Civil Procedure Case Doctrines Mendoza 1

CIVIL PROCEDURE – ATTY.
CHARLIE MENDOZA
Victor Kenner S. Galang – 3D
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Case Doctrines
JURISDICTION
1. Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc., G.R. No. 202664, [November 10, 2015]
The present controversy lies, however, in the procedure to be followed when a commercial case — such as
the instant intra-corporate dispute — has been properly filed in the official station of the designated
Special Commercial Court but is, however, later wrongly assigned by raffle to a regular branch of that
station.
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction over a particular case's subject
matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law
itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the Court. The matter of
whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a
special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction. Pertinent to
this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8, 2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 28 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A 29 was transferred from the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts of general jurisdiction. To clarify, the word "or" in Item
5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799 was intentionally used by the legislature to particularize the fact that the phrase "the
Courts of general jurisdiction" is equivalent to the phrase "the appropriate Regional Trial Court." In other words,
the jurisdiction of the SEC over the cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the
courts of general jurisdiction, that is to say (or, otherwise known as), the proper Regional Trial Courts. The
word "or" may be used as the equivalent of "that is to say" and gives that which precedes it the same
significance as that which follows it. It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or expository
of the preceding word.
Here, petitioners filed a commercial case, i.e., an intra-corporate dispute, with the Office of the Clerk of Court
in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, in
accordance with A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. It is, therefore, from the time of such filing that the RTC of Muntinlupa
City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of the action. 43 Unfortunately, the commercial
case was wrongly raffled to a regular branch, i.e., Branch 276, instead of being assigned 44 to the sole Special
Commercial Court in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, which is Branch 256. This error may have been caused by a
reliance on the complaint's caption, i.e., "Civil Case for Injunction with prayer for Status Quo Order, TRO and
Damages," 45 which, however, contradicts and more importantly, cannot prevail over its actual allegations that
clearly make out an intra-corporate dispute. The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is, an incident
related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of
Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not for the
commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to
the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.
The following guidelines shall be observed:

1. If a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper
courses of action are as follows:
a. If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall
be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter,
assigned to the sole special branch;
CIVIL PROCEDURE – ATTY. CHARLIE MENDOZA
b. If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall
be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled
off among those special branches; and
c. If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case
shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a designated Special Commercial Court branch within
the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-docket
the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated
as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said
RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among
those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary
civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same RTC (including its designated special
branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular
branches), as provided for under existing rules.
3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any
difference. On the other hand, all docket fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess,
refunded.
4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's
nature both in its caption and body. Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the
court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after due rectification. This last procedural
rule is prospective in application.
5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded.
2. Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr., G.R. Nos. 153690, 157381 & 170889 (Resolution), [February 15, 2011], 658
PHIL 156-222
Subject matter incapable of pecuniary estimation; In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in
the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which
the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts
of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction.
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be exclusively
cognizable by courts of first instance. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the
parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a "rescission" being a
counterpart, so to speak, of "specific performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake
an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for damages may be had in an
action for rescission without first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a
contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law in actions
not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those raised;
the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money deposit
made; validity of a judgment; validity of a mortgage; the relations of the parties, the right to support created by
the relation, etc., in actions for support), the validity or nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated.
Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought,
or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission
should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation — a prayer
which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a
result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule
against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.
In this case, the said Resolution added that the value of the 600,000 shares of stock, which are the properties
in litigation, should be the basis for the computation of the filing fees. It bears noting, however, that David, et
al. are not claiming to own these shares. They do not claim to be the owners thereof entitled to be the
transferees of the shares of stock. The mention of the real value of the shares of stock, over which David, et
al. do not, it bears emphasis, interpose a claim of right to recovery, is merely narrative or descriptive in
order to emphasize the inequitable price at which the transfer was effected. Whatever property, real or
personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders would be a mere consequence of the main action. In
the end, in the event LLDC is dissolved, David, et al. would not be getting the value of the 600,000 shares, but
only the value of their minority number of shares, which are theirs to begin with.The complaint filed by David, et
al. is one for declaration of nullity of share issuance. The main relief prayed for both in the original complaint
and the amended complaint is the same, that is, to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000 unsubscribed
and unissued shares to Lu Ym father and sons, et al. for a price of 1/18 of their real value, for being inequitable,
having been done in breach of director's fiduciary's duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority
stockholders' rights, and with unjust enrichment.
ESTOPPEL; A mere inquiry from an improper office at that, could not, by any stretch, be considered
as an act of having raised the jurisdictional question prior to the rendition of the trial court's decision;
Lu Ym father and sons did not raise the issue before the trial court. The narration of facts in the Court's original
decision shows that Lu Ym father and sons merely inquired from the Clerk of Court on the amount of paid
docket fees on January 23, 2004. They thereafter still "speculat[ed] on the fortune of litigation." Thirty-seven
days later or on March 1, 2004 the trial court rendered its decision adverse to them. Meanwhile, Lu Ym father
and sons attempted to verify the matter of docket fees from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In
their Application for the issuance a writ of preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, they still failed
to question the amount of docket fees paid by David Lu, et al. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration
of the denial by the appellate court of their application for injunctive writ that they raised such issue. Lu Ym
father and sons' further inquiry from the OCA cannot redeem them.
3. Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, [March 10, 2014])

The core issue is whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property
or any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The course of action embodied in the
complaint by the present petitioners' predecessor, Alfredo R. Bautista, is to enforce his right to repurchase the
lots he formerly owned pursuant to the right of a free-patent holder under Sec. 119 of CA 141 or the Public
Land Act. The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary estimation, viz.:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation. 14
The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for specific performance.
The facts are clear that Bautista sold to respondents his lots which were covered by a free patent. While the
deeds of sale do not explicitly contain the stipulation that the sale is subject to repurchase by the applicant
within a period of five (5) years from the date of conveyance pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141, still, such legal
provision is deemed integrated and made part of the deed of sale as prescribed by law. It is basic that the law
is deemed written into every contract. 15 Although a contract is the law between the parties, the provisions of
positive law which regulate contracts are deemed written therein and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties. 16 Thus, it is a binding prestation in favor of Bautista which he may seek to enforce. That
is precisely what he did. He filed a complaint to enforce his right granted by law to recover the lot subject of
free patent. Ergo, it is clear that his action is for specific performance, or if not strictly such action, then it is
akin or analogous to one of specific performance. Such being the case, his action for specific performance is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC.
At first blush, it appears that the action filed by Bautista involves title to or possession of the lots he sold to
respondents. Since the total selling price is less than PhP20,000, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction
over the case. This proposition is incorrect for the re-acquisition of the lots by Bautista or herein successors-
in-interests, the present petitioners, is but incidental to and an offshoot of the exercise of the right by the latter
to redeem said lots pursuant to Sec. 119 of CA 141. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely
dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question and is not the principal or main relief
or remedy sought. Thus, the action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the property
conformably to the express provision of CA 141. Even if we treat the present action as one involving title to
real property or an interest therein which falls under the jurisdiction of the first level court under Sec. 33 of BP
129, as the total selling price is only PhP16,000 way below the PhP20,000 ceiling, still, the postulation of
respondents that MTC has jurisdiction will not hold water. This is because respondents have actually
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and aggressively defended their position, and by virtue of which
they are already barred to question the jurisdiction of the RTC following the principle of jurisdiction by estoppel.
4. Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, [June 25, 2013], 712 PHIL 44-176
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the statute; the issue
of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court. Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997), family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme
Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of
several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now
provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law.
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as
a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. Plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens
to be in issue.
5. (Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Gomez, G.R. No. 199601, [November 23,
2015])
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the statute; the issue
of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the
petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same,
subject to the review of this Court.
The civil courts have jurisdiction over a case when the cause of action does not have a reasonable
causal connection from the employer- employee relationship; The RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of Josephine's complaint despite the fact that her cause of action arose because her employer arbitrarily
deducted from her salary — an act expressly prohibited by our labor laws. Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code
provides that the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual,
moral, exemplary, and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations. Nevertheless, when
the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 224 of the Labor
Code, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. Here, since Josephine's cause of action is based
on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code,the civil courts (not the labor
tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Quoting jurisprudence, “While seemingly
petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations which are cognizable by Labor
Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just
cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval
of his application for leave of absence without pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz
"maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement
to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings
it within the purview of Civil Law.” Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by
private respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on
the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which
petitioner had to suffer.
In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how her employer
quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary. Clearly,
without having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction of our civil courts
because her right to fair treatment was violated. In a different case, “Although the acts complained of seemingly
appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the
severance of a preexisting employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se
as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the
consequent effects of such dismissal.” From the foregoing, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil
dispute because it has something to do with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the Civil Code,and does not
involve an existing employer-employee relation within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code.
Josephine's complaint was, therefore, properly filed with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC.
6. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Alibudbud, G.R. No. 209011, [April 20, 2016]
The present action involves the parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their "employer-
employee" relationship; In reversing the trial court's ruling, the CA declared that "[Alibudbud] could not have
availed of the Car Financing Plan if she was not an employee of [Malayan]. The status of being an employee
and officer of [Alibudbud] in [Malayan] was, therefore, one of the pre-condition before she could avail of the
benefits of the Car Financing Plan. Such being the case, there is no doubt that [Alibudbud's] availing of the
Car Financing Plan being offered by [Malayan] was necessarily and intimately connected with or related to her
employment in the aforesaid Company. It should be noted, however, that the present action involves the
parties' relationship as debtor and creditor, not their "employer-employee" relationship. Malayan's demand for
Alibudbud to pay the 50% company equity over the car or, to surrender its possession, is civil in nature. The
trial court's ruling also aptly noted the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage voluntarily signed by
Alibudbud to secure her financial obligation to avail of the car being offered under Malayan's Car Financing
Plan. 41 Clearly, the issue in the replevin action is separate and distinct from the illegal dismissal case. The
Court further considers it justified for Malayan to refuse to accept her offer to settle her car obligation for not
being in accordance with the Promissory Note and Deed of Chattel Mortgage she executed. 42 Even the illegal
dismissal case she heavily relied upon in moving for the suspension of the replevin action was settled in favor
of Malayan which was merely found to have validly exercised its management prerogative in order to improve
its company sales.
7. Barrazona v. RTC, Br. 61, Baguio City, G.R. No. 154282, [April 7, 2006], 521 PHIL 53-60)
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint
at the time of its filing, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted.
Petitioner stated in her motion that respondent's allegations in its complaint show that it is one for ejectment
cognizable, not by the RTC but, by the MTC of Baguio City. The allegation that the plaintiff demanded the
defendant to pay her overdue account shows that respondent made several demands upon petitioner to pay
her overdue rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last demand to pay and vacate in writing was on
March 27, 2002. Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of Sum of Money with Damages," the
allegations therein show that respondent's action is for ejectment. All ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction
of the MTC.
CAUSE OF ACTION
RULES 40 – 46
8. Selga v. Brar, G.R. No. 175151, [September 21, 2011], 673 PHIL 581-598
The case at bar satisfies the four essential requisites of res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior
judgment, viz.:
(a) Finality of the former judgment;
(b) The court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action.
It is not disputed that the Decision of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276 had become final and executory.
Petitioners no longer appealed the said decision, while respondent withdrew her appeal of the same before
the Court of Appeals. There is also no question that RTC-Branch 55 had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties in Civil Case No. 276, and that its Decision dated May 8, 1996 was a judgment on the
merits, i.e., one rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case. Controversy herein arises from the fourth requirement: the identity of parties, subject matter
and, particularly, the causes of action between Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573. There is identity of
parties. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 were both instituted by respondent against petitioners.
There is also identity of subject matter. Civil Case No. 276 and Civil Case No. 573 both involved respondent's
rights and interests over the subject property as Francisco's legitimate child and compulsory heir. The cause
of action in Civil Case No. 273 and Civil Case No. 576 is the sale of the entire subject property by Basilia, et
al., to petitioners without respondent's knowledge and consent, hence, depriving respondent of her rights and
interests over her pro-indiviso share in the subject property as a co-heir and co-owner. The annulment of the
sale of respondent's share in the subject property, the legal redemption by respondent of her co-heirs' share
sold to petitioners, and the claim for damages should not be mistaken to be the causes of action, but they were
the remedies and reliefs prayed for by the respondent to redress the wrong allegedly committed against her.
The allegations in respondent's Complaint in Civil Case No. 573 initially give the impression that the cause of
action therein was petitioners' refusal to heed respondent's demand to redeem petitioners' ten-eleventh (10/11)
share in the subject property. But a closer study of said Complaint, as well as the trial proceedings before RTC-
Branch 56, reveal that respondent's right to redeem petitioners' ten-eleventh (10/11) share in the subject
property also arose from the sale of the said subject property to petitioners by respondent's co-heirs and co-
owners, alleged to be without respondent's knowledge or consent — the very same cause of action at the crux
of Civil Case No. 276.
The silence of the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 on respondent's right to redemption
invoked by the latter does not mean that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the same, but rather, that
RTC-Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right. In her Complaint in Civil Case No. 276,
respondent already alleged her right to redemption and prayed, among others, the RTC-Branch 55 to order
respondent legally entitled to redeem the subject property for the price of P52,000.00. The Decision dated May
8, 1996 of the RTC-Branch 55 neither discussed respondent's right to redemption nor ordered in its decretal
portion for petitioners to accept respondent's offer to redeem the subject property. In consonance with the
provisions of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court cited above, we hold that all the matters within the
issues raised in Civil Case No. 276 were laid before RTC-Branch 55 and passed upon by it. Resultantly, the
silence of the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 on respondent's right to redemption invoked
by the latter does not mean that RTC-Branch 55 did not take cognizance of the same, but rather, that RTC-
Branch 55 did not deem respondent entitled to said right. Regardless of whether or not RTC-Branch 55 erred
in not ordering the redemption by respondent of the subject property in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil
Case No. 276, said judgment can no longer be reviewed or corrected by RTC-Branch 56 in Civil Case No. 573.
Any error committed by RTC-Branch 55 in the Decision dated May 8, 1996 in Civil Case No. 276 could only be
reviewed or corrected on appeal. Although respondent initially filed an appeal of said judgment before the
Court of Appeals, she eventually filed a motion to withdraw the same, which was granted by the appellate
court. Hence, the Decision dated May 8, 1996 attained finality.
Therefore, Civil Case No. 573 before RTC-Branch 56 should be dismissed, being barred by res judicata, given
the final and executory Decision dated May 8, 1996 of RTC-Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 276. We stress that res
judicata, in the concept of bar by prior judgment, renders the judgment or final order conclusive between the
parties and their privies, not just with respect to a matter directly adjudged, but also any other matter that could
have been raised in relation thereto.
9. Umale v. Canoga Park Development Corp., G.R. No. 167246, [July 20, 2011], 669 PHIL 427-
437
Litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:
(1) identity of the parties in the two actions;

