1. PESIGAN VS. ANGELES 2. PEOPLE VS.

VERIDIANO

FACTS: Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of FACTS: Private respondent Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged w/ violation
April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Camarines Sur with of BP 22. Before he could be arraigned, Go Bio, Jr. filed a Motion to
Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates: Quash the information on the ground that the info, did not charge an
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian, 2) permit to offense, pointing out that at the time of the alleged commission of the
transfer or transport from the provincial commander; and 3) three offense, w/c was about the second week of May 1979 (date of issue of
certificates of inspections. In spite of the papers, the carabaos were the check), BP 22 has not yet taken effect. The prosecution opposed the
confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town‗s police station motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of the
commander while passing through Camarines Norte. Confiscation was check, September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense.
based on Executive Order No. 626-A which prohibits transportation of Resolving the motion, the court granted the same and held that BP 22
carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. cannot be given a retroactive effect to apply to the case. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner submitting for review the
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A, providing for the respondent Judge's dismissal of the criminal case.
confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported
from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable HELD: When private resp. Go Bio, Jr. committed the act complained of in
before publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982. May 1979 (at the time he issued the check-- the law penalizes the act of
making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check and not only the
RULING: No. The said order isn‗t enforceable against the Pesigans on fact of its dishonor), there was no law penalizing such act. Following the
April 2, 1982 because it‗s a penal regulation published more than 2 special provision of BP 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979.
months later in the Official Gazette. It became effective only fifteen days The copy editor of the OG made a certification that the penal statute in
thereafter as provided in A2 of the Civil Code and §11 of the Revised question was made public only on 6/14/79 and not on the printed date
Administrative Code. The word ―laws‖ in article 2 includes circulars & 4/9/79. Differently stated, 6/14/79 was the date of publication of BP 22.
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise Before the public may be bound by its contents especially its penal
the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed
binding on the persons affected thereby. Commonwealth Act No. 638 of its contents. For, it a statute had not been published before its viod,
requires that all Presidential Executive Orders having general then, in the eyes of the law, there was no such law to be violated and,
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that, consequently the accused could not have committed the alleged crime.
every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be
deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This applies to a The effectivity clause of BP 22 states that "This Act shall take effect 15
violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation & days after publication in the Official Gazette." The term "publication" in
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. It results that such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, i.e., to
they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The make known to the people in general. If the legislature had intended to
summary confiscation wasn‗t in order. The recipients of the carabaos make the printed date of issue of the OG as the point of reference, then it
should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.
carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and
Zenerosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of
the carabaos.

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the

regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
hereby. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.
3. TAÑADA VS. TUVERA 4. MRCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein
implementations and administrative orders. (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the
dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
personality to bring the instant petition. mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required HELD: Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure,
for "it is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may
RULING: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the not affect or change vested rights."
date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be

published in the Official Gazette. The word ―shall‖ therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before
a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances
of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
5. YAOKASIN VS. COMMISSIONER 6. KASILAG VS. RODRIGUEZ

FACTS: On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags FACTS: Responds, Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the
/ sacks of refined sugar, which were being unloaded from the M/V deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from
Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted
Customs. On June 7, 1988 the District Collector of Customs ordered the by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.
release of the seized sugar to the petitioner Yaokasin.
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on
On July 15, 1988, the Collector of Customs reversed his order to release the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the
the seized sugar since it is still subject for review by the Commissioner of indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. In Clause V, the parties stipulated
Customs since it is adverse to the government citing the Customs that Emiliana Ambrosio was to pay, w/in 4 1/2 years, the debt w/ interest
Memorandum Order No. 20-87. This CMO implements Sec 12 of the thereon, in which event the mortgage would not have any effect; in
Integrated Reorganization Plan, which is under P.D. No. 1, dated Clause VI, the parties agreed that the tax on the land and its
September 24, 1972. This Section 12 states that a decision of a Collector improvements, during the existence of the mortgage, should be paid by
of Customs in seizure and protest cases adverse to the government is the owner of the land; in Clause VII, it was covenanted that w/in 30 days
subject to review by the Commissioner of Customs or the Secretary of from the date of the contract, the owner of the land would file a motion in
Finance. When no decision is rendered after 30 days by either the CFI of Bataan asking that cert. of title no. 325 be cancelled and that
commissioner or secretary, the decision of the Collector of Customs shall in lieu thereof another be issued under the provisions of RA 496; in
become final and executory. clause VIII the parties agreed that should Emiliana Ambrosio fail to
redeem the mortgage w/in the stipulated period of 4 1/2 years, she would
The petitioner objected the applicability of the Sec. 12 of the execute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of the mortgagee,
reorganization plan and the CMO No. 20-87 on the ground that they had the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interest;
not been published in the Official Gazette. and in Clause IX it was stipulated that in case the motion to be presented
under Clause VII should be disapproved by the CFI-Bataan, the contract
ISSUE: Whether the enforcement of the Sec. 12 of the Integrated of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would
Reorganization Plan and thereafter CMO No. 20-87 valid when these subsist in all its force.
laws have not been published in the Official Gazette.
One year after the execution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that
RULING: Yes. CMO and Sec 12 of the Integrated Reorganization Plan is Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as
enforceable. The requirement of Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not apply the tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the
to CMO No. 20-87 since it is only an administrative order of the petitioner entered into another verbal contract whereby she conveyed to
Commissioner of Customs to his subordinates, namely the customs the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collectors. Also in the Commonwealth Act No. 638, which enumerates collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, states that administrative tax, would benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce
orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no improvements thereon.
general applicability. CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to
comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of
addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons, hence no the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis,
general applicability therefore need not be published in the Official are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien and as
Gazette. such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended.
The CA held that petitioner acted In BF in taking possession of the land
because he knew that the contract he made w/ EA was an absolute sale,
and further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited
by Sec. 116 of Act 2874.
xxx [A] person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that 7. PUZON VS. ABELLERA
there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is
invalidated. FACTS: The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her
death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of
The question to be answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a land situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the
possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another case
manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is Republic v. Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued
the keynote of the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to
neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio
title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition which was covered by a town site reservation.
contained in Sec. 116. This being the case, the question is within good
faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws. This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271
with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of title covering lands within the Baguio Town Site Reservation pursuant to
good faith but excusable ignorance may be such basis (if it is based RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered
upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant as valid certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was
the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was reverted to the public domain.
not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking
possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of taxes. Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year
the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner
as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his filed a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile,
ignorance of the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition to
basis of good faith. the petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that
said auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegally
The petitioners being in good faith, the respondents may elect to have made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition
the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and that
value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the PD 1271 has a curative effect.
land where the improvements or plants are found, by paying them its
market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively

RULING: Yes. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive
application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows
some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The
intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time
they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize
the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons
with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated,
honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such
would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31
July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the
validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the
conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.
8. ACOSTA VS. PLAN 9. MRCA VS. CA

FACTS: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana in the Court of First FACTS: Petitioner argues that since the decision in Manchester had not
Instance of Isabela against the private respondent Bernardino Magday. yet been published in the Official Gazette when its complaint was filed,
After the answer, the complaint was amended to implead the Department the ruling therein was ineffective; that said ruling may not be given
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as retroactive effect because it imposes a new penalty for its non-
additional defendants. Magday filed an amended answer. The Secretary observance; the dismissal of the complaint for want of jurisdiction; and,
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filed that it should not apply to the present case because the petitioner herein
separate answers to the amended complaint. (plaintiff in the trial court) had no fraudulent intent to deprive the
government of the proper docketing fee, unlike the Manchester case
After the parties had submitted a stipulation of facts, the court, upon where enormous amounts of damages were claimed in the body of the
plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary complaint, but the amounts were not mentioned in the prayer thereof, to
judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, rendered judgment mislead the clerk of court in computing the filing fees to be paid.
dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. It was denied by the HELD: It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that statutes
respondent Judge. They filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
and filed a notice of appeal. The trial court granted their motion to appeal actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
as paupers. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court. Respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file
a record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order
was filed by the appellants. They mailed their record on appeal to the
Court. The lower court denied their motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition for certiorari by the appellants raising the lone legal question
of whether for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant, the timely
submission of a record on appeal is required.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law can be given retroactive effect.

RULING: The reorganization having been declared to have been

completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A
record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same
proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued
by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being procedural in nature, those
provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as
appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.'
10. BPI VS. IAC 11. GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE

FACTS: The original parties to this case were Rizaldy T. Zshornack and FACTS: This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question
the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philippines [hereafter the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the
referred to as "COMTRUST."] In 1980, the Bank of the Philippine 1990 budget. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is
Islands(hereafter referred to as BPI absorbed COMTRUST through a authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of
corporate merger, and was substituted as party to the case. Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled
HELD: Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
them to the Central Bank within one business day from receipt, is a Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it must be Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of
considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. The
having been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,
law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to
against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, pursuant to said decrees.
both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action
against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the
one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law. aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos became functus oficio when
he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-
man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power
was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution
was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by
Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the
present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that
rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced. Moreover, petitioners
contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative
under Section 3, Article XVIII.

HELD: The Court is not persuaded. Section 3, Article XVIII of the

Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked."

This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted

by its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then
President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force
and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are
otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 12. MARTINEZ VS. VAN BUSKIRK
81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful
authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise FACTS: Both parties agree that on the 11th day of September, 1908,
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila.
the duty to implement the same. When a delivery wagon owned by the defendant which was used for the
transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached, was
coming from the opposite direction, the carromata in which the plaintiff
was seated went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by. However, instead of passing by, the horses ran into the
carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
causing a serious cut upon the plaintiff‘s head and injuring the
carromata. However, the defendant contends that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle
Herran, and for that purpose the defendant‘s employee tied the driving
lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose
of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by
the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to
run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon
the ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for
the negligence of such driver.

RULING: It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent
in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this
case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have
not been destructive and which are approved by the society, are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have been permitted
by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could
not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an
injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero
negligent because of such circumstances.

Acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious

and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a
time has to have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be
unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver
was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in
unloading his wagon.
13. ARMIGOS VS. CA 14. NAMARCO VS. TECSON

FACTS: The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against FACTS: On October 14, 1955, the CFI-Manila rendered judgment in a
the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for civil case, Price Stabilization Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this
the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was decision was, on October 21, 1955 served upon defendants in said case.
rendered in favor of the private respondent and against the herein On December 21, 1965, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties,
petitioner. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as plaintiff in that case and
June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of judgment creditor therein, filed with the same court, a complaint against
appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed defendants for the revival of the judgment rendered therein. Defendant
the other requirements for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint, upon the ground of prescription
of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court docket fee. of action, among others. The motion was granted by the court. Hence,
However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the consideration of the appeal to the Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme
the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was filed Court, upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of
beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal. law, namely, pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement
Petitioner‘s contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy must be brought within 10 years from the time the judgment sought to be
of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he revived has become final. This in turn, took place on December 21, 1955
perfected his appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the or 30 days from notice of the judgment -- which was received by
decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his defendants on October 21, 1955 -- no appeal having been taken
appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period, is therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which the 10 years
erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the from December 21, 1955 expired. Plaintiff alleges that it was 12/21/65,
computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he but appellee maintains otherwise, because when the law speaks of years
received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960
comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 and 1964 being leap years, so that 10 years of 365 days each, or an
o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of aggregate of 3650 days, from December 21, 1955, expired on December
23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June 1977. 19, 1955. Plaintiff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that
when it is not a leap year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one
HELD: Day is synonymous with Date; consequently the 5th day shall be year. If the extra day in a leap year is not a day of the year, because it is
the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was the 366th day, then to what year does it belong? Certainly, it must belong
submitted. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days constitute one
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day year.
included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the ISSUE: Whether or not the present action for the revival of a judgment is
time within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed barred by the statute of limitations.
by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the last be Sunday
or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its
Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of theory contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of connotation of each "year" - as the term is used in our laws - to 365 days.
the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins [The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21,
to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to 1955 prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in
be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the terms of 365 days each, the action has prescribed on December 19,
time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a 1955, since the two intervening leap years added two more days to the
legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as computation. It is not the calendar year that is considered.]
synonymous with the date and we find no cogent reason to adopt a
different view.
15. BARRETTO-GONZALES VS. GONZALES manner which out government believes is contrary to public order & good
morals.
FACTS: The plaintiff and defendant were both citizens of the Philippines,
married & lived together from January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15 says that ―Laws relating to
which they voluntary separated and have not lived together as man and family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of
wife, they had 4 minor children together. persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country‖. And the last part of Art 11 of the Old Civil Code, now in
After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow Manuela Art 17 also states ―...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts &
Barretto (plaintiff) for her & her children‘s support of P500 (five hundred their property, and those intended to promote public order & good
pesos) monthly which to be increased in cases of necessity & illness, morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. Shortly after judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a
the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & foreign country.‖
secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of
desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date he went through
the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3children
with her.

When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had

agreed to pay monthly for the support of Manuela Barretto and her
children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.

Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after,
Barretto brought an action at the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm and
ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada, invoking Sec
9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the
Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due to their
children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents
died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barretto & Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales
be ordered to pay Barretto P500 per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all
the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of
the children also filed as intervenors in the case.

ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine

Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would
grant a divorce.

RULING: Art 9 and Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the
Philippines does not allow such to be done, the effect of foreign divorce
in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to approve
of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in
16. TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO 17. VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO

FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent,
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis. While in Misamis, Escano asked were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time
for petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8,
non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the US without 1983, stating that petitioner‘s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then married ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as
again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. On July the administrator of the said property.
30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation and
damages against wife and parents in law. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal. petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING: No, the divorce and the second marriage are not recognized as RULING: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.
valid. As stated in Art. 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over
Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
The Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
the code, instead of divorce; legal separation is used, wherein marriage Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
is still recognized. To recognize a decree of divorce of foreign courts recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
would be violation on public policy and Article 17 of Civil Code. national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and those respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be
which have for their object public order, policy, and good customs shall discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by served.
determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would
also discriminate in favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced
elsewhere. It would not make any difference if Tenchavez was also in the
court of Nevada when divorce was filed since mere appearance can‗t
confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has grounds
to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other
than her husband, entitling him to ask for legal separation under basis of
adultery. As result, the petitioner has grounds to file for legal separation,
and may recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.
18. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA 19. PEOPLE VS. RITTER

FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private FACTS: Rape of a 12-yr-old girl allegedly by appellant who inserted a
respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the foreign object into her vagina causing her death. A criminal case and a
Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal civil case was filed against the defendant
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980
and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in HELD: Moral and exemplary damages are awarded to the victim‗s heirs
private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against despite acquittal of accused on grounds of reasonable doubt.
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free
1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. doctrine in Urbano v IAC, wherein a person while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable, is applicable.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the
ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child
was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery

before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda,
latter ―had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983‖.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the

ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as
decree of divorce was already issued.

RULING: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery

and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should
be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.
20. ROE VS. WADE interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
FACTS: Roe (petitioner), a pregnant single woman, brought a class 2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy,
action suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. including a woman‘s right to terminate her pregnancy, against
These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on state action.
medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the 3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right
lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for to terminate her pregnancy, it has legitimate interests in
violating the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no protecting both the pregnant woman‘s health and the potentiality
children, who sought an injunction against enforcement of the laws on of human life at various stages of pregnancy.
the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county 4. No. The natural termination of Roe‘s pregnancy did not render
District Attorney Wade (defendant). her suit moot.
5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.
A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that
Roe and Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the
controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also decision must be left to the judgment of the pregnant woman‘s doctor. In
ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does‘ regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may promote their
complaint was not justiciable. Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. interests in the mother‘s health by regulating abortion procedures related
The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states
vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth may promote their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve the life
district court ruled that injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws or health of the mother.
was not warranted.
The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States ―capable of repetition, yet evading review,‖ is an exception to the general
and Wade cross-appealed the district court‘s judgment in favor of Roe rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial review,
and Hallford. and not merely when the action is initiated.

ISSUES: The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. § 1253 does not authorize a party
1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those seeking only declaratory relief to appeal directly to the Supreme Court,
required on medical advice to save the life of the mother, violate review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from
the Constitution of the United States? specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to both injunctive and declaratory relief are necessarily identical.
the United States Constitution protect the right to privacy,
including the right to obtain an abortion? The Does‘ complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on
3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws contingencies which might or might not occur and was therefore too
prohibiting abortion? speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary
4. Did the fact that Roe‘s pregnancy had already terminated for the Court to decide Hallford‘s case for injunctive relief because once
naturally before this case was decided by the Supreme Court the Court found the laws unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were
render her lawsuit moot? prohibited from enforcing them.
5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?
3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child‗s
RULING: PERSONALITY
1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only
life-saving procedures on the mother‘s behalf, and that do not In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines
take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other
21. GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS 22. QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and
the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for
married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting amendment of complaint. Quimiguing averred that the then already
on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she force and intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts
was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then claimed
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the for monthly support, damages and attorney‘s fees. The defendant-
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing‘s failure to
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion allege the fact that a child had been born in her complaint. The lower
and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to
clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for failure of the
the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old original complaint to state a cause of action.
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and
his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
consent, to the abortion. complaint.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action for
we granted certiorari. damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional
of his unborn child. personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to support from its
progenitors, even it is only ―en ventre de sa mere.‖ Article 742 of the
RULING: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal same Code holds that, just as a conceived child, it may receive
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles
if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article 29 of the Spanish Code also further
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could strengthen the case for reversal of order.
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was Additionally, ―for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that
take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused‖ per Article 21 of
as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the the Civil Code, a provision supported by Article 2219, which provides
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other
under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly lascivious acts.
limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is
no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's
womb.
23. DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA 24. LIMJOCO VS. INTESTATE OF FRAGANTE

FACTS: Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a FACTS: Fragante filed an application for a CPC to install, maintain and
cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendant‘s brother in law Vicente operate an ice plant in San Juan. Pending application with the Public
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an Service Commission (PSC), Fragante died and he was substituted by the
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have legal representative of his estate. The PSC granted the application.
his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and Petitioner contends that the PSC erred when it allowed the substitution of
had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant the legal representative of the estate of Fragante as the party applicant
and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. In the early months of in the case pending before the commission.
Antonia‘s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February
1931, he even wrote a letter to a reverend father confirming that the child ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante can be considered as a
is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was ―person‖.
out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her
to eat on time for her and ―junior‘s‖ sake. The defendant ask his friend RULING: There would be a failure of justice unless the estate is
Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. considered a ―person‖. Within the framework and principles of the
Joseph Hospital in Manila. constitution itself, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil
rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in persons, the term ―person‖ used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed
Camarines Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. to include artificial or juridical persons. It was the intent of the framers to
When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly include artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
departed and he was married with another woman at this time. It should constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature. Among these
be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons. Hence,
in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael the Court held that within the framework of the constitution, the estate of
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned. Fragante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include
ISSUES: Whether or not the note to the padre in connection with the the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and
other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves the fulfilment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
acknowledgement of paternity.

RULING: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as

admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the
admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable. ―The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's
resolution to admit the status‖. Supreme Court held that they agree with
the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify
the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco
in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it
is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the
amount of pension.
25. DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTICS 26. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ

FACTS: Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, FACTS: Vitaliana Vargas‘ brothers and sisters unaware of the former‘s
1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on
Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final or she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was
else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond. confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of
which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitaliana‘s body to
area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas
sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given as corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure
security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio‘s residence. The court ordered
before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria‘s death. that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but
The summons and copies of complaint was personally served on June Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged
and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants. Dionisio, Fausta, ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, RULING: The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
1963 for the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to
against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his capacity as Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that
administrator of Oria‘s testate estate. ―Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried
man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment against Oria and execution against devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.‖ Albeit, petitioner claims
his land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity. he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code,
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where ―a man
RULING: Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
learned that Oria was already dead prior case T-662 was filed. The husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
Dumalaos‘ agreed in their stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
unaware of Oria‘s death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, jurisdictions‖. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
thus, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower court‘s judgment together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.
against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying
capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost Vitaliana.
through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order
to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow that they are entitled
to claim attorney‘s fees against the corporation.
27. JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO 28. SMITH, BELL & CO. VS. NATIVIDAD

FACTS: On Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, FACTS: Smith, Bell & Co. is a corporation organized and existing under
Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, the laws of the Philippine Islands; majority of the stockholders are British.
and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato, brought to Cebu for
Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. The the purpose of transporting Smith, Bell & Co.‘s merchandise between
building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three ports in the islands. An application for registration was made at Cebu at
daughters who fell. Navarro Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didn‘t the Collector of Customs, but was denied. This is because they were not
want to leave so he left with his son, his son‘s wife and neighbor citizens of the US or the Philippines. Based on Act 2671, Sec. 1172 of
Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the the Certificate of Philippine Register; upon registration of a vessel of
rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. The German Club collapsed domestic ownership, and of more than 15 tons gross, a certificate of
trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic
and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for ownership and of 15 tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
three days. On Feb. 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, Philippine register shall be optional with the owner. Domestic ownership,
they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. as used in this section, means ownership vested in the (a) citizens or
native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the US residing
The RTC claims that the mother, natural child of petitioner Joaquin, in the Philippine Islands; (c) any corporation or company composed
survived the son; the son dying first before the mother. CA claimed the wholly of citizen of Philippines, or US, or both. Plaintiff‘s contends that
reverse. If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of Act No. 2671 deprives the corporation of its property without due process
succession. If the mother died first, the respondent Antonio, son of JN, of law because by the passage of the law, the company was
Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit. automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership of the
Bato and that they are left with a naked title they could not use.
ISSUE: Whether or not the discussion of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court having repealed Art. 43 of the CC or not is relevant to the ISSUE: Whether or not Smith, Bell & Co. were denied of the due process
case at bar. of law by the Philippine Legislature in its enactment of Act 2761.

RULING: No, neither of the two provisions is applicable. Both provisions, RULING: No. (judgment is affirmed, and plaintiff can‘t be granted
as their language implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so registry.) Act No. 2761, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &
are not to be available when there are facts. Co. Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippine Coastwide trade,
falls within the authorized exceptions. Specifically within the purview of
Upon the issue of who between the mother and son died first, in light of the police power. Literally and absolutely, steamship lines are the
the conditions painted by Francisco Lopez, a fair inference can be arteries of the commerce in the Philippines. If one be severed, the
arrived at that Joaquin Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The lifeblood of the nation is lost. If these are protected, security of the
presumption that Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on country and general welfare is sustained.
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of
evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential.

Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called
to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in
the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.
29. BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ 30. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS

FACTS: The defendant Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff FACTS: On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas, with one other
parish priest, took possession of the church on July 5, 1901. He persons as principals, along with Vicente Sixto Villanueva, who with two
administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until November others as sureties, assumed the obligation to pay jointly and severally
14, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a Standard Oil Co. On April 5, 1909, Standard Oil sued for payment of the
demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and debt. On May 12, 1909Villanueva was declared to be in default. The wife
cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other of Villanueva, declared while the judgement was in execution; (1) that
prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused her husband was declared insane on June 24, 1909 by Manila‘s Court of
to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction First Instance;(2) that she was appointed as guardian on Oct. 11, with
w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the authority to institute legal proceedings for annulment of bonds given by
Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the her husband while insane; (3) that her husband was already permanently
Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Manila. insane when he gave the bond to Standard Oil an was insane and
unable to defend himself during the litigation and for this reason asked
In January 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant., the court to reopen the trial to allow for the introduction of evidence for
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was Villanueva regarding his incapacity to act at the time he gave the bond.
the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, The court reopened the trial but concluded that Villanueva had capacity
money, and other properties, belonging thereto, and asking that it be to act at the time he gave the bond on Dec. 15, 1908.
restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of
the properties which he had received and which was retained by him, ISSUE: Whether or not Villanueva, appellant, was incapable of entering
and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the into contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15, 1908.
plaintiff.
RULING: No, he wasn‘t. ―Capacity to act‖ must be supposed to attach to
HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made capacity is presumed to continue so long contrary is not proved, that is,
with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years at the time of his acting he was incapable, crazy or out of his mind;
any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian which, in the opinion of the court, has not been proved in this case.‖
eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still There was no direct proof that showed that at the date of the giving of
worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious the bond, December 15, 1908, the appellant was incapable of acting
consideration. because of insanity. The witnesses who as physicians, testified that they
observed insane periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908,
but none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December 15,
1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought to legally
deprive her husband management over his estate knowing full well that
he was insane.
31. MERCADO VS. ESPIRITU 32. YOUNG VS. TECSON

FACTS: This case is about the signing of a deed of sale in which two of HELD: Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not estop
the four parties were minors with age 18, and 19. On the date of sale, him from denying that he was of age or from asserting that he was under
these minors presented themselves that they were of legal age at the age, at the time he entered into the contract, for the breach of w/c an
time they signed it, and they made the same manifestation before the action is brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the liab. resulting from
notary public. The plaintiffs alleged that as the sole heirs, along with their misrepresentation has its juridical source in the capacity of the person
two sisters, to a 48 hectare tract of land which belonged to their mother making the misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making the
the sister of the defendant. The defendant cajoled, induced, and misrepresentation cannot bind himself by contract, he cannot also be
fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs to sell their land for a sum bound by any misrepresentation he may have made in connection
of P400 as opposed to its original value. The plaintiffs demand the therewith. A person entering into a contract must see to it that the other
annulment of the sale, the return of the land, and the remuneration of the party has sufficient capacity to bind himself.
thing benefited by the defendant.
The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the
According to the Defendant, the plaintiff‘s mother had sold a portion of minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affect
the original land to the defendant for a sum. The plaintiff‘s father the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his
subsequently, mortgaged the remaining parcel to the defendant for a previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing
sum to cover his children‘s welfare after his wife‘s death. The plaintiffs the contract.
had alleged themselves of legal age and ratified the absolute and
perpetual sale of the land in consideration of the P400. Cross-complaint
filed for damages due to the malicious and unfounded complaint by the
plaintiffs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.

RULING: The courts laid down that such sale of real estate was still valid
since it was executed by minors, who have passed the ages of puberty
and adolescence, and are near the adult age, and that the minors
pretended that they had already reached their majority.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,

prodigality and civil-interdiction are mere restrictions on the capacity to
act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations,
as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.

Also, these minors cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves

from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their
annulment. This is in accordance with the provisions of the law on
estoppels.
33. BAMBALAN VS. MARAMBA 34. SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. ALCANTARA

FACTS: Petitioner Isidro Bambalan, a minor, owned a piece of land. He FACTS: Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent Ramon)
was forced by his mother Paula Prado to sell the land to Genovena executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931, conveying five parcels of
Muerong, since she was threatening Paula of imprisonment due to the land to petitioner Sia Suan. A few days later (within the month after the
loan Genoveva gave Paula. To have the document of the sale sale of the parcels of land), Ramon‘s counsel wrote to Suan‘s husband,
acknowledged, the respondent even purchased the cedula of the Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the ground that Ramon was a
petitioner. Isidro didn‗t try to conceal his age; in fact the respondent was minor when the signing took place. After Gaw Chiao responded to the
well aware that Isidro was a minor. letter, Ramon went to the office of Gaw Chiao‘s counsel to ratify the sale.
After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw Chiao, as
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the piece of land in question void or payment for the sold parcels of land/ Meanwhile, Sia Suan sold the
valid. parcels of land to Nicolas Azores; his son Antonio inherited it.

