy, Risk & Performance / Chief Risk Officer
FAS Abigail Bradshaw
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Executive Coordination
FAS Kylie Scholten
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Ministerial & Parliamentary
AS Emily Grant
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Portfolio Media & Engagements
A/g AS Laura Kemp
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Commonwealth Transnational Serious & Organised Crime Centre Strategy and
Capability Branch
Gemma Smyth
s22(1)(a)(ii)
Media Operations
Home Affairs Hotline 02 6264 2244 s22(1)(a) [email protected] s22(1)(a)(ii)
ABF Media 02 6264 2211 [email protected]
ACIC Media 02 6268 7343
(ii) [email protected]
AFP Media 02 6131 6843 [email protected]
ASIO Media 02 6249 8381 [email protected]
AUSTRAC Media 02 9950 0488 [email protected]
Parliamentary & Executive Coordination
Cabinet Liaison Office Barton s22(1)(a)(ii)
Cabinet Liaison Office Brindabella Park
Cabinet Liaison Office Duty Phone
Ministerial Liaison Officer
ABF Ministerial and Parliamentary Coordination
Coordinator Ministerial and Parliamentary Liaison (AFP)
AFP Strategic External Forums - Cabinet Related Matters
ACIC Ministerial and Executive Support - Cabinet Related Matters
ESU Intel
ABF
Executive Support Unit s22(1)(a)(ii)
WATCH FLOORS | KEY CONTACTS
Australian Border Force (ABOC Duty Superintendent) s22(1)(a)(ii)
Australian Federal Police (AOC)
Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC)
Platinum IT Support (FAS & Business critical positions)
General IT Support
MSS Customs House Security Desk
ABF HQ Security Desk
4 National Circuit Security Desk
MSS 6 Chan Street Security Desk
JLL Property Service Centre
Customs Incident Reporting Centre (CIRC)
Mail & Freight: Decipha (Australia Post: Civic)
Mail & Freight: Decipha (Australia Post: Belconnen)
Production & Print Services
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
FOI Document #1
Home Affairs Portfolio - Quick Facts
Monthly statistics as at COB 30 April 2019 unless specified
COUNTER TERRORISM
As at As at
Foreign Fighters - Syria/Iraq (since Sep 2012) Terrorism Charges and Convictions
21-May-19 22-May-19
Australians currently fighting or engaged with terrorist Number of convictions for Commonwealth terrorism
Around 80 69
groups involved in the conflict offences since 2001, including:
Australians being investigated for actively providing • foreign incursions offences 17
Around 230
support for terrorist group involved in the conflict Number of convicted terrorist currently serving a
48*
Australians travelled to fight or support groups involved in custodial sentence
Around 230
the conflict Number of persons currently before the courts on
26**
At least 103 terrorism charges, including:
Australians killed as a result of their involvement in the
and possibly as • foreign incursions offences 7
conflict
many as 110 * 44 of these persons may be subject to the High Risk Terrorist Offender (HRTO) scheme
** If convicted, 26 of these persons may be subject to the HRTO scheme
Passports cancelled or refused in relation to the conflict Around 250
YTD
National Security Hotline (NSH) Apr-19
Returned to Australia after travelling and joining groups 2018-19
Around 40
involved in the conflict Calls and other contacts received 26,321 2,653
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Notes:
Local * The ‘YTD’ column includes the number of disasters that have occurred under each of the disaster
YTD recovery programmes – e.g. there have been 27 disasters in 2018-19 that have triggered the activation of
Disaster Recovery Programme Government
2018-19* the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements.
Areas** ** The ‘Local Government Areas’ column includes the number of local government area (LGA) activations
for assistance under each of the programmes – i.e there have been 198 LGA activations for assistance
Natural Recovery Funding under the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements in 2018-19.
27 198
Arrangements
Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery
10 20
Arrangements
Disaster Recovery Payment 2 23
Disaster Recovery Allowance 3 27
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Australian Border Force Australian Federal Police (as at 31 March 2019)
Major Drugs, Precursors, NPS & YTD YTD YTD FT Average
Activities
PIEDs (as at 31 March 2019) 2018-19 variation 2018-19 (Past 5 years)
Detections 27,816 (1,656) Referrals* 2,528 3,721
Of which: Major Drugs 16,974 (1,130) Investigations** 1,090 1,367
Weight (kg) 13,535.53 3,497.06 Criminal assets restrained $71.5 (m) $159.8 (m)
Undeclared Firearms, Parts & YTD YTD Conviction rate 95% 95%
Accessories 2018-19 variation * Referrals includes all cases reported from external and internal clients. Excludes ACT and Airports
Detections 1,434 (253) ** Investigations refers to cases accepted by the AFP with a case type of INVESTIGATION or FRAUD &
Released 610 (333) ANTI-CORRUPTION recorded in National PROMIS.
Re-Exported 2 0 AUSTRAC
Disposed 257 (2) Transaction reports and reporting YTD
Still in store 565 82 entities 2018-19
YTD YTD International funds transfer instructions reports
Undeclared tobacco
2018-19 variation Number 116,155,106
Detections 243,284 184,338 Threshold transaction reports (AUD 10,000 or more)
Duty Evaded ($m) (ex GST) 549.33 285.95 Number 2,257,468
Equivalent Weight (tonnes) 525.03 222.89 Cross-border movement (cash AUD 10,000 or more;
YTD YTD bearer negotiable instruments any value)
Undeclared Currency
2018-19 variation Number 39,202
Detections 659 2 Suspicious matter reports
Value ($m) 12.28 (0.49) Number 206,680
Reporting entities enrolled
Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Number 14,742
FOI Document #1
Home Affairs Portfolio - Quick Facts
Monthly statistics as at COB 30 April 2019 unless specified
YTD YTD
Citizenship
2018-19 variation
Citizenship Conferral Lodgements 110,543 (69,334)
Citizenship Acquisitions 101,629 33,893
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FOI Document #1
Home Affairs Portfolio - Quick Facts
Monthly statistics as at COB 30 April 2019 unless specified
BIOMETRICS
YTD YTD
2018-19 variation
Facial Enrolments 1,166,864 308,861
Fingerprints
Enrolments 512,895 49,579
Referrals to Migration 5 Partners 1,740,873 1,137,928
s47C, s47E(d)
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Overview
The Home Affairs Weekly Statistics is produced by the Data Division of the Department of Home Affairs.
The intention of the report is to provide a regular snapshot of metrics and trends covering certain key aspects of the Department. The
report will also highlight emerging or prominent issues.
The report is developed in consultation with program owners across the Department. Any clarification on figures within the report can be
provided directly by the relevant business area.
The content of the report has been produced specifically for the Minister’s Office. All other parties who wish to republish the statistics or
commentary contained in this document must seek permission from the relevant business areas. Requests for additional statistics
should also be directed at the relevant business areas. The Data Division can assist in facilitating these requests.
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Children in Nauru
Weekly
15-May 22-May
Movement
RPC 0 0 0
Community 0 0 0
Medical Transfer (Australia) 283 283 0
Medical Transfer (Port Moresby) 0 0 0
Total 283 283 0
RPC Incident Types - Nauru
Weekly
Incident Types 15-May 22-May
Movement
Self Harm - Actual 1 1 0
Self Harm - Threat 1 3 2
Food/Fluid Refusal 0 0 0
Assault Nonsexual 0 0 0
Assault Nonsexual - Under 18 0 0 0
Assault Sexual 0 0 0
Abusive/Aggressive Behaviour 0 0 0
Total 2 4 2
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Key Observations
The following incidents occurred between 16 May and 22 May 2019:
s47F
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1 Please note that reporting in relation to IMA assisted or managed departures (including returns from the community and removals from immigration detention) has changed. As part of its program of statistical improvement, the
Department has automated its production of statistics on IMA returns/removals. The transition has resulted in a change to the previously reported figures. The reported figures were extracted from DIBP systems as at 7 May 2019.
2 Third country settlement includes refugees settled in Cambodia, Canada and the United States of America.
Note that the historical figures for previous financial years have been refreshed and updated at the commencement of the current program year. As a result, due to retrospective data entries or systems corrections; and recent
improvement to methodologies in the extraction of system data, the figures will differ from those previously reported.
Return Services
Departures (No.) - YTD Re-Integration Assistance ($) - YTD
2017-18 2018-19 Variance 2017-18 2018-19 Variance
Onshore 270 233 (37) $892,803 $756,678 ($136,125)
Offshore 78 9 (69) $1,798,100 $225,000 ($1,573,100)
Nauru 9 3 (6) $225,000 $75,000 ($150,000)
Manus 69 6 (63) $1,573,100 $150,000 ($1,423,100)
Key Observations
Rapid Departure Assistance service (RDA)
The Rapid Departure Assistance service, delivered by the International Organisation for Migration as part of their existing returns services, is only available to transferees in the Regional
Processing Centres and was implemented on 30 May 2014. This service provides an increased amount of financial assistance for individuals, compared to the assistance available to those
returning from an onshore location. The increased costs associated with the implementation of RDA offshore accounts for the increase in costs across the program, despite a drop in the
number of comparative returns from Manus Island and Nauru. Allowances are provided on a GDP per capita, country-specific basis and consist of cash and in-kind assistance.
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Humanitarian Program
Financial Year Year to Date
2016-17 2017-18 Variance Actual Pro-Rata Target Variance
Total Humanitarian Program 13,760 16,250 2,490 14,101 15,625 (1,524)
Total Offshore 12,049 14,825 2,776 12,870 14,250 (1,380)
Refugee 6,642 7,909 1,267 7,320 7,986 (666)
Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) 5,407 6,916 1,509 5,550 6,264 (714)
Total Onshore1 1,711 1,425 (286) 1,231 1,375 (144)
1
Only includes program coutable 866 visas
Note: Data is taken from live systems and may vary from previously reported figures.
Humanitarian Program - Onshore / Offshore
Year to Date
Onshore Offshore Total
Lodgements 20,237 56,346 76,583
Onhand 29,846 47,908 77,754
Grants 1,231 12,870 14,101
Refused / Other 10,146 51,109 61,255
Offshore Grants
Offshore Program - Top Countries of Vulnerable Women and Children - Top
Top Ethnicities
Birth Countries of Birth
Iraq 5,284 Iraq 1,321 Iraqi 2,150
Congo (DRC) 1,850 Congo (DRC) 280 Congo 1,332
Myanmar 1,555 Afghanistan 165 Chaldean
1,179
Syria 1,541 Syria 71 (Iraq)
Afghanistan 929 Ethiopia 49 Syrian 1,107
Other 1,711 Other 147 Kurdish 1,000
Total 12,870 Total 2,033 Other 6,102
Total 12,870
Top Religious Groups
Christian 8,405 Age Gender
Islam 2,121 <18 years of age 5,167 Female 6,553
Other 1,884 >18 years of age 7,703 Male 6,317
Buddhist 404
Hindu 51
Judaic 5
Offshore Onhand
Refugee Special Humanitarian Program
Not UNHCR P3, P4 &
Country of Birth UNHCR referred Total Country of Birth CSP P1 & P2 Total
referred* P5
Iraq 489 8,072 8,561 Iraq 372 7,001 2,499 9,872
Syria 681 4,139 4,820 Myanmar 11 2,226 3,930 6,167
Congo (DRC) 1,640 176 1,816 Syria 29 2,320 578 2,927
Afghanistan 219 899 1,118 Afghanistan 510 846 145 1,501
Eritrea 338 488 826 Congo (DRC) 0 1,069 273 1,342
Ethiopia 178 616 794 Ethiopia 4 230 618 852
Yemen 0 492 492 Eritrea 29 652 143 824
Saudi Arabia 470 8 478 Iran 228 498 86 812
Myanmar 0 458 458 Bhutan 0 291 179 470
South Africa 56 289 345 Burundi 0 272 36 308
Other 594 1,381 1,975 Other 34 599 517 1,150
Total 4,665 17,018 21,683 Total 1,217 16,004 9,004 26,225
*Not UNHCR referred applicants include In-country and self-referred applications, which are usually refused.
