Sample Arc Flash Study Report
Sample Arc Flash Study Report
Sample Arc Flash Study Report
PROJECT TITLE
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
DOCUMENT TITLE
ARC FLASH ANALYSIS REPORT
REVISION DETAILS
0A 0B OC OD
NAM SIG NAM SIG NAM SIG NAM SIG DAT
DATE DATE DATE
E N E N E N E N E
PRE
12-17-
PAR AT AT
2013
ED
REV
12-19-
IEW MS MS
2013
ED
APP
12-20-
RO MVS MVS
2013
VED
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CONFIDENTIAL DATA
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INDEX
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................................. 4
1.1 DELIVERABLES SUBMITTED ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 5
1.2.1EQUIPMENT EVALUATION RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 6
2. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 8
3. SCOPE OF WORK ........................................................................................................................................... 9
4. INTERNATIONAL CODES AND STANDARDS .......................................................................................... 10
5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 11
6. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN SHORT CIRCUIT AND ARC FLASH STUDY ................................ 12
7. PURPOSE OF STUDY ................................................................................................................................... 15
7.1 OBJECTIVE OF SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY ................................................................................................. 15
7.2 INPUT DATA FOR SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY............................................................................................. 15
7.3 BUS APPLICATION CHART ........................................................................................................................ 17
7.4 DEVICE APPLICATION CHART .................................................................................................................. 18
8. ARC FLASH STUDY ...................................................................................................................................... 19
9. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF ARC FLASH STUDY ................................................................................. 21
10. ASSUMPTIONS FOR ARC FLASH STUDY ............................................................................................... 23
11. INPUT DATA FOR ARC FLASH STUDY .................................................................................................... 25
12. ARC FLASH STUDY METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 26
13. OPERATING PHILOSOPHY......................................................................................................................... 27
14. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE) ........................................................................................ 28
15. PROTECTION CO-ORDINATION STUDY AND ANALYSIS ..................................................................... 29
16. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................................ 30
17. RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................................................................................. 32
18. ANNEXURES ................................................................................................................................................. 33
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ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The project for conducting Short Circuit and Arc Flash Hazard Analysis for Lane Cove
Plant Electrical Distribution System was awarded to L&T Integrated Engineering
Services. The scope of the work included Short Circuit Study and Arc Flash Analysis to
be carried out on ETAP software Ver. 12.0.
The Short Circuit Study was carried out to analyze and check if the existing switchgears
are able to withstand the obtained three phase bolted fault current. Arc Flash Study was
carried out to determine the arc flash boundaries and incident energy levels at each
protective device and load side (with existing settings and revised settings of PD).
Protective Device Co-ordination was carried out to reduce the incident energy levels
and Hazard Risk Categories at locations where the incident energy level was more than
Level-C (HRC-2) in the system. Arc Flash Warning Labels for each protective device
and load side bus was generated from ETAP software. The Arc Flash Warning Labels
includes the information regarding the arc flash boundaries, incident energy levels and
the type of Personal Protective Equipment to be worn by personnel.
The details of all the equipment (i.e. Fuses, circuit breakers, transformers, loads, etc)
was provided by Ingredion in the form of input datasheets. The format for the input data
sheets and details of the required inputs were exchanged and agreed upon between
L&T and Ingredion to have a better data collection and tracking. These inputs data
sheets were analyzed upon receipt and a query sheet was generated to solve on the
discrepancies observed.
Upon receiving the input data sheet from Ingredion, Single Line Diagram of the Lane
Cove Plant was modeled in ETAP as per the philosophy decided. Short Circuit Study
was then carried out followed by Arc Flash Analysis.
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To summarize the entire arc flash hazard study in brief, following are the major
observations:
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Marginal and over-duty devices were identified as a result of short circuit study. On
analyzing the report, it was found that 5 numbers of circuit breakers are unable to
withstand the short circuit fault current. These circuit breakers could be replaced with
higher breaking capacities so as to withstand the short circuit current. The
recommended breaking capacity for circuit breakers which were unable to withstand the
short circuit current is listed as under.
Arc Flash Study when carried out with the existing settings indicated energy levels
lower than level C at all the locations. However, to attain proper co-ordination along with
lower energy levels, it is recommended to change the rating of one HT fuse. The results
are listed out in terms of ease of implementation (i.e. short and long term approach).
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Existing Proposed
Device ID Energy Energy Implementation
Remarks
Stage
Level Level
Fuse rating needs to be changed from 55A to
HVCFS-2 - - Short Term
63A to achieve proper co-ordination
Arc Flash Hazard Risk Categories after recommended settings for 11kV and 0.4kV
voltage levels are as under:
a. 11kV Network:
The Hazard Risk Category at 11kV voltage level is not determined because there
is no protective device to isolate the arc fault.
Note: Maintenance of 11 KV ring mains is responsibility of Grid Personnel and
Ingredion does not carry out maintenance at these levels.
b. 0.415kV MCCs:
The incident energy levels at various MCCs have been restricted to incident
energy Level C as per NFPA 70E-2012 (ie Level 2 as per NFPA 70E- 2009) and
ESMS Standard S10_2013.
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2. INTRODUCTION
This document details the study parameters and results of the Arc Flash Study carried
out for Lane Cove plant in Australia. The study has been carried out on ETAP 12.0
software. In absence of data (if any), the same has been assumed as mentioned in the
design basis document.
Lane Cove Plant located in Australia is having 11kV Grid Supply from Grid. The power
from Grid is then stepped down to 0.415kV through number of distribution transformers
located in the plant. There are total 4 distribution transformers in the plant which are in
turn connected to different MCCs as per the SLD.
All the transformers are provided with a fuse of rating according to the full load current
of the transformer on the primary side. The secondary of each transformer is connected
to MCC through LT cable. Numbers of capacitor banks are connected on each MSB to
improve the power factor of the system at each location. The Motor control centers are
being protected either by fuses or MCCBs.
The arc flash study has been carried out considering that the entire plant load is being
fed by the 11kV Grid. Following is the list of substations/loads for which the arc flash
study has been carried out.
1. Grid Bus
2. MSB-1 Substation
3. MSB-2 Substation
4. MSB-3 Substation
5. MSB-4 Substation
Each substation has number of distribution feeders feeding load to various MCCs. The
arc flash study for all the MCCs of each substation has been considered in the report.
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3. SCOPE OF WORK
3.1. The scope of the work is to perform and analyse the short circuit study, arc flash study
and relay co-ordination study (Protective Device Study) of Lane Cove Plant located in
Australia through ETAP (Electrical Transient Analyser Program) software.
3.2. The equipment evaluation analysis needs to be carried out for the existing equipments
under normal operating conditions.
3.3. All the studies shall be carried out as per the inputs provided by Ingredion.
3.4. Short Circuit Study shall be carried out for the entire system so as to identify the fault
current at each bus and to identify overdutied equipment.
3.5. Arc Flash Study shall be carried out to determine the arc flash boundaries and incident
energy levels associated with each location of the electrical system.
3.6. Existing protective device co-ordination shall be cross checked to ensure proper
discrimination between releases.
3.7. Protective Device Co-ordination shall be carried out so as to reduce the incident energy
levels at each various locations.
3.8. Arc Flash Warning Labels shall be obtained from ETAP in PDF format for all
Switchgear, MCCs, individual motor feeders having rating >=100HP and all other
lumped loads.
3.9. Single line diagrams in Auto-cad 2005 format shall be provided for further working.
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Ingredion Guidelines:
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5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
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This is the maximum possible instantaneous value of the available short circuit
current.
This is the rms value of the short circuit current, which remains after the decay
of the transient phenomena.
• Arc Blast :
• Arc-Flash :
Current flow (arc) between two separated conducting surfaces. Arc flashes
have two components: heat radiation (quantified as Incident Energy Level)
and a pressure wave (aka “Arc Blast”).
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ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
• Arc-flash hazard:
Current flow during an arc flash incident. The amount of arcing current is a
function of the voltage, available bolted fault current, and the gap between the
conductors. Particularly at lower voltages the arcing current can be
significantly lower than the available bolted fault current.
Total time it takes to clear a fault from fault inception. This includes both
protective device operation and interrupting device current clearing time.
• Incident energy:
• Shock hazard
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• Working distance
The distance between the possible arc point and the head and body of the
worker positioned in place to perform the assigned task.
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7. PURPOSE OF STUDY
The purpose of various studies such as short circuit study, arc flash study, and relay co-
ordination study carried out for Lane Cove Plant is elaborated as below.