RULING: The sale of the land is void because Isidro is incapacitated to Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of First Instance of
enter into such contracts, and because the land wasn‗t even registered Laguna, praying that the deed of sale may be annulled on the ground of
and hence, cannot be sold. The decision in Mercado vs. Espiritu cannot his minority at the time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao; action
be used since the petitioner didn‗t try to hide his age was denied and Sia Suan, Gaw Chiao, Ramon‘s father and brother,
Nicolas and Antonio Azores were absolved. Ramon brought case to the
Art. 38 NCC provides that minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of Court of Appeals which reversed the CFI Decision.
being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions
on capacity to act (aptitude for the exercise of rights), and do not exempt ISSUE: Whether or not Ramon Alcantara‘s execution of the deed of sale
the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter is valid, despite being a minor at the time of its execution.
arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
RULING: Ramon may not be allowed to execute deed of sale, but due to
The land in question wasn‗t even registered in the Register of Deeds; the his act of ratification, the contract was given its binding effect. The deed
sale of the land cannot be executed without registration as provided in of sale is binding on Ramon, because he ratified it. Ramon is not allowed
section 50 of Act. 496. to annul such deed, because he already ratified it. Mercado doctrine is
applicable in this case. Ramon may have executed his acts in bad faith;
he earned money from Gaw Chiao as a result of the sale and its
ratification, yet he summons the courts to annul the sale because he
executed it while still a minor. ―…previous misinterpretation has already
estopped him from disavowing the contract‖. The Court of Appeals said
that Ramon may not be stopped because of the letter, yet the Supreme
Court holds that he is already stopped by his misrepresentation in the
deed of sale, due to his minority. The Supreme Court is of the opinion
that Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao is hereby absolved, without incurring any
costs on their part. Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu,
herein followed, to bind a minor who represents himself to be of legal
age, it is not necessary for his vendee to actually part with cash, as long
as the contract is supported by a valid consideration. The circumstance
that about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee
informed the appeallants of his minority, is of no moment, because
appellee‗s previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from
disavowing the contract.
35. BRAGANZA VS. VILLA ABRILLE 36. US VS. VAQUILAR

FACTS: Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille FACTS: Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife and his
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and in consideration thereof, promised in daughter, as well as injuring other persons with a bolo. Eyewitnesses
writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal currency of the testified that the defendant appeared to be insane prior to the
Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no commission of the crimes. They also testified that the appellant was
paid, Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first complaining of pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing. The
instance and CA held the family solidarily liable to pay according to the witnesses‘ evidence for insanity include:
contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the decision of the • ―appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight penetrating
CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 at the time he was killing his wife.‖
+ 2% interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza • ―he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he
sons when they signed the contract. wouldn‘t have killed his family‖
• at the moment of cutting those people, ―he looked like a
ISSUE: Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are madman; crazy because he would cut anybody at random‖
to be bound by the contract of loan they have signed. • sister said, ―…then he pursued me….he must have been crazy
because he cut me‖
RULING: The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in
the contract because they minority of her sons does not release her from ISSUE: Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient to declare
liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 + 2% interest. the accused as insane, therefore exempt from criminal liability.

However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which RULING: The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The
found them similarly liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an enraged criminal,
The SC sustained previous sources in Jurisprudence – ―in order to hold not of a person with an unsound mind at the time he committed the
the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. It has crimes. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is
been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age insane. The popular meaning of ―crazy‖ is not synonymous with the legal
does not constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of terms ―insane‖. The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail
deceit.‖ is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person (not saying a word in
the cell, crying out loud at night) who has reflected and felt remorse after
The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still the commission of the crime.
liable to pay the actual amount they have profited from the loan. Art.
1340 states that even if the written contract is unenforceable because of The court further held that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity
their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may which results not from any disease of the mind, but from a perverted
have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which condition of the moral system where the person is mentally sane, does
is P46,666.66, which when converted to Philippine money is equivalent not exempt one from criminal responsibility. In the absence of proof that
to P1,166.67. the defendant had lost his reason or became demented after a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is presumed
that he was in a normal state of mind.
37. STANDARD OIL CO. VS. ARENAS 38. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN

FACTS: The SOCNY sued the 5 debtors for payment, including the FACTS: Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old and was hired as a
appellant Vicente Villanueva who acted as surety to the loan. The CFI of housekeeper by the mother of the accused. Accused Policarpio Rafanan
Manila ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs and his family lives with his mother. On March 16 1976 in the evening,
SOCNY. While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa after dinner, Estelita was sent to help the accused in the store. At 11pm,
Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her husband was the accused called Estelita to help him close the door of the store and he
declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct. 11, she was suddenly pulled her inside and said ― come, let us have sexual
authorized by the court as guardian to institute the proper legal intercourse‖ in which Estelita said she don‘t like. Despite the struggle of
proceedings for the annulment of several bonds given by her husband Estelita, Policarpio was able to rape her and told her not to tell anyone or
while in a state of insanity. else he would kill her. But somehow, the family of the accused was able
to find out which made Estelita leave the house. Estelita was crying on
ISSUE: Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth necessarily her home and told her mother about what happened. During trial, the
warrants the conclusion that the person does not have capacity to act. accused pleaded not guilty but in the end he was convicted. He then
appeal to the court.
RULING: The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva
possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no evidence to ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission
warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a person suffering from of the crime.
monomania of wealth is really insane and therefore is deranged and
incapable of binding himself in a contract. From the testimony of his RULING: Schizophrenia is not an exempting circumstance. If there was
wife, it seemed that Vicente has the liberty to go wherever he wished, impairment of the mental faculties, such impairments was not so
that he had property of his own and was not deprived of its management, complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the consciousness
as well as the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of of his acts. The testimonies negate complete destruction of intelligence
money. at the time of the commission of the crime. The fact that the appellant
threatened Estelita with death reveals to the court that the accused was
aware of his act. The law presumes every man to be sane. A person
accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of
insanity and the accused was not able to prove it. Although it is not a
exempting circumstance under art 12 of Revised Penal Code, it is a
mitigating circumstance under the art 13 of RPC.
39. ABELLA VS. COMELEC 40. CABAGUE VS. AUXILLO

FACTS: Initially, Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to FACTS: In the justice of the peace court of Basud, Camarines Norte,
intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the defendant Matias
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, defendants' refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Leyte.It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her Socorro and Geronimo.
husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office.
The complaint alleged, in short: (a) that defendants promised such
The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission marriage to plaintiffs, provided the latter would improve the defendants'
granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, house in Basud and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the
hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second bride; (b) that relying upon such promises plaintiffs made the
highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of improvement and spent P700; and (c) that without cause defendants
Kananga, Leyte. refused to honor their pledged word.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous HELD: The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement. One,
petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the
the matter of determination of the ―residence‖ is more on the principle of agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For
―intention‖, the animus revertendi rather than anything else.‖ In this breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for
regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual promise is
to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because
Kananga residence, for as long as she had the animus revertendi it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to
evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this action could not be maintained
course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City." on the theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded as
action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
HELD: In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to
pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers
herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to
abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The
fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does
not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common
among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly resided
specially so when we have left friends and relatives although for intents
and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.
41. DOMALAGAN VS. BOLIFER 42. HERMOSISIMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that he and the defendant entered into a FACTS: Soledad Cagigas, a teacher and petitioner, who was almost ten
contract by virtue of the terms of which he was to pay to the defendant a (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were
certain amount upon the marriage of his son with the daughter of the regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage
defendant; that he has completed his obligation under said contract by prior thereto their intimacy developed among them Soledad advised
paying the stipulated amount; that notwithstanding said agreement, the petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to
daughter was joined to a lawful wedlock with another man not his son; marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born. However defendant
that immediately upon learning of the marriage, he demanded the return married one Romanita Perez.
of the payment he has made. The trail court rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by reason of a RULING: When the woman becomes pregnant and subsequently
prospective marriage is valid and effective. delivers. Although she cannot recover moral damages for the breach,
nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and
RULING: Plaintiff invokes paragraph 3 of section 335 of the Code of hospitalization expenses as well as attorney‘s fees. Because of
Procedure in Civil Action and, appellant argues that the verbal contract, defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed
not having been reduced to writing, plaintiff cannot recover. The section by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
relied upon by the does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties to and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said
an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in question damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a writing, it paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing.
43. WASSMER VS. VELEZ 44. ESTREMOS VS. EPHAN

FACTS: Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of promise to marry can be
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as recoverable for damages.
the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left a note to her that they
have to postpone their wedding because his mother opposed it. And on RULING: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong
the next day he sent her the following telegram ―Nothing changed rest and by clear and manifest intent of the law making body is not to
assured returning very soon apologize mama papa love Paking‖. sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, any award of damages
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again, sued by is untenable.
Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954, plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances. The bride-to-be‘s trousseau, party dresses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid
of honor and the flower girl were prepared, but two days before the
wedding he never returned and was never heard from again.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a case of mere breach of

promise to marry.

RULING: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.

As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The
lower court‘s judgment is hereby affirmed.
45. TANJANCO VS. COUIRT OF APPEALS 46. BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli Santos, FACTS: Petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh was an Iranian citizen,
he expressed and professed his undying love and affection towards her exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City, who courted
which she eventually reciprocated. For one year from Dec. 1953 to Dec. private respondent Marilou Gonzales, and promised to marry her. On the
1954, petitioner succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of condition that they would get married, she reciprocated his love. They
his protestation of love and promise of marriage. She got pregnant, for then set the marriage after the end of the school semester. He visited
which she resigned from her work as IBM secretary to avoid Marilou‘s parents to secure their approval of marriage. In August 1987,
embarrassment. He refused to marry her or to give support. Thus, she he forced her to live with him, which she did. However, his attitude
filed for an action before the trial court to compel him to recognize the toward her changed after a while; he would maltreat and even
unborn child and provide support. The complaint was dismissed for threatened to kill her, from which she sustained injuries. Upon
failure to state the cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause confrontation with the barangay captain, he repudiated their marriage
of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21. agreement, saying that he was already married to someone living in
Bacolod.
ISSUE: Whether or not breach of a promise to marry is an actionable
wrong. Marilou then filed for damages before the RTC. Baksh denied the
accusations but asserted that he told her not to go to his place since he
RULING: The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code discovered her stealing his money and passport. The RTC ruled in favor
Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The of Gonzales. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
essential feature is seduction, which in law is more than sexual
intercourse, or a breach or promise of marriage; it connotes essentially ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on wrong.
the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one
whole year, a woman of adult age maintained an intimate sexual RULING: Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However,
relationship with a man, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and
seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since
no case is made under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment
alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint. for damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner,
―deflowered‖ her since she believed that his promise to marry was true,
In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute seduction, there must in and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her claims against
all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must the petitioner.
yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and
no seduction. Decision of CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed. chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage,
and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the
respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent against the
petitioner.
47. PANGANIBAN VS. BORROMEO 48. IN RE SANTIAGO

FACTS: Alejandro and Juana Mapala subscribed a contract before FACTS: Ernest Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
notary public Elias Borromeo. Respondent cooperated the inexecution of Soledad Colares for nine years, sought the legal advice of respondent
the document although he may not fully understand the content of the Atty. Santiago, a notary public in Negros Occidental. Santiago assured
document. The substance of the document permits the husband and the Baniquit that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again,
wife to live in an adulterous relationship without any opposition. and told the latter to bring his wife that afternoon to process the
document which authorized each other to marry again and waive
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying.
practice Relying on the validity of the document, Baniquit on June 11, 1939,
contracted a second marriage, with Trinidad Aurelio.
RULING: Yes, the contract contained a provision which is contrary to
law, morals and public order and as a consequence not judicially ISSUE: Whether or not the contract prepared by a notary public annuls a
recognizable. In his instance, if the spouse should retain their present marriage of Baniquit to his (first) wife.
frame of mind, no prosecution of either one by the other could be
expected. Nevertheless, it is far from the purpose of the Legislature to RULING: The contract executed between husband and wife upon the
bar to legalize adultery and concubinage. advice, prepared and acknowledged by a lawyer and notary public is
contrary to law and morals, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of
The agreement between Alejandro and Juana prior to marriage were the family. The advice given by the respondent as well as the preparation
contrary to law, morals and public order, as consequence not judicially and acknowledgement by him of the contract constitute malpractice
recognizable. which justifies disbarment from the practice of law.
49. SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA 50. LICHAUCO-DE LEON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza FACTS: On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon
prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in wedlock before
partnership of complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. In October, 1972, a de facto
Ceniza. The contract, signed by the spouses and two witnesses before separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital
the culpable judge, divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the differences. On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court
spouses between them, and licensed either spouse to commit any act of of California, County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution of
infidelity; and withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which marriage and filed for distribution of marriage but Jose Vicente was a
each had filed against the other. Filipino Resident. On March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into
a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria
ISSUE: Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to De Leon. Said agreement contained the payment sum of P100, 000 and
dissolve their marriage is valid. transfer of lots conveyed to her who Macaria did. On March 30, 1977,
Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of
RULING: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the Rizal a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution of their conjugal
provision under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, which state that the following partnership. Macaria intervened that the properties in distribution which
shall be void and of no effect: (1) any contract for personal separation she paid was her properties and assailed that the purpose of validity and
between husband and wife; (2) every extrajudicial agreement, during legality of the Letter-Agreement is the termination of marital relationship
marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the between Sylvia and Jose Vicente which states:
absolute community of property between husband and wife.
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held that relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband,
the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:
approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which
permits the husband to take a concubine and for the wife to live in HELD: The Letter-Agreement is invalid, because the use of the word
adulterous relationship with another man, is void. While adultery and "relations" in the letter agreement is ambiguous and subject to
concubinage are private crimes, they still remain crimes, and a contract interpretation since Macaria believed it to be dissolution of marriage but
legalizing their commission is contrary to law, morals and public orders, for Sylvia it is only dissolution of property relations and that Sylvia and
and as a consequence not judicially recognizable. Jose both filed in the court for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership.
The judge having become a lawyer in 1948, who was in good faith and
with honest intent to terminate the marital conflict, since he was not Also, under Article 221 of the New Civil Code:
aware of Art. 221 of the Civil Code, was merely reprimanded.
The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;

The letter agreement is an extra-judicial agreement prepared during

marriage by Sylvia so it is void and agreement must be entered by the
spouse and not to a third party.
51. PUGEDA VS. TRIAS 52. SISON VS. TE LAY LI

FACTS: The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the FACTS: Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two
ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. marriages celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 null and void
Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who on the ground of plaintiff‘s consent was obtained through force and
died on February 11, 1934. The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, intimidation employed upon her by her father. Morning of April 28, 1949,
Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of MC of Davao; and on the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the afternoon, they remarried in accordance with rites of Republic of China
defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office in Davao City. The plaintiff‘s
plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff alleges that testimony provides that the defendant never wooed her and that the
during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased wedding was arranged by her father. Her father whipped her often as
Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. she opposed marriage and resorted in to beating her. She then ran away
273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon from home but found by father and promised she will not force her again.
estate with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot But when the subject of marriage was renewed, he handed her a knife
No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in lot No. 2718 telling her to choose between her life of his, because of fear that her
and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said father might kill her, so she agreed to the marriage
interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C.
Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said The testimony corroborated by her mother and Epifania del Rio, a
properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners relative of her mother. She lived with her husband in his parent‘s home
thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as but considered him a stranger since she doesn‘t love him. She was kept
conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be a prisoner in the house; she never occupied the same bed with husband.
partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff. The couple never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 having
been forced by her husband using a knife. She mustered courage to
The defendants questioned the marriage of the plaintiff, when they escape from her husband‘s home. Meanwhile, the defendant claims that
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the the marriages were regular and legal, and entered freely and voluntarily.
Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January 1916, to show That she was not kept as a prisoner and that she would ask her father in
that there was no record of the alleged marriage. law to give her and her husband their own house and business. And only
once he slapped her — when she ran away with P1200 and when asked
HELD: Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held where she came from she retorted it was none of his business.
competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it is not proof HELD: The CFI found the plaintiff‘s marriage consummated only by
that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented it to proof intimidation and force and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to
marriage. the status of a wife to the defendant and declared two marriages
between them null and void; defendant ordered to return the P1200 and
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the whatever personal belongings the plaintiff had left in their house.
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the
fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also Supreme Court affirmed that while it is true that it is the policy of the law
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the
marriage is effected through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent
and against the will of one of the parties, there are no ties to be
preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled. And also
affirmed that there was no voluntary cohabitation on the wife‘s part.
53. VILAR VS. PARAISO 54. ARANES VS. OCCIANO

FACTS: In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge
Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge
and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the
was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the
as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as couple‘s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his
the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then
a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be
Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition,
proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for
and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He the alleged marriage.
also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso. Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license.
resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and
August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical
church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the
and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license
not be declared elected to take his place that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their
marriage is valid.
HELD: Paraiso was disqualified when he ran for mayor while he was still
holding a religious position granting him the power to solemnize ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage
marriages. without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his
territorial jurisdiction.
The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the RULING: The court held that ―the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
the protection of the public. This is specially so with regard to the Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative
authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage‖.
devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or
upon the official in charge of such registration, upon proper showing of WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge
the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined
the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
instant case is the respondent himself. or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
55. MARTINEZ VS. TAN 56. MADRIDEJO VS. DE LEON

FACTS: Plaintiff Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the FACTS: Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one
cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for damages. Plaintiff claimed child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio de Leon,
that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived
legal marriage under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the
the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage,that they take each born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio
other as husband and wife." CFI found for the defendant. Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On
June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of
HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the father. On July 8, 1920,
peace stating that they had agreed to marry, and asking the justice of the Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on
oath that they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by
they asked for. This statement was signed by them, in the presence of Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as
witnesses that they produced. A certificate was then made out by the her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died
justice of the peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties on the 2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of
had been married by him. Both the parties knew the contents of the Madridejo and Perez was valid and the Melecio Madridejo was
document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place legitimated by that marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de Leon) contends that
before the justice of the peace amounted to a marriage. trial court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and
that Pedro Madridejo was legitimated by that marriage.

ISSUES: Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro

Madridejo is valid, and whether or not the marriage subsequently
legitimated Melecio Madridejo.

RULING: With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that
the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it
not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity
were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been
acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily
or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said
marriage did not legitimate him.
57. BORJA-MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ 58. NINAL VS. BADAYOG

FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September
Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel 26, 1974 and they had five children who are the petitioners in this case.
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, Twelve years later (1985), Pepito shot Teodulfa which resulted in her
1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao death. A year and 8 months after the said death (Dec. 1986), Pepito
before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both married the respondent Norma Badayog without a marriage license
contracting parties were ―separated‖ thus, respondent Judge ought to claiming that they were exempt from the requirement because they had
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he already cohabited with each other for five years as husband and wife.
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had Pepito died in a car accident on February 1997 galvanizing petitioners,
been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested the children from his first marriage, to file a declaration of nullity of the
in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never subsequent marriage claiming that it was void for lack of a marriage
cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. license.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two ISSUE: Whether or not the five year cohabitation as husband and wife in
contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract this case can be considered to have sufficiently met the requirement to
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of be exempt from acquiring a marriage license.
Family Code.
RULING: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
RULING: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because
a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they from the time of Pepito‘s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
are both ―separated‖ is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is
a void and bigamous marriage. still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
59. REPUBLIC VS. OBRECIDO 60. PERIDO VS. PERIDO

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was
on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael,
Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had Gonzalo. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,
certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for "where they partitioned among themselves lots inherited by them from
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Lucio Perido. The children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido
Code. filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance against the children of the
second marriage, to annul the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Judicial Partition". Petitioners alleged that the children belonging to the
Family Code. second marriage were illegitimate. The trial court held that the 5 children
of Perido were all legitimate and it annulled the "Declaration of Heirship
RULING: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative and Extra- Judicial Partition". The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26, Par. 2 should be Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred (1) in declaring that the 5
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the children were and (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of owner of Lots because the said lots were the conjugal partnership
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong.7.The court of
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Now, the instant
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the petition.
marriage.
HELD: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that
Hence, the court‘s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, Par. 2 be of marriage. Marriage is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a of which the public is deeply interested. Every intendment of the law
spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry leans toward legalizing matrimony. Because if they are not married, they
under Philippine law. would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage." The petitioner‘s witness‘s failed to
prove the illegitimacy of second marriage.
61. FIEL VS. BANAWA 62. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA

HELD: A man and woman not legally married who co-habit for many FACTS: Arturo Mendoza and Jovita de Asis were married on Aug. 5,
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as 1936 in Marikina. While the marriage was still subsisting, Mendoza got
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the married to Olga Lema in Manila on May 14, 1941. de Asis died on Feb.
community where they live may be considered legally "married" in 2, 1943. Then, Mendoza contracted another marriage with Carmencita
common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna on Aug. 19, 1949. He was sued and
convicted of bigamy for the second marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza is liable for bigamy.

RULING: No. Acquitted. Sec. 29, Marriage Law Act 3613 provides: ―Any
marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse shall be illegal and void unless first marriage has been
annulled, dissolved or first spouse has been absent for 7 consecutive
years without news if he/she is still alive. Judicial declaration of nullity is
only necessary for third case.‖ Thus, his marriage with Lema is null and
void without need for judicial declaration. Third marriage was contracted
after the death of the first spouse, thus not bigamous.
63. PEOPLE VS. ARAGON 64. TOLENTINO VS. PARAS

FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his FACTS: Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia G. Tolentino on July
marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with 31, 1943. While marriage was still subsisting, he contracted another
Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a marriage with Ma. Clemente at Paombong, Bulacan on Nov. 1, 1948. He
traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When was convicted with bigamy. After serving his sentence, he continued
Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as living with Clemente until he died on July 25, 1974. Ma. Clemente was
teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by the surviving spouse indicated in his death certificate. Tolentino claims
physical maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo that she is the rightful surviving spouse and petitions for correction of the
treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage death certificate. Lower court dismissed petition for lack of publication.
with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paras is the rightful surviving spouse of
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void. Tolentino.

RULING: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second RULING: Yes. Petition granted. She needs to obtain judicial declaration
wife whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the from court first before she can request for the correction of the entry.
first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last Publication not necessary because all the parties involved are part of the
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting case. Court should order the publication. Conviction of Tolentino for
marriage cannot prosper. bigamy is best proof that his second marriage is null and void thus,
Paras is still his rightful spouse. No need for judicial declaration of nullity
for void marriages. Certificate entries though presumed to be correct
must yield to positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.
65. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY 66. DONATO VS. LUNA

FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was
married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter‘s former marriage. petitioner‘s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile
Having been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contends and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of
that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
married to another woman before their marriage. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering
into the marriage which was Donato‘s second since she had no previous
ISSUE: Whether Karl‘s marriage with Lilia is void. knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain Rosalinda
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage
RULING: No, it is voidable. Petition dismissed. Presence of force only was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that
makes a marriage voidable, not void. (CC ART. 85) It is valid until force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
annulled and since there was no annulment, marriage is still valid. Even private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to
if marriage is void, judicial declaration of nullity is still needed especially the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
for purposes of remarriage. together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for
It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with
with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with
is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that
that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first Donato already previously married.
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is
no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the
such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia‘s marriage are regarded void under marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the
the law. ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

RULING: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can‘t apply rule on prejudicial

question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by
means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order

of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be
sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to
costs.
67. TERRE VS. TERRE 68. JONES VS. HORTIGUELA

FACTS: Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, FACTS: Jones married Escano in December 1914 and had a child with
her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her named Angelita. Four years later Jones secured a passport to go
her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that abroad and was never heard from again. Escano instituted proceedings
they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. The court issued
wrote single under Dorothy‘s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. an order which would take effect six months after publication (Dec.
Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to 1919). Later, Escano married Hortiguela in 1927. Escano died intestate
Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of leaving her widower Hortiguela as judicial administratrix and both
minor and bigamy. Hortiguela and Angelita as sole heirs. Property was divided accordingly.
However, upon Angelita‘s marriage and her reaching the age of majority,
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre‘s marriage with Dorothy is null and she filed a complaint claiming that she was the only heir of her mother
void. since the marriage between Escano and Hortiguela was void because
only six years and fourteen days have elapsed prior to the solemnization
RULING: Dorothy‘s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that of the second marriage.
Merlito is her first cousin; thereby against public policy. However, she
did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she ISSUE: WON the subsequent marriage can be considered void.
contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is
void. Article 40 states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may RULING: No. It is not necessary that the former spouse be judicially
be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final declared an absentee. The law only requires that the former spouse has
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage or the former spouse is reputed to be dead and this is the belief
of the spouse present. The absence of Jones begins on the date when
the latest news about him was received – Jan. 10, 1918. Hence, the
more than nine years have elapsed prior to the present spouse
contracting the subsequent marriage.
69. IN RE SZATROW 70. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MOLINA

HELD: The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the
that a person not heard from in seven years is dead may arise and be marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the
invoked either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court. a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both
Independently of such an action or proceeding, the presumption of death as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends
cannot be invoked nor can it be made the subject of an action or special whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and
proceeding. assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances.
In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their
relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with
her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of

psychological incapacity.

RULING: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and

remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not
meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo‘s action at the time of the marriage did
not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed
that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not
shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not
considered as psychological incapacity. The following are the guidelines
as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically
inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the
marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in
complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art
220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the
Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned
to it to act on behalf of the state
71. CHOA VS. CHOA 72. BARCELONA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENGZON

FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 FACTS: Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married
children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an union begot five children. On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended R. Bengzon (―respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (―petitioner Diana). The
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply
controvert for the dismissal of the case. with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists
up to the present time. The petition alleged several non-complied marital
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and obligations. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their
deportation which shows latter‘s psychological incapacity because varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a
according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She
behind bars but also to banish outside the country. would go to her sister‗s house or would play tennis the whole day. When
the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of eventually refused to speak to her husband. On November 1977, the
psychological incapacity. respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on
the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
RULING: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to keep
trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‗s pregnancy, the
incapacity of his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The
abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
complained about three aspects of Leni‘s personality namely lack of psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of
attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.
sexuality and none of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination
psychological incapacity. conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical case and there is no cause for action.
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does
nd
not constitute psychological incapacity. RULING: Diana contends that the 2 petition of his husband is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to incapacity. It is not defective since the new rules do not require the
identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows
just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that that there is no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The psychological incapacity. (only experts can determine the root cause and
totality of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a at times they couldn‘t determine it). What the new Rules require the
finding of psychological incapacity more so without any medical, petition to allege are physical manifestations indicative of psychological
psychiatric or psychological examination. incapacity. Second petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement
73. REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO 74. MORIGO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.
of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and
the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992,
of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial
and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a
to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty
several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
child.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free
issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an from the bigamy case.
ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication.
The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of RULING: Morigo‘s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
the prosecutor for investigation. marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago.
Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligation.