(2) substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
(3) the identity between the two actions should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one
case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action, such
as;
(1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action (also
known as the "same evidence" test), or
(2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test of determining
(3) whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.
Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present case, i.e., whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint — and to which we answer in
the negative. The facts clearly show that the filing of the first ejectment case was grounded on the
petitioner's violation of stipulations in the lease contract, while the filing of the second case was based
on the expiration of the lease contract. At the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on
October 10, 2000, the lease contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of
two (2) years, from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, the lease
remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contract that the cause of
action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available to the respondent as a ground for
ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the second case was not yet in existence at the time of
filing of the first ejectment case.
10. Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015]
The principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to the present case because the records are bereft of any
indication that the decision in the judicial foreclosure case had already attained finality, evidenced, for instance,
by a copy of the entry of judgment in the said case. Accordingly, with the very first element of res judicata
missing, said principle cannot be made to obtain. However, Marilag’s prosecution of the collection case was
barred, instead, by the principle of litis pendentia in view of the substantial identity of parties and singularity of
the causes of action in the foreclosure and collection cases, such that the prior foreclosure case barred
petitioner's recourse to the subsequent collection case.
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public
policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order
that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of
persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not
be permitted to split up a single cause of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must
be determined in one action. To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is
litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be).
In this relation, it must be noted that the question of whether a cause of action is single and entire or separate
is not always easy to determine and the same must often be resolved, not by the general rules, but by reference
to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount
arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued for in one action, or the several parts
arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain separate suits.
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single
cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action
for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two
remedies are alternative not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by itself. Thus, if the
creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the
unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the outstanding obligation of
the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of the mortgaged properties.
Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
There is no novation in the present case; In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-
mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy
thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case,
under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not
shown to have attained finality. While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note
executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct
contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are
bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the
subject PN extinguished by novation the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of
express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but
must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the
parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one,
which was not shown here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the consideration for the subject PN was the same
consideration that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b) respondent merely assumed to pay
Rafael's remaining unpaid balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or representative; and (c) the
subject PN was executed after respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made several
payments thereon. Case law states that the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who
has assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors, not novation, and the creditor may
enforce the obligation against both debtors. PN both refer to one and the same obligation, i.e., Rafael's loan
obligation. As such, there exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Petitioner cannot
split her cause of action on Rafael's unpaid loan obligation by filing a petition for the judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage covering the said loan, and, thereafter, a personal action for the collection of the unpaid
balance of said obligation not comprising a deficiency arising from foreclosure, without violating the proscription
against splitting a single cause of action, where the ground for dismissal is either res judicata or litis pendentia,
as in this case.
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other
words, the creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his
mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and, for that reason,
they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements,
the latter is subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists
only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rule above stated,
cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent
complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to
recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress
for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the
debtor.
11. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, [July 31, 2013], 715 PHIL 678-691
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the
foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father's marriage
to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
12. Magbanua v. Junsay, G.R. No. 132659, [February 12, 2007], 544 PHIL 349-369 ||| (Resident
Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 180771 &
181527, [April 21, 2015])
Malicious prosecution has been defined as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein." Applying
the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof
of a sinister design on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner Rosemarie by instituting the
criminal case against her and her co-accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable belongings
can only be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed
to one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal proceedings.
Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following:
(1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its
commencement
(2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal;
(3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice — an improper or a sinister motive.
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but
the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

RULE 3
13. Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. Nos.
180771 & 181527, [April 21, 2015]
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by
our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in
their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Under Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court; when the consent of a party who should be joined as a
plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling
party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The
unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as
such would be a denial of due process. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an
act she made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy against embroiling
the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention." Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo
cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
14. Ang v. Spouses Ang, G.R. No. 186993, [August 22, 2012], 693 PHIL 106-118)
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he
does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners
as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.
Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest. Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his
personal capacity does not have the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do
so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners — the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be
enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not
a real party in interest. Nowhere in the rule is it stated that the representative is likewise deemed as the real
party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be prosecuted or defended
by a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and, hence, should be included
in the title of the case.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved. A real
party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
15. Spouses Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 196894, [March 3, 2014)
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the
persons considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529; Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologo's liens were indeed
annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand
to be benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other
words, they are as indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one
of the many lien holders. Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to
preclude the judgment, orders and the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled
that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings
before RTC-Br. 14 were null and void including the assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever and
whenever it exhibits its head."
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not prejudice
Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable parties, to simply
recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the titles, the Court
would have noticed the adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any annotations in the
subject TCTs. Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can
appeal. 25 Here, Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they
never possessed the required legal standing in the first place.
16. Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121171, [December 29, 1998], 360
PHIL 768-837
The arbiters exceeded their authority in awarding damages to MMIC, which is not impleaded as a party
to the derivative suit; Civil Case No. 9900 filed before the RTC being a derivative suit, MMIC should have
been impleaded as a party. It was not joined as a party plaintiff or party defendant at any stage of the
proceedings. As it is, the award of damages to MMIC, which was not a party before the Arbitration Committee,
is a complete nullity. Settled is the doctrine that in a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest
while the stockholder filing suit for the corporation's behalf is only a nominal party. The corporation should be
included as a party in the suit. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative suit on behalf of
the corporation wherein he holds stock in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials
of the corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones to be sued or hold the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as a nominal party, with the corporation as the real party in interest.
It is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because not only is the corporation
an indispensable party, but it is also the present rule that it must be served with process. The reason given is
that the judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit
of the suit and may not bring a subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. In
other words the corporation must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and
because judgment must be a res adjudicata against it.
The reasons given for not allowing direct individual suit are:
(1) The universally recognized doctrine that a stockholder in a corporation has no title legal or equitable to
the corporate property, that both of these are in the corporation itself for the benefit of the stockholders."
In other words, to allow shareholder to sue separately would conflict with the separate corporate entity
principle;
(2) That the prior rights of the creditors may be prejudiced. Thus, our Supreme Court held in the case of
Evangelista v. Santos, that "the stockholders may not directly claim those damages for themselves for
that would result in the appropriation by, and the distribution among them of part of the corporate assets
before the dissolution of the corporation and the liquidation of its debts and liabilities, something which
cannot be legally done in view of section 16 of the Corporation Law;
(3) The filing of such suits would conflict with the duty of the management to sue for the protection of all
concerned;
(4) It would produce wasteful multiplicity of suits; and
(5) It would involve confusion in a ascertaining the effect of partial recovery by an individual on the damages
recoverable by the corporation for the same act.
If at all an award was due MMIC, which it was not, the same should have been given sans deduction, regardless
of whether or not the party liable had equity in the corporation, in view of the doctrine that a corporation has a
personality separate and distinct from its individual stockholders or members. DBP's alleged equity, even if it
were indeed 87%, did not give it ownership over any corporate property, including the monetary award, its right
over said corporate property being a mere expectancy or inchoate right. 59 Notably, the stipulation even had
the effect of prejudicing the other creditors of MMIC.
17. Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, G.R. No. 159121, [February 3, 2005], 491
PHIL 15-32
The principle requiring the piercing of the corporate veil mandates courts to see through the protective
shroud that distinguishes one corporation from a seemingly separate one; The corporate mask may be
removed and the corporate veil pierced when a corporation is the mere alter ego of another. An examination
of the facts reveals that, for both the coconut plantation and the golf course, there is only one management
which the laborers deal with regarding their work. A portion of the plantation (also called Hacienda Pamplona)
had actually been converted into a golf course and other recreational facilities. The weekly payrolls issued by
petitioner-company bore the name "Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc." It is also a fact that respondents all received
their pay from the same person, Petitioner Bondoc — the managing director of the company. Since the workers
were working for a firm known as PamplonaPlantation Co., Inc., the reason they sued their employer through
that name was natural and understandable. True, the Petitioner Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc., and the
Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation appear to be separate corporate entities. But it is settled that this
fiction of law cannot be invoked to further an end subversive of justice.
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative
of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the NLRC did not require respondents to
implead the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation as respondent; instead, the Commission summarily
dismissed the Complaints. In any event, there is no need to implead the leisure corporation because, insofar
as respondents are concerned, the leisure corporation and petitioner-company are one and the same entity.
18. Santiago Land Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106194, [January 28,
1997], 334 PHIL 741-749
Since petitioner is a transferee pendente lite with notice of the pending litigation between Quisumbing
and PNB, petitioner stands exactly in the shoes of defendant PNB and is bound by any judgment or
decree which may be rendered for or against PNB; Under Rule 3, §20, the action may be continued against
PNB, the original defendant. In the alternative — although it was not essential that the transferee be substituted
and the latter insist on such substitution — the trial court could have directed that petitioner be either substituted
as party-defendant or joined with defendant PNB. But petitioner could not be allowed to intervene for the reason
already stated that the conditions under which one may be allowed to intervene are significantly far different
from the conditions under which a transferee pendente lite is substituted in place of the original party. For the
fact is that an intervenor can withdraw and refuse to be bound by any decision that may be rendered in the
case but the fortunes of a transferee pendente lite, although not formally impleaded as a party, are bound up
with those of his transferor.
Petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration, maintains that, as purchaser pendente lite of the land in litigation
(Norberto J. Quisumbing vs. PNB) it has a right to intervene under Rule 12, Sec. 2. The Court cited in its
decision Sen. Francisco's work on the Rules of Court (Vol. I. p. 719) only for the proposition that the purpose
of Rule 12, Sec. 2 on intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party to protect his interest
and the court to settle in the process all conflicting claims. Since petitioner is not a stranger in the action
between Quisumbing and the PNB, petitioner in fact having stepped into the shoes of PNB, it cannot claim any
further right to intervene in the action. Petitioner points out that Francisco's book in turn cites Moore's Federal
Practice (Vol. 2, p. 2307) which actually supports petitioner's right to intervene. We do not find the cases cited
in Moore's Federal Practice supportive of petitioner's right to intervene in this case. As the purchaser in those
cases did not acquire the property from their owners but adverse to them, he could expect no party in the
pending suit to safeguard his interest. Hence, the necessity of allowing his intervention. In contrast, in the case
at bar, petitioner himself considers the defenses raised by PNB, its predecessor in interest, to be "formidable"
and all that it desires in seeking to intervene is "to fortify even more such defenses" (Reply to Opposition, p.
4). Petitioner is thus unlike the heirs in Dizon v. Romero, 26 SCRA 452, or the purchaser pendente lite at a
sheriff's sale in Bily v. Board of Property Assessment (44 A.2d at 251) who had to be allowed to intervene
because it was "reasonably necessary for him to safeguard an interest of his own which no other party on
record is interested in protecting." It is simply petitioner's perfectionism or meticulousness that makes it want
to intervene "to further improve the defenses of the original party (here, PNB)." But otherwise there is not
reasonable necessity for its intervention.
19. V-Gent, Inc. v. Morning Star Travel and Tours, Inc., G.R. No. 186305, [July 22, 2015])
An agent may sue or be sued solely in its own name and without joining the principal when the following
elements concur:
(1) the agent acted in his own name during the transaction;
(2) the agent acted for the benefit of an undisclosed principal; and
(3) the transaction did not involve the property of the principal.
When these elements are present, the agent becomes bound as if the transaction were its own. This rule is
consistent with Article 1883 of the Civil Code
In the present case, only the first element is present; the purchase order and the receipt were in the name of
V-Gent. However, the remaining elements are absent because: (1) V-Gent disclosed the names of the
passengers to Morning Star — in fact the tickets were in their names; and (2) the transaction was paid using
the passengers' money. Therefore, Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court cannot apply. To define the actual
factual situation, V-Gent, the agent, is suing to recover the money of its principals — the passengers — who
are the real parties-in-interest because they stand to be injured or benefited in case Morning Star refuses or
agrees to grant the refund because the money belongs to them. From this perspective, V-Gent evidently does
not have a legal standing to file the complaint, hence V-GENT is not a real party in interest. Moreover, the
granting of the initial refund of Morning Star recognized V-Gent's authority to buy the tickets and collect refunds
on behalf of the passengers. But this recognition of V-Gent's authority to collect a refund for the passengers is
not equivalent to recognition of V-Gent's authority to initiate a suit on behalf of the passengers. Morning Star
therefore, is not estopped from questioning V-Gent's legal standing to initiate the suit.
VENUE
RULE 4
20. (BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Spouses Yujuico, G.R. No. 175796, [July 22, 2015])
VENUE: The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules
of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one
that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real action is to be
commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved,
or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local action.
In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. Such actions may include those
brought for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages
for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. The
venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may
be found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
An action to recover the deficiency after the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real property mortgage is
a personal action, for it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein. Petitioner
correctly brought Civil Case No. 03-450 in the Makati RTC because Makati was the place where the main office
of the petitioner was located. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and may be waived by the defendant if
not seasonably raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. 25 Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court
thus expressly stipulates that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived.
21. Spouses Ochoa v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 192877 (Resolution), [March 23, 2011],
661 PHIL 757-761
The case at bar involves Ochoa’s mortgaged real property located in Parañaque City over which China Banking
Corporation was granted a special power to foreclose extra-judicially. Thus, by express provision of Section 2,
the sale can only be made in Parañaque City. The exclusive venue of Makati City, as stipulated by the parties
and sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, cannot be made to apply to the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure filed by respondent bank because the provisions of Rule 4 pertain to venue of actions,
which an extrajudicial foreclosure is not. An extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is initiated by filing
a petition not with any court of justice but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be
made. Hence, extrajudicial foreclosures are not judicial proceedings, actions or suits. Verily then, with respect
to the venue of extrajudicial foreclosure sales, Act No. 3135, as amended, applies, it being a special law dealing
particularly with extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgages, and not the general provisions of the
Rules of Court on Venue of Actions. Consequently, the stipulated exclusive venue of Makati City is relevant
only to actions arising from or related to the mortgage, such as petitioners' complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure, Sale, and Damages.
22. Paglaum Management & Development Corp. v. Union Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
179018, [June 18, 2012], 688 PHIL 157-169)
In Sps. Lantin v. Lantion, this Court explained that a venue stipulation must contain words that show exclusivity
or restrictiveness, as follows: At the outset, we must make clear that under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the
filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of
an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must
be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place. Clearly, the words "exclusively" and "waiving for this purpose any other venue" are restrictive
and used advisedly to meet the requirements.
The Real Estate Mortgages were executed by PAGLAUM in favor of Union Bank to secure the credit line
extended by the latter to HealthTech. All three mortgage contracts contain a dragnet clause, which secures
succeeding obligations, including renewals, extensions, amendments or novations thereof, incurred by
HealthTech from Union Bank, to wit:On the other hand, the Restructuring Agreement was entered into by
HealthTech and Union Bank to modify the entire loan obligation. Meanwhile, Section 20 of the Restructuring
Agreement as regards the venue of actions states that the “Venue of any action or proceeding arising out of
or connected with this Restructuring Agreement, the Note, the Collateral and any and all related documents
shall be in Makati City, [HealthTech] and [Union Bank] hereby waiving any other venue.” These quoted
provisions of the Real Estate Mortgages and the later Restructuring Agreement clearly reveal the intention of
the parties to implement a restrictive venue stipulation, which applies not only to the principal obligation, but
also to the mortgages. The phrase "waiving any other venue" plainly shows that the choice of Makati City as
the venue for actions arising out of or in connection with the Restructuring Agreement and the Collateral, with
the Real Estate Mortgages being explicitly defined as such, is exclusive. Considering that Makati City was
agreed upon by the parties to be the venue for all actions arising out of or in connection with the loan obligation
incurred by HealthTech, as well as the Real Estate Mortgages executed by PAGLAUM, the CA committed
reversible error in affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-1567 by RTC Br. 134 on the ground of improper
venue.
23. (Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119657, [February 7,
1997], 335 PHIL 415-440)
STIPULATION; RESTRICTIVE OR PERMISSIVE; RATIONALE. — Written stipulations as to venue may be
restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that
the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by law (Rule 4
specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties
respecting the matter. Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue, it is easy to accept the
proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed permissive merely, and that interpretation
should be adopted which most serves the parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating venues
other than those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it more convenient for the
parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or
expounding the venues indicated in said Rule 4.
GENERALLY REGARDED AS PERMISSIVE OR COMPLIMENTARY TO RULE 4 OF THE RULES OF