7.1.1. Short-circuit studies are done to determine the magnitude of currents flowing throughout
the power system at various time intervals after a fault occurs.
7.1.2. To ensure that circuit protective equipment can isolate faults quickly and minimize
system components damage, personal hazard and outage severity, it is required to carry
out short circuit analysis of the power system.
7.1.3. Short Circuit Studies are carried out to determine whether the electrical equipments are
rated properly for the maximum available short circuit current that the equipment may
see.
7.1.4. For different types of fault (i.e. three phase fault, line-to-line fault, line-to-ground fault
and line-to-line-to-ground fault), the fault currents shall differ and hence the adequacy of
the connected equipments to sustain the fault is checked.
7.1.5. Apart from symmetrical and asymmetrical fault currents, this study allows identification
of the fault X/R ratios and voltage profiles on the various buses under fault condition.
7.2.1. Various data are required to carry out short circuit studies in the ETAP software.
7.2.2. The section highlights the inputs required for feeder, utility and the contribution of
distribution transformers and motors in the modeled system.
7.2.3. The feeder input section in ETAP details the feeder size, type, length, quantity and its
insulation class.
7.2.4. Distribution transformer parameters like rated voltage, type, full load kVA, impedance
and tap setting details needs to entered in the software.
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7.2.5. Generation data section details the Utility contribution (three phase and line to earth)
and impedance value.
7.2.6. Motor load data enlists the number of motors, motor ratings, efficiency and power factor
for all the motors.
7.2.7. The details of the input data required to be entered into ETAP for carrying out short
circuit studies are as follows.
1. Bus Details
• Nominal kV
• %Voltage
• Type (such as MCC, switchgear, etc) and bracing ratings
2. Branch Details
• Branch Z, R, X, X/R values , tolerances, temperatures if applicable
• Cable and transmission line length unit
• Transformer rated kV and MVA
• Base kV and MVA of impedance branches
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7. Fuse Data
• Fuse rated kV
• Breaking (rms AC breaking capability)
7.3.1. This section covers the summary chart of three phase symmetrical or line-to-ground
RMS fault levels (whichever is greater) for each bus under the scope of software
simulation.
7.3.2. It also includes the bus bracing rating of the equipment used in the study.
7.3.3. The bus duty (%) is the ratio of available fault current (kA) and Bus bracing (kA) of the
equipment. It determines the certainty of the equipment being overdutied.
7.3.4. Once the short circuit study is done, equipment evaluation analysis is carried out.
7.3.5. Following are the conditions taken into consideration while evaluating all the equipments
of the system.
1. Equipment is considered not overdutied when:
(Calculated fault current/ Short circuit rating) ≤ 90%.
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7.4.1. Device Application Chart is a tabulation of all equipment ratings as compared to the
calculated fault current available at each equipment location. Breakers, switches and
fuses are included for evaluation.
7.4.2. Equipment evaluation is done by comparing device interrupting rating and available fault
current.
7.4.3. The devices will be considered and reported as overdutied if their interrupting rating,
withstand rating or momentary ratings exceed the fault levels as detailed below:
1. Moulded case circuit breakers are considered not overdutied when:
(Calculated fault current/ Short circuit rating) ≤ 75%
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8.1 ETAP Arc Flash is a fully integrated module that takes advantage of all the capabilities
already built into ETAP.
8.2 The program automatically determines the bolted short circuit current (3-phase and 1-
phase).
8.3 It also calculates the individual arcing current contributions and arc fault clearing time of
all the protective devices involved in the arc fault.
8.4 An arc flash is the flow of current through the air between phase conductors or between
phase conductors and neutral / ground.
8.5 An arc fault can release tremendous amount of energy at the point of arcing in a small
fraction of seconds. This will result in high temperature, pressure blast containing molten
metals.
8.6 Arc flash analysis defines the safety equipment that the maintenance personal will wear
and the safe distance to be maintained while working with energized switchgear.
8.7 NFPA has defined four various protection boundaries for classification of the arc flash
hazard analysis. They are as under:
• Flash Protection Boundary
• Limited Approach Boundary
• Restricted Approach Boundary
• Prohibited Approach Boundary
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8.8 Flash Protection Boundary - The Flash Protection Boundary is the distance at which
the incident energy level equals 1.2 cal/cm2.
8.9 Limited Approach Boundary - An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live
part within which a shock hazard exists. For a person to cross the Limited Approach
Boundary and enter the limited space, he or she must be qualified to perform the
job/task.
8.10 Restricted Approach Boundary – An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live
part within which there is an increased risk of shock, due to the electrical arc over
combined with inadvertent movement, for personnel working in close proximity to the
live part.
8.11 Prohibited Approach Boundary – An approach limit at a distance from an exposed live
part within which work is considered the same as making contact with the live part.
Crossing the Prohibited Approach Boundary and entering the prohibited space is
considered the same as making contact with exposed energized conductors or circuit
parts.
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9.1 The main objective of Arc Flash Study is to find out required personal protective
equipment (PPE) needed at each switchboard, panelboard, and control panel.
Compliance with NFPA70E, Plant’s PPE electrical safety policy shall determine the PPE
requirements.
9.2 The purpose of an arc-flash hazard study is to calculate the incident energy that could
be available if a short circuit occurred while working on or operating an exposed and
energized piece of equipment.
9.3 Arc Flash study is carried out on the electrical system with the objective of:
a. Establishing the maximum incident energy at each Switchgear / MCC / Panelboard
b. Establishing the Arc flash boundary limit based on the arc fault current and fault
clearing time
c. Specifying the rating of Hazard / Risk category for each Switchgear / MCC /
Panelboard
d. Reduce improper use of PPE to zero
e. Reduced improperly labelled or non-labelled hazardous locations to zero
9.4 The methodology for Arc Flash Study covers the following:-
a. Existing protective device setting shall be used in the protection devices for
carrying out Arc flash study.
b. Calculate fault current at each Switchgear / MCC / Panelboard busbar.
c. Estimate the minimum and maximum arcing fault current at each Switchgear /
MCC / Panelboard busbar.
d. Select the working distance and determine the incident energy for each
Switchgear / MCC / Panelboard busbar.
e. Calculate the acceptable Arc Flash Boundary.
f. Determine the required Hazard / risk level.
g. Create Arc Flash Warning Labels for Switchgear, MCCs, Individual motor feeders
having rating >=100HP and all other lumped loads
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10.1 The following assumptions are considered for carrying out arc flash study under:
a. The 11kV utility short circuit value of Lane Cove Plant is considered as 109.933
MVAsc as per the inputs received from Ingredion.
b. The breaking capacity of the APFC circuit breaker is considered to be the same as
the incoming breaker, which is 85kA.
c. Breaking capacity of the bus tie between MSB-1 and MSB-2 is considered to be the
same as the incoming breaker, which is, 85kA.
d. The breaking capacity of MSB-4 circuit breakers is considered as 25kA as per the
input datasheets.
e. The operating load of the plant is assumed as 60% of the connected load as per the
input datasheet.
f. Worker is stationary during entire arc flash incident (constant working distance) up to
2.0 seconds.
g. The maximum time that a worker will be exposed to the arc flash is 2.0 seconds. It is
assumed that the person will move away from the arcing fault location.
h. By default, ETAP arc flash model searched upto 5 branches away from the faulted
bus to find first protective device with an over-current trip curve.
i. The operating time of the LV breakers are considered as 20ms, 10ms for LV MCCB.
This operating time is exclusive of release trip time.
j. The MV fuses are considered to be operating instantaneously.
k. Any changes in protection settings or system configuration will change the calculated
values of the arc flash hazard study and PPE requirements.
l. The grounding system is determined automatically in ETAP from the single line
diagram connection.
m. Standard IEC 60909 for short circuit calculation.
n. Protective device duty is based on Total bus fault current.
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o. The main protective device has been considered as per IEEE 1584. (ie. the working
distance and bus air gaps are considered as per IEEE 1584). The incident energy
levels for both Main PD load side and line side has been considered while carrying
out Arc Flash Studies.
p. For obtaining the worst case category levels at the MCCs, it is considered that no
adequate isolation exists and the directly connected source PDs is ignored.
q. The working distances and switchgear conductor to conductor or conductor to earth
air gap is considered as per IEEE 1584.
r. Method used for arc flash hazard study is IEEE 1584. Arc current variation
considered as 15%.
s. Fault clearing time (FCT) is limited to 2 sec. maximum.
t. Hazard / Risk categories as per NFPA 70E 2012.
u. Small power boards (< 208 volts) which are very near to the PCC/MCC are excluded
from the arc flash study. As per NFPA, the incident energy level at each lighting
panel is considered.
v. For the study purpose, Incident energy having category level A, B and C are
considered to be acceptable as the PPE required to be worn are not bulky. The same
is consistent with Ingredion PPE policy which adopts NFPA 70E standard.