RULING: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and

strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Toshio‘s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was

never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would
have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshio‘s illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing
marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness.
Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
75. TENEBRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 76. YAPTINCHAY VS. TORRES

FACTS: Tenebro contracted marriage with Ancajas in 1990. The two FACTS: Teresita Yaptinchay (petitioner) asked the Pasay City, Rizal, CFI
lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of to appoint her, first, as Special Administratrix and then as regular
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who died in Hongkong
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes in 1986. Petitioner thereafter left the on July 7, 1965 alleging that Isidro had lived with her continuously,
conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19 yrs (‗46-64—Taft Ave.,
going to cohabit with Villareyes. In 1993, petitioner contracted yet Pasay City, and ‘64-‘65—Russel Ave., Pasay City). Isidro died without a
another marriage with a certain Nilda Villegas. Ancajas thereafter filed a will and left an estate in Philippines, HK and other places with estimated
complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his value of about P500K; and left 3 daughters: Virginia, Mary and Asuncion.
marriage with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no On July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the
record of such. He further argued that his second marriage, with residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to Isidro together
Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological with others exclusively owned by Teresita. CFI granted such
incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy. appointment while Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife,
and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased opposed
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy. saying that Teresita, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to
institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less
RULING: The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having
marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said
subsistence of petitioner‘s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner‘s petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity.
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely Also, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia, as
regardless of petitioner‘s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a special administratrix and of Josefina, as regular administratrix.
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an HELD: The petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, provisions of Art. 144, CC cannot be decisive. Art. 144 says that: "When
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes ―any person who man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." But
the proper proceedings‖. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second envisaged in Art. 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of
or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be
deemed to accrue. One such condition is that there must be a clear
showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to
the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership
is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy
cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection
is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights;
nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
77. WIEGEL VS. SEMPIO-DIY 78. TERRE VS. TERRE

FACTS: Karl Wiegel filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with FACTS: The man, a lawyer, pursued a woman despite knowing that she
Lilia Oliva on the ground of Lilia‘s previous existing marriage to one was already married. He convinced her to marry him and that the first
Eduardo Maxion. Lilia admitted to the previous marriage but claimed that marriage was void because the woman married her first cousin, and was
it was null and void since she was forced to enter the said union. In the thus void ab initio. Since it was void, according to the lawyer, it was no
pre-trial that ensued, both parties agreed that the issue was whether the longer necessary to go to court to declare it as such. She agreed to
previous marriage was void or merely voidable. Lilia asked the court for marry him. After the birth of the first child, the lawyer disappeared and
an opportunity to present more evidence but the respondent judge contracted a second marriage while claiming that his marriage to the
denied the petition. Lilia appeals to the SC in hopes of modifying the woman was void from the beginning since she had already married her
―agreed facts‖ and to allow her to present evidence in her favor. first cousin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prior marriage was void or voidable. ISSUE: Whether or not an action for judicial declaration of nullity of the
prior marriage is necessary before entering a subsequent marriage.
RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. There is no need to prove that
her marriage was vitiated by force. Assuming, however that this is so, it RULING: Yes. Even if the first mistake was contracted in good faith, the
would still be irrelevant since the previous marriage wasn‘t void but lawyer would still be liable for bigamy after he contracted his second one.
merely voidable (therefore valid, until annulled). Since no annulment was It was deemed that the moral character of the respondent was deeply
made, her current marriage is therefore void. flawed and thus, should be disbarred and struck out from the Roll of
Attorneys.
79. JOCSON VS. ROBLES 80. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA

FACTS: here the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the FACTS: Where the husband filed a case for annulment on the ground of
husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was concealment of pregnancy, and the wife failed to file a responsive
coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for pleading, the court referred the case to the fiscal for investigation.
summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and However, the husband refused to show his evidence nor be interrogated
brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for by the fiscal.
judgment on the pleadings.
HELD: The court correctly dismissed the complaint for annulment. The
HELD: The court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in investigation of the fiscal is a prerequisite to the annulment of marriage
view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly prohibiting the rendition of where defendant has defaulted.
a decree of annulment of marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment. The affidavits of the wife's father and brothers
practically amounts to these methods not countenanced by the Civil
Code.
81. BUCCAT VS. BUCCAT 82. AQUINO VS. DELIZO

FACTS: Petitioner met defendant in 1938 and married her the same FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of
year. Eighty nine days into the marriage, defendant gave birth to a child. Appeals. Conchita Delizo married Fernando Aquino in 1954 while she
It is for this reason that petitioner is seeking the annulment of their was pregnant. Aquino now claims that her pregnancy was concealed
marriage. He said she claimed to be a virgin entering into the marriage. from him because it was of another man while Delizo claims that it was
The court decided in favor of the defendant despite the fact that she did their child out of wedlock. Aquino filed a petition for nullification of
not appear. The court found it untenable that petitioner did not notice that marriage by reason of fraud. He presented the marriage contract while
defendant was pregnant at the time of marriage because she was about Delizo did not present any. The court ruled in favor of Delizo and did not
6 months pregnant then. Upon appeal, said decision was affirmed. invalidate the marriage because the concealment of the pregnancy does
not constitute the fraud that would invalidate a marriage. Aquino tried to
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be declared annulled based on reopen the case but it was denied and the CA eventually affirmed the
the evidence adduced. lower court‘s decision saying that it was impossible for him not to have
noticed that the girl was pregnant. A motion for reconsideration was filed
RULING: The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. This is due or chance to present further evidence to the lower court which he did.
to the fact that it was impossible for a person whose intelligence cannot These evidences were his brother‘s statement that he himself fathered
be questioned, being a first year law student, to not have noticed the the child and hid this fact from petitioner and showed pictures of Delizo
severe stage and advanced stage that the person he was marrying was saying she was naturally plump. The petition was denied.
in at that time. His claim of developed abdomens being normal is not
something the court can accept because it was not just a normal ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy constitutes fraud that
developed abdomen but one in an advanced and severe stage of could annul the marriage.
pregnancy. The court cannot accept that there is fraud.
RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative. In the Family Code, the law
includes fraud as grounds for nullification of a marriage. In the present
case, the pregnancy was concealed from petitioner at the time of the
marriage and said child was of another man. This constitutes fraud and
can justify an annulment. Petitioner was able to show that the girl was
naturally plump or fat which does not make it obvious that she is
th
pregnant. It has been shown that pregnancy is usually obvious on the 6
month when the roundness actually appears. The case was then
remanded for a new trial.
83. ANAYA VS. PALAROAN 84. SISON VS. TE LAY LI

FACTS: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. FACTS: Morning of April 28, 1949, a civil wedding before Judge Delfin
Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the Hofilena of MC of Davao was held, in the afternoon, spouses remarried
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. in accordance with rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T.
The complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and Mih in office in Davao City. Plaintiff‘s testifies that the defendant never
granting Aurora‘s counterclaim. While the amount of counterclaim was wooed her. And that the wedding arranged by father. The father whipped
being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior to her often as she opposed marriage and resorted to beating her. She ran
their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. away from home but found by father and promised she will not force her
According to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret again. But when the subject of marriage was renewed, they handed her
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for the annulment a knife telling her to choose between her life or his. Because of fear that
of her marriage with Fernando on such ground. her father might kill her she agreed to the marriage. Testimony
corroborated by mother and Epifania del Rio, relative of her mother. She
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his lived with her husband in his parent‘s home but considered him a
pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of stranger since she doesn‘t love him. She was kept a prisoner in the
marriage. house; she never occupied the same bed with husband. They never had
sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949 forced by husband using a
RULING: The concealment of a husband‘s pre-marital relationship with knife, she mustered courage to escape from her husband‘s home.
another woman was not one of those enumerated that would constitute Defendant claims that the marriages were regular and legal, entered into
fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last marriage freely and voluntarily. The plaintiff was not kept a prisoner and
paragraph providing that ―no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her and her husband
chastity‖ shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the their own house and business. She slapped her only when she ran away
case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an with P1200 and when asked where she came from she retorted it was
annulment of marriage. none of his business.

The CFI found the plaintiff‘s marriage consummated only by intimidation

and force and that plaintiff never for a moment acquiesced to the status
of a wife to the defendant and declared two marriages between them null
and void; defendant ordered to return the P1200 and whatever personal
belongings the plaintiff had left in their house

HELD: While it is true that it is the policy of the law to maintain the
marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the marriage is effected
through duress and intimidation and w/o the consent and against the will
of one of the parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage
should consequently be annulled. There was no voluntary cohabitation
on the wife‘s part
85. RUIZ VS. ATIENZA 86. SARAO VS. GUEVARA

FACTS: Plaintiff requests the annulment of her marriage on the ground FACTS: On the day of the marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant, the
that his consent was given under duress. His wife, whom he had marriage was not consummated because the defendant complained of
premarital relations, bore a child. When the child was born, the father of pains. The defendant was operated on and her uterus and ovaries were
his wife allegedly approached him with a knife and in the company of a surgically removed. The removal rendered the defendant incapable of
lawyer. The lawyer threatened his entrance to the bar. procreation as such, plaintiff wants his marriage with the respondent
annulled.
HELD: Petition cannot be granted because the petitioner had several
chances of escape before the marriage and because his wife bore his HELD: Impotency is not inability to procreate but inability to copulate.
own child. Where a man marries under threat of or constrain from lawful Inability to copulate cannot be a ground for annulment and a temporary
prosecution for seduction or bastardy, he cannot avoid marriage on the or occasional incapacity cannot be used as a ground to nullify a
ground of duress. Proof of bodily harm must be sufficiently shown. marriage.
Threat to obstruct admission to the bar does not constitute duress. Only
if the threat is so grave that the person is not acting in his own freewill
that a marriage becomes void.
87. JIMENEZ VS. CANIZARES 88. JOCSON VS. ROBLES

FACTS: Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of HELD: Where the second wife filed an action for annulment, and the
his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the ground that the orifice of husband also assailed the validity of the marriage claiming he was
her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male coerced to marry her by her parents and brothers, and filed a motion for
organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and summary judgment supported by affidavits of the plaintiff's father and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and brothers to this effect, and the plaintiff also submitted the case for
one day after the marriage. The court summoned and gave a copy to the judgment on the pleadings, the court correctly denied the motion for
wife but the latter did not file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit summary judgment in view of provisions of the Civil Code expressly
herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 prohibiting the rendition of a decree of annulment of marriage upon a
days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits of the
lack of interest on her part and therefore rendering judgment in favor of wife's father and brothers practically amounts to these methods not
the petitioner. countenanced by the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the
testimony of the husband.

RULING: The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did
not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot
be convincingly be concluded. It is a well-known fact that women in this
country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-incriminating.
She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be
a witness against herself. Impotence being an abnormal condition should
not be presumed. The case was remanded to trial court.
89. TOLENTINO VS. VILLANUEVA 90. JONES VS. HORTIGUELA

FACTS: Petitioner prays that his petition for annulment be allowed even FACTS: Petitioner requests that she be declared the sole heir of the
if the sermons were not served to the respondent. intestate estate of Marciana Escano, her mother. Prior to the motion, at
the time when petitioner was still a minor, respondent was awarded a
HELD: The Supreme Court denied because in accordance with NCC - fixed rate of P10,000for the administration of the estate of the deceased.
88, 101, in case of non-appearance of defendant, court shall order a Petitioner alleged that when her mother remarried in May 1927, the
prosecuting attorney to inquire w/n collusion exists, and if not, the judicial declaration of the absence of her father was not yet effective. As
attorney shall intervene to make sure that evidence is not fabricated and such, the marriage of the deceased and the respondent was null and
no collusion is in place. void.

HELD: Petition denied. Absence of one spouse shall be counted from the
last day of communication or from the reception of the last news
regarding the absent spouse. In this case, the first spouse was absent
for 9 years.
91. LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC 92. GUE VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in 1933 FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the CFI Manila dismissing the
and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of petition of Angelina Gue. On Oct 11, 1944 Angelina was married to
since then. She diligently looked for him asking the parents and friends William Gue and had a child Anthony Gue, and another child named
but no one knew his whereabouts. She believes that husband is already Eulogio. On January 5, 1946 her husband left Manila and went to
dead since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she Shanghai China but since then had not been heard of, neither had he
intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to written to her nor in any way communicated with her and she failed to
be relieved on any liability under the law. locate him despite of her efforts and diligence. They had not acquired
any property during the marriage. She asked the court for a declaration
ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive of the presumption of death of William Gue. The Court of First Instance,
death before she can remarry. after publication and hearing, issued the order of dismissal saying that no
right had been established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree
RULING: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure may be predicated and this action is not for settlement of the estate of
declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code the absentee as it is clear he did not leave any
prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that ―for the purposes
of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse HELD: A judicial presumption even if final and executor, would still be a
judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in prima facie presumption only and it still disputable, it is for this reason
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose that it cannot be a subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration,
to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration proof of actual death would still have to be determined. The provisions of
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, Art 390 of the New Civil Code , absence of 7 years, for succession shall
however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent not be presumed dead till after an absence of 10 years.
for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the
spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that
each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
93. PEOPLE VS. MASINSIN 94. BENEDICTO VS. DELA RAMA

HELD: If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that FACTS: This is an action for divorce on the ground of abandonment and
her husband was permanently impotent or sterile, there is no liability. adultery. The answer charged the plaintiff with adultery, denied the
adultery imputed to defendant, and asked for divorce. They were married
in July 1891 until August 1892, and lived happily together. The defendant
suddenly without any previous warning took his wife to the house of her
parents, left her there and never lived with her afterwards. The plaintiff:
complains that husband committed adultery with one Gregoria Bermejo
in 1892. The CFI granted the divorce to plaintiff and 81,042.76 pesos as
her share of the conjugal property. The court assumed that the
provisions of the civil code relating to divorce contained in Title 4 of Book
1 are still in force. The petitioner argues the power of the Governor
General, without such order to suspend the operation of the code. And
that the order of suspension is inoperative, for it did not mention the
Book of this Code in which the suspended Titles 4 and 12, were to be
found. The Title 4 relates to marriage and divorce, while Title 12 refers to
Civil Registry (Book 1).

The Supreme Court declared such as an error. On July 31, 1889, the
Civil Code as it existed in the peninsula was extended to the Philippines
and took effect on Dec 8, 1889. On Dec 31, an order was published
which states that Titles 4 and 12 of the CC are suspended in the
archipelago, though no decree can be found published in the Gaceta.
The history of Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 is well known. As a
consequence of the religious liberty proclaimed in the Constitution of
1869, the whole of the law was in force in the peninsula. But that basis
was wanting in these islands, and prior to the promulgation of the CC in
1889, no part of the law was in force here, except Articles 44 to 78 which
were promulgated in 1883. It is claimed that if these are suspended, the
only marriages in the islands would be canonical and the only courts
competent to declare a divorce would be ecclesiastical. There can be no
doubt that the order of suspension refers to Titles 4 and 12 of Book 1
and it has always been understood, it follows that Arts 42-107 of the CC
were not in force here. The canon law had not as such any binding force
outside the church, however, any part of the canon law which by proper
action of the civil authorities had become a civil law stood upon same
footing as any other law in Spain. As ordered by the Council of Trent,
these decrees have, in Spain, the force of a civil law. It may be doubted if
these decrees, even if considered as extended to the Philippines and in
force here, furnish any aid in the solution of the question. Canonists
suggest declaring adultery to be a ground for divorce, however, the
causes for divorce is nowhere distinctly stated therein. The laws of the
church which do state what these causes are have not the force of civil
laws. The decretal law provides abolishing in the peninsula the special
jurisdictions was extended to the Philippines. It states that ecclesiastical of the offense gave the injured party the right to a divorce. That provision
courts shall continue to take cognizance of matrimonial and of the substantive civil law was not repealed by the change of
eleemosynary causes and of ecclesiastical offenses in accordance with sovereignty. The complete separation of the church and the state under
provisions of canon law and have jurisdiction over causes of divorce and the American government while it changed the tribunal in which this right
annulment of marriage as provided by the Council of Trent, but incidents should be enforced, could not affect the right itself. The fact that
with respect to the deposit of a married woman, alimony, suit money and ecclesiastical courts no longer exercise such power is not important. The
other temporal affairs shall pertain to ordinary courts. The Partidas jurisdiction formerly possessed by them is now vested in CFI by virtue of
contain provisions relating to the subject of divorce, it states that when ACT no. 136.
spouses are separated by law, it is not then considered that man
separates them, but the written law and the impediment existing between As the result, the courts of CFI have jurisdiction to entertain suit for
them. Two forms of separation with two reasons: one is religion and the divorce. For that the only ground therefore is adultery and that the action
other the sin of fornication. Religion if on desires to take holy orders and on that ground can be maintained by husband, and that the decree does
the other should grant permission, with authority of the church; while not dissolve the marriage bond. The CFI of Iloilo therefore, committed no
Divorce due to Adultery or Fornication, brought before the judge of the error in assuming the jurisdiction of this case. The adultery of the
holy church, includes spiritual fornication. In here the spouses are defendant was fully proved. The adultery of the plaintiff is however,
separated but the marriage still subsists, neither one of them can plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, which is the
contract second marriage at any time excepting in the case of separation letter showing confession of guilt.
granted by reason of adultery in which case the surviving spouse may
remarry after the death of the other. No other person but the spouses On the main issue of Adultery, the lack of evidence destroys the theory
themselves can make an accusation for such a cause and it ought be of the court below and of the appellee that the defendant expelled the
made before the bishop or the ecclesiastical judge either by the parties plaintiff from his house because he was tired of her and desired the
themselves of their attorneys. This divorce did not annul the marriage. company of other women. It is not adequate to explain the sudden
That either spouse has been guilty of adultery is a defense to his or her termination of their marital relations. The testimony of the defendant
suit so is the fact that she has pardoned her—if after a divorce has been correctly explained the theory—he stated that on his return from an
granted to the husband, he commits adultery, there is a waiver of the inspection of one his estates his wife‗s maid gave him a letter in the
judgment handwriting of his wife and directed to her lover, a Spanish Corporal of
the civil guard, named Zabal. She admitted the genuineness of the letter,
ISSUE: Whether these provisions of the Partidas were in force in the fell upon her knees and implored him to pardon her, that same day he
islands prior to 1889? took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred and left her
there. That the plaintiff is guilty and the defendant has condoned the
RULING: The general rule was that laws of the Peninsula did not rule in offense, though no factual evidence on this claim. Law 6 , Title 9 Partida
the colonies unless they were expressly extended to them, as to certain 4 provides that the wife can defeat the husband‗s suit for divorce by
laws, this result was, however, accomplished in another way. proving that he has pardoned her, but no laws in the Partidas says that
Recopilacion de laas Leyes de Indias provides ―and as to all matters not the effect of the pardon would be so far-reaching as to entitle her to a
provided for by the laws of this compilations, the laws of the compilations divorce against him in a case like this present one. Therefore, neither of
and the Partidas of these kingdoms of the Castile shall be followed in the the party is entitled to a divorce, both committed adultery. Judgment is
decisions of causes in accordance with the following law. By the therefore reversed.
operation of this law (TORO), first enacted in 1530, those laws of the
Partidas herein before referred to relating to divorce, upon the discovery
and settlement of the Philippines became at once effective therein, they
have remained in force since all civil laws of the state as distinguished
from laws of the church. Being in force on August 13, 1898, they
continued to be in force with other laws of a similar nature. The Partidas
recognized adultery as a ground for divorce, therefore according to the
civil as well as canonical law in force in august 13, 1898, the commission
95. ALBANO VS. GAPUSAN 96. IN RE: ATTY RUFILO BUCANA

FACTS: Albano a municipal judge prepared and notarized a document FACTS: On November 10, 1975, Bucana notarized an Agreement
providing for personal separation of Valentina Andres and Guillermo executed by the spouses Gonzalo Baltazar and Luisa Sorongon wherein
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. It they agreed that in case anyone of them will remarry, both parties offer
provides that if either spouse should commit adultery or concubinage, as no objection and waive all civil and criminal actions against them. It
the case may be, then the other should refrain from filing an action would allow them to have a concubine, and extra-marital affairs. As his
against the other. They did this since they were separated for a long time defense, it is said to have been prepared by his clerk and he only signed
and to forestall violent incidents between husband and wife. it out of negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Albano can notarize a personal ISSUE: Whether or not he committed grave act of misconduct in
separation. notarizing agreement

RULING: No. The law considers as void "any contract for personal RULING: Yes, he is guilty of malpractice. It is for the notary to inform
separation between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial himself of the facts to which he intends to certify and to take part in no
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been
partnership. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and duties notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led
extrajudically dissolving the conjugal partnership. Family Code 26, Par 2 to hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public
provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by the court
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad even to the extent of disbarment.
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
97. TENCHAVES VS. ESCAÑO 98. VAN DORN VS. ROMILO

FACTS: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes-Van Dorn a Filipino and Richard Upton a
Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, US citizen married in Hongkong. They established their residence in thhe
they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to work while Philippines. On 1982, they obtained a divorce in Nevada, US. Petitioner
Escano stayed in Cebu, then Misamis. In Misamis, Escano asked for remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. Upton is contesting for his
petition to annul her marriage but this was dismissed because of her share in Galleon Shop which he contends is conjugal property.
non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the United States
without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
extreme cruelty and mental in character in Nevada. Respondent then alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the
married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US Citizen. divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no
On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the proceedings for legal separation community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
and damages against wife and parents in law. through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce in Nevada was legal
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the
RULING: No, the divorce and 2nd marriage are not recognized as valid. Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines
As stated in Art 15, since marriage was contracted by Filipinos in and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus remaining valid. Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
the code, instead of divorce, legal separation is used, wherein marriage
is still recognized. To recognize decree of divorce of foreign courts would ISSUE: Whether or not Filipino Laws would still prevail.
be violation on public policy and article 17 of Civil Code. Prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts, or property and those which have for their RULING: No. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
object public order, policy, and good customs shall not be rendered Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
conventions agreed upon in foreign country. It would also discriminate in our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
favor of wealthy persons who can get divorced elsewhere. It would not divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
make difference if Tenchavez was also in court of Nevada when divorce they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
was filed since mere appearance can‗t confer jurisdiction on court which Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
had none. Tenchavez now has grounds to divorce respondent since she standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling him to
ask for legal separation under basis of adultery. Therefore, petitioner has
grounds to file for legal separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral
damages and fees.
99. PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA 100. GARCIA-RECIO VS. GARCIA

FACTS: On Sept. 7, 1979, Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino, married Erich FACTS: A Filipino (Recio) was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
Geiling, a German in Federal Republic Germany. They later resided in citizen in 1987. In 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the
Malate, Manila. On Jan. 1983, they asked for divorce which was marriage was issued by an Australian family court. On 1992, Recio
obtained on Jan. 15 1986. By June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two complaints became an Australian citizen and married a Filipina (Garcia) in
of adultery with William Chia and Jesus Chua. Cabanatuan City. The application for marriage license showed that Recio
was single and a Filipino. Late 1995, couple started living separately. On
ISSUE: Whether or not he can still file for adultery after German divorce May 1996, conjugal assets were divided in accordance with Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia. On 1998, Garcia filed a complaint to
RULING: No. Article 344 of RPC provides that only offended spouse may nullify the marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that Recio had a
bring case of adultery to court and should still be spouse when complaint subsisting marriage when they were married and that she only became
was filed. Since he filed it after he divorce was decree he is now not aware of this on November of the preceding year. Recio says otherwise
considered a spouse. It would be absurd to bring action determined by and claims that his first marriage was dissolved by the Australian divorce
his status before or subsequent to commencement of adultery. Marriage decree, was legally capacitated to marry, and that Garcia was aware of
in his part was already extinguished thus he cannot sue as spouse this as early as 1993. On 1998, five years after the couple‗s wedding and
anymore. while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, respondent
wasable to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. RTC
declared the marriage dissolved because the Australian divorce had
ended the marriage. Garcia filed current petition in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was
proven.

RULING: The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson

appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately for
respondent‗s cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner‗s qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner‗s failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted
articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
101. GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA 102. PEOPLE VS. ZAPANTA

FACTS: On Jan. 7, 1915, the parties were legally married but after a
month the woman left because of gross acts by her husband. As to the
marriage, a contract in so far as civil effects are concerned requiring
consent of parties provides that after the marriage ceremony, a conjugal
partnership is formed between the two. Reciprocal rights arise and legal
existence becomes one, and that the termination of it should result in
some relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 149 is absolute and therefore can‗t grant wife
any support since she was the one who left home

RULING: No, separation is different from support given to wife as agreed

upon in the contract they entered into when they got married when
husband promised to support wife. The wife is still part of conjugal
domicile even if she doesn‗t live in house anymore. Therefore, the
husband should pay support.
103. GANDIONCO VS. PEÑARANDA 104. MUNOZ VS. BARRIOS

FACTS: On 29 May 1986, Teresita Gandionco, the legal wife of the FACTS: Married in 1942. Husband (Barrio) and wife (Munoz) had
petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental frequent quarrels. During these quarrels, husband maltreated the wife.
complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of Unable to stand the maltreatment she suffered, she lived separately from
concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 her husband. After they lived separately, two more incidents of
October 1986, private respondent also filed in Municipal Trial Court, maltreatment occurred. She filed for a petition seeking legal separation,
General Santos City a complaint against petitioner for concubinage. By custody and child support. Upon the testimonies of witnesses it was
14 November 1986 private respondent filed for support of pendent lite established that the maltreatment of the wife consisted of: boxing in the
which was granted on 10 December 1986. Petitioner contends that civil face or abdomen, hair-pulling and twisting her neck.
action for legal separation and its consequences should be suspended in
light of criminal charge of concubinage under Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules ISSUE: Whether or not the maltreatment in this case is a ground for legal
on Criminal Procedure. It is said that after a criminal action has been separation.
commenced the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall
be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in RULING: No. Prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, maltreatment
the criminal proceeding has been rendered. suffered by the wife does not constitute attempts on her life. Intent to kill
must be established with clear and convincing evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not other actions should be suspended due to
criminal action of concubinage

RULING: The Supreme Court held in negative. On the issue of

separation: civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce the civil
liability arising from the offense‖. The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule
111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which refers to civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas,
the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply referred to "Civil action arising from
the offense." The action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability,
but is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to
each other. An that a decree of legal separation on ground of
concubinage may be issued without criminal conviction of concubinage
thus no need to wait. On the issue of support, it can be availed of in an
action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge.
Hence, petition is dismissed.
105. CONTRERAS VS. MACARAIG 106. LAPUZ VS. EUFEMIO

FACTS: In Sept. 1962, family driver told Elena Contreras that her FACTS: On August 18, 1953, Camen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal
husband Macaraig was living with another woman. She failed to verify separation against Eufeimo S. Eufemio. On September 21, 1934, a Civil
the rumor from her husband. In April 1963, she heard rumors that her Marriage was celebrated, while on September 30, 1934 a Canon
husband was seen with another woman who was pregnant. In May of the Marriage took place. They lived together until 1943 when Eufemio
same year she once more failed to ascertain the veracity of the abandoned Lapuz. They had no children. Lapuz found out Eufemio was
allegations because she was afraid that it would precipitate a quarrel and cohabiting with Go Hiok on or about March 1949. Petitioner then prayed
drive him away. However she finally found out about her husband‘s for issuance of legal partnership and that Eufemio should be deprived of
mistress and the birth of the latter‘s child. In December 1963, wife finally his share of the conjugal partnership of profits. Eufemio‗s answer states
met with her husband and pleaded him to give up his mistress and return declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Lapuz on the ground of
to the conjugal home, assuring him that all would be forgiven. He his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law
declined. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation but the and customs with Go Hiok alias Ngo Hiok. During the pendency of case,
case was dismissed because prescription had, according to the court, Lapuz died in a vehicular accident (May 31, 1969). On June 9, 1969,
already taken place from Sept. 1962 when she had found out about her Eufemio moved to dismiss petition for legal separation on 2 grounds:
husband‘s illicit relationship from the family driver. The CA dismissed the first, that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
complaint because of prescription. period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code, and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. On June 26, 1969 the
ISSUE: Whether or not the period of prescription is counted from Sept. counsel for Lapuz moved to substitute the deceased by her father,
1962 or from December 1963. Macario. On July 29, 1969, the Court dismissed the case, ruling that
Carmen Lapuz‗s cause of action has not survived, and it did not act on
RULING: December 1963. This was the only time when she became the motion for substitution. Eufemio acquiesced in the dismissal of said
truly cognizant of her husband‘s infidelity. Hearsay information would not counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed
have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation. not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to
declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an
action for legal separation, abate the action? If it does, whether or not
abatement also applies if the action involves property rights?

RULING: Yes, the action for legal separation is purely personal, it may
be made by the innocent spouse and can still stop proceedings if they
reconcile. The death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself.

Yes, it is solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they
cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. Art
106 of civil code provides for rights and disabilities that, by the very
terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of
the spouses thus cannot be transferred to anyone after their death. The
rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the
decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence,
so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. The enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court do
not enumerate actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage 107. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES
Even in actions of bigamy, when one has died all actions cease. The
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10,
the parties involved questions of property are now carried out not in 1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. They
nullity of marriage proceedings but intestate proceedings. had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over
each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each
other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also
agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse
and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo
cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and
recorded as Zoilo‗s. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.
Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal
separation and change of surname against husband due to
abandonment and concubinage. The trial court declared that Zoilo‗s acts
constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:

 CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year
after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known
cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and
 CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e.
that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo
and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of
their agreement)

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is
not an innocent spouse

RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only
made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time
one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she
condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds
for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are
expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides
for (NCC 100).
108. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ sexual intercourse after she has full knowledge of the husband's guilt,
her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong. In this case, he
FACTS: On August 27, 1949, Bugayong married Ginez. Bugayong was a slept with her for 2 nights and 1 day after almost ten months after he
serviceman in the US Navy. Bugayong began receiving letters from his came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. Thus, falling
sister-in-law informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. On under exemptions in Article 100 of NCC: The legal separation may be
October 1951, Bugayong sought the advice of Navy chaplain as to the claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
propriety of a legal separation. On August 1952, Bugayong went to condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Bugayong and Geniz proceeded to
the house of Pedro Bugayong (cousin) and stayed and lived together for
2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. They repaired Bugayong‗s
house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the
information he received that she had committed adultery. Instead of
answering, Geniz packed up and left, which Bugayong took as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. On November 18,
1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against Geniz.
Geniz vehemently denied the averments of the complaint and file a
motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

 Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the

commission of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the
cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations;
 That under the same assumption, the act charged have been
condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and
 That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for
this court to render a valid judgment.

