Succession - Cases
Succession - Cases
Succession - Cases
DECISION
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez
entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981
and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, 4 this time in
the amount of ₱123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another
unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory
note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed
a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently in March
1981, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings,
the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
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Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was
not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the
date of his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to
respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint
agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was
null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.14 Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the
court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. 15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate
court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of
money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found
that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22,
1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was
void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no
valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that
petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which
the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of
respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint
agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause
of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE
HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT
TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she
cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both
heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the
probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those
enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the
heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was
tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the
petitioner should have been presented before the probate court. 17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner
should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void,
since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA,
page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic
terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD
BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER
RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL
DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY
AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF ₱128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13,
1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE
RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR
EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve
the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and
assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint
agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary
thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of
the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the
ordinary civil action against the petitioner’s claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the
claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the
joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under consideration would be
equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing the vinculum jurisor the legal bond between the late Efraim
Santibañez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory
Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibañez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as
the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions
of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named
respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was
no need for the petitioner to file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner
stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as
heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is
trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should
have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the
joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew
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about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.1a\^/phi1.net
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the
agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by
her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as
it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights,
as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate
court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on
the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nét
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all
the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. 21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
embraced in the will.23 In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez, left a holographic
will24 which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my
demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph
in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time
he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs
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is not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors
among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way
without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the
Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears
to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative,
and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover,
it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the
decedent.28 In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement
were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were.
Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may
have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of
the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that
the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and
use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to
the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir
shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The petitioner,
purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. — All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any
action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the
deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
6
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor
of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the
estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory.30 As
we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and
to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation
and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the
estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the
decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any
defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it
is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned
its assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation
and Union Bank of the Philippines…"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that
the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere
can the petitioner’s participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or
testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank
is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did
not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of
the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic
vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36 This being the case, the petitioner’s personality to file the
complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court
did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC
SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACTS; BINDING EFFECT OF CONTRACTS UPON HEIRS OF DECEASED PARTY. — The
binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in
the Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 39). The reason is that whatever payment
is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately
a payment by the heirs and distributes, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or
reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. The general rule,
therefore, is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
2. ID.; SURETYHIP; NATURE OF OBLIGATION OF SURETY. — The nature of the obligation of the
surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are
contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. The creditor expects of the surety
nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys that said creditor might have to disburse on
account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of
money, resulting from an obligation to give; and to the creditor, it was indifferent that the
reimbursement should be made by the surety himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long
as the money was paid to it.
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity
agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H.
Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of
having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The twenty
counterbonds, or indemnity agreements, all contained the following stipulations:
"Premiums. — As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree
to pay the COMPANY the sum of ________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in
advance as premium there of for every __________ months or fractions thereof, this ________
or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.
Indemnity. — The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the
COMPANY and keep it indemnified and hold and save it harmless from and against any and all
damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of whatsoever kind and
nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having
become surety upon this bond or any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made
at the instance of the undersigned or any of them or any order executed on behalf of the
undersigned or any of them; and to pay, reimburse and make good to the COMPANY, its
successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or
cause to be paid, or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or any of them, of
whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount involved in the litigation or other
matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorney’s fees, but in no case less
than P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we
equally bind ourselves for the payment thereof under the same terms and conditions as above
mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement for the purpose and
that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this
________ which may be granted under this indemnity agreement.
Interest on amount paid by the Company. — Any and all sums of money so paid by the company
shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated
and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the capital and the total
sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY
shall have become liable therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any
part thereof or not.
x x x
Waiver. — It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which
may arise between them by reason of this document and which has to be submitted for decision
9
to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent jurisdiction in the City of
Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and
approval of this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived.
x x x
Our Liability Hereunder. — It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the
principal upon his default, or to exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder
of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary one, the same as that of
the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default." (Rec. App.
pp. 98- 102.)
The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty
bonds it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for
the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent interest
thereon.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemady’s estate, the lower
court, by order of September 23, 1953, dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds:
(1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not contemplated under the
indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they
were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; and (2) that "whatever
losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death
he ceased to be guarantor."
Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning of
the court below ran as follows:
"The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor
terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the
claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that there is merit in this contention
and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement
has been added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is: integrity. As correctly pointed out
by the Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the
death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss
therefore, may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate because upon his
death he ceased to be a guarantor.
Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the
personality, character, honesty and integrity of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact
that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled ‘Security by
way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced by the security company. The
security company has not demanded from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of
giving security by way of first mortgage. In the supporting papers of the claim presented by Luzon
Surety Company, no real property was mentioned in the list of properties mortgaged which
10
appears at the back of the indemnity agreement." (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).
We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under
the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that — "Contracts take effect only as between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligations arising
from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles
774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so
provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law."
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death."
"Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the
rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties with
respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate of the deceased
(Barrios v. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).
x x x
"The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of
Civil Procedure, and, in accordance with that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be
held to be "third persons" in relation to any contracts touching the real estate of their decedent
which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all the
obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights."
(See also Galasinao v. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman v. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision in our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from
his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
11
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization"
of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has characterized the
history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the
obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying
only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal,
i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and
by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated
as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K.
H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the
reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of
the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money,
resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was indifferent that the
reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as
the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being
exceptional and contrary to the general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied,
but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly inferable from the provisions of
the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are
non-transferable.
Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los efectos de
los vinculos juridicos creados por sus antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es
indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.
Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir más allá de las personas que les dieron
vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los sucesores de esa persona; cuando no se quiera esto, se impone
una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente
se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon." (Scaevola, Codigo
Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)
Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have
contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate
to that effect; hence, his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon
12
his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to execute a
mortgage indicates nothing more than the company’s faith and confidence in the financial
stability of the surety, but not that his obligation was strictly personal.
The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are
"not transmissible by operation of law". The provision makes reference to those cases where the
law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal
support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece
of work (Article 1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the
articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no
provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.
The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that "one who is
obliged to furnish a guarantor must present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind
himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he guarantees". It will be
noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the
perfection of the contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become
perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the guarantor would not operate to
exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; and if that be true of his capacity to
bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article
alongside the capacity.
The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:
"ART. 2057. — If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving
dishonesty or should become insolvent, the creditor may demand another who has all the
qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor has
required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor."
From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the
guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance of his integrity after he has become bound) does not
terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of the
guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor: it is his right, not his duty; he may waive
it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil
Code is incompatible with the trial court’s stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor
or surety makes the latter’s undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the
guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the
contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed
upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable
against his estate under section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; Gaskell & Co. v. Tan Sit, 43
13
Phil. 810, 814).
"The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound
as surety or guarantor for a principal who is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of
suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he himself pays something
by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly
arises in favor of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until
the surety has contributed something to the payment of the debt, or has performed the secured
obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody — no claim that could be
reduced to judgment. (May v. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; Gibson v. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; Maxey v. Carter,
10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves v. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; Ernst v. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)"
For defendant administratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the
surety files claims against the estate of the principal debtor; and it is urged that the rule does not
apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady was a surety, not a principal debtor. The
argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between parties. If under the Gaskell ruling,
the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal
debtors if the latter should die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim
against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor of his principals. What the
Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the
estate of Hemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the
benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal debtor.
The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against
the principal debtors under Articles 2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.
Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that
in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s liability for premiums and
stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety’s claim did
state a cause of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the
court of origin, with instructions to proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the
Administratrix- Appellee. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.
14
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal
redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at
Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the
following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez,
1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026 was
instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the
aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed his
estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs. Angela
M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate, the estate
proceedings are still pending up to the present on account of the claims of creditors which exceed
the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was appointed judicial
administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of
the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the execution by her
attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal notices of the
sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the
name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it
of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was forwarded by the
latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta, Manila, and having
received the same on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them to plaintiff-appellant's
son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who in turn personally handed the letters to his mother, Mrs. Butte, on
December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendant-appellant, the vendor, thru her
15
attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers, wrote said bank on December 11, 1958 confirming vendee's
letter regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz property for the sum of P500,000.00.
Said letter was received by the bank on December 15, 1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's
counsel, the latter received the same on December 16, 1958. Appellant received the letter on
December 19, 1958.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter and a
Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This tender having
been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed the
corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court
of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly
excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply thereto,
trial was held, after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing plaintiff's
complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if ever she had
any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal redemptions provided
by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was likewise dismissed for not
being sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to this Court.
Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not plaintiff-
appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez, can
exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of
her share in the testate proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised the right of legal
redemption within the period prescribed by law.
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so
in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may
be. The deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an
affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is clear.
As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in
16
the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz
property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the
rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of
his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive the
decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. (657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from
the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code,
and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the
time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment(Art.
908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of
credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator
(Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art.
948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired
his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and from that instant,
they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original surviving co-owners
of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-owner of the
whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became entitled to exercise
the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Maria
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This
right of redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share which the
law nowhere takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of Jose
V. Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the possession of
the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the decedent's
debts and the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and the administrator may bring or
defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased (sec. 2,
Rule 88), such rights of possession and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez. The reason
is obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to Uy & Sons,
Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years after the death of Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his
estate. The redemption right vested in the heirs originally, in their individual capacity, they did
not derivatively acquire it from their decedent, for when Jose V. Ramirez died, none of the other
co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had as yet sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence,
there was nothing to redeem and no right of redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such
right at his death, he could not transmit it to his own heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire such
17
right of redemption eight years after his death, when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made;
because death extinguishes civil personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to
acquire or transmit rights and obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has not
been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of estate of
Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided portion in the Sta. Cruz
property, in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said undivided portion. Even if it
were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided share remains in the estate, the
heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before his demise, so that his heirs
are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V. Ramirez was himself a co-owner
thereof during his lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any one
of them, became personally vested with right of legal redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold
her own pro-indiviso interest to Uy & Sons. Even if subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez
(and of his heirs) should eventually be sold to satisfy the creditors of the estate, it would not
destroy their ownership of it before the sale, but would only convey or transfer it as in turn sold
(of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors. Hence, the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem
the Garnier share will not be retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal
redemptioner should be a co-owner at the time the undivided share of another co-owner is sold
to a stranger. Whether or not the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after exercising
the legal redemptioner is irrelevant for the purposes of law.
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs
would stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the inheritance
is repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is undisputed, the
purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title directly from the
deceased Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the administrator who
owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from the Ramirez heirs,
represented by the administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption being established, the next point
of inquiry is whether she had made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days from
notices as prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because the policy of the
law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period. In
considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice given by the
vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly and expressly
prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted from notice in
writing by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was immaterial who
gave the notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation in favor of the
stranger, the redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature
in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that method must
be deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] 528). As ruled in Wampler
vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275) —
Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may assume until
the contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted the
18
legislature in so legislating. The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller,
and not by the buyer, are easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position
to know who are his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice
by the seller removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice
being a reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller may still
contest the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the buyer.
The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as attorney-
in-fact of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, 1958, she
wrote the Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her principal's one-sixth (1/6) share
in the Sta. Cruz property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for P500,000.00. The Bank
received this notice on December 15, 1958, and on the same day endorsed it to Mrs. Butte, care
of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal (her attorneys), who received the same on December 16, 1958.
Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon the vendee's refusal, judicially consigned the price of
P500,000.00 on January 15, 1959. The latter date was the last one of the thirty days allowed by
the Code for the redemption, counted by excluding December 16, 1958 and including January 15,
1959, pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption was made in due time.
The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator Bank (December 15) can not be
counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not a
proper redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the share of Marie Garnier
did not form part of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.
We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for the
Garnier share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere individual
estimates of market price by a single realtor.
The redemption and consignation having been properly made, the Uy counterclaim for damages
and attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly unfounded,
becomes untenable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and
another one entered:
(a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte duly and
properly made;
(b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption of the one-
sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No. 59363 of the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
(c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to convey to
Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days from the time our
decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals and fruits of the redeemed
share from and after January 15, 1958, until its conveyance; and.
(d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable
to this opinion. Without finding as to costs.
19
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 131953 June 5, 2002
MA. ESTELA MAGLASANG, NICOLAS CABATINGAN and MERLY S. CABATINGAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN, namely, LUZ M. BOQUIA, PERLA M. ABELLA, ESTRELLA
M. CAÑETE, LOURDES M. YUSON, and JULIA L. MAYOL, HEIRS OF GENOVIVA C. NATIVIDAD
namely, OSCAR C. NATIVIDAD, OLGA NATIVIDAD, ODETTE NATIVIDAD, OPHELIA NATIVIDAD,
RICHARD NATIVIDAD, RAYMUND NATIVIDAD, RICHIE NATIVIDAD, SONIA NATIVIDAD and
ENCARNACION CABATINGAN VDA. DE TRINIDAD, ALFREDO CABATINGAN and JESUSA C.
NAVADA, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Posed for resolution before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the sole issue of whether the donations made by the late Conchita
Cabatingan are donations inter vivos or mortis causa.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, petitioner Nicolas
Cabatingan, a "Deed of Conditional of Donation (sic) Inter Vivos for House and Lot" covering one-
half (½) portion of the former's house and lot located at Cot-cot, Liloan, Cebu.1 Four (4) other
deeds of donation were subsequently executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 14, 1995,
bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two (2) parcels of land - one located in Cogon,
Cebu (307 sq. m.) and the other, a portion of a parcel of land in Masbate (50,232 sq. m.); (b)
petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land located in Masbate (80,000 sq. m.);
and (c) petitioner Merly S. Cabatingan, a portion of the Masbate property (80,000 sq. m.).2 These
deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the
DONOR does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE
the above-described property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing
thereon, to become effective upon the death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the
event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)
On May 9, 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.
20
Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 55, an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of
Deeds of Donations and Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2599, seeking the
annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed on January 14, 1995. Respondents
allege, inter alia, that petitioners, through their sinister machinations and strategies and taking
advantage of Conchita Cabatingan's fragile condition, caused the execution of the deeds of
donation, and, that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis
causa.4 Respondents prayed that a receiver be appointed in order to preserve the disputed
properties, and, that they be declared as co-owners of the properties in equal shares, together
with petitioner Nicolas Cabatingan.5
Petitioners in their Amended Answer, deny respondents' allegations contending that Conchita
Cabatingan freely, knowingly and voluntarily caused the preparation of the instruments.6
On respondents' motion, the court a quo rendered a partial judgment on the pleadings on
December 2, 1997 in favor of respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREREFORE, and in consideration of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant and unwilling co-plaintiff with regards (sic) to the four
Deeds of Donation Annexes "A", "A-1", "B" and Annex "C" which is the subject of this partial
decision by:
Declaring the four Deeds of Donation as null and void ab initio for being a donation Mortis Causa
and for failure to comply with formal and solemn requisite under Art. 806 of the New Civil Code;
b) To declare the plaintiffs and defendants as well as unwilling co-plaintiff as the heirs of the
deceased Conchita Cabatingan and therefore hereditary co-owners of the properties subject of
this partial decision, as mandated under Art. 777 of the New Civil Code;
SO ORDERED."7
The court a quo ruled that the donations are donations mortis causa and therefore the four (4)
deeds in question executed on January 14, 1995 are null and void for failure to comply with the
requisites of Article 806 of the Civil Code on solemnities of wills and testaments.8
Raising questions of law, petitioners elevated the court a quo's decision to this Court,9 alleging
that:
"THE LOWER COURT PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE LONG-AND-WELL-ESTABLISHED RULINGS OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE CHARACTERIZATION OF DONATIONS AS INTER
VIVOSOR MORTIS CAUSA AND, INSTEAD, PROCEEDED TO INTERPRET THE DONATIONS IN
QUESTION IN A MANNER CONTRARY THERETO."10
Petitioners insist that the donations are inter vivos donations as these were made by the late
Conchita Cabatingan "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" for the donee, and
there is nothing in the deeds which indicate that the donations were made in consideration of
Cabatingan's death.11 In addition, petitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case
21
petitioners die ahead of Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the
donation as inter vivos.
Petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the
donor is still alive."12 In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following
characteristics must be taken into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;
and
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. 13
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners
prior to Cabatingan's death.14 The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR"
admits of no other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership
of the properties to petitioners during her lifetime. Petitioners themselves expressly confirmed
the donations as mortis causa in the following Acceptance and Attestation clauses, uniformly
found in the subject deeds of donation, to wit:
"That the DONEE does hereby accept the foregoing donation mortis causa under the terms and
conditions set forth therein, and avail herself of this occasion to express her profound gratitude
for the kindness and generosity of the DONOR."
xxx
"SIGNED by the above-named DONOR and DONEE at the foot of this Deed of Donation mortis
causa, which consists of two (2) pages x x x."15
That the donations were made "in consideration of the love and affection of the donor" does not
qualify the donations as inter vivos because transfers mortis causa may also be made for the
same reason.16
Well in point is National Treasurer of the Phils. v. Vda. de Meimban.17 In said case, the
questioned donation contained the provision:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, the
said Donor by these presents does hereby give, transfer, and convey unto the DONEE, her heirs
and assigns a portion of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (100,000) SQUARE METERS, on the
southeastern part Pro-indiviso of the above described property. (The portion herein donated is
within Lot 2-B of the proposed amendment Plan Subdivision of Lots Nos. 1 and 2, Psu-109393),
22
with all the buildings and improvements thereon, to become effective upon the death of the
DONOR. (italics supplied.)"18
Notably, the foregoing provision is similar to that contained in the donation executed by
Cabatingan. We held in Meimban case that the donation is a mortis causa donation, and that the
above quoted provision establishes the donor's intention to transfer the ownership and
possession of the donated property to the donee only after the former's death. Further:
"As the donation is in the nature of a mortis causa disposition, the formalities of a will should
have been complied with under Article 728 of the Civil Code, otherwise, the donation is void and
would produce no effect. As we have held in Alejandro v. Geraldez (78 SCRA 245,253), "If the
donation is made in contemplation of the donor's death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee because of the donor's death, then
it is at that time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be
embodied in a last will and testament. (Citing Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 481)."19
We apply the above rulings to the present case. The herein subject deeds expressly provide that
the donation shall be rescinded in case petitioners predecease Conchita Cabatingan. As stated
in Reyes v. Mosqueda,20 one of the decisive characteristics of a donation mortis causa is that the
transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what
Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take
effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated be transferred to the
donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would have not expressed such
proviso in the subject deeds.1âwphi1.nêt
Considering that the disputed donations are donations mortis causa, the same partake of the
nature of testamentary provisions21 and as such, said deeds must be executed in accordance with
the requisites on solemnities of wills and testaments under Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
"ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses
of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them. (n)
23
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court. (n)"
The deeds in question although acknowledged before a notary public of the donor and the donee,
the documents were not executed in the manner provided for under the above-quoted
provisions of law.
Thus, the trial court did not commit any reversible error in declaring the subject deeds of
donation null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
24
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 146006 February 23, 2004
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their capacities as President and Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of Philippines International Life Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO M. AREOLA,
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS ADENAUER G. RIVERA and
PEDRO L. BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA ENDERES
claiming to be Special Administratrix, and other persons/ public officers acting for and in their
behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA G.R. 59736, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their
capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of Philippine International Life Insurance
Company) and Filipino Loan Assistance Group. The antecedent facts follow.
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on
July 6, 1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%)
of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortañez died. He left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three
legitimate children (Rafael, Jose and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya
Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo,
Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez).2
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortañez filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch (now Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez, docketed as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains
pending at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the
petition for letters of administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the
intestate court appoint a special administrator.
25
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael
and Jose Ortañez joint special administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the
appointment of a regular administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an
inventory of the estate of their father which included, among other properties, 2,029 3 shares of
stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing
50.725% of the company’s outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned
1,0144 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares with right
to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by
its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of
stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG
in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose Ortañez, acting in his personal capacity and
claiming that he owned the remaining 1,0115 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his inheritance share
in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. After one year, petitioner FLAG
consolidated in its name the ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose Ortañez
failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during the pendency of the intestate
proceedings at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortañez and her two
children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of
agreement dated March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio
Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves.
This was the basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana Ortañez on April 15, 1989
(1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortañez on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings
(hereafter referred to as private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for appointment of
special administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. This move was opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the motion of private respondents Enderes et
al. and appointed private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of
stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On January 9, 1996, she filed a
motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate.
These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
26
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again opposed by Special
Administrator Jose Ortañez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of
sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as
special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer
any shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a sale of a property of the estate
without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Since the sales
in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in their personal capacity
without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock
and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby denied.6
On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special
Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or
extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11, 1997 DENYING the approval of the
sale of Philinterlife shares of stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special
Administratrix, the "Urgent Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement" dated
December 19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as the
transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock are concerned, in particular, No.
5, 9(c), 10(b) and 11(d)(ii) of the Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982
executed by Juliana S. Ortañez, Rafael S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez as partially void ab
initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stocks are
concerned.7
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate court, Jose Ortañez filed, on December 22,
1997, a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied his petition,
however, ruling that there was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of
the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the
pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite approval of the
intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be
prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez
to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of
the intestate court, was void.8
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
decision but it was denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review
27
under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His
motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13, 1999. On February 23, 1999,
the resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez
became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled
board of directors, increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process
the 50.725% controlling interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance
company.9 This became the subject of a separate action at the Securities and Exchange
Commission filed by private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner Jose
Lee and other members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife on November 7, 1994.
Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez
and her sons against private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil
courts.10 Somehow, all these cases were connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale
of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG, represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose Lee who later became the president of Philinterlife after the
controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a
motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997
because the orders of the intestate court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes served a
copy of the motion to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and secretary,
respectively, of Philinterlife,11 but petitioners ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion for execution, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the 2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of the Estate of
Dr. Juvencio Ortañez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group (FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in the stock
and transfer book of Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife shares of stock in the name of the Estate
of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the owner thereof without prejudice to other claims for violation of
pre-emptive rights pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock certificates
of Philinterlife for 2,029 shares in the name of the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez as the owner
thereof without prejudice to other claims for violations of pre-emptive rights pertaining to the
said 2,029 Philinterlife shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes, has the power to
exercise all the rights appurtenant to the said shares, including the right to vote and to receive
dividends.
28
5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise,
to acknowledge and allow the said Special Administratrix to exercise all the aforesaid rights on
the said shares and to refrain from resorting to any action which may tend directly or indirectly
to impede, obstruct or bar the free exercise thereof under pain of contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or any other
person or persons claiming to represent it or otherwise, are hereby directed to comply with this
order within three (3) days from receipt hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and Pedro Borja are hereby directed to implement the
writ of execution with dispatch to forestall any and/or further damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.12
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the office of petitioners to execute the writ of
execution, he was barred by the security guard upon petitioners’ instructions. Thus, private
respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and
Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) in contempt.13
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion in (1) declaring that the ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of
stock was null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order declaring such nullity and (3)
depriving the petitioners of their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the light of the
following considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent judge had long become final and
executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is signed by only one (1) of the three (3) petitioners
in violation of the Rules; and
3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of execution, deed of sale with right to repurchase,
deed of sale of shares of stocks and omnibus motion, the petition is not accompanied by such
pleadings, documents and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations
therein in violation of the second paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.14
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao of the above decision was
denied by the Court of Appeals on October 30, 2000:
29
This resolves the "urgent motion for reconsideration" filed by the petitioners of our resolution of
July 26, 2000 dismissing outrightly the above-entitled petition for the reason, among others, that
the assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the respondent Judge had long become final and
executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court through a petition for
review under Rule 45 but on December 13, 2000, we denied the petition because there was no
showing that the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error to
warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.16
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee and Aggabao, the Supreme
Court granted the motion and reinstated their petition on September 5, 2001. The parties were
then required to submit their respective memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes, on July 19, 2000, filed a motion
to direct the branch clerk of court in lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao to reinstate the
name of Dr. Ortañez in the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife and issue the corresponding
stock certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides that "the
court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have the effect as if done by the party."
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao opposed the motion on the ground that the intestate court should
refrain from acting on the motion because the issues raised therein were directly related to the
issues raised by them in their petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion, ruling that there was
no prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders inasmuch as the appellate court did
not issue any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461, questioning this time the October 30, 2000 order of
the intestate court directing the branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale made in
their favor by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals
denied their petition and upheld the power of the intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners
Lee and Aggabao then filed motion for reconsideration which at present is still pending resolution
by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife)
and FLAG now raise the following errors for our consideration:
The Court of Appeals committed grave reversible ERROR:
A. In failing to reconsider its previous resolution denying the petition despite the fact that the
appellate court’s mistake in apprehending the facts had become patent and evident from the
30
motion for reconsideration and the comment of respondent Enderes which had admitted the
factual allegations of petitioners in the petition as well as in the motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration was
contained in only one page without even touching on the substantive merits of the exhaustive
discussion of facts and supporting law in the motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rule
on administrative due process;
B. in failing to set aside the void orders of the intestate court on the erroneous ground that the
orders were final and executory with regard to petitioners even as the latter were never notified
of the proceedings or order canceling its ownership;
C. in not finding that the intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction (1) when it issued the Omnibus Order nullifying the ownership of petitioner
FLAG over shares of stock which were alleged to be part of the estate and (2) when it issued a
void writ of execution against petitioner FLAG as present owner to implement merely provisional
orders, thereby violating FLAG’s constitutional right against deprivation of property without due
process;
D. In failing to declare null and void the orders of the intestate court which nullified the sale of
shares of stock between the legitimate heir Jose S. Ortañez and petitioner FLAG because of
settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that an heir has the right to dispose of the decedent’s property
even if the same is under administration pursuant to Civil Code provision that possession of
hereditary property is transmitted to the heir the moment of death of the decedent (Acedebo
vs. Abesamis, 217 SCRA 194);
E. In disregarding the final decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 128525 dated December 17,
1999 involving substantially the same parties, to wit, petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao
were respondents in that case while respondent Ma. Divina Enderes was the petitioner therein.
That decision, which can be considered law of the case, ruled that petitioners cannot be enjoined
by respondent Enderes from exercising their power as directors and officers of Philinterlife and
that the intestate court in charge of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate title to
properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are equally CLAIMED BY petitioner FLAG.17
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not
only the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated July 7, 2000 but also
the validity of the August 11, 1997 order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, in their personal capacities
and without court approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of
stock in their favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in
its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by
us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No. 135177 dismissing the petition for review
on a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on January 13, 1999 on
the ground that there was no compelling reason to reconsider said denial.18 Our decision became
31
final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments. For all
intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen
said issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties to
relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient
administration of justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 affirming the nullity of the sale
made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez of the Philinterlife shares of stock read:
Petitioner’s asseverations relative to said [memorandum] agreement were scuttled during the
hearing before this Court thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the Memorandum of Agreement was executed, did the children of
Juliana Salgado know already that there was a claim for share in the inheritance of the children
of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Your Honor please, at that time, Your Honor, it is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for extrajudicial settlement of a property subject of intestate
proceedings when there is an adverse claim of another set of heirs, alleged heirs? What would
be the legal justification for extra-judicially settling a property under administration without the
approval of the intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-judicial settlement there is an approval of the honorable
court as to the property’s partition x x x. There were as mentioned by the respondents’ counsel,
Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No…
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no adjudication of a property under intestate proceedings without the
approval of the court. That is basic unless you can present justification on that. In fact, there are
two steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the document and then ask for approval of the
document executed. Now, is there any legal justification to exclude this particular transaction
from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
32
ATTY. BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no legal justification, Your Honor, we rest the case for the
private respondent. How can the lower court be accused of abusing its discretion? (pages 33-35,
TSN of January 29, 1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing court
approval have appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the
exclusion and the extreme prejudice of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs,
without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among themselves and
proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by
the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification
for this action by the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife
shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum of Agreement dated March 4, 1982
(see Annex 7 of the Comment). . . are not the only heirs claiming an interest in the estate left by
Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez. The records of this case. . . clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981
an Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of Administration was filed by the
acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez with Ligaya Novicio. . . This claim by the
acknowledged natural children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez is admittedly known to the parties to
the Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the same. This much was admitted by
petitioner’s counsel during the oral argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence, public respondent can never be
faulted for not approving. . . the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortañez] and his mother
[Juliana Ortañez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez."
(pages 3-4 of Private Respondent’s Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of
jurisdiction committed by respondent judge.19
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and
Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their knowledge that
there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her
children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana
and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the
decedent.20 However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be allotted
to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that
33
is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their
shares.21 This means that an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific
properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of petitioner
FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what
happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval.
It is well-settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the
decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs. Orellano,22 we laid down the rule that the sale
of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the probate court is void
and passes no title to the purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,23 we ruled
that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties (fishpond) were included in the inventory
of properties of the estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on
November 14, 1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on March
3, 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the questioned deed of sale of
the fishponds was executed between petitioner and private respondent without notice and
approval of the probate court. Even after the sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon still included
the three fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her inventory submitted on
August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of
the fishponds in question, knew that the same were part of the estate under administration.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of the probate court which according
to our settled jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties
under administration. . . More emphatic is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes
(123 SCRA 767) where We stated that when the estate of the deceased person is already the
subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction
involving it without prior approval of the probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale
of an immovable property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special proceedings, needs
court approval. . . This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil
vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is within the jurisdiction of a
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs
before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the probate court
before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null
and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule
that a sale by an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
34
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the
property under administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected
without authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null
and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold petitioner’s
contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless
the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an
administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any
unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being
no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid
sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with
regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the
unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property would be meaningless. In other words,
enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s power to annul
unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale was affirmed by the
appellate courts (the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23, 1998 and
subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of
the decision of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of judgments on February
23, 1999. Considering the finality of the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed
by the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes to
thereafter move for a writ of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG, however, contend that the probate court could
not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale because said order was
merely provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to determine provisionally whether said
shares are included or excluded in the inventory… In ordering the execution of the orders,
respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and grossly violated settled law and
jurisprudence, i.e., that the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether a property
is included or excluded in the inventory of the estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the
subject of execution.24 (emphasis ours)
Petitioners’ argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this case, that the
Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as
in fact these shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by
Rafael Ortañez after he and his brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special administrators by
the intestate court.25
35
The controversy here actually started when, during the pendency of the settlement of the estate
of Dr. Ortañez, his wife Juliana Ortañez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock in favor
petitioner FLAG without the approval of the intestate court. Her son Jose Ortañez later sold the
remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the approval of the intestate
court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or exclusion of properties in the inventory of
the estate because there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife shares of stock
were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. Rather, we are concerned here with the
effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the
determination of the intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out
in a separate proceeding is incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next contend that the writ of execution should not
be executed against them because they were not notified, nor they were aware, of the
proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down
by the intestate court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation. This is the logical
consequence of our ruling in Godoy andin several subsequent cases.26 The sale of any property
of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the probate or intestate
court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon. Melencio
Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer
certificate of title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator after finding that the
sale of real property under probate proceedings was made without the prior approval of the
court. The dispositive portion of our decision read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed Order dated February 18, 1981 of
the respondent Judge approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is declared NULL and VOID
and hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and by the latter to
William Go is likewise declared NULL and VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the
latter is hereby ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlife’s authorized capital stock, approved on
the vote of petitioners’ non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make it difficult
for Dr. Ortañez’s estate to reassume its controlling interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab
initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only to them, did not appeal the decision of
the intestate court nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the vendor, Jose
Ortañez, appealed the case. A careful review of the records shows that petitioners had actual
knowledge of the estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private respondent Enderes
was questioning therein the sale to them of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
36
It must be noted that private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes filed before the
intestate court (RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85) a "Motion to Declare Void Ab Initio Deeds of Sale
of Philinterlife Shares of Stock" on March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already knew
of the pending settlement proceedings and that the shares they bought were under the
administration by the intestate court because private respondent Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes
and her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a case against them at the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 7, 1994, docketed as SEC No. 11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer
of shares of stock, annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of subscriptions on
increased capital stocks, accounting, inspection of corporate books and records and damages
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.27 In said case,
Enderes and her mother questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to petitioners. The
SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of
the intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of stock sold to petitioners by Jose
Ortañez and Juliana Ortañez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez who died, in 1980,
are part of his estate which is presently the subject matter of an intestate proceeding of the RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 85. Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the
documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of stocks were allegedly partitioned and
conveyed to Jose S. Ortañez who allegedly assigned the same to the other private respondents,
approval of the Court was not presented. Thus, the assignments to the private respondents [Jose
Lee et al.] of the subject shares of stocks are void.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stock owned by the late Dr.
Juvencio Ortañez, we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court
where the intestate proceedings are currently pending.28
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as early as March 24, 1995 recognizing the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Dr. Ortañez and the subsequent sale by the heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife
shares of stock to petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were not aware of the intestate
proceedings?
Furthermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing officer reached the Supreme Court in 1996
(docketed as G.R. 128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein filed their answer
which contained statements showing that they knew of the pending intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the jurisdiction of the SEC but with the
Regional Trial Court; Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be the common law
wife and illegitimate children of the late Ortañez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse
Juliana Ortañez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio, executed a Memorandum of
Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortañez, dividing the estate of
the deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties; that in the said
Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S. Ortañez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329 shares
of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares
37
of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of petitioners, private
respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of
Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortañez, the principal stockholder at that time,
executed a deed of sale of his shares of stock to private respondents; and that the right of
petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of
private respondent is barred by prescription.29
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes offered additional proof of actual
knowledge of the settlement proceedings by petitioners which petitioners never denied: (1) that
petitioners were represented by Atty. Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother of private
respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao for the
nullification of the sale of the shares of stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-around
and appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and (2) that the deeds of sale executed between
petitioners and the heirs of the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez) were
acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who, during the pendency of the settlement
proceedings, filed a motion for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock to the
Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc. (which motion was, however, later
abandoned).30 All this sufficiently proves that petitioners, through their counsels, knew of the
pending settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as libel (Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81), grave
coercion (Criminal Case No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No. Q-96-67919) against private
respondent’s mother Ligaya Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife,31 all of which criminal
cases were related to the questionable sale to petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept petitioners’ claim of denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where the opportunity to
be heard has been accorded, there is no denial of due process.32 In this case, petitioners knew of
the pending instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez’s estate but for
reasons they alone knew, they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of the sale,
they did not bother to appeal. And when they were notified of the motion for execution of the
Orders of the intestate court, they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners alone should bear the
blame. Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling in G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma.
Divina Ortañez-Enderes vs. Court of Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we allegedly ruled
that the intestate court "may not pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of
determining whether the same should or should not be included in the inventory but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties."
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No. 128525. The issue therein was whether the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes et al. were not entitled to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct
in affirming the resolution of the SEC denying the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
because injunction is not designed to protect contingent rights. Said case did not rule on the issue
of the validity of the sale of shares of stock belonging to the decedent’s estate without court
approval nor of the validity of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525
38
clearly involved a different issue and it does not therefore apply to the present case. Petitioners
and all parties claiming rights under them are hereby warned not to further delay the execution
of the Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P.
No. 59736 dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari and affirming the
July 6, 2000 order of the trial court which ordered the execution of its (trial court’s) August 11
and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
39
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth
Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R. CV No.
56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision dated July 8,
1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the petitioners to
pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental
and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and
P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively and (b) the
resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the motion for reconsideration of
its decision.
The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B which
were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental. Lot 773,
with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes
under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9, 1917 by the Register
of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the
other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a party
in this case.
Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as
she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around
twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated
some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to
40
settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the
"Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he
was informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession
of Lot 773. 2
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT No. RF 2694
describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and as originally
registered under OCT No. 8804.
The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the
name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said
transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was originally
registered under OCT No. 8804.
On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-19291
and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6
After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof
(Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-
B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de
Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT Nos. T-
23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to Rosendo
Alvarez. 10
Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino,
namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of
Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and
823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of
the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting, the share
or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be ordered to
pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11
During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-
B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919 and 30920
were issued to Siason, 13 who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for assessment
purposes. 14
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other
plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating that
the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or otherwise,
against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-entitled case." 15
41
On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to the
plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of said defendant,
and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the plaintiffs. No special pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in
the aforesaid decision.
However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return of
service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been
subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who had
purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as Siason
was "not a party per writ of execution." 17
The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private
respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity
of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required
Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.
Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658, not
Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge of any
lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral
proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was
not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding
said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965,
nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned
therein. 21
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No. 5022, the
lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of the land in
question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as he was not
a party in the case. 23
The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,
Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for the
cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void; the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the sheriffs
return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to the
42
Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title could not
be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum of P45,000.00.
They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from November 13,
1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and severally pay the
Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00 plus attorney's
fees of P4, 000.00. 25
In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and 773-
B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had become res
judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order. 26 On their part, the Alvarez
stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred by res judicata, statute
of limitation and estoppel." 27
In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the
properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies,
was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in
their failure to place a notice of lis pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental
in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity
demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed
between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is hereby rendered in the following
manner:
A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register of Deeds are (sic) hereby
dismmissed,
B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez being the legitimate
children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of
Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's
fees, all with legal rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final payment.
C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the defendants, Laura, Flora
and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby dismissed.
D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are hereby ordered to pay the
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 29
The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August
31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to
pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is
reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual
43
damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively." 31 The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants
to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs- appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual
value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and is
reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual
damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court
denied the same.
Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:
1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been timely and properly
invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower court.
2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private respondents, if ever there are
any, as alleged in their complaint dated February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial
court as Civil Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or prescription
of action and estoppel.
3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case No. 5022, supra and father
of the petitioners become a privy and/or party to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil
Case No. 8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and absolutely waived,
renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated November
6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been controverted or even impliedly or indirectly
denied by them.
4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos.
773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally
passed or transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and
due process . 33
The petition is devoid of merit.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the Supreme
Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the lots in
dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and executory and
with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the decision in Civil
Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended when Alvarez or his
heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court, every
44
litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a limit to it.
Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he
should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing party should
not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed, unscrupulous
litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of justice. 36
There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally
adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted
evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of the
lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to execute
Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private respondents Yaneses,
the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the petitioners' father to Dr. Siason
who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis pendens annotated on the titles.
Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a purchaser in good faith.
Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of Dr.
Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of Rosendo
Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) the
amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in dispute. It did not
order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38
As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the
landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is
to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property
has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. 39 "It is one thing to
protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if
deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious decided
As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such an
undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against." 40
The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil Case
No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on the
pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by the
lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have
therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another
case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and
executory.
Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B
made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo
Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the
general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children
and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
45
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are
not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature,
or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady
vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from
his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that
whatever payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or
distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are
transmissible to the successors.
The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties
that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has characterized the history of these institutions. From the
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation
from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring
those rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no other.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal
fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary
estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate. 42
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their
inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are other
properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of
private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the Court
of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
46
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44837 November 23, 1938
SOCORRO LEDESMA and ANA QUITCO LEDESMA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CONCHITA MCLACHLIN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Adriano T. de la Cruz for appellants.
Simeon Bitanga for appellees.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This case is before us by virtue of an appeal taken by the defendants Conchita McLachlin, Lorenzo
Quitco, Jr., Sabina Quitco, Rafael Quitco and Marcela Quitco, from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Occidental Negros, the dispositive part of which reads:
For the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment in this case declaring Ana Quitco
Ledesma an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, for legal
purposes, but absolving the defendants as to the prayer in the first cause of action that the said
Ana Quitco Ledesma be declared entitled to share in the properties left by the deceased Eusebio
Quitco.
As to the second cause of action, the said defendants are ordered to pay to the plaintiff Socorro
Ledesma, jointly and severally, only the sum of one thousand five hundred pesos(P1,500), with
legal interest thereon from the filing of this complaint until fully paid. No pronouncement is made
as to the costs. So ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court in its aforesaid decision:
1. That the trial court erred in holding, that the action for the recovery of the sum of P1,500,
representing the last installment of the note Exhibit C has not yet prescribed.
2. That the trial court erred in holding that the property inherited by the defendants from their
deceased grandfather by the right of representation is subject to the debts and obligations of
their deceased father who died without any property whatsoever.lawphi1.net
3. That the trial court erred in condemning the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff
Socorro Ledesma the sum of P1,500.
The only facts to be considered in the determination of the legal questions raised in this appeal
are those set out in the appealed decision, which have been established at the trial, namely:
In the year 1916, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the
latter was still single, of which relation, lasting until the year 1921, was born a daughter who is
the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. In 1921, it seems hat the relation between Socorro
47
Ledesma and Lorenzo M. Quitco came to an end, but the latter executed a deed (Exhibit A),
acknowledging the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922,
he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note (Exhibit C), of the following
tenor:
P2,000. For value received I promise to pay Miss Socorro Ledesma the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000). Philippine currency under the following terms: Two hundred and fifty pesos (P250) to
be paid on the first day of March 1922; another two hundred and fifty pesos (P250)to be paid on
the first day of November 1922; the remaining one thousand and five hundred (P1,500) to
be paid two years from the date of the execution of this note. San Enrique, Occ. Negros, P. I., Jan.
21, 1922.
Subsequently, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had
four children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M. Quitco died (Exhibit
5), and, still later, that is, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died, and as the
latter left real and personal properties upon his death, administration proceedings of said
properties were instituted in this court, the said case being known as the "Intestate of the
deceased Eusebio Quitco," civil case No. 6153 of this court.
Upon the institution of the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco and the appointment of the
committee on claims and appraisal, the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma, on August 26, 1935, filed
before said committee the aforequoted promissory note for payment, and the commissioners,
upon receipt of said promissory note, instead of passing upon it, elevated the same to this court
en consulta (Exhibit F), and as the Honorable Jose Lopez Vito, presiding over the First Branch,
returned said consulta and refrained from giving his opinion thereon (Exhibit C), the aforesaid
commissioners on claims and appraisal, alleging lack of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim, denied
he same (Exhibit H).
On November 14, 1933 (Exhibit I), the court issued an order of declaration of heirs in the
intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco, and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among
the declared heirs, Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the
reconsideration of said order, a petition which the court denied. From the order denying the said
petition no appeal was taken, and in lieu thereof there was filed the complaint which gives rise
to this case.
The first question to be decided in this appeal, raised in the first assignment of alleged error, is
whether or not the action to recover the sum of P1,500, representing the last installment for the
payment of the promissory note Exhibit C, has prescribed.
According to the promissory note Exhibit C, executed by the deceased Lorenzo M. Quitco, on
January 21, 1922, the last installment of P1,500 should be paid two years from the date of the
execution of said promissory note, that is, on January 21, 1924. The complaint in the present case
was filed on June 26, 1934, that is, more than ten years after he expiration of the said period. The
fact that the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma filed her claim, on August 26, 1933, with the committee
on claims and appraisal appointed in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, does not suspend the
running of the prescriptive period of the judicial action for the recovery of said debt, because the
claim for the unpaid balance of the amount of the promissory note should no have been
48
presented in the intestate of Eusebio Quitco, the said deceased not being the one who executed
the same, but in the intestate of Lorenzo M. Quitco, which should have been instituted by the
said Socorro Ledesma as provided in section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing a
creditor to institute said case through the appointment of an administrator for the purpose of
collecting his credit. More than ten years having thus elapsed from the expiration of the period
for the payment of said debt of P1,500, the action for its recovery has prescribed under section
43, No. 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, well-founded.
As to the second assignment of alleged error, consisting in that the trial court erred in holding
that the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father, who
died without leaving any property, while it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927
of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties
of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child
answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be
seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the
inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the
properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco,
in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of
their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.
The second assignment of alleged error is also well-founded.
Being a mere sequel of the first two assignments of alleged errors, the third assignment of error
is also well-founded.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That the filing of a claim
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of the father, for a
monetary obligation contracted by a son who died before him, does not suspend the prescriptive
period of the judicial action for the recovery of said indebtedness; (2) that the claim for the
payment of an indebtedness contracted by a deceased person cannot be filed for its collection
before the committee on claims and appraisal, appointed in the intestate of his father, and the
propertiesinherited from the latter by the children of said deceased do not answer for the
payment of the indebtedness contracted during the lifetime of said person.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed, and the defendants are absolved from the
complaint, with the costs to the appellees. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
49
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171035 August 24, 2009
WILLIAM ONG GENATO, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BAYHON, MELANIE BAYHON, BENJAMIN BAYHON, JR., BRENDA BAYHON, ALINA
BAYHON-CAMPOS, IRENE BAYHON-TOLOSA, and the minor GINO BAYHON, as represented
herein by his natural mother as guardian-ad-litem, JESUSITA M. BAYHON, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, CJ.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 16, 20051 and Resolution denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration issued
on January 6, 2006.
This is a consolidated case stemming from two civil cases filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) – Civil Case No. Q-90-7012 and Civil Case No. Q-90-7551.
Civil Case No. Q-90-7012
On October 18, 1990, respondents Benjamin M. Bayhon, Melanie Bayhon, Benjamin Bayhon Jr.,
Brenda Bayhon, Alina Bayhon-Campos, Irene Bayhon-Tolosa and the minor Gino Bayhon, as
represented by his mother Jesusita M. Bayhon, filed an action before the RTC, Quezon City,
Branch 76, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-90-7012. In their Complaint, respondents sought the
declaration of nullity of a dacion en pago allegedly executed by respondent Benjamin Bayhon in
favor of petitioner William Ong Genato.2
Respondent Benjamin Bayhon alleged that on July 3, 1989, he obtained from the petitioner a
loan amounting to PhP 1,000,000.00;3 that to cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 38052; that,
however, the execution of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was conditioned upon the personal
assurance of the petitioner that the said instrument is only a private memorandum of
indebtedness and that it would neither be notarized nor enforced according to its tenor. 4
Respondent further alleged that he filed a separate proceeding for the reconstitution of TCT No.
38052 before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 87.5 Petitioner William Ong Genato filed an Answer
in Intervention in the said proceeding and attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering
said lot.6 Respondent assailed the dacion en pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his
wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had executed it.7
In his Answer, petitioner Genato denied the claim of the respondent regarding the death of the
latter’s wife.8 He alleged that on the date that the real estate mortgage was to be signed,
50
respondent introduced to him a woman as his wife.9 He alleged that the respondent signed
the dacion en pago and that the execution of the instrument was above-board.10
Civil Case No. Q-90-7551
On December 20, 1990, petitioner William Ong Genato filed Civil Case No. Q-90-7551, an action
for specific performance, before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 79. In his Complaint, petitioner
alleged that respondent obtained a loan from him in the amount of PhP 1,000,000.00. Petitioner
alleged further that respondent failed to pay the loan and executed on October 21, 1989 a dacion
en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion en pago was inscribed and recorded with the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.11
Petitioner further averred that despite demands, respondent refused to execute the requisite
documents to transfer to him the ownership of the lot subject of the dacion en pago. Petitioner
prayed, inter alia, for the court to order the respondent to execute the final deed of sale and
transfer of possession of the said lot.12
Decision of the Consolidated Cases
The two cases were consolidated and transferred to the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 215. On
October 9, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision. It found that respondent obtained a loan
in the amount of PhP 1,000,000.00 from the petitioner on July 3, 1989. The terms of the loan
were interest payment at 5% per month with an additional 3% penalty in case of nonpayment. 13
With respect to the dacion en pago, the trial court held that the parties have novated the
agreement.14 It deduced the novation from the subsequent payments made by the respondent
to the petitioner. Of the principal amount, the sum of PhP 102,870.00 had been paid: PhP
27,870.00 on March 23, 1990, PhP 55,000.00 on 26 March 1990 and PhP 20,000.00 on 16
November 1990.15 All payments were made after the purported execution of the dacion en pago.
The trial court likewise found that at the time of the execution of the real estate mortgage, the
wife of respondent, Amparo Mercado, was already dead. It held that the property covered by
TCT No. 38052 was owned in common by the respondents and not by respondent Benjamin
Bayhon alone. It concluded that the said lot could not have been validly mortgaged by the
respondent alone; the deed of mortgage was not enforceable and only served as evidence of the
obligation of the respondent.16
In sum, the trial court upheld the respondent’s liability to the petitioner and ordered the latter
to pay the sum of Php 5,647,130.00.17 This amount included the principal, the stipulated interest
of 5% per month, and the penalty; and, was calculated from the date of demand until the date
the RTC rendered its judgment.
Appeal to the Court of Appeals
Respondents appealed before the Court of Appeals. On March 28, 2002, respondent Benjamin
Bayhon died while the case was still pending decision.18 On September 16, 2005, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court.
51
The Court of Appeals held that the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void.
The appellate court ruled that at the time the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were
executed, or on July 3, 1989 and October 21, 1989, respectively, the wife of respondent Benjamin
Bayhon was already dead.19 Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two
documents. The appellate court struck down both the dacion en pagoand the real estate
mortgage as being simulated or fictitious contracts pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code. 20
The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of
respondent Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it. 21 The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts
left by the deceased.22 Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s
appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated January 6,
2006.23
Petition for Review
Petitioner now comes before this Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals and raising
the following issues:
Whether or not Benjamin Bayhon is liable to Mr. Genato in the amount of Php 5,647,130.00 in
principal and interest as of October 3, 1997 and 5% monthly interest thereafter until the account
shall have been fully paid.24
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Real Estate Mortgage dated July 3, 1989 and the
Dacion en Pago dated October 21, 1989, null and void.25
We shall first tackle the nullity of the dacion en pago.
We affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the subject dacion en pago is a simulated or
fictitious contract, and hence void. The evidence shows that at the time it was allegedly signed
by the wife of the respondent, his wife was already dead. This finding of fact cannot be reversed.
We now go to the ruling of the appellate court extinguishing the obligation of respondent. As a
general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. Article 1311, par.1 of the Civil
Code provides:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent.1avvphi1
In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,26 the Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles
774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so
provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
52
"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law."
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which
are not extinguished by his death."27 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court proceeded further to state the general rule:
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco, has
characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person
to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation
is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a
specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the
imprisonment for debt.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before
the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists
against his estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs
unless the debt has first been satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the
estate has been amply represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties in
Civil Case No. Q-90-7012.
The procedure in vindicating monetary claims involving a defendant who dies before final
judgment is governed by Rule 3, Section 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
When the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the
time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the
manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased
person.
Pursuant to this provision, petitioner’s remedy lies in filing a claim against the estate of the
deceased respondent.
We now go to the interest awarded by the trial court. We note that the interest has been pegged
at 5% per month, or 60% per annum. This is unconscionable, hence cannot be enforced.29 In light
of this, the rate of interest for this kind of loan transaction has been fixed in the case of Eastern
Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals,30 at 12% per annum, calculated from October 3, 1989, the
date of extrajudicial demand.31
Following this formula, the total amount of the obligation of the estate of Benjamin Bayhon is as
follows:
53
Plus: Interest
55,000.00
20,000.00
897,130.00
(12% per annum x 20 years) 2,153,552.00
54
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA,
AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of
First Instance of Abra, respondents.
Federico Paredes for petitioners.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.
MARTIN, J:
This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No.
856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration
of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case.
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to
quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the
hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in
order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was granted and
on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.
On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss
was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of
Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the
petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground
that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.
On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the
complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2
On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the
plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written
manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to
55
substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit.
From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal.
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of
Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975.
This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still
alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died,
the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of
the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a
party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9,
1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however,
instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person
has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his
property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of
their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right
be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even
before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When
Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil
Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution
as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased
to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The
question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental,
while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the
claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives
even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
56
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the
respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the
latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the
same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother
ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased
because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also
suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is
busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is
another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested
to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for
them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to
allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased
plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Which this Court treats as special civil action as per its Resolution dated February 11, 1976.
2 Section 16. Duty of Attorney upon which death, incapacity or incompetency of party. -
Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and
to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative.
Section 17. Death of party.—After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed
by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to
be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litemfor the minor heirs.
57
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4275 March 23, 1909
PAULA CONDE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN ABAYA, defendant-appellant.
C. Oben for appellant.
L. Joaquin for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
From the hearing of the appeal interposed by Roman Abaya in the special proceedings brought
in the Court of First Instance of La Laguna for the settlement of the intestate estate and the
distribution of the property of Casiano Abaya it appears:
I. As antecedents: that Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina
Labadia, died on the 6th of April, 1899; that Paula Conde, as the mother of the natural children
Jose and Teopista Conde, whom the states she had by Casiano Abaya, on the 6th of November,
1905, moved the settlement of the said intestate succession; that an administrator having been
appointed for the said estate on the 25th of November, 1905, Roman Abaya, a son of the said
Romualdo Abaya and Sabrina Labadia, the parents of the late Casiano Abaya, came forward and
opposed said appointment and claimed it for himself as being the nearest relative of the
deceased; that this was granted by the court below on the 9th of January, 1906; that on the 17th
of November, 1906, Roman Abaya moved that, after due process of law, the court declare him
to be the sole heir of Casiano Abaya, to the exclusion of all other persons, especially of Paula
Conde, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all the property of said estate, and that
it be adjudicated to him; and that on November 22, 1906, the court ordered the publication of
notices for the declaration of heirs and distribution of the property of the estate.
II. That on the 28th of November, 1906, Paula Conde, in replying to the foregoing motion of
Roman Abaya, filed a petition wherein she stated that she acknowledged the relationship alleged
by Roman Abaya, but that she considered that her right was superior to his and moved for a
hearing of the matter, and, in consequence of the evidence that she intended to present she
prayed that she be declared to have preferential rights to the property left by Casiano Abaya, and
that the same be adjudicated to her together with the corresponding products thereof.
III. That the trial was held, both parties presenting documentary and oral evidence, and the court
below entered the following judgment:
That the administrator of the estate of Casiano Abaya should recognize Teopista and Jose Conde
as being natural children of Casiano Abaya; that the petitioner Paula Conde should succeed to
the hereditary rights of her children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased natural
58
father Casiano Abaya; and therefore, it is hereby declared that she is the only heir to the property
of the said intestate estate, to the exclusion of the administrator, Roman Abaya.
IV. That Roman Abaya excepted to the foregoing judgment, appealed to this court, and presented
the following statement of errors:
1. The fact that the court below found that an ordinary action for the acknowledgment of natural
children under articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code, might be brought in special probate
proceedings.
2. The finding that after the death of a person claimed to be an unacknowledged natural child,
the mother of such presumed natural child, as heir to the latter, may bring an action to enforce
the acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with articles 135 and 137 of the Civil
Code.
3. The finding in the judgment that the alleged continuos possession of the deceased children of
Paula Conde of the status of natural children of the late Casiano Abaya, has been fully proven in
these proceedings; and
4. On the hypothesis that it was proper to adjudicate the property of this intestate estate to Paula
Conde, as improperly found by the court below, the court erred in not having declared that said
property should be reserved in favor of relatives of Casiano Abaya to the third degree, and in not
having previously demanded securities from Paula Conde to guarantee the transmission of the
property to those who might fall within the reservation.
As to the first error assigned, the question is set up as to whether in special proceedings for the
administration and distribution of an intestate estate, an action might be brought to enforce the
acknowledgment of the natural child of the person from whom the inheritance is derived, that is
to say, whether one might appear as heir on the ground that he is a recognized natural child of
the deceased, not having been so recognized by the deceased either voluntarily or compulsorily
by reason of a preexisting judicial decision, but asking at the same time that, in the special
proceeding itself, he be recognized by the presumed legitimate heirs of the deceased who claim
to be entitled to the succession opened in the special proceeding.
According to section 782 of the Code of Civil Procedure —
If there shall be a controversy before the Court of First Instance as to who the lawful heirs of the
deceased person are, or as to the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the
law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath, and
signed by the witness. Any party in interest whose distributive share is affected by the
determination of such controversy, may appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance
determining such controversy to the Supreme Court, within the time and in the manner provided
in the last preceding section.
This court has decided the present question in the manner shown in the case of Juana Pimentel
vs. Engracio Palanca (5 Phil. Rep., 436.)
The main question with regard to the second error assigned, is whether or not the mother of a
natural child now deceased, but who survived the person who, it is claimed, was his natural
59
father, also deceased, may bring an action for the acknowledgment of the natural filiation in
favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to receive the inheritance from the person
who is supposed to be his natural father.
In order to decide in the affirmative the court below has assigned the following as the only
foundation:
In resolving a similar question Manresa says: "An acknowledgment can only be demanded by the
natural child and his descendants whom it shall benefit, and should they be minors or otherwise
incapacitated, such person as legally represents them; the mother may ask it in behalf of her child
so long as he is under her authority." On this point no positive declaration has been made,
undoubtedly because it was not considered necessary. A private action is in question and the
general rule must be followed. Elsewhere the same author adds: "It may so happen that the child
dies before four years have expired after attaining majority, or that the document supporting his
petition for acknowledgment is discovered after his death, such death perhaps occurring after
his parents had died, as is supposed by article 137, or during their lifetime. In any case such right
of action shall pertain to the descendants of the child whom the acknowledgment may interest."
(See Commentaries to arts. 135 and 137, Civil Code, Vol. I.)
The above doctrine, advanced by one of the most eminent commentators of the Civil Code, lacks
legal and doctrinal foundation. The power to transmit the right of such action by the natural child
to his descendants can not be sustained under the law, and still less to his mother.
It is without any support in law because the rule laid down in the code is most positive, limiting
in form, when establishing the exception for the exercise of such right of action after the death
of the presumed parents, as is shown hereafter. It is not supported by any doctrine, because up
to the present time no argument has been presented, upon which even an approximate
conclusion could be based.
Although the Civil Code considerably improved the condition of recognized natural children,
granting them rights and actions that they did not possess under the former laws, they were not,
however, placed upon the same place as legitimate ones. The difference that separates these
two classes of children is still great, as proven by so many articles dealing with the rights of the
family and the succession in relation to the members thereof. It may be laid down as legal maxim,
that whatever the code does not grant to the legitimate children, or in connection with their
rights, must still less be understood as granted to recognized natural children or in connection
with their rights. There is not a single exception in its provisions.
If legitimacy is the attribute that constitutes the basis of the absolute family rights of the child,
the acknowledgment of the natural child is, among illegitimate ones, that which unites him to
the family of the father or the mother who recognized him, and affords him a participation in the
rights of the family, relatively advantageous according to whether they are alone or whether they
concur with other individuals of the family of his purely natural father or mother.
Thus, in order to consider the spirit of the Civil Code, nothing is more logical than to establish a
comparison between an action to claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce acknowledgment.
60
ART. 118. The action to claim its legitimacy may be brought by the child at any time of its lifetime
and shall be transmitted to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a state of insanity. In such
cases the heirs shall be allowed a period of five years in which to institute the action.
The action already instituted by the child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if it has not
lapsed before then.
ART. 137. The actions for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted only during
the life of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
1. If the father or mother died during the maturity of the child, in which case the latter may
institute the action before the expiration of the first four years of its maturity.
2. If, after the death of the father or mother, some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted with the six months following the discovery of such
instrument.
On this supposition the first difference that results between one action and the other consists in
that the right of action for legitimacy lasts during the whole lifetime of the child, that is, it can
always be brought against the presumed parents or their heirs by the child itself, while the right
of action for the acknowledgment of a natural child does not last his whole lifetime, and, as a
general rule, it can not be instituted against the heirs of the presumed parents, inasmuch as it
can be exercised only during the life of the presumed parents.
With regard to the question at issue, that is, the transmission to the heirs of the presumed
parents of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to recognize the natural filiation,
there exists the most radical difference in that the former continues during the life of the child
who claims to be legitimate, and he may demand it either directly and primarily from the said
presumed parents, or indirectly and secondarily from the heirs of the latter; while the second
does not endure for life; as a general rule, it only lasts during the life of the presumed parents.
Hence the other difference, derived as a consequence, that an action for legitimacy is always
brought against the heirs of the presumed parents in case of the death of the latter, while the
action for acknowledgment is not brought against the heirs of such parents, with the exception
of the two cases prescribed by article 137 transcribed above.
So much for the passive transmission of the obligation to admit the legitimate filiation, or to
acknowledge the natural filiation.
As to the transmission to the heirs of the child of the latter's action to claim his legitimacy, or to
obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation, it is seen that the code grants it in the first
case, but not in the second. It contains provisions for the transmission of the right of action which,
for the purpose claiming his legitimacy inheres in the child, but it does not say a word with regard
to the transmission of the right to obtain the acknowledgment of the natural filiation.
Therefore, the respective corollary of each of the two above-cited articles is: (1) That the right of
action which devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy under article 118, may be
transmitted to his heirs in certain cases designated in the said article; (2) That the right of action
61
for the acknowledgment of natural children to which article 137 refers, can never be transmitted,
for the reason that the code makes no mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.
It is most illogical and contrary to every rule of correct interpretation, that the right of action to
secure acknowledgment by the natural child should be presumed to be transmitted,
independently, as a rule, to his heirs, while the right of action to claim legitimacy from his
predecessor is not expressly, independently, or, as a general rule, conceded to the heirs of the
legitimate child, but only relatively and as an exception. Consequently, the pretension that the
right of action on the part of the child to obtain the acknowledgment of his natural filiation is
transmitted to his descendants is altogether unfounded. No legal provision exists to sustain such
pretension, nor can an argument of presumption be based on the lesser claim when there is no
basis for the greater one, and when it is only given as an exception in well-defined cases. It is
placing the heirs of the natural child on a better footing than the heirs of the legitimate one,
when, as a matter of fact, the position of a natural child is no better than, no even equal to, that
of a legitimate child.
From the express and precise precepts of the code the following conclusions are derived:
The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents.
Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his whole
life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their heirs; while the right of
action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since it does not last during his whole
life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as a general rule can only be exercised against
the latter.
Usually the right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a personal character and
pertains exclusively to him, only the child may exercise it at any time during his lifetime. As an
exception, and in three cases only, it may be transmitted to the heirs of the child, to wit, if he
died during his minority, or while insane, or after action had been already instituted.
An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be exercised against
the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of the death of the latter during
the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some instrument of express
acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the existence of which was
unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It can
not be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.
In support of the foregoing the following authorities may be cited:
Sanchez Roman, in his Treatise of Civil Law, propounds the question as to whether said action
should be considered transmissive to the heirs or descendants of the natural child, whether he
had or had not exercised it up to the time of his death, and decides it as follows:
62
There is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be deemed admissible as a
solution, that the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child is transmitted by
the analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted to the
descendants of a legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but nothing more;
because on this point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing
than those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be a strained and
questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason
that for the heirs of the legitimate child, the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural
child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the
other hand there is none that prohibits it. (Vol. V.)
Diaz Guijarro and Martinez Ruiz in their work on "The Civil Code as construed by the supreme
court of Spain," commenting upon article 137, say:
Article 118, taking into account the privileges due to the legitimacy of children, grants them the
right to claim said legitimacy during their lifetime, and even authorizes the transmission of said
right for the space of five years to the heirs thereof, if the child die during his minority or in a
state of insanity. But as article 137 is based on the consideration that in the case of a natural
child, ties are less strong and sacred in the eyes of the law, it does not fix such a long and
indefinite period for the exercise of the action; it limits it to the life of the parents, excepting in
the two cases mentioned in said article; and it does not allow, as does article 118, the action to
pass on to the heirs, inasmuch as, although it does not prohibit it, and for that reason it might be
deemed on general principles of law to consent to it, such a supposition is inadmissible for the
reason that a comparison of both articles shows that the silence of the law in the latter case is
not, nor it can be, an omission, but a deliberate intent to establish a wide difference between the
advantages granted to a legitimate child and to a natural one.
(Ibid., Vol. II, 171.)
Navarro Amandi (Cuestionario del Código Civil) raises the question: "Can the heirs of a natural
child claim the acknowledgment in those cases wherein the father or mother are under obligation
to acknowledge"? And says:
Opinions are widely divergent. The court of Rennes held (on April 13, 1844) that the right of
investigation forms a part of the estate of the child, and along with his patrimony is transmitted
to his heirs. The affirmation is altogether too categorical to be admissible. If it were correct the
same thing would happen as when the legitimacy of a child is claimed, and as already seen, the
right of action to demand the legitimacy is not transmitted to the heirs in every case and as an
absolute right, but under certain limitations and circumstances. Now, were we to admit the
doctrine of the court of Rennes, the result would be that the claim for natural filiation would be
more favored than one for legitimate filiation. This would be absurd, because it can not be
conceived that the legislator should have granted a right of action to the heirs of the natural child,
which is only granted under great limitations and in very few cases to those of a legitimate one.
Some persons insist that the same rules that govern legitimate filiation apply by analogy to
natural child are entitled to claim it in the cases prescribed by the article 118. The majority,
however, are inclined to consider the right to claim acknowledgment as a personal right, and
63
consequently, not transmissive to the heirs. Really there are no legal grounds to warrant the
transmission. (Vol. 2, 229.)
In a decision like the present one it is impossible to bring forward the argument of analogy for
the purpose of considering that the heirs of the natural child are entitled to the right of action
which article 118 concedes to the heirs of the legitimate child. The existence of a provision for
the one case and the absence thereof for the other is a conclusive argument that inclusio unius
est exclusio alterius, and it can not be understood that the provision of law should be the same
when the same reason does not hold in the one case as in the other.
The theory of law of transmission is also entirely inapplicable in this case. This theory, which in
the Roman Law expressed the general rule than an heir who did not accept an inheritance during
his lifetime was incapacitated from transmitting it to his own heirs, included at the same time
the idea that if the inheritance was not transmitted because the heir did not possess it, there
were, however, certain things which the heir held and could transmit. Such was the law and the
right to accept the inheritance, for the existing reason that all rights, both real and personal, shall
pass to the heir; quia haeres representat defunctum in omnibus et per omnia. According to the
article 659 of the Civil Code, "the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations of
a person, which are not extinguished by his death." If the mother is the heir of her natural child,
and the latter, among other rights during his lifetime was entitled to exercise an action of his
acknowledgment against his father, during the life of the latter, if after his death in some of the
excepting cases of article 137, such right, which is a portion of his inheritance, is transmitted to
his mother as being his heir, and it was so understood by the court of Rennes when it considered
the right in question, not as a personal and exclusive right of the child which is extinguished by
his death, but a any other right which might be transmitted after his death. This right of supposed
transmission is even less tenable than that sought to be sustained by the argument of analogy.
The right of action pertaining to the child to claim his legitimacy is in all respects superior to that
of the child who claims acknowledgment as a natural child. And it is evident that the right of
action to claim his legitimacy is not one of those rights which the legitimate child may transmit
by inheritance to his heirs; it forms no part of the component rights of his inheritance. If it were
so, there would have been no necessity to establish its transmissibility to heirs as an exception in
the terms and conditions of article 118 of the code. So that, in order that it may constitute a
portion of the child's inheritance, it is necessary that the conditions and the terms contained in
article 118 shall be present, since without them, the right that the child held during his lifetime,
being personal and exclusive in principle, and therefore, as a general rule not susceptible of
transmission, would and should have been extinguished by his death. Therefore, where no
express provision like that of article 118 exists, the right of action for the acknowledgment of a
natural child is, in principle and without exception, extinguished by his death, and can not be
transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of the deceased child.
On the other hand, if said right of action formed a part of the child's inheritance, it would be
necessary to establish the doctrine that the right to claim such an acknowledgment from the
presumed natural father and from his heirs is an absolute right of the heirs of the child, not
limited by certain circumstances as in the case of the heirs of a natural child with a legitimate one
to place the heirs of a natural child and his inheritance on a better footing than those of a
64
legitimate child would not only be unreasonable, but, as stated in one of the above citations,
most absurd and illegal in the present state of the law and in accordance with the general
principles thereof.
For all of the foregoing reasons we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from in all its parts,
without any special ruling as to the costs of this instance.
Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:
The questions arising from the facts and points of law discussed in this litigation between the
parties thereto, decided in the judgment appealed from, and set up and discussed in this instance
by the said parties in their respective briefs, are subordinate in the first place to the main point,
submitted among others to the decision of this court, that is, whether the right of action brought
to demand from the natural father, or from his heirs, the acknowledgment of the natural child
which the former left at his death was, by operation of the law, transmitted to the natural mother
by reason of the death of the said child acknowledged by her.
The second error assigned by the appellant in his brief refers exclusively to this important point
of law.
Article 846 of the Civil Code prescribes:
The right of succession which the law grants natural children extends reciprocally in similar cases
to the natural father or mother.
Article 944 reads:
If the acknowledged natural or legitimized child should die without issue, either legitimate or
acknowledged by it, the father or mother who acknowledged it shall succeed to its entire estate,
and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike.
It can not be inferred from the above legal provisions that from the right succession which the
law grants the natural father or mother upon the death of their natural child, the right of heirs of
any of the said parents to claim the acknowledgment of the natural child is excluded. No article
is to be found in the Civil Code that expressly provides for such exclusion or elimination of the
right of the heirs of the deceased child to claim his acknowledgment.
If under article 659 of said code, the inheritance includes all the property, rights, and obligations
of a person, which are not extinguished by his death, it is unquestionable that among such rights
stands that which the natural child had, while alive, to claim his acknowledgment as such from
his natural father, or from the heirs of the latter. There is no reason or legal provision whatever
to prevent the consideration that the right to claim acknowledgment of the filiation of a deceased
child from his natural father, or from the heirs of the latter, is included in the hereditary
succession of the deceased child in favor of his natural mother.
65
It is to be regretted that such an eminent writer as Manresa is silent on this special point, or that
he is not very explicit in his comments on article 137 of the Civil Code. Among the various noted
writers on law, Professor Sanchez Roman is the only one who has given his opinion in a
categorical manner as to whether or not the right of action for the acknowledgment of a
deceased natural child shall be considered transmissive to his heirs, as may bee seen from the
following:
In order to complete the explanation of this article 137 of the Civil Code, three points must be
decided: (1) Against whom shall an action for acknowledgment be brought under the cases and
terms to which the two exceptions indicate in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 137 refer? (2) Who is
to represent the minor in bringing this action when neither the father nor the mother has
acknowledged him? (3) Should this right of action be considered as transmitted to the heirs or
descendants of the natural child whether or not it was exercised at the time of his death?
With respect to the third, there is an entire absence of legal provisions, and at most, it might be
deemed admissible as a solution, that the right of action to claim acknowledgment of a natural
child is transmitted by analogy to his heirs on the same conditions and terms that it is transmitted
to the descendants of the legitimate child, to claim his legitimacy, under article 118, but no more;
because on his point nothing warrants placing the heirs of a natural child on a better footing than
those of the legitimate child, and even to compare them would not fail to be strained and
questionable matter, and one of great difficulty for decision by the courts, for the simple reason
that for the heirs of the legitimate child the said article 118 exists, while for those of the natural
child, as we have said, there is no provision in the code authorizing the same, although on the
other hand there is none that prohibits it.
Certainly there is no article in the Civil Code, or any special law that bars the transmission to the
heirs of a natural child, particularly to his natural mother, of the right of action to claim the
acknowledgment of said natural child from the heirs of his deceased natural father.