COURT; EXCEPTION. — An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and emphasizes the soundness of the
Polytrade principle. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties' intention in their agreement governing
the venue of actions between them. That ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the
foundation of venue regulations, and that the construction should be adopted which most conduces thereto.
Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations is that they do not negate but merely
complement or add to the codal standards of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties
make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of actions
between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescription of Rule 4,
agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive but merely permissive, or
complementary of said rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venue
mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without
more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated
only at the place named by them, E.G. — "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —
," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," etc. regardless of the general precepts of Rule 4 and any doubt
or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved against giving their agreement a restrictive or
mandatory aspect. Any other rule would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable
standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
VENUE AS DISTINGUISHED FROM JURISDICTION, CASE AT BAR. — One last word, respecting
KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of . . . (UNIMASTER'S)
action considering that venue was improperly laid." This is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It
equates venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction except in criminal actions. This is
fundamental. The action at bar, for the recovery of damages in an amount considerably in excess of
P20,000.00 is assuredly without the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. Sec. 19 (8), B.P. 129, The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Assuming that venue were improperly laid in the Court where the action was
instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment precluding
ventilation of the case before that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter is within its
jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure to set it up in a motion to dismiss, Sec.
4, Rule 4, the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular fashion if it then tried and decided the action. This is true
also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property" were commenced in a province or city other
than that "where the property or any part thereof lies," if no objection is seasonably made in a motion to dismiss,
the objection is deemed waived, and the Regional Trial Court would be acting entirely within its competence
and authority in proceeding to try and decide the suit.
24. Briones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 204444, [January 14, 2015])
The parties are not precluded from agreeing in writing on an exclusive venue, as qualified by Section 4 of the
same rule. Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the
place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon
but also in the places fixed by law. As in any other agreement, what is essential is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter. As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence
instructs that it must be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words, such as "exclusively," "waiving for this purpose any other venue," "shall only" preceding the designation
of venue, "to the exclusion of the other courts," or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.In this relation, case
law likewise provides that in cases where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of
a written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein shall still be binding
on the parties, and thus, the complaint may be properly dismissed on the ground of improper venue. 35
Conversely, therefore, a complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument itself should not be
bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein and should be filed in accordance with the general
rules on venue. To be sure, it would be inherently consistent for a complaint of this nature to recognize the
exclusive venue stipulation when it, in fact, precisely assails the validity of the instrument in which such
stipulation is contained.
In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that
it effectively limits the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be
emphasized that Briones's complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts, claiming forgery in
their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be expected to comply with the aforesaid venue
stipulation, as his compliance therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant to
the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court in the City of Manila where the
subject property is located.
KINDS OF PLEADINGS
RULE 6
25. SPOUSES MENDIOLA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the logical
relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
constituted to secure the payment of petitioners' credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with
Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not
validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon's cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial
foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have
missed the logical relation between the two actions.
26. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM V. HEIRS OF CABALLERO, G.R. NO.

158090, [OCTOBER 4, 2010], 646 PHIL 314-326)
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA's view that GSIS’ counterclaim for
the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The
evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is
different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main
action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely
different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent
payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the
consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner
did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner
the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
27. CALIBRE TRADERS, INC. V. BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. NO. 161431, [OCTOBER 13,
2010], 647 PHIL 350-382
Bayerphil's suit may independently proceed in a separate action. Although the rights and obligations of the
parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed against each other are distinct and
do not involve the same factual issues. We find no logical relationship between the two actions in a way that
the recovery or dismissal of plaintiff's suit will establish a foundation for the other's claim. The counterclaim for
collection of money is not intertwined with or contingent on Calibre's own claim for damages, which was based
on the principle of abuse of rights. Both actions involve the presentation of different pieces of evidence.
Calibre's suit had to present evidence of malicious intent, while Bayerphil's objective was to prove nonpayment
of purchases. The allegations highlighting bad faith are different from the transactions constituting the subject
matter of the collection suit. Respondent's counterclaim was only permissive. Hence, the CA erred in ruling
that Bayerphil's claim against the petitioners partakes of a compulsory counterclaim. The trial court was
incorrect in dismissing Bayerphil's counterclaim for non-payment of docket fees. All along, Bayerphil has never
evaded payment of the docket fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It has always
argued against Calibre's contention that its counterclaim was permissive ever since the latter opposed
Bayerphil's motion before the RTC to implead the Sebastian spouses. Lastly, Bayerphil's belief was reinforced
by Judge Claravall's October 24, 1990 Resolution when she denied Calibre's motion to strike out Bayerphil's
counterclaim.
28. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. V. CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC.,
G.R. NO. 200567, JUNE 22, 2015
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-à-vis the
amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed
by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed
in order to prove their respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since
these two actions are absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid
at the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if
these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the
same transaction, and the same evidence. The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts
based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover
the amounts due. It is elementary that a defending party's compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at
the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the
records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price,
respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. 33
Unfortunately, respondents' belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure their failure to timely
raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently, respondents' claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.
With this, We now resolve the substantive issues of this case.
29. PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. V. PARAS, G.R. NO. 161909, [APRIL 25,
2012], 686 PHIL 736-759
Although this action does not fall under either of the exceptions, the award of moral damages to Paras was
nonetheless proper and valid. There is no question that Inland filed its third-party complaint against Philtranco
and its driver in order to establish in this action that they, instead of Inland, should be directly liable to Paras
for the physical injuries he had sustained because of their negligence. To be precise, Philtranco and its driver
were brought into the action on the theory of liability that the proximate cause of the collision between Inland's
bus and Philtranco's bus had been "the negligent, reckless and imprudent manner defendant Apolinar Miralles
drove and operated his driven unit, the Philtranco Bus with Plate No. 259, owned and operated by third-party
defendant Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc." 10 The apparent objective of Inland was not to merely
subrogate the third-party defendants for itself, as Philtranco appears to suggest, 11 but, rather, to obtain a
different relief whereby the third-party defendants would be held directly, fully and solely liable to Paras and
Inland for whatever damages each had suffered from the negligence committed by Philtranco and its driver. In
other words, Philtranco and its driver were charged here as joint tortfeasors who would be jointly and severally
be liable to Paras and Inland.
PARTS OF A PLEADING
RULE 7
30. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. v. Tablante, G.R. No. 162924, [February 4, 2010], 625
PHIL 368-376
We have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping. We recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the
verification and certificate against forum shopping; In sum, we have held that the following officials or
employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution; The
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; The President of a corporation; The General Manager or Acting General
Manager; Personnel Officer, and Employment Specialist in a labor case. While the above cases do not provide
a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the
determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the
foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition." The failure to attach the Secretary's Certificate, attesting to General Manager
Antonio Merelos's authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be
considered fatal to the filing of the petition.
31. Heirs of Spouses Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., G.R. No. 201816, [April 8, 2013], 708 PHIL
327-336
Both the RTC and the CA found said verification defective, since the phrase "or based on authentic records,"
as indicated under the second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 7 as afore-quoted, was omitted. We do not agree.
That the verification of the complaint does not include the phrase "or based on authentic records" does not
make the verification defective. Notably, the provision used the disjunctive word "or." The word "or" is a
disjunctive article indicating an alternative. As such, "personal knowledge" and "authentic records" need not
concur in a verification as they are to be taken separately. Also, verification, like in most cases required by the
rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Thus,
when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby
be served."
32. Mahinay v. Gako, Jr., G.R. No. 165338, 179375, [November 28, 2011], 677 PHIL 292-318)
Verification of pleading is not an empty ritual bereft of any legal importance. It is intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely
imagined; and have been made in good faith. 81 A pleading may be verified by stating that the pleaders have
read the allegations in their petition and that the same are true and correct based either on their personal
knowledge or authentic records, or based both on their personal knowledge and authentic records. While the
rule gives the pleaders several ways of verifying their pleading, the use of the phrase personal knowledge or
authentic records is not without any legal signification and the pleaders are not at liberty to choose any of these
phrases fancifully. Sorensen had no participation in the preparation and execution of these documents although
they constitute the main bulk of her evidence. Hence, it was necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification
that the allegations in her petition are true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also
based on the information she gathered from authentic records. 83 The CA is, therefore, correct in its
observation that Sorensen's verification is insufficient. Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking
a liberal stance in resolving Sorensen's petition for certiorari as the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect
her substantive rights. No circumstances were present in Sorensen's petition which would warrant the liberal
application of the rules to serve the needs of justice.
33. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 157867, [December 15, 2009], 623 PHIL
134-148)
The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading. The ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading.
Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. What
distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing
it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but
incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent
right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question
that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy. An application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding. Hence,
although it was denominated as a "petition," it was in substance merely a motion. Since a petition for a writ of
possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is neither a complaint nor an initiatory pleading, a
certificate against non-forum shopping is not required. The certificate that Metrobank attached to its petition is
thus a superfluity that the lower court should have disregarded.
34. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Kemper Insurance Co., G.R. No. 179488, [April 23,
2012], 686 PHIL 327-342
In the present case, since Kemper is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member
of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise,
the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable
by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The
same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to
sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against
forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's
complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against petitioner. There was no proof of authority submitted, even
belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the
board resolution or secretary's certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact
that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus, there
exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot
justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Moreover, the SPA was fatally defective
and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healy's authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of
the absence of a resolution from respondent's board of directors or secretary's certificate proving the same.
Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondent's
attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by
a board resolution or secretary's certificate.
35. In re Lim, G.R. No. 156797, [July 6, 2010], 638 PHIL 80-93
Lim was not guilty of forum shopping, because the factual bases of his application for the administrative
reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were
not identical. When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA, he still had his co-owner's
duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA resolved his application allowing the
relief prayed for, his co-owner's duplicate copies of the TCTs had meanwhile been destroyed by fire, a fact that
he had duly reported in an affidavit dated May 29, 1998 presented on June 1, 1998 to the Office of the Register
of Deeds for Quezon City. 13 The loss by fire was corroborated by the certification issued by the Chief of Fire
District I of Manila to the effect that the commercial establishment for Cheer-up Foods Corporation, the
petitioner's company, had been gutted by fire on February 24, 1998. 14 Thus, the intervening loss of the
owner's duplicate copies that left the favorable ruling of the LRA no longer implementable gave rise to his need
to apply for judicial reconstitution in the RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26. Although the bases
for the administrative reconstitution were the owner's duplicate copies of TCT No. 303168 and TCT No.
303169, those for judicial reconstitution would be other documents that "in the judgment of the court, are
sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title." 16 The RTC should have
also noted soon enough that his resort to judicial reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to
administrative reconstitution had been denied (in fact, the LRA had resolved in his favor), 17 but because the
intervening loss to fire of the only permissible basis for administrative reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his
resort to the RTC. 18 Indeed, he came to court as the law directed him to do, unlike the litigant involved in the
undesirable practice of forum shopping who would go from one court to another to secure a favorable relief
after being denied the desired relief by another court. Neither did the petitioner's omission from the petition for
judicial reconstitution of a reference to the application for administrative reconstitution in the LRA justify the
dismissal of the petition. The petition for judicial reconstitution and the application for administrative
reconstitution addressed different situations and did not have identical bases. Besides, only the RTC could
grant or deny any relief to him at that point.
MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN

PLEADINGS
RULE 8
36. Ledda V. Bank Of The Philippine Islands, G.R. NO. 200868, [NOVEMBER 21, 2012], 699
PHIL 273-284
In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money arising from Ledda's default in her credit
card obligation with BPI. BPI's cause of action is primarily based on Ledda's (1) acceptance of the BPI credit
card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods, avail services and secure cash advances, and (3)
non-payment of the amount due for such credit card transactions, despite demands. 11 In other words, BPI's
cause of action is not based only on the document containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the
issuance of the BPI credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions
governing the use of the BPI credit card is not an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be set forth in and attached to the
complaint.
37. Titan Construction Corporation V. David, SR., G.R. NO. 169548, [MARCH 15, 2010], 629
PHIL 346-364
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery was not made
under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath, alleged that the sale of the
subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was without his knowledge, consent, and
approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on the face of the deed of sale that would show that he
gave his consent thereto. Where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never sold, transferred or
disposed their share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the defendants were placed on adequate
notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due execution of the disputed
deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery procedure and must be reasonably
construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation
should be one which assists the parties in obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just
determination of the disputed issues. Moreover, during the pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation that the
special power of attorney was signed by Manuel authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but Manuel
refused to admit the genuineness of said special power of attorney and stated that he is presenting an expert
witness to prove that his signature in the special power of attorney is a forgery. However, Titan did not register
any objection. Furthermore, Titan did not object to the presentation of Atty. Desiderio Pagui, who testified as
an expert witness, on his Report finding that the signature on the special power of attorney was not affixed by
Manuel based on his analysis of the questioned and standard signatures of the latter, and even cross-examined
said witness. Neither did Titan object to the admission of said Report when it was offered in evidence by Manuel
on the ground that he is barred from denying his signature on the special power of attorney. In fact, Titan
admitted the existence of said Report and objected only to the purpose for which it was offered. In Central
Surety & Insurance Company v. C.N. Hodges, it was held that where a party acted in complete disregard of or
wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and did not object to the introduction and admission of evidence
questioning the genuineness and due execution of a document, he must be deemed to have waived the
benefits of said Rule. Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the mantle of protection given [it] by
Section 8, Rule 8.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

