MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No.

135306,
Jan. 28, 2003

FACTS: Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than
70 Muslim religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS
Publications, Inc., arising from an article, which reads:

"ALAM BA NINYO?

Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?

Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin
kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa
nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-
lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."

ISSUE:

o W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.

DEFAMATION DEFINED:

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which
tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in
the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the
publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or
tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since
it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff.

GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:

…where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is

essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the
class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately, if need be….
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify
nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged
libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for
social censure pointedly resulting in damages.

The action likewise is not for emotional distress.

Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action
filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal
attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular
individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage
caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational
harm which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of
defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm which includes injuries
to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their
complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in
the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and
in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present
case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for
defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional
distress properly belongs.
 Today is Thursday, January 16, 2020

EN BANC

, JR., petitioners,

F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, respondents.

u to continue writing it. —

— liberties that belong as well, if not more, to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. For the ultimate good which we all
market — not just the ideas we desire, but including those thoughts we despise.1

Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE
wide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from

uslim?

hit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing

words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings,
y the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
rticle did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was me

cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified —

ied with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs x x x. It is thu
nce, it is difficult for an individual Muslim member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him. The evidence presented in this

ar from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and id
s was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organ

he elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exem

r reputation through false and malicious statements.5 It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goo
into disrepute.7 Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may hav

d mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis fo

iable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class ha
rt,13 we dismissed a complaint for libel against Newsweek, Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause of actio
s in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual members, filed a class action suit for damages in beha
sland of Fear" in its weekly newsmagazine allegedly depicting Negros Province as a place dominated by wealthy landowners and su
and malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and/or misrepresentation of facts intended to put the sugarcane planters in a b
general. We ratiocinated —

ntial that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently spe
bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the representation of class interest af
n the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

e. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they

lim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and professio
pportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individua
at will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

uiding principle of group libel is that defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual un

nst all persons of the Jewish religion. The Court held that there could be no libel against an extensive community in common law. In a
t be absolved.16 With regard to the largest sectors in society, including religious groups, it may be generally concluded that no crimina

by the airing of a national television broadcast of a film depicting the public execution of a Saudi Arabian princess accused of adultery
mages arising from "an international conspiracy to insult, ridicule, discredit and abuse followers of Islam throughout the world, Arabs
defamation was to protect individuals; a group may be sufficiently large that a statement concerning it could not defame individual gr

iateness of any action for tortious libel involving large groups, and provides a succinct illustration:
scription of the members. Here the problem is merely one of evaluation. Is the description of the member implicit in the description of

e that all of the lawyers were shysters. A charge that the lawyers in a local point in a great city, such as Times Square in New York C
shysters would be a specific charge, so that any lawyer having an office within that building could sue.

o anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no action; the plaintiff doe
ases, the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is said to embrace
ond, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of the press, effecting a so

re particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Pr
nd others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philipp

alian, Presbyterian, Lutheran, and other groups the essence of which may lie in an inspired charlatan, whose temple may be a corner
opulation may be divided into smaller groups with varying agenda, from the prayerful conservative to the passionately radical. These d

course of the deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating discussion on group

written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is

ning and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character and conduct warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiff's feelings and sen
hers may have of the plaintiff. The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement that would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputa

mation action is upon the allegedly defamatory statement itself and its predictable effect upon third persons. A statement is ordinarily
of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that "tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of th

t of his prima facie case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.

atory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for damages suffered by reason of defama
Even when a publication may be clearly defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they a

appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases w

pplied to any member of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory languag
s small group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision o

ersons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the cla
esumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of sui
employment, directed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of p

rge group — which if defamed entitles no one to sue — is not always so simple. Some authorities have noted that in cases permitting
en some distinguishing characteristic of the individual or group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to appl
up" its performance; the individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position on the team and had played in all but two of the team's ga
ether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its m
size may be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.

oregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the political and ideological beliefs; there are the m
utes to prevent concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime to circulate insidious rumors aga

s for libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too large and poorly defined to support a f

cally identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents

g mental distress and not an action for libel. That opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire22 where the U.S. Supreme Court he
ed that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the l

emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual24 to assuage the injuries to his emotion
y the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the
r complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in
s for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.

distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The
e.26

degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society.
e member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him or her to exclaim, "Outrageous!" as his or h

ation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.29 "Seve
cluding posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.30 The plaintiff is required to show, among o
damages.31

barrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialitie
rds that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting,

of emotional distress. A parody appeared in Hustler magazine featuring the American fundamentalist preacher and evangelist Rever
s District Court for the Western District of Virginia ruled that the parody was not libelous, because no reasonable reader would have u
se of action that did not require a false statement of fact to be made. The United States Supreme Court in a unanimous decision over
nd may have been intended to cause severe emotional distress, but these circumstances were not sufficient to overcome the free spe
ech.

as an individual particularly singled out or identified in the parody appearing on Hustler magazine. Also, the emotional distress allege

e emotional distress allegedly suffered by respondents so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. There is

4 —

mere insult, indignity, annoyance, or even threats, where the case is lacking in other circumstances of aggravation. The reasons are n
ability of course cannot be extended to every trivial indignity x x x x The plaintiff must necessarily be expected and required to be har
 hurt. There must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irascible temp

that would "open up a wide vista of litigation in the field of bad manners," an area in which a "toughening of the mental hide" was tho
ern courts today.37

uent First Amendment doctrines. Back in simpler times in the history of free expression the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a th
pressed in Chaplinsky:

d punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profan
rances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may

merican courts no longer accept the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwi
en was convicted for violating a California statute prohibiting any person from "disturb[ing] the peace x x x by offensive conduct." The
ed an "incitement" to illegal action nor "obscenity." It did not constitute insulting or "fighting" words for it had not been directed at a pe
nal insult, nor was there any danger of reactive violence against him.

viction could only be justified by California's desire to exercise the broad power in preserving the cleanliness of discourse in the publi
h are just as essential in the exercise of this right as the purely cognitive. As Mr. Justice Harlan so eloquently wrote: "[O]ne man's vul
on of provocative and potentially offensive speech.

he Two-Class Theory in Chaplinsky survives — U.S. courts continue to treat "obscene" speech as not within the protection of the Firs
ng the test held that there was no showing that Cohen's jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" had threatened to provoke immine

ed, when Beauharnais was decided in 1952, the Two-Class Theory was still flourishing. While concededly the U.S. High Tribunal did
es that dealt a crushing impact on Beauharnais and rendered it almost certainly a dead letter case law are Brandenburg v. Ohio,42 an

Syndicalism Statute for advocating the necessity, duty and propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as
was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court, holding that the advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such advocacy is dir
h speech is not translated into action.

enburg must be understood as overruling Beauharnais and eliminating the possibility of treating group libel under the same First Ame

y pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In de
s of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any other factor be

us to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in ef
ther have they been able to demonstrate the identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be shown that t

is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its causal connection with the acts complained o
ages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensator

ommonplace as self-appointed critics of government, it would be more appropriate to respect the fair criticism of religious principles, i
uency of suits among religious fundamentalists, whether Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or others. This would unnecessa
 lief; neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of one religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asu
luence. Courts must be viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free speech rig
r the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correct
ntees of freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press.

t 1998 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the RTC-Br. 4, Manila, dismissing the complaint for lack of merit, is REIN

., concur.

ative than that which protects his life, liberty or property. Thus, the law imposes upon him who attacks another's reputation, by slande

eligious organizations in the country, and the other named respondents all claim, with understandable indignation, that they have bee

Muslim?

ahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwin

against petitioners, alleging that the published article was defamatory and an insult to respondents. The trial court dismissed the com

ence of the elements of libel, the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and the liability of petitioners for moral damages, exe

vil Code recognizes the possibility of such a civil action either pursuant to Article 26, paragraph (4), to the effect that although it may n
on for damages, or consonantly with Article 33 which provides that in case of defamation, a civil complaint for damages, entirely sepa
age or injury as a direct consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct. In fine, it must be shown that the act complained of is vex

arly American cases have refused all remedy for mental injury, such as one caused by vexation, because of the difficulty of proof or o
ageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distres
rious.5 Accordingly, it is generally declared that there can be no recovery for insults,6 indignities or threats7 which are considered to am
ndant.
 reputation of another, the unprivileged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another.9 It is
a "relational interest" since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.11 The Re
bel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circu