According to the above-cited article 944 of the Civil Code, the only persons designated to succeed
to the intestate estate of a natural child who died during minority or without issue are its natural
father or mother who acknowledged it; consequently if by operation of the law his parents are
his legal successors or heirs, it is unquestionable that by reason of the child's death the property,
rights, and obligations of the deceased minor were, as a matter of fact, transmitted to them,
among which was the right to demand the acknowledgment of the said deceased natural child
from the heirs of the deceased natural father or mother, respectively, on account of having
enjoyed uninterruptedly the status of natural child of the said deceased parents. (Arts. 135 and
136, Civil Code.)
At the death of the children, Teopista in 1902, and Jose in 1903, during their minority, and after
the death of their natural father which took place in 1899, the natural mother of the said minors,
Paula Conde, succeeded them in all of their property and rights, among which must necessarily
appear and be included the right of action to claim the acknowledgment of said two children
from the heirs of Icasiano Abaya, their deceased natural father. There is no legal provision or
precept whatever excluding such right from those which, by operation of the law, were
transmitted to the mother, Paula Conde, or expressly declaring that the said right to claim such
66
acknowledgment is extinguished by the death of the natural children. It is true that, as a general
rule, an action for acknowledgment can not be brought by a surviving natural child after the
death of his parents, except in the event he was a minor at the time of the death of either of his
parents, as was the case with minors Teopista and Jose Conde, who, if living, would
unquestionably be entitled to institute an action for acknowledgment against the presumed heirs
of their natural father; and as there is no law that provides that said right is extinguished by the
death of the same, and that the mother did not inherit it from the said minors, it is also
unquestionable that Paula Conde, the natural mother and successor to the rights of said minors,
is entitled to exercise the corresponding action for acknowledgment.
If the natural mother had no right of action against the heirs of the natural father, for the
acknowledgment for her natural child, the unlimited and unconditional reciprocity established
by the article 846 of the code would neither be true nor correct. It should be noticed that the
relation of paternity and that of filiation between the above-mentioned father and children are
both natural in character; therefore, the intestate succession of the said children of Paula Conde
is governed exclusively by articles 944 and 945 of the said code. It is true that nothing is provided
by article 137 with reference to the transmission to the natural mother of the right to claim the
acknowledgment of her natural children, but, as Sanchez Roman says, it does not expressly
prohibit it; and as opposed to the silence of the said article, we find the provisions of articles 846
and 944 of the Civil Code, which expressly recognize the right of the natural mother to succeed
her natural child, a right which is transmitted to her by operation of law from the moment that
the child ceases to exist.
The question herein does not bear upon the right of a child to claim his legitimacy, as provided
in article 118 of the code, nor is it claimed that the rights of natural children and their mother are
equal to those of legitimate ones, even by analogy. The foundations of this opinion are based
solely on the provisions of the above-mentioned articles of the code, and I consider that they are
sustainable so long as it is not positively proven that the so often-mentioned right of action for
acknowledgment is extinguished by the death of the minor natural child, and is not transmitted
to the natural mother by express declaration or prohibition of the law, together with the property
and other rights in the intestate succession.
In view of the considerations above set forth it is my opinion that it should be held: that Paula
Conde, as the natural mother and sole heir of her children Teopista and Jose, was and is entitled
to the right to institute proceedings to obtain the acknowledgment of the latter as natural
children of the late Icasiano Abaya, from Roman Abaya, as heir and administrator of the estate
of the said Icasiano Abaya; and that the said Teopista and Jose who died during their minority,
three years after the death of their father, should be considered and acknowledged as such
natural children of the latter, for the reason that while living they uninterruptedly enjoyed the
status of his natural children. The judgment appealed from should be affirmed without any
special ruling as to costs.
With regard to the declaration that the property of the late Icasiano, which Paula Conde might
take, are of a reservable character, together with the other matter contained in the third error
assigned by the appellant to the said judgment, the writer withholds his opinion until such time
as the question may be raised between the parties in proper form.
67
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010
MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision2 dated 20 December 2005 and
Resolution dated 21 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80355. The CA affirmed with modification the
Order3 dated 2 June 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 30, Manila (RTC).
The Antecedent Facts
The undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a
Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages."
Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect
Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero,
Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her name under TCT No. 63467 at the Register
of Deeds of Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property
was transferred by appellee and the latter’s wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT No. 0-
199377 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973; that the said deed was executed
through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with
the help of her husband’s relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated
pleas and demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a
complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject
property; and that since the matter was unsettled, the barangay x x x issued x x x a certification
to file [an] action in court, now the subject of controversy.
After Memoracion x x x finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996.
Through a Manifestation, Memoracion’s counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on
January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.
For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff’s
reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death, pursuant to
68
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would result
in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this
case.
On June 2, 1997, the trial court issued the appealed Order in a disposition that reads:
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, this case is ordered dismissed without prejudice to the
prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings."
On October 17, 1997, Memoracion’s son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that
he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the June 2, 1997 Order. However, the said motion was subsequently
denied by Acting Presiding Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla [on October 31, 2000].
Thereafter, Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, filed a notice of appeal in behalf of the
deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the appeal was dismissed by Judge Mindaro-Grulla,
[stating that] the proper remedy being certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On
appellant’s motion for reconsideration, Judge Lucia Pena Purugganan granted the same, stating
that the remedy under the circumstances is ordinary appeal.4
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
Petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz, represented by Edgardo Z. Cruz, filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On 20 December
2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the RTC decision. We quote the
dispositive portion of the CA’s decision below.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. The trial court’s directive
as to the prosecution of the action in the proper estate proceedings is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution of 21 June 2006. 6
Hence, this appeal.
The Issues
The issues for resolution in this case are:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz’s Petition for Annulment
of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her
death; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming with modification the RTC Order dismissing
the Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal meritorious.
69
The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages survived the death of petitioner
The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated
in Bonilla v. Barcena,7 to wit:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and
the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the
person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.8
If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the
death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato,9 we held that a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and
therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of
sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.
The CA erred in affirming RTC’s dismissal of the
Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance and Damages
When a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:
SEC. 17. Death of party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
70
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
If the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased’s counsel to inform
the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased’s legal
representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action. As explained
in Bonilla:
x x x Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided
for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right
to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property
of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate
or intestate proceedings. When [plaintiff], therefore, died[,] her claim or right to the parcels of
land x x x was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death.
Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest
in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution
as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.10
If no legal representative is named by the counsel of the deceased, or the legal representative
fails to appear within a specified period, it is the duty of the court where the case is pending to
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased. The reason for this rule is to protect all concerned who may be affected
by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and his estate.111avvphi1
In the instant case, petitioner (plaintiff) Memoracion Z. Cruz died on 30 October 1996. Her
counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court of such death on 13 January 1997, through
a Manifestation stating thus:
COMES NOW the undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully gives notice that
the plaintiff, Memoracion Z. Cruz, died on October 30, 1996, in Manila as shown by a Certificate
of Death, a certified true copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A" hereof.
The legal representative of the deceased plaintiff is her son EDGARDO CRUZ whose address is at
No. 3231-E Tabora St., Bo. Obrero, Tondo, Manila.
x x x x12
71
On 24 January 1997, respondent (defendant) Oswaldo Z. Cruz moved to dismiss the case alleging
that it did not survive Memoracion’s death. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss in the assailed
Order dated 2 June 1997.
We rule that it was error for the RTC to dismiss the case. As mentioned earlier, the petition for
annulment of deed of sale involves property and property rights, and hence, survives the death
of petitioner Memoracion. The RTC was informed, albeit belatedly,13 of the death of
Memoracion, and was supplied with the name and address of her legal representative, Edgardo
Cruz. What the RTC could have done was to require Edgardo Cruz to appear in court and
substitute Memoracion as party to the pending case, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, and established jurisprudence.
We note that on 17 October 1997, Edgardo Cruz filed with the RTC a Manifestation, stating that
he is retaining the services of Atty. Roberto T. Neri. We quote:14
UNDERSIGNED HEIR of the late Memoracion Z. Cruz respectfully manifests that he is retaining
the services of ATTY. ROBERTO T. NERI as counsel for the plaintiff.
(Sgd.) EDGARDO Z. CRUZ
Plaintiff
Consistent with our ruling in Heirs of Haberer v. Court of Appeals,15 we consider such
Manifestation, signed by Memoracion’s heir, Edgardo Cruz, and retaining Atty. Neri’s services as
counsel, a formal substitution of deceased Memoracion by her heir, Edgardo Cruz. It also needs
mention that Oswaldo Cruz, although also an heir of Memoracion, should be excluded as a legal
representative in the case for being an adverse party therein.16
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 20
December 2005 and Resolution dated 21 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80355. We REMAND this
case to the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 30, Manila, for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
72
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162784 June 22, 2007
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR.
31, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 31, and
private respondent Segunda Almeida.
On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several
portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is
evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787.1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA was
succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was
succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency of
LTA is the petitioner in this case.
The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother
of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother
and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.3
On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being the
sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the late
Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960,
allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY
SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;
Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo, kasalukuyang naninirahan at
tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay
malaya at kusang loob kong isinasaysay at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:
73
1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo sa Nayon ng
San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG
PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang, at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari
ng Land Tenure Administration;
2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land Tenure
Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO
SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si
G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No.
4; Libro No. IV, Serie ng 1959;
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay nakatira at
pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa
unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta sa Land Tenure Administration;
4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay,
ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi kong anak na FRANCISCA
HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang
naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang
mga tagapagmana at;
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian na ng Dios ng aking
buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si
Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa unahan.
SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong kamay sa ibaba nito at
sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960. 4
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the left-
hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total.
Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5above her name in the second page and at the left-
hand margin of the first page of the document.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-
Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna (now,
Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case No. B-1263.6
On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-
Adjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void.7
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera
filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.
In a Resolution8 dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca
Herrera, holding that:
74
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered the
following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to the late Margarita
Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure Administration; protestant is the daughter
of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz
are children of the late Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos.
45, 46, 47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an area of
148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the lots in question with
the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the Tunasan Homesite since birth;
protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee left the place only after marriage but
resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has
been occupying the lots in question; he has been there even before the death of the late
Margarita Herrera; on October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
whereby she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in favor
of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March 8, 1966 with the
defunct Land Tenure Administration.
This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question.9
Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President. 10 The NHA Resolution was
affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987. 11
On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of
her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the
NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and
titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda
Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA,
private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification of
Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed
properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has
been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of
Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the
Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer
of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration
and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own money. 15 Further, they
argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been
paying taxes thereon.16
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that the
Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and possession
to real property within its jurisdiction."18 The case was then remanded for further proceedings
on the merits.
75
A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of
the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of
Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null
and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the Transfer
Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights
but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said
document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for reconsideration
which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of
Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by the appellate court
in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief submitted by the NHA
and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, viz:
There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to Margarita
Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on
October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or
transfer of rights and interest over the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is
disposed to believe otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita
Herrera, it can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense
that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death. Clearly the
Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita Herrera. Evidently, if the
intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her right over the lots to her daughter
Francisca Herrera, she should have given her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to
Francisca Herrera for submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase
price of the lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as what the NHA in its
resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita Herrera was shared no less
by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-
Adjudication claiming that she is her sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was
questioned in court by the surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz
Mercado, that Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights.19
The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of
Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an
assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon
death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
76
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER DETERMINING WHO
BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE AWARD ON THE SUBJECT
LOTS; AND
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA IS ARBITRARY.
We rule for the respondents.
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the
hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res judicata:
"the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by
the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded
as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood
as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more equitable
attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers
have been conferred.
In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals,21 the Court held that the rule
prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an
express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true judicial
power—that which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of
adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." 22 This function
applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or bodies who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict sense. The
doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3) branches—the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and coordinate, and
supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by its own fiat,
impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Courts have an expanded role under the 1987
Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article VIII
which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government committed an act
77
that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.25
Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
198026 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals)
shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions,
orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution…"27 and contends that the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled
that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already been
settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become final and
executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989).28 We find no
reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The system
of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and
executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which must be
adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30
Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when it
considered the application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter
Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective
application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not
done arbitrarily.
The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could
not bind the NHA.31That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject
lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera
was then applying to purchase the same before it."32
We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have
noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of
the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such
period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of
her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law.33
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has
already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its
resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca
78
Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property,
rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the
disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property,
the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that
interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them
later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita
Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's
demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an
obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are
transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her
death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the
decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the
NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property
already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession
and the law on sales and obligations.38
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as the
next "person"39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price. The
opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the NHA on
guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-1263
(questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and
void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of
the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded.
The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.
We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine.
We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element
of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of
which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated March 9, 1998, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.
79
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the
Municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her
four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of
minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved
in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff
claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession
illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her
husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way
of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her
husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).
After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision
ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute
without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.
There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former
owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del
Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda
with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from
the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code).As this Court
aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely
as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs.
Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over
the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because
she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his
death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for
80
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1
Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co.,
41 Phil., 531).
But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of
the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and
rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter
(article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the
first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are
declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them
may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice
any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be
declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which
gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said
new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated
in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of
the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article
657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of
the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.
As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity
or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were
acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat
the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we
are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property,
inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a
public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633,
old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged
assignment or donation has no valid effect.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
81
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA,
as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA
(deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees,
vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de
Borja, appellant. .
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special
Administratrix appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-
appellant.
L-28040
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.
Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.
Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.
Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.
L-28568
Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.
L-28611
Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.
Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Gueverra for defendant-appellant.
82
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja,
special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding
No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special
Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja,
Special Administratrix".
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala
Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and
exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with
his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate,
which is under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch II.
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In
1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de
Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the
sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a widower Francisco
de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in
1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco
was questioned in said proceeding.
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some
eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa
Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to
all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and
between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise
agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and between
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and
as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
83
AND
The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr.
WITNESSETH
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein terminate and settle, with finality, the various
court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the
administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any
reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala,
Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. No. 7866,
Rizal), more specifically described as follows:
Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la
Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con
los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla
with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the
total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which
represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs
Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and
complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de
Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-
Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco
de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly
conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from
and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala,
"Poblacion."
3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation
incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes
payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco
de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala,
"Poblacion" from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph
2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-
children of Francisco de Borja.
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay directly to Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this
Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
84
Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn, will issue the
corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.
5. In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco
Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and
assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any
and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money,
accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or
now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955,
CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and Civil Case
No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their
heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or
indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities
of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and
lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her
rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.
6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4
hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to
Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the
corresponding receive thereof.
7. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties
mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment
of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property "Poblacion", otherwise, the non-fulfillment of
the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have her unto set their hands in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the 12th of October, 1963.
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963
to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August
1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise
agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme
Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement of 12 October 1963 is not
disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1)
the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco
de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between
Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have
force and effect.
85
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate
Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein
the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and
that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left
a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an
extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that
"(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having
been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement
was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja
stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was
Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also
relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein
was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a
decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate
in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent
from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana
Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000
payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the
estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any
properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to
the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de
Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was
merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest,
actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation
as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after
such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent
liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what
is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does
not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates
86
fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed,
although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a
compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja,
Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code.
Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were
not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the
Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on
the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual
capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to
enter into the same. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is
submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution
proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period
for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its
effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly
stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and
sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that
the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39- 46)
and which contained the following clause:
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property
mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by
the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde,
all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is
consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the
period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of
no further effect.
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to
this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it
bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October 1963"; and while signed by the
parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed
notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A),
provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800, 000 to be
paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
87
Matilde all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in
Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de
Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate
unformalize agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in
the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal
compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the
Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose
de Borja's co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since
the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to
Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold
until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and
in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order
now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve
the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the
estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco
de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was
only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already
shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva
Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could
dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and
provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any
or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because
it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The
point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil
status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of
Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration
of the cession of her hereditary rights.
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal
in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva
88
Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been
arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated
that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and
motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already
had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record
discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back
out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the
Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid
because of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the
contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this
Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's
status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already
discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to
reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement
of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy.
That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's
counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No.
28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17
June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But
the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A")
and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and
enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed
that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now
under appeal.
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its
order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
should be, and is, reversed.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her
unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished,
the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the
payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to
nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel,
Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon
Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if
there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and
properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion),
concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is
the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or
whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate
89
evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article
160 of the Civil Code.
We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has
become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding
cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in
the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the
accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the
rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired
jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title thereto was
duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of
Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the
Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the
Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion)
corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of
Marcelo de Borja O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less,
assessed at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of
Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's
first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of
Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was
conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the
presumption established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of
the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and
exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff
had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his
Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose
de Borja then appealed to this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in
question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the
late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor
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of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended
Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the
plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted
therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the
"Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more,
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an
inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the
Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No.
7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions
against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the
course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal
presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late
Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement
by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that —
He tomado possession del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337
hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal).
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda
had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed
by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent
demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his
brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon
Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes
and said that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the
Hacienda. The witness further testified that —
Marcelo de Borja said that that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was
still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965,
t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the
admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate
courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the
testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original
Hacienda with his private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal
partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4) of Civil
Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
91
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio
de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain
hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what
Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the
statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio
testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for
Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the
P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of
Gregorio's testimony.
As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does
not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal) "
refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there
were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed
at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de
Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F")
refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo"
is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and
"7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already
noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de
Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight
than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor
of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been
rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de
Borja and Josefa Tangco.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages
should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates
of the deceased, the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case
No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three
(3) cases.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
92
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43082 June 18, 1937
PABLO LORENZO, as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
LAUREL, J.:
On October 4, 1932, the plaintiff Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas
Hanley, deceased, brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga against the
defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the refund of the amount
of P2,052.74, paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate of the deceased, and for the
collection of interst thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, computed from September 15,
1932, the date when the aforesaid tax was [paid under protest. The defendant set up a
counterclaim for P1,191.27 alleged to be interest due on the tax in question and which was not
included in the original assessment. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga dismissing both the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's counterclaim, both
parties appealed to this court.
It appears that on May 27, 1922, one Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, Zamboanga, leaving a
will (Exhibit 5) and considerable amount of real and personal properties. On june 14, 1922,
proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate were
begun in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate. Said will
provides, among other things, as follows:
4. I direct that any money left by me be given to my nephew Matthew Hanley.
5. I direct that all real estate owned by me at the time of my death be not sold or otherwise
disposed of for a period of ten (10) years after my death, and that the same be handled and
managed by the executors, and proceeds thereof to be given to my nephew, Matthew Hanley,
at Castlemore, Ballaghaderine, County of Rosecommon, Ireland, and that he be directed that the
same be used only for the education of my brother's children and their descendants.
6. I direct that ten (10) years after my death my property be given to the above mentioned
Matthew Hanley to be disposed of in the way he thinks most advantageous.
xxx xxx xxx
8. I state at this time I have one brother living, named Malachi Hanley, and that my nephew,
Matthew Hanley, is a son of my said brother, Malachi Hanley.
The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga considered it proper for the best interests of ther estate
to appoint a trustee to administer the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to
Matthew Hanley ten years after the two executors named in the will, was, on March 8, 1924,
93
appointed trustee. Moore took his oath of office and gave bond on March 10, 1924. He acted as
trustee until February 29, 1932, when he resigned and the plaintiff herein was appointed in his
stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue,
alleging that the estate left by the deceased at the time of his death consisted of realty valued at
P27,920 and personalty valued at P1,465, and allowing a deduction of P480.81, assessed against
the estate an inheritance tax in the amount of P1,434.24 which, together with the penalties for
deliquency in payment consisting of a 1 per cent monthly interest from July 1, 1931 to the date
of payment and a surcharge of 25 per cent on the tax, amounted to P2,052.74. On March 15,
1932, the defendant filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings pending before the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga (Special proceedings No. 302) praying that the trustee, plaintiff
herein, be ordered to pay to the Government the said sum of P2,052.74. The motion was granted.
On September 15, 1932, the plaintiff paid said amount under protest, notifying the defendant at
the same time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its
recovery. The defendant overruled the plaintiff's protest and refused to refund the said amount
hausted, plaintiff went to court with the result herein above indicated.
In his appeal, plaintiff contends that the lower court erred:
I. In holding that the real property of Thomas Hanley, deceased, passed to his instituted heir,
Matthew Hanley, from the moment of the death of the former, and that from the time, the latter
became the owner thereof.
II. In holding, in effect, that there was deliquency in the payment of inheritance tax due on the
estate of said deceased.
III. In holding that the inheritance tax in question be based upon the value of the estate upon the
death of the testator, and not, as it should have been held, upon the value thereof at the
expiration of the period of ten years after which, according to the testator's will, the property
could be and was to be delivered to the instituted heir.
IV. In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net amount of the estate
subject to said tax, the amounts allowed by the court as compensation to the "trustees" and paid
to them from the decedent's estate.
V. In not rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and in denying his motion for new trial.
The defendant-appellant contradicts the theories of the plaintiff and assigns the following error
besides:
The lower court erred in not ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P1,191.27,
representing part of the interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month from April 10, 1924, to June
30, 1931, which the plaintiff had failed to pay on the inheritance tax assessed by the defendant
against the estate of Thomas Hanley.
The following are the principal questions to be decided by this court in this appeal: (a) When does
the inheritance tax accrue and when must it be satisfied? (b) Should the inheritance tax be
computed on the basis of the value of the estate at the time of the testator's death, or on its
94
value ten years later? (c) In determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to
deduct the compensation due to trustees? (d) What law governs the case at bar? Should the
provisions of Act No. 3606 favorable to the tax-payer be given retroactive effect? (e) Has there
been deliquency in the payment of the inheritance tax? If so, should the additional interest
claimed by the defendant in his appeal be paid by the estate? Other points of incidental
importance, raised by the parties in their briefs, will be touched upon in the course of this
opinion.
(a) The accrual of the inheritance tax is distinct from the obligation to pay the same. Section 1536
as amended, of the Administrative Code, imposes the tax upon "every transmission by virtue of
inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa, or advance in anticipation of inheritance,devise,
or bequest." The tax therefore is upon transmission or the transfer or devolution of property of
a decedent, made effective by his death. (61 C. J., p. 1592.) It is in reality an excise or privilege
tax imposed on the right to succeed to, receive, or take property by or under a will or the
intestacy law, or deed, grant, or gift to become operative at or after death. Acording to article
657 of the Civil Code, "the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death." "In other words", said Arellano, C. J., ". . . the heirs succeed immediately to all of
the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed
for the same before his death." (Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232. See also, Mijares vs. Nery, 3
Phil., 195; Suilong & Co., vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13; Lubrico vs. Arbado, 12 Phil., 391; Innocencio
vs. Gat-Pandan, 14 Phil., 491; Aliasas vs.Alcantara, 16 Phil., 489; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17
Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bowa vs. Briones, 38 Phil., 27; Osario vs. Osario &
Yuchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317; Dais vs. Court of First Instance
of Capiz, 51 Phil., 396; Baun vs. Heirs of Baun, 53 Phil., 654.) Plaintiff, however, asserts that while
article 657 of the Civil Code is applicable to testate as well as intestate succession, it operates
only in so far as forced heirs are concerned. But the language of article 657 of the Civil Code is
broad and makes no distinction between different classes of heirs. That article does not speak of
forced heirs; it does not even use the word "heir". It speaks of the rights of succession and the
transmission thereof from the moment of death. The provision of section 625 of the Code of Civil
Procedure regarding the authentication and probate of a will as a necessary condition to effect
transmission of property does not affect the general rule laid down in article 657 of the Civil Code.
The authentication of a will implies its due execution but once probated and allowed the
transmission is effective as of the death of the testator in accordance with article 657 of the Civil
Code. Whatever may be the time when actual transmission of the inheritance takes place,
succession takes place in any event at the moment of the decedent's death. The time when the
heirs legally succeed to the inheritance may differ from the time when the heirs actually receive
such inheritance. "Poco importa", says Manresa commenting on article 657 of the Civil Code,
"que desde el falleimiento del causante, hasta que el heredero o legatario entre en posesion de
los bienes de la herencia o del legado, transcurra mucho o poco tiempo, pues la adquisicion ha de
retrotraerse al momento de la muerte, y asi lo ordena el articulo 989, que debe considerarse como
complemento del presente." (5 Manresa, 305; see also, art. 440, par. 1, Civil Code.) Thomas
Hanley having died on May 27, 1922, the inheritance tax accrued as of the date.
95
From the fact, however, that Thomas Hanley died on May 27, 1922, it does not follow that the
obligation to pay the tax arose as of the date. The time for the payment on inheritance tax is
clearly fixed by section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3031, in
relation to section 1543 of the same Code. The two sections follow:
SEC. 1543. Exemption of certain acquisitions and transmissions. — The following shall not be
taxed:
(a) The merger of the usufruct in the owner of the naked title.
(b) The transmission or delivery of the inheritance or legacy by the fiduciary heir or legatee to
the trustees.
(c) The transmission from the first heir, legatee, or donee in favor of another beneficiary, in
accordance with the desire of the predecessor.
In the last two cases, if the scale of taxation appropriate to the new beneficiary is greater than
that paid by the first, the former must pay the difference.
SEC. 1544. When tax to be paid. — The tax fixed in this article shall be paid:
(a) In the second and third cases of the next preceding section, before entrance into possession
of the property.
(b) In other cases, within the six months subsequent to the death of the predecessor; but if
judicial testamentary or intestate proceedings shall be instituted prior to the expiration of said
period, the payment shall be made by the executor or administrator before delivering to each
beneficiary his share.
If the tax is not paid within the time hereinbefore prescribed, interest at the rate of twelve per
centum per annum shall be added as part of the tax; and to the tax and interest due and unpaid
within ten days after the date of notice and demand thereof by the collector, there shall be
further added a surcharge of twenty-five per centum.
A certified of all letters testamentary or of admisitration shall be furnished the Collector of
Internal Revenue by the Clerk of Court within thirty days after their issuance.
It should be observed in passing that the word "trustee", appearing in subsection (b) of section
1543, should read "fideicommissary" or "cestui que trust". There was an obvious mistake in
translation from the Spanish to the English version.
The instant case does fall under subsection (a), but under subsection (b), of section 1544 above-
quoted, as there is here no fiduciary heirs, first heirs, legatee or donee. Under the subsection,
the tax should have been paid before the delivery of the properties in question to P. J. M. Moore
as trustee on March 10, 1924.
(b) The plaintiff contends that the estate of Thomas Hanley, in so far as the real properties are
concerned, did not and could not legally pass to the instituted heir, Matthew Hanley, until after
the expiration of ten years from the death of the testator on May 27, 1922 and, that the
inheritance tax should be based on the value of the estate in 1932, or ten years after the
96
testator's death. The plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that in 1932 the real
properties in question had a reasonable value of only P5,787. This amount added to the value of
the personal property left by the deceased, which the plaintiff admits is P1,465, would generate
an inheritance tax which, excluding deductions, interest and surcharge, would amount only to
about P169.52.
If death is the generating source from which the power of the estate to impose inheritance taxes
takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the right of the
estate to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the vlaue of the estate as it stood at
the time of the decedent's death, regardless of any subsequent contingency value of any
subsequent increase or decrease in value. (61 C. J., pp. 1692, 1693; 26 R. C. L., p. 232; Blakemore
and Bancroft, Inheritance Taxes, p. 137. See also Knowlton vs. Moore, 178 U.S., 41; 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 747; 44 Law. ed., 969.) "The right of the state to an inheritance tax accrues at the moment
of death, and hence is ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that time of such
property as passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depriciation is immaterial." (Ross,
Inheritance Taxation, p. 72.)
Our attention is directed to the statement of the rule in Cyclopedia of Law of and Procedure (vol.
37, pp. 1574, 1575) that, in the case of contingent remainders, taxation is postponed until the
estate vests in possession or the contingency is settled. This rule was formerly followed in New
York and has been adopted in Illinois, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania and
Wisconsin. This rule, horever, is by no means entirely satisfactory either to the estate or to those
interested in the property (26 R. C. L., p. 231.). Realizing, perhaps, the defects of its anterior
system, we find upon examination of cases and authorities that New York has varied and now
requires the immediate appraisal of the postponed estate at its clear market value and the
payment forthwith of the tax on its out of the corpus of the estate transferred. (In re Vanderbilt,
172 N. Y., 69; 69 N. E., 782; In re Huber, 86 N. Y. App. Div., 458; 83 N. Y. Supp., 769; Estate of
Tracy, 179 N. Y., 501; 72 N. Y., 519; Estate of Brez, 172 N. Y., 609; 64 N. E., 958; Estate of Post, 85
App. Div., 611; 82 N. Y. Supp., 1079. Vide also, Saltoun vs. Lord Advocate, 1 Peter. Sc. App., 970;
3 Macq. H. L., 659; 23 Eng. Rul. Cas., 888.) California adheres to this new rule (Stats. 1905, sec. 5,
p. 343).
But whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, we hold that a transmission by inheritance
is taxable at the time of the predecessor's death, notwithstanding the postponement of the
actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary, and the tax measured by the
value of the property transmitted at that time regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.
(c) Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in arriving at the
net value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be computed (sec. 1539, Revised
Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the defendant and the trial court allowed a deduction
of only P480.81. This sum represents the expenses and disbursements of the executors until
March 10, 1924, among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The plaintiff
contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28 (Exhibits C,
AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL, NN, OO), should also be deducted under section 1539 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides, in part, as follows: "In order to determine the net sum which
97
must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in case of a
resident, . . . the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, . . . ."
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services (Barney vs.
Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not follow that the
compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject
to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be deducted
in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705).
Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator
intended that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In re Vanneck's
Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.) On
the contrary, in paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real estate be
handled and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten years therein
provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in State vs.
Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said: ". . . The
compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but in the
management thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within
the class or reason for exempting administration expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf
have no reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled
to it, and are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . .
Trusts . . . of the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those
to whom the property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the
preservation of the estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such
expenses should be taken into consideration in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of
this tax."
(d) The defendant levied and assessed the inheritance tax due from the estate of Thomas Hanley
under the provisions of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section
3 of Act No. 3606. But Act No. 3606 went into effect on January 1, 1930. It, therefore, was not
the law in force when the testator died on May 27, 1922. The law at the time was section 1544
above-mentioned, as amended by Act No. 3031, which took effect on March 9, 1922.
It is well-settled that inheritance taxation is governed by the statute in force at the time of the
death of the decedent (26 R. C. L., p. 206; 4 Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 3461). The taxpayer
can not foresee and ought not to be required to guess the outcome of pending measures. Of
course, a tax statute may be made retroactive in its operation. Liability for taxes under retroactive
legislation has been "one of the incidents of social life." (Seattle vs. Kelleher, 195 U. S., 360; 49
Law. ed., 232 Sup. Ct. Rep., 44.) But legislative intent that a tax statute should operate
retroactively should be perfectly clear. (Scwab vs. Doyle, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep., 491; Smietanka vs. First
Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S., 602; Stockdale vs. Insurance Co., 20 Wall., 323; Lunch vs. Turrish,
247 U. S., 221.) "A statute should be considered as prospective in its operation, whether it enacts,
amends, or repeals an inheritance tax, unless the language of the statute clearly demands or
expresses that it shall have a retroactive effect, . . . ." (61 C. J., P. 1602.) Though the last paragraph
of section 5 of Regulations No. 65 of the Department of Finance makes section 3 of Act No. 3606,
amending section 1544 of the Revised Administrative Code, applicable to all estates the
98
inheritance taxes due from which have not been paid, Act No. 3606 itself contains no provisions
indicating legislative intent to give it retroactive effect. No such effect can begiven the statute by
this court.
The defendant Collector of Internal Revenue maintains, however, that certain provisions of Act
No. 3606 are more favorable to the taxpayer than those of Act No. 3031, that said provisions are
penal in nature and, therefore, should operate retroactively in conformity with the provisions of
article 22 of the Revised Penal Code. This is the reason why he applied Act No. 3606 instead of
Act No. 3031. Indeed, under Act No. 3606, (1) the surcharge of 25 per cent is based on the tax
only, instead of on both the tax and the interest, as provided for in Act No. 3031, and (2) the
taxpayer is allowed twenty days from notice and demand by rthe Collector of Internal Revenue
within which to pay the tax, instead of ten days only as required by the old law.
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In
common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes"
all status which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation, and
even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their
commission (59 C. J., p. 1110). Revenue laws, generally, which impose taxes collected by the
means ordinarily resorted to for the collection of taxes are not classed as penal laws, although
there are authorities to the contrary. (See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 361; Twine Co. vs.
Worthington, 141 U. S., 468; 12 Sup. Ct., 55; Rice vs. U. S., 4 C. C. A., 104; 53 Fed., 910; Com. vs.
Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St., 150; State vs. Wheeler, 44 P., 430; 25 Nev. 143.) Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable to the case at bar, and in the absence of clear legislative
intent, we cannot give Act No. 3606 a retroactive effect.
(e) The plaintiff correctly states that the liability to pay a tax may arise at a certain time and the
tax may be paid within another given time. As stated by this court, "the mere failure to pay one's
tax does not render one delinqent until and unless the entire period has eplased within which
the taxpayer is authorized by law to make such payment without being subjected to the payment
of penalties for fasilure to pay his taxes within the prescribed period." (U. S. vs. Labadan, 26 Phil.,
239.)
The defendant maintains that it was the duty of the executor to pay the inheritance tax before
the delivery of the decedent's property to the trustee. Stated otherwise, the defendant contends
that delivery to the trustee was delivery to the cestui que trust, the beneficiery in this case, within
the meaning of the first paragraph of subsection (b) of section 1544 of the Revised Administrative
Code. This contention is well taken and is sustained. The appointment of P. J. M. Moore as trustee
was made by the trial court in conformity with the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will.
It is true that the word "trust" is not mentioned or used in the will but the intention to create one
is clear. No particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C. J., p.
711). The words "trust" and "trustee", though apt for the purpose, are not necessary. In fact, the
use of these two words is not conclusive on the question that a trust is created (69 C. J., p. 714).
"To create a trust by will the testator must indicate in the will his intention so to do by using
language sufficient to separate the legal from the equitable estate, and with sufficient certainty
designate the beneficiaries, their interest in the ttrust, the purpose or object of the trust, and the
99
property or subject matter thereof. Stated otherwise, to constitute a valid testamentary trust
there must be a concurrence of three circumstances: (1) Sufficient words to raise a trust; (2) a
definite subject; (3) a certain or ascertain object; statutes in some jurisdictions expressly or in
effect so providing." (69 C. J., pp. 705,706.) There is no doubt that the testator intended to create
a trust. He ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a
fixed period, for a stated purpose. The probate court certainly exercised sound judgment in
appointment a trustee to carry into effect the provisions of the will (see sec. 582, Code of Civil
Procedure).
P. J. M. Moore became trustee on March 10, 1924. On that date trust estate vested in him (sec.
582 in relation to sec. 590, Code of Civil Procedure). The mere fact that the estate of the deceased
was placed in trust did not remove it from the operation of our inheritance tax laws or exempt it
from the payment of the inheritance tax. The corresponding inheritance tax should have been
paid on or before March 10, 1924, to escape the penalties of the laws. This is so for the reason
already stated that the delivery of the estate to the trustee was in esse delivery of the same
estate to the cestui que trust, the beneficiary in this case. A trustee is but an instrument or agent
for the cestui que trust (Shelton vs. King, 299 U. S., 90; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 689; 57 Law. ed., 1086).