AMENDED & SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS
BILL OF PARTICULARS
FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND
OTHER PAPERS
RULE 9-13
38. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. v. Tablante, G.R. No. 162924, [February 4, 2010], 625
PHIL 368-376
We have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping. We recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to sign the
verification and certificate against forum shopping; In sum, we have held that the following officials or
employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of a board resolution; The
Chairperson of the Board of Directors; The President of a corporation; The General Manager or Acting General
Manager; Personnel Officer, and Employment Specialist in a labor case. While the above cases do not provide
a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the rules, the
determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the
foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being "in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness
of the allegations in the petition." The failure to attach the Secretary's Certificate, attesting to General Manager
Antonio Merelos's authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be
considered fatal to the filing of the petition.
39. Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134 (Resolution), [August 15, 2012], 692 PHIL 714-730 (Default)
A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default. Loss of standing
in court, the forfeiture of one’s right as a party litigant, contestant or legal adversary, is the consequence of an
order of default. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine
or cross-examine witnesses. A defending party declared in default loses his standing in court and his right to
adduce evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right to appeal from the judgment by default
and assail said judgment on the ground that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from
that prayed for or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the decision
is contrary to law. Otero, in his appeal from the judgment by default, asserted that Tan failed to prove the
material allegations of his complaint. He contends that the lower courts should not have given credence to the
statements of account that were presented by Tan as the same were not authenticated. It is not accurate to
state that having been declared in default by the MTCC, Otero is already deemed to have waived any and all
defenses which he may have against Tan’s claim. While it may be said that by defaulting, the defendant leaves
himself at the mercy of the court, the rules nevertheless see to it that any judgment against him must be in
accordance with the evidence required by law. Considering that Tan failed to authenticate the aforesaid
statements of account, the said documents should not have been admitted in evidence against Otero. It was
thus error for the lower tribunals to have considered the same in assessing the merits of Tan’s Complaint.
However, the pieces of evidence adduced by Tan during the ex parte presentation of his evidence, excluding
the said statements of account, sufficiently prove the material allegations of his complaint against Otero.
40. Diona v. Balangue, G.R. No. 173559, [January 7, 2013], 701 PHIL 19-37
The award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the
evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any provision on
interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her
"the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum" and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither
did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per
annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents
were not informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of
reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the
complainant [petitioner] was seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint. Neither can the grant of the
5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner's general prayer for "[o]ther reliefs and remedies
just and equitable under the premises". To repeat, the court's grant of relief is limited only to what has been
prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party's cause of
action. Besides, even assuming that the awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged
and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be equitably reduced in
accordance with applicable jurisprudence.
41. De La Cruz vs. Planters Development Bank [G.R. No. 193650. October 8, 2014.]
The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a quo and the CA did not
overlook the fact that PDB's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed one day too late.
The bank received a copy of the trial court's June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days —
or up to August 1, 2006 — within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for
new trial, pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new trial only
on August 2, 2006. Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules. This is not to
mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or area which was not covered by LBC
courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by registered
mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had
expired. PDB's Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only up to
August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in denying PDB's notice
of appeal. Since PDB's Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late and the 15-day
period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice of appeal, it follows that its right to
appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question the trial court's Decision in any other manner. Settled
is the rule that a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him." The
"presumption that a party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower
court" applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the trial court, its
Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court.
42. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals (Eight Division), G.R. No. 182814, [July 15, 2015]
As a rule where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all notices or orders
required to be given therein must be given to the attorney of record. Accordingly, notices to counsel should be
properly sent to his address of record, and, unless the counsel files a notice of change of address, his official
address remains to be that his address of record. There is no question that in this case, petitioners' counsel
was able to receive a copy of the judgment, as evidenced by the Certification issued by the Postmaster
General. As borne by the Certification, the said copy of the judgment was duly delivered to the address on
record of the petitioners' counsel at 2/F LPC Mansion, 122 L.P. Leviste St., Salcedo Village, Makati City and
was received by Daniel Soriano, the security guard on 15 March 2002.
While petitioners impliedly admitted the fact that the security guard in the building where their counsel's office
is located received the copy of the judgment, they argued, however, that such receipt is not valid under the
law, a contention which pulled the rug from under their feet exposing the utter frailty of their position. In Balgami
v. Court of Appeals, the Court instructed the counsels to device a system to ensure that official communications
would be promptly received by them, lest, they will be chargeable with negligence, thus: the law office is
mandated to adopt and arrange matters in order to ensure that official or judicial communications sent by mail
would reach the lawyer assigned to the case. The court has time and again emphasized that the negligence
of the clerks, which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter. The doctrinal rule
is that negligence of the counsel binds the client because, otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so
long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and [prove] that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned. Evidently, petitioners' counsel was wanting on this respect. Not
only did petitioners' counsel fail to device a system for the prompt and efficient receipt of mails intended for
her, she also failed to ensure that she could be notified of the decision as soon as possible. As a practicing
lawyer, petitioners' counsel should have been more circumspect in monitoring official communications intended
for her so as to avoid situations like this, where a mail matter was inexplicably lost after delivery thereby running
the risk of losing a client's case on technicality. Petitioners' counsel cannot hide behind the security guard's
negligence to shield her even professional negligence in an effort to seek reversal of a decision that has long
attained finality. It bears stressing that a decision had become final and executory without any party perfecting
an appeal or filing a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. It was only months after its
finality that questions assailing the Decision were raised.
43. Republic v. Viaje, G.R. No. 180993, [January 27, 2016]
The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to
assist it in representing the government is well settled. But it is likewise settled that the OSG's deputized
counsel is "no more than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding" and the latter
remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. In this
case, records show that it was the OSG that first entered an appearance in behalf of the Republic; hence, it
remains the principal counsel of record. The appearance of the deputized counsel did not divest the OSG of
control over the case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record. Thus, the RTC
properly acted within bounds when it relied on the rule that it is the notice to the OSG that is binding.
Nonetheless, the OSG also pointed out that it specifically requested the RTC to likewise furnish its deputized
counsel with a copy of its notices. Records show that the deputized counsel also requested that copies of
notices and pleadings be furnished to him. Despite these requests, it was only the OSG that the RTC furnished
with copies of its notices. It would have been more prudent for the RTC to have furnished the deputized counsel
of its notices. All the same, doing so does not necessarily clear the OSG from its obligation to oversee the
efficient handling of the case. And even if the deputized counsel was served with copies of the court's notices,
orders and decisions, these will not be binding until they are actually received by the OSG. More so in this
case where the OSG's Notice of Appearance and its Letter deputizing the LRA even contained the caveat that
it is only notices of orders, resolutions and decisions served on the OSG that will bind the Republic, the entity,
agency and/or official represented. In fact, the proper basis for computing a reglementary period and for
determining whether a decision had attained finality is service on the OSG. As was stated in National Power
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission: The underlying justification for compelling service of
pleadings, orders, notices and decisions on the OSG as principal counsel is one and the same. As the lawyer
for the government or the government corporation involved, the OSG is entitled to the service of said pleadings
and decisions, whether the case is before the courts or before a quasi-judicial agency such as respondent
commission. Needless to say, a uniform rule for all cases handled by the OSG simplifies procedure, prevents
confusion and thus facilitates the orderly administration of justice.
44. Philippine Asset Growth Two, Inc. v. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 206528,
[June 28, 2016]
It is a long-standing doctrine that where a party is represented by several counsels, notice to one is sufficient,
and binds the said party. Notice to any one of the several counsels on record is equivalent to notice to all, and
such notice starts the running of the period to appeal notwithstanding that the other counsel on record has not
received a copy of the decision or resolution. In the present case, PDB was represented by both Janda Asia &
Associates and DivinaLaw. It was not disputed that Janda Asia & Associates, which remained a counsel of
record, albeit, as collaborating counsel, received notice of the CA's March 5, 2013 Resolution on March 12,
2013. As such, it is from this date, and not from DivinaLaw's receipt of the notice of said resolution on April 3,
2013 that the fifteen (15)-day period to file the petition for review on certiorari before the Court started to run.
Hence, petitioners only had until March 27, 2013 to file a petition for review on certiorari before the Court, and
the petition filed on April 18, 2013 was filed out of time. Notably, there is no showing that the CA had already
resolved PAGTI's motion for substitution; hence, it remained bound by the proceedings and the judgment
rendered against its transferor, PDB. Generally, the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the
period provided for by law renders the decision appealed from final and executory, and beyond the competence
of the Court to review. However, the Court has repeatedly relaxed this procedural rule in the higher interest of
substantial justice. In Barnes v. Padilla, it was held that: [A] final and executory judgment can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice[,] considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. After a meticulous scrutiny of this case, the Court finds that the
unjustified rehabilitation of respondents, by virtue of the CA ruling if so allowed to prevail, warrants the
relaxation of the procedural rule violated by petitioners in the higher interest of substantial justice. The reasons
therefor are hereunder explained.
SUMMONS
RULE 14
45. NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Ltd.v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No.
175799, [November 28, 2011], 677 PHIL 351-375
The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging Contracts between the parties
void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the
defendant under a contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering into such
contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the plaintiff attaches a property within the
Philippines belonging to the defendant, in which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem. Since
the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec,
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because
of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily appears in court. However, we
rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss on account of failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
46. Palma v. Galvez, G.R. No. 165273, [March 10, 2010], 629 PHIL 86-100
Private respondent was a Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service
of summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. But
Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of
summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who
is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the
following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service in Section 7, Rule 14; (2) personal
service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient. The Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the
country; thus, the service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was residing in
that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private respondent's behalf. The RTC
had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered his
appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of the
service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private
respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the
motions for extension of time to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking
affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure
affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting otherwise.
47. Gentle Supreme Philippines, Inc. v. Consulta, G.R. No. 183182, [September 1, 2010], 644
PHIL 200-207
There is valid substituted service of summons on Consulta at his place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof. Canave was a person charged with authority to receive court documents for the
company as well as its officers who held office in that company. Absent contrary evidence, the veracity of the
return's content and its effectiveness stand. Further, this Court has ruled that "it is not necessary that the
person in charge of the defendant's regular place of business be specifically authorized to receive the
summons. It is enough that he appears to be in charge." In this case, Canave, a secretary whose job description
necessarily includes receiving documents and other correspondence, would have the semblance of authority
to accept the court documents. It is true that this Court emphasized the importance of strict and faithful
compliance in effecting substituted service. It must, however, be reiterated that when the rigid application of
rules becomes a conduit for escaping one's responsibility, the Court will intervene to set things right according
to the rules.
48. Ang v. Chinatrust (Philippines) Commercial Bank Corp., G.R. No. 200693, [April 18, 2016]
In the present case, the return failed to establish the impossibility of prompt personal service. The return stated
that the process server and the assisting sheriffs made two attempts at personal service. The server claims
that in between the two attempts, he made diligent efforts to locate the whereabouts of the other defendants
outside their office. The process server only made two attempts at Nation's office and both attempts were made
on the same date. He did not even attempt to serve the defendants at their homes. This does not establish the
impossibility of personal service within a reasonable period of time; this only shows a half-hearted attempt that
hardly satisfies the diligence and best efforts required from a serving officer. We reiterate that the server must
have made at least three attempts on two different dates within a reasonable period of one month before
substituted service becomes available. On the other hand, Charlotte Magpayo is a Property Custodian at
Nation Petroleum. Her position denotes limited responsibility to office equipment, inventory, and supplies.
Chinatrust did not submit any evidence that Magpayo's job description includes the management of Nation
Petroleum's Makati office. We do not see how she can be considered as the competent person in charge of
the defendants' business or office and the respondents failed to prove otherwise. The statutory requirements
of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that
authorized by statute is considered ineffective. We find that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioners Mario Ang, Nena Ang, Renato Ang, Pauline Ang, Guillermo Sy, Alison Ang-Sy, Nelson Ang, and
Melinda Ang for failure to comply with the rules on substituted service under Rule 14, Section 8. However, with
respect to petitioner Ricky Ang, we sustain the lower courts' conclusion that he was personally served
summons. Personal service may be effected by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. 46 The return indicates that Ricky Ang
personally received a copy of the summons and the complaint despite his refusal to sign the original copy. This
constitutes valid tender of the summons and the complaint.
49. Macasaet v. Co, Jr., G.R. No. 156759, [June 5, 2013], 710 PHIL 167-183
In the present case, the circumstances fully warranted the conclusion that substituted service may be resorted
to. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all
times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he be unable to
effect the personal service within a reasonable time. There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted
to serve the summons upon each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of
September 18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet
and Quijano were "always out and not available" and the other petitioners were "always roving outside and
gathering news." After Medina learned from those present in the office address on his second attempt that
there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other
day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would be futile. The
circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect
personal service by all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard,
what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are strict in insisting on
personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify
substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs. In reality,
petitioners' insistence on personal service by the serving officer was demonstrably superfluous. They had
actually received the summonses served through their substitutes, as borne out by their filing of several
pleadings in the RTC, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief ad
cautelam. They had also availed themselves of the modes of discovery available under the Rules of Court.
Such acts evinced their voluntary appearance in the action.
50. Vlason Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 121662-64, [July 6, 1999], 369
PHIL 269-311
Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had not been served
summons anew for the Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental
Petition. In the records, it appears that only Atty. Tamondong, counsel for Singkong Trading, was furnished a
copy of the Second Amended Petition. The corresponding sheriff's return indicates that only Omega, M/V Star
Ace and Capt. Rada were served summons and copies of said Petition.
We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus
deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of
a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared
before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served
upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are alleged. 84 After it is acquired,
a court's jurisdiction continues until the case is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet
appeared in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must
be served on them. 85 It is not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another
summons for the amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service of summons for the
amended complaint is required. In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression
that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the
secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the subsequent
amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on petitioner
was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a
new service of summons for the amended Petitions.
OMNIBUS MOTION RULE