Mission is unable to access most in-country applicants for interviewing. Self-referred applicants do not usually
hold reliable identity documents e.g. UNHCR registration card. P1 SHP Split Family
P2 Close Family
P3 Other Family
P4 Other Offshore and UMA links
P5 UHM IMA
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Drugs
s47C, s47E(d)
Financial Year Year to Date
Detections
2016-17 2017-18 Variance 2017-18 2018-19 Variance
s47C, s47E(d)
s47C, s47E(d)
Financial Year Year to Date
Final Weight (kg)
2016-17 2017-18 Variance 2017-18 2018-19 Variance
s47C, s47E(d)
* A detection may be determined from either confirmatory or presumptive tests. This information is sourced from transactional systems.
s47C, s47E(d)
a
Precursor detections refer to detections of chemical substances that are prohibited imports / exports that may be used in the manufacture of illicit drugs. Some precursors detected were likely not intended for the manufacture of illicit
drugs but were active ingredients in health supplements, cold and flu preparations, herbal medicines and weight-loss products purchased on the internet.
b
ATS detections include methamphetamine and amphetamine but excludes MDMA (ecstasy).
c
PIED detections include steroids, DHEA (dehydroepiandrosterone / prasterone) and hormones.
d
On 5 September 2015, legislation amendments came into force which allows Border Force officers to search for and seize New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) and Substances Represented as Serious Drug Alternatives (SDA).
Note: Data is taken from live systems and may vary from previously reported figures. Data is typically available 1 month after the end of each reporting period.
Note: Data is taken from live systems and may vary from previously reported figures. Data is typically available 1 month after the end of each reporting period.
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Total
Number of detections^ 61,304 112,124 50,820 58,946 243,284 184,338
Tobacco (tonnes) 169.13 217.90 48.77 144.66 246.49 101.83
Cigarette sticks (millions) 233.83 238.43 4.60 201.50 365.48 163.98
Duty Evaded ($m) (ex GST) 268.81 356.84 88.03 263.38 549.33 285.95
Equivalent Weight (tonnes)** 356.19 406.45 50.26 302.13 525.03 222.89
*
Preliminary detections are based on indicative uncleansed data which may be subject to further revision. The figures may not fully reflect detections by the ABF across illicit goods classes as the Department does not currently report on
pre or post-border detections.
**
Equivalent weight represents the total weight of loose leaf tobacco detections together with the total weight of cigarette sticks (calculated using an average weight per stick).
^ The number of detections may be more than stated due to current recording practices. For example, one detection could be a 'bin' or a 'pallet' etc.
Note: Data is taken from live systems and may vary from previously reported figures. Data is typically available 1 month after the end of each reporting period.
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Up to 12 months
Business Visitor No work 7 days 15 days $145 N/A 261,833 246,850
Visit Australia for a visit or for business visitor Longer validity in some circumstances
purposes.
NIL
Multiple entry, 3 month stays, valid for 12
601 - ETA $20 service fee applies for online N/A
months
<1 day applications only 168,336
Business No work 168,360
$115
676 – Tourist additional applicant charge over
EFFECTIVELY No work Closed to new applicants 18 yrs $115 Up to 12 months N/A 0 0
CEASED additional applicant charge
under 18 yrs $30
Allows young people (18-30yrs) from certain 12 months from date of grant.
First Working Holiday 6 months with any one employer, except
countries to holiday and work in Australia for Allows holder to remain in Australia for 12 155,040 152,622
Visa where given permission from the Department
up to a year. months from date of first entry on this visa.
417 – Working
24 days 42 days 12 months from date of grant
Holiday
For people who have completed three months (or for 24 months from date of first entry
Second Working 6 months with any one employer, except
of specified work in regional Australia while into Australia on their WHM1 visa if they 38,198 32,828
Holiday Visa where given permission from the Department
on their first WHM were in Australia on WHM1 when applying
$440 ($80 Non-internet for WHM2) N/A
Application Charge 417 only)
Allows young people (18-30yrs) from certain 12 months from date of grant.
First Work & Holiday 6 months with any one employer, except
countries to holiday and work in Australia for Allows holder to remain in Australia for 12 21,206 21,667
Visa where given permission from the Department
up to a year. months from date of first entry on this visa.
462 – Work &
44 days 80 days 12 months from date of grant
Holiday*
For people who have completed three months (or for 24 months from date of first entry
Second Work & 6 months with any one employer, except
of specified subclass 462 work in northern into Australia on their W&H1 visa if they 3,997 3,339
Holiday Visa where given permission from the Department
Australia while on their first s/c 462 visa were in Australia on W&H1 when applying
for W&H2)
*Due to high demand for subclass 462 Work and Holiday visas in the period of July - September, global processing times during these months are expected to increase and may exceed 30 days.
Students
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FOI Document #1
$365
Allows recent engineering graduates of additional applicant charge over
476 – Recognised
recognised institutions to gain up to 18 18 yrs $185
Graduate Unlimited 7 months 9 months Up to 18 months N/A 4,868 2,768
months of skilled work experience in additional applicant charge
Australia. under 18 yrs $90
Non-internet application fee $80
$1,500
Graduate Work Unlimited 4 months 5 months additional applicant charge over 18 months 9,534 8,149
18yrs $750
$560
additional applicant charge under
Allows the guardian of an international
18yrs $0
590 - Student student, younger than 18 and studying in Generally granted for the same period of
No work rights 86 days 4 months N/A 2,986 2,566
Guardian Australia on a student visa, to stay in effect as the nominating student's visa.
Subsequent Temporary
Australia.
Application Charge (further stay)
$700
Temporary Work
Primary applicant - conditon 8107- must only $285
Highly Specialised Allows holder to travel to Australia to do short- work in activities stated in the visa additional applicant charge over
Work term, highly specialised, non-ongoing work. application. 18yrs $285
Dependant applicant not allowed to work additional applicant charge under
18yrs $75
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FOI Document #1
g p ,
Allows holder to come to Australia under the official or service passport; and a
Primary applicant – condition 8107 – must
terms and conditions of a bilateral agreement third person note of support from For the period specified by the Aust or
Government only work in activities stated in the visa
between the Australian Government or an 30 days 43 days foreign govt agency foreign signatory to the agreement (gen 976 821
Agreement application.
Australian state or territory government and max of up to 2 yrs)
Dependent applicant – unlimited work rights
the government of another country.
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FOI Document #1
$330
additional payment over 18yrs
Visa is for self-funded retirees who have no Primary and Dependent applicants - condition
405 – Investor Closed to new applicants $170
dependents and want to live in Australia 8104 - must not work more than 40 hours per 4 years from date of grant Sponsorship 193 102
Retirement additional payment under 18 yrs
during their retirement years. fortnight.
$80
Second instalment: $12,990
$365
Allows retirees and their partners who want to additional applicant charge over Applications made on or after 1 July 2009,
Unlimted work rights for both primary and
410 – Retirement spend some of their retirement years in Closed to new applicants 18yrs $185 the visa period is 10 years from date of visa N/A 19 14
dependent applicants
Australia. additional applicant charge under grant
18yrs $90
Other Temporary
Allows holder to remain lawful in Australia
010 – Bridging Yes - possible if satisfy ‘compelling need to N/A
while their new substantive visa application is NIL
Visa A (BVA) work’ Variable – until associated substantive visa
processed.
application is determined, or judicial review
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FOI Document #1
pp , j
proceedings are completed, or a substantive visa is
Allows holder to lawfully remain in, and leave
020 – Bridging Yes - possible if satisfy ‘compelling need to cancelled, or another Bridging Visa is granted, or N/A
and re-enter, Australia while their substantive $145
Visa B (BVB) work’ person departs Australia while BVA or BVC is in
visa application is processed.
effect, or person departs Australia while BVB is in
Allows holder to stay in Australia lawfully effect after the travel facility period has ended
030 – Bridging Yes - possible if satisfy ‘compelling need to
while their substantive visa application is NIL N/A
Visa C (BVC) work’
processed.
Indefinite:
will cease when a person no longer belongs to the
prescribed class
Guests of
N/A N/A N/A
Government
SOFA forces
members, inc civilian
component
members,
Asia-Pacific forces Indefinite; will cease when a person no longer
belongs to the prescribed class, is absent without
members,
leave, or performs work in Australia other than work N/A N/A N/A
Commonwealth Visa allows people with a prescribed status or of a kind that he or she normally performs during the
Special Purpose forces members, who are declared by the Minister to hold a course of his or her duties - whichever occurs first
Foreign armed forces Special Purpose Visa to lawfully enter and Yes - within parameters of visa issuance N/A NIL
Visa
dependants, Foreign remain in Australia.
naval forces
members.
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FOI Document #1
Indonesian traditional
fisherman visiting
See Reg. 2.40(16) of the Migration Regulations 1994 N/A N/A N/A
Territory of Ashmore
and Cartier Islands
444 – Special Allows New Zealand citizens to visit, study, N/A as granted by operation of law Indefinitely - provided they remain of good
Yes NIL N/A 1,856,614 1,856,614
Category Visa stay and work in Australia. character and are a New Zealand citizen
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$2275
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1135
Enables individuals to continue to own and Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
890 – Business Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume <18yrs $570
operate a business in Australia as permanent visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent N/A 309 452
Owner of applications.* of applications.*
residents. restriction
Second VAC: $4890
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
$2275
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1135
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa.
Enables individuals to continue to invest in Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume <18yrs $570
891 – Investor This means the visa holder can work without Permanent N/A ‘<5 N/A
Australia as permanent residents. of applications.* of applications.*
restriction
Second VAC: $4890
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
$2275
additional applicant:
892 – State/territory Enables individuals to continue to own and Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa. >18yrs $1135
Sponsored by state or territory
Sponsored Business operate a business in Australia as permanent This means the visa holder can work without 21 months 23 months <18yrs $570 Permanent 1090 2147
government
Owner residents. restriction Second VAC: $4890
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
$2275
additional applicant:
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa. >18yrs $1135
893 – State/territory Enables individuals to continue to invest in Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume Sponsored by state or territory
This means the visa holder can work without <18yrs $570 Permanent 305 278
Sponsored Investor Australia as permanent residents. of applications.* of applications.* government
restriction Second VAC: $4890
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
No nomination fee
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494 - Skilled
Employer Sponsored
Regional Enables skilled workers to live, and work in
Nominated by an approved
(Provisional) their nominated occupation for their
Australian Standard Business
Employer Sponsored approved sponsor (who is a SBS), in regional N/A N/A Temporary (5 years) N/A N/A
$3755 sponsor (see 482 program) for a job
Australia for up to 5 years. Primary applicant must only work in nominated
(new subclass, additional applicant: located in regional Australia
commences on 16 occupoation for approved sponsor. >18yrs $1875
Nov 2019) <18yrs $940
All applicants:
- must live work and study only in a regional area
Second VAC: $9800
- notify immigration of change in specific
circumstances
if primary applicant does not meet
- must provide evidence of specific addresses if Functional English
requested Second VAC: $4890
Enables skilled workers to live, and work in - must attend interview if requested if any adult secondary applicant Nominated by a party to a Labour
their nominated occupation for their does not meet Functional English Agreement that authorises 494
Labour Agreements approved sponsor( who is a party to a Labour N/A N/A Temporary (5 years) N/A N/A
visas, for a job located in regional
Agreement that authorises 494 visas), in
Australia
regional Australia for up to 5 years.