Court ordered the dismissal of the case on the 2nd ground

(condonation). Assignment of errors was brought to CA based on
premature dismissal of case; in finding that there were condonation on
Bugayong‗s part; and in entertaining condonation as a ground for
dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion
to dismiss. Case was lifted to SC based on question of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of sleeping with wife for two days was
already a sign of condonation to the infidelity she allegedly committed

RULING: Yes, condonation is defined as conditional forgiveness or

remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter
has committed; forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation, it may be express or implied. US jurisprudence shows
that one single act of sexual intercourse implies condonation.
Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the
other infidelity. Such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely
consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to
109. YANGCO VS. RHODE 110. DELA VIÑA VS. VILLAREAL

FACTS: A complaint filed by Victorina Obin against petitioner praying FACTS: Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance
she be declared lawful wife of said Yangco, she be granted divorce, and an action for divorce; partition of the conjugal property, and alimony
allowance of alimony and attorney‗s fees. Luis contested declaration of pendente lite in the sum of P400/month. Action is based upon the
marriage since there was not witness to it. Giving of alimony was granted following grounds:
even if there was still doubt as expressed by judge.
1) Adultery, and wherein the husband ejected her from conjugal
ISSUE: Whether or not the judge had jurisdiction to grant alimony or home and thus she established her residence in Iloilo, that she
support to Victorina Obin. had no means of support and was only living at the expense of
one of her daughters.
RULING: No. there is a need to show documents or circumstances of 2) A preliminary injunction, restraining her and prohibiting her
relationship to allow one spouse to ask for support. In this case, husband from conjugal property since defendant was trying to
evidence should be the canonical certificate. This case, only claimed to alienate or encumber said property.
be the wife and judge who issued the support said he issued it with
doubt. One cannot ask for support without necessary evidence. CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent appealed claiming that
CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since wife should follow his domicile and that
One SC Justice dissents that one should give support to wife, for it would the judge has exceeded his power in granting the preliminary injunction.
be unfair to her. Court of First Instance had the jurisdiction to hear and
determine the issues upon which the right to alimony depended, and ISSUE: Whether or not the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction
whether the remedy by an appeal from an erroneous exercise of this against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or
jurisdiction is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that had been encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of
provided, and if cases occur in which it does not afford adequate relief it the action.
is the default of the legislative power and it rests with it to provide
additional remedies. Article 68 of the Civil Code provides that after a RULING: Yes. Plaintiff contends that husband is granted power to
petition for a nullity of marriage or for a divorce has been interposed and alienate and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the
admitted certain provisions shall be adopted during the pendency of the wife. This only holds true as long as a harmonious relationship exists.
suit, among which is a provision for the support of the wife and such When such relation ceases, the husband‘s powers of administration
children as do not remain under the power of the husband. should be curtailed during the pendency of action to protect the interests
of the wife.
111. ARANETA VS. CONCEPCION 112. SAMOSA-RAMOS VS. VAMENTA

FACTS: Petitioner filed action against his wife for legal separation on the FACTS: On June 18, 1971, petitioner Lucy Samosa filed for legal
ground of adultery. The defendant filed an omnibus petition to secure separation for concubinage and attempt against her life. She also sought
custody of their three minor children, a monthly support of P5000 for for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what
herself and said children and the return of her passport to enjoin plaintiff she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property (under admin
from ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her as well as and management of private respondent). Clemente Ramos (private
pay for attorney‗s fees. Plaintiff denied misconduct imputed to him and respondent) opposed such saying that hearing the petition for injunction
alleging that defendant has abandoned the children and that the conjugal would only make the prospect of reconciliation dim. CFI Judge Vamenta
properties were worth only P80,000. Also contends that defendant is not Jr granted such motion to suspend hearing on the injunction, and thus
entitled to the custody of the children as she has abandoned them and this certiorari.
had committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to
educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and unable to give ISSUE: WON preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
the children to love, respect and care of a true mother and without remedy on exclusive property of wife that is currently being administered
means to educate them. The CFI granted custody of the children to by her husband can be tried in court even before the 6-month period
defendant and a monthly allowance of P2300 for support for her and the allotted in cases of legal separation
children, P300 for a house and P2000 as attorney‗s fees; reconsideration
denied. RULING: Yes. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the
hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-
HELD: Writ prayed for is issued and the respondent judge or whosoever month period. Art 103 provides that in cases where court deems proper,
takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and it can appoint another to manage property between husband and wife. In
support pendent elite in accordance with this opinion. The court‗s order this case, her paraphernal property, would show that it is not an
fixing the alimony and requiring payment is reversed. aggravating circumstance to the prescribed 6-month period deemed as
the cooling off period. In any case, more than 6 months have already
The main reason given by judge for refusing plaintiff‗s request that passed thus court can hear both legal separation and mandatory
evidence be allowed to be introduced is by Art 103 of CC, provides for 6 injunction.
months allowance as cooling off period. The provision of the code is
mandatory, court understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it
on the merits of the case or on any incident, is prohibited, status quo is to
be preserved for this time. It may be noted that since 6 months have
elapsed since the filing of the petition may not be allowed, reasons for
granting the preliminary injunction should be given at the scope of the
article cited may be explained. The cooling off period is to make possible
a reconciliation but this practical expedient, is necessary to carry out
legislative policy does not have the effect of overriding other provisions
such as the determination of the custody of children and alimony and
support pendent elite according to the circumstances. The law expressly
enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances, if these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to
actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
113. LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 114. MATUBIS VS. PRAXEDES

FACTS: Around May 1951, Lerma (petitioner) and Diaz (private FACTS: Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes were married on Jan. 10,
respondent) got married. On August 1969, Lerma filed a complaint for 1943. But from May 30, 1944 they lived separately from each other. They
adultery vs. Diaz and her lover Teodoro Ramirez. By November 1969, had an agreement on April 3, 1948 that they relinquish their rights over
respondent files for legal separation and / or separation of properties, each other as husband and wife, and that they cannot prosecute each
custody of children and support pendente lite (during pendency of action) other for concubinage or adultery, by way of condonation. They also
for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of concubinage and attempt agree that each is no longer entitled to support from the other spouse
against her life. The CFI said that respondent is entitled to support and that neither can claim anything from each other. On Jan 1955, Zoilo
pendente lite from the date of respondent‗s filing of the complaint, and cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado who gave birth on Sept. 1955 and
that the amount would be a monthly support of Php1,820. Petitioner recorded as Zoilo‗s. they also publicly appeared as husband and wife.
raised the case to the CA. The CA, initially issuing a preliminary Socorro then filed on April 24, 1956 at the CFI Camarines Sur for legal
injunction on the decision of the lower court to give the respondent the separation and change of surname against husband due to
opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the CA dismissed the abandonment and concubinage. The trial court declared that Zoilo‗s acts
petition after the respondent asked for a reconsideration saying that he constitutes concubinage but dismissed complaint due to:
were not asking for a chance to present evidence to the lower court. On
1972, the CFI ruled that respondent and Ramirez are convicted of  CC 102 said action for legal separation can only be filed a year
adultery, this decision was appealed to the CA. Petitioner then files a after such grounds have arisen. Socorro said to have known
new case of adultery against respondent and her new lover, Manila cohabitation of Zoilo since Jan 1955 but action was filed on
policeman Jose Gochangco. Petitioner raises the petition against the 4/24/56 which was outside reglementary period; and
giving support pendente lite to the SC, claiming, among others, that  CC 100 legal separation can be invoked by innocent spouse, i.e.
respondent did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI orders until he that there was no condonation. But agreement between Zoilo
filed a second adultery charge against her. and Socorro showed that there was condonation (Exhibit B of
their agreement)
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can still claim for support even
though she has already been convicted of adultery. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in saying that petitioner filed
her case for legal separation out of time and cannot claim it since she is
RULING: No. Adultery is recognized as a defense for support. CC Article not an innocent spouse
303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a
forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to RULING: Yes, petitioner knew of legal separation on Jan 1955 but only
disinheritance. CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is made the complaint on April 24, 1956. Art. 102 of NCC provides for time
"when the spouse has given cause for legal separation‖. If allowed one one can file for legal separation. As shown in the agreement she
would only need to file a case of legal separation no matter how condoned and consented to (1) living separately (2) can commit grounds
groundless in order to get support. Mere filing would not set Art 292 of for legal separation like concubinage. Condonation and consent are
FC to action. Still preclude loss of such right in certain cases. expressed thus cannot claim to be innocent spouse which law provides
for (NCC 100).
115. PEOPLE VS. SANSANO & RAMOS 116. PEOPLE VS. SCHNECKENBERGER

FACTS: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married and had a FACTS: On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger
child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared to Cagayan and married the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years
abandoned his family.-Wife did not have any means of survival so she of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos. Around 1924, Mariano character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they
returned and filed for adultery, to which both Sansano and Ramos were executed a document which in part recites as follows:
sentenced. After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for Mariano
to take her back. The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el
to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to Hawaii. Mariano went resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni
back to file for divorce (under Act2710) intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los
mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de
accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.
ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore barred from
action
On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the
Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez,
RULING: Yes. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever she would
Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he
like to do. Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He is
contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the
therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The sole purpose of
justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived
filing the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.
together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity
of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted
The husband was only assuming a mere pose of an ―offended spouse‖.
two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First
He consented to the adulterous relations of his wife and Ramos and is
Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance
thus, therefore barred from instituting any criminal proceeding. Even if he
of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused. On the
was still in a foreign country, he would have still been able to take action
trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of
against the accused but since he didn‘t take this option, it showed a
double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the
considerable lack of genuine interest as the offended party.
fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this
was under the former procedure and without deciding the question of
double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the
merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless
imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of
arresto mayor.

HELD: As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its
commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its
ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent
consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to
compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to
court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a
husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy,
if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its
commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior
consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party
from prosecuting the offense.
117. BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ 118. BROWN VS. YAMBAO

FACTS: Bugayong was a serviceman of the US Navy. He was married FACTS: Brown alleges that while he was interned by the Japanese from
on 1949 to Ginez while on furlough leave. Before he reported back to 1942 to 1945, his wife had engaged in adulterous relationships from
duty, they made arrangements as to where the wife would stay. In July which she begot a child. He learned of it after his release. From then on
1951, the husband received letters informing him of his wife‘s infidelities. they decided to live separately from each other and executed, to this
In Aug. 1952, he sought his wife and after finding her, they lived together effect, an agreement liquidating conjugal partnership, even giving the
as husband and wife for two nights and one day. The night after, they erring wife a share. On July, he filed a suit for legal separation praying
continued to live together but the next day, when he questioned her for confirmation of said agreement, custodial rights and disqualification of
about her illicit affairs, she deserted him. He took this as confirmation of wife from succession of plaintiff. Her wife was declared in default for not
her infidelities. On November, he filed a complaint for legal separation. having answered on time. When cross-examined by the assistant city
The court ordered the dismissal of the action based on wife‘s motion to fiscal, it was revealed however that Brown, after the liberation from the
dismiss. He appealed but the CA furthered the case, since it constituted internment, had also lived with another woman with whom he has
questions of law, to the SC. begotten children. The court refused to grant the petition on the basis of
prescription, commission of similar offense by petitioner, and
ISSUE: Whether or not the copulation which transpired after the husband involvement of consent and connivance.
knew about his wife‘s alleged infidelities can be considered an act of
condonation. ISSUE: Whether or not proceedings for legal separation can still be
instituted when both spouses are offenders.
HELD: Yes. Condonation is the conditional forgiveness or remission of
one party of a matrimonial offense which the other party committed. HELD: No. His petition cannot prosper for two reasons: (1) prescriptive
According to American jurisprudence, any cohabitation and sexual period is over since he learned of his wife‘s relations in 1945 and only
intercourse with the guilty party after the commission for the offense and filed a complaint after ten years; and (2) His cohabitation with another
with knowledge of the offense will amount to evidence of condonation. woman bars him from claiming legal separation. Failure of the wife to set
Resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation is inferred. up a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between them. Consent and connivance no longer need to be proven
there being two established statutory grounds to grant the decree of legal
separation.
119. BROWN VS. YAMBAO 120. OCAMPO VS. FLORENCIANO

ISSUE: Whether or not findings of City Fiscal Rafael Jose that Brown FACTS: Jose Ocampo was married to Florenciano and had several
lived with another woman after war and had children with her can stop children together who are living with the husband. In March 1951, the
him from legal separation proceedings. husband discovered on several occasions that his wife was having illicit
relations with one Jose Arcalas. On June 18, 1955, plaintiff again
HELD: Yes. Collusion as defined is the act of married persons in surprised the wife and found her engaging in other illicit relations with
procuring a divorce by mutual consent, whether by preconcerted Nestor Orzame. On July 5, 1955, husband filed a petition for legal
commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance separation with the wife conforming to the charge provided that she isn‘t
of agreement to defend divorce proceedings. It is legitimate for the Fiscal criminally charged. Because the wife did not answer the charge, the RTC
to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference declared her in default. The CA, however, held that the husband‘s right
that the wife's default was calculated (emphasis of marriage as more to legal separation on the ground of the wife‘s relations with Arcalas had
than mere contract). The NCC Art 100 now bars him from filing legal already prescribed and it also interpreted the facts to mean that a
separation since he is also guilty of concubinage. NCC Article 102 also confession of judgment on the part of the wife agreeing with the husband
bars him since he filed out of time. Brown did not petition for legal signified collusion between the parties and thus bars the right to
separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's procuring a separation.
adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. It cannot
be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became ISSUE: Whether or not the CA interpreted Art. 101, which prohibits a
cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date decree of legal separation upon a confession of judgment, properly.
when such cause occurred.
HELD: No. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant
appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a
pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand. This did not occur.

Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted

practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of
the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and
should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but
upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a
confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the
separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it.

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement "…

between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to
commit, or to be represented in court as having committed, a matrimonial
offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of
enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express,
may be implied from the acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the
divorce." Griffiths v. Griffiths, Sandoz v. Sandoz.

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make
it appear that a matrimonial offense had been committed although it was
not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even
in the absence of grounds therefore.
121. MATUTE VS. MACADAEG 122. LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Rosario Matute was found guilty of adultery and a decree of FACTS: Elisea Laperal married Enrique Santamaria. They are now
legal separation was granted to Armando Medel, awarding custody of the legally separated. Elisea wants to resume the use of her maiden name.
children to the latter. Medel went to the US leaving children with his Petition was opposed by the City Attorney on the ground that it violates
sister in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her Art. 372 of the CC and that is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The
offspring. Armando returned late 1954. With his permission, Rosario lower court originally dismissed the petition but changed its mind and
brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her father on the granted it on the ground that it was merely for a change of name. It also
condition that the children would be returned after two weeks. She never reasoned that the use of the married name would give rise to confusion
returned and instead filed a motion to regain custody on the ground that in the woman‘s finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal
the children did not want to go back to their father and that the father was assets.
living with another woman. Armando opposed this motion and countered
with a petition to declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court (in ISSUE Whether or not a wife can use her maiden name after a decree of
view of her failure to return the children). Judge Macadaeg absolved the legal separation has been granted.
Rosario from contempt but denied her motion for custody and ordered
her to return the children. Rosario then filed an action of certiorari and HELD: No. Legal Separation alone is not a ground for wife‘s change of
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Armando and the name. Art 372 specifically mandates the wife to continue using name and
Judge. Preliminary injunction was granted after filing. surname employed before the legal separation. Her marriage status is
unaffected by the separation. Rule 103 (provision for a change of name
ISSUE: Whether or not mother can regain custody of her children after in general) does not prevail over the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
the issuance of a degree of legal separation.

HELD: No. A decision rendering custody of minor children is never

final… but until it is reviewed and modified, such a decision must stand.
In the present case, Rosario merely obtained permission from the legal
parental authority who is the father. He may therefore demand their
return at any time. Judge was well within his jurisdiction whether or not
he chose to judge the other way. It is within his power to grant custody or
not. No grave abuse of discretion occurred.
123. ATILANO VS. CHUA CHING BENG 124. GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA

FACTS: Spouses were married on May 1951. Then they went to FACTS: Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y
Zamboanga, and after the husband left the wife with her parents for a Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a
while with the promise that she would go back to Manila, which didn‘t residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a
come true. On Sept 30 1953, Atilano filed for support of 200/month month before petitioner returned to her parent‘s home. Goitia filed a
against her husband in the premise that they were living separately since complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It
October 1952 due to their bickering. The husband replied that he was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and
preferred to support her in their own conjugal home in Manila. She was lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform such
awarded 75/month but with the observation that separation was due acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
more to in-laws than anything else and her demand to move to a cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her
different house from them. by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different
body parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can be compelled to return and live in Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
their conjugal dwelling. conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
RULING: Misunderstandings with a third-party is not seen by the law as
a just cause to leave the conjugal home. The wife cannot be compelled ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who outside the conjugal home.
left. In this case, the husband has option whether to support her or not.
The husband has expressed that he is willing to establish a conjugal RULING: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
home separate from his parents. created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the
husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation
either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own
home at his option. However, this option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation
to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the
husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.
125. ARROYO VS. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO 126. RAMIREZ-CUADERNO VS. CUADERNO

FACTS: Mariano Arroyo and Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo have been FACTS: Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno (petitioner) and Angel Cuaderno
married for 10 years when Dolores decided to leave their domicile with (respondent) separated from each other on November 17, 1956.
the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. Mariano Respondent inflicted bodily injuries on petitioner. He then took her to her
thus initiated an action to compel her to return to the matrimonial home parents‘ home where she asked money from her husband at first, and
and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered that she had eventually stopped from accepting any later. The petitioner then filed a
been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of the husband complaint with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court asking for
and thus she filed a cross complaint that asks for a decree of separation, support on the basis of maltreatment and abandonment. Respondent
a liquidation of conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees claims that she left the domicile and was not entitled to said support. The
and permanent separate maintenance. The trial judge, upon JDRC granted petitioner support in the amount of P150 per month. But
consideration of the evidence, concluded that the continued ill-treatment the CA reversed the decision and the two were admonished to live
of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the together as husband and wife, on the basis of husband‘s testimony.
conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with
him. Thus, the judge gave judgment in favor of the defendant. The ISSUE: Whether or not the courts have the ability to force a husband and
plaintiff appealed. wife to cohabit by legal mandate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband is entitled to a permanent RULING: No. It would be unrealistic for the court to compel or urge the
mandatory injunction to compel the wife to return to the matrimonial couple to live together when, at least for the present, they, specially the
home and live with him as his dutiful wife. husband, are speaking of the impossibility of cohabitation. Marriage
entitles both parties to consortium or cohabitation, but mutual affection
RULING: Although the husband is entitled to a judicial declaration that must be the cause of this right, and not any legal mandate. This is an
his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her inherent characteristic of marriage in this jurisdiction. The separation
duty to return, the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an stays until a different situation exists between the parties.
order, enforceable by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. Thus, that the
plaintiff in this case is not entitled to the unconditional and absolute order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the
petitory part of the complaint.

It was held that the judgment appealed from in respect both to the
original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores has
absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she
is admonished that it is her duty to return. Plaintiff absolved from cross-
complaint.
127. ABELLA VS. COMELEC 128. MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES

FACTS: Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) FACTS: On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of
filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they
running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They
residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13
alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest
who was earlier disqualified from running for the same office. The and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation
COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage
the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her
when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the second highest name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an
votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November
Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made
erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that before Cervantes‗ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.
the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under "the Election Law, ISSUE: Whether the Article 133 of the civil code apply to donations
the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the principle between live-in partners.
of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In this
regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence RULING: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
to Ormoc City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her donation between the spouses during the marriage, policy considerations
Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS REVERTENDI of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as
course of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City.‖ it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
Leyte. rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an
RULING: For the purpose of running for public office, the residence adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory
requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it
where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time. The as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
Civil Code is clear that '[F]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment provision would not be attained.
of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their
habitual residence. Art. 68 provides that the husband and wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support. While Art. 69 provides that the husband
and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other
if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if
the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Husband and
wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is
their usual place of abode.
129. DELIZO VS. DELIZO 130. BALLADOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: From the time of April 1891 until Dec 1909, Nicolas Delizo was
married to Rosa Villasfer, who then later died. During Oct 1911 up to
May 1957, he had a second marriage, to Dorotea de Ocampo until he
himself died. The petitioners and respondents are fighting over the land
owned by Nicolas Delizo whether it belongs to the conjugal property of
the first or second marriage. The trial Court first partitioned the land to
the first marriage‗s heirs since there was no liquidation of conjugal
property of first marriage thus the co-conjugal partnership was converted
into one of co-ownership between Nicolas Delizo and his children of the
first marriage. The judgment was appealed by petitioners from the
second marriage. Court of Appeals ruled that Caanawan lands were
acquired during the first marriage and the fact that lands were registered
under ―Nicolas married to Dorotea‖ is merely descriptive of his civil
status. Though it did not agree with the partition of Trial Court when it
held that ½ of conjugal property from first marriage is husband‗s own
separate property when he remarried again. It also held that since it was
at the time of the second marriage that the land was cultivated, it is
entitled to reimbursement for the increase in value of the 47 hectares.
Thus ½ that is given to the first marriage‗s heirs must be deducted by the
improvements made by second marriage. It declared partition as follows:
One-half of the Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villasfer or 1/6
thereof for each child of the first marriage; and 20% of all the other
properties or 1/15 thereof for each such child. ½ to Nicolas Delizo
descending to his heirs both in the first and second marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partition of lands made by CA is correct.

RULING: No. Lands acquired in first marriage were from the Homestead
Act and at the time of the 1st marriage, the lands weren‗t owned by
Nicolas Delizo yet since he did not fulfill the requirements of the public
land law for the acquisition of such lands. Act 926 provides the right of
the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he
has complied with all the requirements of the law, thus Caanawan lands
weren‗t conjugal property of first marriage due to non-compliance. Thus
held that land properties should be divided between the two conjugal
partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership since to
leave the heirs from the first marriage out would only enhance discord
and not promote family solidarity.
131. JOCSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS 132. ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF

FACTS: Petitioner Moises Jocson and Respondent Agustina Jocson- FACTS: Upon the express guarantee of the Fidelity and Surety Company
Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson of the Philippine Islands, the Philippine Trust Company granted Agcaoili
and Alejandra Poblete. Alejandra predeceased her husband without her a credit in current account not to exceed 20,000. Angel Ansaldo in turn
intestate estate being settled. Emilio Jocson conveyed by sale almost all agreed to indemnify Fidelity and Surety Company for any losses and
of his properties to Agustina Jocson, including his 1/3 share in the estate damages from the obligations of Agcaoili to Philippine Trust Company.
of his wife. Moises says that it should be partitioned between him and Agcaoili defaulted hence Fidelity and Surety Company brought an action
Agustina therefore declaring the said documents null and void. against Ansaldo for the recovery of 19K, and caused the sheriff to levy
Defendant Moises says that the first document was signed through fraud on the joint savings account of Ansaldo and his wife. Ansaldo said that
and deceit. Same with the second and third document. Moreover, he they levied on a conjugal property, hence not liable to Ansaldo‗s personal
said that there could be no sale between father and daughter on the obligations. Ansaldo filed action in the CFI to declare it null and void. It
same roof, and the unliquidated conjugal property also cannot be sold. was granted by the CFI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is conjugal. ISSUE: Whether or not the joint savings account is liable for the payment
of the personal obligations of the husband.
RULING: No. Before tackling the main issue, it must considered that
Moises said that Agustina didn‗t have enough funds, but then Agustina is RULING: No. It must be proven that the fruits of the paraphernal property
in a buy and sell business; and the purchase price was even more than benefited the family to prove that it is conjugal. In this case, there was no
the assessed price. Lastly, Certificates of Title in insufficient to prove that effort to prove that the obligations contracted benefited the family of
a certain property is conjugal, it does not at all prove that the properties Ansaldo.
were gained in the spouses lifetime. Registration and Acquisition of title
are two different acts. In the contrary, it is clear that Emilio Jocson is the
owner of the properties, because it was registered in his name alone.
133. CASTRO VS. MIAT 134. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. QUINTOS

FACTS: Moises and Miat bought two parcels of land, one in Paranaque FACTS: On June 20, 1918 PNB granted the defendants a credit to the
and one in Paco. Moises then wanted the Paranaque property to himself amount of P31, 284 to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI,
but would leave the two properties to his sons. Moises and Concordia Compañia Naviera, Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company. In the
bought the property on installment basis on 1977, and it was only on document, it did not clearly show that they were husband and wife,
1984 it was finished. Alexander agreed to sell the said lot to Romeo. except in their civil statues. It also does not show that they bound
However, Romeo found out that the property was sold to Castro by themselves solidarily to the debt incurred. A complaint was then filed
Moises. Moises bought the property through mortgage from Castro. requiring Mr. Ansaldo to pay his debt. Defendants claim that their debt is
Alexander received 2/3, Moises 1/3, Romeo received none. The Court of not of a solidary nature and should thus only bind one to the extent of
Appeals rendered a decision nullifying deed of sale between Moises and their share in the obligation thus should not be charged to their conjugal
Castro and ordered them to reconvey the land to Romeo for P36,000. partnership. Petitioner raises Art 1408 of NCC that provides all debts
incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are chargeable to
ISSUE: Whether or not the Paco property is the capital property of the conjugal partnership thus Margarita Ansaido, the wife, is part of the
Moises. obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal
partnership is liable for the debt. Supreme Court held that conjugal
RULING: No, it is a conjugal share. Since it was acquired through joint partnership should be used to pay for the debt incurred as well as private
funds, Moises and Concordia bought the property during the marriage. property of each of them since they are both obligated. Upon Motion for
There was even a letter from Moises to Romeo conveying the land. Reconsideration, the court reasserts that conjugal property is liable for
Moreover, Castro is not a buyer in good faith. Since they knew that there the debt they incurred as husband and wife.
was an adverse claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred
through conjugal partnership

RULING: Yes, the Civil Code expressly states that partners are not
solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership. Also Article
1137 provides solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined. A
partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the partnership,
because, there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon one.
Properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the
debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
payment thereof.
135. LAPERAL VS. KATIGBAK 136. BERCILES VS. GSIS

FACTS: The Laperals sought for recovery of money evidenced by FACTS: GSIS recognized Pascual Berciles as an acknowledged natural
promissory notes made by Katigbak and for the recovery of jewelry that child and other private respondents Maria Luisa Berciles Vallreal, Mercy
Katigbak was supposed to sell. On Nov 1, 1950 the Trial Court ordered Berciles Patacsil and Rhoda Berciles as illegitimate children of Judge
Katigbak to pay back the Laperals and return the jewelry. On Dec 1950 Pascual Berciles with Flor Fuentebella and thus have rights to his
Katigbak and Evelina Kalaw filed for judicial separation of property and retirement benefits. This was contested by his wife Iluminada Ponce and
separate administration which was granted. By Feb 1, 1955 the Laperals their children.
filed complaint that the separation of property should be annulled and
should be deemed as conjugal property. On Dec. 27, 1958 the Supreme ISSUE: Whether or not GSIS was correct in upholding their status as a
Court rendered judgment that while the conjugal property should be used natural child and illegitimate children
to pay the debt of Katigbak, the paraphernal property of Kalaw shouldn‗t.
As the case was remanded the Trial Court rendered judgment that RULING: No. Art. 287 of the New Civil Code say that illegitimate children
Kalaw‗s property was indeed paraphernal. other than natural are entitled to support and such successional rights
are granted in the code, but for this article to be applicable there must be
ISSUE: Whether or not property being contested is part of conjugal admission or recognition of paternity of illegitimate child. There was no
property. evidence of admission. There was no evidence that he intervened when
his name was put in the birth certificate of Pascual Berciles, thus his part
RULING: No. Art. 160 of the Civil Code provide properties acquired in the birth certificate is null and void. The baptismal certificate has no
during marriage are deemed conjugal property unless it is proven that it weight as well and living together does not prove filiation, also, pictures
belongs exclusively to husband and wife. It was shown through that (1) are not proof of filiation. Their mother was not recognized to be married
title is in name of wife alone (2) husband gave his marital consent to their to the deceased. Retirement benefits are distributed equally to the five
being mortgaged by his wife (3) wife is financially able to buy property. In recognized heirs from his marriage to Iluminada Ponce who is also an
this case, proved that mother of Evelina bought the contested property heir. This is in corollary with Art. 966 of the New Civil Code that provides
for her, it was under Evelina‗s name, Ramon Katigbak issued a if a widow or widower and legit children or descendants are left, surviving
manifestation where he stated he had no interest in the property, spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
husband could not have afforded to buy it. The land is therefore children. And, by Art. 980 of New Civil Code, children of deceased shall
paraphernal and thus can‗t be subject to the debts of Katigbak. always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
137. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ 138. PLATA VS. YATCO

FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the FACTS: Amailia Plata purchased land which he then sold the property to
possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per Celso Saldana but he resold it to her seven months after when she was
month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services already married to Gaudencio Begosa. On Sept 1958, Amalia mortgaged
rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry to Cesarea Villanueva the property in consideration of a loan of 3,000.
alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question Gaudencio also signed the deal. Amalia and Gaudencio failed to pay
before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to mortgage and the land was then sold to Cesarea and husband Gregorio.
the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her They then sued Gaudencio Begosa alone for illegal detainer which was
mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the granted. However, Amalia resisted all efforts ejecting her from the party
death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short since she is claiming that land was her own paraphernal property and not
time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and conjugal property
gave as security the jewelry.
ISSUE: Whether or not Amalia is bound by the detainer judgment against
ISSUE: Whether or not jewelry is conjugal property. Gaudencio Begosa.