RULE 15
51. Home Development Mutual Fund v. Spouses See, G.R. No. 170292, [June 22, 2011], 667
PHIL 609-622
Whether or not PAG-BIG can raise the argument that the RTC Decision of February 21, 2002 is null and void without
having been issued without a trial in its petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Under the Omnibus Motion
Rule embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, all available objections that are not included in a party's
motion shall be deemed waived. As to Pag-ibig's argument that the February 21, 2002 Decision of the RTC is null
and void for having been issued without a trial, it is a mere afterthought which deserves scant consideration. The
Court notes that Pag-ibig did not object to the absence of a trial when it sought a reconsideration of the February
21, 2002 Decision. Instead, Pag-ibig raised the following lone argument in their motion: [Pag-ibig] should not be
compelled to release the title to other [respondent-spouses] See because Manuel Arimado [has] yet to deliver to
[Pag-ibig] the sum of P272,000.00. Under the Omnibus Motion Rule embodied in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, all available objections that are not included in a party's motion shall be deemed waived. Moreover, the
October 31, 2001 Decision (as well as the Compromise Agreement on which it is based) does not provide that Pag-
ibig cannot be ordered to release the title if Sheriff Arimado fails to pay. On the contrary, what the Order provides is
that if Sheriff Arimado fails to pay, the trial court shall litigate (and, necessarily, resolve) the issue of whether Pag-
ibig is obliged to release the title. It is thus clear from both the October 31, 2001 Decision and the Compromise
Agreement that the trial court was authorized to litigate and resolve the issue of whether Pag-ibig should release
the title upon Sheriff Arimado's failure to pay the P272,000.00. As it turned out, the trial court eventually resolved
the issue against Pag-ibig, i.e., it ruled that Pag-ibig is obliged to release the title. In so doing, the trial court simply
exercised the authority provided in the October 31, 2001 Decision (and stipulated in the Compromise Agreement).
The trial court did not thereby "modify" the October 31, 2001 Decision.
MOTION TO DISMISS
RULE 16
52. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, [April 15, 1968], 131 PHIL 556-568
The Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. It is an undisputed fact that the action
commenced by Spouses Tijam in the CFI of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of
the sum of P1,908.00 only, an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance
with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when
the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the
case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and
circumstances of the present case, We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking
this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation. As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by record,
and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale
demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question
of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in
the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their
Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
53. Alabang Development Corp. v. Alabang Hills Village Association, G.R. No. 187456,
[June 2, 2014], 734 PHIL 664-673
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have
the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or representation he claims[;]
'lack of capacity to sue' refers to a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of a party. In the instant case,
petitioner lacks capacity to sue because it no longer possesses juridical personality by reason of its dissolution
and lapse of the three-year grace period provided under Section 122 of the Corporation Code. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that petitioner's corporate registration was revoked on May 26, 2003. Based on the
above-quoted provision of law, it had three years, or until May 26, 2006, to prosecute or defend any suit by or
against it. The subject complaint, however, was filed only on October 19, 2006, more than three years after
such revocation. In the present case, petitioner filed its complaint not only after its corporate existence was
terminated but also beyond the three-year period allowed by Section 122 of the Corporation Code. Thus, it is
clear that at the time of the filing of the subject complaint petitioner lacks the capacity to sue as a corporation.
To allow petitioner to initiate the subject complaint and pursue it until final judgment, on the ground that such
complaint was filed for the sole purpose of liquidating its assets, would be to circumvent the provisions of
Section 122 of the Corporation Code.
54. Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings Corp., G.R. No. 207376, [August 6, 2014]
The issue in this case is whether or not a court can take cognizance of a compulsory counterclaim
despite the fact that the corresponding complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. A counterclaim
is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. It is in the nature of a cross-
complaint; a distinct and independent cause of action which, though alleged in the answer, is not part of the
answer. Based on the aforequoted ruling of the Court, if the dismissal of the complaint somehow eliminates
the cause of the counterclaim, then the counterclaim cannot survive. Conversely, if the counterclaim itself
states sufficient cause of action then it should stand independently of and survive the dismissal of the
complaint. Now, having been directly confronted with the problem of whether the compulsory counterclaim by
reason of the unfounded suit may prosper even if the main complaint had been dismissed, we rule in the
affirmative. It bears to emphasize that petitioner's counterclaim against respondent is for damages and
attorney's fees arising from the unfounded suit. While respondent's Complaint against petitioner is already
dismissed, petitioner may have very well already incurred damages and litigation expenses such as attorney's
fees since it was forced to engage legal representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack
of jurisdiction of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. Hence, the
cause of action of petitioner's counterclaim is not eliminated by the mere dismissal of respondent's complaint.
It may also do well to remember that it is this Court which mandated that claims for damages and attorney's
fees based on unfounded suit constitute compulsory counterclaim which must be pleaded in the same action
or, otherwise, it shall be barred. It will then be iniquitous and the height of injustice to require the petitioner to
make the counterclaim in the present action, under threat of losing his right to claim the same ever again in
any other court, yet make his right totally dependent on the fate of the respondent's complaint. If indeed the
Court dismisses petitioner's counterclaim solely on the basis of the dismissal of respondent's Complaint, then
what remedy is left for the petitioner? It can be said that he can still file a separate action to recover the
damages and attorney's fees based on the unfounded suit for he cannot be barred from doing so since he did
file the compulsory counterclaim in the present action, only that it was dismissed when respondent's Complaint
was dismissed. However, this reasoning is highly flawed and irrational considering that petitioner, already
burdened by the damages and attorney's fees it may have incurred in the present case, must again incur more
damages and attorney's fees in pursuing a separate action, when, in the first place, it should not have been
involved in any case at all. Since petitioner's counterclaim is compulsory in nature and its cause of action
survives that of the dismissal of respondent's complaint, then it should be resolved based on its own merits
and evidentiary support. 39 (Additional emphasis supplied.)
55. Pineda v. Heirs of Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, [February 14, 2007], 544 PHIL 554-565
Now, did the trial court correctly order the dismissal of the complaint based on laches without conducting trial
on the merits? The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that under Rule 16, Section 1 6 of the Rules of Court,
laches is not enumerated under said provision, hence, it must be proved during trial. On the other hand,
petitioner Pineda asserts that laches is analogous to prescription and, therefore, can be a ground of dismissing
a complaint as though a motion to dismiss is filed.
Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature
which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to
dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. 7 Those
issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses. 8
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief
is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual determination by the trial
court. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. 10 Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time,
rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may
sufficiently constitute laches. 11 Without prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay in the enforcement of
one's claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party charged with negligence or omission in invoking
his right must be afforded the opportunity to raise his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a
contentious proceeding.
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS
RULE 17
56. Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, [June 20, 2012],
688 PHIL 384-399)
As to the remedy available; Appeal under Rule 41 is proper; Due to the absence of any stated factual basis
(in the order of dismissal) and despite the admissions of the parties, the CA still had to delve into the records
to check whether facts to justify the prejudicial dismissal even exist. Since the dismissal of the case appears
to have been rendered motu proprio (as the dismissal order does not state if it was issued upon the
respondents' or the trial court's motion), the facts to be determined by the CA should include the grounds
specified under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A court could only issue a motu proprio dismissal
pursuant to the grounds mentioned in this rule and for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 32 These
grounds are matters of facts. Thus, given that the dismissal order does not disclose its factual basis, we are
thus persuaded that the petitioner had properly filed its appeal from the dismissal order under Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court (because factual circumstances must be reviewed).
Validity of the dismissal order; Since it is an adjudication of mertis, the reasons based on facts and
law must be stated based on Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the ROC; Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the RTC’s
dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice.
Since it is a prejudicial dismissal, the assailed dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits
so that the petitioner's complaint can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. It is an adjudication
on the merits where it is imperative that the dismissal order must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based. The assailed dismissal order clearly violates this rule for its failure to disclose how
and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is
able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. A trial court should always specify
the reasons for a complaint's dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima
facie justification for the dismissal. The dismissal of the case constituted a denial of due process. Where the
reasons are absent, a decision (such as the December 16, 2003 dismissal order) has absolutely nothing to
support it and is thus a nullity. Based on available records and on the averments of the parties, the following
events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of case: (a) the court admitted FGU Insurance's third-
party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the hearing upon FGU Insurance's motion; and (c) Baetiong filed
his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner. None of these events square
with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of a case
for failure to prosecute. Moreover, the petitioner's willingness to prosecute its complaint is present. Indeed,
neither FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify
the dismissal of their case. Hence, the dismissal of case is not warranted. Neither facts, law or jurisprudence
supports the RTC's finding of failure to prosecute on the part of the petitioner
The fundamental test for non prosequitur; whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with
want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the
part of the plaintiff to prosecute.
Four grounds under Section 3, Rule 17:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence
in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.
57. Ching v. Cheng, G.R. No. 175507, [October 8, 2014], 745 PHIL 93-118 (not part of the
coverage)
Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case before any responsive pleadings
have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is
without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court; Section 2 of Rule 17 contemplates a situation where a
counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. It
requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court; Section 3
of Rule 17 contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to prosecute. The case is dismissed
either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise
declared by the court. In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the defendant.
Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to dismiss.
The "two-dismissal rule" vis-à-vis the Rules of Civil Procedure; As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of
Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal; As a general
rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused
its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e. with prejudice to the re-filing
of the same claim, the following requisites must be present;
(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (SECOND DISMISSAL MUST BE BY NOTICE)
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on the ground that
the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.
The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is dismissed a second time, the
plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same claim.
58. Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, G.R. No. 170354, [June 30, 2006], 526 PHIL 868-894
The dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff's fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate
action; The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or
otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his
counterclaim. Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable
to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also
covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu
proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or
compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation
of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a
matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such
absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of
the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice
to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although
neither exists even by mere implication. Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but
relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and
proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he
has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim. The present rule embodied in Sections
2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitabledisposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment
thereon is based on the merit of thecounterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint.Certainly,
if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent ofthe
complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that
the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if
thecounterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from
peremptorydismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
PRE-TRIAL
RULE 18
59. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Genuino, G.R. No. 208792, [July 22, 2015])
Failure to comply with the said duty (to set the case for pre-trial conference) makes the case
susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply
with the rules under Section 3 of Rule 17; In every action, the plaintiffs are duty-bound to prosecute their
case with utmost diligence and with reasonable dispatch to enable them to obtain the relief prayed for and, at
the same time, to minimize the clogging of the court dockets. Parallel to this is the defendants' right to have a
speedy disposition of the case filed against them, essentially, to prevent their defenses from being impaired.
Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to set the case for pre-trial after
the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17, failure to comply with the said duty makes
the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply
with the rules.
Nowhere in the text of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC does it remove the plaintiff's duty under Rule 18, Section 1
of the Rules of Court to set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading has been served and filed;
Nowhere does it repeal Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that allows dismissals due to plaintiff's fault,
including plaintiff's failure to comply with the Rules for no justifiable cause. Nowhere does it impose a sole
burden on the trial court to set the case for pre-trial. Reading A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC together with Rule 17,
Section 3 and Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court accommodates the outright dismissal of a complaint
upon plaintiff's failure to show justifiable reason for not setting the case for pre-trial within the period provided
by the Rules. Thus, trial courts must consider the facts of each case. This court has allowed cases to proceed
despite failure by the plaintiff to promptly move for pre-trial when it finds that "the extreme sanction of dismissal
of the complaint might not be warranted": It must be stressed that even if the plaintiff fails to promptly move for
pre-trial without any justifiable cause for such delay, the extreme sanction of dismissal of the complaint might
not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and
compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC upholds this purpose in requiring the Clerk of Court to issue a notice of pre-trial
"[i]f the plaintiff fails to file [the] said motion [to set case for pre-trial] within the given period. However,
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands also has the duty to set the case for pre-trial after the last
pleading has been served and filed, and to diligently pursue its case and comply with the rules; Failure
to do so without justifiable cause warrants an outright dismissal of the Complaint. Petitioner Bank of the
Philippine Islands' explanation of misfiling by previous counsel's secretary of the case records together with
terminated cases in the office bodega cannot be considered as justifiable cause for its failure to set the case
for pre-trial. This court has held that "a counsel is required to inquire, from time to time, and whenever
necessary, about the status of handled cases, as well as motions filed for a client." While it is true that A.M.
No. 03-1-09-SC does provide that the Clerk of Court set the date of pre-trial, plaintiff should not be rewarded
for his or her negligence.
60. Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Perez, G.R. Nos. 187640 & 187687, [June 15, 2011], 667
PHIL 450-473)
The notice of pre-trial is mandatory as it seeks to notify the parties of the date, time and place of the pre-trial
and to require them to file their respective pre-trial briefs within the time prescribed by the rules. Its absence,
therefore, renders the pre-trial and all subsequent proceedings null and void. The failure of a party to appear
at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared non-
suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. Thus, sending a notice
of pre-trial stating the date, time and place of pre-trial is mandatory. Its absence will render the pre-trial and
subsequent proceedings void. This must be so as part of a party's right to due process. In the case at bar, the
order issued by the trial court merely spoke of a "hearing on March 8, 2006" and required PNB "to prepare and
complete a statement of account." The said order does not mention anything about a pre-trial to be conducted
by the trial court. In contrast, the Notice of Pre-trial dated August 22, 2002 issued by the trial court categorically
states that a pre-trial is to be conducted, requiring the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs. What is
more, PNB even claims that it failed to receive a copy of the said order. Clearly, no amount of reasoning will
logically lead to the conclusion that the trial court issued, or that PNB received, a notice of pre-trial. As such,
We find that the CA aptly held that the Order dated March 8, 2006, which declared the hearing to be a pre-trial
and allowed Spouses Perez to adduce evidence ex-parte, is void. Similarly, its ruling that the Decision dated
July 5, 2006 and all subsequent orders 39 issued pursuant to the said judgment are also null and void, is
proper.
61. Philippine National Bank v. Aznar, G.R. Nos. 171805 & 172021, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL 461-
482)
Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of
the parties and the annexes, if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde. However, when it appears
that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either
denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the
effect of nullifying plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered. In this case,
It was error for the trial court to render a judgment on the pleadings and, in effect, resulted in a denial
of due process on the part of PNB because it was denied its right to present evidence. A remand of
this case would ordinarily be the appropriate course of action. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
justified the trial court's resort to a judgment on the pleadings because the defendant in its Answer made a
qualification that the plaintiff's liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles issued to RISCO constituted as
loan from the stockholders and was not a claim adverse to the ownership rights of the corporation. At this point,
a judgment on the pleadings is proper because the qualification made by defendant in its answer is not
sufficient to controvert the allegations raised in the complaint. Hence, the issues raised by the parties can be
resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto and do not require further
presentation of evidence aliunde. However, a careful reading of Aznar, et al.'s Complaint and of PNB's Answer
would reveal that both parties raised several claims and defenses, respectively, other than what was cited by
the Court of Appeals, which requires the presentation of evidence for resolution. Furthermore, apart from
refuting the aforecited material allegations made by Aznar, et al., PNB also indicated in its Answer the special
and affirmative defenses of (a) prescription; (b) res judicata; (c) Aznar, et al., having no right of action for
quieting of title; (d) Aznar, et al.'s lien being ineffective and not binding to PNB; and (e) Aznar, et al.'s having
no personality to file the suit. From the foregoing, it is indubitably clear that it was error for the trial court to
render a judgment on the pleadings and, in effect, resulted in a denial of due process on the part of PNB
because it was denied its right to present evidence. A remand of this case would ordinarily be the appropriate
course of action. However, in the interest of justice and in order to expedite the resolution of this case which
was filed with the trial court way back in 1998, the Court finds it proper to already resolve the present
controversy in light of the existence of legal grounds that would dispose of the case at bar without necessity of
presentation of further evidence on the other disputed factual claims and defenses of the parties.
INTERVENTION
RULE 19
62. Heirs of Medrano v. De Vera, G.R. No. 165770, [August 9, 2010], 641 PHIL 228-246)
We note that under Rule 3, Section 19, the substitution or joinder of the transferee is "upon motion", and De
Vera did not file any motion for substitution or joinder. However, this technical flaw may be disregarded for the
fact remains that the court had already admitted his answer and such answer was on record when the ex parte
presentation of evidence was allowed by the court. Because De Vera's answer had already been admitted, the
court should not have allowed the ex parte presentation of evidence. We are not persuaded by petitioners'
insistence that De Vera could not have participated in the case because he did not file a motion to intervene.
The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for him to protect
his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits
more than on due process considerations. The intervenor can choose not to participate in the case and he will
not be bound by the judgment. In this case, De Vera is not a stranger to the action but a transferee pendente
lite. As mentioned, a transferee pendente lite is deemed joined in the pending action from the moment when
the transfer of interest is perfected. 49 His participation in the case should have been allowed by due process
considerations. We likewise adopt with approval the appellate court's observation that De Vera's failure to file
a pleading-in-intervention will not change the long foregone violation of his right to due process. The ex parte
presentation of evidence had already been terminated when the trial court required De Vera to file his pleading-
in-intervention. Even if he complied with the order to file a pleading-in-intervention, the damage had already
been done. The precipitate course of action taken by the trial court rendered compliance with its order moot.
Given the Court's finding that the ex parte presentation of evidence constituted a violation of due process
rights, the trial court's judgment by default cannot bind De Vera. A void judgment cannot attain finality and its
execution has no basis in law. The case should be remanded to the trial court for trial based on De Vera's
answer and with his participation.
63. Malvar v. Kraft Food Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 183952, [September 9, 2013], 717 PHIL 427-
460
In the absence of the lawyer's fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive the lawyer of his just fees already
earned in the guise of a justifiable reason. Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the Intervenor's legal
service to her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by offering excuses that were
not only inconsistent with her actions but, most importantly, fell short of being justifiable. To be sure, the
Intervenor's withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor terminated the written agreement on the contingent
attorney's fees. Nor did the withdrawal constitute a waiver of the agreement. On the contrary, the agreement
continued between them because the Intervenor's Manifestation (with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for
Petitioner) explicitly called upon the Court to safeguard its rights under the written agreement. The respondents
also in this case is liable because they were shown to have connived with Malvar in the execution of the
compromise agreement, with the intention of depriving the Intervenor of its attorney's fees. Thereby, they will
be solidarily liable with her for the attorney's fees as stipulated in the written agreement under the theory that
they unfairly and unjustly interfered with the Intervenor's professional relationship with Malvar. The
circumstances show that Malvar and the respondents needed an escape from greater liability towards the
Intervenor, and from the possible obstacle to their plan to settle to pay. Thereby, she and the respondents
became joint tort-feasors who acted adversely against the interests of the Intervenor. As joint tort-feasors, they
are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot
insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally
liable for the whole amount. Thus, as joint tort-feasors, Malvar and the respondents should be held solidarily
liable to the Intervenor. There is no way of appreciating these circumstances except in this light.
64. Pulgar v. RTC of Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64, G.R. No. 157583, [September 10, 2014]
Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly, an intervention
presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, Pulgar does not contest
the RTC's dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by
asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. This recourse, the Court,
however, finds to be improper since the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the main case necessarily resulted in
the dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation of the principal litigation — on jurisdictional
grounds at that — means that Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene. Verily, it must be
borne in mind that: [I]ntervention is never an independent action, but is ancillary and supplemental to the
existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily delay the placid operation of the machinery
of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case,
the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interests. Otherwise stated,
the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has
ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of intervention ceases.
65. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Miñoza, G.R. No. 186045,
[February 2, 2011], 656 PHIL 537-549 (OPTIONAL READING)
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings. 16 It is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make
himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in
resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by
which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a
person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such person becomes a party thereto for
the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has
(1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation;