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11.1 For carrying out Arc Flash Analysis, certain inputs needs to be entered besides those
entered during short circuit study.
11.2 The required inputs for arc flash study are as follows:
a. Ibf - Three phase fault level
b. V - System Voltage
c. Open or boxed configuration – In this study, it will be boxed by selection of MCC and
switchgear
d. Type of Bus
e. Bus Bracing
f. Rated Amps of Bus
g. Gap Between Conductors/Busbars - The bus-gap for 480V LV MCC / Panel,
Switchgears and Switchboards are considered as 25 mm, 32 mm and 61mm
respectively as per IEEE 1584
h. Typical Gap and Boundary
i. Ungrounded/High Impedance/ Grounded system
j. T - The arcing time is based on the protection plus breaker operating time. It is
assumed that the protection operating time includes CT errors, relay/release errors
etc. The LV Air Circuit Breaker operating time is taken as 20ms and MCCB
operating time is taken as 10ms.
k. D: The distance from possible arc point to the person. It will be based on typical
value in IEEE 1584 for 480V MCC / Panel & 480V switchgear of 455mm and 610mm
respectively. The distance for 13.8kV switchgear is 910mm. This is approximately the
distance for racking the CBs.
l. X Factor - The distance factor taken as per IEEE 1584.
m. Limited Approach Boundary
n. Restricted Approach Boundary
o. Prohibited Approach Boundary
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ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
12.1.1 NFPA 70E, “Standards for Electrical safety in the Workplace”, adopts IEEE Standard 1584
calculation procedures and assigns hazard levels ranging from A through G to incident
energies up to and including 120 cal/cm2. It also lists typical PPE suit levels appropriate for
working near energized electrical equipment at each of defined hazard levels.
12.1.2 The arc flash study is carried out using the Arc Flash study module of ETAP. The study
involves following process:
12.1.2.1 Collecting the system data: All the inputs were received from Ingredion as per the scope of
document and design basis.
12.1.2.2 Determining the bolted fault current at each switchgear: This involves calculating the RMS
value of bolted fault current and X/R ratio at each switchgear. The short circuit study is
performed to determine the bolted fault current for various operating philosophies.
12.1.2.3 Determine the arc fault current: The arc fault current is normally less than the bolted fault
current. The software calculates the arc fault current from the bolted fault current.
12.1.2.4 Determine the duration of arc fault current: The duration of arc fault current is decided by
the fault clearing time. This is determined by the protective device coordination study.
12.1.2.5 Select the working distance: The arc flash study always considers the incident energy on
the face and body of a person at the working distance. It is not based on the incident energy
on hand or arm. The typical working distance is selected from the table-3 in IEEE 1584. The
typical working distance is the sum of the distance of the worker from the front of the panel
and the distance of the arc source to the front of the panel.
12.1.2.6 Determine the incident energy for each switchgear at the working distance.
12.1.2.7 Determine the flash protection boundary. This is the distance from the arc source within
which the incident energy can cause second degree burn. It is based on the incident energy of
1.2 cal/cm2.
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ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
13.1. Short Circuit and Arc Flash Study has been carried out on ETAP 12.0 software and the results
are shown in the attachments.
13.2. Following are the operating philosophies considered while carrying out the Short Circuit and Arc
Flash Studies.
(a) Under Normal operating Conditions, entire Plant Load is Being Catered by the 11kV
Grid.
(b) All the motor loads are OFF and hence no motor contribution is considered during Short
Circuit
(c) Entire Plant load is being catered by Grid with bus tie between MSB-1 and MSB-2 closed
13.3. The short circuit fault current obtained shall be maximum when the entire plant load is being
catered by Grid.
13.4. Hence, the Arc Flash Warning Labels are prepared based on the operating philosophy (a) ie.
Entire Plant Load Being Catered By Grid.
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14.1. Personal protective equipment (PPE) is required to limit workers exposure to incident energy
should an incident occur. Incident energy causes burns, which are the major hazard to
individuals from an arc flash.
14.2. NFPA 70E outlines two acceptable approaches for conducting a flash hazard analysis to
determine PPE category for various switchgear within the electrical distribution system:-
14.3. One approach employs general guidelines and tables found in NFPA 70E standard (article
130.7 table 130.7(C)(a), and table 130.7(C)(16)), that can be used to determine flash protection
boundaries (FPB) and PPE requirements without doing a comprehensive power system
analysis.
14.4. The simplified approach found in NFPA 70E are not applicable to power systems with fault
currents and/or fault clearing times outside limits stated in the NFPA.
14.5. Additionally, these simplified methods yield unacceptably conservative PPE requirements.
14.6. Another approach is to perform more comprehensive arc flash hazard calculations involving
detailed power system parameters.
14.7. This approach can accurately quantify arc flash hazards on a wide range of power systems. The
calculations as recommended by NFPA should be carried out using the IEEE standard 1584 -
2004a, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
14.8. As part of this arc flash study report, arc flash analysis to determine PPE and Flash Protection
Boundary have been carried out as per the 2nd approach discussed above using the IEEE
standard 1584 -2004a for Arc Flash Hazard Calculations.
14.9. Detailed arc flash analysis is carried out as part of this report using ETAP 12.0.
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15.1. The purpose of a coordination study is to ensure that devices are selected and set to
provide selectivity between protective devices (relay/release, fuse or circuit breaker),
provide maximum equipment protection and minimize arc-flash energy by reducing
interrupting time.
15.2. The methodology followed for protective device coordination is described below:
15.3. For protective device coordination purpose, out of the multiple outgoing feeders from a
specific switchgear/MCC, one with the maximum fuse rating is considered for checking
coordination with incomer protective device.
15.4. Once coordination for maximum rated Fuse with incomer protective device is achieved,
the co-ordination of the other smaller rated fuse feeder can be automatically achieved.
The co-ordination curves are plotted accordingly indicating maximum rated feeder only.
15.5. The settings of circuit breaker are selected such that the same operates prior to
operation of the upstream fuse providing necessary coordination at prospective fault
current values.
15.6. Coordination curves of various protective devices are plotted in ETAP software to check
the proper co-ordination amongst various protective devices. Settings of are fine-tuned
such that to optimize the coordination and to reduce the overlapping to the extent
possible.
15.7. Through a coordination or selectivity study, protective devices are selected and
adjusted such that the protective device closest to the fault operates first.
15.8. This in theory prevents a fault on a single motor from shutting down the power for the
entire plant.
15.9. Coordination studies should also strive to achieve the fastest interrupt time possible so
the available arc-flash energy is minimized.
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16. CONCLUSION
16.1. The Arc Flash Study was performed to determine the expected incident energy levels. Arc Flash
Protection Boundary and Arc Flash hazards/risk category (as defined by NFPA 70E) for the
electrical system of Lane Cove Plant.
16.2. Arc Flash Study when carried out for Substations, shows PPE (Personnel Protective equipment)
that should be worn at locations which can be exposed to arc flash hazard.
16.3. The report covers the arc flash incident energy levels using the existing settings.
Recommendations are provided to decrease the incident energy levels to acceptable values.
16.4. Following operating philosophies are considered for analyzing the arc flash results to obtain the
worst case scenario:
• Normal working condition – Plant power fed through 11 kV grid power.
• No Motor Contribution during arc flash.
• Entire plant load being fed by Grid with bus tie between MSB-1 and MSB-2 closed.
16.5. While carrying out the short circuit study with bus tie between MSB-1 and MSB-2 closed, it was
observed that the existing circuit breakers are adequate to withstand the fault current. Also, as a
worst case scenario, if 1MVA transformer is out, the entire load of MSB-1 and MSB-2 will be fed
by the 1.5MVA transformer. During this condition, the 1.5MVA transformer gets overloaded.
Hence, even if the circuit breakers are adequate to withstand the short circuit fault current, this
condition is not feasible.
16.6. The maximum short circuit fault current is achieved when the entire plant load is being catered by
Grid. Hence, the arc flash study has been carried out considering this philosophy.
16.7. The warning labels and relay co-ordination curves for recommended settings are provided in the
final report.