RULING: It was contended that the jewelry was never delivered to RULING: No, Sufficiently proved that property contested is her own
Plaintiff. It was shown that the key to the box where the jewelry was kept exclusive paraphernal property since she owned it before marriage and
remained with the deceased. Defendant now denies that she knew that even if Saldana did give it back to her when she was already married it
her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to redeem the did not transform it to conjugal property since there was no proof that
same by paying the amount due. Record shows that the jewels were the they money paid to Saldana came from common or conjugal funds. And
sole and separate property of the wife acquired from her mother. It is part since Cesarea and Gregorio were also aware that property was
of her paraphernal property. As such she exercised dominion over the paraphernal as clearly stated in land records, illegal detainer judgment
same. She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until against the husband alone doesn‗t affect the paraphernal property of
and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, Amalia. Thus she had a right to ignore the judgment of eviction against
with the intent that the husband might administer it properly.(Article 1384, her husband. The Supreme Court can‗t decide at the moment whether
Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered property is validly conveyed to Cesarea and Gregorio it was then
the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. remanded to Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
139. LIM VS. GARCIA 140. VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ

FACTS: Hilario Lim died intestate in 1903, with an estate valued at FACTS: Plaintiff commenced an action to recover of the defendant the
P50,000. It was alleged in the inventory by the administrator, Luis Lim, possession of a certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per
that everything but a house and lot, P10k (paraphernalia) and P700 month. Defendant answered and filed a counterclaim for services
(acquired as payment for the land that he sold) were the conjugal rendered by the deceased to the plaintiff and recovery of certain jewelry
property of Hilario and his wife, Isabel Garcia. The administrator alleged to be in the possession in the plaintiff. The jewels in question
contends that the said properties were the separate properties of Hilario before the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff belonged to
because he allegedly brought them into the marriage alone. The three the defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her
parcels of land were only conveyed to Isabel as a gift or for valuable mother. Defendant Lucia is the widow of Domingo Franco and after the
consideration by Hilario during the coverture; hence, it is a void donation. death of her husband she was appointed as the administratrix. A short
The P700 was the price he had received for the sale of a certain lot. time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from plaintiff money and
gave as security the jewelry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parcels of land were conjugal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the jewelry needs to be returned to the
RULING: No, the evidence show that the properties were not acquired by defendant.
Isabel by conveyance from Hilario but by third parties by way of
exchange for a certain property she had inherited from her father‗s RULING: The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate
estate. Hence, they are her separate properties according to Civil Code property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of
Art. 1396 (3) since they were acquired by exchange of her separate further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
properties. While the RTC held that they were part of her dowry, the paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised
record did not prove that it was so and evidence strongly supported the dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the
presumption that it was and continued to be part of her separate estate. exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had
Regarding the P700 (the balance of the price received for the lot) and the delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the
buildings constructed thereon, Supreme Court held that they were part of husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is
the conjugal properties since the buildings were constructed out of the no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her
conjugal partnership funds. Even if the land sold was the separate husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could
property of Hilario, Civil Code 1404 holds that the buildings, erected not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her
during coverture on a land belonging to one of the spouse, will be consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code
considered as conjugal partnership property, that is ―after allowing the above cited.
owner of the land the value thereof.‖
141. MANOTOK REALTY VS. COURT OF APPEALS (against third parties). Lucero and Sojio were also found to have acted in
bad faith since the latter waited a long time before going to PTC, ignored
FACTS: Authorized as the special co-administrator of the testate estate the Court summons, and instead executed a deed of assignment, while
of Clara Tambunting de Legarda, Vicente Legarda sold 280 sq.m. of the the latter constructed a house when he was a mere lessee.
Legarda Tambunting Subdivision to Dr. Abelardo Lucero for P30/sq.m.,
payable on an installment basis. Lucero paid the initial amount of P200
and Legarda issued a receipt and delivered the property to him. Although
he was ordered by the CFI to sell the Subdivision, Legarda failed to
execute the necessary document/s and to submit the same to the Court
for approval as he was ordered. He did not execute and register a deed
of sale in a public instrument. Meanwhile, Lucera subsequently leased
the property on 1953 to six tenants, who paid monthly rentals and
constructed their houses thereon. On July 31, 1956, CFI authorized
Philippine Trust Company as administrator of the estate to sell the
subdivision at the earliest possible time. Hence, it sold the same portion
of the property to Manotok Realty, Inc. Although the property was
advertised for sale, Lucera failed to appear in the estate proceedings.
Instead, he waited for Legarda, who was no longer a special co-
administrator, to send him the formal contract in order for him to make
further payments. In 1957-1958, PTC refused to entertain Lucero when
he finally went to them for payment of the property because the estate
was then involved in litigation. Consequent to the litigation, a deed of
sale was then issued to Manotok Realty, Inc. on March 13, 1959; the
same was approved by the Court. On Jan. 1966, Manotok Realty, Inc.
demanded the surrender of the actual and material possession of the
property and on March 4, 1966, it filed a complaint for ejectment.
Although summonses were served to Lucero and tenant Sojio, Lucero
instead executed a deed of assignment of the lot in favor of his lessees.
When RTC favored Manotok Realty, Inc., Lucero alleged on appeal to
CA that the sale made by Legarda was valid because Legarda was
authorized to do so and hence, there was no need for the approval of the
probate court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale between Legarda and Lucero was valid.

RULING: No, the Court directed Legarda to sell the subdivision by

executing the necessary document/s and submitting it to the Court for
approval which Legarda failed to do especially where the sale was on
installment basis. Moreover, the receipt does not conform to the legal
requirements of contracts of sale since it was neither executed in a
public instrument nor registered with the Registry of Deeds. By virtue of
Sec. 1, Rule 73 (Estate of Olave v. Reyes) and Sec. 4, Rule 89 (Vda. de
Gil v. Cancio) of the Rules of Court, the Court as a probate court is
authorized to approve sales of immovable properties belonging to an
estate of a decedent. Hence, the sale was invalid and unenforceable
142. PALANCA VS. SMITH-BELL 143. LIM QUENCO VS. CARTAGENE

FACTS: Emiliano Boncan Yap borrowed P14k from the International

Banking Corporation in order to construct a house. He then conveyed the
house to his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, on Sept. 20, 1904,
which the latter accepted, as a guaranty for the payment of his debt to
IBC. When Smith, Bell & Co. later obtained a judgment and writ of
execution against Emiliano for the collection of money and he failed to
pay, the property was levied. Alejandra filed for declaration that the
property was her exclusive property and demanded its possession and
the dissolution of the levy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is Alejandra‗s exclusively.

RULING: No, because the borrowed P14k of Emiliano was made upon
credit of the property of his wife, the money became conjugal property by
virtue of Civil Code 1401 (3). The subsequent use of the money to the
construction of the house also made the house conjugal property and
liable to the payment of his debts by virtue of Civil Code 1408.
144. TORELA VS. TORELA 145. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was issued in favor FACTS: The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim
of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and
owner of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770). By March 5, 1958, Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They
Felimon Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the
Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him by way of inheritance properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
prior to his marriage to his first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an
order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein
(movant's) civil status, appearing on the face of the original certificate of the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.
title, "from Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon
Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago". He then executed a definite ISSUE: Whether or not the properties belong to the one spouse alone.
deed of sale whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold Lot
No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and RULING: When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
Maria Luna Mahilum. The children claim that the land was conjugal and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
property and they were entitled to the proceeds. They claim that while in spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot
Gallego clean the lot in question. Felimon Torela declared that he and prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
his first wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land in question was innocent third parties are involved.
decreed in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal

property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs'
mother).

RULING: The property in question is not one of those enumerated in

Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited
by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first
wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil
Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully
disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first
marriage. Decree No. 440157 which confirmed the ownership of Felimon
Torela over the land in question described him as married to Graciana
Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot
be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The
further circumstance that the land was registered during their marriage
cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage
for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not confer
title; it merely confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.
146. MAGALLON VS. MONTEJO the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected
during Martin Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the
FACTS: Respondents instituted a case against Martin Lacerna to compel private respondents.
partition of a parcel of land to which Martin had perfected a claim by
homestead. Respondents claiming to the common children of Martin and
his wife, Eustaqia, who died in 1953, asserted a right to ½ of the land as
their mother‘s share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. Defendant
denied marriage to Eustaqia although he admitted living with her without
benefit of marriage. Trial Court found that Martin was indeed married to
Eustaqia and the respondents were their children. The Trial Court further
found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a
patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. On the
basis of these findings, the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of
the land claimed by them. It appears that at the time the case was
brought no certificate of title has been issued to Martin although he had
complied with the requirements necessary to the grant. The OCT was
only issued while Lacerna‘s appeal was pending in the IAC. It states on
its face that it is issued in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino,
of legal age, married to Epifania Magallon ...," the latter being the present
petitioner. IAC ruled in favor of respondents thus a writ of execution was
issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is owned by Martin and Petitioner.

RULING: No. The land in question, which rightfully pertained to the

conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the
plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said
spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of
Martin Lacerna and petitioner herein, Epifania Magallon In such a
situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied,
or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto. The
petitioner herein, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation
to convey to the private respondents that part of the land in question to
which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining
to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal
partnership with Martin Lacerna. The phrase "married to Epifania
Magallon written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of
title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the land is
"conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner. Neither can petitioner
invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that
property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin
Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the aforestated
entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that
147. CUENCA VS. CUENCA 148. ZULUETA VS. PAN AM

FACTS: Respondents were legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and FACTS: This case is about the off-loading of Rafael Zulueta from his
Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. flight back to the Philippines. Rafael Zulueta, along was his wife and
They allege that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria daughter, was traveling from Wake island, going back home to Manila.
while all others are conjugal. They also allege that Engracia Basadre and While waiting for the flight, Mr. Zulueta went to relieve himself, but for
Agripino were not legally married because at the time they lived together some weird reason, did not go into one of the 8 restrooms in the
Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar. Petitioners denied terminal, but went to a secluded spot in the beach outside some 400
legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the yards from the terminal. Upon his return, he was late, and the captain of
legitimacy of the respondents. They claimed that Agripino and their the plane, Capt. Zentner was already being arrogant. As such there was
mother Engracia Basadre were legally married and that they are the an altercation between Zentner and Zulueta. Consequently,
legitimate children thereof. They also contend that subject parcels of land Capt.Zentner had Zulueta‘s luggage off loaded, but only 3 of the 4
are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia. The Appellate Court suitcases were found, and the last piece of luggage remained on the
held Agripino, in his lifetime, expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of flight to Manila. Originally, Even Mrs. and Ms. Zulueta were supposed to
the estate of Maria Bangahon, proofs that properties in question belong be offloaded, but Mr. Zulueta was able to negotiate a compromise to
exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property. Tax declarations were allow them to stay on the plane back to Manila. Upon reaching Manila,
presented by petitioners are not real evidence to prove ownership or wife tried asking local Pan-Am office to bring her husband home but they
possession. Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to prove: that refused. When Zulueta sued, trial court awarded them damages which
Engraciaand Agripino were legally married; that other petitioners were the SC reduced the amount upon appeal by Pan-Am. Upon, motion for
the legitimate children, and; that subject parcels of land were conjugal reconsideration initiated by both parties (case at hand), Zulueta wants
properties of Agripino and Engracia. the trial court‘s decision to be affirmed in toto while Pan-Am wants the
amount of damages reduced.32 While waiting for the results of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject parcels of land were conjugal appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta, for reasons of their own, separated from
properties of Agripino and Engracia. each other. Mrs. Zulueta then entered into a compromise agreement with
Pan-Am, settling for P50,000.00. Motion to dismiss, as far as she was
RULING: No. Art. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is presumed concerned anyway, was filed but was subsequently denied by the SC on
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains the ground that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
exclusively to the husband or the wife. The presumption refers only to husband‘s consent, except in case cases provided by law.
the property acquired during marriage and doesn‗t operate when there is
no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages involved are part of the conjugal
Documents sought to be presented do not show that the claims to the property
subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during the
marriage of Agripino and Engracia. Presumption cannot prevail when the RULING: Yes. Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta entered into a contract of
title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third carriage with defendant, one which was ultimately breached by the
parties are involved. Documents show that 5 out of 8 parcels covered are offloading of Mr. Zulueta. The award of damages therefore was done
titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Retituto Presumption collectively. Since Mr. Zulueta, having acted in his capacity as
cannot prevail, therefore petition was dismissed. administrator, entered into contract with PanAm and paid for this with
funds from the Conjugal funds, damages incurred by breach of contract
of carriage naturally would be conjugal.
149. MENDOZA VS. REYES 150. CALIMLIM VS. FORTUN

FACTS: Ponciano Reyes and Julia de Reyes were married in 1915. They FACTS: Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas (petitioner) and Fernando Canullas
were able to acquire two parcels of land in QC, plus buildings erected were married Dec 19, 1962. They begot 5 kids. They lived in a house on
thereon from Araneta Inc. sometime in Feb. 1947 on installment basis. the residential land in question, located at Bacabac, Bugallon,
They had to borrow money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation Pangasinan. After Fernando‘s dad died in 1965, he inherited the land. In
(RFC) to pay the installments (2 joint loans of P12,000 and P8,000 1978, Fernando abandoned this family and lived with Corazon Daguines
acquired on 1948 and 1952 respectively). In the deed of sale, the vendee (private Respondent) During the pendency of this appeal, they were
named is JULIA de REYES, with marital consent from Ponciano. The convicted of concubinage by the CFI, which judgment had become final.
transfer certificates in the Register of Deeds were also in her name. The On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the subject property with the house
spouses built a house and camarin on the lots which were eventually thereon to Corazon Daguines for the sum of P2000. In the deed of sale,
leased to Efren and Inocencia Mendoza (appellees) who transformed the Fernando described the house as ―also inherited by me from my
camarin into a movie house. November 1958, the Reyes spouses had to deceased parents‖. Corazon however was unable to take possession of
ask for an extension of 5 years from the Dev‘t Bank of the Phil the house and lot because of Mercedes, so she initiated a complaint
(successor of the RFC) for the payment of the money they borrowed, as against Mercedes for the quieting of title and for damages. Mercedes
payment for the outstanding balance of the lots. On March 3, 1961, Julia claims that the house in dispute where she and her children were
sold the lots to the Mendoza couple while Ponciano was in Pampanga, residing, including the coconut trees on the land, were built and planted
attending to his farm. The couple ain‘t cool with one another anymore. with conjugal funds and through her industry; she also claims that the
The sale was made without the consent of Ponciano. the contract was sale of land together with the house and improvements to Corazon was
entered into using funds from the conjugal partnership, if the right of null and void because they are CONJUGAL PROPERTIES and she had
redemption pertains to the wife, it may make the property redeemed, in NOT GIVEN CONSENT to the sale. The original judgment declared
this case the damages, not conjugal. in this case however, since this Corazon as the lawful owner of the land in question as well as the ½ of
right of redemption was not proven, there remains a presumption that the the house erected on said lands. Upon reconsideration prayed for by
damages are part of the conjugal property. In the end, petitions were Mercedes, respondent court amended the prior decision and resolved
dismissed. Transfer certificates were issued to Mendozas. Ponciano filed that the plaintiff (Corazon) is (still) the true owner of the land in question
a case in the CFI for the annulment of the sale. The Mendozas and Julia and the 10 coconut trees, (but) declared the sale of the conjugal house
allege that the lots were paraphernal properties of Julia, and the to plaintiff including 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the
purchase was done in good faith. The CFI ruled in favor of Julia and the conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas and his legitimate wife
Mendozas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring the (Mercedes). Hence this case.
sale null and void with respect to the ½ share of Julia to the lots in
question. ISSUE: Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the character
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties in question conjugal or of conjugal property.
paraphernal?
RULING: Yes. A correct interpretation of Art 15835 yields that: Both the
RULING: Court says conjugal. The Court applied Art. 153 of the Civil land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
Code (Art.117 of the FC par.1), declaring that the properties are acquired partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The
by onerous title during the marriage. Records show that the funds came spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for
from loans obtained by the Reyes spouses from the RFC. Although Julia the value of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of
was contending that the money came from her personal funds and from the conjugal partnership. Fernando could not have alienated the house
the donations of her mother, various records show otherwise (Income lot to Corazon since Mercedes had not given her consent to said sale.
Tax Returns – declaring conjugal partnership), and she did not deny the
truth of these statements.
151. MARAMBA VS. LOZANO 152. JAVIER VS. OSMENA

FACTS: In 1948, plaintiff Maramba files a complaint for the collection of a FACTS: Florentino Collantes, husband of Petrona Javier, became
sum of money from spouses Nieves and Pascual Lozano. This was indebted to the estate of Tomas Osmena. Sheriff executed judgment of
granted by the court. On 1960, not satisfied with the judgment, Lozano debt by selling at public auction all the right, title, interest or share which
appealed to the CA who dismissed appeal because it was not filed on the Collates had or might have in two parcels of improved real estate and
time. Record of the case was then remanded to the court a quo and a especially the usufructuary interest therein of Pascuala Santos, the
writ of execution was issued. On Aug. 18, 1960, a levy on a parcel of surviving widow of Felix Javier, which interest was acquired by Petrona
land in the name of Nieves Lozano was made. A notice of a sale at a Javier (wife). Specifically the land inherited by Petrona from her parents
public auction was also made and scheduled for Sept. 16, 1960. and the usufructuary right acquired from Petrona‗s father‗s second wife
However, Lozano had made a partial payment by then and asked for an for the sum of P3,000 (amount was borrowed giving as security for the
adjournment of the sale to October 26. During this time, her husband loan an mortgage on the property she had inherited). Petrona Javier
died. She then prayed for a restraining order on the sale of the lot for claimed that Collantes had no rights in said properties or in the
sale being her paraphernal property. She also prayed that her liability be usufructuary interest and filed for annulment of sale. The Osmena estate
then fixed at ½ of the amount awarded in the judgment. The sale admitted exclusive right of ownership; claimed that the money which said
proceeded anyway. On June 28, 1961, trial court granted the motion of usufructuary interest was purchased belonged to the conjugal
Nieves Lozano. The sale on her property was allowed to proceed to partnership and therefore the right of usufruct belonged to said conjugal
satisfy her liability which is only half now from the original. (from partnership. The CFI: annulled only the sale of 2 properties.
P3,500.07 to P1,750.04)
ISSUE: Whether or not fruits of paraphernal property should be used to
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the pay off the debt incurred by the husband
proceeds of the properties sold at the public auction.
RULING: Yes. Art 1401 of Civil Code provides that fruits, revenue, or
RULING: It cannot. This is only on properties acquired during the interest collected during marriage coming from partnership property of
marriage. In this case, it is established that the property is paraphernal to from that which belongs to either of the spouses is community property.
the wife alone. The court has previously stated that the construction of a Thus, fruits of paraphernal property form part of assets of conjugal
house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the partnership and are liable for payment of marriage expenses. Wife
spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. manages paraphernal property but the fruits of such are managed by the
husband as the administrator of conjugal property. Debt he incurred in
The ownership remains the same until the value is paid but payment can this case was to meet the obligations of the conjugal partnership and
only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. Since there was were for the benefit of the family in his exercise of profession or industry.
no liquidation yet in the conjugal partnership of Nieves and Pascual, her Thus conjugal partnership can be used to pay it off
exclusive property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other
defendant. While they may both use the building constructed in
paraphernal land, ownership is still with her until liquidation of
partnership pays for it.
153. VDA. DE STA. ROMANA VS. PCIB 154. DBP VS. ADIL

FACTS: PCIB is the administrator of the estate of the deceased C.N. FACTS: Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an
Hodges. PCIB filed for the recovery of a parcel of land (Lot 1258-G) agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum of P2,000.00 in a promissory
purchased by Ramon Sta. Romana from C.N. Hodges. Sheriff levied on note whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the
the rights and interests of Ramon Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F and account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. The obligation remained
improvements, also purchased from C.N. Hodges. A third party claim outstanding and unpaid. Confesor, who was by then a member of the
was filed by Emilio Sta. Romana who claimed that Lot 1258-F and its Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April
improvements had been sold to him. The RTC rescinded the contract 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the
and ordered return of possession of Lot 1258-G. The CA affirmed same on or before June 15, 1961. They defaulted in payment, prompting
decision. The trial judge issued a writ of execution and the sheriff issued DBP to file a complaint. Inferior court ordered payment but the CFI of
a notice of sale at public auction of the rights and interests of Ramon Iloilo reversed the order.
Sta. Romana over Lot 1258-F. Ramon Romana died intestate, petitioner
Socorro L. Vda. De Sta. Romana, surviving spouse, filed a motion to ISSUE: Whether or not conjugal partnership may be used to pay debt in
quest the writ of execution. Petitioner prayed that the writ of execution promissory note when husband was the only one who signed it.
and levy on execution made on Lot 1258-F and the improvements
existing thereon be annulled insofar as her ½ share in the said RULING: Yes. Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
properties. Respondent moved to dismiss on ground of res judicata and administrator of the conjugal partnership. All debts and obligations
the CFI granted the motion to dismiss. contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
ISSUE: Whether or not wife should get ½ of property of husband who
died when the land in question is used to pay off debt. In this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory note for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is
RULING: No. As long as conjugal partnership subsists, there can be no liable for this obligation.
½ share of husband or wife. Only when conjugal partnership is dissolved
between husband and wife can they claim it. Any levy on conjugal
partnership property to satisfy monetary judgment against husband is
null and void. In this case, the auction was made before the conjugal
property was dissolved thus wife can‗t claim it. Also showed that the debt
was for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Non-inclusion of wife in
suit to enforce obligation is immaterial. Need not be joined by wife in suit
against conjugal partnership (section 4, rule 3of rules of court and Art
113 of CC)
155. LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA 156. BA FINANCE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Luzon Surety granted a crop loan to Chavez based on a surety FACTS: One May, Augusto abandoned his wife and children. On July 1,
bond executed in favor of Philippine National Bank. Garcia was one of 1975, Augusto Yulo secured loan from BA Finance Corp. as evidenced
the guarantors of the indemnity agreement. On April 1957, PNB filed by a promissory note he signed in own behalf and as representative of
complaint against Luzon Surety. This subsequently prompted Luzon A&L industries which is managed by his wife, Lily Rulo whom he said
Surety, on August of the same year, to file a complaint against the gave him authority to procure loan and sign the promissory note.
guarantors (one of which was Garcia). The lower court ruled in favor of Augusto failed to pay loan. Thus BA Finance filed a complaint against
PNB in the first case and ordered the guarantors in the second case to the spouses. Lily Yulo contended thought that they were already
pay Luzon Surety. July 30, 1960, CFI issued a writ of execution for separated when promissory note was executed, that her signature was
Garcia to pay the amount of P3,839. On August, the sheriff levied his forged, and she was the sole proprietor of A&L and never gave Augusto
sugar quedans, conjugal property of the Garcia spouses. The Garcias any authority to sign the promissory note and said business already
filed a suit of injunction which the lower court found in their favor based closed. Both the TC and CA dismissed petitioner‗s complaint and
on Art. 161 of the CC. Luzon Surety appealed to the CA which affirmed ordered them to pay Lily damages.
the lower court‘s decision. Review through SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Augusto and Lily can be made answerable for
ISSUE: Whether or not the signing of the indemnity agreement obligations since it is part of the conjugal partnership of spouses.
redounded to the benefit of the family and thus, should fall under the
liabilities of the conjugal partnership. RULING: No. While Augusto and Lily is part of conjugal property, it can‗t
be made liable since the obligation contracted by Augusto is not for the
RULING: No. The administrator‘s obligations are only chargeable to the benefit of the conjugal partnerships (Art 161 of CC). Evidenced by his
conjugal property if he believes it is done for the benefit of the family. No abandonment two months prior to when he contracted the promissory
proof was presented that Vicente Garcia, acting as surety or guarantor, note. Made it appear that wife gave him authority to procure such loan.
did so for the benefit of the family. Luzon Surety claims that the surety
did benefit the family because it added to Garcia‘s reputation as being
trustworthy and enhanced his standing in the community. This is too
remote/fanciful a benefit to be considered in terms of what is provided for
in Art. 161.
157. CARLOS VS. ABELARDO 158. PEOPLE VS. LAGRIMAS

FACTS: On Oct. 31, 1989, Honorio Carlos issued a check worth $25k, in FACTS: On October 11, 1962 a judgment finding Froilan Lagrimas guilty
the name of Pura Vallejo, against his personal account in Banker‗s Trust. of murder becomes final. A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity
It was allegedly a loan to his daughter Maria Theresa and her husband in the case was issued and 11 parcels of land in the name of the
Manuel Abelardo for the purchadse of a house and lot from Vallejo in accused were scheduled for auction on Jan. 5, 1965. On December 29,
order to help them in their married life. Vallejo issued an 1964 the wife of Lagrimas files a motion to quash the writs of attachment
acknowledgement receipt. The failure of the spouses to pay led Honorio and execution on the properties citing that they belong to the spouses‗
to formally demand the payment. Maria Theresa acknowledged their conjugal property and thus could not be held liable for the husband‗s
debt to her father but claimed that it was payable on a staggered basis. individual indemnity. The LC grants the petition which is later reversed by
Despite this acknowledgement and the evidence of Honorio‗s Bank‗s a second judge of the same court only to be reaffirmed by a third judge
Trust Check (the one paid to Vallejo) and his formal demand, Manuel ruling for the wife of the accused on March 5, 1960. The LC rules that
denied the nature of the money as a loan. He claimed, instead, that the indemnities may be imposed on the conjugal properties of the accused
amount given was his share in income from Honorio‗s business, H. L. only after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the liquidation of
Carlos Construction. He even presented 10 BPI checks against the the assets thereof pursuant to ART 161 of the NCC.
account of HLCC to prove that he had been receiving profit from HLCC.
However, he is not included in HLCC‗s Articles of Incorporation or ISSUE: Whether or not the civil indemnities may be taken from the
Organizational Profile as stockholder, officer, employee, or agent. offender‘s conjugal properties even before the dissolution of the conjugal
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that a check of $25k had been issued to partnership and the liquidation of its assets.
Vallejo against the personal account of Honorio and that the same was
received by the spouses and given to Vallejo for payment of a house and RULING: Yes, the Civil Code provides that indemnities may be imposed
lot that became their conjugal dwelling. on the conjugal property of an offender when the offender‗s exclusive
properties are insufficient to cover the cost his indemnity. In this the law
ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal property should pay for the loan of does not contemplate that the conjugal partnership must be dissolved
25, 000 even when acknowledgement was not signed by husband and its assets liquidated before the indemnity is to be drawn. It merely
requires that the offending spouse repay the liabilities taken from the
RULING: Yes. Art 121 of FCC, conjugal partnership is liable for (1) debts conjugal partnership when such partnership is to be dissolved. However
and obligations that benefit the conjugal partnership of gains made by it is a condition in the article that the indemnities collectible from the CPG
both the spouses or one of them but with the consent of the other (2) must not eat in to the funds for the maintenance of the family and the
debts and obligations that are without consent f one of the spouse but education of the children as it would lead to injustice.
their family has benefited. Evidence here shows that family did benefit
since they used the loan to buy the house which became their conjugal
home.
159. YSASI VS. FERNANDEZ 160. FELIPE VS. HEIRS OF ALDON

FACTS: Juan Ysasi married Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi. Juan conceded FACTS: Almosara and Maximo acquired several parcels of land during
that Hacienda Manucao-A is CPG. Since 1948 spouses have been their marriage. Wife sold the lots without the consent of husband.
shuttling back and forth from Philippines to Spain (where they also own
real estate) but Juan travels more frequently. Hacienda Manucao-A is HELD: The sale is void. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership by
managed by Valentin Bilbao (1952-1965) but Juan is the overall selling conjugal property without the consent of her husband.
administrator. In 1965 Jon (son) took over as manager. 1966, Juan told
younger son Jose Mari to assist Jon but Jon refused to let Jose Mari act
as cashier, dissension thus developed. Such prompted wife to leave
Spain (May 1967) to fix problem. She brought letter from Juan to sons
and a list of matter that she was to ascertain and report to husband.
Husband then contends that she never made any report. On June 1967,
Jon resigned which was accepted by Juan who designated Valentin to
take over. But upon Valentin‗s arrival in PI on August 19, 1967, Jon
refused to hand over hacienda saying that his mother took possession as
administrator. Wife filed a petition on September 5, 1967 at the CFI
Negros Occidental where she sought administration of CPG or
separation of property, praying that she be appointed receiver litis
pendentia on the grounds that Juan is not in the position to manage
since he is already of old age (77 years old) and has a blind left eye. The
abandonment was without just cause. The husband moved to set aside
order appointing wife as receiver but she opposed. On September 22,
1967 she further prayed that a disinterested person (BPI) be assigned as
receiver if dispute continues. Respondent judge on October 7, 1967
turned aside 9/5 orders appointing her as admin. Juan moved for a writ
of prelim mandatory and preventive injunction to compel wife and son to
turn over hacienda to Valentin, but wife and son opposed. Respondent
Judge denied petition for mandatory injunction on December 22, 1967.
Thus petition where husband prays for prelim mandatory injunction to
compel wife and son to hand over hacienda.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband may be deprived of conjugal

partnership of properties upon allegations of fraud and abuse of such
powers.