When Moore accepted the trust and took possesson of the trust estate he thereby admitted that
the estate belonged not to him but to his cestui que trust (Tolentino vs. Vitug, 39 Phil.,126, cited
in 65 C. J., p. 692, n. 63). He did not acquire any beneficial interest in the estate. He took such
legal estate only as the proper execution of the trust required (65 C. J., p. 528) and, his estate
ceased upon the fulfillment of the testator's wishes. The estate then vested absolutely in the
beneficiary (65 C. J., p. 542).
The highest considerations of public policy also justify the conclusion we have reached. Were we
to hold that the payment of the tax could be postponed or delayed by the creation of a trust of
the type at hand, the result would be plainly disastrous. Testators may provide, as Thomas Hanley
has provided, that their estates be not delivered to their beneficiaries until after the lapse of a
certain period of time. In the case at bar, the period is ten years. In other cases, the trust may
last for fifty years, or for a longer period which does not offend the rule against petuities. The
collection of the tax would then be left to the will of a private individual. The mere suggestion of
this result is a sufficient warning against the accpetance of the essential to the very exeistence of
government. (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, 16 Pet., 435; 10 Law. ed., 1022; Kirkland vs. Hotchkiss,
100 U. S., 491; 25 Law. ed., 558; Lane County vs. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71; 19 Law. ed., 101; Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. vs. Kentucky, 199 U. S., 194; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep., 36; 50 Law. ed., 150; Charles
River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet., 420; 9 Law. ed., 773.) The obligation to pay taxes rests
not upon the privileges enjoyed by, or the protection afforded to, a citizen by the government
but upon the necessity of money for the support of the state (Dobbins vs. Erie Country, supra).
For this reason, no one is allowed to object to or resist the payment of taxes solely because no
personal benefit to him can be pointed out. (Thomas vs. Gay, 169 U. S., 264; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
340; 43 Law. ed., 740.) While courts will not enlarge, by construction, the government's power
of taxation (Bromley vs. McCaughn, 280 U. S., 124; 74 Law. ed., 226; 50 Sup. Ct. Rep., 46) they
also will not place upon tax laws so loose a construction as to permit evasions on merely fanciful
and insubstantial distictions. (U. S. vs. Watts, 1 Bond., 580; Fed. Cas. No. 16,653; U. S. vs.
Wigglesirth, 2 Story, 369; Fed. Cas. No. 16,690, followed in Froelich & Kuttner vs. Collector of
100
Customs, 18 Phil., 461, 481; Castle Bros., Wolf & Sons vs. McCoy, 21 Phil., 300; Muñoz & Co. vs.
Hord, 12 Phil., 624; Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Rafferty, 39 Phil., 145; Luzon
Stevedoring Co. vs. Trinidad, 43 Phil., 803.) When proper, a tax statute should be construed to
avoid the possibilities of tax evasion. Construed this way, the statute, without resulting in
injustice to the taxpayer, becomes fair to the government.
That taxes must be collected promptly is a policy deeply intrenched in our tax system. Thus, no
court is allowed to grant injunction to restrain the collection of any internal revenue tax ( sec.
1578, Revised Administrative Code; Sarasola vs. Trinidad, 40 Phil., 252). In the case of Lim Co Chui
vs. Posadas (47 Phil., 461), this court had occassion to demonstrate trenchment adherence to
this policy of the law. It held that "the fact that on account of riots directed against the Chinese
on October 18, 19, and 20, 1924, they were prevented from praying their internal revenue taxes
on time and by mutual agreement closed their homes and stores and remained therein, does not
authorize the Collector of Internal Revenue to extend the time prescribed for the payment of the
taxes or to accept them without the additional penalty of twenty five per cent." (Syllabus, No. 3.)
". . . It is of the utmost importance," said the Supreme Court of the United States, ". . . that the
modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any
delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is developed of collecting the taxes,
may derange the operations of government, and thereby, cause serious detriment to the public."
(Dows vs. Chicago, 11 Wall., 108; 20 Law. ed., 65, 66; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil., 580.)
It results that the estate which plaintiff represents has been delinquent in the payment of
inheritance tax and, therefore, liable for the payment of interest and surcharge provided by law
in such cases.
The delinquency in payment occurred on March 10, 1924, the date when Moore became trustee.
The interest due should be computed from that date and it is error on the part of the defendant
to compute it one month later. The provisions cases is mandatory (see and cf. Lim Co Chui vs.
Posadas, supra), and neither the Collector of Internal Revenuen or this court may remit or
decrease such interest, no matter how heavily it may burden the taxpayer.
To the tax and interest due and unpaid within ten days after the date of notice and demand
thereof by the Collector of Internal Revenue, a surcharge of twenty-five per centum should be
added (sec. 1544, subsec. (b), par. 2, Revised Administrative Code). Demand was made by the
Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue upon Moore in a communiction dated October 16, 1931
(Exhibit 29). The date fixed for the payment of the tax and interest was November 30, 1931.
November 30 being an official holiday, the tenth day fell on December 1, 1931. As the tax and
interest due were not paid on that date, the estate became liable for the payment of the
surcharge.
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for us to discuss the fifth error assigned by the
plaintiff in his brief.
We shall now compute the tax, together with the interest and surcharge due from the estate of
Thomas Hanley inaccordance with the conclusions we have reached.
101
At the time of his death, the deceased left real properties valued at P27,920 and personal
properties worth P1,465, or a total of P29,385. Deducting from this amount the sum of P480.81,
representing allowable deductions under secftion 1539 of the Revised Administrative Code, we
have P28,904.19 as the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax.
The primary tax, according to section 1536, subsection (c), of the Revised Administrative Code,
should be imposed at the rate of one per centum upon the first ten thousand pesos and two per
centum upon the amount by which the share exceed thirty thousand pesos, plus an additional
two hundred per centum. One per centum of ten thousand pesos is P100. Two per centum of
P18,904.19 is P378.08. Adding to these two sums an additional two hundred per centum, or
P965.16, we have as primary tax, correctly computed by the defendant, the sum of P1,434.24.
To the primary tax thus computed should be added the sums collectible under section 1544 of
the Revised Administrative Code. First should be added P1,465.31 which stands for interest at
the rate of twelve per centum per annum from March 10, 1924, the date of delinquency, to
September 15, 1932, the date of payment under protest, a period covering 8 years, 6 months and
5 days. To the tax and interest thus computed should be added the sum of P724.88, representing
a surhcarge of 25 per cent on both the tax and interest, and also P10, the compromise sum fixed
by the defendant (Exh. 29), giving a grand total of P3,634.43.
As the plaintiff has already paid the sum of P2,052.74, only the sums of P1,581.69 is legally due
from the estate. This last sum is P390.42 more than the amount demanded by the defendant in
his counterclaim. But, as we cannot give the defendant more than what he claims, we must hold
that the plaintiff is liable only in the sum of P1,191.27 the amount stated in the counterclaim.
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly modified, with costs against the plaintiff in both
instances. So ordered.
102
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA,
NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO
P. ORFINADA,respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of
an administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as
its Resolution2 dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several
personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.3 He also
left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with
whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada,
Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada,
Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. 4
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their
children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered
into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza
sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica5, Alberto and Rowena.6
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on
June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued
Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio,
Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also
103
found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-
judicial settlement.7
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be
issued to him.8
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register
of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.9
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the
defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained
to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero 10 and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to
register them in his name.11 Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are
not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.12 On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to
Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing13 on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order14 dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that
respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its
reconsideration15 but the motion was likewise denied.16
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.17 Petitioners averred that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal
of the case on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents.18
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision19 dated January 31, 1997, stating that it
discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public
respondent judge when he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in
view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.20 Hence, the petition
before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing
to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the
administration proceedings.21
104
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the
estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a
preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from
the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for
in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.22 (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word "may" in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional
character of the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect.23Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase "in the discretion of
the Court", apart from the retention of the word "may" in Section 6,24in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower court’s doorstep for not hearing
petitioners’ affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing
of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality
to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article
777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.25
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total
lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule
326 and Section 2, Rule 8727 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,28 this
Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the
decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,29 while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These
rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But
no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of
an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such
instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then
wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the
rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and
the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if
the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;30 and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of 31 and he is made a party
105
defendant.32 Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of
the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there
is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties
himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions,
the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court,
recourse to this Court is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
106
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165554 July 26, 2010
LAZARO PASCO and LAURO PASCO, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF FILOMENA DE GUZMAN, represented by CRESENCIA DE GUZMAN-
PRINCIPE, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
No court should shield a party from compliance with valid obligations based on wholly
unsubstantiated claims of mistake or fraud. Having refused to abide by a compromise agreement,
the aggrieved party may either enforce it or regard it as rescinded and insist upon the original
demand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the May 13, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) and its October 5, 2004 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81464 which dismissed petitioners’
appeal and affirmed the validity of the parties’ Compromise Agreement.
Factual Antecedents
The present petition began with a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages4 filed on December
13, 2000 by respondents, the heirs of Filomena de Guzman (Filomena), represented by Cresencia
de Guzman-Principe (Cresencia), against petitioners Lauro Pasco (Lauro) and Lazaro Pasco
(Lazaro). The case was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bocaue, Bulacan, and
docketed as Civil Case No. MM-3191.5
In their Complaint,6 herein respondents alleged that on February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a
loan in the amount of ₱140,000.00 from Filomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners’
loan, Lauro executed a chattel mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death,
her heirs sought to collect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands,
petitioners refused to either pay the balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the
respondents. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the collection case to compel the
petitioners to pay the principal amount of ₱140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of 5%
monthly interest from February 7, 1997, 25% attorney’s fees, exemplary damages, and expenses
of litigation.
Filomena’s heirs, consisting of Avelina de Guzman-Cumplido, Cecilia de Guzman, Rosita de
Guzman, Natividad de Guzman, and Cresencia de Guzman-Principe, authorized Cresencia to act
as their attorney-in-fact through a Special Power of Attorney7 (SPA) dated April 6, 1999. The SPA
authorized Cresencia to do the following on behalf of the co-heirs:
107
1) To represent us on all matters concerning the intestate estate of our deceased sister, Filomena
de Guzman;
2) To file cases for collection of all accounts due said Filomena de Guzman or her estate, including
the power to file petition for foreclosure of mortgaged properties;
3) To do and perform all other acts necessary to carry out the powers hereinabove conferred.
During the pre-trial of the case on February 15, 2002, the parties verbally agreed to settle the
case. On February 21, 2002, the parties jointly filed a Compromise Agreement8 that was signed
by the parties and their respective counsel. Said Compromise Agreement, approved by the MTC
in an Order9 dated April 4, 2002, contained the following salient provisions:
1. That [petitioners] admit their principal loan and obligation to the [respondents] in the sum of
One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (₱140,000.00) Philippine currency; in addition to the
incidental and other miscellaneous expenses that they have incurred in the pursuit of this case,
in the further sum of ₱18,700.00;
2. That, [petitioners] undertake to pay to the [respondents] their aforementioned obligations,
together with attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percentum (10%) of the total sum thereof,
directly at the BULACAN OFFICE of the [respondents’] counsel, located at No. 24 Hornbill Street,
St. Francis Subdivision, Bo. Pandayan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, WITHOUT NEED OF FURTHER
DEMAND in the following specific manner, to wit:
₱60,000.00 – to be paid on or before May 15, 2002
₱10,000.00 – monthly payments thereafter, starting June 15, 2002 up to and until the
aforementioned obligations shall have been fully paid;
3. That, provided that [petitioners] shall truely [sic] comply with the foregoing specifically agreed
manner of payments, [respondents] shall forego and waive all the interests charges of 5%
monthly from February 7, 1998 and the 25% attorney’s fees provided for in Annex "AA" of the
Complaint;
4. In the event of failure on the part of the [petitioners] to comply with any of the specific
provisions of this Compromise Agreement, the [respondents] shall be entitled to the issuance of
a "Writ of Execution" to enforce the satisfaction of [petitioners’] obligations, as mentioned in
paragraph 1, together with the 5% monthly interests charges and attorney’s fees mentioned in
paragraph 3 thereof.10
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
Unfortunately, this was not the end of litigation. On May 2, 2002, petitioners filed a verified
Motion to Set Aside Decision11 alleging that the Agreement was written in a language not
understood by them, and the terms and conditions thereof were not fully explained to them.
Petitioners further questioned the MTC’s jurisdiction, arguing that the total amount allegedly
covered by the Compromise Agreement amounted to ₱588,500.00, which exceeded the MTC’s
₱200,000.00 jurisdictional limit. In an Order12 dated June 28, 2002, the MTC denied the motion;
it also granted Cresencia’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of
108
execution13 was subsequently issued on July 3, 2002. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and
to Quash Writ/Order of Execution14 dated August 1, 2002 was denied by the MTC in an
Order15 dated September 5, 2002.
Undeterred, on October 10, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction 16 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bocaue. The case was raffled to Branch 82,17 and docketed as Civil Case No. 764-
M-2002. In their petition, petitioners argued that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in
approving the Compromise Agreement because (1) the amount involved was beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC; (2) the MTC failed to ascertain that the parties fully understood the
contents of the Agreement; (3) Crescencia had no authority to represent her co-heirs because
Filomena’s estate had a personality of its own; and (4) the Compromise Agreement was void for
failure of the judge and Cresencia to explain the terms and conditions to the petitioners.
In their Comment18 dated October 29, 2002, respondents argued that (1) the principal claim of
₱140,000.00 was within the MTC’s jurisdiction; and (2) the records reveal that it was the
petitioners themselves, assisted by their counsel, who proposed the terms of the settlement,
which offer of compromise was accepted in open court by the respondents. Thus, the
Compromise Agreement merely reduced the parties’ agreement into writing.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC initially granted petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)19 on November 18, 2002, and later issued a preliminary injunction in an Order 20 dated
December 10, 2002, primarily on the ground that the SPA did not specifically authorize Cresencia
to settle the case. However, Presiding Judge Herminia V. Pasamba later inhibited herself,21 so the
case was re-raffled to Branch 6, presided over by Judge Manuel D.J. Siayngo.22 The grant of the
preliminary injunction was thus reconsidered and set aside in an Order23dated May 15, 2003. In
the same Order, the RTC dismissed the petition and held that (1) the MTC had jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (2) Cresencia was authorized to institute the action and enter into a
Compromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs; and (3) the MTC’s approval of the Compromise
Agreement was not done in a capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary manner; thus, petitioners’ resort
to certiorari under Rule 65 was improper. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration24 was
denied,25 hence they sought recourse before the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision26 dated May 13, 2004 and Resolution27 dated October 5,
2004, the CA dismissed petitioners’ appeal, and held that:
1) the MTC had jurisdiction, since the principal amount of the loan only amounted to
₱140,000.00;
2) Cresencia was duly authorized by her co-heirs to enter into the Compromise Agreement;
3) Petitioners improperly sought recourse before the RTC through a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, when the proper remedy was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38.
109
Issues
Before us, petitioners claim that, first, they correctly resorted to the remedy of certiorari under
Rule 65; second, the RTC gravely erred in dismissing their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
when the matter under consideration was merely the propriety of the grant of the preliminary
injunction; and third, that the SPA did not validly authorize Cresencia to enter into the
Compromise Agreement on behalf of her co-heirs.
Our Ruling
We deny the petition.
The MTC had jurisdiction over the case.
It bears stressing that the question of the MTC’s jurisdiction has not been raised before this Court;
hence, petitioners appear to have admitted that the MTC had jurisdiction to approve the
Compromise Agreement. In any event, it is beyond dispute that the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, or Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129,28 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,29 fixes the
MTC’s jurisdiction over cases where "the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs."30 Thus, respondents’ initiatory complaint, covering the principal amount of
₱140,000.00, falls squarely within the MTC’s jurisdiction.
Petitioners properly resorted to the special civil action of certiorari.
On the first question, the CA held that the proper remedy from the MTC’s Order approving the
Compromise Agreement was a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 and not a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65. We recall that petitioners filed a verified Motion to Set Aside
Decision on May 2, 2002,31 which was denied by the MTC on June 28, 2002. This Order of denial
was properly the subject of a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Rule 41, Section 1, of the Rules
of Court:
Section 1. Subject of Appeal – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on
the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent.
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
From the express language of Rule 41, therefore, the MTC’s denial of petitioners’ Motion to Set
Aside Decision could not have been appealed. Indeed, a decision based on a compromise
agreement is immediately final and executory and cannot be the subject of appeal, 32 for when
110
parties enter into a compromise agreement and request a court to render a decision on the basis
of their agreement, it is presumed that such action constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal
said decision.33 While there may have been other remedies available to assail the
decision,34petitioners were well within their rights to institute a special civil action under Rule 65.
The Regional Trial Court rightly dismissed the petition for certiorari.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the RTC, in reconsidering the order granting the
application for writ of preliminary injunction, should not have gone so far as dismissing the main
case filed by the petitioners. They claim that the issue in their application for writ of preliminary
injunction was different from the issues in the main case for certiorari, and that the dissolution
of the preliminary injunction should have been without prejudice to the conduct of further
proceedings in the main case. They also claim that the RTC did not have the power to dismiss the
case without requiring the parties to file memoranda.
These assertions are belied, however, by petitioners’ own submissions.
Their arguments were exactly the same, whether relating to the preliminary or permanent
injunction. Identical matters were at issue – the MTC’s jurisdiction, petitioners’ alleged vitiated
consent, and the propriety of enforcing the Compromise Agreement. The reliefs sought, too,
were the same, that is, the grant of an injunction against the enforcement of the compromise: 35
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that:
1) A Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction issue ex parte directing the
respondents to cease and desist from enforcing, executing, or implementing in any manner the
Decision dated April 4, 2002 and acting in Civil Case No. MM-3191 until further orders from this
Honorable Court.
2) After hearing, the temporary restraining order/ex parte injunction be replaced by a writ of
preliminary injunction.
3) After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered:
a. Making the injunction permanent.
Since the RTC found at the preliminary injunction phase that petitioners were not entitled to an
injunction (whether preliminary or permanent), that petitioners’ arguments were insufficient to
support the relief sought, and that the MTC’s approval of the Compromise Agreement was not
done in a capricious, whimsical, or arbitary manner, the RTC was not required to engage in
unnecessary duplication of proceedings. As such, it rightly dismissed the petition.
In addition, nothing in the Rules of Court commands the RTC to require the parties to file
Memoranda. Indeed, Rule 65, Sec. 8 is explicit in that the court "may dismiss the petition if it
finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration."36
Cresencia was authorized to enter into the Compromise Agreement.
111
As regards the third issue, petitioners maintain that the SPA was fatally defective because
Cresencia was not specifically authorized to enter into a compromise agreement. Here, we fully
concur with the findings of the CA that:
x x x It is undisputed that Cresencia’s co-heirs executed a Special Power of Attorney, dated 6 April
1999, designating the former as their attorney-in-fact and empowering her to file cases for
collection of all the accounts due to Filomena or her estate. Consequently, Cresencia entered
into the subject Compromise Agreement in order to collect the overdue loan obtained by Pasco
from Filomena. In so doing, Cresencia was merely performing her duty as attorney-in-fact of her
co-heirs pursuant to the Special Power of Attorney given to her.371avvphi1
Our ruling in Trinidad v. Court of Appeals38 is illuminating. In Trinidad, the heirs of Vicente
Trinidad executed a SPA in favor of Nenita Trinidad (Nenita) to be their representative in litigation
involving the sale of real property covered by the decedent’s estate. As here, there was no
specific authority to enter into a Compromise Agreement. When a compromise agreement was
finally reached, the heirs later sought to invalidate it, claiming that Nenita was not specifically
authorized to enter into the compromise agreement. We held then, as we do now, that the SPA
necessarily included the power of the attorney-in-fact to compromise the case, and that Nenita’s
co-heirs could not belatedly disavow their original authorization.39 This ruling is even more
significant here, where the co-heirs have not taken any action to invalidate the Compromise
Agreement or assail their SPA.
Moreover, we note that petitioners never assailed the validity of the SPA
during the pre-trial stage prior to entering the Compromise Agreement. This matter was never
even raised as a ground in petitioners’ Motion to Set Aside the compromise, or in the initial
Petition before the RTC. It was only months later, in December 2002, that petitioners – rather
self-servingly - claimed that the SPA was insufficient.
The stated interest rate should be reduced.
Although the petition is unmeritorious, we find the 5% monthly interest rate stipulated in Clause
4 of the Compromise Agreement to be iniquitous and unconscionable. Accordingly, the legal
interest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu of the excessive interest stipulated in the
agreement. As we held in Castro v. Tan:40
In several cases, we have ruled that stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable
interests are contrary to morals, if not against the law. In Medel v. Court of Appeals, we annulled
a stipulated 5.5% per month or 66% per annum interest on a ₱500,000.00 loan and a 6% per
month or 72% per annum interest on a ₱60,000.00 loan, respectively, for being excessive,
iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, we declared a 3% monthly
interest imposed on four separate loans to be excessive. In both cases, the interest rates were
reduced to 12% per annum.
In this case, the 5% monthly interest rate, or 60% per annum, compounded monthly, stipulated
in the Kasulatan is even higher than the 3% monthly interest rate imposed in the Ruiz case. Thus,
we similarly hold the 5% monthly interest to be excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and
112
exorbitant, contrary to morals, and the law. It is therefore void ab initio for being violative of
Article 1306 of the Civil Code. x x x (citations omitted)
The proceeds of the loan should be released to Filomena’s heirs only upon settlement of her
estate.
Finally, it is true that Filomena’s estate has a different juridical personality than that of the heirs.
Nonetheless, her heirs certainly have an interest in the preservation of the estate and the
recovery of its properties,41 for at the moment of Filomena’s death, the heirs start to own the
property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In this connection, Article 777 of the Civil Code
states that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent."42
Unfortunately, the records before us do not show the status of the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Filomena, if any. But to allow the release of the funds directly to the
heirs would amount to a distribution of the estate; which distribution and delivery should be
made only after, not before, the payment of all debts, charges, expenses, and taxes of the estate
have been paid.43 We thus decree that respondent Cresencia should deposit the amounts
received from the petitioners with the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan and in turn, the MTC of Bocaue,
Bulacan should hold in abeyance the release of the amounts to Filomena’s heirs until after a
showing that the proper procedure for the settlement of Filomena’s estate has been followed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 13, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its
October 5, 2004 Resolution are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the interest rate of 5% per
month (60% per annum) is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum. Respondent Cresencia De
Guzman-Principe is DIRECTED to deposit with the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan the
amounts received from the petitioners. The Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan is
likewise DIRECTED to hold in abeyance the release of any amounts recovered from the
petitioners until after a showing that the procedure for settlement of estates of Filomena de
Guzman’s estate has been followed, and after all charges on the estate have been fully satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
113
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168970 January 15, 2010
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner,
vs.
SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set
aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch
4 in Civil Case No. 3263.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he
obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank). The said property was originally
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more
or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, and bounded as follows:
Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River;
along line 12-13 by Lot 4649, Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 2
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose. On
November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The
property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. More than two years after the
auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the Bank's favor.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate5adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject property consisting
of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the
parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the
Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed of Sale of Registered Land 6 was
114
executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-39,484(a.f.)7 was issued in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued
possession of the subject lot.
On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for Recovery of Possession and Damages
against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they
were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for
the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision9 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in
favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by
him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows:
A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate
of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated
at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of
Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot
4661, consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.
The amount of ₱6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered
delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third portion of the land in question.
Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the
disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.
Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.
On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside
the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to immediately surrender possession of the
subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not
redeem the subject property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of
ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was
extinguished.
Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE
PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK)
BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE
RESPONDENTS; THUS, WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY
115
REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE REPURCHASE
PRICE.11
The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the
subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto
transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from
the Bank.
Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the
disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still proceeded to execute the
subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the property
together with petitioner and of continuing their co-ownership thereof.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between
him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby the parties agreed to continue
their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the
Bank. This agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the
respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the disputed property
from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his
rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing respondents the
equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
The Court is not persuaded.
Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution
of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased
father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the
subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time
that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted
by the trial court on October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale13 was issued
in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired. There is neither
any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
Hence, there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot
during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.14 In addition,
the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening
of the succession.15 In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during
his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and
respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of
the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did
116
not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given
point in time.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the
issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's argument that the Extrajudicial
Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a
portion of the disputed lot bought by respondents.1avvphi1
It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by
mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what
has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law.
Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided these are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate
any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to continue with their supposed co-
ownership of the contested lot.
On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in
any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his sibling's intention to buy the
subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It
is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be
accorded primordial consideration.16 It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and realistic
construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the
purpose which it is intended to serve.17 Such intention is determined from the express terms of
their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical
interpretations should also be avoided.19
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his
siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of the subject property, even after
the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial
Settlement too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to
partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their
supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions in the present petition that on
several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do
so. In fact, he claims that after the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same
to him but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his intention
to purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's
offer to re-sell the subject property to him?
117
In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the
execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the subject property was already
exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and
respondents that the mortgage was already foreclosed and title to the property was already
transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare
themselves as co-owners of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would
be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the party-litigants and not on the evidence
adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed
co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial
Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided
or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the
same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in
each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate
without supervision or interference from the other.20 In other words, the purpose of partition is
to put an end to co-ownership,21 an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present
case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
118
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 103577 October 7, 1996
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A. CORONEL, ANNABELLE C.
GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Florida C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A.
CORONEL, FLORAIDA A. ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.
MELO, J.:p
The petition before us has its roots in a complaint for specific performance to compel herein
petitioners (except the last named, Catalina Balais Mabanag) to consummate the sale of a parcel
of land with its improvements located along Roosevelt Avenue in Quezon City entered into by
the parties sometime in January 1985 for the price of P1,240,000.00.
The undisputed facts of the case were summarized by respondent court in this wise:
On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. (hereinafter referred to as
Coronels) executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A") in favor of
plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz (hereinafter referred to as Ramona) which is reproduced
hereunder:
RECEIPT OF DOWN PAYMENT
P1,240,000.00 — Total amount
50,000 — Down payment
———————————
P1,190,000.00 — Balance
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 119627 of the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of P1,240,000.00.
We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father, Constancio P.
Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the down payment above-
stated.
On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will immediately execute the deed of
absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the
balance of the P1,190,000.00.
119
Clearly, the conditions appurtenant to the sale are the following:
1. Ramona will make a down payment of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos upon execution of
the document aforestated;
2. The Coronels will cause the transfer in their names of the title of the property registered in the
name of their deceased father upon receipt of the Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos down
payment;
3. Upon the transfer in their names of the subject property, the Coronels will execute the deed
of absolute sale in favor of Ramona and the latter will pay the former the whole balance of One
Million One Hundred Ninety Thousand (P1,190,000.00) Pesos.
On the same date (January 15, 1985), plaintiff-appellee Concepcion D. Alcaraz (hereinafter
referred to as Concepcion), mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos (Exh. "B", Exh. "2").
On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels' father was
transferred in their names under TCT
No. 327043 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4")
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property covered by TCT No. 327043 to intervenor-
appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for One Million Five Hundred
Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00) Pesos after the latter has paid Three Hundred Thousand
(P300,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. "F-3"; Exh. "6-C")
For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract (Exh. "A") with Ramona by
depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz.
On February 22, 1985, Concepcion, et al., filed a complaint for specific performance against the
Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT No. 327403 (Exh.
"E"; Exh. "5").
On April 2, 1985, Catalina caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim covering the same
property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (Exh. "F"; Exh. "6").
On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in
favor of Catalina (Exh. "G"; Exh. "7").
On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of Catalina under
TCT No. 351582 (Exh. "H"; Exh. "8").
(Rollo, pp. 134-136)
In the course of the proceedings before the trial court (Branch 83, RTC, Quezon City) the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of documentary exhibits. Thus, plaintiffs
therein (now private respondents) proffered their documentary evidence accordingly marked as
Exhibits "A" through "J", inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Adopting these same
exhibits as their own, then defendants (now petitioners) accordingly offered and marked them
120
as Exhibits "1" through "10", likewise inclusive of their corresponding submarkings. Upon motion
of the parties, the trial court gave them thirty (30) days within which to simultaneously submit
their respective memoranda, and an additional 15 days within which to submit their
corresponding comment or reply thereof, after which, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
On April 14, 1988, the case was submitted for resolution before Judge Reynaldo Roura, who was
then temporarily detailed to preside over Branch 82 of the RTC of Quezon City. On March 1, 1989,
judgment was handed down by Judge Roura from his regular bench at Macabebe, Pampanga for
the Quezon City branch, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds
for Quezon City, together with all the improvements existing thereon free from all liens and
encumbrances, and once accomplished, to immediately deliver the said document of sale to
plaintiffs and upon receipt thereof, the said document of sale to plaintiffs and upon receipt
thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay defendants the whole balance of the purchase price
amounting to P1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 331582 of the Registry of
Deeds for Quezon City in the name of intervenor is hereby canceled and declared to be without
force and effect. Defendants and intervenor and all other persons claiming under them are
hereby ordered to vacate the subject property and deliver possession thereof to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' claim for damages and attorney's fees, as well as the counterclaims of defendants and
intervenors are hereby dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So Ordered.
Macabebe, Pampanga for Quezon City, March 1, 1989.
(Rollo, p. 106)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner before the new presiding judge of the
Quezon City RTC but the same was denied by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, thusly:
The prayer contained in the instant motion, i.e., to annul the decision and to render anew
decision by the undersigned Presiding Judge should be denied for the following reasons: (1) The
instant case became submitted for decision as of April 14, 1988 when the parties terminated the
presentation of their respective documentary evidence and when the Presiding Judge at that
time was Judge Reynaldo Roura. The fact that they were allowed to file memoranda at some
future date did not change the fact that the hearing of the case was terminated before Judge
Roura and therefore the same should be submitted to him for decision; (2) When the defendants
and intervenor did not object to the authority of Judge Reynaldo Roura to decide the case prior
to the rendition of the decision, when they met for the first time before the undersigned
Presiding Judge at the hearing of a pending incident in Civil Case No. Q-46145 on November 11,
1988, they were deemed to have acquiesced thereto and they are now estopped from
questioning said authority of Judge Roura after they received the decision in question which
121
happens to be adverse to them; (3) While it is true that Judge Reynaldo Roura was merely a
Judge-on-detail at this Branch of the Court, he was in all respects the Presiding Judge with full
authority to act on any pending incident submitted before this Court during his incumbency.
When he returned to his Official Station at Macabebe, Pampanga, he did not lose his authority
to decide or resolve such cases submitted to him for decision or resolution because he continued
as Judge of the Regional Trial Court and is of co-equal rank with the undersigned Presiding Judge.
The standing rule and supported by jurisprudence is that a Judge to whom a case is submitted
for decision has the authority to decide the case notwithstanding his transfer to another branch
or region of the same court (Sec. 9, Rule 135, Rule of Court).
Coming now to the twin prayer for reconsideration of the Decision dated March 1, 1989 rendered
in the instant case, resolution of which now pertains to the undersigned Presiding Judge, after a
meticulous examination of the documentary evidence presented by the parties, she is convinced
that the Decision of March 1, 1989 is supported by evidence and, therefore, should not be
disturbed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the "Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Annul Decision and
Render Anew Decision by the Incumbent Presiding Judge" dated March 20, 1989 is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 12, 1989.
(Rollo, pp. 108-109)
Petitioners thereupon interposed an appeal, but on December 16, 1991, the Court of Appeals
(Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Abad Santos (P), JJ.) rendered its decision fully agreeing with the trial
court.
Hence, the instant petition which was filed on March 5, 1992. The last pleading, private
respondents' Reply Memorandum, was filed on September 15, 1993. The case was, however, re-
raffled to undersigned ponente only on August 28, 1996, due to the voluntary inhibition of the
Justice to whom the case was last assigned.
While we deem it necessary to introduce certain refinements in the disquisition of respondent
court in the affirmance of the trial court's decision, we definitely find the instant petition bereft
of merit.
The heart of the controversy which is the ultimate key in the resolution of the other issues in the
case at bar is the precise determination of the legal significance of the document entitled
"Receipt of Down Payment" which was offered in evidence by both parties. There is no dispute
as to the fact that said document embodied the binding contract between Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz on the one hand, and the heirs of Constancio P. Coronel on the other, pertaining to a
particular house and lot covered by TCT No. 119627, as defined in Article 1305 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines which reads as follows:
Art. 1305. A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
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While, it is the position of private respondents that the "Receipt of Down Payment" embodied a
perfected contract of sale, which perforce, they seek to enforce by means of an action for specific
performance, petitioners on their part insist that what the document signified was a mere
executory contract to sell, subject to certain suspensive conditions, and because of the absence
of Ramona P. Alcaraz, who left for the United States of America, said contract could not possibly
ripen into a contract absolute sale.
Plainly, such variance in the contending parties' contentions is brought about by the way each
interprets the terms and/or conditions set forth in said private instrument. Withal, based on
whatever relevant and admissible evidence may be available on record, this, Court, as were the
courts below, is now called upon to adjudge what the real intent of the parties was at the time
the said document was executed.
The Civil Code defines a contract of sale, thus:
Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.
Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by mere consent. The
essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the
price;
b) Determinate subject matter; and
c) Price certain in money or its equivalent.
Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a Contract of Sale because the
first essential element is lacking. In a contract to sell, the prospective seller explicity reserves the
transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree
or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the
happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as the full payment of the
purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill is promise to sell the
subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other
words the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the non-
fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus, ownership is retained
by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer. In Roque
vs. Lapuz (96 SCRA 741 [1980]), this Court had occasion to rule:
Hence, We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a contract to
sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment
of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to
convey title from acquiring binding force.
Stated positively, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of
the purchase price, the prospective seller's obligation to sell the subject property by entering into
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a contract of sale with the prospective buyer becomes demandable as provided in Article 1479
of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally
demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding
upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,
while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer
upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as a conditional contract
of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to the property subject of the sale until the
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element
of consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a contingent event which
may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract
of sale is completely abated (cf. Homesite and housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777
[1984]). However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is thereby perfected,
such that if there had already been previous delivery of the property subject of the sale to the
buyer, ownership thereto automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any
further act having to be performed by the seller.
In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of
the purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer although the property
may have been previously delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the
prospective buyer by entering into a contract of absolute sale.
It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially
in cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted
with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract to sell, there being no previous
sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer
in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property.
There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer to the buyer after
registration because there is no defect in the owner-seller's title per se, but the latter, of course,
may be used for damages by the intending buyer.
In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the
sale becomes absolute and this will definitely affect the seller's title thereto. In fact, if there had
been previous delivery of the subject property, the seller's ownership or title to the property is
automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer have any title to transfer
to any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the Civil Code, such second buyer of the property
who may have had actual or constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller's title, or at least
was charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in good faith.
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Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer's title. In case a title is issued to the second
buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of the property subject of the sale.
With the above postulates as guidelines, we now proceed to the task of deciphering the real
nature of the contract entered into by petitioners and private respondents.
It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein should be given their
natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical meaning was intended (Tan vs. Court of
Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]). Thus, when petitioners declared in the said "Receipt of Down
Payment" that they —
Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon City, the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house and lot, covered by TCT No. 1199627 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, in the total amount of P1,240,000.00.
without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire purchase price, the natural and
ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold their property.
When the "Receipt of Down Payment" is considered in its entirety, it becomes more manifest
that there was a clear intent on the part of petitioners to transfer title to the buyer, but since the
transfer certificate of title was still in the name of petitioner's father, they could not fully effect
such transfer although the buyer was then willing and able to immediately pay the purchase
price. Therefore, petitioners-sellers undertook upon receipt of the down payment from private
respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz, to cause the issuance of a new certificate of title in their names
from that of their father, after which, they promised to present said title, now in their names, to
the latter and to execute the deed of absolute sale whereupon, the latter shall, in turn, pay the
entire balance of the purchase price.