$3755
Enables skilled workers to live and work in if family member was an invited
regional or low population-growth pathway applicant
489 - Skilled Regional metropolitan areas of Australia for up to 4
Sponsored years. Main Applicant: This is not a permanent residence $335
Temporary
(Provisional) - visa. The main applicant must live, work and study in if family member was an extended stay
Until the primary visa of the family member ends
subsequent entry There are three pathways to the visa: a specified region of Australia. pathway applicant
pathway • Extended stay (above)
• Invited (above) Second VAC (>18yrs): $4890
• Subsequent entry if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
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$385
additional applicant:
Enables individuals who have lived and >18yrs $195
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa.
worked in specified areas of regional <18yrs $100
887 - Skilled Regional This means the visa holder can work without 15 months 16 months Permanent N/A 7181 5068
Australia to live and work in Australia as
restriction
permanent residents. Second VAC: $4890
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
Distinguished Talent
$3810
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1910 Nominated by and Australian
Enables individuals with a distinguished Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa.
124 - Distinguished Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume <18yrs $955 organisation or Australian citizen,
talent to live in Australia as a permanent This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 128 110
Talent of applications.* of applications.* permanent resident or eligible New
resident. restriction
Second VAC: $4890 Zealand citizen
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
$3810
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1910 Nominated by and Australian
Enables individuals with a distinguished Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa.
858 - Distinguished Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume <18yrs $955 organisation or Australian citizen,
talent to live in Australia as permanent This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 239 96
Talent of applications.* of applications.* permanent resident or eligible New
residents. restriction
Second VAC: $4890 Zealand citizen
if any adult applicant does not meet
Functional English
Partner Migration
There is no fee payable. The visa
Enables partners of eligible sponsors to application fee is attached to the
remain in Australia on the basis of their Permanent Partner visa (subclass 100).
However, as the applicant applies on the Temporary Sponsored by an Australian citizen,
309 - Provisional married or de facto relationship on a Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no
14 months 20 months same form at the same time for both visa lasts from the date it is granted until a decision permanent resident or eligible New 20,885 17,446
Partner Visa provisional basis. This visa is the first stage work restrictions visas, the applicant must pay the is made on permanent Partner visa (subclass 801). Zealand citizen
towards a Permanent Partner visa (subclass subclass 100 visa application fee at the
100) time the combined subclass 309/100
application is made.
$7160
Enables partners of eligible sponsors to additional applicant:
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa. Sponsored by an Australian citizen,
remain in Australia on the basis of their >18yrs $3585
100- Partner Visa This means the visa holder can work without 20 months 37 months Permanent permanent resident or eligible New 20,760 24,846
married or de facto relationship as permanent <18yrs $1795
restriction Zealand citizen
residents
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$7160
additional applicant: Temporary Sponsored by a partner you intend
300 - Prospective Enables people to come to Australia to marry Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no >18yrs $3585 to marry who is an Australian
15 months 21 months 3975 3130
Marriage Visa and live with their prospective spouse work restrictions <18yrs $1795 The visa lasts 9 months from the date it is granted. citizen, permanent resident or
It cannot be extended eligible New Zealand Citizen
$2,470
additional applicant:
Enables a child to enter and live in Australia Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence visa. Sponsored by an eligible parent or
802- Child Visa >18yrs $1235
indefinitely with their parent, who is usually This means the visa holder can work without 12 months 15 months Permanent that parent's cohabiting spouse/de 915 522
(Onshore) <18yrs $620
also their sponsor restriction facto parter
$2,470
Enables a child to be added to their parent’s additional applicant:
Temporary Sponsored by the same person who
445 - Dependent Child permanent Partner visa application after a Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no >18yrs $1235
10 months 18 months Valid until a decision is made on the permanent is sponsoring their parent for their 653 591
Visa temporary Partner visa has been granted to work restrictions <18yrs $620
Partner Visa application permanent partner visa.
their parent.
$2,470
additional applicant:
Enables adopted children to enter and live in Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence >18yrs $1235
Unavailable due to low volume Unavailable due to low volume Sponsored by an adoptive parent or
102 - Adoption Visa Australia indefinately with their adoptive visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 182 122
of applications.* of applications.* <18yrs $620 prospective adoptive parent
parents (or prospective adoptive parents). restriction
$4,035
Enables parents of a settled Australian Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a child who is a
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
103 - Parent Visa citizen, permanent resident or eligible New visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $2020 settled Australian citizen, permanent
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 918 1,310
(Offshore) Zealand citizen to live in Australia applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $1010 resident or eligible New Zealand
restriction
permanently. queued queued citizen
$4,035
Enables parents of a settled Australian Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a child who is a
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
804 - Aged Parent Visa citizen, permanent resident or eligible New visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $2020 settled Australian citizen, permanent
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 1,047 48
(Onshore) Zealand citizen to live in Australia applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $1010 resident or eligible New Zealand
restriction
permanently. queued queued citizen
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$3,855
additional applicant:
Enables parents to pay a higher visa fee and Global processing times for this Global processing times for >18yrs $1925 Sponsored by a child who is a
884 - Aged Parent
live in Australia for 2 years; this is part of a Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as <18yrs $965 Temporary settled Australian citizen, permanent
Visa (Onshore) 42 13
two-stage process which provides a pathway work restrictions applications are capped and applications are capped and Valid for two years resident or eligible New Zealand
Temporary
to a permanent visa. queued queued Second VAC: citizen
>18yrs $29,130
< 18yrs $2095
$3,855
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1925
Global processing times for this Global processing times for <18yrs $965 Sponsored by a child who is a
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
864 - Aged Parent Visa Enables parents to pay a higher visa fee for visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as settled Australian citizen, permanent
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 803 321
(Onshore) Permanent faster processing to live in Australia. applications are capped and applications are capped and Second VAC: resident or eligible New Zealand
restriction
queued queued >18yrs $43,600 citizen
< 18yrs $2095
Subclass 884 visa holder will pay a
smaller VAC
$2595
additional applicant:
Enables parents to pay a higher visa fee and Global processing times for this Global processing times for >18yrs $1300 Sponsored by a child who is a
173 - Contributory
live in Australia for 2 years; this is part of a Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as <18yrs $650 Temporary settled Australian citizen, permanent
Parent Visa 479 572
two-stage process which provides a pathway work restrictions applications are capped and applications are capped and Valid for two years resident or eligible New Zealand
Temporary
to a permanent visa. queued queued Second VAC: citizen
>18yrs $29,130
< 18yrs $2095
$3,855
additional applicant:
>18yrs $1300
Global processing times for this Global processing times for <18yrs $650 Sponsored by a child who is a
143 - Contributory Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
Enables parents to pay a higher visa fee for visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as settled Australian citizen, permanent
Parent Visa visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 10,301 5,692
faster processing to live in Australia. applications are capped and applications are capped and Second VAC: resident or eligible New Zealand
Permanent restriction
queued queued >18yrs $43,600 citizen
< 18yrs $2095
Subclass 173 visa holder will pay a
smaller VAC
$4,035
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative who is a
114 - Aged Dependent Enables aged people to move to Australia if Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $2020 settled Australian citizen, permanent
Relative Visa they are financially dependent on an eligible visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 7 ‘<5
applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $1010 resident or eligible New Zealand
(Offshore) relative restriction
queued queued citizen
Second VAC: $2,065
$4,035
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative who is a
838 - Aged Dependent Enables aged people to move to Australia if Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $2020 settled Australian citizen, permanent
Relative Visa they are financially dependent on an eligible visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 51 0
applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $1010 resident or eligible New Zealand
(Onshore) relative restriction
queued queued citizen
Second VAC: $2,065
$1,665
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative (or their
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
116 - Carer Visa Enables people to enter Australia and provide visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $835 partner) who requires assistance
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 625 250
(Offshore) care for an eligible relative. applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $415 due to a long-term or permanent
restriction
queued queued medical condition.
Second VAC: $2,065
$1,665
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative (or their
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
836 - Carer Visa Enables people to enter Australia and provide visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $835 partner) who requires assistance
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 351 120
(Onshore) care for an eligible relative. applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $415 due to a long-term or permanent
restriction
queued queued medical condition.
Second VAC: $2,065
$1,510
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative who is a
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
117 - Orphan Relative Enables an orphan child to move to Australia visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $755 settled Australian citizen, permanent
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 453 128
Visa (Offshore) to live with their sponsoring relative applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $380 resident or eligible New Zealand
restriction
queued queued citizen
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$1,510
Global processing times for this Global processing times for additional applicant: Sponsored by a relative who is a
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence
837 - Orphan Relative Enables an orphan child to move to Australia visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as >18yrs $755 settled Australian citizen, permanent
visa. This means the visa holder can work without Permanent 17 6
Visa (Onshore) to live with their sponsoring relative applications are capped and applications are capped and <18yrs $380 resident or eligible New Zealand
restriction
queued queued citizen
$4,035
Sponsored by only near relatives
additional applicant:
Global processing times for this Global processing times for live in Australia and are settled
115 - Remaining Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence >18yrs $2,020
Enables people to move to Australia to be visa are unavailable as this visa are unavailable as Australian citizens, Australian
Relative Visa visa. This means the visa holder can work without <18yrs $1,010 Permanent 290 52
with their only near relatives. applications are capped and applications are capped and permanent residents or eligible New
(Offshore) restriction
queued queued Zealand citizens and are usually
Second VAC: $2,065
resident in Australia.
$340
additional applicant:
461 - New Zealand Enables family member of a New Zealand
Main Applicant: This is a temporary visa. It has no >18yrs $170 Temporary
Citizen Family citizen to live and work in Australia 21 months 25 months N/A 2742 1036
work restrictions <18yrs $85 five years validity
Relaitonship Visa temporarily
Resident Return
Main Applicant: This is a permanent residence $375 (non-internet additional charge Permanent
155 - Resident Enables permanent residents to travel in and
visa. This means the visa holder can work without 2 days 67 days of $80 may apply) Travel validity is only for 5 years if residence N/A 169,031 154,387
Return Visa out of Australia
restriction requirement is met, or 1 year if substantial ties met
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The Administration
of the Immigration
and Citizenship
Program
Third edition, 16 May 2019
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Table of Contents
Purpose of this background paper 3
Introduction 3
Responding to Australia’s increased connection to the world and the movement of people 4
Managing growth 5
Temporary visas 7
Visitors 7
Students 8
Bridging visas 8
Migration and Child Program 10
Skilled Stream 10
Family Stream 10
Special Eligibility Stream 11
Humanitarian Program 11
Humanitarian program - offshore 11
Humanitarian program - onshore 12
Net Overseas Migration 12
Australian Citizenship Program 13
Threat and risk environment 15
Detecting threats within the Immigration Program 15
Lifting of Intelligence capability support to the Immigration Program 16
Biometrics and integrity screening in the Immigration Program 16
Delivering improved immigration integrity and community protection outcomes 17
Maturing of the administration of the Immigration Program in the years ahead 18
Introduction
2. Immigration is central to our national story. From a population of around 7 million people after
the Second World War, Australia has grown to a nation of more than 25 million people in 2019.
The Immigration Program has played a core role in that nation building. The Immigration
Program comprises temporary visas, the Migration and Child Program, and the Humanitarian
Program and is closely aligned with the Australian Citizenship Program.
3. Effective administration of the Immigration Program is central to maintaining Australia’s
sovereignty, economic prosperity, community safety and its place as one of the most peaceful,
united and culturally diverse countries in the world. Our people-to-people links provide
tremendous opportunities and benefits to Australia and help to shape the perception of
Australia around the world.