RULING: No. The code recognizes authority of husband to be

administrator of conjugal property and mere allegations of fraud may not
take this right away from him. The CA‗s resolution of putting hacienda
into receivership of BPI would destroy the husband‗s rights when it
should be used to preserve and secure them. The respondents are
directed to turn over authority to petitioner.
161. AGUILAR-REYES VS. MIJARES 162. DELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ

FACTS: Lot 4349-B-2 is a 396sq.m covered by TCT 205445 in FACTS: Dela Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He
Balintawak QC registered under Spouses Vicente and Ignacia Aguilar- never visited the conjugal home for three years.
Reyes, purchased using conjugal funds during converture (including
apartments in the CPG). Vicente married Ignacia in 1960 but were de HELD: Since there was no abandonment by the husband, there is
facto separated since 1974. In 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1, nothing to justify a separation of conjugal partnership properties.
1983 Vicente sold 4349-B-2 to Mijares spouses for 40k and therefore
new TCT 306087 was issued. She also found out that Vicente filed for
administration and appointment as guardian of their 5 minor children at
the MTC QC XXI where he misrepresented that Ignacia died on 3/22/82
and that he and the 5 kids are the sole heirs. Vicente was appointed
guardian on Sept. 29, 1983 and authorized on Oct. 14, 1983 to sell
estate of Ignacia. On Aug. 9, 1984 she wrote Mijares spouses to return
½ shares in lot. Thereafter she filed for annulment of sale. Mijares
spouses claimed to be good faith buyers and that the sale was valid due
to the court‗s approval. Vicente also contended that what he sold was
only ½ (his share) and left intact her share, that he never misrepresented
her. On Feb. 15, 1990 TC declared sale as null and void. That purchase
price was 110k and ordered Vicente to return 55k to Mijares couple.
Ignacia filed for Motion for modification that sale be declared void in its
entirety and that Mijares reimburse to her the rentals from March 1
,1983. TC granted on 5/31/90 and said that the sale was void in entirety,
ordered Vicente to reimburse the full 110k. TC on 6/29/90 amended the
previous order and directed the Register of Deeds to issue new TCT in
the name of Ignacia and Vicente and Vicente paying 50k to Ignacia for
damages. Pending appeal, Ignacia died thus was substituted by
compulsory heirs, they were contending that rentals should be
reimbursed. On 1/26/2000 CA reversed TC, upholding that the Mijares
were in good faith thus the sale was valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not voidable deed of sale of property due to lack of

consent pertains to only wife‗s share.

RULING: No, whole property. Governing rules Art 166 and 173 of CC.
166, husband can‗t alienate real property of conjugal partnership unless
wife has been declared a spendthrift, or under civil interdiction or in a
leprosarium. 167, wife may annul said contract within ten years from
transaction questioned. And both laws were complied with. Alienation
must be annulled in its entirety and not only in so far as the share of wife
in the conjugal property is concerned. The limitation of, contract shall
prejudice wife‖ was not spelled out in statute. Conjugal partnership is
liable for many things when it is existing thus husband has to be stopped
from disposing it without consent of wife.
163. SANTERO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 164. GARCIA VS. MANZANO

FACTS: Private respondents are requesting for a Motion for Allowance FACTS: Spouses live separately from each other. Wife assumed
from the estate of deceased Pablo Pascual (legitimate father of private complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership.
respondents) which was granted by the CFI. Petitioners (also legitimate
children of Pascual with another woman) oppose the motion on the HELD: The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with
grounds that most of the private respondents are already of age. Neither the consent of the husband. In the event of such maladministration by
of the women are legally married to Pablo Pascual. the wife, the remedy of the husband doesn‘t lie in a judicial separation of
properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the
ISSUE: Whether or not court acted with grave abuse of discretion by administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of
granting the motion for allowance. the conjugal property.

RULING: No, petition lacks merit. Art. 290 (support for children can apply
even beyond the age of majority) and 188 (right to allowance) apply. It
doesn‗t matter if they are of age, gainfully employed and married. The
New Civil Code entitles the children to allowance as advances of their
shares in the inheritance from their father, Pablo. A substantive right
cannot be impaired by a procedural one (Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court).
165. LACSON VS. SAN JOSE-LACSON 166. MAXEY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On Feb. 14, 1953 the Lacson spouses got married. On Jan. 9, FACTS: Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived as
1963, Carmen (respondent) left their home in Bacolod to go to Manila. husband and wife in Davao, out of this common law marriage. They had
On March 12, 1963, she filed a complaint for custody of children as well six children (petitioners). It was about 1903 when they started living
as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Before it together. Through 1911-1912, Melbourne bought the lands in question.
pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest On 1919 when they married in church and when the first wife died. The
kids would go to petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with husband on 1953 remarried, and the second wife sold the land. It was
Carmen and this was affirmed by the CFI. By May 7, 1963, respondent only on 1961 when the children discovered sale. Plaintiffs are currently
filed a motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC praying for the annulment of the documents of sale over particular lands
since she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of her that were sold to private respondent couple by their father‗s second wife.
younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as They allege that common properties belonged to their parents who
well who are all below 7 years old. The CA ruled that compromise acquired the lands during their lifetime and through their joint effort and
agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and capital. Sales of land by their father were done without their knowledge
void and as such the execution of said judgment is void too. and consent and only after their mother, Regina had died in 1953.
Respondent spouses insist that they are buyers in good faith and they
ISSUE: Whether or not support should be awarded to the wife. believed that the Melbourne was the sole owner of the parcels of land.

RULING: Yes it should have, but was filed out of time. NCC Art 363 - "No ISSUE: Whether or not common law spouses, prior to marriage, share
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, conjugal property over lands acquired in 1912.
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The older
children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been RULING: Yes. Art. 144 of the Civil Code should apply there being no
declared null and void since no compelling reasons were stated showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its
otherwise. However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 application. Art. 144 may be retroactively applied, they do not prejudice
year old may choose which parent they want to live with (sec. 6, Rule 99 or impair any vested or acquired right. Prior to the effectivity of the
of the Rules of Court, as long as above ten). Court may also award present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil
custody to who they deem more fit through evidence. Art 356 of the NCC partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their
provides for every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their
at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through
by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere decisions of this Court. Under this new code, it is believed that even if it
conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development. However is only the man who works, there is still a 50-50 sharing of property
even if custody should have been null and void, the rest of the acquired during their cohabitation together. The woman runs the
agreement is valid with respect to the separation of property of the household: "in the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands
spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership since it had hand over their pay checks and get an allowance in return and the wife
judicial sanction. (art 190/191 of NCC) manages the affairs of the household. . . .‖ ―In the Philippines, the best
man is the woman."

The petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of

the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals
for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00
on the other.
167. JUANIZA VS. JOSE 168. GOMEZ VS. LIPANA

FACTS: Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the FACTS: Lipana contracted two marriages: first with Maria Loreto Ancino
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train on 1930 and second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino on 1935. This while the
of the PNR that took place in November 1969 resulted in the 7 deaths first marriage was still subsisting but Isidra didn‗t know. On Dec. 13,
and 5 physical injuries of its passengers. That time, Eugenio was married 1943, Lipana and Isidra purchased a piece of land in Cubao worth
to Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant- P3,000. With the Torrens Title issued in Feb. 1, 1944 and named under
appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision rendered ―Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.‖ On July 20, 1958, Isidra died
them jointly and severally liable to pay damages to the heir of the intestate and childless, survived only by her sisters. By August 7, 1961,
deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for the Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of Isidra‗s estate prayed for the
decision to be reconsidered. forfeiture of the husband‗s share in the Cubao property in favor of the
estate relying on Art. 1417 of the Old Civil Code. The Trial Court ruled in
ISSUE: Whether or not Eugenio and Rosalia are co-owners of the favor of the estate. Because the second marriage was void ab initio and
jeepney the husband was the one who gave cause for nullity

RULING: The co-ownership provided in Article 147 applied only when ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 1417 of the old Civil Code is applicable.
the parties are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to
the conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The common-law wife not RULING: No. Since Lipana‗s first marriage hasn‗t been dissolved or
being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages caused declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has
by its operation. There is therefore no basis for her liability in the not ceased. Under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 1417, it is upon the
damages arising from the death of and physical injuries suffered by the termination of the partnership by either of said causes that the forfeiture
passengers. of the guilty spouse takes place. When did the conjugal partnership
formed by virtue of 2nd marriage terminate? Only upon Isidra‗s death in
1958. Art. 1417 was no longer in force, it is changed by NCC (took effect
1950. No action lies under Art. 1417 for the forfeiture of the husband‗s
share. It should recognize the right of second wife to her husband while
other half is conjugal partnership of first marriage. Thus decision is
reversed.
169. VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS 170. YAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Consuegra contracted two marriages. Upon his death, the two FACTS: Facts: Maning Yap married Talina Bianong in 1939 and they had
wives wanted to get his retirement insurance benefits. 4 children. 2 of which died in infancy. Herein petitioners are the two
surviving children, Shirley and Jaime. While the first marriage was still
HELD: The equitable solution was for the two wives to each be given half subsisting, Maning married Nancy on December 11, 1948. They had four
of the benefits. The first wife was the wife recognized by law. The second children. On February 21, 1964, Maning died because of a plane crash.
wife, on the other hand, married Consuegra in good faith. It was also the On March 3, 1964, Talina sought the issuance of letters of administration
second wife and her children who were acknowledged beneficiaries of for the estate of Maning. It was opposed by Nancy and her minor
the insurance. children. Talina was initially appointed special administratrix and then
later Shirley Yap was appointed regular administratrix.

Since there was a residue of properties and collectible debts after

payments to creditors, the court set the case for hearing to arrive at a
declaration of heirship for the purpose of liquidating the conjugal
partnership of Maning and his surviving spouse and to determine the
heirs entitled to inherit his intestate estate. Lower court declared Talina
and her children as the legal heirs of Maning.

The CA reversed this decision and ruled that the estate should be
equally divided into two equal part: ½ to Talina and her children and ½ to
Nancy Yap and her kids by virtue of the Leyes de Partidas. Petitioners
contend that since Maning died in 1964 when the NCC was already
effective, the Spanish Civil Code should be followed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second wife is entitled to inherit.

RULING: No. The records show that the properties in question were
acquired by Talina and Maning during their marriage. Hence, these
properties in the absence of any evidence to the contrary are considered
conjugal properties of Talina and Maning (Art. 142, NCC). Pursuant to
Art. 142 and Art. 185 of the NCC, the net remainder of the conjugal
partnership of gains after money claims filed by creditors against the
intestate estate of Maning approved by the lower court have been paid
by the administratrix should be equally divided between Maning and
Talina as their shares. The ½ share of Maning would then comprise his
intestate estate to be distributed to his heirs. Nancy Yap, the second wife
cannot inherit from Maning Yap because their marriage was void ab initio
(Art. 83, NCC)
171. CARINO VS. CARINO 172. ALAVADO VS. CITY OF TACLOBAN

FACTS: Cariño contracted 2 marriages. Upon his death, both women FACTS: Ricardo was employed as a carpenter-foreman by the City
filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Engineer‗s Office of Tacloban City. His last day of service was August
19, 1974. On August 6, he went to work only to supervise laborers but he
HELD: Both marriages were void. The first marriage is void for lack of suffered a severe headache. He died on August 7, the day after, of
marriage license. The second marriage is void for being bigamous. Cerebral Hemorrage. The wife filed claim for death benefits, in her own
Article 147 governs the first marriage while Article 148 governs the behalf and of minor children. The hearing officer in Tacloban City issued
second. One- half of the subject ‗death benefits‘ under scrutiny shall go an award granting the wife P5,200 as death benefits and P200 as burial
to the first wife as her share in the property regime, and the other half reimbursement. Tacloban City appealed. On Nov 29, 1975, WCC
pertaining to the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs, his children with dismissed the wife‗s claim for death benefits on the ground of lack of
the first wife. filiation between claimant and deceased. According to WCC, Matilde
only presented a marriage certificate. Marriage Certificate is not an
authentic proof of marital status. She should show original Marriage
Contract or Marriage Certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar. For
filiation, her presentation of birth certificate is not enough. Baptismal
Certificate is not authentic proof of kinship of the person baptized. WCC
said that the wife failed to prove that she was legally married to
deceased because of a lack of marriage contract. She only submitted
was a copy of marriage cert issued by church, which shows that they
were married on August 9, 1939. And that they lived together for 35
years until death of her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the claimant and her children had the right to claim
death benefits of the deceased.

RULING: Yes. Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great
favor. If such relationship was not denied or contradicted, the
presumption of marriage must be admitted as fact. Public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife, birth certificate and baptismal
certificate were held as competent evidence. There is no evidence on
record that will overthrow the presumption of marriage. The marriage
certificate is enough proof of marriage. It is certified to be a true copy of
the original issued by the Local Civil registrar of City of Tacloban. The
provisions of the WCC must be interpreted in favor of laborers, WCC
being a social legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the
workingmen. WCC decision is set aside. Award is reinstated.
173. ARROYO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 174. GAYON VS. GAYON

FACTS: Nov 2, 1982, Dr. Jorge Neri filed criminal complaint for adultery FACTS: The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said
against wife Ruby Neri with Eduardo Arroyo. This is witnessed by complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de
Jabunan in Baguio. Motions of reconsideration filed by the accused party Gayon, alleging substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses
were denied. On Aug 26 1991, Dr. Neri prayed case to be dismissed executed a deed — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
since he consented to his wife‗s infidelity. Petitioners thus filed motions Annex ―A‖ — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00,
for dismissal or grant new trial. a parcel of unregistered land therein described, and located in the barrio
of Cabubugan, municipality of Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon made by spouse after court ruled that one improvements thereon, subject to redemption within five (5) years or not
is guilty of adultery can enable for a new trial to commence. later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption had not been
exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva de Gayon, or any of their heirs
RULING: Pardon has to be given before criminal complaint has been or successors, despite the expiration of the period therefor; that said
filed. Once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of
to the public prosecutor. In this case given after the trial court had sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex ―B‖ —
already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding dated March 21, 1961, sold the aforementioned land to plaintiff Pedro
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In protection of family and Gayon for the sum of P614.00; that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced
marriage as inviolable institution. thereon improvements worth P1,000; that he had, moreover, fully paid
the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that Articles 1606 and 1616 of
our Civil Code require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in
and to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly,
praying that an order be issued in plaintiff‘s favor for the consolidation of
ownership in and to the aforementioned property. In her answer to the
complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died
on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that Annex
―A‖ to the complaint is fictitious, for the signature thereon purporting to be
her signature is not hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had
ever executed ―any document of whatever nature in plaintiff‘s favor‖; that
the complaint is malicious and had embarrassed her and her children;
that the heirs of Silvestre Gayon had to ―employ the services of counsel
for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least P200.00″; and that
being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff ―did not exert
efforts for the amicable settlement of the case‖ before filing his
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that
plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an earnest

effort toward a compromise before the filing of the suit is tenable.

RULING: As regards plaintiff‘s failure to seek a compromise, as an

alleged obstacle to the present case, Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family
unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
article 2035. It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from this
provision applies to suits ―filed or maintained between members of the 175. WAINWRIGHT VS. VERSOZA
same family.‖ This phrase, ―members of the same family,‖ should,
however, be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, FACTS: Margaret Ann Wainright Versoza, and three minor children, Jose
pursuant to which: Family relations shall include those: (1) Between Ma. Versoza, Jr., Charles John Versoza and Virginia Felice Versoza
husband and wife; (2) Between parent and child; (3) Among other lodged a complaint for P1,500.00 monthly support, support in arrears,
ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters. and damages, and custody of children, with a petition for support
pendente lite against Jose Ma. Versoza. Grounds for complaint is that
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff‘s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his abandoned the plaintiffs without providing for their support and maintains
nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as none of them is included in the illicit relations with another woman. The defendant answers the claim is
enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed premature for it states no cause of action. Article 222 of the Civil Code:
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon "No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
must necessarily be excluded as party in the case at bar, it follows that family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff‘s have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the in article 2035." The ground for dismissal of the instant case is ―the suit is
same. between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made."
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or Lower Court‘s decision is the dismissal of the complaint upon the ground
defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of that there was no showing that efforts have been exerted to settle the
Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such case amicably before suit was started. Hence, this petition.
administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre Gayon,
and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision, with the ISSUE: Whether or not Article 222 of the Civil Code will apply in the
costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon. instant case.
It is so ordered.
RULING: Decision of the lower court, reversed. Article 222 is subject to
the limitations in Article 2035 of the Civil Code. Art. 2035. No
compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil
status of persons; (2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3)
Any ground for legal separation; (4) Future support; (5) The jurisdiction of
courts; (6) Future legitime. Since the present action also revolves on the
right to future support and because compromise on future support is
prescribed, then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at
compromise of future support and failure thereof is not a condition
precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be alleged in the
complaint. The right to support cannot be: (1) renounced; (2) transmitted
to third persons; nor (3) compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligor. Article 2035 of the Civil Code cannot be subject to compromise
and therefore outside the sphere of application of Article 222.
176. MODEQUILIO VS. BREVA 177. SIARI VALLEY VS. LUCASAN

FACTS: As liability for a vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 which FACTS: CFI ordered Filemon Lucasan to pay 80k to Siari Valley for
killed Audie Salinas and which injured Renato Culan, Jose Modequillo damages and value of cattle. A writ of execution was issued. Sheriff
and Benito Malubay were ordered to pay indemnity for damages to levied on lands of the defendant. The lands were sold to the highest
spouses Salinas and to Juanito. Consequently on July 7, 1988, a writ of bidder. Lucasan files an opposition challenging the validity of the
execution and levy were issued against a parcel of residential lot and an execution since one of the lands auctioned was the land where he
agricultural land, the titles of which were under the name of Modequillo. extrajudicially constituted as the family home.
Modequillo then motioned to quash, alleging that the residential lot was
their family home that had been constituted since 1969, prior to the case ISSUE: Whether or not Lucasan‘s family home which was extrajudicially
and hence exempt from liability by virtue of FC 155. established exempt from execution.

HELD: The family home is not exempt from liability. Modequillo‗s house RULING: No. The family home is exempt from execution EXCEPT when
and lot were constituted as a family home NOT under the NCC (by a debt is incurred before the family home was registered (CC art 243).
judicial or extrajudicial means) but under the FC by operation of law The reason for this is to protect creditors from a debtor who may act in
when the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. FC 162 provides that all bad faith by making such property a supposed family home for the sole
existing family residences at the time of the FC‗s effectivity are purpose of defeating the claim against him.
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to the family home under the FC. FC 162 has a prospective
application. Hence, his family home was constituted only on August 3,
1988 and not on 1969 when it was first occupied as a family home. The
accident took place on March 16, 1976 and the judgment became final
on Jan. 29, 1988, prior to the constitution of the family home in August.
Liability can thus be held against the family home.
178. PERIDO VS. PERIDO 179. DE LA PUERTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. He died on 1942. FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a
The children and grandchildren from his first and second marriages will leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely,
executed a document entitled ―Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given
Partition‖ where they would partition amongst themselves the estate of the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed executrix of
Lucio. Eventually, the heirs from the first marriage backed out from said the will. The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was
partition. They now say that they are exclusive heirs of the estate since opposed by her brothers, who averred that their mother was already
ALL FIVE CHILDREN of LUCIO are illegitimate and have no succesional senile at the time of the execution of the will and did not fully
rights. Heirs from the first marriage say that the first three children from comprehend its meaning. Moreover, some of the properties listed in the
the second marriage are born before the first wife died in 1905, therefore inventory of her estate belonged to them exclusively. Meantime, Isabel
proving that they were born out of wedlock. The last two were also born was appointed special administratrix by the probate court. Alfredo
out of wedlock as testified by the heirs from the first marriage. The case subsequently died, leaving Vicente the lone oppositor. On November 20,
reached the SC, hence the instant case. 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
ISSUE: Whether or not the children are legitimate. allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la Puerta. At
the hearing on her motion, Carmelita presented evidence to prove her
RULING: Yes. It was found out that the first wife died during the Spanish claimed status to which Isabel was allowed to submit counter-evidence.
regime, therefore disproving the theory that the three children were born
out of wedlock. The certificate of titles indicating that he was single and ISSUE: Whether or not they are legitimate children.
the testimonies saying that the children were born out of wedlock were
not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the capacity of marriage. RULING: Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
Lucio and the second wife, who were without impediments to marry, paternity or maternity of spurious children under the circumstances
were already living together as husband and wife before the children specified in Articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that
were born, thereby giving rise to the presumption that the children are the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to
legitimate. spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children.

The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rule on voluntary
and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to
spurious children.
180. TAN VS. TROCIO 181. MOORE VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: April 1971 when as Felicidad said, Galileo Trocio raped her FACTS: Petitioner Elaine Moore (American citizen) is married with
which begot a son, Jewel. She didn‗t immediately tell the police since Joseph Velarde (also American) had a son out of wedlock William
Trocio was threatening to have her alien husband and to tell authorities Michael Velarde (now 14 years old) born also at US. Said marriage
that she was violating the Anti-Dummy Law in operation of her vocational however was dissolved through a decree of divorce from SC of California
school. On Nov 1979, Felicidad filed case of disbarment against Atty. on May 31, 1949. Elaine had 2nd marriage with Don Moore on
Trocio. Trocio denied allegation of rape, only testifying that he dealt her September 29, 1956 at LA, CA. William (minor) lived with them. Elaine
and her family‗s cases and said she was only doing this because he filed at CFI Rizal a motion to have her child‗s surname be changed into
declined on her request to increase his fee so that she may get the extra. Moore instead of Velarde. TC denied such petition therefore this appeal.
On Feb 13 1986,since Trocio failed to attend the hearings etc,, the
provincial fiscal of Lanao Del Norte, on prima facie evidence presented, ISSUE: Whether or not law permits minor to adopt surname of the 2nd
held Trocio administratively liable. husband of his mother and is there is justifiable reason exists to allow
change of name.
ISSUE: Whether or not Trocio should be disbarred for gross immoral
conduct. RULING: Regarding the first issue, RP said that through NCC 364
legitimate child should use the surname of his father. NCC 369 moreover
RULING: No, there is lack of evidence. After the incident, she still asked cites that in case of annulment, child conceived before such decree shall
him to be the lawyer for her cases such as a robbery case and her claim use the surname of his/ her father. Likewise, same concept rules over
for indeminity when a fire burned down the school. The fear that her alien decree of divorce; therefore law does NOT sanction such change of
husband would be deported has actually been an absent fear since she name. SC upheld such position, saying that confusion may arise with
said she lost contact of her husband on the night the tryst happened. respect to paternity and that said change may even redound to the
Keeping her peace for 8 years could be construed as a condonation of prejudice of the child. Moreover, the child is still a minor and therefore
his alleged immoral conduct. Testimony of household help that they aforesaid action is premature. Said child may in his mature age decide
heard her cries for help is negated by fact that she said it happened in for himself to instigate such change of name.
school premises. How could the help have been there then? Insuffiecient
evidence show that it was his son: (1) unusual closeness as testified by
her household help (2) pictures of Jewel and Trocio together is not
enough ground to establish paternity. Presumption is Jewel is the child of
the alien husband since he was born on 1972 when husband and
Felicidad were living together.
182. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC 183. MANGULABNAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30, FACTS: Edna Padilla Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and
1970. They had two children: Jr. and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio support for her child Alfie Angelo. The TC ordered Ambrocio Tan Chew
abandoned conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his Acero to pay monthly support. He then moved for a reconsideration but
previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50k from Rep. Maglana was denied on December 5, 1984. CA annulled the orders of the TC on
and 10k from a certain Galagar, etc. Classmates of Jr. and Bombi were the ground that even as to illegitimate children who are not natural
teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate any children, there is a need for the latter class of children (spurious children)
connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the kids to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they
of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed at the CFI Bohol on April 10, cannot demand support as in the case of an acknowledged child.
1978 a petition to change surname of her 2 children from Divinagracia
into Naldoza (her maiden name). TC dismissed petition saying that ISSUE: Whether or not recognition of an illegitimate child like the minor
aforementioned reasons (swindling, abandoning, previous marriage of Alfie whose father is married and had no legal capacity to contract
Dionesio <but their marriage has not yet been annulled nor declared marriage at the time of his conception is required before support may be
bigamous>) were not sufficient grounds to invoke such change of granted.
surname. Furthermore, change of name would give false impression of
family relations. RULING: No. The requirement for recognition by father or mother jointly
or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural
ISSUE: Whether or not two children‗s prayer to drop their father‗s child under Article 276 of the NCC. Such child is presumed to be the
surname is justified. natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to
contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child
RULING: No. Following NCC 364, since Jr. and Bombi are LC (legitimate like Alfie is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in
children), therefore they should use their father‗s surname. Said minors which case recognition is not required before support may be granted.
and their father should be consulted about such, mother‗s desire should
not only be the sole consideration. Change of name is allowed only upon However, under Article 887 of the NCC, in all cases of illegitimate
proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec 5 ROC). Change of name children, their filiation must be proved. The status of the minor child had
may even redound to the prejudice of the children later on, may cause been provisionally established as affidavits of petitioner and 2 witnesses,
confusion as to the minor‗s parentage and might also create the and the birth certificate were presented to prove the paternity of the child.
impression that said minors are ICs, which is inconsistent with their legal
status.

In Oshita v. Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change

names have been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already
attained mature age. In this case, when these minors have attained the
right age, then they can already file said action for themselves.
184. OSMENA DE VALENCIA VS. RODRIGUEZ 185. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG

FACTS: Plaintiffs say that they are the legitimate children of the FACTS: On Jan 1941, Emiliano Andal, who was married to Maria
defendant Pio Valencia in the latter‗s lawful wedlock with plaintiff Duenas, became sick with tuberculosis. His brother Felix went to live
Catalina Osmena. Defendants on the other hand are the illegitimate with them to help them with the farm. Sept 10 1942, Maria eloped with
children of defendant Pio Valencia with Emilia Rodriguez his common- Felix and lived together from 1942-1943. Jan 1, 1943 Emiliano died.
law wife. Plaintiffs allege that they alone have the right to the surname Maria didn‗t attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth to
―Valencia‖. Mariano Andal. Maria then filed for recovery of land that was originally
given to Emiliano by his mother upon his marriage to Maria. Maria said
ISSUE: Whether or not the illegitimate children could use the surname that the land is her son‗s since he is the legitimate heir of Emiliano.
Valencia.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mariano is the legitimate son and can thus inherit
RULING: Yes. This cannot happen since if plaintiffs were correct then the land.
they could stop numerous inhabitants from using the surname Valencia
as well. Moreover, Pio Valencia has acquiesced to this as well. Finally, RULING: Yes. Art 108 of NCC Children born after the one hundred and
there is no law granting the exclusive ownership over a surname. eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within the
three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Emiliano is presumed to be
legitimate sine he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of
marriage. Evidence did not show that Emiliano, even when he was sick
of tuberculosis, could not sexually perform so even if Maria was having
an affair even before eloping with Felix, it is still presumed that Mariano
is Emilianos‗ son. As result the son is the legit heir and thus inherits the
land of his father.
186. MACADANGDANG VS. COUT OF APPEALS 187. TAN VS. TROCIO

FACTS: Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner FACTS: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan
Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together contends that Jewel is Trocio‘s son.
for two years and had 6 children. They started a buy and sell business
and sari-sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune, HELD: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan
their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, contends that Jewel is Trocio‘s son.
transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate
etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated
in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she
returned in Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her
estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action. In April
1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal
separation has effect on the legal separation.

RULING: The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation

has no effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued,
the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to
appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation
on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate
succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining
properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final

decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code
provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the
judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the
share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
188. JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 189. AMURAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Jao filed petition for recognition and support against Perico. HELD: Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already
Based on the Blood Grouping Test, Janice could not have been the been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
possible offspring of Perico. decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears.

HELD: There is almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping

tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity. The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of
the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the
child is born by such parents. But if the blood type of the child is not the
possible blood type when the bloods of the parents are cross-matched,
then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
190. CHUA KENG GIAP VS. PAC 191. CABATBAT-LIM VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Chua Keng Giap filed on May 19, 1983, a petition for the FACTS: Violeta is claiming to be the only child of the late Dra Esperanza
settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the regional trial court of Cabatbat.
Quezon City. He claims that he is the son of Chua Bing Guan and Sy
Kao. The private respondent, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of HELD: Factual findings indicate that child is not born of the deceased;
action and of the petitioner's capacity to file the petition. No cause of she is only a ward (ampon) without formal adoption proceedings. The
action because he is not the son of the abovementioned couple as action is not impugning legitimacy since the claim is not that child is
testified by the mother herself. illegitimate but that she is not the decedent's child at all.