16.8. The calculation of arc flash which were based on IEEE 1584 (IEEE Guide for Performing Arc
Flash Hazard Calculations”) calculations using system study software ETAP concludes that the
maximum arc flash hazard / risk category can be assigned as follows to various switchgear:
a. 11kV Network: The Hazard Risk Category at 11kV voltage level is not determined
because there is no protective device to isolate the arc fault.
Note: Maintenance of 11 kV ring mains is responsibility of Australian Grid and
Ingredion does not carry out maintenance at these levels.
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
b. 0.415kV MCCs: The incident energy levels at various MCCs have been restricted to
incident energy Level C.
16.9. The arc flash energy levels obtained in the existing plant loading conditions is within acceptable
limit. However, to achieve proper co-ordination, it is recommended to change the rating of
HVCFS-2 fuse from 55A to 63A.
16.10. The co-ordination curves for all the MCCs where the settings have been modified are attached
in the report.
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
17. RECOMMENDATIONS
17.1. On carrying out the Short Circuit Study and Arc Flash Hazard Study with the existing settings,
following were observations noted and recommendations for the same are provided.
17.2. Breakers which are not able to withstand the short circuit current could be replaced with higher
breaking capacities so as to withstand the obtained fault current. The recommended breaking
capacities of these circuit breakers are provided in the “Annexure-3 - Equipment Evaluation
Recommendations”.
17.3. The ratings HT fuses for all the transformers are as per the full load current of the transformer
except HVCFS-2. To achieve proper co-ordination and lower HRC energy levels, it is required
to change the rating of the fuse. The recommended rating of fuse is provided in “Annexure-10
Fuse Selection Recommendations”.
17.4. It is recommended that the Switchgear/MCC shall be provided with warning labels for the arc
flash taking place on line side protective devices as Line side is the worst case scenario. Hence
PPE shall be based on the Line side category levels. Warning labels are provided in the
“Annexure-11 Warning Labels”.
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
18. ANNEXURES
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 1:
ETAP SLD
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Edit Mode)
C-SWB11KV
3-1/C 50
35 m
11 kV GRID BUS
SW-3 SW-4
SW-1 SW-2
TX-2 TX-4
TX-1 TX-3 1 MVA
1 MVA 0.75 MVA
1.5 MVA
11/0.433 kV 11/0.433 kV
11/0.433 kV 11/0.433 kV
4.9 %Z 4.85 %Z
6.5 %Z 6.2 %Z
C -MSB4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2 6-1/C 400
9-1/C 400 6-1/C 400 5 m
15 m 15 m
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
Open
WCM-2 BFM-16
110 kW 134 kW
PGM-9
132 kW
DB-33C/MS DB-33D/MS
50 kA 400 A
400 A 70 kA
Laboratory DB
41.2 kVA
DB-33D/CB1
200 A
70 kA
GLP8
75 kW
C -MSB4
CFS-45A
CFS-46E
200 A
200 A
DB41/CB1 DB41/CB2 DB41/CB3 DB41/CB4 DB41/CB5 CFS-43G F44 80 kA
80 kA
250 A 250 A 250 A 160 A 315 A
250 A 250 A CB-MCC4-pf
25 kA 25 kA 25 kA 25 kA 25 kA 80 kA 80 kA 500 A
65 kA
C-45A
C-46E
3-1/C 50
1-3/C 95
30 m
20 m
ANNEXURE 2:
Single Line Diagrams and Reports for Short
Circuit Study
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
Case-1:
Entire Plant Load Being Catered By Grid Under
Normal Operation
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB11KV
11 kV GRID BUS
5.74
.171
.432 .197
.129 6.7
kA
TX-2 TX-4
TX-1 TX-3 1 MVA
1 MVA 0.75 MVA
1.5 MVA
C -MSB4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
24.52
26.3 23.27
MDB-1 & MDB-2 MSB-3 MSB-4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
41.7 28.1
MSB-1 BUS 0.415 kV kA kA
26.3 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS
23.27
1.65 1.7 .935 .256 2.07 1.27 1.28 3.23 3.24 1.28 .461 1.24 .862 1.06
Open
MSB1-PF 1.26 .475 19.0 1.45 .328 20.3 1.5 1.78 36.2
kA kA kA
500 kvar STEEPS MCC WSM-10
AIR COMPRESSOR 35.3 kVA WSM-23 110 kW WASH CHANNELS MSB2-PF BOILER FEED DRYER MCC
480 kVA WSM-18 Dryer 2&3
129 kVA 110 kW 500 kvar 151 kVA
110 kW 173 kVA 124 kVA
BIO FILTER
295 kVA D.B-25C Starch Pack
64.7 kVA
WCM-2 BFM-16
110 kW 134 kW
PGM-9
132 kW
C-DB33D/CB1
GLP8
75 kW
C -MSB4
C-45A
C-46E
0.415 FU-BFM-16 Fuse 80.000 106.462 20.341 33.588 19.587 20.157 4.353
0.415 DB-33D/MS CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 14.638 24.753 13.909 13.921 0.593
0.415 DB-33D/CB1 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 14.638 24.753 13.909 13.921 0.593
11.000 HVCFS-1 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.664 13.681 6.525 7.656 4.012
11.000 HVCFS-2 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.664 13.681 6.525 7.656 4.012
11.000 HVCFS-3 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.664 13.681 6.525 7.656 4.012
11.000 HVCFS-4 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.664 13.681 6.525 7.656 4.012
0.415 WC MCC4/WCM-5 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 19.038 30.191 18.111 18.113 0.275
0.415 CFS-12B Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-12C Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-12D Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-12E Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-12F Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-13E Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-14A Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-15A Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 CFS-15B Fuse 80.000 106.462 41.731 87.049 39.155 47.595 27.305
0.415 C-MSB1-PF CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 41.731 87.049 38.076 40.117 12.633
0.415 ACB-1 CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 41.731 87.049 38.076 40.117 12.633
0.415 ACB-2 CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 28.146 55.838 26.858 27.442 5.631
0.415 C-MSB2 PF CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 28.146 55.838 26.858 27.442 5.631
0.415 CFS-22D Fuse 80.000 106.462 28.146 55.838 27.206 31.125 14.971
0.415 CFS-25C Fuse 80.000 106.462 28.146 55.838 27.206 31.125 14.971
0.415 CFS-25D Fuse 80.000 106.462 28.146 55.838 27.206 31.125 14.971
0.415 CFS-25E Fuse 80.000 106.462 28.146 55.838 27.206 31.125 14.971
0.415 CFS-25F Fuse 80.000 106.462 28.146 55.838 27.206 31.125 14.971
0.415 MCB-3 CB 187.000 50.000 51.913 19.682 39.319 18.585 19.046 4.164
0.415 C-MSB3-PF3 CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 19.682 39.319 18.585 19.046 4.164
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 2
12.5.0C
Location: Australia Date: 12-06-2013
Contract: SN: LARSONVAD2
Engineer: Ms. Amrita Tandon Revision: Base
Study Case: SC-DD-1
Filename: Lane_Cove Config.: Normal
0.415 CFS-33B Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.682 39.319 18.853 21.801 10.765
0.415 CFS-33C Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.682 39.319 18.853 21.801 10.765
0.415 CFS-33D Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.682 39.319 18.853 21.801 10.765
0.415 CFS-33F Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.682 39.319 18.853 21.801 10.765
0.415 DB41/CB1 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 30.223 60.337 * 28.516 * 29.213 * 6.345
0.415 DB41/CB2 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 30.223 60.337 * 28.516 * 29.213 * 6.345
0.415 DB41/CB3 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 30.223 60.337 * 28.516 * 29.213 * 6.345
0.415 DB41/CB4 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 30.223 60.337 * 28.516 * 29.213 * 6.345
0.415 DB41/CB5 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 30.223 60.337 * 28.516 * 29.213 * 6.345
0.415 CFS-43G Fuse 80.000 106.462 30.223 60.337 28.919 33.412 16.468
0.415 CFS-45A Fuse 80.000 106.462 30.223 60.337 28.919 33.412 16.468
0.415 CFS-46E Fuse 80.000 106.462 30.223 60.337 28.919 33.412 16.468
0.415 F44 Fuse 80.000 106.462 30.223 60.337 28.919 33.412 16.468
0.415 CB-MCC4-pf CB 143.000 32.500 33.743 30.223 60.337 28.516 29.213 6.345
0.415 MCB- 4 CB 187.000 50.000 51.913 30.223 60.337 28.516 29.213 6.345
PREGEL MCC BUS 0.415 PREGEL MCC BUS Bus 36.185 69.914 23.352
0.415 DB-15A/CB1 CB 150.000 70.000 75.191 36.185 69.914 33.426 33.984 6.133
3-Phase
Short-Circuit
Device Capacity
Current
Bus ID Device ID Icw (kA) Tkr (sec.) Ith (kA)
Case-2:
All Motor Loads are OFF and hence no Motor
contribution is considered during Short Circuit
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB11KV
11 kV GRID BUS
5.74 kA
5.7
kA
TX-2 TX-4
TX-1 TX-3 1 MVA
1 MVA 0.75 MVA
1.5 MVA
C -MSB4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
24.05 kA
25.92 kA 22.83 kA
MDB-1 & MDB-2 MSB-3 MSB-4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
25.9 22.8
MSB-1 BUS 0.415 kV kA kA
25.92 kA 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS
22.83 kA
Open
BIO FILTER
295 kVA D.B-25C Starch Pack
64.7 kVA
WCM-2 BFM-16
110 kW 134 kW
PGM-9
132 kW
C-DB33D/CB1
GLP8
75 kW
C -MSB4
C-45A
C-46E
ALL THE MOTORS ARE OFF & HENCE NO MOTOR CONTRIBUTION IS CONSIDERED DURING SHORT CIRCUIT.