4. Since the dismantling of the White Australia policy in the early 1970s, Australia’s Immigration
Program has been based around a universal, non-discriminatory visa system, which focuses
on the contribution a person can make to Australia rather than their ethnicity, gender or
religious beliefs. Australia enjoys high levels of social cohesion and broad public support for its
Immigration Programs. This is in part based around confidence in well-managed non-
discriminatory migration.
5. Administration of the Immigration Program involves dual, but equally important and
complementary, objectives:
to facilitate the entry and stay of those who legitimately seek to visit, study, work (in roles
that aren’t able to be filled locally, or which would build our national capability and increase
competitiveness) or to migrate; and
to prevent entry or stay by those who disguise their true identity or intentions or otherwise
pose a risk to the security or safety of our community, or to our national interest.
6. The systems, processes and capabilities required to achieve effective facilitation, counter
threats and mitigate risk must be as dynamic as the changing global environment in which the
Department of Home Affairs operates.
Managing growth
12. The total number of non-humanitarian visa applications lodged by people seeking to enter or
remain in Australia has grown markedly in recent years. From 2015-16 to 2017-18, visa
application lodgements in the temporary and permanent visa programs have increased by
1 million or 12.1 per cent. In 2018-19, the Department is expecting to receive over 9.7 million
visa applications (Figure 1 refers).
13. All applications are assessed on a case-by-case basis against relevant program criteria. The
Department strives to assess applications as efficiently and effectively as possible. The time
taken is driven by a range of factors including the volume of applications received, the quality
and completeness of those applications, how promptly applicants respond to requests for
information and the level of complexity involved in the assessment of genuineness, character
and security requirements.
14. Processing times are also impacted by the demand for certain visa categories and the number
of places available if the category is capped at a particular level. The Migration Act 1958 (the
Act) allows the Minister, by way of legislative instrument, to ‘cap’ or limit the number of certain
visas that may be granted in a program year which ensures that the planning levels decided by
the Government each year are not exceeded.
Figure 1: Total non-humanitarian visa program trends: 2015-16 to 2018-19 (including forecast
from 30 April 2019– 30 June 2019)
15. Heightened levels of risk and caseload fraud have been a feature across most programs and
have led to an increase in refusal decisions (Figure 1 refers). Since 2015-16 to 2017-18, the
average refusal rate across the temporary and permanent visa programs has increased from
2.5 per cent to 3.3 per cent, which equates to 96,724 more applicants being refused. In the
current year to 30 April 2019, the refusal rate across programs was tracking at 3.8 per cent.
This has involved a significant and commensurate increase in work effort and time for the
Department to appropriately assess and decide applications.
16. Despite this growth, the Department has achieved greater levels of productivity, finalising more
applications each year by:
encouraging the up-take of online lodgement (which reduces manual data entry and
enables the Department to fully utilise processing capacity across its global delivery
network);
continually improving systems and processes; and
increasingly consolidating visa processing into ‘hubs’ that are able to achieve improved
efficiency, consistency and integrity outcomes.
17. As at 30 April 2019, over 95 per cent of all visa applications were lodged electronically. The
Temporary visa program has seen online lodgement increase from 59 per cent in 2015-16 to
92 per cent in 2018-19 as at 30 April 2019 (Figure 2 refers) and the expansion of online
lodgement to China and India, two of Australia’s largest tourism and international education
markets.
Figure 2: Online lodgement growth for the Temporary Visa Program 2015-16 to 2018-19, as at
30 April 2019
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 to 30/04/2019
Online Paper
18. The sections that follow, provide additional information on some of the key visa programs and
the Australian citizenship program administered by the Department.
Temporary visas
19. Australia's temporary visa program is designed to allow overseas people to come to Australia
for specific purposes that benefit Australia, including temporary activity or work, international
relations, study/training and to visit.
Visitors
20. Australia’s economy benefits significantly from tourism; generating jobs, investment and growth
in communities throughout Australia. Tourism is a key export sector which is projected for
growth. International visitors spent a record $43 billion in the year to September 2018, with
tourists from China contributing $11.5 billion–well above their pro-rata share. For these
reasons, the Department places a heavy focus on working across Government to position
Australia’s tourism industry at the forefront globally, and a critical part is our work to keep
processing times low, without compromising on integrity or community safety.
21. In 2007-08, the Department finalised 3.72 million visitor visa applications. By 2017-18, this had
grown to 5.87 million visa finalisations, an increase of more than 57 per cent in just ten years,
with 32 per cent of that growth occurring in the past three years (Figure 3 refers). This growth
has been managed while responding to changing patterns of caseload risk and maintaining
competitive processing times. Refusal rates for visitor visas to Australia have increased from
1.6 per cent in 2007-08 to 4.4 per cent in 2018-19 to 30 April 2019, as a result of better
information being available to our decision makers. More information about the capabilities the
Department has invested in to achieve these improved outcomes are detailed in the Detecting
Threats in the Immigration Program section of this paper below.
Figure 3: Visitor visa program trends: 2012-13 to 2018-19 (including forecasts from
30 April 2019 – 30 June 2019)
Students
22. Australia’s international education, training and research sectors also make a significant
economic, social and cultural contribution to Australia, to our foreign policy interests and to
individual communities. The Department has supported continuing growth in the international
education sector, and the student visa program has been growing steadily since 2011-12
(Figure 4 refers).
Figure 4: Student visa program trends: 2012-13 to 2018-19 (including forecasts from
30 April 2019 – 30 June 2019)
23. In 2017-18, a record 378,292 Student visas were granted, surpassing the previous peak
reached in 2016-17 of 343,035. Grants to applicants outside Australia reached 234,110 in
2017-18, exceeding the previous peak of 226,898 in 2008-09.
24. There is no cap on Student visas and the demand for visas depends on a number of factors;
including education sector quality and reputation, cost of Australia’s international education,
marketing, and value of the Australian dollar. The variation in refusal rate largely reflects
changing patterns of risk within cohorts applying for student visas over time; this subsequently
informs the risk framework, evidentiary requirements and assessment of applications.
Bridging visas
25. Bridging visas are an important tool that enable the Department to maintain a non-citizen’s
lawful status while they stay in Australia for a range of legitimate purposes. This includes
maintaining lawful status in the community while a person is:
applying for a visa in Australia, or where they seek to temporarily travel overseas during the
visa application process;
appealing a decision made to refuse their visa application, either at merits review or by a
court;
making arrangements to depart Australia.
26. The number of bridging visa holders in Australia has increased in recent years, from 99,816 as
at 30 April 2014 to 219,059 as at 30 April 2019.
27. Increased packaged product offerings—such as a university packaging English, a preparation
course and a subsequent degree course—have increased the number of bridging visa holders
as each new course requires a subsequent visa application and grant of that visa is dependent
on the successful completion of the previous package element. A significant number of student
visa holders are also applying for a Temporary Graduate visa after completing their academic
study. A proportion of temporary visa holders apply for a further temporary visa (such as a
second working holiday visa, where they have undertaken qualifying work in regional areas),
while some skilled temporary visa holders apply to stay permanently in Australia, and a
bridging visa is granted while they await a decision. Illegal maritime arrivals and protection visa
applicants that are awaiting resolution of their protection claims are also generally granted a
bridging visa in association with those matters.
28. An increasing number of non-citizens seek merits review of the Department’s decision to refuse
their visa application. While awaiting merits review, these individuals generally remain on a
Bridging visa. In April of the 2016-17 financial year, there were 23,614 cases awaiting review in
the Migration and Refugee Divisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). This
increased to over 57,500 in April 2019 (Figure 5 refers). Of the applications finalised by the
AAT between 1 July 2018 and 30 April 2019, the AAT upheld the Department’s decision in 75
per cent of cases, an indicator of the Department’s ongoing strong focus on quality decision
making.
Figure 5: AAT cases awaiting review in the Migration and Refugee Division,
April 2017 – April 2019.
70,000
60,000
57,597
50,000
40,000 41,267
30,000
23,614
20,000
10,000
-
AAT Number of On Hand Cases
Skilled Stream
34. The Skill stream is designed to improve the productive capacity of the economy and fill
shortages in the labour market, including those in regional Australia that cannot be filled by
suitable skilled Australians. The majority of the places in the Migration program are in the
Skilled stream, currently set at approximately two thirds of the program.
35. Legislative reforms were implemented in 2017 and 2018 to strengthen the quality of skilled
applications. Enhancements to legislation included tightening in relation to labour market
testing, lowering of the qualifying age, and higher qualifications and experience requirements.
36. The Department has implemented a range of initiatives to improve Skilled visa stream
outcomes, including triaging and streamlining low-risk applications and establishing a priority
processing team to focus on skilled regional applications, accredited sponsors and applications
under Designated Area Migration Agreements. As a result, grants in the Employer Sponsored
and General Skilled Migration categories almost doubled during the third quarter of the 2018-
19 program year. As at 30 April 2019, the Migration Program had delivered 134,330 places.
37. The refusal rate for 2018-19 as at 30 April 2019 for the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme
and Employer Nomination Scheme was 35 per cent and 9.8 per cent respectively. For General
Skilled Migration the refusal rate was 3.9 per cent.
Family Stream
38. The Family stream is predominantly made up of Partner and Parent categories, enabling
Australian citizens and permanent residents to reunite with close family members. The Family
stream comprises approximately one third of the program.
39. The Department processes visas in line with the legal framework under the Act and
Regulations, and policy parameters as set by Government. Where demand is higher than the
available places, processing times may lengthen. Under section 85 of the Act, the Minister has
the power to ‘cap’ or limit the number of visas which can be granted each year in particular
subclasses, covering Parent and Other Family streams.
Humanitarian Program
Humanitarian program - offshore
41. Australia is one of the world’s most generous contributors to international refugee resettlement
efforts, successfully settling more than 880,000 refugees and others in humanitarian need
since the end of the Second World War. At present, about 30 countries offer permanent
resettlement places to people in humanitarian need through managed and annual programs.
Australia is consistently ranked among the world’s top permanent resettlement countries. The
number of applications for offshore humanitarian visas the Department receives each year is
far greater than available visas, even though the base program has grown by over 36 per cent
in the past few years and a special additional program of 12,000 places for people displaced by
conflict in Iraq and Syria was delivered between 1 July 2015 and 21 March 2017 (Figure 6
refers). The composition of the offshore Humanitarian Program is decided by the Government
on an annual basis, taking account of changing patterns of global displacement and
humanitarian need, risks to the Australian community and the capacity to facilitate the
successful settlement of humanitarian entrants in the community. The Department has
continued to deliver the Humanitarian Program in line with planning levels set by the
Government each year.
100,000 90%
90,000 80%
80,000 70%
70,000
60%
60,000
50%
50,000
40%
40,000
30%
30,000
20,000 20%
10,000 10%
0 0%
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Figure 7: Citizenship by conferral program trends: 2010-11 to 2018-19 YTD (30 April 2019)
50. It is important that only people who can meet the legislative requirements for Australian
citizenship are accorded this privilege. Once citizenship is conferred it can be revoked only in
extremely limited circumstances. Citizenship by conferral applicants must meet residential and
other eligibility provisions to apply. They must satisfy the decision maker of their identity and be
of good character. Depending upon circumstances such as their age, applicants must also
possess a basic knowledge of the English language, and demonstrate knowledge of Australia
and the responsibilities and privileges that come with Australian citizenship.
51. A decision to approve or refuse an application for Australian citizenship is an independent
decision under the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Citizenship Act), which is a different Act of
Parliament to the Migration Act 1958 under which permanent visa decisions are made. As
such, an applicant who may have lived in Australia for several years and who had previously
satisfied the legislative criteria for the grant of a permanent residence visa still needs to be
assessed against the relevant eligibility, identity, character and security provisions of the
Citizenship Act. Each application is assessed on its merits on a case-by-case basis.