The agreement could not have been a contract to sell because the sellers herein made no express
reservation of ownership or title to the subject parcel of land. Furthermore, the circumstance
which prevented the parties from entering into an absolute contract of sale pertained to the
sellers themselves (the certificate of title was not in their names) and not the full payment of the
purchase price. Under the established facts and circumstances of the case, the Court may safely
presume that, had the certificate of title been in the names of petitioners-sellers at that time,
there would have been no reason why an absolute contract of sale could not have been executed
and consummated right there and then.
Moreover, unlike in a contract to sell, petitioners in the case at bar did not merely promise to sell
the properly to private respondent upon the fulfillment of the suspensive condition. On the
contrary, having already agreed to sell the subject property, they undertook to have the
certificate of title changed to their names and immediately thereafter, to execute the written
deed of absolute sale.
Thus, the parties did not merely enter into a contract to sell where the sellers, after compliance
by the buyer with certain terms and conditions, promised to sell the property to the latter. What
may be perceived from the respective undertakings of the parties to the contract is that
petitioners had already agreed to sell the house and lot they inherited from their father,
completely willing to transfer full ownership of the subject house and lot to the buyer if the
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documents were then in order. It just happened, however, that the transfer certificate of title
was then still in the name of their father. It was more expedient to first effect the change in the
certificate of title so as to bear their names. That is why they undertook to cause the issuance of
a new transfer of the certificate of title in their names upon receipt of the down payment in the
amount of P50,000.00. As soon as the new certificate of title is issued in their names, petitioners
were committed to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale. Only then will the obligation
of the buyer to pay the remainder of the purchase price arise.
There is no doubt that unlike in a contract to sell which is most commonly entered into so as to
protect the seller against a buyer who intends to buy the property in installment by withholding
ownership over the property until the buyer effects full payment therefor, in the contract entered
into in the case at bar, the sellers were the one who were unable to enter into a contract of
absolute sale by reason of the fact that the certificate of title to the property was still in the name
of their father. It was the sellers in this case who, as it were, had the impediment which
prevented, so to speak, the execution of an contract of absolute sale.
What is clearly established by the plain language of the subject document is that when the said
"Receipt of Down Payment" was prepared and signed by petitioners Romeo A. Coronel, et al.,
the parties had agreed to a conditional contract of sale, consummation of which is subject only
to the successful transfer of the certificate of title from the name of petitioners' father,
Constancio P. Coronel, to their names.
The Court significantly notes this suspensive condition was, in fact, fulfilled on February 6, 1985
(Exh. "D"; Exh. "4"). Thus, on said date, the conditional contract of sale between petitioners and
private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz became obligatory, the only act required for the
consummation thereof being the delivery of the property by means of the execution of the deed
of absolute sale in a public instrument, which petitioners unequivocally committed themselves
to do as evidenced by the "Receipt of Down Payment."
Article 1475, in correlation with Article 1181, both of the Civil Code, plainly applies to the case at
bench. Thus,
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From the moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
of the law governing the form of contracts.
Art. 1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or
loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the condition.
Since the condition contemplated by the parties which is the issuance of a certificate of title in
petitioners' names was fulfilled on February 6, 1985, the respective obligations of the parties
under the contract of sale became mutually demandable, that is, petitioners, as sellers, were
obliged to present the transfer certificate of title already in their names to private respondent
Ramona P. Alcaraz, the buyer, and to immediately execute the deed of absolute sale, while the
126
buyer on her part, was obliged to forthwith pay the balance of the purchase price amounting to
P1,190,000.00.
It is also significant to note that in the first paragraph in page 9 of their petition, petitioners
conclusively admitted that:
3. The petitioners-sellers Coronel bound themselves "to effect the transfer in our names from
our deceased father Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon
receipt of the downpayment above-stated". The sale was still subject to this suspensive condition.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Rollo, p. 16)
Petitioners themselves recognized that they entered into a contract of sale subject to a
suspensive condition. Only, they contend, continuing in the same paragraph, that:
. . . Had petitioners-sellers not complied with this condition of first transferring the title to the
property under their names, there could be no perfected contract of sale. (Emphasis supplied.)
(Ibid.)
not aware that they set their own trap for themselves, for Article 1186 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that:
Art. 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its
fulfillment.
Besides, it should be stressed and emphasized that what is more controlling than these mere
hypothetical arguments is the fact that the condition herein referred to was actually and
indisputably fulfilled on February 6, 1985, when a new title was issued in the names of petitioners
as evidenced by TCT No. 327403 (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
The inevitable conclusion is that on January 19, 1985, as evidenced by the document
denominated as "Receipt of Down Payment" (Exh. "A"; Exh. "1"), the parties entered into a
contract of sale subject only to the suspensive condition that the sellers shall effect the issuance
of new certificate title from that of their father's name to their names and that, on February 6,
1985, this condition was fulfilled (Exh. "D"; Exh. "4").
We, therefore, hold that, in accordance with Article 1187 which pertinently provides —
Art. 1187. The effects of conditional obligation to give, once the condition has been fulfilled, shall
retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation . . .
In obligation to do or not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the retroactive effect of
the condition that has been complied with.
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the perfected contract of sale became
mutually due and demandable as of the time of fulfillment or occurrence of the suspensive
condition on February 6, 1985. As of that point in time, reciprocal obligations of both seller and
buyer arose.
127
Petitioners also argue there could been no perfected contract on January 19, 1985 because they
were then not yet the absolute owners of the inherited property.
We cannot sustain this argument.
Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership as follows:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P.
Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the
point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject
property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and
enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850
[1952]).
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors
have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title
to the property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter
into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to
that which they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P.
Alcaraz. The Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale,
petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
Petitioners also contend that although there was in fact a perfected contract of sale between
them and Ramona P. Alcaraz, the latter breached her reciprocal obligation when she rendered
impossible the consummation thereof by going to the United States of America, without leaving
her address, telephone number, and Special Power of Attorney (Paragraphs 14 and 15, Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43), for which reason,
so petitioners conclude, they were correct in unilaterally rescinding rescinding the contract of
sale.
We do not agree with petitioners that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the
instant case. We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners' rescission, are mere
allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express provision of the rules, are
deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of
Court). The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners'
allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be proven by sufficient
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evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882 [1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961].
Mere allegation is not an evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States of America on February
6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioner-sellers' act of unilaterally and extradicially rescinding the
contract of sale, there being no express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extarjudicially
rescind the contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda. de Leon,
132 SCRA 722 [1984])
Moreover, petitioners are estopped from raising the alleged absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz
because although the evidence on record shows that the sale was in the name of Ramona P.
Alcaraz as the buyer, the sellers had been dealing with Concepcion D. Alcaraz, Ramona's mother,
who had acted for and in behalf of her daughter, if not also in her own behalf. Indeed, the down
payment was made by Concepcion D. Alcaraz with her own personal check (Exh. "B"; Exh. "2")
for and in behalf of Ramona P. Alcaraz. There is no evidence showing that petitioners ever
questioned Concepcion's authority to represent Ramona P. Alcaraz when they accepted her
personal check. Neither did they raise any objection as regards payment being effected by a third
person. Accordingly, as far as petitioners are concerned, the physical absence of Ramona P.
Alcaraz is not a ground to rescind the contract of sale.
Corollarily, Ramona P. Alcaraz cannot even be deemed to be in default, insofar as her obligation
to pay the full purchase price is concerned. Petitioners who are precluded from setting up the
defense of the physical absence of Ramona P. Alcaraz as above-explained offered no proof
whatsoever to show that they actually presented the new transfer certificate of title in their
names and signified their willingness and readiness to execute the deed of absolute sale in
accordance with their agreement. Ramona's corresponding obligation to pay the balance of the
purchase price in the amount of P1,190,000.00 (as buyer) never became due and demandable
and, therefore, she cannot be deemed to have been in default.
Article 1169 of the Civil Code defines when a party in a contract involving reciprocal obligations
may be considered in default, to wit:
Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something, incur in delay from the time the obligee
judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready
to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the
parties fulfill his obligation, delay by the other begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is thus neither factual nor legal basis to rescind the contract of sale between petitioners
and respondents.
With the foregoing conclusions, the sale to the other petitioner, Catalina B. Mabanag, gave rise
to a case of double sale where Article 1544 of the Civil Code will apply, to wit:
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Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should if be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The record of the case shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1985 as proof of the
second contract of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City giving rise to
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Catalina B. Mabanag on June 5, 1985.
Thus, the second paragraph of Article 1544 shall apply.
The above-cited provision on double sale presumes title or ownership to pass to the first buyer,
the exceptions being: (a) when the second buyer, in good faith, registers the sale ahead of the
first buyer, and (b) should there be no inscription by either of the two buyers, when the second
buyer, in good faith, acquires possession of the property ahead of the first buyer. Unless, the
second buyer satisfies these requirements, title or ownership will not transfer to him to the
prejudice of the first buyer.
In his commentaries on the Civil Code, an accepted authority on the subject, now a distinguished
member of the Court, Justice Jose C. Vitug, explains:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge
by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the second
buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33).
Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he
is first to register, since knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 58530, 26 December 1984). In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June
1984, 129 SCRA 656), it has held that it is essential, to merit the protection of Art. 1544, second
paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed of sale
(citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. No. 95843, 02
September 1992).
(J. Vitug Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 Edition, p. 604).
Petitioner point out that the notice of lis pendens in the case at bar was annoted on the title of
the subject property only on February 22, 1985, whereas, the second sale between petitioners
Coronels and petitioner Mabanag was supposedly perfected prior thereto or on February 18,
1985. The idea conveyed is that at the time petitioner Mabanag, the second buyer, bought the
property under a clean title, she was unaware of any adverse claim or previous sale, for which
reason she is buyer in good faith.
We are not persuaded by such argument.
130
In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not whether or not the second
buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or not said second buyer registers such second sale
in good faith, that is, without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
As clearly borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in good
faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as early as February 22,
1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on the transfer certificate of title in the names
of petitioners, whereas petitioner Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At
the time of registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had already
been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was charged with knowledge that a
previous buyer is claiming title to the same property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes
to the defect in petitioners' title to the property at the time of the registration of the property.
This Court had occasions to rule that:
If a vendee in a double sale registers that sale after he has acquired knowledge that there was a
previous sale of the same property to a third party or that another person claims said property
in a pervious sale, the registration will constitute a registration in bad faith and will not confer
upon him any right. (Salvoro vs. Tanega, 87 SCRA 349 [1978]; citing Palarca vs. Director of Land,
43 Phil. 146; Cagaoan vs. Cagaoan, 43 Phil. 554; Fernandez vs. Mercader, 43 Phil. 581.)
Thus, the sale of the subject parcel of land between petitioners and Ramona P. Alcaraz, perfected
on February 6, 1985, prior to that between petitioners and Catalina B. Mabanag on February 18,
1985, was correctly upheld by both the courts below.
Although there may be ample indications that there was in fact an agency between Ramona as
principal and Concepcion, her mother, as agent insofar as the subject contract of sale is
concerned, the issue of whether or not Concepcion was also acting in her own behalf as a co-
buyer is not squarely raised in the instant petition, nor in such assumption disputed between
mother and daughter. Thus, We will not touch this issue and no longer disturb the lower courts'
ruling on this point.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed
judgment AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
131
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993,
in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in
Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the
estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee
of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No.
4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained the following
provisions:
"FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of
141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002
(10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights
which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and
spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
132
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla
shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease
of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until
he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of
Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation
to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom
I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED
(100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December,
SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my
command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately
seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near
desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100)
piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they decide
to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants and my
sister."4
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City,
against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject
Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in
that:
133
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of
sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela
y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil,
despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that in case
of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise
have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of
TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the
Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his Answer,
accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of
the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-
heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the
obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will be
delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary Rose
Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar
Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner
will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied in
cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed upon,
taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year, which is in
the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,
payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1988-89;
For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1989-90;
134
For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1990-91; and
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable on or
before December of crop year 1991-92."5
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a
partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of
plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from
them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in
question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.
Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may
initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to
give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."6
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation
under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount
of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with said
obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil
Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such
non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392
from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant
must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of
an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her
right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of
the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together
with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."7
135
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to
this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of
the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal
institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with
Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue raised
which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that Article 882
does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere
simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the
testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private
respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near
descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and
therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed
as not written.
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of Appeals
deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The Court of
Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had
a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the
Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the
widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of
law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them
from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
136
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to
the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent
every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights
and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the
fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir
reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or
performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at
bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court
erred in dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be
substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the
obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir
or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason
of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the provisions of
subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,
incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the
Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed
in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near
descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to
transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir
is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the
near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a
fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the
preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The
property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article
863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
137
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.17 In the case under
scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject
Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is
the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by
the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it
appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir
or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of
anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should
disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article
cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a
manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an
obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition
suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent,
it is similar to a resolutory condition.21
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded
that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela
Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's
inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of
the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the
property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge
upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself
that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered
as modal and not conditional.22
138
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has
only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir
because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made.23 Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted. 24
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred (100)
piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall
seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of
the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to
the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not
only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the instituted heir
and his successors-in-interest.
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the
said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation
petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have made a
substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated settlement
between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the
petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the
amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person
disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses the manner in
which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
139
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3362 March 1, 1951
TESTATE estate of Carlos Gil, deceased. ISABEL HERREROS VDA. DE GIL, administratrix-
appellee,
vs.
PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCIANO, oppositor-appellant.
Eligio C. Lagman for appellant.
Reyes, Albert and Agcaoili for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the
deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed to this Court, raising only
question of law. Her counsel assigns the two following alleged errors:
Primer Error. — El Juzgado inferior erro al dejar de declarar que el alegado testamento de Carlos
Gil no ha sido otogar de acuerdo con la ley.
Segundo Error. — Erro finalmente a legalizar el referido testamento.
The alleged will read as follows:
Primera Pagina (1)
EN EL NOMBRE DE DIOS, AMEN
Yo, Carlos Gil, de 66 años de edad, residente de Porac, Pampanga, I. F., hallandome sano y en
pleno goce de mis facultades intelectuales, libre y expontaneamente, sin violencia, coaccion, dolo
o influencia ilegal de persona extraña, otorgo y ordeno este mi testamento y ultima voluntad en
castellano, idioma que poseo y entiendo, de la manera siguiente:
1. Declaro que durante mi matrimonio con mi esposa la hoy Isabel Herreros no tuvimos hijos;
2. Declaro que tengo propiedades situadas en Manila y en la Provincia de Pampanga;
3. Doy y adjudico a mi querida esposa Isabel Herretos todos mis bienes ya que muebles e
inmuebles situados en Manila y en Pampanga, bajo la condicion de que cuando esta muera y si
hayan bienes remanentes heredadas por ella de mi, que dichos bienes remanentes se
adjudicaran a Don Carlos Worrel.
4. Nombro como albacea de mis bienes despues de mi fallecimiento al Dr. Galicano Coronel a
quien tengo absoluta confianza, con relevacion de fianza;
En testimonio de todo lo cual, firmo este mi testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de
sus dos paginas, utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a
140
su vez firmaron cada una de dichas paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada
uno de ellos con la de los demas, hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de Mayo de mil
novecientos treinta y nueve.
CARLOS GIL
Testificacion:
Nosotros los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que
precede este escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testadora, compuesto de dos paginas
utiles con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la
parte superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada
uno de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
Regarding the correctness and accuracy of the above-copied alleged will, the court below said:
. . . The only copy available is a printed form contained in the record appeal in case G.R. No. L-
254, entitled "Testate Estate of Carlos Gil; Isabel Herreros Vda. de Gil, petitioner and
appellant vs. Roberto Toledo y Gil, oppositor and appellee." Both parties are agreed that this is a
true and correct copy of the will. (P. 10, Record on Appeal).
The appeal being only on questions of law the above finding of the court below cannot be
disputed. The conclusions of law reached by said court are based on it. Moreover, the finding is
correctly based on the evidence of record. The parties agreed that said copy is true and correct.
If it were otherwise, they would not have so agreed, considering that the defect is of an essential
character and is fatal to the validity of the attestation clause.
It will be noted that the attestation clause above quoted does not state that the alleged testor
signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the
precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being
the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is said that
the court may correct a mere clerical error. This is too much of a clerical error for it effects the
very essence of the clause. Alleged errors may be overlooked or correct only in matters of form
which do not affect the substance of the statement.
It is claimed that the correction may be made by inference. If we cure a deficiency by means of
inferences, when are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills?
Where are we to draw the line? Following that procedure we would be making interpolations by
inferences, implication, and even by internal circumtantial evidence. This would be done in the
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face of the clear, uniquivocal, language of the statute as to how the attestation clause should be
made. It is to be supposed that the drafter of the alleged will read the clear words of the statute
when he prepared it. For the court to supply alleged deficiencies would be against the evident
policy of the law. Section 618 of Act No. 190, before it was amended, contained the following
provision:
. . . But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it proven that
the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
However, Act No. 2645 of the Philippine Legislature, passed on July 1, 1916, besides increasing
the contents of the attestation clause, entirely suppressed the above-quoted provision. This
would show that the purpose of the amending act was to surround the execution of a will with
greater guarantees and solemnities. Could we, in view of this, hold that the court can cure alleged
deficiencies by inferences, implications, and internal circumstantial evidence? Even in ordinary
cases the law requires certain requisities for the conclusiveness of circumstantial evidence.
It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the
body of the alleged will, which we have quoted above. At first glance, it is queer that the alleged
testator should have made an attestation clause, which is the function of the witness. But the
important point is that he attests or certifies his own signature, or, to be accurate, his signature
certifies itself. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the
evidence of its authenticity. It would be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps. Consequently,
the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of
the witnesses. Adding zero to an insufficient amount does not make it sufficient.
It is said that the rules of statutory construction are applicable to documents and wills. This is
true, but said rules apply to the body of the will, containing the testamentary provisions, but not
to the attestation clause, which must be so clear that it should not require any construction.
The parties have cited pro and con several decisions of the Supreme Court, some of which are
said to be rather strict and others liberal, in the interpretation of section 618 of Act No. 190, as
amended by Act No. 2645.
In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30, 31), the court had the following to say:
1. WILLS; ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE; SECTIONS 618 AND 634 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE CONSTRUED. — The right to dispose of the property by will is governed entirely by
statute. The law is here found in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended. The law
not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes further and makes use of
the negative, to enforce legislative intention.
2. ID.; ID.; ATTESTATION. — The Philippine authorities relating to the attestation clause to wills
reviewed. The cases of Saño vs. Quintana ([1925], 48 Phil., 506), and Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar
([1924], 47 Phil., 152), particularly compared. The decision in In re Will of Quintana, supra,
adopted and reaffirmed. The decision in Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar, supra, modified.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — The portion of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides that "The attestation clause shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which
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the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused
some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of each other" applied and enforced.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the
will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is
defective, and such a defect annuls the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, supra.)
In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481, 482), Judge Manuel V. Moran, now
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in his decision made the following pronouncement:
. . . En la clausula de atestiguamiento del testamento en cuestion, se hace constar que los
testadores firmaron el testamento en presencia de los tres testigos instrumentales y que estos
firmaron el testamento los unos en presencia de los otros, pero no se hace constar que dichos
testigos firmaron el testamento enpresencia de los testadores, ni que estos y aquellos firmaron
todas y cada una de las paginas del testamento los primeros en presencia de los segundos y vice-
versa.
En su virtud, se deniega la solicitud en la que se pide la legalizacion del alegado testamento Exhibit
A de Gregorio Pueblo y Carmen Quinto, y se declara que Gregorio Pueblo murio intestado.
The Supreme Court fully affirmed the decision, laying down the following doctrine:
1. WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE; EVIDENCE TO SUPPLY DEFECTS OF. — The attestation clause
must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as
amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements,
the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. (Sano vs. Quintana, 48
Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30). Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to
establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been
admitted it should not be given the effect intended. (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405,
409.).
2. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 618 OF ACT NO. 190, AS AMENDED. — Section 618 of
Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give effect to the
intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of
wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defensive execution of will. (40 Cyc., p.
1079; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, supra.)
It is true that in subsequent decisions, the court has somewhat relaxed the doctrine of
the Gumban vs. Gorcho case, supra, but not to the extent of validating an attestation clause
similar to that involved herein.
In the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil., 378), the testatrix signed the attestation clause which
was complete, and it was also signed by the two attesting witnesses. For this reason, the court
said:
In reality, it appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained
in the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have
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signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of
the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 1 of Act No.
2645 which provides that: . . . (p. 381, supra.)
The attestation clause involved herein is very different.
In the case of Dischoso de Ticson vs. De Gorotiza (57 Phil., 437), it was held that:
An attestation clause to a will, copied from a form book and reading: "We, the undersigned
attesting witnesses, whose residences are stated opposite our respective names, do hereby
certify that the testatrix, whose name is signed hereinabove, has publish unto us the foregoing
will consisting of two pages as her Last Will and Testament, and has signed the same in our
presence, and in witness whereof we have each signed the same and each page thereof in the
presence of said testatrix and in the presence of each other," held not to be fatally defective and
to conform to the law.
This very different from the attestation clause in the case at bar.
In the case of Grey vs. Fabie * (40 Off. Gaz., 1st Supplement, 196, No. 3, May 23, 1939), the will
was objected to on the ground that, although the attestation clause stated that "each of the
pages of which the said will is composed" was signed by the testatrix at the left margin and at
the foot of the fifth page, it did not state that the signature was made in the presence of the
witnesses. It was held, however, that said deficiency was cured by the phrase "as well as by each
of us in the presence of the testatrix." The words "as well as" indicate that the testatrix signed
also in the presence of the witnesses, for the phrase "as well as" in this case is equivalent to
"also." The language is clear and, unlike the attestation clause in the present case, does not
necessitate any correction. In the body of the will the testatrix stated that she signed in the
presence of each and all of the three witnesses. This was considered as a corroboration, but it
was unnecessary.
In the case of Leynez vs. Leynez (40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supplement, 51, 52, No. 7, October 18, 1939;
68 Phil., 745), the attestation clause reads as follows:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Valerio Leynez, como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de todos y cada uno de nosotros, y a ruego de dicho testador, firmamos el presente
cada uno en presencia de los otros, o de los demas y de la del mismo testsador, Valerio Leynez.
El testamento consta de dos (2) paginas solamente.
The objection was that the attestation clause did not state that the testator and the witnesses
signed each and every page of the will. This fact , however, appears in the will itself. It is clear,
therefore, that in case of the will complied with all the requisites for its due execution. In the
instant case, essential words were omitted.
In the case of Alcala vs. De Villa 1 (40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supplement, 131, 134-135, No. 23, April 18,
1939), the attestation clause reads as follows:
Hacemos constar que en la fecha y pueblo arriba mencionadios otorgo el Sr. Emiliano Alcala su
ultima voluntad o testamentao compuesto de cuatro paginas incluida ya esta clasula de
atestiguamiento. Que estabamos presentes en el momento de leer y ratificar el que el
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testamento arriba mencionado es su ultima voluntad o testamento compuesto de cuatro
paginasen papel de maquinilla. Que igualmente estabamos presentes cuando el firmo este
documento al pie del mismo y en el margen izquierdo de cada pagina del testador tambien en
presencia suya y de cada uno de nosotros en cada pagina y en el margen izquierdo de esta
escritura o testamento. En su testimonio firmamos abajo en prsencia del testador y de cada uno
de nosotros.
The above attestation clause is substantially perfect. The only clerical error is that it says
"testador" instead of "testamento" in the phrase "cada pagina del testador." The word "tambien"
renders unnecessary the use of the verb "firmamos."
In the case of Mendoza vs. Pilapil 2 (40 Off. Gaz., 1855, No. 9, June 27, 1941), the attestation
clause did not state the number of pages of the will. However, it was held that this deficiency
was cured by the will itself, which stated that it consisted of three pages and in fact it had three
pages.
In the case of Rallos vs. Rallos (44 Off. Gaz., 4938, 4940, No. 12, October 23, 1947), decided by
the Court of Appeals, the attestation clause (translated in Spanish) reads as follows:
Nosotros, los testigos, certificamos que este que hemos firmado es el testamento y ultima
voluntad, que se ha redactado en cuatro paginas, de Numeriano Rallos, quien despues de leer y
de leer y de leerle el mencionado testamento, y despues de que ella dio su conformidad, firmo y
marco con su dedo pulgar derecho en nuestra presencia y en presencia de cada uno de nosotros,
que asimismo cada uno de nosotros, los testigos, firmamos enpresencia de la testadora y en
presencia de cada uno de nosotros.
It will be noticed that the only thing omitted is the statement as to the signing of the testatrix
and the witnesses of each and every page of the will, but the omission is cured by the fact that
their signatures appear on every page. This attestation clause is different from that involved in
the present case.
There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear
requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements. The right to dispose of
property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should be satisfied.
The right to make a testamentary disposition of one's property is purely of statutory creation,
and is available only upon the compliance with the requirements of the statute. The formalities
which the Legislature has prescribed for the execution of a will are essential to its validity, and
cannot be disregarded. The mode so prescribed is the measure for the exercise of the right, and
the heir can be deprived of his inheritance only by a compliance with this mode. For the purpose
of determining whether a will has been properly executed, the intention of the testator in
executing it is entitled to no consideration. For that purpose only intention of the Legislature, as
expressed in the language of the statute, can be considered by the court, and whether the will as
presented, shows a compliance with the statute. Estate of Walker, 110 Cal., 387, 42 Pac., 815, 30
L. R. A., 460, 52 Am. St. Rep. 104. In re Seaman's Estate, 80 Pac., 700, 701.)
In interpreting the legislature's thought, courts have rigidly opposed any exception tending to
weaken the basic principle underlying the law, the chief purpose of which is to see that the
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testator's wishes are observed. It is possible, in some or many cases, a decedent may have
thought he had made a will, but the statute says he had not. The question is not one of his
intention, but of what he actually did, or . . . failed to do. . . . It may happen . . . that . . . wills . . .
truly expressing the intertions of the testator are made without observations of the required
forms; and whenever that happens, the genuine intention is frustrated. . . . The Legislature . . .
has taught of it best and has therefore determined, to run the risk of frustrating (that intention,
. . . in preference to the risk of giving effect to or facilitating the formation of spurious wills, by
the absence of forms. . . . The evil probably to arise by giving to wills made without any form, . .
." or, in derogation of testator's wishes, fraudulently imposing spurious wills on his effect on his
estate. Churchill's Estate, 260 Pac. 94, 101, 103 Atl. 533.
It has always been the policy of this court to sustain a will if it is legally possible to do so, but we
cannot break down the legislative barriers protecting a man's property after death, even if a
situation may be presented apparently meritorious. (In Re: Maginn, 30 A. L. R., pp. 419, 420.)
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is reversed, denying the probate of the
alleged will and declaring intestate the estate of the deceased Carlos Gil. With costs against the
appellee. It is so ordered.
Separate Opinions
TUAZON, J., dissenting:
The decision takes for granted that the will was written just as it was copied in the stipulation of
facts by the parties. But counsel for appellee makes the correctness of the copy an issue thereby
raising the question of not whether the burnt will possessed the statutory requirements but
whether the copy is erroneous. Since this is a chief feature on which the appellee's case is built;
since, in fact, the objection to form of the attestation clause, with which the decision wholly
deals, would disappear if the appellee's contention were well founded, it is proper that in this
dissenting opinion we should accord the matter at least a passing notice.
It may be stated as background that the original of the will was filed in the Court of First Instance
of Manila in 1943; that in 1945, before the will came up for probate, it was destroyed by fire or
looters; that in the probate proceeding after liberation, the parties submitted an agreed
statement of facts in which the will was reproduced as copied in the record on appeal in another
case docketed in this court on appeal as G.R. No. L-254 and decided on April 30, 1948. It further
appears from the record of that case and from the decision of this court that the controversy
there concerned the right of a nephew of the testator to impugn the will, it being alleged that he
was not a legal heir and had no interest in the probate.
As transcribed in the majority decision, it will be seen that the attestation clause is truncated and
meaningless. The last of the compound sentence in incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase.
Counsel for appellee contends that the phrase "ha sido firmado por el testador" or equivalent
expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be
inserted if the sentence is to be complete and have sense. The attestation clause with the
inclusion of the omitted phrase, which we italicize should read thus:
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Nosotros, los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos que el testamento que
precede escrito en la lengua castellana que conoce la testador, compuesto de las paginadas utiles
con la clausula de atestiguamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todos las hojas del mismo (Ha sido firmado por el testador) en
nuestra presencia y que cada de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas
las hojas del mismo presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was inadvertently left out. The probabilities of error in
the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the will was not in controversy. The form of
the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or on care was employed in the copying
thereof in the pleading or record on appeal above mentioned. The absence of the signature of
the testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof that little or on pain was taken to
insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la testadora" in the copy instead of "el
testador" is another.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the decision says.
Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaña, who drafted the whole instrument and signed it as an
attesting witness, knew the law and, by the context of the whole instrument, has shown
familiarity with the rules of grammar and ability to express his idea properly.
Read in the light of these circumstances — without mentioning the evidence or record, not
objected to, that the testator signed the will in the presence of the attesting witnesses — so
important an omission as to make the sentence senseless — granting such omission existed in
the original document-could not have been intentional or due to ignorance. The most that can
be said is that the flaw was due to a clerical mistake, inadvertance, or oversight.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it was "reproduced in the
record on Appeal" above mentioned is bound by the agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The
binding effect of a stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring them or either
of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. That there was such
mistake, is indubitable. It is noteworthy that the opponent and appellant herself appears not to
have noticed any defect in the attestation clause as copied in the stipulation. It would seem that
in the court below she confined her attack on the will to the alleged failure of the testator to sign
the first page. We say this because it was only the alleged unsigning of the first page of the
document which the trial court in the appealed decision discussed and ruled upon. There is not
the slightest reference in the decision, direct or implied, to any flaw in the attestation clause —
which is by far more important than the alleged absence of the testator's signature on the first
page.
As stated the problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills
which requires certain formalities to be observed in the execution, but by the rules of
construction applicable to statues and documents in general. And this rule would obtain even if
the omission had occurred in the original document and not in the copy alone. In either case, the
court may and should correct the error by supplying the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del finado Emilio Alcala, a similar situation arose and the Court said:
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Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su redaccion
se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el sentido comon pueden suplirlas sin alterar ni
tergiversar la intencion tanto del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervinieron en el
otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraselogia de la segunda parte de la clausula
se observara que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en meros errores
gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de
interpretacion de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer
que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan sus efectos.
La interpritacion que se acaba de bar a la clausula de atestacion y la correccion de los errores
gramaticales de que misma adolece, incluyendo la insercion del verbo "firmamos" que se omitio
involuntariamente, esta de acuerdo con las reglas fundamentals de interpretacion de
documentos segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya
redactado el instrumento (art. 288, Cod. de Proc. Civ.; Pecson contra, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28 R. C. L.,
sec. 187, pags. 225, 226.)
La solucion que se acaba de bar al asunto es la que se halla mas conforme con la justificia en vista
de que se ha presentado prueba alguna que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del
testamento se ha cometido dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudiar a cualquiera. (Testamentaria
de Emiano Alcala, 40 G. O., 14. Suplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)
From 69 C. J., 82 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court
whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will; but not where
the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the
meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50, 51, the same work says: "To aid
the court in ascertaining and giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of an ambiguous
will, certain rules have been established for guidance in the construction or interpretation to be
placed upon such a will, and in general a will should be construed according to these established
rules of construction." Speaking of construction of statutes which, as has been said, is applicable
to construction of documents, the same work, in Vol. 59, p. 992, says: "Where it appears from
the context that certain words have been inadvertently omitted from a statute, the court may
supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative intent.
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in accordance with
law. (2 Page on Wills, 840, 841; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
Let us assume, for the purpose of this decision only, that the attestation clause was drawn as the
draftsman intended, that the mistake in language in said clause was not inadvertent, and
consider the case on the premise from which the court has approached it; is the decision well
grounded, at least in the light of this court's previous decisions?
At the outset, it should be pointed out that as early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity
of the will was sustained, found its way into this court. (Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378). The case
was more than four-square behind the case at bar. There the departure from the statutory
formality was more radical, in that the testator took charge or writing the entire attestation
clause in the body of the will, the witnesses limiting their role to signing the document below the
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testator's signature. Here, at most, the testator took away from the witness only a small part of
their assigned task, leaving them to perform the rest.
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a unanimous decision in
banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said (syllabus): "When the attestation clause is signed by the
witnesses to the instruments besides the testator, such attestation clause is valid and constitutes
a substantial compliance with the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts
recited in said attestation appear to have been make by the testator himself."
That was good doctrine when it was announced. We think it is good law still. That ruling should
set the present case at rest unless the court wants to discard it. On the possibility that this is the
intention, we will dwell on the subject further.
This Court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza, (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have
been noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the law of wills — the one being
planted on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former
views may be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a
literal enforcement of the law. The basic case in the other direction,predicated on reason,
is Abangan vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in later decisions." In the
Abangan case, unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, later Chief Justice,
observed: "The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their
truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as
to attain these primodial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever,
that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded."
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle were numerous: Avera
vs. Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922,)
43 Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46
Phil., 922; Nayve vs. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey
vs. Cartegana (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de
M. Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Pañganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs.
Yap (1939)1, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939)2, 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl.
No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939)3, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs.
Martir (1940)4, 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941)5, 40 Off. Gaz.,
1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941)6 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941)7, 40 Off. Gaz., 14th
Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948)8, 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.
The majority decision says, and we quote: "If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when
are we going to stop making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to
draw the line?" These same questions might well have been asked in the case above cited by the
opponents of the new trends. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty,
nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The decisions we have cited to tell us when
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and where to stop; the dividing line is drawn with precision. They say "Halt" when and where
evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document is attempted. They only permit a probe,
an exploration within the confines of the will, to ascertain its meaning and to determine the
existence or absence of the formalities of law. They do not allow the courts to go outside the will
or to admit extrinsic evidence to supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. This
clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainly and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined. If the witnesses here purposely omitted
or forgot that the testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did and the
witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary
and none was introduced or taken into consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the thing that
led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of the old way that
impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of form in
preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has known, that the mechanical system
of construction has operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That, it
must be conceded, is the effect in this case of this court's rejection of the will under
consideration. For the adverse party concedes the genuineness of the document. At least, the
genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue pressure, mental
incapacity of the testator of fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses' presence "would
be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile, we say with due respect, does not
look to us quite well placed. Under physical law a man cannot raise his body from the ground by
his own bare hands without the aid of some mechanical appliance, at least not for more than a
flitting moment. But there is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless
forbidden by rules of positive law. The rationale of our dissent is that he is not. If we were to
make a metaphorical comparison, it would be more appropriate to say that a man can and
generally does himself pull the bootstraps to put the boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate practical reason for objecting to the testator
instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the latter. The will is
the testator's and the intervention of attesting witnesses is designed merely to protect the
testator's and not anybody else's interest.
If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete
intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one
instrument for another (1 Page on Wills, 481), What better guaranty of the genuineness of the
will can there be than a certification by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the
testator's signature is duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling it or
attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a
contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the end themselves, and that
end is achieved by another method slightly different from the prescribed manner, what has been
done by the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should satisfy both law
and conscience. The chief requirements of statutes are writing, signature by the testator, and
150
attestation and signature of three witnesses. Whether the courts profess to follow the harsher
rule, whether to follow the milder rule, they agree on one thing — that as long as the testator
performs each of those acts the courts should require no more. (1 Page on Wills, 481, 484.)