nd as imparting an erroneous interpretation of a Muslim practice that tends to ridicule the Islamic faith, it is, however, impersonal on its
ned, an ascertained or ascertainable individual.14 It is only then that plaintiff's emotions and/or reputation can be said to have been inju
d or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of suc

n cannot reasonably be interpreted to be pointing to each judge or to a certain judge in the Philippines. Thus, no particular magistrate
gatory conduct now refers to a relatively narrow group that might yet warrant its looking into in an appropriate suit. And if the article a

ewer members.18 When statements concern groups with larger composition, the individual members of that group would be hardput t
n to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury would fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit.20 This principle is said t
2) the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as of press, effecting a sound co

schools, one school suing;22 or where there was imputation of criminality to a union, one member suing;23 or where an attack was ma

marks filed by four incorporated associations of sugar planters in Negros Occidental in behalf of all sugar planters in that province, aga
nated that an article directed at a class or group of persons in broad language would not be actionable by individuals composing the c
n sense would tell those to whom the publication was made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an u

Da'wah Council of the Philippines or to any of the individual respondents. There is no direct reference or allusion to the federation or a
ines, Inc., itself, much like any other artificial being or juridical entity, having existence only in legal contemplation, would be devoid o
al reputation.28

peals, REINSTATING thereby the order of dismissal rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

nal tortious act causing mental distress to those whom private respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines; Inc. represents.

rivate respondents stated their case as follows:

"Statement of Case

with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.' [Art. 19]
all indemnify the latter for the same.' [Art. 20]

morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.' [Art. 21]

hbor and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of a

n life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.' [Art. 26]

court 'a quo' a civil case for damages on account of a published article at the editorial section of the defendant newspaper x x x."1

when petitioners state in their Petition that "[p]laintiffs rely heavily on Article 26 of the Civil Code particularly par. 4 thereof." Petitioner

atement. If this were a libel case under Article 303 of the Civil Code, which authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability ar
eir action on Article 30 of the Civil Code.

Code. Unlike the action in Article 30 of the Civil Code which must arise from a "criminal offense," the action under Article 26 "may not
s, is embraced in the tort known as intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. This case must be decided on the issue of wh

uslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawala

r god, was published with intent to humiliate and disparage Muslims and cast insult on Islam as a religion in this country. The publicat

he trial court ruled that the article was not libelous because the article did not identify or name the plaintiffs. Declared the trial court:

hen it portrayed the Muslims to be worshipping the pig as their god. Likewise, there is no doubt that the subject article was published,

ot present.

ed with specificity. The subject article was directed at the Muslims without mentioning or identifying the herein plaintiffs. x x x x."

as a libel case rather than a case for damages for violation of Articles 19, 20, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code." The Court of Appeals rev
 e Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation unden

to Muslims, causing wounded feelings and mental anguish to believers of Islam. This is a finding of fact that the Court is duty bound
ate courts, we find the newspaper article in question dripping with extreme profanity, grossly offensive and manifestly outrageous, and

iefs. The only question is whether the wrongful act committed by petitioners, which does not constitute the crime of libel, is a case of

ons mentioned in Article 26.

effectively protect this right.

view of the law in force. Alienation of the affection of another's wife or husband, unless it constituted adultery or concubinage, is not c
ntold moral suffering to the other spouse. Why should not these acts be the subject matter of a civil action for damages? In American

rs of the family against the other members. In this manner many a happy family is broken up or estranged. Why should not the law try

be alienated from his friends.

nt of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect or other personal condition. The penal laws against defama

er by reason of the latter's religion.

ion in life. To a certain extent this is inevitable, from the nature of the social make-up, but there ought to be a limit somewhere, even w
t sought by the legal provision under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety.

f humiliation cast upon other persons. Such tampering with human personality, even though the penal laws are not violated, should b

occur with unpleasant frequency."6 (Emphasis supplied)

fall short of being criminal offenses. Article 24 itself expressly refers to tortious conduct which "may not constitute criminal offenses." T
for such act becomes liable for "damages, prevention and other relief." In short, to preserve peace and harmony in the family and in t

esponsibility for tortious conduct under Article 26. Where the tortious act humiliating another because of his religious beliefs is publish
not even be published or broadcasted but merely hurled privately at the offended party.