52. Over time a person’s individual circumstances can change which may affect their identity
information, their ability to meet the good character requirement, or give rise to other matters of
integrity concern. Some applicants conceal their true identity. Others simply do not present or
hold identity documents that readily enable identity to be confirmed. Getting to the true facts in
these circumstances can be incredibly complex and time consuming and can increase
processing times for these applicants, sometimes with flow on processing impacts for other
applications.
53. The changing threat environment (Threat and Risk Environment of this paper refers), the risk of
un-detected migration fraud within the Immigration Program, along with a number of
citizenship applications requiring complex identity assessments, has necessitated a
strengthening of integrity measures in the Citizenship Program. These measures have been
introduced to help ensure any adverse information is identified and appropriately dealt with,
and to ensure that the identity and character considerations of a person have been resolved to
the best extent possible before they are approved for Australian citizenship.
54. While these measures have contributed to increased processing times, on top of the impact of
large numbers of applications, they are nonetheless imperative in meeting community
expectations of the integrity of the program and in ensuring the protection of the Australian
people (Delivering improved immigration integrity and community protection outcomes section
of this paper refers).
55. The increased focus on integrity is having an impact. Refusals of applications for citizenship by
conferral have increased significantly from 3.4 per cent in 2014-15 to 5.7 per cent in 2017-18.
Where appropriate, applications that present integrity concerns are referred for consideration of
visa cancellation. Additionally, in recent years to March 2019, 29 individuals have had their
Australian citizenship revoked for criminal conduct or for citizenship or migration fraud.
56. The Department has implemented a range of initiatives to respond to growth and improve
processing times, without compromising on integrity. These include an enhanced capability to
triage applications according to risk, identifying cases with similar characteristics to harness
processing consistency and efficiency, automating business processes and expanding online
lodgement capability.
57. These initiatives have resulted in a 76% per cent increase in finalisations for citizenship by
conferral applications in 2018-19 as at mid-April 2019, compared to the previous year, as well
as many more people acquiring Australian citizenship and thereby becoming Australians and
contributing to our great nation.
At the strategic level, intelligence capability routinely assesses migration-related threats and
systemic vulnerabilities that threaten the integrity of the Immigration Program, including in
relation to visa fraud and non-compliance, criminality, exploitation of labour, and human
trafficking.
At the operational and tactical level, intelligence directly supports the Immigration Program
through a network of intelligence analysts integrated with operational teams and specialist
enforcement and investigative capabilities. This intelligence is particularly focused on
targeting serious and organised crime and serious and deliberate non-compliance.
An increasing spectrum of risks and proposed treatments are captured within visa and border
processing systems and provided to relevant decision-makers for consideration and action.
Case study
Convergences of threat manifesting in one domain are now leading to discoveries in other
domains. Recently, the discovery of a traveller suspected of importing illicit drugs across the
border led to the immediate discovery and disruption of a large, sophisticated imposter
syndicate exploiting multiple temporary visa programs through identity and passport fraud to
conceal adverse immigration histories. Agile responses by the Department and the Australian
Border Force led to pre-border profiles being deployed quickly in both the visa and traveller
domains. This level of immediate cross-domain analysis, threat identification and response
would not have been possible previously, which focused immediate efforts on specific
domains, and demonstrates the power of a more robust and joined up border-intelligence
effort.
71. Intelligence sharing with law enforcement agencies and Five Eyes partners has strengthened
since the establishment of the Department of Home Affairs resulting in over 3,000 persons
confirmed or suspected of transnational serious and organised crime being added to watch-
lists to ensure any visa applications by these individuals are individually scrutinised.
72. Over the past three years, the Department has established new integrity capabilities that are
increasingly leveraging new information sources previously not available to visa and citizenship
decision-makers to detect individuals who are involved in activities that are of national security
concern or against the law. The capabilities which have been built enable us to hone our focus
on individuals of concern, and intensively research their history and behaviour to assess
whether they may present a threat.
Figure 8: Cancellations under section 501 of the Migration Act 1958: 2010 to 2018
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Identification of emerging threats and vulnerabilities at the earliest point possible and using
this information to develop and deploy predictive models and profiles that support visa
decision makers to prevent the entry of those who would seek to undermine the intent of
the Immigration Program or cause harm to our community, and our national interests
Further automation of manual processing activities and consolidation and connection of
fraud, criminality risk and security threat information from an expanded range of sources
to support real time decision making and recurrent risk checking
Biometrics collection to anchor identity at the earliest possible point, together with advanced
matching and validation capabilities
Increasing quality and consistency of decision-making through enhanced vocational training
for visa decision makers, a single, global business processing model, better real time
reporting for Immigration Program managers, an integrated model of quality assurance and
regular operational practice reviews
Other initiatives to improve the client experience for genuine travellers and migrants.
79. Importantly, we apply a ‘golden rule’ of accountability: no adverse visa decision is ever made
by a machine. If a person is denied a visa, it will be denied by a departmental officer based on
the applicant’s risk and whether they meet the legislative criteria. The officer might be
prompted and assisted by the latest technology and automated analytical tools, but it is a
person who will be the decision-maker.
Overview
This Fact Book provides a regular snapshot of key immigration statistics, including permanent migration,
temporary migration, net overseas migration and Bridging visa holders in Australia.
List of charts
Chart 1: Permanent migration program outcome by stream, 1996-97 to 2017-18 8
Chart 2: Permanent humanitarian program grants, onshore/offshore, 1996-97 to 2017-18 8
Chart 3: Temporary visa grants (flows), 2001-02 to 2017-18 9
Chart 4: Temporary resident (skilled) visa grants (flows), primary/secondary applicants, 2001-02 to 2017-18 9
Chart 5: Student visa grants (flows) by sector, 2001-02 to 2017-18 9
Chart 6: Stock of temporary visa holders in Australia, as at 30 June, 1998 to 2018 10
Chart 7: Stock of temporary resident (skilled) visa holders in Australia, primary/secondary applicants, as at 30 June, 1998 to 2018 10
Chart 8: Stock of student visa holders in Australia, as at 30 June, 2002 to 2018 10
Chart 9: Stock of Bridging visa holders in Australia as at 30 June, 2007 to 2018 11
Chart 10: Net Overseas Migration, 2004-05 to 2017-18 11
Chart 11: Net Overseas Migration by temporary visa major groups, 2004-05 to 2017-18 11
Child program
• Child visas are granted to adopted, biological or step children whose parents have acquired Permanent Residence. Child visas are demand driven, unlike other streams
of the Permanent Migration Program.
• Since 2015-16 an indicative planning level for Child visas has been included within the overall ceiling of the permanent migration program. In 2018-19, a minimum of
3485 places were provided for Child category migrants outside the managed Migration program.
• In 2017-18, 3,350 Child visas were granted, which accounted for 2.1 per cent of the permanent migration places. Of those Child visas grants 81.3 per cent were located
outside Australia.
• Demand for Child visas has remained consistent since moving to a demand driven model.
Note: The sum of Tables 3a and 3b equal the corresponding figures in Table 1.
Additional information
• Student visa grants: top citizenship countries for 2018-19 were China, India, Nepal, Brazil and Colombia. Higher education visa grants made up 55 per
cent of grants, and vocational education and training sector (VET) made up 25 per cent of grants.
• Temporary resident (skilled) visa grants: top citizenship countries for 2018-19 were India, United Kingdom, the Philippines, China and the United States
of America. The top nominated occupations for primary applications granted in 2018-19 were Developer Programmer; ICT Business Analyst; Software
Engineer; Chef; and Resident Medical Officer.
• New Zealand citizens are granted a special category (subclass 444) visa every time they cross the border.
Visa grants
• Visa grants enable a person to travel to Australia. The permissible duration of stay on a visa varies between visas. Most Student and Temporary resident
(skilled) visas allow people to stay for more than 12 months.
• Applications for Student visas have increased in recent years. This growth is driven by universities actively promoting their offerings, seeking new markets
and continued growth in existing key markets. Temporary graduate visas have also grown in recent years, with more students becoming eligible.
Bridging visa A (BVA) (subclass 010) which allows individuals to stay lawfully in Australia while their new application is being processed (in most cases a
separate BVA application is not required under the regulations, as their substantive visa application is also an application for a BVA), and can also provide
them with lawful status during merits review or judicial review processes;
Bridging visa B (BVB) (subclass 020) may be granted to BVA and BVB holders to enable them to depart or return to Australia during the processing of
their application where they have a need to travel. BVB applications can generally be applied for online and are generally granted for up to a maximum of
three months. Note: There have been previous policy proposals to provide BVAs with a travel facility to avoid the need for a separate BVB to be granted.
Such issues were, however, to be considered as part of broader upcoming visa reform.
A Bridging visa C (BVC) (subclass 030) or a Bridging visa E (BE) (subclasses 051 and 050) may be granted to applicants who have an application on
hand, but did not hold a substantive visa when they lodged this application and regularises their status. These visas may also be relied upon where visa
applicants are seeking merits or judicial review, or are seeking Ministerial Intervention.
Bridging visa D (BVD) (subclasses 040 and 041) provides the visa holder with five days in which to make a substantive visa application
(i.e. often where they have attempted to lodge but were unsuccessful).
Bridging visa F (BVF) (subclass 060) is used in the context of unlawful non-citizens who are suspected victims of trafficking to keep them lawful while
other options are considered).
Bridging visa R (BVR) (subclass 070) is used to resolve complex cases where the Minister’s s195A intervention powers are used.
Table 6b: Stock of Bridging visa holders in Australia by last substantive visa held
Bridging visa holders as at
Last Visa Held - Visa Category 31-Mar-14 31-Mar-15 31-Mar-16 31-Mar-17 31-Mar-18 31-Mar-19
*
Number of Bridging visa holders 107,153 111,178 136,904 153,809 194,875 229,242
Student 46,435 38,203 48,751 55,777 69,306 81,929
Visitor 21,854 24,434 32,046 42,519 59,107 77,794
Temporary Resident (Skilled) 3,832 4,833 8,568 10,845 16,016 16,744
Temporary Resident (Other) 9,885 6,506 5,375 6,381 11,750 15,839
Offshore Humanitarian 594 16,999 22,582 21,160 15,599 12,506
Working Holiday Maker 6,238 6,421 8,336 8,003 10,779 10,142
Skilled 1,395 1,541 1,789 2,132 2,847 4,681
Family 1,990 2,117 2,166 2,960 4,682 4,096
Other Temporary 613 566 529 524 579 734
Crew and Transit 177 174 182 237 316 462
Onshore Protection 31 33 40 56 92 87
Resident Return/ADV 6 10 14 27 37 51
Child 18 21 23 24 31 31
Special Category 12 27 28 20 11 16
Travel Authority 9 <5 9 7 8 14
Other Permanent 12 17 12 12 12 12
Special Eligibility <5 <5 <5 8 <5 <5
Unknown 14,051 9,269 6,450 3,117 3,701 4,101
* It is important to note that the information used in this table comes from a new data source. Figures reported in this table differ slightly in Table 5 for Bridging visa holders.