Paras, Feria, Montemayor and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
TUASON, J.:
This appeal is before us on a motion for reconsideration of this court's decision. Whereas
formerly six justices voted for reversal and five for affirmance of the probate court's order
admitting the will to probate, the vote upon reconsideration was six for affirmance and five for
reversal, thereby making the dissenting opinion, which had been filed, the prevailing rule of the
case. Under the circumstances, this resolution will largely be confined to a restatement of that
dissenting opinion.
The will in question was presented for probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1943
with Roberto Toledo y Gil, decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano, decedent's sister
opposing the application. Toledo's legal right to intervene was questioned by the proponent of
the will, and the objection was sustained in an order which was affirmed by this court in G. R. No.
L-254. As a result of the latter decision, Toledo was eliminated from the case and did not appear
when the trial was resumed.
The proceeding seems to have held in abeyance pending final disposition of Toledo's appeal, and
early in 1945, before the application was heard on the merit, the record, along with the will, was
destroyed, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. In the reconstitution, a stipulation of
facts was submitted in which, according to the appealed order, "both parties . . . agreed that the
will as transcribed in the record on appeal in Case G. R. No. L-254 is true and a correct copy.
The will consisted of only two pages, and the attestation clause as thus copied reads:
NOSOTROS los que suscribimos, todos mayores de edad, certificamos: que el testamento que
precede escrito en la lengua castellana que canoce la testador, compuesto de dos paginas utiles
con la clausula de atestigamiento paginadas correlativamente en letras y numeros en la parte
superior de la casilla, asi como todas las hojas del mismo, en nuestra presencia y que cada uno
de nosotros hemos atestiguado y firmado dicho documento y todas las hojas del mismo en
presencia del testador y en la de cada uno de nosotros.
(Fdo.) ALFREDO T. RIVERA.
(Fdo.) RAMON MENDIOLA.
(Fdo.) MARIANO OMAÑA
151
It will be noted from the above copy that the last of the compound sentence is truncated and
meaningless. This defect is the main basis of the appellant's sole assignment of error.
Counsel for appellee contend that the phrase "han sido firmadas por el testador" or equivalent
expression between the words "del mismo" and the words "en nuestra presencia" should be
inserted if the attestation clause is to be complete and have sense. With this insertion the
attestation clause would read ". . ., asi como todas las hojas del mismo han sido firmadas por el
testador en nuestra presencia . . ." The point is well taken.
It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The probabilities of error in
the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the Will was not controversy in Toledo's
appeal. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or no care was
employed in transcribing the document in the agreement or record on appeal. The absence of
the signature of the testator on the first page of the copy is an additional proof that little or no
pain taken to insure accuracy in the transcription. The appearance of "la testadora" in the copy
instead of "el testador" is another indication of the haste and carelessness in the transcription.
Quite aside from all this, the testator was presumed to know the law, as the trial court says.
Certainly, Attorney Mariano Omaña, who drew the instrument and signed it as an attesting
witness, knew the law and, by the context thereof, has shown familiarity with the rules of
grammar and ability to express his idea properly. In the light of these circumstances and of
further fact that the clause was brief and, by its importance, must have been written with utmost
concern, so important an omission as to make the clause or sentence senseless could not have
been made, intentionally or otherwise, in the original.
There is insinuation that the appellee in agreeing that the will read as it was "reproduced in the
Record on appeal" is bound by the agreement. This is not an absolute rule. The binding effect of
a stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring either of them from impeaching
it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. The mistake just pointed out clearly brings the
case within the exceptions of the rule. The able counsel for the proponent of the will could not
possibly have subscribed to the agreement if they had noticed the incomplete sentence in the
copy without making an objection or reservation.
The problem posed by the omission in question is governed, not by the law of wills which requires
certain formalities to be fulfilled in the execution, but by the rules of construction applicable to
statutes and documents in general. And this rule would obtain whether the omission occurred in
the original document or in the copy alone. In either case, the court may and should correct the
error by supplying the omitted word or words.
In Testamentaria del finado Emiliano Alcala, a similar situation arose and the court said:
Es evidente que leyendo la clausula de atestiguacion se nota a simple vista que en su redaccion
se ha incurrido en omisiones que la razon y el sentido cumon pueden suplirlas sin altenar ni
tergiversar la intencion tanto del testador como la de los tres testigos que intervenieron en el
otorgamiento de la misma. Teniendo en cuenta la fraseologia de la segunda parte de la clausula
se observara que las omisiones, aunque son substanciales, consisten en meros errores
gramaticales que los tribunales, en el ejercicio de su discrecion y en la aplicacion de las reglas de
152
interpretacion de documentos, pueden subsanarlos para dar efectividad a la intencion y hacer
que el conjunto de los terminos de la clausula de atestacion surtan efectos.
La interpretacion que se acaba de dar a la clausula de atestacion y la correccion de los errores
gramanticales de que misma adolece, incluyedo la insercion del verbo "firmamos" que se omitio
involuntariamente, esta de acurdo con las reglas fundamentales de interpretacion de
documentos segun las cuales se debe hacer prevalecer siempre la intencion del que haya
redactado el instrumento (art 286, Cod. de Proc. Civil; Pecson contra Coronel, 45 Jur. Fil., 224; 28
R. C. L., sec. 187, pages. 225, 226).
La solucion que se acaba de dar al asunto es la que se halla mas conforme con la justicia en vista
de que no se ha presentado prueba alguna que insinue siquiera que en el otorgamiento del
testamiento se ha cometido dolo o fraude con el animo de perjudicar a cualquiera. Testamentaria
de Emiliano Alcala, 40 Gaz. Of., 14. Supplemento, No. 23, pags. 131, 132.)
From 69 C. J. 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court
whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will: but not where
the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the
meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." On pages 50 and 51, the same work says: "To
aid the court in ascertaining and giving effect to the testator's intention in the case of an
ambiguous will, certain rules been established for guidance in the construction or interpretation
to be placed upon such a will, and in general a will should be construed according to these
established rules of construction." And referring to construction of statues which, as has been
said, is applicable to construction of documents, C. J. S., in Vol. 59, p. 992, tells us that "Where it
appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently from a statute, the court
may supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative
intent."
Adding force to the above principle is the legal presumption that the will is in accordance with
law. (2 Page on Wills 840; 57 Am. Jur., 720.)
But let it be assumed, for the sake of this decision only, that the attestation clause was drawn
exactly as it was copied in Toledo's record on appeal, was the mistake fatal? Was it, or was it not,
cured by the testator's own declaration? to wit: "En testimonio de lo cual, firmo este mi
testamento y en el margen izquierdo de cada una de sus dos paginas utiles con la clausula de
atestiguamiento en presencia de los testigos, quienes a su vez firmaron cada una de dichas
paginas y la clausula de atestiguamiento en mi presencia cada uno de ellos con la de los demas,
hoy en Porac, Pampanga, I. F., el dia 27 de marzo de mil novecientos treinta y nueve." The answer
is in the negative.
As early as 1922 a similar case, in which the validity of the will was sustained, found its way into
this court. See Aldaba vs. Roque, 43 Phil., 378. That case was more than foursquare behind the
case at bar. There the departure from the statutory formality was more radical, in that the
testator took charge of writing the entire attestation clause in the body of the will, the witnesses
limiting their role to signing the document below the testator's signature. Here, at the most, the
testator took away from the witnesses only a small part of their assigned task, leaving to them
the rest.
153
Referring to "the lack of attestation clause required by law," this court, in a unanimous decision
in banc, through Mr. Justice Villamor said in the Adalba-Roque case (syllabus):
When the attestation clause is signed by the witnesses to the instruments, besides the testator,
such attestation clause is valid and constitutes a substantial compliance with the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 2645, even though the facts recited in said attestation clause appear to have
been made by the testator himself.
That ruling should set the present case at rest unless we want to revert to the old, expressly
abandoned doctrine, in a long line of what we believe to be better-considered decisions.
This court noted in Dichoso de Ticson vs. De Gorostiza (1922), 57 Phil., 437, "that there have been
noticeable in the Philippines two divergent tendencies in the lie of wills — the one being planted
on strict construction and the other on liberal construction. A late example of the former views
be found in the decision in Rodriguez vs. Alcala (1930), 55 Phil., 150, sanctioning a literal
enforcement of the law. The basic rule in the other direction, predicated on reason, is Abangan
vs. Abangan (1919), 40 Phil., 476, oft-cited approvingly in later decisions."
In the Abangan case, a unanimous court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, later Chief
Justice, observed:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primodial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded."
Subsequent decisions which followed and adopted the Abangan principle were: Avera vs.
Garcia (1921), 42 Phil., 145; Aldaba vs. Roque (1922), 43 Phil., 378; Unson vs. Abella (1922), 43
Phil., 494; Pecson vs. Coronel (1923), 45 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios (1924), 46 Phil.,
922; Neyve vs. Mojal (1924), 47 Phil., 152; De Gala vs. Gonzales (1929), 53 Phil., 104; Rey vs.
Cartagena (1931), 56 Phil., 282; Ticson vs. Gorostiza (1932), 57 Phil., 437; Testamentaria de N.
Ozoa (1933), 57 J. F., 1007; Sebastian vs. Panganiban (1934), 59 Phil., 653; Rodriguez vs.
Yap (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl. No. 3, p. 194; Grey vs. Fabia (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 1st Suppl.,
No. 3, p. 196; Leynez vs. Leynez (1939), 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Suppl. No. 7, p. 51; Martir vs.
Martir (1940), 40 Off. Gaz., 7th Suppl. No. 11, p. 215; Sabado vs. Fernandez (1941), 40 Off. Gaz.,
1844; Mendoza vs. Pilapil (1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 1855; Alcala vs. De Villa (1941), 40 Off. Gaz., 14th
Suppl. No. 23, p. 131; and Lopez vs. Liboro (1948), 46 Off. Gaz., Suppl. No. 1, p. 211.
It is objected that "If we cure a deficiency by means of inferences, when are we going to stop
making inferences to supply fatal deficiencies in wills? Where are we to draw the line?" These
same question might well have been asked by the opponents of the new trends in the cases
above cited. But the so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open
the door to serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they
154
draw the dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part
of the document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit
a probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine
the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates
uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
The case at hand comes within the bounds thus defined if the witnesses here purposely omitted
or forgot to say that the testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did
and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was
necessary and none was introduced or taken into consideration.
To regard the letter rather than the spirit of the will and of the law behind it was the thing that
led to unfortunate consequences. It was the realization of the injustice of the old way that
impelled this court, so we believe, to forsake the antiquated, outworn worship of form in
preference to substance. It has been said, and experience has shown, that the mechanical system
of construction has operated more to defeat honest wills than prevent fraudulent ones. That,
must be conceded, would be the effect in this case if the will under consideration were rejected.
For the adverse party now concedes the genuineness of the document. At any rate, the
genuineness is super obvious, and there is not the slightest insinuation of undue pressure, mental
incapacity of the testator, or fraud.
It is said that for the testator to certify that he signed the will in the witnesses' presence "would
be like lifting one's self by his own bootstraps." The simile does not look to us quite well placed.
There is no impossibility or impropriety in one attesting to his own act unless forbidden by rules
of positive law. The rationale of this decision is that he is not. If we were to make a metaphorical
comparison, it would be more correct to say that a man can and generally does himself pull the
bootstraps when he puts his boots on.
Coming to execution of wills, we see no legitimate, practical reason for objecting to the testator
instead of the witnesses certifying that he signed the will in the presence of the latter. The will is
of the testator's own making, the intervention of attesting witnesses being designed merely to
protect his interest. If the sole purpose of the statute in requiring the intervention of witnesses
is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete intention to pass his property,
and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one instrument for another (1 Page
on Wills, 481), what better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a
certification by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is
duly authenticated? Witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling and bungling it or the
attestation clause. For the testator, who is desirous of making a valid will, to do so would be a
contradiction. If the formalities are only a means to an end and not the end themselves, and that
end is achieved by another method slightly from the prescribed manner, what has been done by
the testator and the witnesses in the execution of the instant will should satisfy both law and
conscience.
A second ground of attack on the questioned will is that the first page or sheet thereof does not
bear the testator's signature. The discussion on the correctness of the copy of the attestation
clause amply answers this objection in fact, the appellee's case is much stronger on this point for
155
the reason that there is not only speculative but also positive basis for the conclusion that the
testator's signature was affixed to the first page of the original. Both the testator and the
attesting witnesses stated in the will and in the attestation clause, respectively, that the former
signed both pages or sheets of the testament.
Upon the foregoing consideration, the order of the probate court is affirmed with costs.
A motion dated February 17, 1953, was filed after the motion for reconsideration was deliberated
and voted upon, in behalf of the minor children of Carlos Worrel, who was a residuary legatee
under the will and who is alleged to have died on February 6, 1949. The motion prays that a
guardian ad litem be appointed for the said children, and allowed to intervene and file "A
Supplementary Memorandum in Support of Appellant's (Appellee's?) Motion for
reconsideration." Counsel for the appellant objects to the motion on the ground that the
movants having only a contingent interest under the will are not of right entitled to intervene.
As this case has already been considerably delayed and thoroughly considered and discussed
from all angles, it is the sense of the court that the children's intervention with the consequent
further delay of the decision would not serve the best interest of the parties. For this reason, the
motion is denied.
156
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1 involving the probate of the two
wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980,
naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld
the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her
(Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court
to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his
advances to the estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal
funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent
for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as
"increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and
P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part
of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his
ouster for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds
belonging to the estate." 4
Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The
agreement provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND
SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now or hereafter
deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current account shall be
the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either
or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of either or any of us shall belong to and be
the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or all of
us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any payment or
157
withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient release and
discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5
The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of
the estate of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of
Romarico Vitug in the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis causa which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed
by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8 and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it
is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II, petition) is
hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell certain properties of
the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged advances to the estate, but the
same order is sustained in all other respects. In addition, respondent Judge is directed to include
provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No. 35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati,
in the inventory of actual properties possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's
death. With costs against private respondent. 10
In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of
our decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we
sustained the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory
contracts. 13
The petition is meritorious.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in
a will. A will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to
take effect after his death." 14 In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature
of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims
that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one party's separate properties in favor of the
other, but simply, their joint holdings:
xxx xxx xxx
... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive
owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1)
that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera
"served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person
deposits money in the bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that
Ana Rivera served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from
him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself
158
and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although
there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence, then,
of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit which
recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that
they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part
or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death
of either, belonged to the survivor. 17
xxx xxx xxx
In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to article
1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to give or do
something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the
occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time. As already
stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick automobile and most of the
furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the owner of the house in case Leonarda
died first, and Leonarda would become the owner of the automobile and the furniture if Juana
were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and Juana reciprocally assigned their respective
property to one another conditioned upon who might die first, the time of death determining
the event upon which the acquisition of such right by the one or the other depended. This
contract, as any other contract, is binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had
died before Juana, the latter thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same
manner as Leonarda would have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture
if Juana had died first. 19
xxx xxx xxx
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was
to take effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no
"cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not
prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account,
more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an "and/or" account. In the case at bar,
when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully
belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other,
which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds were
159
conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her
deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such
agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. 24
Under Article 2010 of the Code:
ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do upon the happening
of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an indeterminate time.
Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the
happening of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time."
A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value
of currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for
life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the
second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death
of one party and survivorship of the other.
However, as we have warned:
xxx xxx xxx
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect may
be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is a mere
cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to defeat the
legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No such vice has
been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case. 26
xxx xxx xxx
There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such
unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the
latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No.
35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the
inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate
property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its
resolution, dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
160
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22036 April 30, 1979
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR and JOVITA ESCOBAR DE
FAUSTO, respondents-appellees.
D. Tañedo, Jr. for appellants.
J. Palanca, Sr. for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That devise was made in the will of
the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who
would study for the priesthood.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that
the said devise was inoperative (Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9,
1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-
Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato
Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest (paragraphing supplied to
facilitate comprehension of the testamentary provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de terreno palayeros situados en el municipiooo
de Guimba de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA
DE TITULO SON; — Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de superficie Titulo Num. 6548,
mide 242,998 m. cuadrados de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados de superficie;
y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m. cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon
mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea
Sacerdote; las condiciones de estate legado son;
161
(1.a) Prohibe en absoluto la venta de estos terrenos arriba situados objectos de este legado;
(2.a) Que el legatario pariente mio mas cercano tendra derecho de empezar a gozar y administrar
de este legado al principiar a curzar la Sagrada Teologio, y ordenado de Sacerdote, hasta su
muerte; pero que pierde el legatario este derecho de administrar y gozar de este legado al dejar
de continuar sus estudios para ordenarse de Presbiterado (Sacerdote).
Que el legatario una vez Sacerdote ya estara obligado a celebrar cada año VEINTE (20) Misas
rezadas en sufragio de mi alma y de mis padres difuntos, y si el actual legatario, quedase
excomulgado, IPSO FACTO se le despoja este legado, y la administracion de esto pasara a cargo
del actual Parroco y sus sucesores de la Iglecia Catolica de Victoria, Tarlac.
Y en intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado segun lo arriba queda expresado,
pasara la administracion de este legado a cargo del actual Parroco Catolico y sus sucesores, de
Victoria, Tarlac.
El Parroco administrador de estate legado, acumulara, anualmente todos los productos que
puede tener estate legado, ganando o sacando de los productos anuales el CINCO (5) por ciento
para su administracion, y los derechos correspondientes de las VEINTE (20) Misas rezadas que
debiera el Parroco celebrar cada año, depositando todo lo restante de los productos de estate
legado, en un banco, a nombre de estate legado.
To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix in 1940 submitted a project containing
the following item:
5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative
who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest
of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties
herein below indicated, to wit
Title No. Lot No. Area in Has. Tax Dec. Ass. Value
T-6530 3663 1.6249 18740 P 340.00
T-6548 3445-C 24.2998 18730 7,290.00
T-6525 3670 6.2665 18736 1,880.00
T-6521 3666 11.9251 18733 3,580.00
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and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the
ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the
parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration Florencia Rigor),
who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying that the possessors
thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits. The probate court granted the petition.
A new administrator was appointed. On January 31, 1957 the parish priest filed another petition
for the delivery of the ricelands to the church as trustee.
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that
the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said
ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the
testator "has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition
was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge Bernabe de Aquino,
declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his
order of June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of December 10,
1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the
grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers
in Quezon City. The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that Father Rigor
had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who would take the holy orders
but that such trust could exist only for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period
would violate "the rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands
within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing
articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the
testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally construing the testamentary
provisions so as to render the trust operative and to prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest inoperative because
no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied for the priesthood and not
because the trust was a private charitable trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding
is binding on this Court. They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal .
In this case, as in cases involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the
intention of the contracting parties or of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary
issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the law of the case (dicat testor et
163
erit lex. Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 215; Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546).
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. When his
intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in accord with the plain
and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was
different from that literally expressed (In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil. 333).
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is "the life and soul
of a will It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide, the polestar, in giving effect to a will".
(See Dissent of Justice Moreland in Santos vs. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209, 223, 237-8.)
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's intention is
to be ascertained from the words of the wilt taking into consideration the circumstances under
which it was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following re-statement of the
provisions of his will.
1. that he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who would pursue
an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and administer
the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying and administering the
same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the
ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year twenty
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his parents.
5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the riceland would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his
successors.
6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee as contemplated above, the
administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the incumbent parish priest
of Victoria and his successors, and
7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the products
thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof for his administration
and the fees corresponding to the twenty masses with prayers that the parish priest would
celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the income of the devise in the bank in the
name of his bequest.
From the foregoing testamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator intended to
devise the ricelands to his nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden
to sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies for the priesthood,
164
or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say
annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands only
in two situations: one, during the interval of time that no nearest male relative of the testator
was studying for the priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he
was excommunicated.
What is not clear is the duration of "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario acondicionado",
or how long after the testator's death would it be determined that he had a nephew who would
pursue an ecclesiastical vocation. It is that patent ambiguity that has brought about the
controversy between the parish priest of Victoria and the testator's legal heirs.
Interwoven with that equivocal provision is the time when the nearest male relative who would
study for the priesthood should be determined. Did the testator contemplate only his nearest
male relative at the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male relatives
at anytime after his death?
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of
his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of
representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them
as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the
provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could
not have been his intention.
In 1935, when the testator died, his nearest leagal heirs were his three sisters or second-degree
relatives, Mrs. Escobar, Mrs. Manaloto and Mrs. Quiambao. Obviously, when the testator
specified his nearest male relative, he must have had in mind his nephew or a son of his sister,
who would be his third-degree relative, or possibly a grandnephew. But since he could not
prognosticate the exact date of his death or state with certitude what category of nearest male
relative would be living at the time of his death, he could not specify that his nearest male relative
would be his nephew or grandnephews (the son of his nephew or niece) and so he had to use the
term "nearest male relative".
It is contended by the legal heirs that the said devise was in reality intended for Ramon
Quiambao, the testator's nephew and godchild, who was the son of his sister, Mrs. Quiambao.
To prove that contention, the legal heirs presented in the lower court the affidavit of Beatriz
Gamalinda, the maternal grandmother of Edgardo Cunanan, who deposed that after Father
Rigor's death her own son, Valentin Gamalinda, Jr., did not claim the devise, although he was
studying for the priesthood at the San Carlos Seminary, because she (Beatriz) knew that Father
Rigor had intended that devise for his nearest male relative beloning to the Rigor family (pp. 105-
114, Record on Appeal).
Mrs. Gamalinda further deposed that her own grandchild, Edgardo G. Cunanan, was not the one
contemplated in Father Rigor's will and that Edgardo's father told her that he was not consulted
165
by the parish priest of Victoria before the latter filed his second motion for reconsideration which
was based on the ground that the testator's grandnephew, Edgardo, was studying for the
priesthood at the San Jose Seminary.
Parenthetically, it should be stated at this juncture that Edgardo ceased to be a seminarian in
1961. For that reason, the legal heirs apprised the Court of Appeals that the probate court's order
adjudicating the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria had no more leg to stand on (p. 84,
Appellant's brief).
Of course, Mrs. Gamalinda's affidavit, which is tantamount to evidence aliunde as to the
testator's intention and which is hearsay, has no probative value. Our opinion that the said
bequest refers to the testator's nephew who was living at the time of his death, when his
succession was opened and the successional rights to his estate became vested, rests on a
judicious and unbiased reading of the terms of the will.
Had the testator intended that the "cualquier pariente mio varon mas cercano que estudie la
camera eclesiatica" would include indefinitely anyone of his nearest male relatives born after his
death, he could have so specified in his will He must have known that such a broad provision
would suspend for an unlimited period of time the efficaciousness of his bequest.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby his nephew
living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was still in grade school or in
high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case, the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands before the nephew entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's
nephew entered the seminary, then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands
and receive the fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor
died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his
desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of
appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged
therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable
conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the
administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was
likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the testator in is
favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That contention is untenable. A
reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that
the parish priest of Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the
testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
166
entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code,
now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall
be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists" ("el legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides
that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no
disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there
may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to
the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED
167
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10763 April 29, 1961
DELFIN YAMBAO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGELINA GONZALES, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Marcial G. Mendiola for plaintiff-appellant.
Onofre P. Guevara for defendants-appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action filed by Delfin Yambao against Angelina Gonzales and Maria Pablo praying that
the latter be ordered to appoint and employ him as tenant during his lifetime on the parcels of
land bequeathed to and inherited by them from Maria Gonzales, as well as to deliver to him the
value of the harvests belonging to him as tenant of said parcels of land. In their answer,
defendants averred that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff is not mandatory; that
the determination of who should be the tenant of the land is vested in a special court; and that
the present action is not the proper remedy.
After trial, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action. It held that the
provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff merely amount to a suggestion to the defendants
who, though morally bound, are not legally compelled to follow said suggestion, invoking as
authority Article 797 of the old Civil Code. Plaintiff has appealed.
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as follows:
Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA
GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Pahihintulutan nila na si Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng bukid habang panahon, at ang
nasabing bukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala ng Albasea samantalang ang bukid ay nasa usapin
at may utang pa.
It appears that on August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to appellees all
her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated in 1948. Immediately,
thereafter, appellant went to appellees to request that he be placed as tenant of the riceland
which, by an express provision of said will, they were directed to give to him for cultivation, as
tenant, and when they refused alleging that they had already given it to another tenant he filed
the present action.
In holding that the provisions of the will relied upon by appellant imposes only a moral but not
a legal obligation, the trial court went on to consider the import of the word "Pahihintulutan"
168
employed with reference to appellant. In its opinion said word only means to permit or to allow,
but not to direct appellees to appoint appellant as tenant. Rather, it opines, it merely contains a
suggestion to employ because the testatrix did not use the words "ipinaguutos ko" which she
used in connection with other provisions of the will, so that there is no clear indication that it
was her intention to make such provision compulsory.
We believe, however, that the trial court has not properly interpreted the real import of the wish
of the testatrix. Analyzing it carefully we will find that the same contains a clear directive to
employ appellant as may be seen from the words preceding the word "pahihintulutan", which
say: "Dapat din naman malaman ng dalawa kong tagapagmana na sila MARIA PABLO at
ANGELINA GONZALES na sila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga
sumusunod." The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a
mandate or directive, and having reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other
meaning than to impose a duty upon appellees. To follow the interpretation given by the trial
court would be to devoid the wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
Article 797 of the old Civil Code, invoked by the trial court, is inapplicable. That refers to an
institution of an heir intended to be conditional by providing that a statement to the effect
cannot be considered as a condition unless it appears clearly that such is the intention of the
testator. We are not faced here with any conditional institution of heirship. What we have is a
clear-cut mandate which the heirs cannot fail to carry out.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Appellees are hereby ordered to employ
appellant as tenant immediately after this decision has become final. Costs against appellees.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
169
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA
NEPOMUCENO,defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of
certain properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and
which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of
Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties,
giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .
SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de
mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y
posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad
estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof would be deemed
annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th
reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este testamento que tratan de
institucion de herederos y los legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa,
170
en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues
estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of
the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's estate and in that
proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she
submitted a project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit
"C", the probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding closed. As
the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue
thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the
project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin
perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage,
and without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now
being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N.
Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same Leonor Villaflor
mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of
the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death,
said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed
by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's
position, adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became absolutely
vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as manifested in clause
8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that
if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That
the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras
viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase "uso y posesion" instead
of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not
give his widow the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their
possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the remainder of
the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y
universales herederos de todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
171
iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones y legados que, abajo mi
mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary legatee, could
succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the
widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras viva," and considered
the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court
violated Article 791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of an
instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible,
to be adopted as will give effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of
his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the
testator had intended to impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words
"uso y posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only
remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the
following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a
clear intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained."
.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by
the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon,
26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its
execution and fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30
Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultimo
voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha
menester de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues no ofrece
172
la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni
tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because they involve cases
where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow
should have the possession and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily
follows that by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to the
testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if the widow never
remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary legatee for their return,
unless they had been lost due to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent
third parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Leonor
Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties
described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation,
accounting and further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the
Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ.,
concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.
173
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the
City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was
an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he
left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote
out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he
(testator) signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of
which the document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed
their names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of
each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which
Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may
override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate
Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing
from that decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was
certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
174
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator
himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was
executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not
permitted, and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such
as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand
margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not
complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not
signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate of Saguinsin, 41
Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his witnesses to sign on the left hand
margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not enough that the signatures
guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been
written on, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature of the
alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same requirement, this Court
declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the left margins of the six
pages of the document are signed only by Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of
Act No. 2645 by the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left margin
of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect
that constitutes an obstacle to its probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil
Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the
appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce
at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his
heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down by
this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a wholesome doctrine and should be
followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling
factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry
out said intention, and that when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the
175
death of the testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to
the law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the day of the
death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes
a vested right, protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate
such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such
requirements as to execution should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest
the heirs of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur.
176
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3)
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval
of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of
said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's
business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish
laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code
which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well
as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be
the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what
the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36
Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges
it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that
177
he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition
until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an
error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was
granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on
the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the
national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in
question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant
as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken
into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will,
which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having
been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other
hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded
in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my
property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish,
otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted
legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the
laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as
the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the
testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the
civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law
when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is
the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and
the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even
as to the herein oppositor.
178
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it,
and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid
and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this
estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all
other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
179
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving
among things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above
named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia,
about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and
who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank,
and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until
the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
180
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to
me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and
project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed
that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California
Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable.
It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural
child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a
testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal.
Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
181
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his
death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor
himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.;
his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board
the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the
State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928,
he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year,
1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and came back to
the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the
Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but
returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp.
Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p.
473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making
of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices
182
in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30,
1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for
nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and
only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned
or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately
abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence
to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than
mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when
he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the
Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he
executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one
may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has
no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in
each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place
to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled
New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as
physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest
temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use
et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
183
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law"is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in
force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner
he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed
to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the
case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly
cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should
govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a
jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of
the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is,
applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But
once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to
see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have
resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal writers.
The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus
rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the
original reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true
that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at
184
that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent
for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two
states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should
be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would
happen, though the courts would switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts
accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question,
and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws
rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the
forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land,
recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile
of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in
Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of
laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's
last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the
Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever
corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this
property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French
law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would
do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own
law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum
refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to
the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial
process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular
case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been considered by the
185
courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and
essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer"
to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer
to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in
many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the
forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take
into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and
then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This
may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country,
but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means
the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in
1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of
the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them
is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same
system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman
who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first
inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance
with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference
back to his own law.
186
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws
rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere,
the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the
manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time
of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as
the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the
domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the
situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process
of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice
of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal
law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the
citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in
accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law
for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in
said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be
sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in
the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
187
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like
a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in
the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a
citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear
in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or
identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code. We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the
Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
188
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor
in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that
after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate
should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives,
namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
189
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total
of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed
its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of
shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the
project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes
as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower
court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi,
applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In
the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
190
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
— Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old
Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession.
As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. Appellants would
also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,
was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Wherefore, the order of the probate
court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
191
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954
In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Sison and Aruego for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged
will and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate
left by the deceased is more than P50,000.
On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city
of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the
Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had
with the late Manuela T. Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana,
Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria
Natividad Lim Billian who survived him. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892) and after hearing letters of administration
were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed
administrator of the estate. On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been
executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition
was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing
thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal
was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before
the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793). In spite of the fact that a
commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking of the deposition
of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court denied a motion
for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow and
dismissed the petition. In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming
that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same
was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino
Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed
192
in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China,
on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).
There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria
Natividad Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign
will because of the transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of
the late Jose B. Suntay to Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño
and the subsequent assignment thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter
to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in
this proceedings which is concerned only with the probate of the will and testament executed in
the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January
1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal district court of Amoy, Fookien
province, Republic of China.
As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no
bar to the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.
As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:
No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same
be established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the
testator without his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at
least two credible witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly
stated and certified by the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed
and recorded as other wills are filed and recorded.
The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness,
Anastacio Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will,
was dead at the time of the hearing of this alternative petition. In his deposition Go Toh testifies
that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-three sheets signed by Jose
B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of Alberto
Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the attesting
witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of the
will in the presence of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd,
49th, 50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting
thereof (answer to the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents of the will written in
Spanish although he knew very little of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd
interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory, Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the
lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the time it was executed (answers to the 25th
interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.); that Jose B. Suntay told him that the
contents thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B) (answers to the 33rd interrogatory
and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of Alberto Barretto in November
1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th interrogatories, Id); that
Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better see if you want any
correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after checking Jose B.
193
Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" (answers to
the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft of the
will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft
(Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).
Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio
Suntay she learned that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay,
who was bringing along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was
the will of our father Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of
24 February 1948); that she saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in her presence
and of Manuel and learned of the adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit:
one-third to his children, one-third to Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino,
Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read
that portion, then he turned over the document to Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s.
n., Id.). On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to
know what was the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that
she saw the signature of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s.
n., Id.).
Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January
1948), before the last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his
law office in the De los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit
C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope
Exhibit A with those on the will placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly
the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp. 32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).
If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned
by the latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former
coming to the latter's office straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948)
that brought him to the Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934
(p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her brother
Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February
1948), must not be true.
Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own
interest, still the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp.
526-8, 530-1, 542, t. s. n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go
Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-
examination that she read the part of the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony
in chief that after Apolonio had read that part of the will he turned over or handed the document
to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).
If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929
when the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft
to Jose B. Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that
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"after checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and
executed" cannot be true, for it was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it
must have been corrected before and all corrections and additions written in lead pencil must
have been inserted and copied in the final draft of the will which was signed on that occasion.
The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is just to fit it within the framework of
the appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by deposition on the provisions of
the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned to them from information
given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft (Exhibit B) into Chinese.
Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the
supposed will or the alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according
to the will, is two-thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness
testified to oppose the appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he
had acquired the interest of the surviving widow not only in the estate of her deceased husband
but also in the conjugal property (pp. 148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the
original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B) is not clear. For him the important point was that
he had acquired all the share, participation and interest of the surviving widow and of the only
child by the second marriage in the estate of his deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony
that under the will the surviving widow would take two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B.
Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony of Anastacio Teodoro. According to the
latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third for betterment is for Silvino,
Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the surviving widow and
her child Silvino.
Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope
(Exhibit A) and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the
testimony of Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of
the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible
witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are
neither competent nor credible witnesses.
On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew
up two mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his
own handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that
after checking up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel
Lopez; that this draft was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing
of 21 February 1948); that two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and
the former asked him to draw up another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he
had the rough draft of the second will typed (pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez
(p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from
the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that the handwritten insertions or additions
in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s. n., Id.); that the final draft of the
first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed and executed, two or three
months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s. n., Id.) in his office at
the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by Jose B. Suntay,
195
Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that on that
occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were written:
"Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was
placed inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B.
Suntay and the envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses
(pp. 398, 401, 441, 443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house
one Saturday in the later part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect
condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s. n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his
law office bringing along with him the envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go
Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh
did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.);
that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409,
410, t. s. n., Id.).
The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope
(Exhibit A), corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was
signed by Jose B. Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh
took part as attesting witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same
assistant fiscal that he did not leave the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n.,
Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words, "Because I can not give him this envelope even though
the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to bring that document to court or to anywhere else
myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).
As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the
point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be
allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition
for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having
jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so
allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the
courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and
the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.
The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The
law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the questions
196
propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China set forth
in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart
from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds
it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the
adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls
are appointed to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in
the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting
witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport
to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate
court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a
deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure same as
those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of
such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be
made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence
shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines (pp.
474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The proceedings had in the municipal
district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the standard of such proceedings
in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the
back of such interested parties.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads as follows:
ORDER:
SEE BELOW
The above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that
there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the court.
Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year of the Republic
of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China.
198
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua
as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line
for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew
a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States
Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with
judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel. 10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the
Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all
factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. 11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.13 Apparently, Alicia had no
knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not
oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.15 Their twenty-five
(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. 16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and
their three children, to wit:
"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,
located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F.
Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties
whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio
Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties
located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and
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my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and
165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal
properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could
only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and
Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of
age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)
without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore
executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorente’s
Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively
to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that
Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo
was still alive.19
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to
probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition22 for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed
of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share
in the conjugal property.23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due
course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
200
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of
Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled
to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with
Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so
declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and
declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties,
and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and
then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in
equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased,
Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon
her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the
court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any
other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a
true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be
granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. 28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but modified
its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children "legitimate or otherwise"
of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987,
the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
201
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of
the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, 36 the issue
is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court
for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the
time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death,
is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found." (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the
foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where
the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in
the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American law
follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity of
Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law" indicated in Article
16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing
the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own
202
law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other
than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of
Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated
as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light
of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.43 We
hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
203
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the
decedent's national law.45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.
17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as
VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior
Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4,
1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing
proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
204
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner
although it has not been probated in its place of execution.
The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed
in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will
for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s
will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003,
however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas
(Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin
added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless
for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of
the estate.
Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate
occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for
leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties
to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated
in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based
executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
205
Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA),3arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding
that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission
of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required
bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior
probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will
already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.
Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may
be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the
country where it was executed.
The Court’s Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they
claim, ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They
insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the
testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to
probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the
law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and
(e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign
will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will
of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country.6
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate
may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
206
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.7The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of
California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the
reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is
presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule
77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court
acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over
the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically.1âwphi1 If the instituted heirs do not
have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright
of their inheritance, since our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper court.8
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the
court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime,
it was designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present
evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator’s state of mind at the time of the
execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This
explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
207
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912
JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, admitting
to probate a document which was offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y
Pizarro. The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar, Province of Bataan, on
the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five
months following the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the executrix,
Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents are a son and several grandchildren
by a former marriage, the latter being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the same was not executed
according to the formalities and requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the
testator was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the
mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to
the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior
to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. Owing to the
paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained
the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs
he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four testamentary witnesses,
Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor Marco, and one
Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently their
testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court. The other three
testamentary witnesses and the witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which
the will was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these witnesses the will
was executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the
disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor Marco, who
transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which
the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to
208
the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus
written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the
witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking
over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it
in the presence of the testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the will and we are in perfect
accord with the judgment of the lower court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure
have been fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second assignment of error, viz, the testator's
alleged mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable
evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the
execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he
indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses
stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or
not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The
other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the
opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only
reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the
fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he
verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he was present when the will
was executed and his testimony was cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will
was executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This witness also stated that he
had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution
of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to
communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence
of mental capacity on the part of the testator. Among other witnesses for the opponents were
two physician, Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had attended the
testator some four or five years prior to his death and that the latter had suffered from a cerebral
congestion from which the paralysis resulted. The following question was propounded to Doctor
Basa:
Q. Referring to mental condition in which you found him the last time you attended him, do
you think he was in his right mind?
A. I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind, but I noted some mental disorder,
because when I spoke to him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his testimony is that the testator had
suffered a paralysis and that he had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the
testator was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor does he give it at
his opinion that he was without the necessary mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not
209
state in what way this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had noticed that
the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but his answer was in reply to a
hypothetical question as to what be the mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and
who had suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have had according to the
testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at
some length the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the testator had
suffered; he read in support of his statements from a work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman
Eichost. In answer, however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to certify to
the mental condition of a person who was suffering from such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any way strengthens the
contention of the appellants. Their testimony only confirms the fact that the testator had been
for a number of years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of which his
physician and mental strength was greatly impaired. Neither of them attempted to state what
was the mental condition of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There can
be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious character, and it is quite evident
that his mind was not as active as it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity to dispose of his property by
will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances,
but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will
intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs.
Ubag (14 Phil. Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by this court. The
numerous citations there given from the decisions of the United States courts are especially
applicable to the case at bar and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is
in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will
to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep.,
463; in the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs. Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the
testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to
overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There
are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held
that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If
such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that
the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the
highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are
denominated as insanity and idiocy.
210
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which
a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is
established in a positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of testamentary
capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law, that —
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses,
disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous
cases there cited in support of this statement.)
The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and
quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in
the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory possessed by the testator, as, had
he a disposing memory? Was he able to remember the property he was about to bequeath, the
manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory
sufficiently sound to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was engaged
at the time when he executed his will. (See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared upon the trial of the case:
The testator died at the age of nearly 102 years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well
informed man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic stroke and from that
time his mind and memory were mush enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in
consequence of the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract causing total
blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits, although formerly he was observant of the
properties of life. The court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to
make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient to create the
incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate family or property. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years before he made the will, and his physical
and mental weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast with their strength in the
meridian of his life. He was blind; not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was
forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated questions in conversation; and
sometimes, when aroused for sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular that
some of those who had known him when he was remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the
opinion that his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a will, although they
never heard him utter an irrational expression.
211
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we might draw the same contrast as
was pictured by the court in the case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental
vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him
in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that
the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the
testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he
exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his
conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature
of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution
of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time,
taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be and the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.
212
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926
In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased. MANUEL TORRES, special
administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The
appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and nearest
heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accredition and in the character
of universal heir the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in favor
of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas
Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially
declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-
mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on
February 25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented
his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of
his death. Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred
to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination
(Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil Code
which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary
provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts
of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the situation
before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was
not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of
guardian and ward existing between the parties.
213
We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there declared,
in effect, that accretion take place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more
persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special
designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator
or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we have a will
calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without
special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had
been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not
only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had
been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error
whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the
whole estate.
The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy
with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half
has descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the
decedent. In this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is
declared, among other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir
is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among
other things, that legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when
the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted
conducting to the conclusion that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact
that one of the individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and that as a
consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share of said disqualified heir.
We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that the appellee clearly has the better
right. In playing the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions
as far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions the more
general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and
983, it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does, with the
general topic of intestate succession while the latter is more specific, defining the particular
conditions under which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the
former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the
provision with respect to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the
expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the same express qualification is
not found in subsection 4 of article 912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of
interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held to control the general.
Besides, this interpretation supplies the only possible means of harmonizing the two provisions.
In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that intestate
succession to a vacant portion can only occur when accretion is impossible.
The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article 912,
intestate succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
214
suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one
of the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz
de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take,
and it is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under
article 912 rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so
refined an interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which
Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity
to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate
succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject, tend
to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant
by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is
governed by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by
provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil
Español, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16
Mucius Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees
fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy,
if he dies before the testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise
incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in the
common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial
intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a presumption against it, — a
presumption which has its basis in the supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the
appellant.
Avanceña, C, J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
215
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-39033 November 13, 1933
In re will of the late Matea Abella. MONS. SANTIAGO SANCHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
MARCIANA ABELLA, opponent-appellant.
Sotto and Astilla for appellant.
B. Quitoriano for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the opponent Marciana Abella from the judgment rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, this court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the opposition filed by Marciana Abella
is without merit and, therefore, it is hereby denied. The application filed herein is granted and
the document, Exhibit A, is hereby ordered and decreed probated as the last will and testament
of the late Matea Abella. So ordered.
In support of her appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in the decision of the
court a quo, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that Matea Abella was in the full enjoyment of her mental
faculties and executed the document, Exhibit A, as a true expression of her last will.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the requirements of the law have been complied with in
the execution of the will, Exhibit A.
3. The lower court erred in holding that when the late Matea Abella affixed her alleged signatures
to the will, Exhibit A, she did not act under the illegal and undue influence of certain legatees.
4. The lower court erred in decreeing the probate of the will, Exhibit A.
The following facts have been proven by a preponderance of evidence presented during the trial,
to wit:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, resident of the municipality of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been informed
that Dr. Antonio Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a good physician. On April 13, 1932, she
left her home situated in the said municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her niece, Filomena
Inay, to consult the said physician in his clinic in San Fernando, La Union, stopping at the convent
of the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of Father Cordero with whom she was
acquainted he having been the parish priest of Sinait. During her stay in the said convent, she
went to Dr. Antonio Querol's clinic twice within the period of one week accompanied by her
aforesaid niece, Filomena Inay, to consult the said physician who, after submitting her to a
216
general medical examination, found that she was suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the
stomach.
On or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton of the convent to call Attorney
Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed her desire to make a will, in the presence of the
Father Cordero's sister, Father Zoilo Aguda, Macario Calug and the fiscal of the convent.
Inasmuch as the aforesaid attorney had to attend to other business, he could not finish his
interview with the testatrix on the first day and had to continue it the following day, also in the
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, Filomena Inay and some children who were then at the
convent. Inasmuch as he did not finish the interview on the second day, the said attorney
returned again on the afternoon of the 28th and continued it in the presence of the same persons
who entered and left the sala. At the end of the interview, Matea Abella ordered he niece,
Filomena Inay, to bring her some papers which were in her trunk, which she delivered to the said
attorney. After the will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix, Macario Calug
read it to her and she approved it. When the will had been copied clean, it was again read to the
testatrix and she express her approval thereof, but inasmuch as it was rather late at night, she
did not care to sign the same suggesting that it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932,
which was done. At about 7:30 o'clock on the morning of April 29, 1932, the signing of the will
took place in the corridor of the convent. The testatrix Matea Abella was the first to sign it on a
table in the presence of each and every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of other
persons, including Father Cordero. After the testatrix, each of the instrument witnesses signed in
the presence of the testatrix and of each and every one of the other witnesses. After the will had
been signed, Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso delivered the original and the copies thereof to the
testatrix, retaining one for his file. On July 3, 1932, Matea Abella died of the senile debility in the
municipality of Sinait at the age of 88 years.
The opponent herein attempted to prove that the testatrix was deaf and that her eyesight was
defective; that when one moved away from her and again approached her she was unable to
recognize him; that it was necessary to shout into her ear to call her for meals; that she used to
urinate on her clothes without being aware of it; that she had a very poor memory inasmuch as
she used to try to collect from her debtors in spite of the fact that they had already paid their
debts; that once, although she had sold a parcel of land for P60 she said she had sold it for P160;
that she was unable to go downstairs without assistance; that when she was called at mealtime
she used to answer: "Why, I have already eaten"; that she could not remember her properties
nor the names of her tenants; that she could no longer read; that she often repeated to her
tenants the same questions regarding their crops; that she had been suffering from the
disabilities for more than two months previous to her death; that the deceased complained of
headache and of stomachache; that she already began to be dotty five years before, and
particularly a few days previous to her death; that in her will she bequeathed properties which
she had already donated to other persons.
We are face to face with two divergent theories regarding the mental state of the testatrix Matea
Abella at the time of the execution of her will, Exhibit A. The opponent claims that, inasmuch as
the testatrix was 88 years of age when she made her will, she was already suffering from senile
debility and therefore her mental faculties were not functioning normally anymore and that she
217
was not fully aware of her acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to prove
that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection with her properties and interest; that she
could not go downstairs without assistance, and that she could not recall her recent acts.
On the other hand, as to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of the execution of her will,
we have the undisputed fact of her having left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13, 1932,
in order to go to San Fernando, La Union, to consult Dr. Antonio
Querol — of whose ability she had heard so much — regarding her headaches and stomach
trouble, stopping at the convent of the parish church; the fact of her having walked twice to the
aforesaid doctor's clinic, accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay; the fact that she had
personally furnished the aforesaid doctor with all the necessary data regarding the history of her
illness the fact of her having brought with her in her trunk the deeds to her properties; the fact
of her having called for Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso; the fact of her having personally furnished
said attorney all the data she wished to embody in her relative to her properties and the persons
in whose favor she wished to bequeath them; the fact of her not wishing to sign her will on the
night of April 28, 1932, but the following day, in order to be able to see it better, and the fact of
her having affixed her signature, in her own handwriting, to the original as well as to the copies
of her will which consisted of nine pages. All these data show that the testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in intelligence that she could not, with
full understanding thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither senile debility, nor
blindness, nor deafness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for
making his ill (Avelino vs. De la Cruz, 21 Phil., 521; Bagtas vs. Paguio, 22 Phil., 227; Jocson vs.
Jocson, 46 Phil., 701; Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485; Torres and Lopez de
Bueno vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772; 28 R.C.L., p. 94, par. 44). The mere fact that in her will Matea
Abella disposed of properties, which she had already donated to other persons at a prior date, is
not an indication of mental insanity. At most it constitutes forgetfulness or a change of mind, due
to ignorance of the irrevocability of certain donations.lawphil.net
It is insinuated that the testatrix has been unduly influenced in the execution of her will. There is
nothing in the records establishing such claim either directly or indirectly. The fact of her having
stopped at the convent of the parish church of San Fernando, La Union, is not unusual in the
Philippines where, due to lack of hotels, the town convents are usually given preference by
strangers because they are given better accommodations and allowed more freedom. In the
present case, the testatrix Matea Abella was a stranger in San Fernando, La Union. Inasmuch as
Father Cordero, the parish priest of the said town, was well known to her having served in the
church of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, in the same capacity, she did not have any difficulties in obtaining
accommodations in his convent. The fact that Matea Abella stopped at a convent and enjoyed
the hospitality of a priest who gave her accommodations therein, nor the fact that the will was
executed in the convent in question in the presence of the parish priest and witnessed by another
priest, could certainly not be considered as an influence which placed her under the obligation
to bequeath of her property to the bishop of said diocese.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That neither senile
ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the
presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment of his mental
218
faculties, when there is sufficient evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of
the will; and (2) that neither the fact of her being given accommodations in a convent, nor the
presence of the parish priest, nor a priest acting as a witness, constitutes undue influence
sufficient to justify the annulment of a legacy in favor of the bishop of a diocese made in her will
by a testatrix 88 years of age, suffering from defective eyesight and hearing, while she is stopping
at a convent within the aforestated diocese.
Wherefore, not finding any error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed in toto,
with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
219
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.
Lucio Javillonar for appellee.
DE JOYA, J.:
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister, Encarnacion Neyra, in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the recovery of one-half (½) of the property
mentioned and described therein, which had been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra,
and which had been previously divided equally between the two extrajudicially, demanding at
the same time one-half (½) of the rents collected on the said property by the defendant
Encarnacion Neyra. The defendant filed an answer admitting that the property mentioned and
described therein was community property, and at the same time set up counterclaims
amounting to over P1,000, for money spent, during the last illness of their father, and for money
loaned to the plaintiff.
After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to one-half (½) of
the said property, adjudicating the same to her, but at the same time ordered said plaintiff to
pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77, plus interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of Appeals for Manila,
alleging several errors, attacking the execution and validity of said agreement; and on November
10, 1942, said appeal was dismissed, pursuant to the to an agreement or compromise entered
into by the parties, as shown by the corresponding document, dated November 3, 1942, which
was filed in the case the following day, November 4, 1942.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two years, unexpectedly
died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly from heart attack, as a consequence of
Addison's disease from which, it was claimed, she had been suffering for sometime.
In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal,
by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent
Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a
petition, dated November 23, 1942, asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the Court
of Appeals, dismissing the appeal, claiming that the alleged compromise or agreement, dated
November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already
then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that
if it had been signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said
220
document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney, against Encarnacion's
will; and that the court had no more jurisdiction over the case, when the alleged agreement was
filed on November 4, 1942, at the instance of Trinidad Neyra, as Encarnacion was already dead
at the time.
The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for reconsideration, is
whether or not said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by
Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942. Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative.
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, in this case, has
fully established the following facts:
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938, leaving certain properties
and two children, by his first marriage, named Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other
children by his second marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters,
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with the
properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March
31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila, concerning said
properties. In the first case, filed in March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by
Encarnacion Neyra and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon
Street, Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in the court of first instance,
and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No. 8162); and the second is the instance
case.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer any ascendants,
executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16, disposing of her properties in favor
of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora
Neyra, Pilar de Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in
said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter
enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities of said
Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious organization declined the
bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious
organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a
new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat,
and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that Atty. Sikat, instead of preparing
a new will, merely prepared a draft of a codicil, amending said will, dated September 14, 1939,
again naming said religious organization, among others as beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil
was also forwarded to the authorities of religious organization, for their consideration and
acceptance; but it was also rejected.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from Addison's disease,
and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser and confessor, Mons. Vicente
Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make confession, after which she requested that holy mass
be celebrated in her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy
communion; that Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be made, and, as a
221
matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro
Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed,
took holy communion; that after the mass, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and
advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion
accepted said advise and, at about noon of the same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio
Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two
sisters greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and two had a
long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they also talked about the properties left
by their father and their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila,
the instant case being the second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition
that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter
should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion, and the Trinidad
had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis,
to prepare the necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis could
come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him
instructions for the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other
instructions for the preparation of her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said
document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and
Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and
the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning
of November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and
testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro
Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked
her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said
documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the
two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of
each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which
said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each
other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and
Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents, at the request of
Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, who
are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case.
Two of them are ministers of the Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional
men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz,
and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially
corroborated the testimony of the witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the
signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of November 3,
1942.
222
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified, however, that when the
thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the agreement in question, dated November 3,
1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present,
as they were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the documents
thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and
Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz also testified that
Encarnacion Neyra's, thumbmark was affixed to the will, only in the morning of November 4,
1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature of effects of
Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra.
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease often live as long as
ten (10) years, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease progresses,
asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and
complications of the heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250-
1253; McCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on November 4, 1942, due to a
heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of about two (2) years.
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of
witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of
the alleged medical experts.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate
of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to effect the full
possession of mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution.
(Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite
of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the
third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The
testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been
in a comatose condition for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he
was conscious and able to understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires.
(Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly
sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand
in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48
Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator
intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to
move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
223
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of
the execution of the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the
morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra
talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really
of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from
Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that,
on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental
rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of
sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the
execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra
thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they
were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were
present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in
the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw
each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each
other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case.
(Jaboneta vs.Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement
and will in question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27
Phil., 579.)
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are children of
legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will, dated
November 3, 1942.
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect that there could
have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumbmark of Encarnacion
Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on
November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question,
when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is absolutely
devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all
sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have
testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to
the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal aphorism — falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)
To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the two documents,
dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously placed great emphasis on the fact that,
up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies.
224
They were banking evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most
violent. Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and yet not
impossible. They had forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious woman instructed in the
ancient virtues of the Christian faith, and hope and charity, and that to forgive is a divine
attribute. They had also forgotten that there could be no more sublime love than that embalmed
in tears, as in the case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the two sisters,
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest relative of the former, her only sister
of the whole blood. The approach of imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest
recollections of family life. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought
her happiness, and that she had always been just to her sister, who had been demanding
insistently what was her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon reconciliation, as she did not want
to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most
logical that Encarnacion should make Trinidad the benificiary of her generosity, under her last
will and testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said agreement, and thus
depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been legally signed and
executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in the presence of credible and
trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos mentis and possessed the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity of the time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty.
Lucio Javillonar, on November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been
dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have appeared, in accordance with
the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of
the Court of Appeals for Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby re-
affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
225
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19142 March 5, 1923
In the matter of the estate of Mariano Corrales Tan, deceased.
FLAVIANA SAMSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE CORRALES TAN QUINTIN, oppositor-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo for appellant.
Epimaco Molina for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate a
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There
is no direct evidence as to the interest of the oppositor-appellant in the estate in question,
though it may, perhaps, be inferred from the testimony of his wife Maximina Ong that he is the
son of the deceased.
In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will is incomplete and
fraudulent and does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under
duress and under undue influence, and that at the time of the execution of the will he was not
of sound and disposing mind.
We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations. There is no
evidence whatever showing that the testator acted under duress or undue influence and the only
question of fact which we need consider is whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind
when the document in question was executed.
Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as a witness for the
opposition, is to the effect that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a
comatose condition for several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the
evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of
the same day. Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably and vigorously
that coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the testator, therefore, could not at that
time have been in possession of his mental faculties and have executed a will. There are,
however, varying degrees of coma and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have
lucid intervals. Such seems to have been the case here. Doctor Tee Han Kee, the opponent's
principal witness, who visited the deceased in the evening of December 25th, says he
then seemed to be in a state of coma and that in the forenoon of December 26th, when the
doctor again visited him, he was in "the same state of coma." Maximina Ong, the wife of the
opponent, the only other witness for the opposition, states that on December 26th the deceased
could not talk and did not recognize anyone. But all the witnesses presented by the petitioner,
226
five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear and understand what was
said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four of these witnesses state that he could speak
distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.
That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is
evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no
doubt that he was of sound mind and capable of making his will. And we see no reason to
discredit any of these witnesses; the discrepancies found between their respective versions of
what took place at the execution of the document are comparatively unimportant and so far
from weakening their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence of any
conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee.
The former is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say
that mere professional speculation cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently
credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
There is no direct evidence in the record showing that the publication of the time and place of
the hearing of the petition for probate has been made as provided for in section 630 of the Code
of Civil Procedure and the appellant argues that the court below erred in admitting the will to
probate without proof of such publication. This question not having been raised in the court
below will not be considered here.
Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaking of hearings for the probate of wills, also
provides that "At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and
signed by the witnesses" and the appellant maintains that the transcript of the testimony of the
witness Dr. N. M. Saleeby, not having been signed by the witness, the testimony should have
been excluded.
There is no merit in this contention. When, as in this case, the testimony is taken by the
stenographer of the court and certified to by him, the provision quoted can only be regarded as
directory and a failure to observe the provision will not render the testimony inadmissible. (Reese
vs. Nolan, 99 Ala., 203.)
The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
227
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005
LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why
it should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse
and set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision2 and the March 7, 2003 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the
petitioner Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and
concomitant proceedings."4
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:
"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States
until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines,
and he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which
he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468.
Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was
then 28 years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause
written down as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the
end or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
228
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again
on the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:
‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:
‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of
9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing
mind and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:
1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church
in accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and
provided my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends;
2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion
of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:
a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and
share alike;
b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed
materials used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati,
Metro Manila also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in
the name of my deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike
or equal co-owners thereof;
3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings
account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever
and wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;
4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament,
and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City,
Philippines.’
"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:
1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;
2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give
them proper notice pursuant to law;
3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities
were not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being
in an advance sate of senility;
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5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;
6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner
and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or
7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’
and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of
understanding and integrity.
"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty.
Floro Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses
Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia
and her daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.
"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at
Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly
pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on
expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self
when the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza
Gomez, who were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no
knowledge of the existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously
found it in his attache case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator
bequeathed to her his properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her
estimate, the value of property both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less
P100,000.00. Josefina declared too that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because
despite his old age he went alone to the market which is two to three kilometers from their home
cooked and cleaned the kitchen and sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled
to Manila alone to claim his monthly pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good
health and that he was hospitalized only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his
death.
"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, testified that
it was in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the
will went to his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament.
After the testator instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary
public told them to come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had
prepared the will the notary public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator
and his witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the
testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and
every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise
explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his witnesses on
June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the
formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the
typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The
230
notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally
capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified
that the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village,
Quezon City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento
purposely for his intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they
were told to return on June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of
the will but were asked to come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the
notary public; that the testator executed the will in question in their presence while he was of
sound and disposing mind and that he was strong and in good health; that the contents of the
will was explained by the notary public in the Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as
witnesses attested and signed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. And that
during the execution, the testator’s wife, Josefina was not with them.
"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her
there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him.
She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of
the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew
whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s
family to live with him and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and
mental condition showed deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.
"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the
opposition to two grounds, namely:
1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of
the will; and
2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an
advanced state of senility
"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate." 5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate.
The CA upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had
acknowledged the due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and
unhygienic, crude and impolite ways"6 did not make him a person of unsound mind.
Hence, this Petition.7
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
"I.
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Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.
"II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will
and testament.
"III.
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed
the subject will."8
In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Probate of a Will
At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented
during the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the
instant case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.9
The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that
must be satisfied for the probate of a will.10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the
instances when a will may be disallowed, as follows:
"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his
will at the time of affixing his signature thereto."
In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud in
its execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time.
Existence of Fraud in the
232
Execution of a Will
Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud.
Particularly, she alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary,
conspired with the notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it.
Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the
will.
Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to]
almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who
happened to be [a] Fil-American pensionado,"11 thus casting doubt on the intention of
respondent in seeking the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason,
logic and common experience"12 for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have
willingly signed a last will and testament.
We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will
which, but for the fraud, he would not have made."13
We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud
at the time of its execution.14 The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will
only upon a showing of credible evidence of fraud.15 Unfortunately in this case, other than the
self-serving allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will.16 That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that
he had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking
care of [the testator] in his twilight years."17
Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on
the will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a
[notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion."18 More important, the
will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must
also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. 19Furthermore, the testator
and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public.20 In any event, we agree
with the CA that "the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation
was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental
witnesses."21
The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985,
October 13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as
follows:
"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:
233
Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his
witnesses were supposed to be in your office?
A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?
A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.
xxxxxxxxx
Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing
therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?
A Yes sir.
Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective
signature on the first and second pages of exhibit C?
A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.
Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the
document as well as the attestation clause?
A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting
August 9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)
Eugenio Gomez:
Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?
A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was
first week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we
returned, Atty. Sarmiento was not there.
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?
A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.
Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?
A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)
Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:
Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?
xxxxxxxxx
A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We
went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament.
After that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said
234
was that he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was
not there so we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there
on August 9 and that was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)
Josie Collado:
Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?
A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.
Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For what purpose?
A Our purpose is just to sign the will.
Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?
A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)"22
Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of
a fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit
from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary
are credible evidence of its due execution.23 Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it
was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any
showing of ill motives.24
Capacity to Make a Will
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time
of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all
his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of
the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to
the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month,
or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the
validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
235
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido
had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds
of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the
proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As
we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal
validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes
irrelevant.
Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA,25 which held thus:
"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries
with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as
insanity or idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on
one hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body,
or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person
may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a
sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or
unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind."26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
236
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 147145 January 31, 2005
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner,
vs.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals of 12
January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 47644. The Court of Appeals sustained the Resolution 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61 ("RTC-Kabankalan"), admitting
to probate the last will and testament of Alipio Abada ("Abada").
The Antecedent Facts
Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition,5 docketed as SP No. 070 (313-8668), for the
probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is
the son of Eulogio.
Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will when
he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2)
it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds invoked by
Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo,
Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro, Antonio, Florian,
Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the petition. The oppositors are
the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition6 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP
No. 071 (312-8669), for the probate of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel
237
Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition on the same grounds they cited in SP
No. 070 (313-8668).
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition7 before the RTC-Kabankalan, docketed as SP
No. 069 (309), praying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to probate the will of Toray.
Since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the order allowing the probate
of Toray’s will became final and executory.8
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan designated Belinda Caponong-Noble
("Caponong-Noble") Special Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray.9 Caponong-Noble
moved for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-Kabankalan
denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.10
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered that
in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted
the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June 1994, as
follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial
compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his
testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the
execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is
admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar11 is appointed administrator of the estate of Paula Toray
who shall discharge his duties as such after letters of administration shall have been issued in his
favor and after taking his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00)
Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of Alipio Abada shall continue
discharging her duties as such until further orders from this Court.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to dismiss
the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required
by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other
matter forecloses all other issues.
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution of
the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to
probate the will of Abada.
Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
238
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. What laws apply to the probate of the last will of Abada;
2. Whether the will of Abada requires acknowledgment before a notary public; 13
3. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator;
4. Whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws;
5. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is
written in a language known to Abada;
6. Whether evidence aliunde may be resorted to in the probate of the will of Abada.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the
will of Abada.
The Applicable Law
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of 1889
or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure14 which governed the
execution of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,15 governs the form of the
attestation clause of Abada’s will.16Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. – No will, except as provided in the preceding section,17 shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator’s name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation
shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed
and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Requisites of a Will under the Code of Civil Procedure
Under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are the following:
239
(1) The will must be written in the language or dialect known by the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other;
(4) The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses
of the will must sign each and every page of the will on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page of the will, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and
the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all pages of the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language
or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before
a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the
testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the
Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an absentee,
while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions. Article 804 of the New Civil Code
is taken from Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.20 Article 806 of the New Civil Code is
taken from Article 685 of the Old Civil Code21 which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the will must be acquainted with
the testator, or, should they not know him, he shall be identified by two witnesses who are
acquainted with him and are known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and
the witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has, in their judgment,
the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in cases falling under Articles
700 and 701, are also required to know the testator.
However, the Code of Civil Procedure22 repealed Article 685 of the Old Civil Code. Under the Code
of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a notary is not necessary in the execution
240
of any will.23 Therefore, Abada’s will does not require acknowledgment before a notary
public.1awphi1.nét
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern that Abada knew the
Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the
will. On this issue, the Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to
dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree with Caponong-Noble
that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in probate proceedings. 24 In addition, the language
used in the will is part of the requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the
Court deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to
state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. 25 This is a
matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde.26 Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio,
in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents
of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used
to gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language.27 This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish
language.
The Attestation Clause of Abada’s Will
A scrutiny of Abada’s will shows that it has an attestation clause. The attestation clause of
Abada’s will reads:
Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en
presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen
izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo. Y en testimonio de ello, cada uno de
nosotros lo firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador al pie de este documento y en el
margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo, las
cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS’ en la parte superior de la
carrilla.28
Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble
alleges that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on which the will is written.
The allegation has no merit. The phrase "en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos
hojas de que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of each and every one
of the two pages consisting of the same" shows that the will consists of two pages. The pages are
numbered correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned from the phrase
"las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con las letras "UNO" y "DOS."
Caponong-Noble further alleges that the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the
testator signed the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She then faults the
Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the rule on substantial compliance found in
Article 809 of the New Civil Code.29
241
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio
Abada como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el
testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas
del mismo." The English translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as
his last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on
the left margin of each and every one of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly
states that Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the witnesses.
However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the
number of witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule
on substantial compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause
does not state the number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.
This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance even before the effectivity of the New
Civil Code. In Dichoso de Ticson v. De Gorostiza,30 the Court recognized that there are two
divergent tendencies in the law on wills, one being based on strict construction and the other on
liberal construction. In Dichoso, the Court noted that Abangan v. Abangan,31 the basic case on
the liberal construction, is cited with approval in later decisions of the Court.
In Adeva vda. De Leynez v. Leynez,32 the petitioner, arguing for liberal construction of applicable
laws, enumerated a long line of cases to support her argument while the respondent, contending
that the rule on strict construction should apply, also cited a long series of cases to support his
view. The Court, after examining the cases invoked by the parties, held:
x x x It is, of course, not possible to lay down a general rule, rigid and inflexible, which would be
applicable to all cases. More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a
regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any
suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the
document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. x x x.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the
facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed.,
sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose
of the law. x x x 331a\^/phi1.net
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows
four signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there
are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The
Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:
[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to
serious consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
242
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the
document or supply missing details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a
probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine
the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation
eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.34 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled with the signatures
appearing on the will itself and after the attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada
subscribed to and professed before the three witnesses that the document was his last will, and
(2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each page of the will in the presence of these
three witnesses.
Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not expressly state the
circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all its pages in the presence
of the testator and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.35
The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every
one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will
in the presence of one another and of the testator.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals of 12 January 2001 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 47644.
SO ORDERED.
243
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964
PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.
Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division
(C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819)
and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.
The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Petition, Annex A, pp. 2-4):
It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed
a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that "our two parcels of
land acquired during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to
Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give
us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot", and that "while each
of the testators is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands
aforementioned", the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677,
both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabe dela
Serna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia
and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required
by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939; in
Special Proceedings No. 499, "declara legalizado el documento Exhibit A como el testamento y
ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Serna con derecho por parte du su viuda superstite
Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al propio tiempo segun el Exhibit A de gozar de los frutos de los
terranos descritos en dicho documents; y habido consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes,
se decreta la distribucion sumaria de los mismos en favor de la logataria universal Manuela
Rebaca de Potot previa prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la sum de P500.00 para
responder de cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe
de la Serna de los años desde esta fecha" (Act Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la
Serna) Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate
of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special
Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the
petitioner, Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said
244
petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954 Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the
Probate of the Will of Gervasia Rebaca).
The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void,
for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code
of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the
Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a
court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Further, the
Court of Appeals declared that:
... . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code). prohibits the making of a
will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third
person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued
to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been
admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no
alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was
done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect
to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying, "assuming that the joint will in
question is valid."
Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the
Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive
effect as to his last will and testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already
decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor
of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an
error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction
of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final
judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world
(Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estates of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and
sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium (Dy Cay vs.
Crossfield, 38 Phil, 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1963
Ed., p. 322).
Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939
decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated,
overlooks that the ultimate decision on Whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and
here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this court, the
dismissal of their action for partition was correct. But the Court of Appeals should have taken
into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1989 could only
affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the
disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose
interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because
245
her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will
could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.
It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must
be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate
will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the court of First Instance of Cebu that the
joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia
Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision
in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra,
51 Phil. 267. Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death
to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will
in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not
make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only
repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their
observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).
WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
246
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 2026-CFI December 19, 1981
NENITA DE VERA SUROZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25 and
EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO, Deputy Clerk of Court, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a
will, which on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not
appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself?
That question arises under the pleadings filed in the testate case and in the certiorari case in the
Court of Appeals which reveal the following tangled strands of human relationship:
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45th Infantry of the U.S. Army (Philippine Scouts), Fort McKinley,
married Marcelina Salvador in 1923 (p. 150, Spec. Proc. No. 7816). They were childless. They
reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considered them as his
parents as shown in his 1945 marriage contract with Nenita de Vera (p. 15, Rollo of CA-G.R. No.
08654-R; p. 148, Rollo of Testate Case showing that Agapito was 5 years old when Mauro married
Marcelina in 1923).
Mauro died in 1942. Marcelina, as a veteran's widow, became a pensioner of the Federal
Government. That explains why on her death she had accumulated some cash in two banks.
Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia who became a medical technologist and went
abroad. Agapito also became a soldier. He was disabled and his wife Nenita was appointed as his
guardian in 1953 when he was declared an incompetent in Special Proceeding No. 1807 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch I (p. 16, Rollo of CA-G.R. No. 08654-R).
In that connection, it should be noted that a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz wanted also to be
his guardian in another proceeding. Arsenia tried to prove that Nenita was living separately from
Agapito and that she (Nenita) admitted to Marcelina that she was unfaithful to Agapito (pp. 61-
63, Record of testate case).
Judge Bienvenido A. Tan dismissed the second guardianship proceeding and confirmed Nenita's
appointment as guardian of Agapito (p. 16, Rollo of CA case). Agapito has been staying in a
veteran's hospital in San Francisco or Palo Alto, California (p. 87, Record).
247
On a date not indicated in the record, the spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child
named Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a
girl friend of Agapito) and who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her
up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter (pp. 23-26, Rollo of CA-G.R.
No.SP-08654-R). Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito. She married Oscar Medrano and is residing at 7666 J.B. Roxas Street, Makati,
apparently a neighbor of Marina Paje, a resident of 7668 J.B. Roxas Street.
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English
to the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her (pp. 38-39, CA Rollo). In that wig,
Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.
Marcelina died on November 15, 1974 at the Veterans Hospital in Quezon City. At the time of her
death, she was a resident of 7374 San Maximo Street, Olimpia, Makati, Rizal. She owned a 150-
square meter lot and house in that place. She acquired the lot in 1966 (p. 134, Record of testate
case).
On January 13, 1975, Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina (P. 97, CA Rollo)
and the executrix in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar,
Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch 25, a petition for
the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado.
As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado commissioned his deputy clerk of court, Evangeline
S. Yuipco, to hear the evidence. The transcripts of the stenographic notes taken at the hearing
before the deputy clerk of court are not in the record.
