RULE 110

9. PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN +

GR No. 152662, Jun 13, 2012

PEREZ, J.

Facts:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas

Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor

of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount

of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor

of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

Consequently, the case was modified, and only on February 3, 2000 that two counts for violation of BP Blg.

22 were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. On

17 June 2000, respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance

of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been

extinguished by reason of prescription.

In defense of her claim, Pangilinan said that the prevailing law that governs the prescription of special penal

law, B.P. 22, is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods Of Prescription For Violations Penalized

By Special Acts) where the right to file an action to a “proper court” and not to merely to prosecution office

for B.P. 22, prescribes four (4) years from the commission of the crime. The imputed violation occurred

sometime in 1995, and only on February 3, 2000 that a case was formally filed in the Metropolitan Trial

Court, therefore the action already prescribes. RTC granted the motion.

On the other hand, the complainant argued that the filing with the office of city prosecutor constitutes an

interruption to the prescription.

Issue: Is filing complaint to city prosecutor office considered a “judicial proceeding” that can interrupt

prescription of crime under B.P. 22, a special law?

Ruling:

YES. Following a catena of cases, the court held that, there is no more distinction between cases under the

Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period

of prescription; that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation in the office of prosecutor

against accused interrupts the period of prescription.

Following the factual finding the crime was committed sometime in 1995, the filing of complaint on

September 1997, two (2) years from the commission of the crime validly interrupts the running of

prescription. Therefore, the action against the respondent Pangilinan did not prescribe.

12. LEE PUE LIONG v. CHUA PUE CHIN LEE

GR No. 181658
August 7, 2013

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Facts:

Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company

affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman

Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner

and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of

CHI.

On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and

barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by CKC. Petitioner and other factory

employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of criminal cases against

Nixon Lee and against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and respondent, which are now

pending in different courts in Valenzuela City.

On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI issued by Virginia Lee caused the filing of a verified Petition

for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238 which covers

a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss stating that: (1) by virtue

of his position as President of CHI, he had in his custody and possession the owner's duplicate copy of TCT

No. 232238 issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner's copy of TCT No. 232238 was

inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May 1999; (3) he exerted

diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found and is already beyond recovery; and (4)

said title had not been the subject of mortgage or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with

any person, credit or banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments

during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order dated September 17, 1999, the RTC granted the petition and

directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's Duplicate Copy in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among others, that the

September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew fully well that respondent was in

possession of the said Owner's Duplicate Copy, the latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of

vital documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title

because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank. Respondent even

produced the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the

RTC recalled and set aside its September 17, 1999 Order.

On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit to clarify that she was accusing petitioner

of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions: (1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity

of the contents in his petition filed with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in

his possession but was lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost; and (3)

by testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.

Respondent posed that the presence and intervention of the private prosecutor in the perjury cases are

not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer
and the treasurer of CHI and the private complainant.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT

UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED

PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST.

Ruling:

The petition has no merit. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should

be allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.

There was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate civil

action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability

arising from the offense committed and the private offended party has the right to intervene through the

private prosecutors.

Such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability is involved as pronounced in the ruling in Lim Tek

Goan.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this

Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco cited by both MeTC and CA, that whether public

or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended

party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right

to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the

offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal

act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to

the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor

institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private

prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

RULE 116

38. LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE +

GR No. 174461, Sep 11, 2013

BRION, J.

Facts:

On one fateful night, the evidence of the prosecution reveals, Johan Kummer, a minor, the son of Leticia

Kummer, shot a certain Jesus Mallo, Jr. According to the eyewitness, Amiel Malana, he and Jesus Mallo

went to the house of Kummer's. Jesus knocked on the door of the Kummer’s house, declaring that he is

“Boy Mallo”. Then, according to the testimonies of Malana, Johan shot Mallo dead with a shotgun. Being a

minor, Johan was released at the cognizance of his father. Then he left the country without notifying the

court. In defense, Leticia Kummer produced another version of the story which shows that they were

sleeping innocently in their house on that fateful night, when there was a commotion outside their house,

admitting however that, when they were practically disturbed by the said commotion, Johan got a shotgun
and fired outside their house, without intention to kill or injure anybody, especially Jesus. An Information

was filed with the Court on January 12, 1989, which was later on modified. This modification was about the

date of the commission of the crime. The modification, however, happened after she was arraigned. The

RTC convicted her and Johan, who was out of the Philippine Legal System’s reach. She appealed the case

to the CA, which was denied and affirmed the RTC's decision, arguing, among others, that by virtue of the

amendment of the Information, she should have been arraigned again; and, since she was not, there was

a blatant violation of her right to be informed of the nature of her case, since an amended Information is a

new Information. Hence, all proceedings which the case had undergone were void

Issue: Does she have to be arraigned again?

Ruling:

No. She does not have to be arraigned again. Note that only the date was amended. Sec. 14, Rule 110 of

the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that, “[a] complaint or an Information may be amended,

in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the

plea and during trial, a formal amendment may only be done with leave of court and when it can be done

without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.” Accordingly, a change in time in the commission of

the crime, when the disparity is not so great, is only a formal amendment. In view of the foregoing, the

amendment was from “July” to “June” can only be regarded as formal amendment. Moreover, it does not

and could not prejudice the rights of the accused, because (1) it does not change the nature of the crime,

and (2) it does not render the defenses prepared for the former Information as it stood invalid. Having said all
these, a formal amendment does not require a subsequent arraignment as the purpose of which is to

INFORM THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION. Since the nature and cause of the accusation are

not changed by a formal amendment, a re-arraignment is not necessary, as she was already informed of

these things. Hence, there has been no violation of her rights as accused.

Hence, she does not have to be arraigned again.

RULE 120

46. PEOPLE vs. PAREJA

G.R. No. 202122 January 15, 2014

FACTS: AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of

lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates.

AAA’s parents separated when she was only eight years old. At the time of

the commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother

and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was

cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged

twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.

The first incident took place in December 2003 [the December 2003 incident].

AAA’s mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna.
Taking advantage of the situation, Pareja, while AAA was asleep, placed

himself on top of her. Then, Pareja, who was already naked, begun to undress

AAA. Pareja then started to suck the breasts of AAA. Not satisfied, Pareja

likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain

that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house.

Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the

[December 2003] incident for fear that Pareja might kill her. [Pareja]

threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to

anyone.

AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more

than once. According to AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident],

she had again been molested by Pareja. Under the same circumstances as

the December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her

half-siblings were asleep, Pareja again laid on top of her and started to suck

her breasts. But this time, Pareja caressed her and held her vagina and

inserted his finger in it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident],

it was AAA’s mother who saw Pareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her

daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother

immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident.

AAA then narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually

abused by Pareja x x x many times x x x.

On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one

Attempted Rape.

RTC: Acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him

of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and

February 2004 incidents, respectively.

CA: DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court seriously erred in convicting Pareja of the

crimes charged on the ground that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis

of his conviction as it was riddled with inconsistencies.

RULING: No. When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before

this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have overtime been established

in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, we enumerated them as follows:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the

testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly

observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point,
the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the

RTC’s assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound

by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and

circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded. And
third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. The recognized rule in this
jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage
point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court
has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter of AAA’s credibility. Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally
expected. As this Court stated in People v. Saludo: Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. For such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as
to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a
stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt
to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of
the traumatic and horrifying experience she had undergone. As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone
testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held: Furthermore, settled is the rule that the
testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy
and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule
requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case