Table 6c: Stock of Bridging visa holders in Australia by last visa applied for
Bridging visa holders as at
Visa Applied For - Visa Category 31-Mar-14 31-Mar-15 31-Mar-16 31-Mar-17 31-Mar-18 31-Mar-19
*
Number of Bridging visa holders 107,153 111,178 136,904 153,809 194,875 229,242
Onshore Protection 14,179 16,207 20,904 35,711 52,346 64,672
Family 30,077 31,636 36,024 40,535 46,419 54,109
Student 19,550 12,361 17,373 21,888 32,260 38,866
Skilled 13,337 10,475 10,670 14,241 24,386 30,191
Temporary Resident (Other) 8,213 6,999 12,327 13,331 15,089 24,557
Temporary Resident (Skilled) 5,683 5,464 8,522 11,172 14,652 6,642
Bridging 13,310 25,392 27,291 12,703 2,611 2,937
Working Holiday Maker 753 568 1,455 776 2,097 1,567
Visitor 698 497 646 776 1,219 1,411
Other Temporary 380 333 328 496 722 860
Child 206 170 160 339 605 738
Other Permanent 42 34 30 24 21 31
Resident Return/ADV 5 <5 6 5 22 30
Special Eligibility 10 7 9 <5 <5 6
Special Category <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5
Offshore Humanitarian <5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5
Crew and Transit - <5 <5 - - -
Unknown 707 1,026 1,154 1,805 2,417 2,619
* It is important to note that the information used in this table comes from a new data source. Figures reported in this table differ slightly in Table 5 for Bridging visa holders.
Immigration FactAffairs
Home
Hme Book
Immigration Fact Book
Net
Net Overseas
Overseas Migrant
Migration Net Overseas Migration
Estimates for the period ending 31 March 2018 Estimates for the period ending 30 September 2018
Definition:
Net overseas migration (NOM) is the net gain or loss of population through immigration to Australia and emigration from Australia. It is based on a person
being in (or out of) Australia for at least 12 of the last 16 months.
Note:
Recent
The growth
growth in NOM
in NOM (see Table
is being driven7)
byisinternational students. For example, some students will come to Australia to study a short course. While in Australia
they can choose to apply for a further visa. When they make a valid application they are granted a bridging visa.
Additional information
• Negative figures in Table 8 denote more departures than arrivals.
• Visitor NOM - is largely driven by people who have entered Australia on a short-term visitor visa and then applied for another visa onshore, such as a
student visa.
• All other temporary NOM - the subtraction from NOM is driven by the departure of people on bridging visas.
Immigration
Home AffairsFact Book
Statistics
Chart packNet
- Permanent
Overseas migration
Migration
Estimates for
Annual
the period
estimates
ending
for 31
theMarch
period2018
ending 2017-18
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
Persons
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
Offshore Onshore
Immigration
Immigration Fact
Fact Book
Book
Chart pack - TemporaryNet
migration (visa
Overseas grants)
Migration
Estimates
Annual for the period
estimates for theending
period 31 March
ending 2018
2017-18
9,000,000
8,000,000
7,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
-
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Chart 4: Temporary resident (skilled) visa grants (flows), primary/secondary applicants, 2001-02 to 2017-18
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Primary Secondary
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Chart 7: Stock of temporary resident (skilled) visa holders in Australia, primary/secondary applicants,
as at 30 June, 1998 to 2018
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Primary Secondary
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
-
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Immigration Fact
Home Affairs Book
Statistics
Chart Pack - Stock of Bridging
Net visa
Overseas
holders
Migration
& NOM
Annual
Estimates
estimates
forfor
the
the
period
period
ending
ending
3130
March
June 2018
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-50,000
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18(a)
Estimates as published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS. Cat. No. 3101.0 Australian Demographic Statistics).
(a) Estimates for 2017-18 are preliminary.
Chart 11: Net Overseas Migration by temporary visa major groups, 2004-05 to 2017-18
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
-50,000
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18(a)
Student Temporary resident (skilled) Working Holiday Maker Visitor All other temporary visas
Estimates as published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS. Cat. No. 3412.0 Migration Australia).
(a) Estimates for 2017-18 are preliminary.
Legacy Caseload
For Internal Use Only
Statistics are correct at 30 April 2019 unless specified
Air Environment
Traveller Pathway – Current and Future States
I
P
C
Automated
TRS
Automated Manual
Manual and
Manual mutli-agency
Manual
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FOI Document #1
BANGKOK BEIJING AMMAN NAIROBI BERLIN DILI COLOMBO PACIFIC REGION BRASILIA
Time diff (hrs) S -4 W -3 Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2 Time diff (hrs) S -9 W -7 Time diff (hrs) S -8 W -7 Time diff (hrs) S -10 W -8 Time diff (hrs) S -2 W -1 Time diff (hrs) S -5.5 W -4.5 Regional Manager Time diff (hrs) S -13 W -13
Switch: (66) 2344 6300 Switch: (8610) 5140 4111 Switch: (9626) 580 7000 Switch: (25420) 4277 100 Switch: (4930) 880 0880 Switch: (670) 332 2111 *6551 Switch: (9411) 246 3200 s22(1)(a) Switch: (5561) 3223 7772 *6722
(ii)
WELLINGTON
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel Aviv
Switch: (9723) 691 5305 *6610 JAKARTA
GUANGZHOU ANKARA PRETORIA Time diff (hrs) S -4 W -3 NEW DELHI AUCKLAND
HANOI Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2 Time diff (hrs) S -9 W -7 Time diff (hrs) S -9 W -8 BELGRADE Switch: (6221) 2550 5555 Time diff (hrs) S -5.5 W -4.5 Time diff (hrs) S +2 W +1 OTTAWA
Time diff (hrs) S -4 W -3 Switch: (8620) 3814 0111 Switch: (90312) 459 9500 Switch: (2712) 423 6000 Time diff (hrs) S -10 W -8 Switch: (9111) 4139 9900 Switch: (649) 921 8800 Time diff (hrs) S -16 W -14
Switch: (8424) 3831 7755 Switch: (38111) 330 3400 Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Switch: (1613) 236 0841
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: (9111) 4149 4408 *6779 Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
BEIRUT PORT MORESBY
HO CHI MINH CITY Time diff (hrs) S -9 W -7 BRUSSELS KUALA LUMPUR Time diff (hrs) S 0 W -1 SANTIAGO
Time diff (hrs) S -4 W -3 HONG KONG Switch: (9611) 960 600 Time diff (hrs) S -10, W -8 Time diff (hrs) S - 3 W - 2 Switch: (675) 325 9333 *6790 Time diff (hrs) S -14 W -14
Switch: (8428) 3521 8100 Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2 Switch: (332) 286 0500 Switch: (603) 2146 5555 Switch: (562) 2550 3500
Switch: (852) 2827 8881 Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Counsellor - s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel:s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) CAIRO
Time diff (hrs) S -7 W -9 LONDON
PHNOM PENH Switch: (202) 2770 6600 Time diff (hrs) S -11 W -9 SUVA WASHINGTON
Time diff (hrs) S -4 W -3 SEOUL Switch: (4420) 7379 4334 Time diff (hrs) S +1 W +2 Time diff (hrs) S -16 W -14
Switch: (85523) 213 470 *6172 Time diff (hrs) S -2 W -1 Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Switch: (679) 338 2211 Switch: (1202) 797 3000
Switch: (822) 2003 0100 Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii) MANILA
Tel: ext: s2 DUBAI Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2 Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii) Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii)
2(1 Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Time diff (hrs) S -7 W -6 Switch: (632) 7578 100
)(a)
YANGON Tokyo Switch: (9714) 508 7200
(ii)
Time diff (hrs) S -3.5 W -4.5 Switch: (813) 5232 4111 *6613 MOSCOW Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
Switch: (95) 1 251 810 Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Time diff (hrs) S -8 W -6
SHANGHAI Switch: (7495) 956 6070
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2
Switch: (8621) 2225 1300 Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii) SINGAPORE
Time diff (hrs) S -3 W -2
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii) ISLAMABAD Switch: (65) 6836 4100
Time diff (hrs) S -6 W -5
Switch: (9251) 835 55 00 Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii)
GENEVA
Time diff (hrs) S -10 W -8 Geneva does not fall within an o/s Posts = 40
TEHRAN Switch: (4122) 7999 100 region. It is a stand alone post which Satellite Posts = 02
reports to the International Division. It
Time diff (hrs) S -7.5 W -5.5 is not a visa post, but an SES-level Total Posts = 42
Switch: (9821) 8386 3666 policy post.
Countries = 36
Tel: s22(1)(a)(ii)
Tel: (s22(1)(a)(ii)
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FOI Document #2
Table of Contents
Senior Executive Biographies 3
1 Overview 6
1.1 Our Role 6
1.2 Our relationship with the Department of Home Affairs 7
1.3 Governance arrangements 7
2 Corporate Performance 8
2.1 Budget 8
2.2 PBS and enterprise performance 8
2.3 Core Functions 9
2.4 Operational Performance 10
4 Outlook 21
6 Our Enablers 29
6.1 Our People 29
6.2 Our Capabilities 30
6.3 Our Partners 31
Between 2011 and 2015, as an Assistant Commissioner with the Australian Federal Police (AFP), Michael
was responsible for the AFP's national protective security function. During this time, Michael led the AFP’s
planning and support for the G20 Summit in Brisbane and the AFP’s response to the downing of Malaysian
Airlines Flight 17 over the Ukraine.
Michael joined the AFP from the Australian Crime Commission (ACC). In 2004, Michael was appointed as
the ACC’s Executive Director, Serious and Organised Crime and he was responsible for the national and
international investigative and intelligence functions of the Agency.
Michael’s career in Australia started in 2002 at the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New
South Wales. His migration to Australia followed a secondment in 2000, to the New South Wales Police
Service. He was seconded from the London Metropolitan Police Service in the UK, where he joined as a
police cadet in 1980 and served as a police officer from 1982.
Michael was awarded the Australian Police Medal in 2014 in recognition of his outstanding service in law
enforcement. In 2014, he was also awarded a Master of Business & Technology degree by the University of
New South Wales and a university prize for academic achievement. In April 2018, Michael completed the
Harvard Kennedy School executive education programme ‘Leadership in Crises’, which he attended having
won a Sir James Wolfensohn Public Service Scholarship.
Prior to joining the ABF, Mandy's was Assistant Commissioner, People, Safety and Security at the AFP —
where she was responsible for security of the AFP and its staff, integrity and internal investigations, as well
as health and human resource management.
In her 11 years as an Assistant Commissioner, Mandy led and managed national security as well as national
and international investigation portfolios. This included overseeing the AFP's International Deployment
Group; tactical response and maritime capabilities, economic, financial crime and special operations. Mandy
has also managed the AFP's 24-hour operations centre, governance and major technology programmes, as
well as its media, marketing and ministerial groups. Significantly, in 2006, Mandy developed the AFP's
Aviation Portfolio at major airports across Australia.
Additionally, Mandy held the position of Deputy Chief Police Officer within ACT policing, has private sector
experience working with ACTEW, and was an Assistant Commissioner at the Australian Taxation Office.
For her distinguished involvement to Aviation Security and the Canberra Bushfires Mandy was recognised
for her leadership and contribution with an Australian Police Medal and National Police Service Medal
respectively.
She is an experienced leader who has the ability to drive and guide successful
change through collaboration, consultation and negotiation. Prior to joining the
ABF, Justine was a member of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for 29
years and a member of the senior executive since 2005, performing leadership roles in counter terrorism,
special references, drug and fraud investigation, in addition to her deployment to New York as Australia’s
police adviser to the Australian Mission to the United Nations.
Previously as the Chief Police Officer of the ACT, Justine ensured ACT Policing delivered on government
and community expectations in terms of operational delivery, whilst also driving and implementing significant
cultural and capability reforms aimed at developing a sustainable and effective policing service for the future.
As an Assistant Commissioner in the broader AFP, Justine has had responsibility for managing strategic
relationships with key government stakeholders and law enforcement partners domestically and
internationally, and had portfolio responsibilities for strategic policy, governance, corporate communications
and support to the Commissioner as Chief of Staff.
She holds a Master of Leadership and Management (Policing), Bachelor of Social Sciences (Policing
Studies) with Distinction and Graduate Certificate in Applied Management.