but the harm to plaintiff's mental and emotional state. In libel, the gist of the action is the injury to plaintiff's reputation. Reputation is t
mages. What is material is the disturbance on the-mental or emotional state of the plaintiff who is entitled to peace of mind. The offens
the statement and it alludes to an identifiable group to which he clearly belongs.

ivate separately to each of the private respondents, the act would be actionable under Article 26 because it would cause mental distr
ed by the publicity. This merely illustrates that the requirements of libel have no application in intentional torts under Article 26 where
nal distress is completely separate and distinct8 from the twin torts of libel and slander.9
s authority that a person "may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a publication unless the publicatio
ctrine in Hustler applies only to public figures, and the U.S. Supreme Court found that "respondent Falwell is a 'public figure' for purpo

onal infliction of emotional distress by reason of publication such as the one here at issue without 'a showing in addition that the publi
(Emphasis supplied)

private person and not a public figure even if there is no showing that the false statement was made with actual malice. In the instant

s full respect for human rights."11 The Constitution created a Commission on Human Rights with the function, among others, to "[M]on
ution referred to the civil and political rights embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights13 to which the Philipp

herein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

nd civil rights.

il and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the

ose the Gentleman has specified.

x x xreligious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." The Human Rights C

ary legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to therein. However, the reports have shown that in some States such action
on and practice.

propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of vio

s municipal law.16 The Covenant carries great weight in the interpretation of the scope and meaning of the term "human rights" as use
en mandates the independent Commission on Human Rights to monitor the compliance of the Philippine Government, which includes

of his religious beliefs. This is just a soft prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred that incites discrimination, hostility or violence, th
nant. Since our ratification of the Covenant in 1986, the Philippines has not enacted any special legislation to enforce the provisions o
ction against intentional conduct, falling short of a criminal act, advocating religious hatred that incites hostility between Muslims and

essly mandates the Philippine Government, we must give redress under Article 26 to the outrageous profanity suffered by private resp
treaty in good faith17 — is one such principle. Thus, if we refuse to apply Article 26 to the instant case, then we admit that we have no

v. Keegstra:18

.P.R. (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) demonstrate that the prohibition of hate promoting expression is considere
otection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are also of aid in illustrating the tenor of the international community's approac
ebate internationally (see, e.g., Nathan Lerner, The U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1980), a
 t have regard to that commitment in investigating the nature of the government objective behind s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code. That
ortance of the objective behind s. 319(2) and the principles of equality and the inherent dignity of all persons that infuse both internatio

e 1987 Constitution to protect the inherent dignity and human rights of all its citizens.

the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression. Words that heap extreme profanity, intended merely to incite hostility, hatred

t, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defi
ofane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediat
hat may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Resort to epithets or personal abuse
is supplied)

that are not constitutionally protected. Profane utterances, like asserting that Muslims worship the pig as their God, have no social va

or implied contempt of sacred things. Town of Torrington v. Taylor, 59 Wyo. 109, 137 P.2d 621, 624; Duncan v. U.S., C.C.A. Or., 48

s use of the name of God. Vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language. It is a federal offense to utter an obscene, indecent, or profane lang

First Amendment doctrines." The majority opinion then cites the 1971 case of Cohen v. California 20 as an "illustrative" case that "Am
e which the majority opinion also cites, clearly explains the state of American law on this matter, thus:

ect to limitations. We recognized in Pacifica Foundation that speech that is 'vulgar, offensive, and shocking' is 'not entitled to absolute
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' These limitations are but recognition of t
[other citations omitted] x x x."

ues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open, this free debate has never been meant to include libelous, obscene or profane utte

tion and enforcement of constitutional rights." This is an innovation in the 1987 Constitution to insure, in the words of former Chief Ju
their judicial power.23 This provision stresses that constitutional rights, whether found in the Bill of Rights or in other provisions of the