In an order dated March 31, 1975, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratrix. On the
following day, April 1, Judge Honrado issued two orders directing the Merchants Banking
Corporation and the Bank of America to allow Marina to withdraw the sum of P10,000 from the
savings accounts of Marcelina S. Suroza and Marilyn Suroza and requiring Corazon Castro, the
custodian of the passbooks, to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order dated April 11, 1975, instructing a
deputy sheriff to eject the occupants of the testatrix's house, among whom was Nenita V. Suroza,
and to place Marina in possession thereof.
That order alerted Nenita to the existence of the testamentary proceeding for the settlement of
Marcelina's estate. She and the other occupants of the decedent's house filed on April 18 in the
said proceeding a motion to set aside the order of April 11 ejecting them. They alleged that the
decedent's son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased, that he has a daughter named Lilia,
that Nenita was Agapito's guardian and that Marilyn was not Agapito's daughter nor the
decedent's granddaughter (pp. 52-68, Record of testate case). Later, they questioned the probate
court's jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order.
In spite of the fact that Judge Honrado was already apprised that persons, other than Marilyn,
were claiming Marcelina's estate, he issued on April 23 an order probating her supposed will
wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress (pp. 74-77, Record).
248
On April 24, Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition "to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and preliminary injunction". Nenita in that
motion reiterated her allegation that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina, that the will was not
duly executed and attested, that it was procured by means of undue influence employed by
Marina and Marilyn and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick.
Nenita further alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of
Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix (pp. 83-91, Record).
To that motion was attached an affidavit of Zenaida A. Penaojas the housemaid of Marcelina,
who swore that the alleged will was falsified (p. 109, Record).
Not content with her motion to set aside the ejectment order (filed on April 18) and her omnibus
motion to set aside the proceedings (filed on April 24), Nenita filed the next day, April 25, an
opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition for letters of administration. In that
opposition, Nenita assailed the due execution of the will and stated the names and addresses of
Marcelina's intestate heirs, her nieces and nephews (pp. 113-121, Record). Nenita was not aware
of the decree of probate dated April 23, 1975.
To that opposition was attached an affidavit of Dominga Salvador Teodocio, Marcelina's niece,
who swore that Marcelina never executed a win (pp. 124-125, Record).
Marina in her answer to Nenita's motion to set aside the proceedings admitted that Marilyn was
not Marcelina's granddaughter but was the daughter of Agapito and Arsenia de la Cruz and that
Agapito was not Marcelina's sonbut merely an anak-anakan who was not legally adopted (p. 143,
Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of July 17, 1975 dismissed Nenita's counter-petition for the issuance
of letters of administration because of the non-appearance of her counsel at the hearing. She
moved for the reconsideration of that order.
In a motion dated December 5, 1975, for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita V.
Suroza reiterated her contention that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear
before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to her (pp. 208-209,
Record).
Judge Honrado in his order of June 8, 1976 "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita (p.
284, Record).
Instead of appealing from that order and the order probating the wig, Nenita "filed a case to
annul" the probate proceedings (p. 332, Record). That case, Civil Case No. 24276, Suroza vs. Paje
and Honrado (p. 398, Record), was also assigned to Judge Honrado. He dismissed it in his order
of February 16, 1977 (pp. 398-402, Record).
Judge Honrado in his order dated December 22, 1977, after noting that the executrix had
delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the estate tax had been paid, closed the testamentary
proceeding.
249
About ten months later, in a verified complaint dated October 12, 1978, filed in this Court, Nenita
charged Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina. The complainant
reiterated her contention that the testatrix was illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed
her thumbmark to the will and that she did not know English, the language in which the win was
written. (In the decree of probate Judge Honrado did not make any finding that the will was
written in a language known to the testatrix.)
Nenita further alleged that Judge Honrado, in spite of his knowledge that the testatrix had a son
named Agapito (the testatrix's supposed sole compulsory and legal heir), who was preterited in
the will, did not take into account the consequences of such a preterition.
Nenita disclosed that she talked several times with Judge Honrado and informed him that the
testatrix did not know the executrix Marina Paje, that the beneficiary's real name is Marilyn Sy
and that she was not the next of kin of the testatrix.
Nenita denounced Judge Honrado for having acted corruptly in allowing Marina and her cohorts
to withdraw from various banks the deposits Marcelina.
She also denounced Evangeline S. Yuipco, the deputy clerk of court, for not giving her access to
the record of the probate case by alleging that it was useless for Nenita to oppose the probate
since Judge Honrado would not change his decision. Nenita also said that Evangeline insinuated
that if she (Nenita) had ten thousand pesos, the case might be decided in her favor. Evangeline
allegedly advised Nenita to desist from claiming the properties of the testatrix because she
(Nenita) had no rights thereto and, should she persist, she might lose her pension from the
Federal Government.
Judge Honrado in his brief comment did not deal specifically with the allegations of the
complaint. He merely pointed to the fact that Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate
and that in a motion dated July 6, 1976 she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate
the house of the testatrix.
Evangeline S. Yuipco in her affidavit said that she never talked with Nenita and that the latter did
not mention Evangeline in her letter dated September 11, 1978 to President Marcos.
Evangeline branded as a lie Nenita's imputation that she (Evangeline) prevented Nenita from
having access to the record of the testamentary proceeding. Evangeline was not the custodian of
the record. Evangeline " strongly, vehemently and flatly denied" Nenita's charge that she
(Evangeline) said that the sum of ten thousand pesos was needed in order that Nenita could get
a favorable decision. Evangeline also denied that she has any knowledge of Nenita's pension from
the Federal Government.
The 1978 complaint against Judge Honorado was brought to attention of this Court in the Court
Administrator's memorandum of September 25, 1980. The case was referred to Justice Juan A.
Sison of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. He submitted a
report dated October 7, 1981.
250
On December 14, 1978, Nenita filed in the Court of Appeals against Judge Honrado a petition for
certiorari and prohibition wherein she prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the
proceedings in the probate case be declared void.
Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Domingo P. Aquino, who notarized the will. He swore
that the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses did not appear before him and that he
notarized the will "just to accommodate a brother lawyer on the condition" that said lawyer
would bring to the notary the testatrix and the witnesses but the lawyer never complied with his
commitment.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because Nenita's remedy was an appeal and her
failure to do so did not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari (Suroza vs.
Honrado, CA-G.R. No. SP-08654, May 24, 1981).
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed on November 17, 1981 a motion to dismiss the
administrative case for having allegedly become moot and academic.
We hold that disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper
disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the
decedent's legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the
decedent's estate.
A judge may be criminally liable or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order
or rendering a manifestly unjust judgment or interlocutory order by reason of inexcusable
negligence or ignorance (Arts. 204 to 206, Revised Penal Code).
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of the court of first instance for serious
misconduct or inefficiency ( Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies malice or a wrongful
intent, not a mere error of judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable
evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-known legal rules" (In relmpeachment
of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be
inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence,
prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In
re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and
was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will
is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to
the testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". (p. 16, Record of testate case). That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and,
therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every
will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will written in
251
English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was disallowed (Acop vs. Piraso,
52 Phil. 660).
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as
to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court, respondent judge
could have noticed that the notary was not presented as a witness.
In spite of the absence of an opposition, respondent judge should have personally conducted the
hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly
executed.
Under the circumstances, we find his negligence and dereliction of duty to be inexcusable.
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S. Suroza, a fine equivalent
to his salary for one month is imposed on respondent judge (his compulsory retirement falls on
December 25, 1981).
The case against respondent Yuipco has become moot and academic because she is no longer
employed in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980 she has been assistant city fiscal of Surigao
City. She is beyond this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firm Adm. Matter No. 2044-
CFI November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA 225).
SO ORDERED.
252
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
In re will of Ana Abangan.
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN, executrix-appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Filemon Sotto for appellants.
M. Jesus Cuenco for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's
will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed.
Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which
contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in
the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental
witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three
witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these omissions, according to appellants' contention,
are defects whereby the probate of the will should have been denied. We are of the opinion that
the will was duly admitted to probate.
In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 (which is the one
applicable in the case) evidently has for its object (referring to the body of the will itself) to avoid
the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when
these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be
completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into
consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred
to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different
interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at the
bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these
signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it
appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another
signature on its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures,
affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute
regards of such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the
sheet that it would consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the
authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
253
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed
on the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know
whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are
written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering
whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying
the will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and
the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover,
referring specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the
attestation clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to
the testator since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.
Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains
all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses
and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator
and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded. lawphil.net
As another ground for this appeal, it is alleged the records do not show that the testarix knew
the dialect in which the will is written. But the circumstance appearing in the will itself that same
was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a
neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this
dialect in which this will is written.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
254
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42258 January 15, 1936
In re Will of the deceased Leoncia Tolentino.
VICTORIO PAYAD, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AQUILINA TOLENTINO, oppositor-appellant.
Vicente Foz, Marciano Almario and Leonardo Abola for petitioner-appellant.
Leodegario Azarraga for oppositor-appellant.
GODDARD, J.:
Both parties in this case appeal from an order of the trial court denying the probate of the alleged
will of Leoncia Tolentino, deceased. That court found that the will in question was executed by
the deceased on the date appearing thereon, September 7, 1933, one day before the death of
the testatrix, contrary to the contention of the oppositor that it was executed after her death.
The court, however, denied probate on the ground that the attestation clause was not in
conformity with the requirements of law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused
Attorney Almario to write her name at her express direction.
The appeal of the oppositor-appellant is based upon the alleged failure of the trial court in not
finding that the will in question was executed after the death of Leoncia Tolentino, or that she
was mentally and physically incapable of executing said will one day before her death. After a
careful examination of the evidence on these points we find no reason for setting aside the
conclusion of the trial court as set forth above. The assignments of the oppositor-appellant are
therefore overruled.
As to the contention of the petitioner-appellant, as stated above, the trial court denied probate
of the will on the sole ground that the attestation clause does not state that the testratrix
requested Attorney Almario to write her name.
The last paragraph of the questioned will reads in part as follows:
En prueba de todo lo cual, firmo el presente testamento con mi marcha digital, poque no puedo
estampar mi firma a causa de mi debilidad, rogando al abogado M. Almario que poga mi nombre
en el sitio donde he de estampar mi marcha digital . . ..
The evidence of record established the fact that Leoncia Tolentino, assisted by Attorney Almario,
placed her thumb mark on each and every age of time questioned will and the said attorney
merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumb mark. In other words
Attorney Almario did not sign for the testatrix. She signed for placing her thumb mark on each
and every page thereof "A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is
made by the testator's mark." (Quoted by this court from 28 R.C.L., p, 117; De Gala vs. Gonzales
255
and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 108.) It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary that the attestation
clause in question should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her name
inasmuch as the testratrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.
The appealed order of the trial court is reversed and the questioned will of Leoncia Tolentino,
deceased, is hereby admitted to probate with the costs of this appeal against the oppositor-
appellant.
Malcolm, Villa-Real, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
256
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10751 March 29, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appellee,
vs.
MARIA CABALLERO Y APARICI, objector-appellant.
Ruperto Montinola and Aurelio Montinola for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This case is a proceeding for the compulsory registration of certain lands in the municipality of
Iloilo, begun under the provisions of section 61 of Act No. 926 and carried forward in accordance
with the provisions of the Cadastral Act (No. 2259).
Maria Cabellero, one of the respondents, claimed that lot No. 5 on the cadastral plan did not
include all the land covered by her Torrens title issued in record No. 1894 on November 6, 1912.
The court thereupon ordered the surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to investigate this claim and
to report the result. The pertinent part of the surveyor's report reads:
Expediente No. 1894 calls for all of lot No. 5 and in addition lot No. 5-a as shown on accompanying
sketch, which is made a part of this report.
From the final order of the court, directing that in the new certificate of title lot No. 5-a be
excluded, Maria Caballero appealed.
All admit that the appellant's Torrens title covers lot No. 5-a, or in other words, lot No. 5-a is a
part of lot No. 5. The judgment of the Land Court, as a result of which the appellant's Torrens
title issued, has long since become final, so there can be no question about the validity or finality
of the appellant's title. But it is urged that the order of the lower court excluding parcel No. 5-a
be sustained because "it is based on sound principles and is essential to the proper handing of
cadastral cases." With this proposition we cannot agree. We see no reason why a part of the
appellant's land, which is covered by a Torrens title, should be taken from her and given to
someone else. It may be true that in administering the Cadastral Law it will be necessary to issue
new certificates of title to these holding Torrens titles for lands within the cadastral survey, but
if this is done, the new certificate must cover all of the land contained in the old one. The
appellant's theory of this case is so clear that a further discussion of the question is unnecessary.
For the foregoing reasons, the order appealed from is reversed, without costs in this instance. So
ordered.
Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
257
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912
PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
A. M. Jimenez for appellant.
Ramon Querubin for appellees.
MORELAND, J.:
This case is closely connected with the case of Faustino Cabacungan vs. Pedro Barut and another,
No. 6284,1 just decided by this court, wherein there was an application for the probate of an
alleged last will and testament of the same person the probate of whose will is involved in this
suit.
This appeal arises out of an application on the part of Pedro Barut to probate the last will and
testament of Maria Salomon, deceased. It is alleged in the petition of the probate that Maria
Salomon died on the 7th day of November, 1908, in the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, leaving a last
will and testament bearing date March 2, 1907. Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino
Ragasa, and A. M. Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the execution thereof. By the
terms of said will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's property.
The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano dialect. Its translation into
Spanish appears at page 11. After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills
by her made. She also stated in said will that being unable to read or write, the same had been
read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo
Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix.
The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives of the deceased
on various grounds, among them that a later will had been executed by the deceased. The will
referred to as being a later will is the one involved in case No. 6284 already referred to.
Proceeding for the probate of this later will were pending at the time. The evidence of the
proponents and of the opponents was taken by the court in both cases for the purpose of
considering them together.
In the case before us the learned probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate
upon the sole ground that the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the
testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other
witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be. We do not
believe that the mere dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to
overcome the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the
testatrix was written by Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in the presence
258
of all the witnesses to the will. It is immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is
written at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the
execution of the will.
The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that under the law relating to the
execution of a will it is necessary that the person who signs the name of the testatrix must
afterwards sign his own name; and that, in view of the fact that, in the case at bar, the name
signed below that of the testatrix as the person who signed her name, being, from its appearance,
not the same handwriting as that constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is accordingly
invalid, such fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the testatrix failed to sign
his own. We do not believe that this contention can be sustained. Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his expenses direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each. . . .
This is the important part of the section under the terms of which the court holds that the person
who signs the name of the testator for him must also sign his own name The remainder of the
section reads:
The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed by
some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that they
attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of
such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact
signed and attested as in this section provided.
From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the will, it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The
important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a
practical matter that the one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that it is not
essential to the validity of the will. Whether one parson or another signed the name of the
testatrix in this case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned. The
plain wording of the statute shows that the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay
down, is absolutely unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the
statute relating to the execution of wills do not in any sense require such a provision. From the
standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw from the words of the law the inference that
the persons who signs the name of the testator must sign his own name also. The law requires
only three witnesses to a will, not four.
Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name of a person who is
unable to write may be signed by another by express direction to any instrument known to the
law. There is no necessity whatever, so far as the validity of the instrument is concerned, for the
259
person who writes the name of the principal in the document to sign his own name also. As a
matter of policy it may be wise that he do so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would
enable a person proving the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the
principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the document, it is unnecessary. The main thing
to be established in the execution of the will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is
proved, whether it be written by himself or by another at his request, it is none the less valid,
and the fact of such signature can be proved as perfectly and as completely when the person
signing for the principal omits to sign his own name as it can when he actually signs. To hold a
will invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the name of the principal is, in the
particular case, a complete abrogation of the law of wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which
the statute expressly declares is valid.
There have been cited three cases which it is alleged are in opposition to the doctrine which we
have herein laid down. They are Ex parte Santiago (4 Phil. Rep., 692), Ex parte Arcenas (4 Phil.
Rep., 700), and Guison vs.Concepcion (5 Phil. Rep., 551). Not one of these cases is in point. The
headnote in the case last above stated gives an indication of what all of cases are and the
question involved in each one of them. It says:
The testatrix was not able to sign it for her. Instead of writing her name he wrote his own upon
the will. Held, That the will was not duly executed.
All of the above cases are precisely of this character. Every one of them was a case in which the
person who signed the will for the testator wrote his own name to the will instead of writing that
of the testator, so that the testator's name nowhere appeared attached to the will as the one
who executed it. The case of Ex parte Arcenas contains the following paragraph:
Where a testator does not know, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will himself, it shall be
signed in the following manner: "John Doe, by the testator, Richard Roe;" or in this form: "By the
testator. John Doe, Richard Roe." All this must be written by the witness signing at the request
of the testator.
The only question for decision in that case, as we have before stated, was presented by the fact
that the person who was authorized to sign the name of the testator to the will actually failed to
sign such name but instead signed his own thereto. The decision in that case related only to that
question.
Aside from the presentation of an alleged subsequent will the contestants in this case have set
forth no reason whatever why the will involved in the present litigation should not be probated.
The due and legal execution of the will by the testatrix is clearly established by the proofs in this
case. Upon the facts, therefore, the will must be probated. As to the defense of a subsequent
will, that is resolved in case No. 6284 of which we have already spoken. We there held that said
later will not the will of the deceased.
The judgment of the probate court must be and is hereby reversed and that court is directed to
enter an order in the usual form probating the will involved in this litigation and to proceed with
such probate in accordance with law.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.
260
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs.
JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
Elviro L. Peralta and Hermenegildo A. Prieto for petitioner.
Faustino B. Tobia, Juan I. Ines and Federico Tacason for respondents.
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado
dated January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following
attestation clause:
We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero
Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and
that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation
clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and
it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were
signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.
In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand nine
hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.
The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals,
reversing the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation
clause failed (1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and
at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in the
presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2) to certify that after the
signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said testator has written
a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists
and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages
thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
261
In our opinion, the attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado
caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner (who is appealing
by way of certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals) argues, however, that there is no
need for such recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient
signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that
the cross is as much a signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by this
Court in the cases of De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104; Dolar vs. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479;
Payad vs. Tolentino, 62 Phil., 848; Neyra vs. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil.,
429.
It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero
Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are
not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The
cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the
attestation clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses,
and by the latter in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
262
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant.
Valerio Fontanilla and Andres Asprer for appellant.
Anacleto Diaz for appellees.
CARSON, J.:
The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument
propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present
in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten
feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was
hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the
other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small
room with the testator and the other subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their
signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates
the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament
of the deceased.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of fact of
vital importance in the determination of this case, as he was of opinion that under the doctrine
laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., 541) the alleged fact that one of the
subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other describing
witnesses signed the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient
in itself to invalidate the execution of the will. But we are unanimously of opinion that had this
subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time when the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner
room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under circumstances
not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of vision
from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have
been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of
inscription of each signature."
In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not
whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other
263
sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with
relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the
moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if
they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing
witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears
that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing
their relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial
judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was
actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see
everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any
physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that
the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes
were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at
that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by
merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend
the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution,
and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the
code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will.
The decree entered by the court below admitting the instrument propounded therein to probate
as the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando, deceased, is affirmed with costs of this instance
against the appellant.
Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.
264
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellee.
Rosendo J. Tansinin for oppositor-appellant Natividad Icasiano.
Jaime R. Nuevas for oppositor-appellant Enrique Icasiano.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila admitting to probate the document
and its duplicate, marked as Exhibits "A" and "A-1", as the true last will and testament of Josefa
Villacorte, deceased, and appointing as executor Celso Icasiano, the person named therein as
such.
This special proceeding was begun on October 2, 1958 by a petition for the allowance and
admission to probate of the original, Exhibit "A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased,
and for the appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof.
The court set the proving of the alleged will for November 8, 1958, and caused notice thereof to
be published for three (3) successive weeks, previous to the time appointed, in the newspaper
"Manila chronicle", and also caused personal service of copies thereof upon the known heirs.
On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the testatrix, filed her opposition; and on
November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special administrator, to which
proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing the
Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. 1äwphï1.ñët
On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the testatrix, also filed a manifestation adopting
as his own Natividad's opposition to the probate of the alleged will.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction of his evidence; but
on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition,
alleging that the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and
that he was, on that date, submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly
found only on or about May 26, 1959. On June 17, 1959, oppositors Natividad Icasiano de Gomez
and Enrique Icasiano filed their joint opposition to the admission of the amended and
supplemental petition, but by order of July 20, 1959, the court admitted said petition, and on July
30, 1959, oppositor Natividad Icasiano filed her amended opposition. Thereafter, the parties
presented their respective evidence, and after several hearings the court issued the order
265
admitting the will and its duplicate to probate. From this order, the oppositors appealed directly
to this Court, the amount involved being over P200,000.00, on the ground that the same is
contrary to law and the evidence.
The evidence presented for the petitioner is to the effect that Josefa Villacorte died in the City of
Manila on September 12, 1958; that on June 2, 1956, the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last
will and testament in duplicate at the house of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano at Pedro
Guevara Street, Manila, published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely:
attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date
before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary Public in and for the City of Manila; and that the will
was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the execution
and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio
Rustia of Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl. Of the said three instrumental witnesses
to the execution of the decedent's last will and testament, attorneys Torres and Natividad were
in the Philippines at the time of the hearing, and both testified as to the due execution and
authenticity of the said will. So did the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged by
the testatrix and attesting witnesses, and also attorneys Fermin Samson, who actually prepared
the document. The latter also testified upon cross examination that he prepared one original and
two copies of Josefa Villacorte last will and testament at his house in Baliuag, Bulacan, but he
brought only one original and one signed copy to Manila, retaining one unsigned copy in Bulacan.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered simultaneously with the
filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A" consists of five pages, and while signed at the end
and in every page, it does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose
V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the amended and
supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is signed by the testatrix and her three
attesting witnesses in each and every page.
The testimony presented by the proponents of the will tends to show that the original of the will
and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in
the testatrix's presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature
of attorney Natividad on page three (3) of the original); that pages of the original and duplicate
of said will were duly numbered; that the attestation clause thereof contains all the facts required
by law to be recited therein and is signed by the aforesaid attesting witnesses; that the will is
written in the language known to and spoken by the testatrix that the attestation clause is in a
language also known to and spoken by the witnesses; that the will was executed on one single
occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the original and the duplicate copies were duly
acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the same date June 2, 1956.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that
he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page
three (3) was signed in his presence.
266
Oppositors-appellants in turn introduced expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of
the testatrix in the duplicate (Exhibit "A-1") are not genuine nor were they written or affixed on
the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting that the documents were
genuine, they were executed through mistake and with undue influence and pressure because
the testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament the wishes of those who
will stand to benefit from the provisions of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and dispositions thereof,
whereby proponents-appellees stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys-in-fact
of the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-appellants are
enjoined not to look for other properties not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the
probate of it, on penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that the testatrix signed
both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-1", respectively) of the will spontaneously,
on the same in the presence of the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who
acknowledged the will; and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will
and its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken by both the testator
and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and Atty. Fermin Samson, together before
they were actually signed; that the attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken
by the testatrix and the witnesses. The opinion of expert for oppositors, Mr. Felipe Logan, that
the signatures of the testatrix appearing in the duplicate original were not written by the same
had which wrote the signatures in the original will leaves us unconvinced, not merely because it
is directly contradicted by expert Martin Ramos for the proponents, but principally because of
the paucity of the standards used by him to support the conclusion that the differences between
the standard and questioned signatures are beyond the writer's range of normal scriptural
variation. The expert has, in fact, used as standards only three other signatures of the testatrix
besides those affixed to the original of the testament (Exh. A); and we feel that with so few
standards the expert's opinion and the signatures in the duplicate could not be those of the
testatrix becomes extremely hazardous. This is particularly so since the comparison charts Nos.
3 and 4 fail to show convincingly that the are radical differences that would justify the charge of
forgery, taking into account the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
signatures, and the effect of writing fatigue, the duplicate being signed right the original. These,
factors were not discussed by the expert.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and questioned
signatures does not appear reliable, considering the standard and challenged writings were
affixed to different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting power. On the whole,
therefore, we do not find the testimony of the oppositor's expert sufficient to overcome that of
the notary and the two instrumental witnesses, Torres and Natividad (Dr. Diy being in the United
States during the trial, did not testify).
Nor do we find adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither (see In re Butalid, 10 Phil. 27; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil.
163; Pecson vs. Coronal, 45 Phil. 216). Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making
a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The testamentary dispositions
267
that the heirs should not inquire into other property and that they should respect the distribution
made in the will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part do not suffice to prove
fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation
which, as shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate being
diverted into the hands of non-heirs and speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a
matter to be litigated on another occassion. It is also well to note that, as remarked by the Court
of Appeals in Sideco vs. Sideco, 45 Off. Gaz. 168, fraud and undue influence are mutually
repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence
of definite evidence against the validity of the will.
On the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature
to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing,
is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page,
but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity
of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory
requisites. Otherwise, as stated in Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479 (decision
on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the
attestation clause".
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is
shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete
set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before
the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the
statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the
literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot
by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan
vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the
pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect
(Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without
undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the
duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it
lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here
into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the
duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and
can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being
superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the
268
omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication
does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication
of the petition for probate. The amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed,
but merely supplemented it by disclosing the existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made
that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and A-1 are admittedly identical); and
appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved or claimed that
the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting
the amended petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
269
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5826 April 29, 1953
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Clouduallo Lucero and Vicente C. Santos for appellants.
Marciano Chitongco and Zosimo B. Echanova for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan,
Pambujan, Samar, on February 14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its
attestation clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause
is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required by law to be made
by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation
clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand
margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation
clause. This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that
the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by
the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such
clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the will in question denied. So
ordered with costs against the petitioner and appellee.
Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. In my opinion the will in question has substantially complied with the formalities of the
law and, therefore, should be admitted to probate . It appears that the will was signed by the
270
testator and was attested by three instrumental witnesses, not only at the bottom, but also on
the left-hand margin. The witnesses testified not only that the will was signed by the testator in
their presence and in the presence of each other but also that when they did so, the attestation
clause was already written thereon. Their testimony has not been contradicted. The only
objection set up by the oppositors to the validity of the will is the fact that the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses do not appear immediately after the attestation clause.
This objection is too technical to be entertained. In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan, (40 Phil.,
476), this court said that when the testamentary dispositions "are wholly written on only one
sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses (as the instant case),their
signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless." In such a case, the
court said, the requirement of the signatures on the left hand margin was not necessary because
the purpose of the law — which is to avoid the substitution of any of the sheets of the will,
thereby changing the testator's dispositions — has already been accomplished. We may say the
same thing in connection with the will under consideration because while the three instrumental
witnesses did not sign immediately by the majority that it may have been only added on a
subsequent occasion and not at the uncontradicted testimony of said witnesses to the effect that
such attestation clause was already written in the will when the same was signed.
The following observation made by this court in the Abangan case is very fitting: The object of
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud
to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it i not the
object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an
interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
(supra)
We should not also overlook the liberal trend of the New Civil Code in the matter of interpretation
of wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt, is to give such interpretation that would have the
effect of preventing intestacy (article 788 and 791, New Civil Code) I am therefore of the opinion
that the will in question should be admitted to probate.
Feria, J., concurs.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I cuncur in Mr. Justice Bautista's dissenting opinion and may add that the majority decision
erroneously sets down as a fact that the attestation clause was no signed when the witnesses
signatures appear on the left margin and the real and only question is whether such signatures
are legally sufficient. The only answers, in our humble opinion, is yes. The law on wills does not
provide that the attesting witness should sign the clause at the bottom. In the absence of such
provision, there is no reason why signatures on the margin are not good. A letter is not any the
less the writter's simply because it was signed, not at the conventional place but on the side or
on top. Feria, J., concurs.
271
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7179 June 30, 1955
Testate Estate of the Late Apolinaria Ledesma. FELICIDAD JAVELLANA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
DOÑA MATEA LEDESMA, oppositor-appellant.
Fulgencio Vega and Felix D. Bacabac for appellant.
Benjamin H. Tirot for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
By order of July 23, 1953, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents
in the Visayan dialect, marked Exhibits D and E, as the testament and codicil duly executed by the
deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952,
respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses.
The contestant, Da. Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of said deceased,
appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in conformity with
law. The appeal was made directly to this Court because the value of the properties involved
exceeded two hundred thousand pesos.
Originally the opposition to the probate also charged that the testatrix lacked testamentary
capacity and that the dispositions were procured through undue influence. These grounds were
abandoned at the hearing in the court below, where the issue was concentrated into three
specific questions: (1) whether the testament of 1950 was executed by the testatrix in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses; (2) whether the acknowledgment clause was signed and
the notarial seal affixed by the notary without the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses;
and (3) if so, whether the codicil was thereby rendered invalid and ineffective. These questions
are the same ones presented to us for resolution.
The contestant argues that the Court below erred in refusing credence to her witnesses Maria
Paderogao and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma.
Both testified that on March 30, 1950, they saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to
the will) inform the deceased that he had brought the "testamento" and urge her to go to
attorney Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da. Apolinaria manifested that she could not go, because
she was not feeling well; and that upon Yap's insistence that the will had to be signed in the
attorney's office and not elsewhere, the deceased took the paper and signed it in the presence
of Yap alone, and returned it with the statement that no one would question it because the
property involved was exclusively hers.
Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for reversing the trial Court's
rejection of the improbable story of the witnesses. It is squarely contradicted by the concordant
testimony of the instrumental witnesses, Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon Tabiana, and his wife Gloria
272
Montinola, who asserted under oath that the testament was executed by testatrix and witnesses
in the presence of each other, at the house of the decedent on General Hughes St., Iloilo City, on
March 30, 1950. And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either Tabiana or Yap should
have insisted that Da. Apolinaria, an infirm lady then over 80 years old, should leave her own
house in order to execute her will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for
the purpose. Moreover, the cross-examination has revealed fatal flaws in the testimony of
Contestant's witnesses. Both claim to have heard the word "testamento" for the first time when
Yap used it; and they claimed ability to recall that word four years later, despite the fact that the
term meant nothing to either. It is well known that what is to be remembered must first be
rationally conceived and assimilated (II Moore on Facts, p. 884). Likewise, Maria Paderogao was
positive that Yap brought the will, and that the deceased alone signed it, precisely on March 30,
1950; but she could remember no other date, nor give satisfactory explanation why that
particular day stuck in her mind. Worse still, Allado claimed to have heard what allegedly
transpired between Yap and Da. Apolinaria from the kitchen of the house, that was later proved
to have been separated from the deceased's quarters, and standing at a much lower level, so
that conversations in the main building could not be distinctly heard from the kitchen. Later, on
redirect examination, Allado sought to cure his testimony by claiming that he was upstairs in a
room where the servants used to eat when he heard Yap converse with his mistress; but this
correction is unavailing, since it was plainly induced by two highly leading questions from
contestant's counsel that had been previously ruled out by the trial Court. Besides, the
contradiction is hardly consonant with this witness' 18 years of service to the deceased. Upon
the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses urged upon us
by the contestant-appellant, concerning the presence or absence of Aurelio Montinola at the
signing of the testament or of the codicil, and the identity of the person who inserted the date
therein, are not material and are largely imaginary, since the witness Mrs. Tabiana confessed
inability to remember all the details of the transaction. Neither are we impressed by the
argument that the use of some Spanish terms in the codicil and testament (like legado, partes
iguales, plena propiedad) is proof that its contents were not understood by the testatrix, it
appearing in evidence that those terms are of common use even in the vernacular, and that the
deceased was a woman of wide business interests.
The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that signing of the certificate of
acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to the Codicil in Visayan, Exhibit E. Unlike the testament,
this codicil was executed after the enactment of the new Civil Code, and, therefore, had to be
acknowledged before a notary public (Art. 806). Now, the instrumental witnesses (who happen
to be the same ones who attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed
by the testatrix and the witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by
notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did
not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there. The variance does
not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears
rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in recalling past events,
to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it (II Moore on Facts, p. 878;
The Ellen McGovern, 27 Fed. 868, 870).
273
At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed the certification
of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity
of the codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the
signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A
comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and
witnesses sign in the presence of each other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that
the latter should avow to the certifying officer the authenticity of their signatures and the
voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary disposition. This was done in the
case before us. The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the
testament was duly acknowledged by the participants therein is no part of the acknowledgment
itself nor of the testamentary act. Hence their separate execution out of the presence of the
testatrix and her witnesses can not be said to violate the rule that testaments should be
completed without interruption (Andalis vs. Pulgueras, 59 Phil. 643), or, as the Roman maxim
puts it, "uno codem die ac tempore in eadem loco", and no reversible error was committed by
the Court in so holding. It is noteworthy that Article 806 of the new Civil Code does not contain
words requiring that the testator and the witnesses should acknowledge the testament on the
same day or occasion that it was executed. The decision admitting the will to probate is affirmed,
with costs against appellant.
274
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32213 November 26, 1973
AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
Paul G. Gorrez for petitioner.
Mario D. Ortiz for respondent Manuel B. Lugay.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court First Instance of Cebu allowing the
probate of the last will a testament of the late Valente Z. Cruz. Petitioner-appellant Agapita N.
Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will (Exhibit "E"),
alleging the will was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence;
that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the
content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was disposing and that the supposed last
will and testament was not executed in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the
Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by certiorari
which was given due course.
The only question presented for determination, on which the decision of the case hinges, is
whether the supposed last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") was executed in
accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code, the first requiring
at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the
testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public.
Of the three instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Reduced to simpler
terms, the question was attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other, considering that the three attesting witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the same. As the third witness is the notary
public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel
B. Lugay, who is the supposed executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court,
maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three
attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them, bolstering up his stand with
57 American Jurisprudence, p. 227 which, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows:
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It is said that there are, practical reasons for upholding a will as against the purely technical
reason that one of the witnesses required by law signed as certifying to an acknowledgment of
the testator's signature under oath rather than as attesting the execution of the instrument.
After weighing the merits of the conflicting claims of the parties, We are inclined to sustain that
of the appellant that the last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with
law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To
acknowledge before means to avow (Javellana v. Ledesma, 97 Phil. 258, 262; Castro v. Castro,
100 Phil. 239, 247); to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or
preceding in space or ahead of. (The New Webster Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English
Language, p. 72; Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, p. 252;
Webster's New International Dictionary 2d. p. 245.) Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front
of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. To permit
such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement Balinon v. De Leon, 50 0. G. 583.) That function would defeated if the
notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act. It would
place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud (Report of Code Commission p. 106-107), would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary public may, in addition, act as a
witness to the executive of the document he has notarized. (Mahilum v. Court Appeals, 64 0. G.
4017; 17 SCRA 482; Sawyer v. Cox, 43 Ill. 130). There are others holding that his signing merely
as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon (Ferguson v. Ferguson, 47 S. E. 2d.
346; In Re Douglas Will, N. Y. S. 2d. 641; Ragsdal v. Hill, 269 S. W. 2d. 911, Tyson Utterback, 122
So. 496; In Re Baybee's Estate 160 N. 900; W. Merill v. Boal, 132 A. 721; See also Trenwith v.
Smallwood, 15 So. 1030). But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in this
jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because the notaries public and witnesses
referred to aforecited cases merely acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and
not as acknowledging witnesses. He the notary public acted not only as attesting witness but also
acknowledging witness, a situation not envisaged by Article 805 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another with
the office of the Clerk of Court. [Emphasis supplied]
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would
be in contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses
to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of
witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as
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has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that purpose. In
the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the probate of
the last will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not valid and hereby set
aside.
Cost against the appellee.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
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