1 Overview
1.1 Our Role
The Australian Border Force (ABF) is Australia’s customs service and supports national prosperity through
enabling legitimate trade and travel while protecting Australia’s border. The ABF is the second highest
revenue collector for Australia and plays a critical role in preventing, deterring and detecting the unlawful
importation or exportation of prohibited, restricted or regulated goods into and out of Australia. To manage
the border effectively the ABF works internationally, in the Australian maritime domain and across Australia.
We also work collaboratively across the Home Affairs Portfolio and with domestic and international partners
to identify, deter, disrupt, detect and manage border risks.
Illustrative of Australia’s prosperity is the constantly increasing volume of trade and travel. The ABF works to
enhance economic growth through streamlined trade and traveller processes albeit through ageing border
systems. Conversely, the ABF undertakes trade enforcement activities to protect government revenue and
ensuring compliance with Australia’s customs laws.
The role of the ABF requires the confidence of the Australian Government, Australian community, our
international and domestic partners, industry and civil society stakeholders. This confidence is realised
through the demonstration of the key ABF values of integrity, respect, teamwork, professionalism and
accountability. These values are the foundation for the leadership role all officers of the ABF are expected to
demonstrate. The ABF conducts a diverse range of functions for which we embrace strategies for diversity in
our workforce. This workforce is supported by the ABF College which through a nationally consistent
curriculum, builds operational excellence, leadership and officer capability for trainee recruits and
experienced ABF officers.
Our Mission
Our Vision
To be a global leader in border law enforcement and trusted partner that helps build a safe,
secure and prosperous Australia.
Integrity Professionalism
Respect Accountability
Teamwork
2 Corporate Performance
2.1 Budget
The Secretary is the responsible Public Governance, Performance and Accountability authority for the
ABF as well as the employer of ABF officers with the exception of the statutorily appointed Commissioner.
The ABF is operationally independent, although it is established within the Department of Home Affairs for
budgetary, employment and administrative purposes.
Within the Department of Home Affairs construct, as the operational arm, the ABF comprises of an
Operations Group and a Support Group. The Commands within the Operations and Support Groups work
closely to deliver a framework of management, operational policy and support required to effectively deliver
border operations. Please refer to Appendix 1.
The ABF’s performance measures are reported as part of the Department of Home Affairs annual report.
The ABF’s operating budget as of February 2019 was $856.4 million.
Outcome 1
Protect Australia’s sovereignty, security and safety through its national security, emergency management
system, law enforcement, and managing its border, including managing the stay and departure of all
non-citizens.
Outcome 3
Advance Australia’s economic interests through the facilitation of the trade of goods to and from Australia
and the collection of border revenue.
To deliver on the PBS Outcomes the ABF’s contributions are achieved through a suite of core functions.
The ABF’s role in border protection involves facilitating traveller and cargo clearance while
preventing the cross border movements of individuals who represent a threat, and the importation
of illicit drugs.
In 2018, there were more than 44 million detections of illicit drugs; 17,123 undeclared firearms,
parts and accessories detected and 217,753 detections of illicit tobacco at the border.
The ABF plays a crucial role in maintaining the integrity of the migration and visa system, which
enhances Australia’s economic interest, and promotes a prosperous and cohesive society. In 2018,
over 44 million air travellers were processed at the border, with more than 26 million using
automated SmartGate technology.
Our work with partner agencies helps identify, target and disrupt high-level criminal activity
associated with the unlawful movement and exploitation of people. In 2018, the ABF located
2,061 illegal workers, and detained and affected the return and removal of unlawful non-citizens.
Continued growth in cargo volumes saw more than 50 million air cargo consignments and more than
3 million sea cargo manifests processed in 2018. In the same year more than 49 million international
mail items were inspected.
The Department of Home Affairs whole of government approach to detecting and deterring illegal
foreign fishing in the Australian Maritime Domain proved to be extremely effective, with 10 illegal
foreign fishing vessels detected and intercepted in Australian waters during 2018.
Australia’s onshore immigration detention network has adapted to reflect changes to the detainee
cohort, including the risks posed by those with serious criminal convictions. There were 1,285 people
in Australian detention at the end of 2018.
Asbestos
The ABF recognises the crucial role it plays within the anti-money laundering strategy. The frequent
cross-border movement of trade, travellers and finances sees the ABF as pivotal in delivering
effective border related enforcement measures to counter illicit financial flows. Additionally,
the ABF contributes to national strategies on corporate and economic crime.
Tobacco – Illicit Tobacco Taskforce
The Illicit Tobacco Taskforce (ITTF) is led by the ABF and builds on the previous success of the
Tobacco Strike Team. It protects Commonwealth revenue by pro-actively targeting, disrupting and
dismantling organised crime syndicates involved in the trade of illicit tobacco.
The ITTF carried out its first operational activity on 24 July 2018 and seized more than 17 acres of
illegal tobacco crops and 6 tonnes of tobacco leaf (estimated excise value of AUD $13.3 million)
near Katherine, Northern Territory.
As at 28 February 2019, approximately 394 tonnes of undeclared tobacco by equivalent weight has
been detected by the ABF during the 2018-19 financial year across all streams. This represents over
AUD $411 million in evaded duty.
Noting the majority of the UNC population has overstayed a visa (rather than had a visa cancelled),
as at 30 June 2018, there were an estimated 62,950 unlawful non-citizens (UNC) in the community,
comprising of the following visa categories.
Visitors 47,050
Students 8,680
Migrant 30
Other 2,730
The ABF protects Australia’s border to facilitate legitimate travel and trade while at the same time,
ensuring compliance with regulatory controls. The ABF safeguards our border from people who seek
to threaten Australia’s safety and security, commit immigration fraud or evade payment of duties
and taxes.
Through an intelligence informed and risk-based approach, the ABF inspects baggage, cargo and
mail to ensure that people and goods entering and leaving Australia adhere to our strict border
controls. ABF officers use specialist technology at maritime ports, airports, depots, mail centres and
have mobile detection capabilities to guard against terrorism and the movement of illegal or illicit
products or substances.
The ABF also operates container examination facilities (CEFs) in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane,
Fremantle, Adelaide, Newcastle, Darwin and Townsville. They enable rapid inspection and physical
examination of selected sea cargo to assist with detecting prohibited goods and verifying compliance
with import and export requirements.
Asbestos
Australia has a comprehensive prohibition on the importation of goods containing asbestos.
Many of Australia’s major trading partners have banned or restricted the use of asbestos
domestically, but do not have import or export prohibitions to the same standards as Australia.
The ABF has significantly increased its operational efforts towards addressing the risk of asbestos,
with a substantial increase in the targeting and testing of at-risk goods. In 2017-18, there were
70 positive asbestos detections:
- vehicles and/or vehicle parts (62 detections)
- aircraft (2 detections)
- building products (5 detections)
- within a mineral (1 detection)
In March 2019, strengthened penalties for asbestos border offences came into effect. A person
found guilty of the unlawful importation or exportation of asbestos may now be imprisoned for up to
five years.
Illicit Drugs
Australia is a high profit illicit drug market, particularly compared to other countries. This is a major
strategic driver of illicit drug importations into Australia. The ABF supports the role of Commonwealth
and State and Territory law enforcement agencies in combatting the illicit drug trade market.
Methamphetamine, cocaine and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) are the three main
drugs supplied to the Australian drug market. However, New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) have
also emerged in recent years as a major threat to Australia.
There were over 43,000 detections of illicit and restricted drugs at the border by the ABF during
2017-18, with a combined weight of more than 11 tonnes prevented from reaching the community.
Child Exploitation
The ABF has detected more than 160 travellers with objectionable media at Australian airports,
inclusive of child exploitation material and extremist propaganda during 2018-19.
The Passport Legislation Amendment (Overseas Travel by Child Sex Offenders) Act 2017 came into
effect on 13 December 2017 after achieving Royal Assent on 27 June 2017. This Act makes it an
offence for registered Australian child sex offenders with reporting obligations to competent
authorities to depart Australia without permission.
As at 31 December 2018, 278 Australian travellers on the Australian National Child Offenders
Register attempted to depart Australia. Of the 278 travellers, 35 were not permitted to board.
Travellers departing Australia were cleared by the AFP to travel from a competent authority.
Counter Terrorism
It is the ABF’s priority to contribute to the whole of government effort to prevent potential terrorist
acts and actors affecting the safety, cohesion and wellbeing of Australian society, including returning
foreign fighters and Right-Wing Extremists.
ABF counter terrorism efforts include detecting and responding to maritime terrorist threats and the
protection of offshore assets and resources through the development of our maritime capability and
response. The ABF, through Maritime Border Command, is the coordinating authority for Australia’s
whole of government response to and recovery from terrorist acts in the offshore maritime
environment to the outer boundary of Australia’s Security Forces Authority Area (SFAA).
The ABF Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) enhance the ABF’s onshore capability to deal with both
inbound and outbound national security risks across the national security spectrum (inclusive of
Right-Wing Extremists). They intervene or intercept persons of national security interest in ABF
controlled areas under the Customs Act 1901.
CTU responsibilities include detection, deterrence, and collection of information of intelligence value
concerning persons of national security interest at the border in support of whole of government
counter terrorism efforts. There were over 150,000 real time assessments with 321 interceptions
through CTU activity measures in 2018-19 year-to-date.
Firearms
The majority of undeclared firearm importations are sent by legitimate international firearms dealers
who are unware of Australia’s restrictions on firearms.
The ABF plays an important role in mitigating the threat of illicit firearms to the Australian community,
through detections at the border and actively participating in multi-agency intelligence initiatives
seeking to better monitor the movement, use and actors involved in illicit firearm activity.
The ABF uses a variety of detection methodologies and technologies, including x-ray and detector
dogs to prevent a significant number of firearms entering the community.
From 2015 to 2017, more than $4.2 million has been invested to significantly upgrade x-ray
screening capabilities at container examination facilities (CEFs) and mobile mail screening
capability, to assist officers combat the increasing sophistication of the methods of concealment
employed by organised crime groups.
Exploitation of Natural Resources
Australian waters and surrounding seas offer healthy fisheries resources that will continue to attract
entities intent on illegally exploiting Australia’s natural resources. Maritime Border Command (MBC)
remains committed to countering the illegal exploitation of natural resources within the Australian
Maritime Domain.
Foreign fishers operating illegally in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone (AEEZ) pose a
threat to Australia’s natural resources, protected environments, biosecurity and border security.
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) is the lead agency for implementing
national fishing policy and acts on behalf of the Australian Government to implement a policy
for the management and sustainable use of Commonwealth fish resources.
MBC undertakes compliance and enforcement action on behalf of AFMA against illegal foreign
fishers (IFF) operating in the AEEZ.
Continued efforts in Australia’s northern waters have led to a major decrease in IFF activity,
with numbers of IFF vessels detected and intercepted in Australian waters dropping from
more than 300 in 2006, to only 14 in 2017-18.
1
Sourced from UNHCR Statistics Database (as at 31 June 2018) – http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern
The ITTF commenced operations on 1 July 2018 with all agencies working collectively in order to
effectively coordinate and triage intelligence to drive operational priorities for the ITTF,
and direct the operational activities of the ITTF in pursuit of strategic objectives.
Since the establishment of the ITTF on 1 July 2018, the Taskforce has effected the seizure of in
excess of 71 tonnes of smuggled tobacco and approximately 103 million smuggled cigarettes. This is
equivalent to more than AUD $161 million in evaded duty.