(2) or in the success of any of the parties;
(3) or an interest against the parties;
(4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in
the custody of the court or an officer thereof.
Moreover, the court must take into consideration whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's right or interest can be
adequately pursued and protected in a separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono
and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima. True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid
claims, the intervenors would surely have a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that
the interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation and effect of the judgment. 19 Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene,
proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. Moreover, the intervenors'
contentions that Leila's predecessors-in-interest executed, in fraud of the intervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the
estate of the late spouses Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the
deceased spouses, and that subsequently, her predecessors-in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold the subject lots to
the NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the proceedings. In addition to resolving who the true
and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia Togono are, the parties would also present additional evidence in
support of this new allegation of fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership,
authenticity of certificates of titles, and regularity in their acquisition. Verily, this would definitely cause unjust delay in the
adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties, which primarily hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirs
represented by Leila have a right to repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA.
MODES OF DISCOVERY
RULE 23-29
66. San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, [March 3, 2008], 571 PHIL 51-73
In this case, the main question is whether or not Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a
non-resident foreign corporation the privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are
foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines
to prove an oral contract, in order to avoid further delay. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 1, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of deposition.
The fact that private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial.
As a general rule, depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means
of informing themselves of all the relevant facts. They are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute
for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent must as a rule be presented for
oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, any deposition offered to prove the facts set out during a trial or hearing, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground that it is hearsay.
However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes under Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court. One of the circumstances is when the deponent is dead, out of the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to come to court to testify. The principle of admissibility is consistent with Section 47,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken
wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition
"shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public". If in a foreign state or country, the deposition
"shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may
be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory".
Thus, there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting the MOTION (To
Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering that Berdex’s allegation in its
MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the exceptions
for its admissibility under Section 4 (c) (2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at
a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition.
Moreover, the right to take depositions upon written interrogatories in lieu of oral testimony in open court
would not result in grave injustice to San Luis, even though Berdex is seeking to establish the existence
of an oral contract which requires stricter standard in proving the same. Depositions are allowed as a
departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in open court, where
their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge; and the procedure is not on that account rendered
illegal nor is the deposition, thereby taken, inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and
testimony of the deponent in open court and without being subject to the prying eyes and probing
questions of the Judge. San Luis’ right to cross-examine Berdex’s witnesses will not be curtailed because
he is accorded with the opportunity to submit cross-interrogatories under Section 25, Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or
proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery (interrogatories to parties; requests
for admission by adverse party; production or inspection of documents or things; physical and mental
examination of persons) are meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only
known to him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses.
In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to learn all the material
and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof, to the end that their pleadings or motions
may not suffer from inadequacy of factual foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and
completely laid before the Court, without omission or suppression.
67. Rosete v. Lim, G.R. No. 136051, [June 8, 2006], 523 PHIL 498-515)
On whether or not Mapalo and Chito Rosete (defendants in the civil case) in a civil suit for
Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages may exercise the right to refuse to take the witness
stand and to give their depositions on the ground that their right to self-incrimination may be violated
considering that there are two pending criminal cases against them; The Supreme Court held that for a
party in a civil case to possess the right to refuse to take the witness stand, the civil case must also
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. In the present controversy, the case is civil it being a suit
for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse
to take the witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal
proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are two
criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will
not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not
facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only if and when
incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the ground of their right against
self-incrimination.
On whether or not the taking of their oral depositions should not be allowed without leave of
court as no answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined because their answers
were filed ex abudanti cautela pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari challenging the trial
court's Orders that denied their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, respectively. The Supreme
Court held that the answer ex abudanti cautela filed by the petitioners is the answer contemplated by
Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the the testimony of a person, whether a party or not,
may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. From Section 1, Rule 23 of
the Rules of Court, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person, whether
a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. In the case
before us, petitioners contend they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the answers
that they have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do not consider
the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers contemplated by the Rules of Court
on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela. Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant
caution" or "to be on the safe side." An answer ex abudanti cautela does not make their answer less of
an answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by petitioners shows that they contain their respective
defenses. Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer, filed their answers
despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Petitioners' argument that the issues of the case have not yet been joined must necessarily fail in light of
our ruling that petitioners have filed their answers although the same were made ex abudanti cautela.
Issues are joined when all the parties have pleaded their respective theories and the terms of the dispute
are plain before the court. In the present case, the issues have, indeed, been joined when petitioners, as
well as the other defendants, filed their answers. The respective claims and defenses of the parties have
been defined and the issues to be decided by the trial court have been laid down. Lastly, in the instant
case, the taking of the deposition may be availed of even without leave of court because petitioners have
already served their answers to the complaint.
68. Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Spouses Mangudadatu, G.R. No. 155010,
[August 16, 2004], 480 PHIL 236-258)
A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has
been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement
the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure,
as an attribute of discovery, is “well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law.” Limitations
would arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.
The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function
of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may
be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to
the witness stand. The present case involved a circumstance that fell under the above-cited Section
4(c)(2) of Rule 23 — the witnesses of JLI in Metro Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan
Kudarat, the place of hearing. JLI offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of
Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously
explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.
We note, however, that the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its February 21, 2001
Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed — against all other evidence — that its Order denying
the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their
depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.
69. NorthWest Airlines, Inc. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 137136, [November 3, 1999], 376 PHIL 96-
115
Whether or not deposition-taking at the Philippine Consulate in New York City falls within the
exceptions to the requirement that a witness give his testimony in open court pursuant to Section 1, Rule
132 of the Rules; Section 16 of Rule 23 of the provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition
by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by person to be examined and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken. The rest of the same section allows the taking of the deposition subject to
certain conditions specified therein. Section 16 of Rule 23 explicitly vesting in the court the power to order
that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However,
the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but
in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. The courts should always see to it
that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated
by Chief Justice Moran: this provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to
discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs — prying that is
quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not be such an aid." For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to litigation,
but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or both.
Respondent court correctly observed that the deposition in this case was not used for discovery
purposes, as the examinee was the employee of petitioner, but rather to accommodate the former who
was in Massachusetts, U.S.A. Such being the case, the general rules on examination of witnesses under
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requiring said examination to be done in court following the order set
therein, should be observed. Respondent court also correctly noted that private respondent's objections
to the oral deposition had been made promptly and vehemently, as required by the Rules, but these were
wrongly disregarded as immaterial by the trial court.
70. Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 108229 (Resolution), [August 24,
1993])
Whether or not a party could, during the trial of the case, present its evidence by taking the
deposition of its witnesses in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity not authorized by law to take
depositions in lieu of their oral examination in open Court, the SC held that where the deposition is to be
taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer
as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory in accordance with Section 12, Rule 24 of
the Rules of Court. A commission is addressed to "officers designated either by name or descriptive title,"
while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign state."
Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may be applied for and
issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted,”. In the case at bar, the RTC has issued
a commission to the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. thru Director Roces to take the testimonies by
deposition (upon written interrogatories)" It appears that said Center may, "upon request and authority of
the DFA issue a "Certificate of Authentication" attesting to the identity and authority of Notaries Public
and other public officers of the Republic of China, Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular
Affairs of the latter's Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Hence, what matters is that the deposition is taken before
a Philippine official acting by authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a
commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and in accordance,
moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court pursuant to which opportunity for cross-
examination of the deponent will be fully accorded to the adverse party.
The deposition-taking in the case at bar is a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial
judge;" but the procedure is not on that account rendered illegal nor is the deposition thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions where the law permits such a situation, i.e.,
the use of a deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony of the deponent in open court and
without being "subject to the prying eyes and probing questions of the Judge." This is allowed provided
the deposition is taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and the
existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility — e.g., "that the witness is out of the province and
at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines,
unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the witness
is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment, etc.".
The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in
question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by oral examination,
i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with the questions and answers
and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically. The imposition of such a limitation, and
the determination of the cause thereof, are to be sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason
given by the Trial Court for the condition — that the depositions be taken "only upon written
interrogatories" — is "so as to give defendant (Dasmariñas) the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses by serving cross-interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will
not be accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of
course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in Taipei, the adverse
party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the law, either by proceeding to Taipei
and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or opting to conduct said cross-examination merely
by serving cross-interrogatories.
71. De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-27263, [March 17, 1975], 159 PHIL 759-
766
Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or authority when he issued the
Order directing the petitioners, who had served notice to take the deposition upon oral examination of
Wong Chu King, to submit instead written interrogatories within 10 days from receipt of the order before
the Court could definitely determine the date when the deposition would be held, or to be more precise,
on whether or not the party to the case has the sole discretion to choose which mode of taking the
testimony of a deponent, the Supreme Court ruled that “we cannot subscribe to the petitioners' view that
the choice as to the mode of taking the testimony of a deponent, whether upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, rests exclusively upon the party exercising such right. If the theory advanced by the
petitioners were to be adopted, the exercise of this right is bound to be abused and utilized for
harassment. It is for this reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24, of the Rules of Court, were incorporated
to serve as safeguards and protection from abuse. A trial Judge must possess certain measure of control
over the right of parties in the taking of depositions in order to prevent abuse. Under Section 16 of the
Rules of Court, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the
deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently the trial court exercises a certain degree of
discretion in connection with the taking of a deposition. We rule, therefore, that the trial Judge in the
present case neither exceeded his jurisdiction nor abused his discretion when he issued the questioned
Order of August 23, 1966, directing that written interrogatories be submitted before determining the date
when the deposition would be taken”.
72. Spouses Zepeda v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 172175, [October 9, 2006], 535
PHIL 133-143
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer
respondent's written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court held that the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply
where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question
in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question,
still refuses to obey the order. Respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and
not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.
In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not
just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5
and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Due to respondent bank's filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court
cannot be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to
compel compliance based on Section 3. This Court has long encouraged the availment of the various
modes or instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24 to 29 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the
importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on
July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in
the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial
courts are directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under Rule 45
and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their discretion make use of depositions
under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27 and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The
parties are likewise required to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing
among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves
of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is
within the sound discretion of the trial court. The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should
be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having
always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of discovery are
intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however,
to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each case
and to make their considered determination thereafter.
73. Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117574, [January 2, 1997],
334 PHIL 77-83)
Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for
Admission of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his
response to the request be deemed an admission of the matters sought to be admitted? No. A cursory
reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it contains the same material averments
in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or reproduced in its
Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer. Petitioner's
request constitutes an utter redundancy and a useless, pointless process which the respondent should
not be subjected to. In the first place, what the petitioner seeks to be admitted by private respondent is
the very subject matter of the complaint. In effect, petitioner would want private respondent to deny her
allegations in her verified Complaint and admit the allegations in the Answer of petitioner (Manifestation
and Reply to Request for Admission). Plainly, this is illogical if not preposterous. Respondent cannot be
said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her
response to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified
Complaint in the court below. Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for
Admission because her Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which
were merely reproduced in the request. The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts
and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which
will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. A party should
not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is
no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the
complaint.
To this we add that a party should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.
A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting
party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Since
the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore
becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Even
assuming that a response to the request is needed, private respondent had already substantially complied
with the requirement of the law when she specifically denied the material allegations of the petitioner in
her Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. Although not under oath the reply to the
request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny the matters set forth in the
Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive defect.
This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the
interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful adherence to the rules of
procedure we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed
as to do substantial justice. There being genuine issues of fact between the private parties, public
respondents correctly denied the motion of petitioner for summary judgment. Where facts pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. 17
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact. 18 Verily, there is a need to determine by presentation of
evidence if respondent is really liable for the stolen articles and for violating its contract for security
services with petitioner. Until these issues are determined no legal compensation can take place between
the parties. This factual dispute can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits, a process which
need not take long to conclude.
74. Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101682, [December 14, 1992], 290-A PHIL
396-409
Whether or not Mag-isa have impliedly admitted the material facts and documents
subject of the request for admission on account of its failure to answer the request for admission
within the period fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath, the Supreme Court held
that a cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly shows, as found
that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same as those set
forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or denied in their answer. Hence, a party
should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which
there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer
to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations
of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents
described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or
defense. Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be
served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to
have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document described in and exhibited with the request or
relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission.
Moreover, all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon the party. This is so because
the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in
all its procedural aspects hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. However, the general rule cannot
apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases,
service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the
notice be valid. Hence, now Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that 'a party
may serve upon any other party a written request' should receive no other construction than that the
request for admission must be served directly on the party and not on his counsel. In the present case, it
will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon
her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to have
admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer
thereto within the period fixed in the request.
75. Lañada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102390 & 102404, [February 1, 2002], 426 PHIL
249-263)
May the counsel of a party to whom a written request for admission is addressed under
Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, answer such request for his client? The Court said, quoting
PSCFC Financial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, that Section 21 of Rule 138 states — Authority of
attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client.
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art.
1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are necessary,
or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both directed to
appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in behalf of his
client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power of attorney or
corporate resolution. Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients
in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters
of ordinary judicial procedure. Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for
admission, it should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of
counsel to make the response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously;
otherwise, it will negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the
Rules of Court. In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did not
authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the respective answers requested of them by
private respondents in the latter's written request for admission. As this Court has said, there is no reason
to strictly construe the phrase "the party to whom the request is directed" to refer solely or personally to
the petitioners themselves. Moreover, the subject matters of the request for admission are the same as
the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private respondents have filed their respective
answers. Private respondents thus desired the petitioners to admit once again the very matters they had
dealt with in their respective answers. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already
admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue, nor should he be required to make a
second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint.
76. Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, [December 13, 2007], 564
PHIL 774-799)
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent's special lubricants are
trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent's
production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondent's competitors. To
compel its disclosure is to cripple respondent's business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the
chemical composition of respondent's lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the
backbone on which its business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of
respondent's business. Respondent's proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and
expended money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought
to be revealed have a commercial value to respondent. Section 1, Rule 27 would show that the production
or inspection of documents or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be
availed of by any party upon a showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is
pending. Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. 26
The documents must not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection
of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged
character, could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items
be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in the party's possession, custody or control. Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types
of disqualification by reason of privileged communication and one of them are trade secrets. We, thus,
rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the
RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights
over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is
indispensable for doing justice. We do not, however, find reason to except respondent's trade secrets
from the application of the rule on privilege. The revelation of respondent's trade secrets serves no better
purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of
money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondent's goods in trade in the normal
course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to
petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of
trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the
greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because
they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public. 52
To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of
confidentiality which shields respondent's trade secrets.
77. Chan v. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, [July 24, 2013], 715 PHIL 67-77
Whether or not it is not proper for a subpoena duces tecum to be issued pertaining to the hospital
records of Johnny on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-
patient communication. The SC held that the physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially
means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case
be examined without the patient's consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter's reputation.
This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his
ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that
ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to
come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to
clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the
time to object to the admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time they are
offered. The offer could be made part of the physician's testimony or as independent evidence that he
had made entries in those records that concern the patient's health problems. Since the offer of evidence
is made at the trial, Josielene's request for subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for
trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny's
hospital records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt
to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24 (c), Rule 130
of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of privileged matters. It is of course
possible to treat Josielene's motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital
records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant prior to
trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure But the above right to compel the production
of documents has a limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since
it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged To allow, however, the
disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records — the results of tests that the physician
ordered, the diagnosis of the patient's illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to
allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient's consent. Physician memorializes all
these information in the patient's records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter's prior
consent. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the petition before the RTC that
he had been confined in a hospital against his will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim
form covering that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged character of its
records. But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already
presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene
into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce
evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would
again be premature.
CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE
RULE 31
78. Republic v. Heirs of Oribello, Jr., G.R. No. 199501, [March 6, 2013], 705 PHIL 614-629
Are the consolidated cases subject to multiple appeals? Consolidation is a procedural device
to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be
dispatched expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. 25 To promote this end, the
rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court's docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases. The Court explained, thus:
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the judgment in the
one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-
consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a single action in
which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending
between the same parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual
consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and requires
the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action,
or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-92) was consolidated
with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello (Civil Case No. 223-0-91). While these two cases
involve common questions of law and fact, each action retains its separate and distinct character. The reversion
suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession case
determines which private party has the better right of possession over the subject property. These cases,
involving different issues and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate judgments.
The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession
proceeded independently of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by the trial court.
Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from the other is not necessary
to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a
judgment or part of a judgment in one case which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within
the sound discretion of the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of
Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an adverse ruling on such
case.
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
RULE 33
79. GMA Network, Inc. v. Central CATV, Inc., G.R. No. 176694, [July 18, 2014]
In a demurrer to evidence, may the movant (defendant) present evidence in