Constitution, is the right to "full respect for human rights." The trial and appellate courts have found that private respondents' religious
nd Political Rights. It now becomes the duty of the Court, as the guardian of the fundamental rights of the people, to exercise its powe

s must bring a class suit. This will avoid multiplicity of suits considering the numerous potential plaintiffs all over the country. A judgm
ddress the fear that cases will swamp the courts all over the country if profanities against religious groups are made actionable under

ociety in its historical development. In the 1950s, faced with rising racial tension in American society, the U.S Supreme Court ruled in
nd as defamation of an individual. This was the only time that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld group libel, and since then, there has be
ive immigration of unassimilated ethnic groups justified the legislature in "punishing x x x libels directed at designated collectives and
majority opinion explains that Brandenburg, a 1969 decision, ruled that "advocacy of illegal action becomes punishable only if such a
preme Court, it was not overturned in Brandenburg which did not even cite or mention Beauharnais. What Brandenburg overturned w

ed, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the des
, and that decision is therefore overruled." (Emphasis supplied)

mere advocacy of violence as a means to accomplish industrial or political reform. This is distinctly different from the instant case, wh

d any section of the public distinguished by color, race, religion or ethnic origin. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the clear and p
preme Court found the U.S. Supreme Court's Beauharnais decision more reflective of Canadian values rather than later U.S. decision
gin and religion. The following passages in Keegstra are instructive:

urisprudence as it pertains to hate propaganda. Central to most discussions is the 1952 case of Beauharnais v. Illinois, where the Su
d by later pronouncements of the Supreme Court (see, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S
e pronouncements is to protect offensive, public invective as long as the speaker has not knowingly lied and there exists no clear and

e in the United States. But it is important to be explicit as to the reasons why or why not American jurisprudence may be useful in the
tical experience is immense, and should not be overlooked by Canadian courts. On the other hand, we must examine American cons

nstitutional jurisprudence in seeking to elucidate the meaning of Charter guarantees that have counterparts in the United States Con

ching human rights in our two countries arisen in the same context. It is only common sense to recognize that, just as similarities will

doctrine. Credible arguments have been made that later Supreme Court cases do not necessarily erode its legitimacy (see, e.g., Ken
United States which evinces a stronger focus upon the way in which hate propaganda can undermine the very values which free spe
prohibiting hate propaganda (see, e.g., Richard Delgado, "Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-C
30; Mari Matsuda, "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story," (1989), 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, at p. 2348; "D

United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which requires signatory states to prohibit any "advocacy of x x x r
ied the Covenant, the United States made a reservation rejecting this provision insofar as it conflicts with U.S. constitutional protectio
Constitution of the Philippines even created a Commission on Human Rights to "[M]onitor the Philippine Government's compliance wi

ueled not only by poverty but also by the palpable feeling among Muslims that the Christian majority is not treating Muslims fairly. Pri
rts for legal redress of their grievance. They could have easily retaliated by flinging their own blasphemous invectives against the Chr

eld opined that the Prophet Mohammed would have approved of the beauty contest. The newspaper stated: "What would Mohamme
ts. Yet the offensive article in the Nigerian newspaper pales in comparison to the utterly profane newspaper article in the instant case
 m religious organizations in the Philippines, deserves commendation for bringing this case before our courts for a peaceful and legal
o breathe life to this long dormant provision of the Civil Code, to give even just a token redress to religious minorities who suffer ment
on, and demonstrate to our Muslim brothers that their grievances can be redressed under the rule of law.

ave adopted in this jurisdiction in determining the constitutionality of legislation that impinges on civil liberties.33 Even under the clear
st movement in the South should make us more sensitive to the grievances of our Muslim brothers who continue to have faith in the

e in question, Article 26 of the Civil Code mandates that the tortious conduct "shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention
se, as duly established by the testimonies of prominent Muslims,34 private respondents suffered emotional distress which was eviden

many of the rights embodied therein were not yet widely accepted by American courts, and in fact even now at least one, the right to
ow in galvanizing the same in actual cases. To date Article 26 stands almost as a mere decorative provision in our statutes; but it may

cle 26. Applying Article 26 will not undermine freedom of speech since the profane publication in question belongs to the class of spe
lying Article 26 implements the constitutional policy that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full resp
anities inflict on religious minorities in violation of their human rights.

oral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 attorney's fees to respondent Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippin

rtion of the subject article which alludes to the Muslims as not eating pork because it is dirty is not the bone of contention of responde

over which any other (name) than (that of) Allah has been invoked. Then, whoever is driven by necessity, not desiring, nor exceedin

malicious publication that the Muslims worship the pig as their God which is absolutely contrary to their basic belief as Muslims that t

can be brought under Article 26 may also be subject to an action for defamation under Article 33. In such a case, the action brought u

entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independe

sary that respondents are able to establish by preponderance of evidence the following elements of defamation:
or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance.

ad.