0.415 DB-33D/MS CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 11.997 20.507 11.997 12.009 0.539
0.415 DB-33D/CB1 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 11.997 20.507 11.997 12.009 0.539
11.000 HVCFS-1 Fuse 40.000 53.231 5.740 11.900 5.740 6.754 3.559
11.000 HVCFS-2 Fuse 40.000 53.231 5.740 11.900 5.740 6.754 3.559
11.000 HVCFS-3 Fuse 40.000 53.231 5.740 11.900 5.740 6.754 3.559
11.000 HVCFS-4 Fuse 40.000 53.231 5.740 11.900 5.740 6.754 3.559
0.415 WC MCC4/WCM-5 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 14.487 23.514 14.487 14.490 0.287
0.415 CFS-12B Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-12C Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-12D Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-12E Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-12F Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-13E Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-14A Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-15A Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 CFS-15B Fuse 80.000 106.462 25.915 57.083 25.915 32.457 19.541
0.415 C-MSB1-PF CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 25.915 57.083 25.915 27.931 10.419
0.415 ACB-1 CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 25.915 57.083 25.915 27.931 10.419
0.415 ACB-2 CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 22.832 45.948 22.832 23.378 5.022
0.415 C-MSB2 PF CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 22.832 45.948 22.832 23.378 5.022
0.415 CFS-22D Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.832 45.948 22.832 26.143 12.734
0.415 CFS-25C Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.832 45.948 22.832 26.143 12.734
0.415 CFS-25D Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.832 45.948 22.832 26.143 12.734
0.415 CFS-25E Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.832 45.948 22.832 26.143 12.734
0.415 CFS-25F Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.832 45.948 22.832 26.143 12.734
0.415 MCB-3 CB 187.000 50.000 51.913 15.670 31.875 15.670 16.107 3.727
0.415 C-MSB3-PF3 CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 15.670 31.875 15.670 16.107 3.727
0.415 CFS-33A Fuse 80.000 106.462 15.670 31.875 15.670 18.114 9.088
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 2
12.5.0C
Location: Australia Date: 12-06-2013
Contract: SN: LARSONVAD2
Engineer: Ms. Amrita Tandon Revision: No Motor
Study Case: SC-DD-2
Filename: Lane_Cove Config.: Normal
ALL THE MOTORS ARE OFF & HENCE NO MOTOR CONTRIBUTION IS CONSIDERED DURING SHORT CIRCUIT.
0.415 CFS-33C Fuse 80.000 106.462 15.670 31.875 15.670 18.114 9.088
0.415 CFS-33D Fuse 80.000 106.462 15.670 31.875 15.670 18.114 9.088
0.415 CFS-33F Fuse 80.000 106.462 15.670 31.875 15.670 18.114 9.088
0.415 DB41/CB1 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 DB41/CB2 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 DB41/CB3 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 DB41/CB4 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 DB41/CB5 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 CFS-43G Fuse 80.000 106.462 24.047 48.776 24.047 27.727 13.803
0.415 CFS-45A Fuse 80.000 106.462 24.047 48.776 24.047 27.727 13.803
0.415 CFS-46E Fuse 80.000 106.462 24.047 48.776 24.047 27.727 13.803
0.415 F44 Fuse 80.000 106.462 24.047 48.776 24.047 27.727 13.803
0.415 CB-MCC4-pf CB 143.000 32.500 33.743 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
0.415 MCB- 4 CB 187.000 50.000 51.913 24.047 48.776 24.047 24.691 5.602
PREGEL MCC BUS 0.415 PREGEL MCC BUS Bus 23.352 47.971 23.352
0.415 DB-15A/CB1 CB 150.000 70.000 75.191 23.352 47.971 23.352 24.099 5.957
ALL THE MOTORS ARE OFF & HENCE NO MOTOR CONTRIBUTION IS CONSIDERED DURING SHORT CIRCUIT.
3-Phase
Short-Circuit
Device Capacity
Current
Bus ID Device ID Icw (kA) Tkr (sec.) Ith (kA)
Case-3:
Entire Plant Load Being Catered by Grid with
Bus-Tie between MSB-1 and MSB-2 CLOSED
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB
11 kV GRID BUS
5.74 kA
.32 kA .274 kA .126 kA .234 kA 6 .7
kA
C-TX1 C-TX4
C-TX3
C-TX2
TX-1 TX-2
TX-3 TX-4
1.5 MVA 1 MVA
0.75 MVA 1 MVA
C-MDB1 C-MDB2
C-MDB4
25.39 kA
22.79 kA 19.56 kA
MDB-1 & MDB-2 MDB-3 MDB-4
C-MDB1
C-MDB2
61.1
MSB1-BUS 0.415 kV kA 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS
22.79 kA 19.56 kA
1.64 kA 1.81 kA .93 kA .256 kA 2.07 kA 1.27 kA 1.28 kA 3.24 kA 1.69 kA 24.42 kA 36.73 kA 1.28 kA .462 kA 1.24 kA .865 kA 1.06 kA 61.1
kA
25.8
kA
BIO FILTER MCC 0.415 kA
23.76 kV
WSM-18
2.17 kA 110 kW DB25-c Starch Pack DRYER2&3 BOILER FEED DRYER MCC
MCC-4 CHILLER MCC PARCEL MCC 64.7 kVA
64.7 kVA WASH CHANNEL
C-WCM5 44.7 kVA C-PGM9 242 kVA 173 kVA 124 kVA 151 kVA
480 kVA
BIO FILTER
295 kVA
19.6
kA
0.415 kV MSB-3 BUS
15.91 kA
.91 kA .274 kA .273 kA 1.03 kA 1.23 kA
0.415 kV
LAB DB 11.3 kA
.275 kA
11.6
kA
LAB DB LOAD
37.5 kVA
GLP8
75 kW
C-MDB4
32.4
kA
0.415 kV MDB-4 BUS
25.39 kA
.491 kA .644 kA 1.02 kA .584 kA .584 kA .434 kA 1.48 kA .895 kA .898 kA
APFC-4
500 kvar
ISD-P5 ISD-M1
WARE HOUSE MCC
CHEMICAL STORAGE 75 kW 75 kW
MCC-3A & 3B MCC-4A & 4B MCC-5 MCC-6 201 kVA
MCC-2A & 2B 62.9 kVA
88.2 kVA 141 kVA 80 kVA 80 kVA
67.1 kVA
ENTIRE PLANT LOAD BEING CATERED BY GRID WITH BUS TIE BETWEEN MSB-1 AND MSB-2 CLOSED.