Serious Migration and Foreign Worker Exploitation
The ABF led Taskforce Cadena, established with Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) in 2015, to address
illegal work, migration fraud and foreign worker exploitation, has identified threats posed by serious
and organised crime groups actively exploiting Australia’s migration system including using foreign
workers for financial gain and to undertake criminal activities in Australia. Many of the most serious
offenders remain offshore in order to subvert law enforcement activities to disrupt their activity.
In particular, the ABF has identified that criminal syndicates are:
- involved in other serious criminal offending including illegal sex work, human trafficking,
modern slavery, illicit drug and tobacco importations and money laundering;
- using complex financial structures to facilitate and hide illegal activity, and avoid payment of
taxes, creditors and employee entitlements;
- using complicit facilitators such as unregulated labour hire intermediaries, registered or unlawful
migration agents to facilitate the movement of foreign workers, including pathways for
permanent residency; and
- adapting their methodology to defeat migration controls, compromise visa programs and sustain
their criminal enterprise.
The ABF will continue to apply available enforcement options, ranging from education, compliance
and prosecution.
There is a significant opportunity to enhance the response to serious migration fraud and exploitation
of foreign workers through a dedicated multi-agency taskforce that delivers a more coordinated,
targeted and enduring response. This could include:
- improving the ability to identify and support victims through communication and engagement
activities;
- delivering targeted industry engagement activities to identify vulnerabilities and opportunities to
mitigate exploitation;
- coordinated and targeted operational activity that maps the supply chain, illicit financial flows
and targets high risk industries and criminal actors;
- targeting facilitators such as unscrupulous employers, complicit registered or unlawful migration
services and financial service providers;
- enhancing the investigation of serious migration and foreign worker exploitation, and other
associated criminal activity by leveraging the specialist capabilities and resources of law
enforcement agencies, domestically and internationally; and
- policy and legislation change to harden the criminal environment and protect Australia’s
migration program.
4 Outlook
The ABF has finite human and financial resources. We operate in a constrained environment and endeavour
to maximise efficiencies where possible and invest in new technologies to support border clearance
processes. We must perform to the highest standards while remaining agile to anticipate and respond to
emerging threats, and capitalise on opportunities to partner with domestic and international border, customs,
immigration, intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
Over the next four years we predict that:
Volumes in trade and travel will continue to increase at an exponential rate. We expect a 21 per cent
increase in international passengers and crew arriving and departing Australia.
Air cargo imports are forecast to increase by 34 per cent. This requires multi-skilled, agile ABF
officers and innovative processes and responses. Growth in legitimate and illicit forms of trade,
traveller and migration patterns means we need to work with domestic and international partner
agencies more closely than ever before.
With the rise of e-commerce, new platforms and diversified supply chains, several challenges lie
ahead for the clearance of goods. The rapid proliferation of online retailers offering Australian
consumers competitively priced products is likely to further facilitate deliberate non-compliant
activities by opportunistic offenders, particularity if these retailers encourage activities like
misdeclaration and the undervaluation of goods.
Supply chains, revenue evasion and fraud, terrorism, child exploitation, people smuggling,
human trafficking, illicit drugs and illegal foreign fishing present complex challenges at the
border. These require rapid and often multi-agency responses. We must be alert and
responsive to changing threats, and work as a trusted partner across the border continuum.
People smuggling remains an enduring threat, despite the reduced attempts to reach Australia
illegally by boat, people smugglers remain active in our region and will seize opportunities to restart
their trade. The ABF will need to balance border compliance and control with trade and travel
services that ensure legitimate people and goods are able to move unhindered.
For most major cruise ship terminals, cruise ship arrivals and departure are seasonal, with the peak
season being between October and May. Cruise ship operators are looking to increase their offering
to retain and attract customers which sees an increasing number of requests for border clearance
services to be provided by the ABF away from established locations, particularly throughout remote
and regional Australia.
Nationally, the ABF operates across numerous areas, including international airports, international mail and
cargo facilities, seaports, wharves and cruise terminals, regional and remote areas, within the Australian
Maritime Domain (AMD) and across the immigration detention network. Currently, the ABF has a permanent
presence at the 10 major international airports and is responsible for 68 ports appointed under section 15 of
the Customs Act 1901.
2
Figure does not include ABF officers posted overseas.
Queensland 821
Tasmania 12
Victoria 1,052
Total 5,697
5.2 International
Our internationally posted ABF officers and Airline Liaison Officers (ALO) work in high-risk source and transit
countries to protect the Australian community with the intent of disrupting threats before they cross our
border. They contribute to offshore detection and disruption efforts through tactical and strategic
identification, detection and response to potential threats. The ABF forms part of the Department of Home
Affairs international network working collaboratively to advance Australia’s priorities and interests
internationally. The ABF’s international footprint comprises of 37 ABF officers posted at 19 strategic locations
and our ALO network comprise 21 officers posted at 16 key international airports.
The ABF’s Airline Liaison Offshore Program maintains a strong position offshore to monitor, detect and deter
the global flow of illicit people movements across borders and to reduce and prevent the travel of those that
represent a risk to the Australian community. This is achieved by detecting identity, passport and visa fraud,
people with criminal links or who are of national security concern and feeding information back into the
Department of Home Affairs to inform pre-visa grant decision makers on trends. ALOs also work in close
consultation with airlines, airport security groups and host government authorities offshore to prevent the
travel of improperly documented passengers and facilitate the travel of genuine passengers. In addition,
it supports regional immigration partners to enhance their effectiveness in detecting the movement of
people on false documentation.
Through our international network we also ensure our strategic and operational priorities are aligned with
the Department of Home Affairs and managed in conjunction with other agencies such as the AFP, ASIO,
ACIC and AUSTRAC and we may also assist in emergency and crisis management; deploying overseas
where the Australian Government commits to assisting in the evacuation of Australians. The ABF leads and
manages the bilateral and multilateral engagement with Customs administrations and Customs focused fora
including the World Customs Organization (WCO) which is the lead inter-governmental body on Customs
matters. Engagement with the WCO provides the ABF with a platform to engage with other strategic partners
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, European Union, United Nations, Europol,
INTERPOL and other non-government organisations.
In the Asia/Pacific (A/P) region, the ABF works collaboratively with the WCO and organisations such as the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and the Oceania Customs Organization (OCO) to promote and progress Customs’ administrations
enforcement agendas. Multilateral Engagement also works closely with the WCO’s regional structures
(Regional Intelligence Liaison Office A/P and Regional Office for Capacity Building) to build Customs
capability, and enhance enforcement outcomes through operations, information and intelligence exchange
as well as cooperation between all Customs administrations.
The ABF also leverages international capabilities through our membership in the Five Eyes and Border5 (B5)
group. The B5 was established to enable greater levels of coordination, encourage international best
practice and to identify areas for joint collaboration that deliver operational outcomes that are critical to
ensuring Australia’s national security and economic prosperity.
A breakdown of our overseas locations and the number of officers posted is outlined below.
Abu Dhabi 1
Ankara 1
Bangkok 3
Beijing 2
Brussels 1
Colombo 1
Doha 1
Dubai 1
Guangzhou 1
Hong Kong 4
Jakarta 5
Kuala Lumpur 6
London 1
Manila 2
New Delhi 1
Shanghai 1
Singapore 3
Suva 1
Yangon 1
Total 37
Australia’s current surveillance capacity is deployed on the basis of available intelligence concerning civil
maritime security threats to cover priority threat axes. The current eight civil maritime security threats are:
illegal maritime arrivals; illegal exploitation of natural resources; illegal activity in protected areas; marine
pollution; prohibited imports and exports; compromise to biosecurity; piracy, robbery and violence at sea;
and maritime terrorism.
The image below outlines the AMD. The dark blue area is the Contiguous zone, where contraventions of
customs and immigration laws can be enforced, the green area is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
where fishing, environmental and resources laws are applicable, and the pink areas are continental shelf
extensions to seabed and subsoil resources as allowed by the United Nations. The area bounded in orange
constitutes Australia’s search and rescue region as well as the area in which Australia assumes
responsibility as the Security Forces Authority for coordination of response to incidents of piracy,
robbery and violence at sea.
6 Our Enablers
6.1 Our People
ABF officers are employed under the Public Service Act 1999 with the Secretary as the PGPA authority
and the employer of all ABF officers excluding the Commissioner who is statutorily appointed by the Minister.
The ABF workforce is made up of Border Force Officers (BFOs) who are part of the Border Operations
vocational stream. BFOs are operationally ready, must be sworn, generally uniformed and are able to be
deployed at short notice across a range of operating domains.
Since the stand-up of the ABF in July 2015, the ABF continues to transition to a modern, border law
enforcement agency capable of operating as a world leading customs organisation, while protecting
our border from new challenges. ABF officers:
are professional, highly skilled and well-supported with training and opportunities to expand
our knowledge and skills
have the highest levels of personal and professional integrity
are challenged with exciting work and new opportunities every day
are part of a highly capable team
are proud of the work they do and are willing to get the job done
In June 2018, the ABF released its strategic narrative Realising our Full Potential. This document sets the
ABF direction over the next three years and details the ABF’s mission, vision, values, challenges and
behaviours. Additionally, it sets out three key priorities to strengthen our operational performance including:
Leadership, Officer Capability and Operational Excellence. There are more than 30 initiatives that will enable
the ABF to deliver on these key priorities and equip the ABF to tackle challenges into the future.
A breakdown of the ABF workforce demographics
Ongoing 5,138
Non-ongoing 59
Table 1: Employee headcount by employment type (includes ABF officers posted overseas)
Under 25 years – 4%
25 - 34 years – 18%
35 - 44 years – 30%
Age Distribution
45 - 54 years – 31%
55 - 64 years – 15%
Over 65 years – 2%
Female – 43.7%
Gender
Male – 56.3%
APS 3 1,657
APS 4 620
APS 5 1,247
APS 6 829
EL 1 450
SES 41
Total 5,734
Key agencies
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) State and Territory law enforcement agencies
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority Department of Industry, Innovation and Science
Comcare
Industry
International Organisations
Regional Partners
Customs, Immigration and Partner agencies in regional Countries that ABF have a presence.
Powers of Officers
ABF officers are able to exercise a range legislative powers to perform functions in specific circumstances or
certain geographical areas following one or more pre-conditions being met. These powers may either be
vested directly in an officer or delegated to an officer (from the Minister, Secretary or ABF Commissioner).
In certain circumstances, officers may exercise a range of powers under other State and Territory legislation
and under non-portfolio Commonwealth legislation, such as:
Australian Passports Act 2005
Crimes Act 1914
Criminal Code Act 1995
Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003
Fisheries Management Act 1991
Navigation Act 2012
Biosecurity Act 2015
Torres Strait Fisheries Act 1984
Crimes at Sea Act 2000
3
Part XVB – Special Provisions Relating to Anti-Dumping Duties and Part XVC – International Trade Remedies Forum is administered
by the Anti-Dumping Commission in the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science.
Delegations
The legislation administered by the ABF contains the broad structure of legal rules under which non-citizens,
goods and cargo operate. The delegated powers are broad, ranging from migration, questioning, searching
and detaining persons to the use of firearms in certain circumstances.
Officers can only exercise a power if they have been delegated or authorised to do so by the Minister,
Secretary or Commissioner/Comptroller-General of Customs in the relevant Instrument of Delegation or
Authorisation.
There are three possible ways any given power, duty or function set out in an Act is exercised:
1. The person vested with the power, duty or function may exercise it themselves.
2. Where the Act enables it, a power, duty or function may be delegated pursuant to an instrument of
delegation and exercised in the name of the delegate.
3. Where the enactment does not include a delegation provision, and the power, duty or function is of
an administrative nature, the person in whom it is vested may authorise, expressly or impliedly,
another person to exercise it in the name of the person vested with it, that is, as an agent
Support Group
Operations Group