on defamed."4

on of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit o

hatred, contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right thinking persons, and deprive him o
derable and respectable class in the community, taking into consideration the emotions, prejudices, and intolerance of mankind.7 It ha
o read the statements are made to hate, despise, scorn or be contemptuous of the person concerning whom the false statements are

esume as a matter of law that they will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or
r disgrace.9 The imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of society whose standard of opinion the court can re

ondition to all Muslims in general, a derision of the religious beliefs of the Muslims and of the objectives of respondent Council to hera

the religious beliefs of Muslims. It has been held that scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; it is enough if the defendan

tify said publication. It cannot be considered as a mere information being disseminated. Petitioners' defense that the article itself was
hole with the other paragraphs, calls the attention of the readers to a statement of fact, not fiction, and that the writer speaks with aut

mation.14 In matters of libel, the question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what is the meaning of the words he has

y particular hearer or reader, by which the actionable quality of the words is to be determined. It is the meaning that the words in fact
king into consideration accompanying explanations and surrounding circumstances which were known to the hearer or reader. The a

on is not excused by the publisher's ignorance that it contains libelous matter.18 The state of mind of the person who publishes a libel
erson publishing the libel was, or whether he intended it to have a libelous meaning or not.20 The defendant may not have intended to
any existing person, or again he may have been actuated by the best motives in publishing the words, but such facts will usually affo

der Article 33 of the Civil Code. If the imputation is defamatory,23 the Court has held that malice is presumed and the burden of overco

the presumption of malice. In fact, there is convincing evidence that the publication of the assailed article was malicious, as more ext

rticle 354 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

alicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

gal, moral or social duty; and

dicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in s

dence was presented to overcome said presumption of malice.

ttedly published in the newspaper "Bulgar" which was circulated in Metro Manila and in other parts of the country.

ticle was published, they also held that the subject article contains an imputation of a discreditable act when it portrayed the Muslims

persons defamed. While the trial court held that the libelous article does not identify the personalities of the persons defamed and the
court is right.

us article must know that it referred to the plaintiff.24 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim is identifiable althoug
y him as the object of the libelous publication.25

slims. The principle laid down in Newsweek, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,26 that "where the defamation is alleged to have bee
ss or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be
us belief in Allah as the one and only God. The publication was directed against all Muslims without exceptions and it is not necessar

to appreciate Article 26(4) of the Civil Code, but the appellate court simply delved exclusively on the applicability of libel and the exis

The Court has ruled that an appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to consider errors not assigned, involving, amon
id dispensing piecemeal justice; (2) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters
uestion properly assigned, is dependent.28 Evidently, all three exceptions apply to the present case.

pondents' claim for damages.

or defamation, whether in a criminal or civil case, and one based on Article 26. In libel, the gravamen of the claim is reputational harm
alice; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the victim,30 must be established, by mere preponderance of evidence in a civil case whic
ered intentionally, wantonly or by negligence.31 Personal injury herein refers not only to reputation but also encompasses character, c

plaintiff is shown to have suffered a wrong, the mere paucity of cases or absence of any precedent does not constitute sufficient reas
he general rules of law applicable to torts.34 Neither is the fact that a tort action does not fit into a nicely defined or established "cubby
ciary's primordial objective, which is, the just resolution of disputes.

rtain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience. These guides for human conduct should run as golden threads through

of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce

in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition." (Emphasis supplied)
s worth setting forth verbatim:

ation. The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If in legislatio
st sentiments; if the statutes insufficiently protect persons from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not properly
aims of the Project of Civil Code. Instances will now be specified.

exations mentioned in Article 26."37 (Emphasis supplied)

ty, even though such do not amount to violations of penal laws. Social equality is not sought, but simply due regard for decency and

, (d) social intercourse, (e) privacy and (f) peace of mind.39 However, it has been held that the violations mentioned in the Article 26 a
anguage,41 may give rise to an action in tort where such language causes mental or emotional disturbance, as in this case, or bodily

ious beliefs finds proper application in the case at bar. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that religious freedom d

amic Affairs of the University of the Philippines, testified in this wise:

article it is not 'katotohanan'. To the Muslim it is a blasphemy. It is an abuse and desecration and belief of the Muslims and the Muslim
also eating slaughtered chicken, cow and carabao and other non-prohibited animals. So to the Muslims this is an insult, not only to th

blisher and it is a defamation and desecration on the religion of the Islam.