0.415 DB12F/MS CB 73.500 35.000 36.339 25.774 39.775 24.993 24.994 0.182
0.415 FU-BFM16 Fuse 80.000 106.462 22.911 36.870 22.214 22.706 4.010
0.415 DB-33D/CB1 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 14.610 24.698 13.920 13.933 0.597
0.415 DB-33D/MS CB 110.000 50.000 51.913 14.610 24.698 13.920 13.933 0.597
GRID BUS 11.000 GRID BUS Open Air 6.665 16.302 5.742
11.000 HVCFS-1 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.665 16.302 6.528 9.408 6.884
11.000 HVCFS-2 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.665 16.302 6.528 9.408 6.884
11.000 HVCFS-3 Fuse 80.000 106.462 6.665 16.302 6.528 9.408 6.884
11.000 HVCFS-4 Fuse 40.000 53.231 6.665 16.302 6.528 9.408 6.884
0.415 DB-33C/MS CB 110.000 50.000 51.913 11.557 17.913 11.246 11.246 0.082
0.415 WC MCC4/MCC5 CB 154.000 70.000 75.191 20.980 32.562 20.242 20.243 0.183
0.415 ACB-4 CB 187.000 85.000 91.304 32.364 65.731 30.372 31.367 7.838
0.415 DB-41/CB1 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 32.364 65.731 * 30.372 * 31.367 * 7.838
0.415 DB-41/CB2 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 32.364 65.731 * 30.372 * 31.367 * 7.838
0.415 DB-41/CB3 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 32.364 65.731 * 30.372 * 31.367 * 7.838
0.415 DB-41/CB4 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 32.364 65.731 * 30.372 * 31.367 * 7.838
0.415 DB-41/CB5 CB 55.000 25.000 25.956 32.364 65.731 * 30.372 * 31.367 * 7.838
0.415 CFS-43G Fuse 80.000 106.462 32.364 65.731 30.869 36.241 18.941
0.415 F44 Fuse 80.000 106.462 32.364 65.731 30.869 36.241 18.941
0.415 CFS-45A1 Fuse 80.000 106.462 32.364 65.731 30.869 36.241 18.941
0.415 CFS-46E Fuse 80.000 106.462 32.364 65.731 30.869 36.241 18.941
0.415 CB-MDB4-pf CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 32.364 65.731 30.372 31.367 7.838
0.415 ACB-1 CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 61.131 129.716 56.341 60.124 20.988
0.415 CB-MSB-PF CB 176.000 80.000 90.936 61.131 129.716 56.995 64.362 29.900
0.415 CFS-12B Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS-12C Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS-12D Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS-12E Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 2
12.0.0C
Location: Thailand Date: 12-16-2013
Contract: SN: LARSON-VAD
Engineer: AMT/DHM Revision: Base
Study Case: SC-DD-3
Filename: Lane Cove Config.: B/C ON
ENTIRE PLANT LOAD BEING CATERED BY GRID WITH BUS TIE BETWEEN MSB-1 AND MSB-2 CLOSED.
0.415 CFS-13E Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS-14A Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS-15A Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 CFS15B Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.665 42.597
0.415 BUS TIE CB 200.000 85.000 86.079 61.131 129.716 54.574 55.344 9.195
0.415 BUS TIE CB 200.000 85.000 86.079 61.131 129.716 54.574 55.344 9.195
0.415 ACB-2 CB 200.000 85.000 91.304 61.131 129.716 56.341 60.124 20.988
0.415 C-MSB2PF CB 220.000 65.000 69.821 61.131 129.716 56.341 60.124 20.988
0.415 CFS-22D Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.949 42.597
0.415 CFS-25C Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.949 42.597
0.415 CFS-25D Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.949 42.597
0.415 CFS-25E Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.949 42.597
0.415 CFS-25F Fuse 80.000 106.462 61.131 129.716 57.659 71.949 42.597
0.415 CFS-33F Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.590 39.685 18.792 21.977 11.329
0.415 CFS-33D Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.590 39.685 18.792 21.977 11.329
0.415 CFS-33C Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.590 39.685 18.792 21.977 11.329
0.415 CFS-33B Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.590 39.685 18.792 21.977 11.329
0.415 CFS-33A Fuse 80.000 106.462 19.590 39.685 18.792 21.977 11.329
0.415 C-MSB3-PF3 CB 143.000 65.000 69.821 19.590 39.685 18.532 19.103 4.633
0.415 MCB-3 CB 187.000 85.000 91.304 19.590 39.685 18.532 19.103 4.633
PARCEL MCC BUS 0.415 PARCEL MCC BUS MCC 49.004 92.879 35.129
0.415 DB-15A/CB1 CB 155.000 70.000 75.191 49.004 92.879 45.956 46.511 7.167
ENTIRE PLANT LOAD BEING CATERED BY GRID WITH BUS TIE BETWEEN MSB-1 AND MSB-2 CLOSED.
3-Phase
Short-Circuit
Device Capacity
Current
Bus ID Device ID Icw (kA) Tkr (sec.) Ith (kA)
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
Case-1:
Entire Plant Load Being Catered By Grid Under
Normal Operation
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB11KV
g
11 kV GRID BUS 0 de
5.74 kA -75.3 deg 0 kV 6.58
kA -
0.393 kA -71.9 deg 0.155 kA -68.6 deg 0.117 kA -68.6 deg 0.179 kA -69.1 deg 74.6
deg
TX-2 TX-4
TX-1 TX-3 1 MVA
1 MVA 0.75 MVA
1.5 MVA
C -MSB4
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
C-MSB1 C-MSB2
24.5
g 7 kA
MSB-1 BUS 0.415 kV 36.4 0 de -72.
23.06 kA -78.8 deg 1 kA 0 kV 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS 5 de
-74. 20.36 kA -73.5 deg g
8 de
1.43 kA -67.9 deg 1.47 kA -72.3 deg 0.808 kA -66.3 deg 0.221 kA -66.2 deg 1.79 kA -65.2 deg 1.1 kA -72.8 deg 1.1 kA -73.1 deg 2.79 kA -69 deg 2.81 kA -63.7 deg g g
1.1 kA -72.8 deg 0.399 kA -65.2 deg 1.07 kA -66.5 deg 0.745 kA -66.1 deg 0.919 kA -65.5 deg 0 de
0 kV
Open
BIO FILTER
295 kVA D.B-25C Starch Pack
64.7 kVA
WCM-2 BFM-16
110 kW 134 kW
PGM-9
132 kW
GLP8
75 kW
C -MSB4
g
MSB-4 BUS 0.415 kV 0 de
21.45 kA -73.9 deg 0 kV
0.39 kA -67.1 deg 0.512 kA -67 deg 0.815 kA -66.8 deg 0.463 kA -66.7 deg 0.463 kA -66.7 deg 0.295 kA -63.4 deg 0.586 kA -67.2 deg 0.711 kA -71.3 deg 0.718 kA -72.3 deg 26.3
8 kA
-72.
8 de
g
C-45A
C-46E
ENTIRE PLANT LOAD BEING CATERED BY GRID. MINIMUM FAULT CURRENT IS CALCULATED IN THIS CONDITION.
CHILLER MCC BUS 0.415 18.017 30.112 13.481 13.651 22.815 13.651 13.651 15.435 25.797 15.435 15.435 16.806 28.088 16.806 16.806
DB-33D BUS 0.415 12.852 21.953 10.548 11.136 19.022 11.136 11.136 11.063 18.897 11.063 11.063 12.194 20.828 12.194 12.194
GRID BUS 11.000 6.579 13.520 5.738 6.246 12.836 6.246 6.246 5.680 11.673 5.680 5.680 6.433 13.221 6.433 6.433
MCC-4 BUS 0.415 16.959 27.190 12.885 12.926 20.724 12.926 12.926 14.541 23.313 14.541 14.541 15.836 25.390 15.836 15.836
MSB-1 BUS 0.415 36.410 76.219 22.771 31.528 65.999 31.528 31.528 31.086 65.074 31.086 31.086 34.996 73.260 34.996 34.996
MSB-2 BUS 0.415 24.569 48.847 20.028 23.293 46.309 23.293 23.293 21.183 42.114 21.183 21.183 24.124 47.963 24.124 24.124
MSB3 BUS 0.415 17.112 34.198 13.672 16.399 32.772 16.399 16.399 14.757 29.491 14.757 14.757 16.863 33.700 16.863 16.863
MSB-4 BUS 0.415 26.382 52.714 21.102 25.508 50.968 25.508 25.508 22.723 45.404 22.723 22.723 26.087 52.125 26.087 26.087
PREGEL MCC BUS 0.415 31.619 61.647 20.523 26.100 50.886 26.100 26.100 27.033 52.704 27.033 27.033 29.887 58.268 29.887 29.887
All fault currents are in rms kA. Current ip is calculated using Method C.
* LLG fault current is the larger of the two faulted line currents.
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 2
12.5.0C
Location: Australia Date: 12-06-2013
Contract: SN: LARSONVAD2
Engineer: Ms. Amrita Tandon Revision: Base
Study Case: SC-RC-1
Filename: Lane_Cove Config.: Normal
ENTIRE PLANT LOAD BEING CATERED BY GRID. MINIMUM FAULT CURRENT IS CALCULATED IN THIS CONDITION.