Respondent contends res judicata: The latter, it was claimed, had been
declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao in
S.P. No. Q-12592, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing
Guan. And also the mother‗s testimonials, SY Kua herself testified that
she is not her son. Petitioner contends paternity and not the maternity of
the petitioner is to be decided. Therefore, the testimony of the mother
should not be credited.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chua Keng Giap is the son of Chua Bing and Sy
Kua.

RULING: Yes. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know of Chua
Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao
who could say - as indeed she has said these many years - that Chua
Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb. Petition Denied.
192. LIYAO, JR VS. TANHOTI-LIYAO 193. REYES VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo. William Liyao, Sr. FACTS: Private respondent filed with the CFI for order compelling the
was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Corazon cohabited with Liyao and petitioner Irene Reyes a.k.a. Irene Ramero to execute a deed of
begot a son. Son claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao, Sr. reconveyance on several props to the respondent. Respondent allege
that petitioner acquired the props in question through fraud, deceit and
HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the misrepresentation by registering herself as the sole child of decedent
child. Liyao, Jr. cannot choose his own filiation. If Corazon‘s husband, Franciscoo Delgado and thus entitled to inherit. Respondent who are the
Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the sisters and brother of the decedent claim otherwise since they allege the
child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child if his mother‘s petitioner was born during the legal marriage of her mother Genoveva
alleged paramour. Ramero and the latter‗s husband Justino Reyes. Petitioner claims that
she was the fruit of the cohabitation b/w her mother and the decedent
during the time subsequent to the separation of her mother with Justino
Reyes. She also claims continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate child since she mentions that decedent supported her
financially through her education. CFI rules against respondent
dismissing the order for reconveyance. Respondent appeal to CA which
rules in their favor reversing the CFI declaring that the TCTs of the
petitioner on the said props are null and void. CA rules that though
petitioner was a spurious child of the decedent she was never
recognized and thus cannot inherit. In her motion for reconsideration w/
the CA petitioner cites how she was in fact acknowledged by the
decedent as proven by the latter‗s consent noted on the petition marriage
certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a recognized child of the decedent

and is thus able to inherit.

RULING: No, it is a well-established doctrine that for an illegitimate child

to inherit he/she must first be recognized by the putative parent through
voluntary or compulsory means. In this case the petitioner was never
validly recognized by Francisco Delgado contrary to her assertions. The
evidence she presented was not compelling to establish her filiation to
the decedent. For instance her birth certificate was not signed by
Francisco. Furthermore it cannot be said that her baptismal certificate is
credible evidence regarding filiation since the statements contained
therein only attest to the administration of the said sacrament on the said
date. In addition to this her permanent student records and her written
consent to her father‗s operation both being unsigned and not written in
her father‗s handwriting cannot suffice as proof of filiation. Moreover the
pictures she present did not give weight to her arguments as they are not
constitutive of proof of filiation. Finally the alleged consent stipulated by
Francisco in the ℗ marriage certificate cannot be given weight since it is
not signed and does not appear in the decedent‗s handwriting.
194. CASTRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 195. MENDOZA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

RULING: Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, ISSUE: Whether or not such recognition or acknowledgement of a
illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock natural child must be made in a record of birth, a will, or in some other
were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or public document.
by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at
the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any RULING: Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said
impediment to marry each other (Article 119, old Civil Code; Article 269, Code must be made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
new Civil Code) and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified of record, or in some other public document. In the case at bar, the only
to marry each other on account of certain legal impediments. document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was
recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed
by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu
City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate daughter of
Nicolasa Gabuya. However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and
uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate if baptism is not sufficient to
prove recognition.
196. RAMOS VS. RAMOS 197. LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

ISSUE: Whether or not actions of the father and his family imply FACTS: Lim and Uy are both alleging that they are heirs of deceased
recognition of plaintiff‘s status as an acknowledged natural child. Susana.

RULING: The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin Ramos, HELD: Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a
received shares in the estate implies that they were acknowledged. competent public official, with formalities required by law. Marriage
Obviously, defendants Agustin and Granada Ramos, and the late Jose contract presented by petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of
Ramos accorded successional rights to the plaintiffs because Martin solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889. Marriage contract
Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. is a mere declaration of the contracting parties, in the presence of the
Presumably, that fact was well known in the community. Under the solemnizing officer and 2 other witnesses of legal age that they take
circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of each other as husband or wife. It does not possess the requisite of a
Jose Ramos are estopped from attacking plaintiffs‘ status as public document of recognition. It is not a written act with the intervention
acknowledged natural children. of the notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary
and certified by him.
198. BANAS VS. BANAS 199. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Raymundo Bañas was the child of Dolores Castillo and of an FACTS:
unknown father. Bibiano Bañas shouldered his education. Upon
Raymundo‘s death, his heirs filed for partition or recovery of hereditary ISSUE:
share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo was a
recognized natural child of Bibiano. RULING:

HELD: There was no voluntary recognition. The note signed ―Su padre,
B. Banas‖ is not sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition. It is merely
indicative of paternal solicitude and not acknowledgement of paternity.
200. VDA. DE ALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 201. BALUYOT VS. BALUYOT

FACTS: FACTS:

ISSUE: ISSUE:

RULING: RULING:
202. PATERNO VS. PATERNO 203. GAPUSAN-CHUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: HELD: In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person
of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or
ISSUE: tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary
recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto.
RULING: Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to
impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly
manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her
rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the
time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition
was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that
recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of
the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on
the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural
daughter. The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is
clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval
can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial
approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment
made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such
approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one
which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor
consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should
make no difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be
shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of
majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's
surname.
204. PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN 205. PEOPLE VS. RIZO

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is obliged to recognize the child. FACTS: Concepcion Dimen noticed that the stomach of her 22-year old
mongoloid sister was bigger than usual. She discovered that she was
HELD: Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines provide iIn any pregnant. Felicidad revealed that Rizo, the husband of her yaya had
of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his intercourse with her in the bodega. Rizo admitted that he had sexual
natural child: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the intercourse with Felicidad. On October 22, 1986, Felicidad delivered a
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; baby. Rizo did not confirm nor deny that he had sexual intercourse with
her but filed a motion to dismiss claiming insufficiency of evidence. RTC
In the case at bar, the record shows that conception had occurred at or found Felicidad to be a competent witness and rendered judgment
about the time that rape been inflicted upon Filomena by the accused, or against the accused. RTC also ordered Rizo to recognize the offspring
more particularly, within 120 days from the commission of the offense. 19 as his legitimate son despite the fact that Rizo is a married man.
The acknowledgment required of the accused by the trial court should be
understood to be acknowledgment merely of the filiation of the child; the ISSUE: Whether or not Rizo can be compelled to recognize the offspring
accused being a married man could not sire an illegitimate natural child, of the crime.
20 a status which in any event is no longer recognized under the Family
Code of the Philippines. RULING: No. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be
compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any,
as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That portion of the
judgment ordering him to recognize the child as his legitimate son should
therefore be eliminated.
206. DEMPSEY VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 207. MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Janalita Rapada cohabited with Joel Dempsey without the FACTS:
benefit of marriage and Christine Marie was born. The child receives
monthly support from him in the sum of $150. Janalita seeks for the ISSUE:
accused to declare Christina Marie as his dependent and after his
American citizenship. Dempsey freely and voluntarily and spontaneously RULING:
entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against him which was
abandonment and failure to provide adequate support for the child
though he had the means to do so. Municipal Trial Court found him to be
guilty. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed into a
fine and not to be acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier decision.

ISSUE:

RULING:
208. PEOPLE VS. BARRANCO 209. LAZATIN VS. CAMPOS

FACTS: Rosalia Barranco (19) was raped by Bartolome Barranco, the FACTS: On Jan. 13, 1974: Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate,
second cousin of her father who lives 100 meters away from her house. survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters,
On Feb 10,1980. Rosalia was raped by while being threatened with respondents Nora and Irma. One month after, Margarita de Asis
death, he was holding a butcher‗s knife to her neck. On March 19, 1980, commenced an intestate proceeding. On April 11, 1974, Margarita de
Bartolome attempted rape but foiled because Rosalia was able to fend Asis died, leaving a holographic will. By Nov 22, 1974, petitioner
him off by hitting him with a piece of wood. On the eve of the same day, intervened for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of Dr.
Rosalia confessed to her mother the rape. They went to the police and Mariano Lazatin, as an admitted illegitimate child. Aug. 20, 1975,
had a physical exam. Turned out she was pregnant. On April 3, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as
trial court convicted Bart of Rape and sentenced him to reclusion an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin
perpetua Lazatin, brother of the deceased Dr. Mariano Lazatin, that petitioner was
an ―illegitimate son‖ of Dr. Lazatin and was lated adopted by him. This
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can order Bartolome to acknowledge affidavit was later modified on Aug. 19, 1975 to state that petitioner was
the child. adopted by both Mariano and Margarita. Respondent court heart
petitioner‗s motion to intervene as an adopted son in the estate of
RULING: The trial court erred when it ordered that the child be Margarita, at which hearings petitioner presented no decree of adoption
acknowledged as Bart‗s because the child of a sin cannot be hi his favor. Instead, petitioner attempted to prove, over private
acknowledged by a married man. However he is entitled to support the respondents‗ objections, that he had recognized the deceased spouses
child. as his parents; he had been supported by them until their death; formerly
he was known as ―Renato Lazatin‖ but was compelled to change his
surname to ―Sta. Clara‖ when the deceased spouses refused to give
consent to his marriage to his present wife. On March 4, 1976,
respondent Court barred the introduction of petitioner‗s evidence and on
March 16, 1976: petitioner filed a motion to declare as established the
fact of adoption. The Court denied motion

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in not allowing

petitioner to introduce new evidence.

RULING: No. Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which

creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Petitioner‗s flow of evidence in the
case below doesn‗t lead us to any proof of judicial adoption. No proof of
specific court of competent jurisdiction rendered in an adoption
proceeding initiated by the late spouses No judicial records of adoption
or copies. Petitioner cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the
estate as an adopted son because of lack of proof
210. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO 211. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARANTO

FACTS: This case is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with this FACTS: Court of Appeals granted Caranto spouses‘ petition for adoption
court over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was of Midael with prayer for the correction of the minor‘s first name from
born on Feb. 14, 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Midael to Michael.
Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered
the child for adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the HELD: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While
petitioners. Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption.
she was barely 2 weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not
the child by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.
The appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioenrs over the
child. RTC rendered a decision granting the petition. Angelie Anne
Fajardo was changed to Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987: respondent Gina took the
child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she
was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina refused

ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted.

RULING: Yes. Respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a

woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally
adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted
212. REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES 213. SANTOS VS. ARANSANZO

FACTS: Feb 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles (private respondent) filed petition FACTS: Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes filed petition for adoption of
to adopt Jason Condat, court grants it given that all requirements for Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos on June 4, 1949. With their parents
adoption are satisfied. Petitioner appeals to CA who affirms the trial court whereabouts unknown, their current guardian, Crisanto de Mesa gave
decision, hence this petition his written consent, Paulina being 14 years old likewise gave consent.
Hence, Court granted petition. On Oct 21, 1957, Juliana dies, Simplicio
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision w/c granted files for settlement of intestate estate including Paulina and Aurora as
the petition in favor of the spouses Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles. surviving heirs. Gregoria Aranzanso, alleges that she is the first cousin of
Juliana files an opposition to the petition, stating that Simplicio‗s
RULING: No. Though Dioscoro was not named as a petitioner, he did marriage to Juliana was bigamous and thus void and that the adoption of
provide written consent that he himself actually joined his wife in Paulina and Aurora were void for there is no written consent from natural
adopting the child, which is sufficient to make him a petitioner. The future parents. Demetria Ventura, alleging also that she is the first cousin of
of the child must not be compromised by insistence of rigid adherence to Juliana and adding that she is the mother of Paulina Santos, likewise
procedural rules. Adoption statutes are liberally construed to carry out files as opposition. The CFI says that validity of adoption cannot be
the beneficent purposes of the adoption institutions and to protect the attacked collaterally, CA however REVERSES and declares that the
child. Welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. The rights adoption is void for lack of written consent. Petitioners file for preliminary
concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the injunction against the CA orders and the Court grants it hence this
best interest of the child. The CA found the following in the petition and petition by the respondents.
correctly approved the adoption: Natural parents gave consent / DSWD
recommended approval / Trial court approved / Written consent of ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents can assail in settlement
adopting parents proceedings the adoption decree of Paulina and Aurora Santos.

RULING: No. If natural parents have abandoned the children, the

guardian‘s consent suffices. Furthermore, the adoption court made
sufficient findings that the natural parents of them minors couldn‗t be
located, hence its order cannot be attacked collaterally. Hence the CA
erred in reviewing, under collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos had
abandoned them. Even if Simplicio were married to another person (not
decided in this case), the estate of Juliana being the subject matter, the
adopted children status of Paulina and Aurora is not affected, hence they
succeed Juliana. Respondents cannot intervene in the settlement
proceedings and attack the adoption. As the adoption is held valid, and
in intestate succession, adopted children exclude first cousins, the CA
decision is reversed.
214. DAOANG VS. MUNICIPAL JUDGE 215. NIETO VS. MAGAT

FACTS: Respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed petition FACTS: pouses Ernesto and Matilde Magat reared as their own child
for adoption of the minor Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. Petitioners Roy Sumintac, who is their nephew, from his birth until the spouses went
minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang assisted by their father, file an to Guam to work when the boy was already four years old. They
opposition claiming that the Agonoys have a legitimate daughter named petitioned the court to allow them to adopt Roy, but the trial court denied
Estrella Agonoy (mother of Roderick and Rommel), who died March 1, this, on the ground that they are non-residents of the Philippines and that
1971, thus Agonoys are disqualified to adopt under NCC Art 335. The the trial custody as required under P.D. No. 603 cannot be effected.
Trial Court still granted the petition for adoption They went to the Supreme Court to have the decision reviewed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent spouses are disqualified to adopt ISSUE: Whether or not residency in another country disqualifies the
under NCC Art. 335 par. 1. couple from adopting, and whether or not the trial custody is a mandatory
requirement.
RULING: No. Art 335, those with legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction cannot adopt. The law is RULING: Negative on both questions. The fact that the prospective
clear, children mentioned therein do not include grandchildren. The adopters reside temporarily in a foreign country does not disqualify them
legislators of the NCC obviously intended that only those persons who from adopting a minor child.
have certain classes of children are disqualified to adopt. Adoption is
used to benefit the adopter. This has since changed as now; the present On the second issue, the law specifically authorizes the court, either
notion on adoption promotes the welfare of the child and the upon its own or on petitioner’s motion, to dispense with the trial
enhancement of his opportunities for a happy life. Under the law now in custody if it finds that it is to the best interest of the child. In this case, the
force, having legitimate, legitimated, etc children is no longer a ground Minister of Social Services and Development suggests that trial custody
for disqualification to adopt is unnecessary because the child was already comfortable with the
couple and the couple was capable of disciplining the child.
216. DUNCAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS 217. CANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty. FACTS: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally
Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to adopt the
to adopt the child. 3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition
for adoption along with Clavano.
HELD: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to the
adoption. The father‘s consent is not required because the child is HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cang‘s consent as the father is
illegitimate. The mother‘s consent is not necessary either, because she necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was
is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty. proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It
Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a
proper party. Provision says legal guardian) settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.
218. BOBANOVIC VS. MONTES 219. PARDO DE TAVERA VS. CACDAC

ISSUE: FACTS: On June 19, 1986, the Gordons sought to adopt the minor,
Anthony Gandhi O. Custodio, a natural son of Adoracion Custodio. On
RULING: the date of hearing, nobody appeared to oppose the Petition, OSG failed
to send any representative for the State. Evidence established that the
Gordons (British spouse) are allowed by their home country to adopt
foreign babies specifically from the Republic of the Philippines. The
husband is employed at the Dubai Hilton International Hotel as Building
Superintendent therefore financially secured. Anthony's mother,
Adoracion Custodio, had given her consent to the adoption realizing that
her child would face a brighter future. The Case Study Report submitted
by the Social Worker of the Trial Court gave a favorable recommendation
as the natural mother thought of the best for her 1yr 2mos child. Trial
Court declared Anthony the truly and lawfully adopted child of the
Gordons. The Gordons wrote MSSD for a travel clearance for Anthony
on 8/11/86 but MSSD opposed even if subpoenaed, saying that the
Report of the Court Social Worker and that of the Pastor of the
International Christian Church of Dubai cannot take the place of a report
of the MSSD or a duly licensed child placement agency. And that there is
a required six-month trial custody, which had not been met nor were the
reasons therefor given as required by Article 35 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603). Contended also that the Gordons had
given P10,000.00 to the natural mother, which is reflective of the
undesirable attitude of the Gordons to shop for children as if they were
shopping for commodities. Under the Muslim Law (Dubai), Anthony
cannot inherit from the adopting parents. The Gordons had filed another
petition for adoption of a baby girl before the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 94, on 24 June 1986 but because she died a month
later they tried to pass off another child to whom they gave the same
name and represented that she was the very same girl they were
adopting. There being no Memorandum of Agreement between Dubai
and the Philippines there is no guarantee that the adopted child will not
be sold, exchanged, neglected or abused.

ISSUE: Whether or not travel clearance can be withheld by MSSD

following the objections MSSD is raising

RULING: NO. As the Trial Court has held, it ordered the MSSD to issue
the travel clearance under pain of contempt and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to issue the corresponding passport saying that the Court Social
Worker Report could take the place of a report from a duly licensed
placement agency or of the MSSD. Court had also impliedly dispensed
with the six-month trial custody considering that the Gordons were
foreigners whose livelihood was earned abroad. And that the Decision 220. IN RE: ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA
had become final and executory.
FACTS: The spouses filed the petition before the court a quo on January
The Trial Court relied on the Resolution of this Court in Administrative 8, 1963, praying that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, be
Matter No. 85-2-7136-RTC denying the request of the MSSD for a declared their (petitioner's) son by adoption. It is established that the
Supreme Court Circular to all Regional Trial Court and the ruling in petitioners are both 32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of
Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes ―"In refusing to grant the travel clearance Manila. They were married in 1957 and have maintained a conjugal
certificate, respondent MSSD discounts and negates the effects of a home of their own. They do not have a child of their own blood. Neither
valid and final judgment of the Court regarding which no appeal had spouse has any legitimate, legitimated, illegitimate, acknowledged
even been taken from (Bobanovic vs. Hon. Montes G.R. L-71370, July 7, natural child, or natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of them
1986)." The 10,000.00 given by Gordon spouses was only a financial been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Edwin Villa y
assistance to the natural mother of the child. The spouses also would Mendoza, 4 years old, is a child of Francisco Villa and Florencia
want to adopt a baby girl but upon learning that she‗s mongoloid, they Mendoza who are the common parents of the petitioner-wife Edipola
turned her over to International Alliance for Children, where she Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with business
unfortunately died. And finally, Muslim Laws shall not apply to them, they interests in a textile development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
being Britons. and is the general manager of Medry Inc. and the secretary-treasurer of
Bearen Enterprises. His income is approximately P600.00 a month. His
co-petitioner-wife, is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly
earning of about P300.00. It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza
was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a sickly child since birth.
Due to the child's impairing health his parents entrusted him to the
petitioners who reared and brought him up for the years thereafter, and
as a result, there developed between the petitioners and the child, a
deep and profound love for each other. The natural parents of the minor
testified that they have voluntarily given their consent to the adoption of
their son by the petitioners, and submitted their written consent and
conformity to the adoption, and that they fully understand the legal
consequences of the adoption of their child by the petitioners.

HELD: Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those persons who may
not adopt, and it has been shown that petitioners-appellants herein are
not among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339 of the same code
names those who cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose
adoption is under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural child by
the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate children by their father
or mother, and of a step-child by the step-father or stepmother. This last
article is, of course, necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not
prohibited even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of
parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption should
not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are related to each
other, except in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to preclude
adoption among relatives no matter how far removed or in whatever
degree that relationship might be, which in our opinion is not the policy of
the law. The interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, 221. CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
and designed to provide homes, care and education for unfortunate
children, should be construed so as to encourage the adoption of such FACTS: A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over the
children by person who can properly rear and educate them (In re person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14,
Havsgord's Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378). 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for
adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petitioners.
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was
barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition.
Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987,
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the
child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she
was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina
refused.

ISSUE: Whether the adoption would be given effect.

RULING: The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full
knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse
of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority
over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses. The
adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted
child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
222. IN RE: HABEAS CORPUS OF ANGELIE CERVANTES 223. PELAYO VS. LAURON

FACTS: A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this court over the FACTS: On the evening of October 13, 1906, Dr. Arturo Pelayo was
person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. Mino was born on Feb. 14, called to the house of Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella. He was asked
1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are to give birth to their daughter-in-law. He assisted in the delivery of the
common-law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for child and was kept occupied until the next day. He valued his fee at P500
adoption to Gina Carreon‗s sister and brother in law, the petitioners. but Marcelo and Juana refused to pay without reason. On November 23,
Petitioner spouses took care and custody of the child when she was 1906, a Complaint by Pelayo against Lauron and Abella for collection of
barely two weeks old. An affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child money was filed. Lauron and Abella contends that that their son and his
by herein petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina. The wife lived independently from them and in a separate house and that if
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child. she did stay in their house that night, it was due to fortuitous
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. circumstances. They also allege that their daughter-in-law had died due
Angelie Anne Fajardo, now Cervantes. Sometime in March or April 1987, to the childbirth. On April 5, 1907, the Regional Trial Court held Lauron
petitioners received a letter from respondents demanding to be paid and Abella absolved from the complaint due to lack of sufficient evidence
P150,000, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to establish a right of action against them.
to accede to the demand. On Sept. 11, 1987, respondent Gina took the
child from her ―yaya‖ at the petitioner‗s residence on the pretext that she ISSUE: Whether or not the husband is bound to pay the bill
was instructed to do so by her mother. Gino brought the child to her
house. The petitioners demanded the return of the child but Gina RULING: Yes. Article 142 and 143, Civil Code provides: Mutual
refused. obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support
which includes medical services in case of illness. Also that when either
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ should be granted. of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the
other is under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary
RULING: Yes, respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a services of a physician in order that health may be restored. Also that the
woman other than respondent Gina, his open cohabitation with Gina will father and mother-in-law are strangers with respect to the obligation that
not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere. Minor has been legally devolves upon the husband to provide support. Hence, her husband, and
adopted by petitioners with full knowledge and consent of respondents. A not her father and mother- in-law, is liable. It is of no matter who called
decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the the doctor and requested his services for there was imminent danger to
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where her life and medical assistance was urgently needed.
the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.
224. SANCHEZ VS. ZULUETA 225. REYES VS. INES-LUCIANO

FACTS: Feliciano Sanchez married Josefa Diego and had a child Mario FACTS: On January 18, 1958, Manuel J. C. Reyes married Celia Ilustre-
Sanchez. On 1932 Feliciano refused to support Josefa and Mario and Reyes and had children. On March 10, 1976, Manuel attacked Celia by
then abandoned them. Josefa and Mario have no means of subsistence. fist blows, bumping her head against the cement floor, pushing her down
Feliciano receives a monthly pension of P174.20 from US Army. Josefa the 13-flight stairs and hitting her in the abdomen that floored her half
Diego and Mario Sanchez sought monthly allowance for support and unconscious. By May 11, 1976, she left their office. On May 26, 1976,
support pendente lite against Feliciano Sanchez. Feliciano contends that she returned to get her overnight bag and Manuel demanded that she
Josefa had an affair with Macario Sanchez which resulted to Mario get out but she ignored him, hence, he doused her with grape juice,
Sanchez. Also that on October 27, 1930, Josefa abandoned the conjugal kicked her and attempted to hit her with a steel tray but was stopped by
home. And as the illegitimate child of Josefa with Macario, Mario is not her driver. On June 3, 1976, Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed against Manuel J.
entitled to his support. He asked for an opportunity to adduce evidence in C. Reyes an action for support pendente lite, and for Legal Separation
support of this defense which Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals when he had attempted to kill her. Manuel contends that Celia committed
denied adultery with her physician and that she is thus not entitled to support
and if she was, the assigned amount of P4000 by the Court was
ISSUE: Whether or not Macario and Josefa are entitled to support excessive

RULING: No, Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against ISSUE: Whether or not Celia is entitled to support pendent lite
an action for support of the wife or an action for support of the child who
is the fruit of such adulterous relations. The defense should be RULING: Yes. Adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support
established and not merely alleged, and that proof must therefore be but only if proven. In fact, adultery is a good defense and if properly
permitted. Hence, Feliciano has a valid defense and he asked for an proved and sustained will defeat the action but it must be established by
opportunity to present evidence to prove his allegations, it was error to competent evidence and not merely alleged. During hearing of the
deny him the opportunity. application for support pendente lite, Manuel did not present any
evidence to prove his allegation. During hearing of the application for
action for legal separation, Manuel did not present any evidence to prove
his allegation. Yet Celia asked for support pending litigation from their
conjugal partnership and not necessarily from Manuel‗s private funds.

Determination of Amount - Celia was unemployed and without funds, all

their conjugal properties, including corporations where Manuel is
President, Manager and Treasurer, are in the possession of Manuel:
Standard Mineral Products earning P85,654.61; Development and
Technology Consultant Inc. earning P98,879.84; The Contra-Prop
Marine Philippines, Inc. Also that these companies have entered into
multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of Public Highways. The
amount was reduced from P5000 since their children are in the custody
of Manuel. In determining the amount to be awarded as support
pendente lite: it is not necessary to go fully into the merits of the case. It
is sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence
which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application.
In view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be
entered, mere affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support
pendente lite.
226. LERMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 227. CANONIZADO VS. BENITEZ

FACTS: Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz were married on 1951. FACTS: On Sept. 27, 1968, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
On 1969, petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent. ordering defendant to give plaintiff a monthly support of P100.00
1969, respondent then filed for legal separation on the grounds of beginning with October 1964, payable in advance within the first 5 days
concubinage and attempt against her life. Moreover, she wanted support of each month. Said decision became final and executory on Jan. 21,
pending trial for their youngest son. On 1969, respondent Judge granted 1969. On Oct. 24, 1969, an order of execution was issued for P27,900
respondents application for support pendente lite. Petitioner filed for a follow by the writ itself on Oct. 28, 1969. The writ was recalled and set
preliminary injunction which was dismissed. Meanwhile, in 1972, the aside to enable Canonizado to correct the amount therein stated. On
Court of First Instance of Rizal found Respondent and Teodor Ramirez Oct. 6, 1967, Christina (daughter) became of age but since she was still
(his paramour) guilty of adultery. studying then, her support was formally terminated only in April 1969.
The total amount due her as of this latter date was determined at
ISSUE: Whether or not adultery is a good defense against the P16,150 for the period from Oct. 1964 to April 1969. Writs of execution
respondents claim for support pendente lite. were again issued on Feb. 10 and March 30, 1970; both were returned
and unsatisfied. On July 11, 1973, the petitioner and respondent entered
RULING: Yes. The right to separate support or maintenance, even from into an Agreement. Petitioner filed a motion for execution and contempt
the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of a of court. By Aug. 3, 1976, petitioner and respondent entered again into
justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. an agreement. On Jan. 12, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to require the
There must be a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to respondent to pay current support beginning Feb 1978 based on the
live separately for him/her to gain support. In other words, the right to decisions of Sept. 27, 1968 and Jan. 21, 1969. Respondent filed an
support was lost by the respondent when she was found guilty of opposition on the ground that his obligation to support has terminated.
adultery.
ISSUE: Whether or not Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court can be
compelled by mandamus to act on the petitioner‗s motion for payment of
current support.