o be worshipped and no other to be worshipped aside from him, He has no beginning and has no end, He is the creator of all creature

d, they call Allah. Muslims are called Muslims because they sincerely believe in the Quran and the Hadith (the Saying and the Condu
s, the greatest sin in Islam is to worship persons or things other than Allah.45

t article; was a graduate of "Mass Com"; based the said article on her interpretation of what she recalled she had read in Reader's Di
n the same degree as the failure of the rest of the petitioners (except Binegas, Jr.)47 to verify the truthfulness of the subject article, for

lously protected rights in the Constitution. But the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies
s and other persons." The freedom of speech does not require a journalist to guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes but it d

sher MVRS, Editor-in-Chief Mars C. Laconsay, Assistant Editor and writer Myla C. Aguja (Myla Tabora) exhibited utter irresponsibility
of pig or swine and thus, perverted their religious beliefs and demeaned the Muslims as a segment of human society. It belittled the M
ace of mind, which are the very rights affirmed by Article 26.

er Binegas, Jr., as Circulation Manager of Bulgar, was to supervise the delivery and the distribution of the paper, monitor the accounts
or not a certain publication of Bulgar shall be circulated; and that his only duty was to distribute the issue after its printing.49 As such, h

he answer is in the affirmative. Respondents IDCP and its officers have the requisite personality to institute the suit inasmuch as the a
 rs of Doña Paz,50 thus:

nly one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in common to many persons, not separately or severally to distinct individuals.

enforcement of a right which is joint, common, or secondary or derivative. x x (It) is a suit wherein, but for the class action device, the

s class action in U.S. Federal Practice — 'involves principles of compulsory joinder, since x x (were it not) for the numerosity of the cl
ssociation x x. A judgment in a true class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is binding under res judicata principles u
es judicata effect of the final determination of the right.'

an integral entity, and not as separate, distinct individuals whose rights or liabilities are separate from and independent of those affe

of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many p

se for whom he sues, and there must be that unity of interest between him and all such other persons which would entitle them to ma

ulo ng Bayan, Inc. vs. Araneta, Inc.,52 thus:

t to dispense with the presence of all the parties, when numerous, except a determinate number, is not only an interest in the questio
ween the numerous parties, there is a common title out of which the question arises, and which lies at the foundation of the proceedin
parties. There is scarcely a suit at law, or in equity, which settles a principle or applies a principle to a given state of facts or in which

well as a community of interest among the members of that class in questions of law and fact involved.53 The class must be cognizable
es, but it is not necessary that the exact number comprising the class be specified or that the members be identified.54

from the other members of the general populace is the Muslim people, and their common interest, undoubtedly, is their religious beli
efs of the Muslims.

the rule permitting class actions is to furnish a mode of obtaining a complete determination of the rights of the parties in such cases,
arly proper in an action wherein the persons are so multitudinous as vexatiously to prolong and probably altogether prevent a full hea

, it is highly impractical to make them all parties or bring them all before the court. It is beyond contradiction that the Muslims affected

ents the class, it is essential that the relief sought must be beneficial to the class members, the party must represent the entire class a
e are persons before the court who have the same interest as the absent persons and are equally certain to bring forward the entire
f representation rather than on the number of representative parties as compared with the total membership of the class.58 Thus, eve

seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations in the Philippines, and its officers who are individual respondents as well, carry the requis

Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, not only testified on how the assailed article
ber 21, 1992 from thirty-one (31) students of the Islamic University Madinah Al-Mukarramah, K.S.A.,60 and the seething letter of one

or where the defamation against the officer has a direct relation to the corporation's trade or business and it causes injury63 .
 epresent, have interest so identical that the motive and inducement to protect and preserve may be assumed to be the same in each

ight, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable

e Guzman, and Ibrahim B. A. Junio, as well as their witness, Professor Abdul Rafih Sayedy, as proper representatives of the class ac

ance with Articles 222968 and 220869 of the Civil Code.

s considered as a class suit and they merely acted as officers and members of the principal plaintiff-respondent IDCP.

icle in view of the fact that the instant suit is a class suit. In a class suit, each member of the class for whose benefit the action is brou
e parties, such that the judgment will be binding on all persons belonging to the class represented.70

oined as parties or not. 71 The class action has preclusive effect against one who was not named representative of the class, as long

are thereby precluded from instituting separate or individual suits for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc., et al., as they are bou

clared in default.