Bus Positive Seq. Imp. (ohm) Negative Seq. Imp. (ohm) Zero Seq. Imp. (ohm) Fault Zf (ohm)
ID kV Resistance Reactance Impedance Resistance Reactance Impedance Resistance Reactance Impedance Resistance Reactance Impedance
CHILLER MCC BUS 0.415 0.00684 0.01062 0.01263 0.00693 0.01089 0.01291 0.01132 0.02176 0.02453 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
DB-33D BUS 0.415 0.00869 0.01543 0.01771 0.00878 0.01563 0.01793 0.01292 0.02220 0.02568 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
GRID BUS 11.000 0.25565 0.93085 0.96532 0.25591 0.93682 0.97115 0.28791 1.07585 1.11371 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
MCC-4 BUS 0.415 0.00817 0.01065 0.01342 0.00826 0.01092 0.01369 0.01375 0.02179 0.02577 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
MSB-1 BUS 0.415 0.00163 0.00603 0.00625 0.00163 0.00622 0.00643 0.00163 0.00884 0.00899 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
MSB-2 BUS 0.415 0.00278 0.00884 0.00926 0.00279 0.00892 0.00935 0.00296 0.01029 0.01071 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
MSB3 BUS 0.415 0.00393 0.01271 0.01330 0.00393 0.01283 0.01342 0.00410 0.01435 0.01493 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
MSB-4 BUS 0.415 0.00255 0.00824 0.00863 0.00255 0.00834 0.00872 0.00260 0.00906 0.00942 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
PREGEL MCC BUS 0.415 0.00239 0.00679 0.00720 0.00239 0.00699 0.00739 0.00306 0.01118 0.01159 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 3:
Equipment Evaluation Recommendations
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
INGREDION - ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS
NOTE:
1 Ib sym is the rated breaking capacity of the fuse or the circuit breaker. The same is taken from the input data sheets provided by the client.
2 Ik'' is the short circuit current obtained from ETAP when a 3-phase bolted fault occurs.
3 "Red" colour indicates that the existing fuse or circuit breaker is not capable of withstanding the 3-phase fault current. Hence, higher rating of circuit breaker needs to be provided.
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 4:
Existing Arc Flash Single Line Diagrams
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB
11 kV GRID BUS
5.61 kA FCT Not Determined
.395 kA .167 kA .123 kA .229 kA Ia "
= 6.5
kA
C-TX1 C-TX4
C-TX3
C-TX2
TX-1 TX-2
TX-3 TX-4
1.5 MVA 1 MVA
0.75 MVA 1 MVA
C-MDB1 C-MDB2
C-MDB4
11.41 kA
11.32 kA 10.78 kA
MDB-1 & MDB-2 MDB-3 MDB-4
C-MDB1
C-MDB2
Level A
AFB = 0.61 m Level A
IE = 1.19 cal/cm² @60.96 cm AFB = 0.48 m
MSB1-BUS 0.415 kV FCT = 0.031 sec 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS IE = 0.84 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
11.32 kA 10.78 kA FCT = 0.030 sec
.707 kA .779 kA .4 kA .11 kA .888 kA .547 kA .55 kA 1.39 kA .725 kA Ia" .59 kA .214 kA .572 kA .4 kA .492 kA Ia"
= 17 = 13
.33 .03
kA kA
Open
85%
Ia"
BIO FILTER MCC 0.415kAkV = 9.
8.74 66kA WSM-18
Level A
.948 kA AFB = 0.40 m 110 kW DB25-c Starch Pack DRYER2&3 BOILER FEED DRYER MCC
IE = 0.97 cal/cm² @45.72 cm
MCC-4 CHILLER MCC FCT = 0.030 sec PARCEL MCC 64.7 kVA
64.7 kVA WASH CHANNEL
C-WCM5 44.7 kVA C-PGM9 242 kVA 173 kVA 124 kVA 151 kVA
480 kVA
BIO FILTER
295 kVA
Ia"
= 9.
0.415 kV MSB-3 BUS 75 k
7.92 kA A
Level A
.453 kA .136 kA .136 kA .511 kA .612 kA AFB = 0.39 m
IE = 0.62 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
FCT = 0.030 sec
LAB DB LOAD
37.5 kVA
GLP8
75 kW
C-MDB4
Ia"
= 14
MDB-4 BUS . 55
0.415 kV 11.41 kA kA
Level A
.221 kA .29 kA .46 kA .262 kA .262 kA .195 kA .663 kA .402 kA .404 kA AFB = 0.48 m
IE = 0.84 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
FCT = 0.027 sec
APFC-4
500 kvar
ISD-P5 ISD-M1
WARE HOUSE MCC
CHEMICAL STORAGE 75 kW 75 kW
MCC-3A & 3B MCC-4A & 4B MCC-5 MCC-6 201 kVA
MCC-2A & 2B 62.9 kVA
88.2 kVA 141 kVA 80 kVA 80 kVA
67.1 kVA
ANNEXURE 5:
Existing Arc Flash Summary Reports
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 1
12.0.0C
Location: Thailand Date: 12-21-2013
Contract: SN: LARSON-VAD
Engineer: AMT/DHM Revision: Base
Study Case: AF-1-E
Filename: Lane Cove Config.: Normal
Faulted Bus Fault Current Trip Device Arc Flash Incident Working
Gap Bolted Fault (kA) PD Arc Trip Open FCT Boundary Energy Distance Energy
ID Nom. kV Equip. Type (mm) Bus PD Fault (kA) Source Trip Device ID (cycle) (cycle) (cycle) (m) (cal/cm²) (cm) Level
BIO FILTER MCC 0.415 MCC 25 22.074 19.988 8.744 CFS-12F 1.52 0.00 1.52 0.4 1.0 46 Level A
CHILER MCC 0.415 MCC 25 19.815 18.010 8.035 CFS-12C 4.02 0.00 4.02 0.7 2.3 46 Level B
DB-33D BUS 0.415 MCC 25 14.608 13.585 6.407 CFS-33D 4.18 0.00 4.18 0.6 1.9 46 Level A
LAB DB 0.415 MCC 25 11.556 11.295 5.559 CFS-33C 7.68 0.00 7.68 0.8 2.8 46 Level B
MCC-4 BUS 0.415 MCC 25 18.476 16.832 7.606 CFS-12B 2.71 0.00 2.71 0.5 1.5 46 Level A
MDB-4 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 32.354 25.378 11.410 ACB-4 1.33 0.00 1.33 0.5 0.8 61 Level A
MSB1-BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 40.296 26.316 11.315 ACB-1 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.6 1.2 61 Level A
MSB-2 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 28.182 23.314 10.780 ACB-2 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.5 0.8 61 Level A
MSB-3 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 19.586 15.902 7.918 MCB-3 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.4 0.6 61 Level A
PARCEL MCC BUS 0.415 MCC 25 35.053 22.544 9.066 ACB-1 2.08 0.00 2.08 0.6 2.0 46 Level B
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 6:
Existing Relay Co-ordination Curves
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Amps X 10 GRID BUS (Nom. kV=11, Plot Ref. kV=11)
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
1K 1K
100 100
SW-2
50 50 HVCFS-2
30 30
C-25F - P
1 - 1/C 95 mm² C-TX2
Copper XLPE 3-1/C 95
10
CFS-25F Tc = 90C 10
GEC Plotted - 1 x 1/C 95 mm²
CMF
C-TX2 - P MSB-2 BUS
5
Other 0.6 kV 5
1 - 1/C 95 mm²
Seconds
Seconds
400A
Copper XLPE
3 Tc = 90C 3
Plotted - 1 x 1/C 95 mm² CFS-25F
TX-2
1 1
1 MVA C-25F
TX-2 3-1/C 95
.5 .5
.3 C-MDB2 - P .3
LRC
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
Amps X 10 GRID BUS (Nom. kV=11, Plot Ref. kV=11) ETAP Star 12.0.0C
TX-2-E
ANNEXURE 7:
Recommended Relay Co-ordination Curves
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Amps X 10 GRID BUS (Nom. kV=11, Plot Ref. kV=11)
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
1K 1K
100 100
SW-2
50 C-25F - P 50 HVCFS-2
1 - 1/C 95 mm²
30 Copper XLPE 30
Tc = 90C
Plotted - 1 x 1/C 95 mm² C-TX2
3-1/C 95
CFS-25F
10 10
GEC
CMF
Other 0.6 kV C-TX2 - P MSB-2 BUS
5 5
400A 1 - 1/C 95 mm²
Seconds
Seconds
Copper XLPE
3 Tc = 90C 3
Plotted - 1 x 1/C 95 mm² CFS-25F
TX-2
1 1
1 MVA C-25F
TX-2 3-1/C 95
.5 .5
.3 C-MDB2 - P .3
LRC
.01 .01
.5 1 3 5 10 30 50 100 300 500 1K 3K 5K 10K
Amps X 10 GRID BUS (Nom. kV=11, Plot Ref. kV=11) ETAP Star 12.0.0C
TX-2-R
ANNEXURE 8:
Revised Single Line Diagrams and Reports for
Arc Flash Study
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
One-Line Diagram - OLV1 (Short-Circuit Analysis)
GRID
109.933 MVAsc
C-SWB
11 kV GRID BUS
5.61 kA
FCT Not Determined
.395 kA .167 kA .123 kA .229 kA I a"
= 6.