RULING: No. NCC 303: The obligation to give support shall also cease:
(3) when the recipient may engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or
has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no
longer needs the allowance from his subsistence. This doesn‗t affect the
right to support between spouses but only the action to make it
demandable subsists throughout the period that the marriage subsists.
Respondent can rightfully file motion to oppose the payment of current
support to terminate the demandability of the same for the time being.
Respondent judge cannot be compelled by mandamus to order
respondent to pay current support when the latter alleges that a ground
exists for the suspension of such obligation. A judgment for support is
never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to
increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-
enforced when appropriate circumstances exists
228. HONTIVEROS VS. IAC 229. UNSON VS. NAVARRO

FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro Hontiveros and private respondent Brenda FACTS: Unson and Araneta were married on April 19, 1971. Maria
Hernando are the father and mother of an acknowledged natural child Teresa, their child would stay with petitioner during school days and
born on November 27, 1981 named Margaux Hontiveros. From spend weekends with her mother but her mother wouldn't even bother to
November 1981 to June 1982, the child had been under the care and pick her up during non-school days. During early part of 1978, Unson
custody of Brenda and Alejandro used to take the child out during found out that Araneta has been living with her brother in law Reyes.
Saturdays and return her Saturday night. On June 21, 1982, Alejandro Reyes and Araneta later beget two kids and later embraced a protestant
picked the kid up and never returned her to the mother. The mother then sect. Petitioner contends that Maria Teresa was born and reared under
filed a petition for habeas corpus to recover custody of Margaux without the Roman Catholic faith and should not be exposed to an environment
depriving the father of his visitorial rights. At the hearing conducted on alien to the Catholic way of life which is the upbringing and training her
September 9, 1982, the minor child was ―produced before the Court father is committed to. Araneta claims that they had an amicable
and a settlement was reached upon agreement of the parties that arrangement and no specific terms were agreed and stipulated upon by
Margaux shall be under the custody of the petitioner for 7 days every her and Unson regarding custody of the child and that Maria Teresa was
other week. On May 24, 1983, the petitioner filed an urgent petition for always allowed to visit and to be picked up at any time by petitioner's
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the mother from parents. She admits her present circumstances at first impression might
bringing the kid to the USA where she is bound for. seem socially if not morally unacceptable but Maria Teresa has been
reared and brought up in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to custody of his minor child honesty.
Margaux.
ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the child should be given to the
RULING: No. Article 363 of the NCC provides that ―no mother shall be mother.
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reasons for such measure‖. Clearly, Brenda has a clear legal RULING. No. It is in the best interest of the child to be freed from the
right under Art. 17 of PD 603 to the custody of her minor child, there obviously unwholesome, not say immoral influence, that the situation in
being no compelling reasons to the contrary. which Araneta has placed herself might create in the moral and social
outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable
While the petitioner would have the court believe that private respondent stage in her life. She might start getting ideas about the peculiar
is unfit to take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law.
under the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in the SC.
The Court has no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitorial
rights over the child. Anyway, decisions even of the SC on the custody of
minor children are open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to
the matter may demand in the light of the inflexible criterion.
230. EXCONDE VS. CAPUNO 231. PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES

FACTS: Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization FACTS: Spouses filed a case with the RTC for damages on the death of
and a student of the Balintawak Elementary School. He attended a their son Dominador Palisoc inside Manila Technical Institute grounds
parade in honor of Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school‘s (laboratory room) against defendants Antonio C. Brillantes (member of
supervisor. He boarded a jeep, took hold of the wheel and drove it while the Board of Directors), Teodosio Valenton (the President), Santiago M.
the driver sat on his left side. The jeep turned turtle and two passengers Quibulue (instructor of the class), and Virgilio L. Daffon (co-student and
(Isidiro Caperina and Amado Ticzon) died. At the time this happened, assailant of Palisoc). The death of the victim was believed to have been
Dante‘s father, Delfin was not with him, nor did he know that his son was caused by the heavy fist blows to the body which he had incurred from a
going to attend a parade. Dante was then charged with double homicide fight with Daffon which damaged his internal organs. The lone witness to
through reckless imprudence. After conviction by the RTC and CA, the event, Desiderio Cruz, attested that he and Daffon were fixing a
petitioner Sabina Exconde (mother of one of the deceased) filed a machine while the victim was looking on. After a snide comment by
separate civil action against Dante and Delfin for damages in the amount Daffon regarding his inaction, the victim slapped him which started the
of P2,959.00. Defendants averred as a defense that Dante should be the fight. Daffon then retaliated with fist blows to the body. After which
only one civilly liable because at the time of the accident he was not Palisoc fell down and fainted after which he was brought to the hospital
under the control, supervision, and custody of Delfin. The lower court where he later died from his injuries. The TC found Daffon guilty for the
sustained the defense, and so Exconde appealed, the case certified to quasi delict under Article 2176 of the NCC but absolved the other
the SC. defendants from liability under Article 2180 of the NCC. The court cited
that the damages to incurred in the case would not be on the defendant
ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin can be held jointly and severally liable with from MTI since Article 2180 of the New Civil Code contemplated a
his son Dante for damages resulting from the death of Isidro caused by situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
the negligent act of his minor son Dante. control or influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.

RULING: Article 1903, 1st and 5th paragraphs: ―The father, and, in case ISSUE: Whether or not under the factual findings, the trial court erred in
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused absolving the defendants-school officials from civil liability under Art.
by minor children who live with them.‖ ―Teachers and directors of arts 2180 of the NCC.
and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.‖ RULING: Yes, the SC held the lower court erred in its application of Art.
2180 in as much as they misconstrued the phrase 'so long as they (the
The 5th paragraph only applies to an institution of arts and trades and student) remain in their (the school‗s) custody‗, to mean that the school
not to any academic educational institution. Hence, neither the head of incurs liability for a student‗s actions only if the student actually boards or
the school, nor the city school‘s supervisor, could be held liable for the resides w/ them (a case where their influence over the student
negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an supersedes that of the parents(as held in Mercado vs. Court of
institution of arts and trades as provided by law. Appeals)), to counter this the SC held that the mentioned phrase actually
implied that liability arises not from the boarding of the student w/ the
The civil liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages school but from the protective and supervisory custody that the school
that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary consequence of and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
the parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. As
parents the ―duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, such being that the offense occurred in school premises during class
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,‖ while, time within the supervision of the school. They should be held liable
on the other hand, gives them the ―right to correct and punish them in under 2180 unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in
moderation.‖ The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family. The defendants "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
failed to do. to prevent damage." which they did not do.
232. AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 233. SALVOSA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a classmate, Pablito Daffon, while FACTS: The Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic
in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. He was in school to institution and is also an institution of arts and trade. Within the premises
finish a physics experiment as a pre-requisite to graduating that year. He of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, which is under the full control of the Armed
died at 17. The respondent school and its faculty members submit that Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy. B. Abon is its duly appointed armorer,
they cannot be held liable for what happened because, technically, the he was appointed by the AFP and he also receives his salary from the
semester had already ended. AFP. He also receives his orders from the AFP. He is also a commerce
student of the BCF. On Mar. 3, 1977: Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a
ISSUE: Whether or not they should be held liable now that the semester student of the University of Baguio in the parking lot of BCF with an
had ended when the incident happened. unlicensed firearm which he took from the armory of the ROTC Unit.
Heirs of Napoleon (Respondents) sued for damages from Abon, his
RULING: No and the petition is hereby denied. Art. 2180 of the Civil officer, officers of the BCF and BCF, Inc. The RTC rendered their
Code states that: ―Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts decision, sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and severally for
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and damages. The IAC affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC.
students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.‖ There
have been cases in the past where who was liable would depend on w/n ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be held solidarily liable with
the school was academic or non-academic. If it were academic, the Jimmy Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
teacher-in-charge of the student would be liable, while if it were non-
academic, the head would be. (The ratio of this being that heads of
schools of arts and trade would be closer and more involved with their RULING: No. Even if Abon was enrolled in BCF, the incident was around
students, who can be considered their apprentices.) The Court believes 8 pm, Jimmy Abon was supposed to be in the ROTC office at that time,
that this provision should apply to ALL schools, academic and non- as ordered by his Commandant, Ungos. Abon could not have been in the
academic. Even if the student was within the school grounds and custody of the school at the time, as he was under direct orders to have
basically doing nothing, he is still within the school custody and subject been somewhere else. IAC decision is reversed.
to the discipline of school authorities. However, in the case at bar, none
of the respondents can be clearly said to have been responsible for what
happened to Amadora. The school itself cannot be held directly liable
because according to the provision, it is only either the teacher-in-charge
or the head of the school. The rector, dean of boys or the high school
principal also may not be held liable because it is clear that they are not
teachers-in-charge. Alfredo‗s physics teacher cannot be held liable
because he was not necessarily the teacher-in-charge of Daffon.
234. ST. MARY‘S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS 235. MEDINA VS. MAKABALI

FACTS: From Feb 13-20 1995, St. Mary‗s conducted an enrollment FACTS: On Feb. 4, 1961, petitioner Zenaida gave birth to Joseph
drive, part of which were school visits from where prospective enrollees Casero in Makabali Clinic, Pampanga, owned by respondent
were studying. As a student of St. Mary‗s, Sherwin Carpitanos (son of Dra.Venancia Makabali. Zenaida left the child with Dra. Makabali from
respondent spouses) was part of the campaign group. Sherwin, along his birth, and the latter reared Joseph as her own son. Zenaida never
with other students were riding the jeep, owned by co-respondent visited the child nor paid for his expenses until Aug of 1966 where she
Vivencio Villanueva, driven by James Daniel, 15 years old, also a claimed for custody of the minor. Trial disclosed that Zenaida lived with
student, allegedly, he was driving in reckless manner resulting the jeep Feliciano Casero with two other children, with the tolerance of Casero‗s
to turtle, and Sherwin died as a result of injuries sustained. After trial, lawful wife who lives elsewhere. During trial, the minor addressed the
RTC ordered St. Mary‗s to pay the spouses Carpitanos for damages. St. respondent as Mammy, and even chose to stay with the respondent.
Mary‗s appealed the ruling to the CA, but was denied, hence this appeal With Dra. Makabili making a promise to allow the minor the free choice of
whom to live with upon reaching the age of 14 – the Court held that it
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner was for the child‗s best interest to be left with the foster mother.
liable for damages for the death of Sherwin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LC erred in ordering the minor to stay with
RULING: Yes, Under FC Art. 218, Schools have special parental the respondent.
authority (APA) over a minor child while under their custody - such
authority applies to field trips and other affairs outside school whenever RULING: No, petition dismissed. While the law recognizes the right of
authorized by the schools. Under the Family Code, Art. 219, if a person parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
under custody is a minor, those exercising SPA are liable for damages principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and
caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under property of children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount" (NCC Art.
their custody. For St. Mary to be liable, there must be an act or omission 363), and that for compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be
considered negligent and which has proximate cause to the injury, and ordered separated from the mother. The right of parents to the company
the negligence must have causal connection to the accident. and custody of their children is but ancillary to the proper discharge of
Respondents fail to show that the negligence was the proximate cause, parental duties to provide the children with adequate support, education,
hence reliance on Art 219 is unfounded. Respondents Spouses Daniel moral, intellectual and civic training and development (Civil Code, Art.
(parents of driver) and Villanueva (owner of the jeep) admit that the 356). As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved
cause of the accident was not negligence of St. Mary‗s nor the reckless remiss in these sacred duties; she not only failed to provide the child with
driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
jeep - which the Carpitons do not dispute. There is likewise no evidence tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
that St. Mary‗s allowed the minor James to drive, it was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of the jeep owner who allowed James to drive. Hence liability
for the accident whether caused by negligence of the driver or
detachment of steering wheel guide must be pinned on the minor‗s
parents. The negligence of St. Mary‗s was only a remote cause. With the
evidence presented by St. Mary‗s and with the fact that the Daniel
spouses mention the circumstance of detachment of steering wheel, it is
not the school but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
responsible
236. LUNA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 237. LINDAIN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Private Respondent Maria Santos is an illegitimate child of the FACTS: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land
petitioner Horacio Luna, who is married to his co-petitioner Liberty Luna. whose title was under their names.
Maria is married to Sixto Salumbides, and they are the parents of
Shirley, who is the subject of this child custody case. Around 2-4 months HELD: Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void.
after the birth of Shirley, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and duties as legal
childless couple with considerable means who loved Shirley and raised administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power
her as their very own. Petitioners asked for the respondents‗ consent to to mortgage, encumber or dispose.
Shirley‗s application for a US Visa because they wanted to bring her to
Disneyland but to no avail. Hence, petitioner left Shirley with the
respondents, upon the latter‗s request, but with instructions that their
driver take and fetch Shirley to Maryknoll College every school day.
When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the
respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The
private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did
the said respondents allow Shirley to visit the petitioners. In view thereof,
the petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, and the trial court ruled
in favor of them. Respondents appealed to CA, who reversed the order.
Petitioners opposed the execution of the judgment and filed a motion for
reconsideration on grounds of the subsequent emotional, psychological,
and physiological condition of the child Shirley which would make the
judgment prejudicial to the child‗s best interests. Shirley made a manifest
during the hearing that she would kill herself or run away from home if
she should ever be separated from her Mama and Papa, the petitioners
herein, and forced to stay with the respondents. Regardless, respondent
court still ruled in favor of the respondents

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners is entitled to the rightful custody of

Shirley.

RULING: Petition granted, Shirley goes to the petitioners. Shirley‗s

manifestations that she would kill herself or run away if she were taken
away from the petitioners would make the judgment unfair, unjust, if not
illegal. NCC Art. 363 provides that questions relating to the care,
custody, and education, etc. of children, the latter‗s welfare is paramount,
hence best interests of the minor can override procedural rules - even
the rights of the biological parents. Furthermore, in her letters to the
members of the court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish
and cruel who beat her often. To return her to the private respondents
would be traumatic, as requested by the child herself, let us not destroy
her future.
238. CHUA VS. CABANGBANG 239. NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Pacita Chua worked as a hostess and lived with Chua Ben in FACTS: Zosima Naldoza married Dionesio Divinagracia on May 30,
1950. They had a child but died in infancy. She then cohabited with Sy 1970. They had two children: Junior and Bombi Roberto. Dionesio
Sia Lay, with Robert and Betty Chua Sy as fruits. After Betty‗s birth, they abandoned the conjugal home after Zosima confronted him about his
separated. She then became Victor Tan Villareal‗s mistress in 1960, a previous marriage. Also, he allegedly swindled 50,000 from Rep.
girl was born to her but then they separated and she gave the child away Maglana and 10,000 from a certain Galagar. Classmates of Junior and
to a comadre in Cebu. On May1958, Bartolome Cabangbang and his Bombi were teasing them because of their swindler father. To obliterate
wife, who were then childless, acquired custody of Betty, who was then any connection between her children and Dionesio (thereby relieving the
four months old. They had her baptized as Grace Cabangbang. On how kids of the remarks of classmates), Zosima filed at the Court of First
Cabangbangs acquired Betty: according to Pacita, it was Villareal during Instance of Bohol on April 10, 1978 a petition to change surname of her
their cohabitation, who gave Betty to Cabangbangs (for favors Villareal two children from Divinagracia into Naldoza (her maiden name). Trial
received). She only knew of such when Betty was three years old and Court dismissed petition saying that aforementioned reasons (swindling,
was brought to her by Villareal, who then returned Betty to the abandoning, previous marriage of Dionesio, but their marriage has not
Cabangbangs due to threats. The Cabangbangs say they found her yet been annulled nor declared bigamous) were not sufficient grounds to
wrapped in bundles at their gates and then treated her as their own, and invoke such change of surname. Furthermore, change of name would
that only when Betty/Grace was 5 ½ years old that the controversy give false impression of family relations.
arose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two children‗s prayer to drop their father‗s
Trial Court said that Betty was given to Cabangbangs by Villareal but surname is justified.
with knowledge and consent from Pacita. Pacita demanded the custody
of the child. Respondents were the Cabangbangs and Villareal. A writ RULING: No. Following the New Civil Code Art. 364, since Junior and
was issued by court but the body of child was not produced. The Trial Bombi are legitimate children, therefore they should use their father‗s
court eventually ruled that for the welfare of the child, she should remain surname. Said minors and their father should be consulted about such,
in the custody of the Cabangbangs mother‗s desire should not only be the sole consideration. Change of
name is allowed only upon proper and reasonable cause (Rule 103 Sec
ISSUE: Whether or not the child should be with Pacita. 5 ROC). Change of name may even redound to the prejudice of the
children later on, may cause confusion as to the minor‗s parentage and
RULING: No. Article 363 of the New Civil Code say that minor under might also create the impression that said minors are illegitimate
seven years of age shall not be separated from mother, but issue is now children, which is inconsistent with their legal status. In Oshita v.
moot as Grace is already 11. The courts may, in cases specified by law, Republic and in Alfon v. Republic, their petition to change names have
deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And there are indeed valid been granted, but petitioners in said cases have already attained mature
reasons, as will presently be expounded, for depriving the petitioner of age. In this case, when these minors have attained the right age, then
parental authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. they can already file said action for themselves.

Petitioner did not at all - not ever - report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not been taken any step to see
the child when she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of
the Cabangbangs.
240. JOHNSTON VS. REPUBLIC 241. LLANETA VS. AGRAVA

FACTS: On June 24, 1960: a Petition for Adoption of Ana Isabel FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married with Serafin Ferrer whom she had
Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana was filed by Isabel Valdes a child named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later
Johnston. The 2-yr.-10-mo. old baby was then under the custody of the Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita
orphanage Hospicio de San Jose whose Mother Superior consented to Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafin‘s
the adoption. As alleged in the petition, Isabel was then married to mother in Manila. Teresita was raised in the household of the Ferrer‘s
Raymond Arthur Johnston who also consented to the adoption. The using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealing even her school records.
adoption was granted but the surname of the child was changed to She then applied for a copy of her birth certificate in Sorsogon as it is
―Valdes‖ because it was held as the surname of the petitioner. On required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant.
October 24, 1960, a Motion was filed to change the surname to ―Valdes Subsequently, she discovered that her registered surname was Llaneta
Johnston‖. and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown
father. She prayed to have her name changed from Teresita Llaneta to
ISSUE: Whether the adopted child can use the surname of adopter‗s Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion
husband. among persons and entities she dealt with and would entail endless and
vexatious explanations of the circumstances.
RULING: No, because only Isabel adopted Ana, only her surname can
be used by the child. ISSUE: Whether Teresita can have her surname changed to Ferrer.

NCC 341 (4): Adopted minor is entitled to use the adopter‗s RULING: The Court ruled in favor of Teresita and granted her petition to
surname. change her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition,
the mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come
The husband of Isabel did not join in the adoption, his consent to the forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of
adoption did not have the effect of making him an adopting father. Ferrer with her. Furthermore, adequate publication of the proceeding
Hence, his surname cannot be used because it would give the wrong has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of
impression that he adopted Ana also and wrongly entitle Ana to the Serafin Ferrer.
status of his legitimate child under NCC 341 (1).

But why ―Valdes‖ despite her marriage to Johnston? Because ―Valdes‖

remains to be as her own surname. Use of the surname of the husband
is only an addition to the surname of the wife and it does not change the
latter. NCC 370 (1) allows a married woman to add to her surname her
husband's surname but she has a surname of her own to which her
husband's surname may only be added if she so chooses.
242. TOLENTINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS 243. LEGAMIA VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of FACTS: Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from
Appeals. On February 8, 1931 – Respondent Consuelo David married November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During
Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was dissolved their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named Michael
and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.
decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and
abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentino From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter‘s death,
married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs.
married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.
Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural
and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after
surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino Emilio‘s death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the
(brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter was
discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of signed ―Corazon L. Reyes.‖ The voucher evidencing payment of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. Michael‘s claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed ―Corazon L.
Reyes.‖
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo
David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio,
was divorced. Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led
to Corazon‘s prosecution.
RULING: Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may
continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no HELD: It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent
provisions for divorce under Philippine law. There was a commentary by herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite
Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to be
exclusive right to use the husband‘s surname. She cannot be prevented sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number
from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 is of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political,
not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the
case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid man‘s wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is
marriage ties. Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of
the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. Of the violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant
husband even if he has remarried. and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment
that the law must be construed.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter
problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20
with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that
relations using the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the she role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material gain
would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for
usurpation of the petitioner‘s name and surname. Usurpation implies Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship.
injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists with the Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon
possibility of confusion of identity had done especially because some of them probably had their own
Corazons.
244. REYES VS. ALEJANDRO 245. EASTERN SHIPPING VS. LUCERO

FACTS: In a petition filed on October 25, 1969 Erlinda Reynoso prayed FACTS: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed
for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes as captain of the ship EASTERN MINICON of eastern shipping lines.
alleging that her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only,
since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his meaning the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the
whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left vessel at the Port of Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that
no will nor any property in his name nor any debts. part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid to Mrs.
Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition
established that she and Roberto L. Reyes were married on March 20, Captain Lucero sent three distress messages to the company on the
1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home following dates: February l6, 1980 7am; February l6, 1980 3:30pm;
due to some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then February 16, 1980 9:50pm (on the third message he stated that
petitioner has not received any news about the whereabouts of her seawater was entering the vessel and they were preparing to abandon
husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their ship). The company notified the coast guard. Search results were
marriage and that they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; negative. The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel.
that her only purpose in filing the petition is to establish the absence of Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the
her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of heirs of the crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who
Court and Article 384 of the Civil Code. refused to accept. On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for the
payment of the accrued salary allotment of her husband which the
ISSUE: Whether or not Roberto must be judicially declared absent. Company had stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of
said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have returned to the port of
RULING: No. The purpose of the declaration is to provide an Manila. She contended that the contract of employment entered into by
administrator of the property. Rule 107 of the Rules of Court is based on her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage basis, and
the provisions of Title XIV of the New Civil Code on absence. The that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
provision is concerned with the interest or property of the absentee. The The company refused to pay. The National seamen board upheld the
purpose of the declaration is to provide an administrator of the property. complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC

The reason and purpose of the provisions of the New Civil Code on ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs Lucero was entitled to the accrued salary.
absence (Arts. 381 to 396) are:
1. The interest of the person himself who has disappeared; RULING: The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391 regarding the
2. The rights of third parties against the absentee, especially those presumption of death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume
who have rights which would depend upon the death of the that Mr. Lucero has died because under the law, four (4) years have not
absentee; and yet passed. Art. 391 NCC: The following shall be presumed dead for all
3. The general interest of society which may require that property purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A
does not remain abandoned without someone representing it person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane
and without an owner. which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane. The Supreme Court ruled however that a
In this case, since there were no properties to speak of, the dismissal of preponderance of evidence from the telegraph messages and the fact
the Courts is valid. that the vessel was not heard of again show that it can be logically
. inferred that the vessel has sunk and the crew perished. As the Court
said in Joaquin vs. Navarro: "Where there are facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not
step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls." Hence the
NLRC decision is reversed; however, death benefits should be paid.
246. TOL-NOQUERA VS. VILLAMOR 247. EUGENIO VS. VELEZ

FACTS: December 1986, Daya Maria Tol (seeking administration of the FACTS: HC served over the body of Vitaliana Vargas who allegedly died
estate) alleged that she was the acknowledged natural child of Remigio on the 28th of august 1988 but was only made known to the courts on
Tol, who had been missing since 1984 and a certain Diosdado Tol had September of 1988 after the HC petition of Vitaliana‗s brothers and
fraudulently obtained a title of Remigio‗s property. Diosdado countered sisters, with the allegation that Tomas Eugenio unduly took away their
that Daya Maria was not an acknowledged natural child of the absentee sister sometime in 1987 and made her reside in his palacial residence in
and the title was originally in his name. Misamis Oriental. Tomas Eugenio was arguing that HC should not
govern the dead body, and besides he was already (allegedly) able to
ISSUE: Whether or not Daya Maria Tol can be appointed administratrix secure a burial permit to bury her at the grounds of PBCM of which he is
when Remigio was not yet declared presumptively dead. the head. The brothers and sisters of Vitaliana were arguing that Tomas
doesn‗t belong to the list of persons who are mandated by the law
RULING: It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a (According to NCC 305 and 308) to bury her (he being just a common-
proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for administration. The law husband, therefore lawfully has no relations with her).
purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property
of the absentee, not of the administrator. ISSUE: Whether or not the brothers and sisters are the lawful custodians
of her body (right to bury the deceased)
The relevant laws on the matter are found in the following provisions of
the Civil Code: RULING: Yes. Supreme Court decided for the sisters and brothers of
Vitaliana, given that Tomas was just the common-law husband of the
Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile his whereabouts deceased. The right to bury her therefore remains on the nearest kin of
being unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property Vitaliana, who are the respondents herein.
the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend,
may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.

This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the
power conferred by the absentee has expired.

Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having

been made, the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard
the rights and interest of the absentee and shall specify the powers,
obligations and remuneration of his representatives, regulating them
according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians.

Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall

be preferred when there is no legal separation.

If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any

competent person may be appointed by the court.
248. REPUBLIC VS. SAYO 249. REPUBLIC VS. VALENCIA

FACTS: Ramon Tan Biana, Jr. was born on January 9, 1952 in Nueva FACTS: Leonor Valencia in behalf of her minor children Bernardo and
Vizcaya as the fifth legitimate child of his parents. The nurse erroneously Jessica Go filed a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries
reported to the Local Civil Registrar that his and his parents' citizenship of their birth in the Civil Registry in the City of Cebu. The TC issued an
as Chinese instead of Filipino. He now claims that he and his parents are order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a
Filipino citizens. Copies were furnished to the Office of the Provincial newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu once a
Fiscal, the Office of the Solicitor General and the Local Civil Registrar. week for three consecutive weeks and notice was duly served on the
Copy of the notice of hearing was posted and it was also published in a Solicitor General the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The petition
newspaper of general circulation published once a week for three seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo and Jessica
consecutive weeks. The TC then proceeded to receive evidence for the from Chinese to Filipino and their status from Legitimate to Illegitimate
petitioner with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal representing the and changing also the status of the mother from married to single. The
Government. Local Civil Registrar avers that the corrections sought are not merely
clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of
ISSUE: Whether or not the procedure followed satisfied the requirements the minors and the status of the mother. The Trial Court granted the
of ―appropriate adversary pro-proceedings‖. petition.

RULING: Yes. It is true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings that took place could be
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one regarded as proper suit or appropriate action for cancellation and/or
involving nationality of citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as correction of entries in the civil register.
well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a summary
proceedings. However it is also true that a right in law may be enforced RULING: Yes. The persons who must be made parties to a proceeding
and a wrong may be remedied as long as the proper remedy is used. concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any
Biana, Jr. submitted the following: a voters ID of his father, a decision of interest which would be affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it
the Bureau of Immigration showing that his father is a natural son of a becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the time and
Filipino citizen and that his mother, being a legal wife was also a place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing
Philippine citizen, a certification issued by a the Bureau of Immigration to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
stating that the father is a Filipino citizen, the birth certificate of his newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are
brother stating that he is the son of Philippine citizens and his Voter's ID. likewise entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any
person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for

correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed
and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no
longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any
person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be
cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the
proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings. The decision of
the Trial Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
250. REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS 251. LABAYO-ROWE VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS: Pang Cha Quen, a Chinese national married Alfredo De la Cruz, FACTS: Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe filed a petition for the correction of
a Filipino citizen. She had a previous marriage to a Chinese citizen Sia entries in the civil registry with the then Court of First Instance of
Bian who fathered her child, May Sia alias Manman Huang. She Pampanga. She asked the court to order the Local Civil Registrar of San
registered her daughter as an alien under the name Mary Pang, which is Fernando, Pampanga to correct the entries in the birth certificates of her
her maternal surname because the child‗s father has abandoned them. children Vicente L. Miclat, Jr. and Victoria Miclat especially with regard to
Now Pang Cha Quen prays that her daughter‗s name be changed to petitioner's name which appears in both certificates as "Beatriz Labayo-
Mary Pang De la Cruz since Alfredo has grown to love her as his own Labayu and as regards her civil status and date of marriage which
daughter. Judge Marcos granted such petition. appears in the birth certificate of Victoria Miclat as "married" with the year
appearing "1953 Bulan." She claimed that she was never married to
ISSUE: Whether or not the name of Mary Pang can be changed to Mary Vicente Miclat and that she was now married to an American citizen,
Pang De la Cruz. William Rowe. Her petition was granted changing her civil status from
married to single in the birth certificate of Victoria.
RULING: No. Firstly, the republic pointed out that the petition to change
the name did not include ―Mary Pang‖ but only May Sia and Manman ISSUE: Whether or not Emperatriz can change her civil status from
Huang. The omission of her other alias "Mary Pang" in the captions of married to single in Victoria‗s birth certificate.
the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the
publication. The general rule is that a change of name should not be RULING: No. The petition for correction of entries in the civil registry
permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another does not only involve the correction of petitioner Labayo's name and
where none actually exists. Furthermore, Mary Pang is the only one who surname registered as "Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayo in the birth
can pray for the change of her name. This cannot be done by her mother certificates of her children. The petition also seeks the change of her
for her. status from "married" to "not married" at the time of her daughter's birth,
thereby changing the status of her child Victoria Miclat from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate." The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents
would be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.