1, "Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. MVRS Publications, Inc."

ad Santos, Jr., and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.

unty, Inc. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, D.C., Ind., 273 F. Stipp. 313, 320.

37.
v. Edmundson, 168 N.Y. Misc. 141.

RPA, 25 September 1980, 506 F. Supp. 186.

p.

nal distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily h

ial Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 Col. L. Rev. 4

of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1035. See also SECOND RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D § 46.
§ 46 citing Magruder.

al Infliction of Emotional Distress, 66 Tulane L. Rev. 2096 (1992) citing Magruder.

s, 109 P 640, Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.

RA 360.
oreham Hotel Corp., Mun. App. D.C. 1946, 49 A2d 81; Stavnezar vs. Sage-Allen & Co., 1959, 146 Conn. 460, 152 A. 2d. 312.

163 N. E. 905; State National Bank of Iowa Park vs. Rogers, Tex. Civ. App. 1935, S. W. 2d 825.

hil. 757; Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 1.

, Inc., 84 A.D. 2d 229.

, 1973), p. 21.
to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil cas

y Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 462 (1998); Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330 (1998); Sandoval v. Court of

he defamatory matter is not seen or heard by anyone except the defamer and the defamed, damages to character reputation can not
d; the character imputed to a person by those acquainted with him. That by which we are known and is the total sum of how we are s

(Second) of Torts.

r Human Rights.

Collector of Customs, 38 Phil. 862 (1918).

ng view in the U.S. was that lewd, obscene and profane speech was not constitutionally protected, whether directed at private individ
s for speech and press require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relati
."
e 10.

Journal of Comparative Law, Fall 2002.

religious and racial. In this area, the law of the United States is precisely contrary to international human rights norms. Article 20(2) o
prohibited by law."' David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment? Evangelism, Proselytism, and the International Religious Freed

No. 5 (December 1972).

. 1981 New Day Publishing, Quezon City, pp. 29–30. (Michael J. Diamond is Vicar General of the Prelature of Marawi, Marawi City, L

d., p. 1271 citing Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, Section 652E.

. 921.
9.

sell L. J. in Cassidy vs. Daily Mirror, 2 K.B. 354 (1929); Newstead vs. London Express, 1 K.B. 377, 396 (C.A.) (1940). See also 50 Am

well in Henty's Case, 52 L.J.Q.B. 232 (1882).

ting Curtis vs. Mussey, 6 Gray (Mass.) 261.

1864); Shepheard vs. Whitaker, LR.L. 10 C.P. 502 (1875); Tompson vs. Dashwood, 11 Q.B.D. 43 (1883); Morrison vs. Ritchie, 4 F. 6

Bowen vs. Hall, 6 Q.B.D. 343 (1881); Jones vs. Hulton, 2 K.B. 279 (1909).

rican, 42 Phil. 757 (1922), Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr., 16 SCRA 807 (1966), and People vs. Monton, 6 SCRA 801 (1962).

Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 358 (2000); Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 333 SCRA 663 (2000); Roman Catholic Arc

also Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 330 SCRA 550, 555–556 (2000); Logronio vs. Taleseo, 312 SCRA 52, 61–62 (1999); Dando vs. Fraze

s, 241 SCRA 51, 59 (1995); Daez vs. Vasquez, 191 SCRA 61, 67 (1990).

374; Smith vs. Buck, 119 Ohio St 101, 162 NE 383, 61 ALR 1343.
 s. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn 573, 162 SW 584.

40 ALR 3d 987.

ments and Cases on Civil Law, 1959 Ed., Vol. I, p. 41.

Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988).

ce, 2d., Vol. 3B, pp. 23–257, 23–258.

. Ct. 217.
,126 Kan 600 (1928), Rusciano & Son Corporation vs. Mihalyfi, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 787, 165 Misc. 932; R.G. Dun & Co. vs. Shepp, 91 S.W.

2d 824.

ociation of Agden, 154 P.2d 620, 107 Utah 347.

; pp. 7, 9, 20–21; April 18, 1994, pp. 7, 10–12.

ection for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

her than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

d expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W. 2d 879; Drainage Dist. Of Lincoln County v. Kirkpatrick-Pettis Co., 140 Neb 530, 300
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