5 kA
C-TX1 C-TX4
C-TX3
C-TX2
TX-1 TX-2
TX-3 TX-4
1.5 MVA 1 MVA
0.75 MVA 1 MVA
C-MDB1 C-MDB2
C-MDB4
11.41 kA
11.32 kA 10.78 kA
MDB-1 & MDB-2 MDB-3 MDB-4
C-MDB1
C-MDB2
Level A
AFB = 0.61 m Level A
IE = 1.19 cal/cm² @60.96 cm AFB = 0.48 m
MSB1-BUS 0.415 kV FCT = 0.031 sec 0.415 kV MSB-2 BUS IE = 0.84 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
11.32 kA 10.78 kA FCT = 0.030 sec
Ia"
.707 kA .779 kA .4 kA .11 kA .888 kA .547 kA .55 kA 1.39 kA .725 kA = 17 .59 kA .214 kA .572 kA .4 kA .492 kA Ia"
.33 = 13
kA .03
kA
Open
85%
Ia"
BIO FILTER MCC 0.415kAkV = 9.
8.74 66
kA WSM-18
Level A
.948 kA AFB = 0.40 m 110 kW DB25-c Starch Pack DRYER2&3 BOILER FEED DRYER MCC
MCC-4 IE = 0.97 cal/cm² @45.72 cm
CHILLER MCC FCT = 0.030 sec PARCEL MCC WASH CHANNEL 64.7 kVA
C-WCM5 64.7 kVA 44.7 kVA C-PGM9 173 kVA 124 kVA 151 kVA
242 kVA 480 kVA
BIO FILTER
295 kVA
Ia"
= 9.
0.415 kV MSB-3 BUS 75 k
7.92 kA A
Level A
.453 kA .136 kA .136 kA .511 kA .612 kA AFB = 0.39 m
IE = 0.62 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
FCT = 0.030 sec
LAB DB LOAD
37.5 kVA
GLP8
75 kW
C-MDB4
Ia"
= 14
MDB-4 BUS .5 5 kA
0.415 kV 11.41 kA
Level A
.221 kA .29 kA .46 kA .262 kA .262 kA .195 kA .663 kA .402 kA .404 kA AFB = 0.48 m
IE = 0.84 cal/cm² @60.96 cm
FCT = 0.027 sec
APFC-4
500 kvar
ISD-P5 ISD-M1
WARE HOUSE MCC
CHEMICAL STORAGE 75 kW 75 kW
MCC-3A & 3B MCC-4A & 4B MCC-5 MCC-6 201 kVA
MCC-2A & 2B 62.9 kVA
88.2 kVA 141 kVA 80 kVA 80 kVA
67.1 kVA
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Project: Lane Cove
ETAP Page: 1
12.0.0C
Location: Thailand Date: 12-21-2013
Contract: SN: LARSON-VAD
Engineer: AMT/DHM Revision: Base
Study Case: AF-1
Filename: Lane Cove Config.: Normal
Faulted Bus Fault Current Trip Device Arc Flash Incident Working
Gap Bolted Fault (kA) PD Arc Trip Open FCT Boundary Energy Distance Energy
ID Nom. kV Equip. Type (mm) Bus PD Fault (kA) Source Trip Device ID (cycle) (cycle) (cycle) (m) (cal/cm²) (cm) Level
BIO FILTER MCC 0.415 MCC 25 22.074 19.988 8.744 CFS-12F 1.52 0.00 1.52 0.4 1.0 46 Level A
CHILER MCC 0.415 MCC 25 19.815 18.010 8.035 CFS-12C 4.02 0.00 4.02 0.7 2.3 46 Level B
DB-33D BUS 0.415 MCC 25 14.608 13.585 6.407 CFS-33D 4.18 0.00 4.18 0.6 1.9 46 Level A
LAB DB 0.415 MCC 25 11.556 11.295 5.559 CFS-33C 7.68 0.00 7.68 0.8 2.8 46 Level B
MCC-4 BUS 0.415 MCC 25 18.476 16.832 7.606 CFS-12B 2.71 0.00 2.71 0.5 1.5 46 Level A
MDB-4 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 32.354 25.378 11.410 ACB-4 1.33 0.00 1.33 0.5 0.8 61 Level A
MSB1-BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 40.296 26.316 11.315 ACB-1 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.6 1.2 61 Level A
MSB-2 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 28.182 23.314 10.780 ACB-2 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.5 0.8 61 Level A
MSB-3 BUS 0.415 Switchgear 32 19.586 15.902 7.918 MCB-3 1.50 0.00 1.50 0.4 0.6 61 Level A
PARCEL MCC BUS 0.415 MCC 25 35.053 22.544 9.066 ACB-1 2.08 0.00 2.08 0.6 2.0 46 Level B
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 9:
Arc Flash Energy Level Recommendations with
Revised Settings
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 10:
Fuse Selection Recommendation
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
INGREDION - ARC FLASH HAZARD
ANALYSIS
PROJECT NO: P003635
FUSE SELECTION DATE: 12-20-2013
DOCUMENT NO: ING-P003635-E-RPT-002-0A RECOMMENDATIONS REVISION: 0A
Fuse Connected
Exsiting
Motor FLC of Recommended
Sr. To MVA Rating of Ratings of
Fuse ID Nom KV Rating Transformer Ratings of Fuse Remarks
No. (Transformer/M Transformer Fuse
(HP) (Amp)
otor/Load) Current
Current (Amp)
(Amp)
To achieve proper co-ordination, rating of
1 HVCFS-2 11.0 TX-2 - 1 52.48 55 63 Fuse needs to be changed from 55A to
63A.
ARC FLASH HAZARDS AND ANALYSIS
ANNEXURE 11:
Warning Labels
CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Present
12-21-2013
Appropriate PPE Required
Arc Flash Boundary 0.40 m Level A
Incident Energy (cal/cm²) 1.0 Non-melting or untreated
Working Distance 45.7 cm
natural fiber long-sleeve shirt
Shock Hazard Voltage 415 VAC and long pants
Shock Hazard when covers removed
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device CFS-12F
Equipment BIO FILTER MCC
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device CFS-12C
Equipment CHILER MCC
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device CFS-33D
Equipment DB-33D BUS
Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Present
12-21-2013
Appropriate PPE Required
Cannot be Determined
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device
Equipment GRID BUS
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device CFS-33C
Equipment LAB DB
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device CFS-12B
Equipment MCC-4 BUS
Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Present
12-21-2013
Appropriate PPE Required
Arc Flash Boundary 0.48 m Level A
Incident Energy (cal/cm²) 0.8 Non-melting or untreated
Working Distance 61.0 cm
natural fiber long-sleeve shirt
Shock Hazard Voltage 415 VAC and long pants
Shock Hazard when covers removed
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device ACB-4
Equipment MDB-4 BUS
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device ACB-1
Equipment MSB1-BUS
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device ACB-2
Equipment MSB-2 BUS
Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Present
12-21-2013
Appropriate PPE Required
Arc Flash Boundary 0.39 m Level A
Incident Energy (cal/cm²) 0.6 Non-melting or untreated
Working Distance 61.0 cm
natural fiber long-sleeve shirt
Shock Hazard Voltage 415 VAC and long pants
Shock Hazard when covers removed
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device MCB-3
Equipment MSB-3 BUS
Equipment Name
Source Protective Device ACB-1
Equipment PARCEL MCC BUS