support of his motion? NO. In this case, the issue to be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on
a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for based on the facts and
the law. These facts and law do not include the defendant's evidence. What should be resolved in a
motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief based
on the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the
merits of the case, excluding technical aspects such as capacity to sue. However, the plaintiff's evidence
should not be the only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to in Section 8
should include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining matters in judicial
proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of judicial notice, stipulations made during the
pre-trial and trial, admissions, and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant's evidence.
The NTC ruled that the complainants, including the petitioner, failed to prove by substantial
evidence that the respondent aired the subject advertisements without the consent of its program
providers, as required under EO No. 436. The NTC, therefore, has issued the assailed order upon a
consideration of the applicable laws and the evidence of the petitioner. On this score, the grant of the
demurrer suffers no infirmity. However, the NTC further extended its consideration of the issue to the
respondent's pieces of evidence that were attached to its demurrer to evidence. On this score, we agree
with the petitioner that the NTC erred.
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, as explained in our ruling in Casent, proscribes the court or the
tribunal from considering the defendant's evidence in the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on a
demurrer to evidence. While an administrative agency is not strictly bound by technical rules of procedure
in the conduct of its administrative proceedings, the relaxation of the rules should not result in violating
fundamental evidentiary rules, including due process. In the present case, the NTC proceeded against
the very nature of the remedy of demurrer to evidence when it considered the respondent's evidence,
specifically the certifications attached to the respondent's demurrer to evidence. Despite the petitioner's
objections, 26 the NTC disregarded the rule on demurrer by allowing the submission of the respondent's
evidence while depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to question, examine or refute the submitted
documents. That the petitioner had the chance to peruse these documents is of no moment. In a demurrer
to evidence, the respondent's evidence should not have been considered in the first place. As the NTC
opted to consider the respondent's evidence, it should not have resolved the case through the remedy of
demurrer but instead allowed the respondent to formally present its evidence where the petitioner could
properly raise its objections. Clearly, there was a violation of the petitioner's due process right.
OTHER CASES (NOT ASSIGNED)
80. Gonzales v. Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, [February 22, 2012], 682 PHIL 463-470
May a demurrer to evidence be filed after the court has rendered judgment? The Court has
previously explained that a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which
pertains to the merits of the case. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the
court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment.
Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment.
In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its Decision. While
respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving
and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied with the
directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion should be deemed abandoned. Consequently,
the RTC's original Decision stands. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer
and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was
clearly no longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had
correctly done.
81. Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Spouses Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, [July 6, 2000], 390
PHIL 601-614
Explaining the consequence of a demurrer to evidence, the Court in Villanueva Transit v. Javellana,
pronounced: The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is permitted,
without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal
(i.e., demur to the plaintiff's evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as thus established and the applicable
law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that
plaintiff's evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still
remains before the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant's evidence so that
all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for adjudication as well
as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost. The doctrine is but in line with the established
procedural precepts in the conduct of trials that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial
to enable it to render its decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate
courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment, and avoiding the
need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded evidence, with the possibility
thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant delays. The rule, however, imposes the condition by
the same token that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on
appeal, the movant losses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have
elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff's case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff's
evidence." (Italics supplied) In other words, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence
retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the court agrees with
them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case
and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.
In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondents' demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on
the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court
reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence
had in fact been admitted by defendants. Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the CA
should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by the petitioner. While the appellate
court correctly ruled that "the documentary evidence submitted by the [petitioner] should have been allowed
and appreciated . . .," and that "the petitioner presented quite a number of documentary exhibits . . .
enumerated in the appealed order," 18 we agree with petitioner that the CA had sufficient evidence on record
to decide the collection suit. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary
on the basis of the facts on record.
82. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Del Monte Motor Works Inc., G.R. No. 143338, [July
29, 2005], 503 PHIL 103-121
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination
of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this
ground as under the rules, if the movant's plea for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendant's motion for
judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is
rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence. 40 The
reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case,
they are obligated to petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos, this being the amount of loan they obtained
on 23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the loan; and
a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit
with both these amounts bearing a 1% interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents.
83. Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Del Monte Motor Works Inc., G.R. No. 143338, [July
29, 2005], 503 PHIL 103-121
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination
of an action. Caution, however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this
ground as under the rules, if the movant's plea for the dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the
order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the defendant's motion for
judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is
rendered in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence. 40 The
reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis
of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RULE 35
84. Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, G.R. No. 178899, [November 15, 2010], 649 PHIL 131-
151)
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases

where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record,
or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the
court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication of all
the issues raised in a case. This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this
section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as it does
not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover
the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the trial process
by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are
not in dispute. After this sifting process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment,
which specifies the disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary
judgment is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment. A partial summary
judgment "is not a final or appealable judgment." (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189, citing several cases.) "It is
merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed established for the trial of the case."
(Francisco, Rules of Court,Vol. II, p. 429.)
The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court being merely interlocutory and not 'a final judgment', it is
puerile to discuss whether the same became final and executory due to the alleged failure to appeal said judgment
within the supposed period of appeal. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary
judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted
on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. This is on the assumption that the partial summary
judgment was validly rendered, which, as shown above, is not true in the case at bar.
The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant,
respondent Chua, based on the latter's admission that he signed promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB.
The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross-claim made by PBB against its co-defendant,
respondent Chua, based on the latter's admission that he signed promissory notes as a co-maker in favor of PBB.
This is obvious from the dispositive portion of the partial summary judgment. Clearly, this partial summary judgment
did not dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tan's complaint, i.e., the validity of the
secretary's certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute promissory notes and
mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed
for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on
appeal or other direct review, not a petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court's judgment. It is
well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and
conclusions of law and fact. 36 As we explained in Apostol v. Court of Appeals: As a legal recourse, the special
civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is restricted to
resolving errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their
jurisdiction, alleged errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment
correctable by an appeal or a petition for review. In light of these findings, we affirm the CA's ruling that the partial
summary judgment is an interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory judgment,
notwithstanding respondent Chua's failure to file a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the
RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua.
As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the issue of the propriety of the partial
summary judgment issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never raised this issue in his petition for certiorari
before the CA. It is well settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the
proceedings below. 39 Basic considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. Furthermore, this issue
would be better resolved in the proper appeal, to be taken by the parties once the court a quo has completely
resolved all the issues involved in the present case in a final judgment. If we were to resolve this issue now, we
would be preempting the CA, which has primary jurisdiction over this issue.
85. Province of Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104266, [March 31, 1993]
Petitioners are correct. We were categorical in the case of Guevarra, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., supra, that a partial summary judgment is merely interlocutory and not a final judgment. Its nature
is specifically provided for in Section 4 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. What Rule 34 contemplates is that
the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered
in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. The
trial court and the respondent court erroneously relied on Section 5 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, which
pertains to judgments in general. In addition, inasmuch as a partial summary judgment does not finally dispose
of the action, execution thereof shall not issue, conformably with Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
86. Guevarra v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-49017 and L-49024, [August 30, 1983], 209
PHIL 240-260
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when, on motion of the
plaintiff after the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear, during the hearing of the motion for such
a judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits that, except as to
the amount of damages, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the winning party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law." (Section 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court.) Conversely, the rendition of summary judgment
is not justified when the defending party tenders vital issues which call for the presentation of evidence. (Villanueva
vs. National Marketing Corporation, 28 SCRA 729.) As was observed in the Viajar vs. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684:
"Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear
undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to
such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary
judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial. An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no
means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary
judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the
adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other
documents (Section 3, Rule 34). In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed
after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that
this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant." The case at bar may not, even by the most
liberal or strained interpretation, be considered as one not involving genuine issues which need the presentation
of evidence to determine which of two conflicting assertions of fact is correct. A cursory examination of the pleadings
will show that the private respondents' causes of action are to annul documents of sale which were allegedly
executed by private respondent Cristina C. Recio on the ground of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and due
influence and intimidation. These allegations were all denied in the answer filed by the petitioners. The issue thus
raised may not be categorized as not genuine so as to dispense with a formal trial and to authorize the rendition of
summary judgment. LLjur
The invalidity of the summary judgment rendered by the trial court stems not only from the circumstance that such
a kind of judgment is not proper under the state of the pleadings filed in the case, but also from the failure to comply
with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a judgment. The motion does not contain a notice of hearing.
After the private respondents filed a motion to set the private respondents' supplemental counterclaim for hearing
on May 22, 1975, Judge Sison scheduled the said motion for hearing on May 28, 1975 "to coincide with the hearing
of the motion for partial summary judgment dated May 16, 1975 filed by the plaintiffs set for hearing on the same
date." Attys. Ferry and Galapon, counsels for the herein petitioners, were served with the said order of Judge Sison
on May 25, 1975 and May 24, 1975, respectively, or only four and five days, respectively, before the date of the
hearing. This is contrary to the requirement under Section 3 of Rule 34 that a motion for summary judgment "shall
be served at least ten days before the time specified for the hearing." The minutes of the hearing held on May 28,
1975 show that the counsel for the herein petitioners prayed that they be given up to June 3, 1975 within which to
file appropriate pleadings, after which the motion for summary judgment shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
(Original Record, Vol. II, p. 412.)
On June 3, 1975, the petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for partial summary judgment contending
principally that such a kind of judgment may not be rendered in the case inasmuch as their answer tenders genuine
issues which need a trial on the merits. (Ibid., pp. 438-441.) No counter-affidavits were filed by the petitioners but
in their aforementioned opposition, they argued why a summary judgment is not proper in the case. On June 4,
1975, the day following the filing of the opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the court rendered its
summary judgment in the case, which granted not only the relief prayed for in the private respondents' first and
second causes of action but also an award of damages which is not even prayed for in any of the said causes of
action.
As earlier observed, the burden of the discussion in this case centered on the timeliness of the filing of the omnibus
motion for reconsideration of the said summary judgment. Viewing this issue from another angle, it may rightly be
said that such elaborate and elongated argumentation on this question is hardly material to resolve the issue at
bar. Both parties appear to have assumed the correctness of the proposition that the summary judgment in question
was appealable; hence, their dispute as to whether or not the period of appeal had lapsed or not by the time the
motion for the reconsideration of the decision was filed. We consider this assumption to be erroneous.
It will be noted that the judgment in question is a "partial summary judgment." It was rendered only with respect to
the private respondents' first and second causes of action alleged in their complaint. It was not intended to cover
the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the supplementary counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the
private respondents, nor the third-party complaint filed by the petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust
Company. A partial summary judgment "is not a final or appealable judgment." (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189,
citing several cases.) "It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed established
for the trial of the case." (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.) The nature of a partial summary judgment is
expressly provided for in Section 4 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court. The partial summary judgment rendered by
the trial court being merely interlocutory and not a final judgment, it is puerile to discuss whether the same became
final and executory due to the alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed period of appeal. What
the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the
judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a
substantial controversy exists. This is on the assumption that the partial summary judgment was validly rendered
which, as shown above, is not true in the case at bar.
87. PBCom v. Spouses Go, G.R. No. 175514, [February 14, 2011], 658 PHIL 43-69
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when, on motion of the plaintiff after
the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear, during the hearing of the motion for such a judgment,
from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits that, except as to the amount of
damages, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the winning party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." (Section 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court.) Conversely, the rendition of summary judgment is not justified
when the defending party tenders vital issues which call for the presentation of evidence. (Villanueva vs. National
Marketing Corporation, 28 SCRA 729.) As was observed in the Viajar vs. Estenzo The Court agrees with the CA
that "[t]he supposed admission of defendants-appellants on the . . . allegations in the complaint is clearly not
sufficient to justify the rendition of summary judgment in the case for sum of money, considering that there are
other allegations embodied and defenses raised by the defendants-appellants in their answer which raise a genuine
issue as to the material facts in the action." The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three
material facts, which have to be addressed during trial: first, the fact of default; second, the amount of the
outstanding obligation, and third, the existence of prior demand. Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings,
if, on motion of a party and after hearing, the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file
show that, "except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," 37 summary judgment may be rendered. This rule was
expounded in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v. Philippine Commercial International Bank, 38
where it was written:
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of damages, when there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be allowed. 39 Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial. Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for
the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when
the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary
judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no
real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for
summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts
have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as
to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary
judgment cannot take the place of trial. 41 (Underscoring supplied.)
Juxtaposing the Complaint and the Answer discloses that the material facts here are not undisputed so as to call
for the rendition of a summary judgment. While the denials of Spouses Go could have been phrased more strongly
or more emphatically, and the Answer more coherently and logically structured in order to overthrow any shadow
of doubt that such denials were indeed made, the pleadings show that they did in fact raise material issues that
have to be addressed and threshed out in a full-blown trial. PBCom anchors its arguments on the alleged implied
admission by Spouses Go resulting from their failure to specifically deny the material allegations in the Complaint,
citing as precedent Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 42 and Morales v. Court of Appeals.
Spouses Go, on the other hand, argue that although admissions were made in the Answer, the special and
affirmative defenses contained therein tendered genuine issues.
Under the Rules, every pleading must contain, in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct
statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be,
omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. To specifically deny a material allegation, a defendant must specify
each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit, and whenever practicable, shall set forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part
of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a
defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made
in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
Rule 8, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates three (3) modes of specific denial, namely: 1) by
specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit,
and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial;
(2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder;
(3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of a denial.
The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the
complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to
support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table.
Again, in drafting pleadings, members of the bar are enjoined to be clear and concise in their language, and to be
organized and logical in their composition and structure in order to set forth their statements of fact and arguments
of law in the most readily comprehensible manner possible. Failing such standard, allegations made in pleadings
are not to be taken as stand-alone catchphrases in the interest of accuracy. They must be contextualized and
interpreted in relation to the rest of the statements in the pleading.
88. Pineda v. Heirs of Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, [February 14, 2007], 544 PHIL 554-565
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when, on motion of the plaintiff after
the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear, during the hearing of the motion for such a judgment,
from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits that, except as to the amount of
damages, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the winning party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." (Section 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court.) Conversely, the rendition of summary judgment is not justified
here is also no basis in procedural law to treat the RTC's order of dismissal as a summary judgment. The trial court
cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an action is in order. Under the applicable provisions of
Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by
filing a motion. 19 The adverse party must be notified of the motion for summary judgment 20 and furnished with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before hearing is conducted. 21 More importantly, a summary
judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Based on the parties' allegations in the complaint and answer, the issues in the case
at bar are far from settled. For instance, both petitioner and respondents claim their ownership rights over the same
property based on two different original certificates of title. Respondents charge petitioner of illegal occupation
while the latter invokes good faith in the acquisition of the property. Clearly, these are factual matters which can be
best ventilated in a full-blown proceeding before the trial court, especially when what are involved appear to be
sizeable parcels of land covered by two certificates of title.
89. Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, [June 1, 2011], 665 PHIL 297-312
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do in respect
thereto, such as an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right, or a judgment or order
that dismisses an action on the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance. Just like any other judgment, a
summary judgment that satisfies the requirements of a final judgment will be considered as such.
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount
of damages. The RTC judgment in this case fully determined the rights and obligations of the parties relative to the
case for quieting of title and left no other issue unresolved, except the amount of damages. Hence, it is a final
judgment. In leaving out the determination of the amount of damages, the RTC did not remove its summary
judgment from the category of final judgments. In fact, under Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary
judgment may not be rendered on the amount of damages, although such judgment may be rendered on the issue
of the right to damages.
In Jugador v. De Vera, the Court distinguished between the determination of the amount of damages and the issue
of the right to damages itself in case of a summary judgment. The Court elucidated on this point, thus: [A] summary
judgment may be rendered except as to the amount of damages. In other words, such judgment may be entered
on the issue relating to the existence of the right to damages. Chief Justice Moran pertinently observes that "if there
is any real issue as to the amount of damages, the c[o]urt, after rendering summary judgment, may proceed to
assess the amount recoverable." It is therefore reasonable to distinguish the present case from GSIS v. Philippine
Village Hotel, Inc. 38 In that case, the summary judgment specifically stated that "[t]rial on the issu[e] of damages
shall resume." Evidently, there remained an unresolved issue on the right to damages. Here, the trial court, in
stating that "except as to the amount of damages, a summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants," had, in effect, resolved all issues, including the light to damages in favor of the
plaintiffs (petitioners). What remained undetermined was only the amount of damages.
JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY

THEREOF
RULE 36
90. Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, [June 20, 2012], 688
PHIL 384-399
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that it is an unqualified order and, as such,
is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether
they are with or without prejudice are held to be with prejudice[.]" 19 As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003
dismissal order is also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 02-488
can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to
prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. As an
adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court
on the writing of valid judgments and final orders. The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates this rule for
its failure to disclose how and why the petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus, neither the petitioner nor the
reviewing court is able to know the particular facts that had prompted the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps
failed to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of its
complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the trial court? The
December 16, 2003 dismissal order does not say. We have in the past admonished trial courts against issuing dismissal
orders similar to that appealed in CA-G.R. CV No. 83096. A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint's
dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification for the dismissal. 21
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the
dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a
higher tribunal.
91. Spouses Marchadesch v. Vda. De Yepes, G.R. No. 151160, [November 11, 2004], 484
PHIL 859-868
Decisive of the issue at hand is Section 9, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Sec. 9. Signing Judgments
out of the Province. — Whenever a Judge appointed or assigned in any province or branch of a Court of First Instance
in a province shall leave the province by transfer or assignment to another court of equal jurisdiction or by expiration of
his temporary assignment without having decided a case totally heard by him and which was argued or an opportunity
given for argument to the parties or their counsel, it shall be lawful for him to prepare and sign his decision in said case
anywhere in the Philippines. He shall send the same by registered mail to the clerk of court where the case was heard
or argued to be filed therein as of the date when the same was received by the clerk in the same manner as if he had
been present in court to direct the filing of the judgment. If a case had been heard only in part, the Supreme Court upon
petition of any of the parties to the case and the recommendation of the respective district judge may also authorize the
judge who has partly heard the case if another judge had heard the case in part to continue hearing and to decide said
case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of equal jurisdiction. In relation to the aforequoted rule,
the Court En Banc issued a Resolution dated February 10, 1983, providing guidelines in the distribution and decision of
cases in the implementation of B.P. Blg. 129, the pertinent provision of which reads as follows: Cases already submitted
for decision shall be decided by the Judge to whom they were submitted, except cases submitted for decision to judges
who were promoted to higher courts or to those who are no longer in the service. Such cases shall be included in the
raffle; Under the Court's Resolution of 10 February 1983, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 thereof, what is
essential is that the Judge who pens the decision of a case heard by him before he was assigned or transferred to
another district or branch of the court of equal jurisdiction is an incumbent Judge, i.e., in this case, a Judge of the same
court (Regional Trial Court), albeit assigned to a different branch at the time the decision was promulgated. 14 There is
no reason why the rule and Resolution of the Court should not apply to a case where a Presiding Judge who resigned
after a case tried by him had already been submitted for decision, and was, thereafter, re-appointed as Presiding Judge
of another regional district and branch of the RTC.
In the present case, Judge Quimsing heard Civil Case No. 6822 after which it was submitted for decision. Although
he resigned, he was, however, re-appointed as Presiding Judge of the RTC in Calbiga, Samar. It was then that he
decided said case. He was an incumbent Judge when he rendered the decision. His authority to decide the said case
under said Rule and Resolution of the Court was affirmed by the Court, per its Resolution in A.M. No. 91-11-2014-RTC,
which reads: A.M. No. 91-11-2014-RTC. — Re: Request of Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing. — Acting on the letter of
Judge Godofredo P. Quimsing, Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Calbiga, Samar, dated November 12, 1991, requesting
that he first be allowed to remain in Tacloban City, in order for him to decide seven (7) cases heard by him in his previous
sala (Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City) before proceeding to General Santos City for his detail as Assisting
Judge, the Court Resolved to GRANT the aforesaid request of Judge Quimsing. In fine then, we affirm the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that Judge Godofredo Quimsing had the authority to decide Civil Case No. 6822 on December 12, 1991
92. Inutan v. Napar Contracting & Allied Services, G.R. No. 195654, [November 25, 2015]
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal
concessions in order to avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. If judicially approved, it becomes more
than a binding contract; it is a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. Thus, a
compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed
except for vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion. A judgment upon compromise is therefore
not appealable, immediately executory, and can be enforced by a writ of execution. However, this broad precept
enunciated under Article 2037 of the Civil Code has been qualified by Article 2041 (If one of the parties fails or refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand) of the same Code which recognizes the right of an aggrieved party to either: (1) enforce the
compromise by a writ of execution or (2) regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, upon the other
party's failure or refusal to abide by the compromise.
In a plethora of cases, the Court has recognized the option of rescinding a compromise agreement due to non-
compliance with its terms. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be
no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise. Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which
is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the
parties themselves. It has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot
be lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041,
the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had
never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the
compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party. To reiterate, Article 2041 confers upon the
party concerned the authority, not only to regard the compromise agreement as rescinded but also, to insist upon his
original demand. Respondents' non-compliance with the strict terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement of reassigning
petitioners and ensuring that they will be given work within the required time constitutes repudiation of the agreement.
As such, the agreement is considered rescinded in accordance with Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Petitioners properly
chose to rescind the compromise agreement and exercised the option of filing anew their complaints, pursuant to Art.
2041. It was error on the part of the CA to deny petitioners the right of rescission.
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

RULE 37
93. Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, [June 20, 2016]
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process. 18 The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside
the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to
ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside
without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order or
resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the trial court to try the
case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial
of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party had been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court,
or by a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been
a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. Ultimately, the overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court.
In this case, while individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful circumstances may not
instantly amount to extrinsic fraud, these circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each other, paint a
deceitful picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's constitutional right to due process. True, the service
of summons in this case is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process. But because of Philip's employment of deceptive
means in the service of summons on Viveca, said purpose of satisfying the due process requirements was
never accomplished. To this Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas court that Viveca's last known
address was still their conjugal home with full and undisputed knowledge that she had already intentionally
abandoned the same and had even established a more recent, local residence herein evinces a clear lack of
good faith. As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage suit,
only finding out about the same when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal
Separation case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the erroneous address,
Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon.
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF

JUDGMENTS
RULE 39
94. Republic v. Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, [June 16, 2014], 736 PHIL 397-414
Whether or not government pension or gratuity is exempt from execution under Section 13(l) of
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court held that Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a
later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that
retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the
withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be
automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary." Hence it is an
exception to the rule that The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such
support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government shall be exempt from execution under the Rules
of Court. Moreover, Section 8 (g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in
its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8 (g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
95. Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, [July 8, 2015
During the execution, may the petitioners introduce evidence that the market value of the
Respondent’s family home exceeded P300,000.00 in order to levy the family home? No. The RTC’s
decision determining the property as family home and that its market value did not exceed the threshold
amount is already final and barred by Res Judicata. In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil
Case No. 4581 bars Eulogio’s move to have the property in dispute levied on execution. There is no
question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the subsequent execution proceedings
involved the same parties and subject matter. For these reasons, Spouses Bell argue that the execution
sale of the property in dispute under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the
trial court has already determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory limit. The entirety
of Civil Case No. 4581 including the bid of petitioners to execute the money judgment awarded to them
by the trial court is founded on a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence submitted
by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified
in the main proceedings. Concomitantly, the very same defense raised by petitioners in the main
proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the property from Spouses Bell for P1 million — was utilized to
substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents' family home was actually P1 million. In fact,
the trial court's order for respondents' family home to be levied on execution was solely based on the
price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over the same property. Moreover, the
same contentions and evidence advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over respondents'
family home have already been used to support their arguments in the main proceedings. Any lingering
doubt on the application of res judicata to this case should be put to rest by the trial court's discussion of
the nature and alienability of the property in dispute. The foregoing points plainly show that the issue
of whether the property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 has already been
determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt
from execution. Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main proceedings and in
the execution proceedings are different, the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether
respondents' family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle of conclusiveness of
judgment.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of
the Family Code. It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment. The great controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the
preservation of the homestead — the dwelling place. A houseless, homeless population is a burden upon
the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not tainted
with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered. 41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases. The nature and
character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption
statute. The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property or the specific articles prescribed by the
statute; the exemption cannot exceed the statutory limit. Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify
the exceptions mentioned in Article 153. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family
home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157,
and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
judgment debtor.
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown,
though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations,
the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the constitution of a family
home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations
specified in Articles 155 and 160. Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by
the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time
of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or
enlargement does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit. 45 Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to
the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
It has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its
value at the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely
claimed the exemption of the property from execution. On the other hand, there is no question that the
money judgment awarded to Eulogio falls under the ambit of Article 160. Notwithstanding Eulogio’s right
to enforce the trial court's money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense
of Bell’s rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception
from an exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any
statutory requirement for its enforcement. To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home
under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual
value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the
persons constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased
actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157. During the execution proceedings,
none of those facts was alleged — much less proven — by petitioners. The sole evidence presented was
the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that the contract was null, and
that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when petitioners and Spouses Bell
executed the Deed of Sale in 1990, the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in
dispute. The Court thus agrees with the CA's conclusion that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the sale on execution of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial court
had already determined with finality that the property was a family home, and there was no proof that its
value had increased beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by respondents. Yet, it
ordered the execution sale of the property. There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of one's judgment, as in this case in
which the assailed order is bereft of any factual or legal justification.
96. Tiorosio-Espinosa v. Hofileña-Europa, G.R. No. 185746, [January 20, 2016])
Whether or not the awards of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, may be
the subject of execution pending appeal. The resolution of this issue is straightforward. Jurisprudence
is replete with pronouncements that execution pending appeal of awards of moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees is not allowed. In Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v.
Lantin, we explained why these cannot be the subject of execution pending appeal: The execution of any
award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual
damages for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the
amounts of which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well
as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by the Intermediate Appellate
Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages
and their causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the assignments
of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards
may be reduced. In Engineering Construction, Inc. v. National Power Corporation, 38 we expanded the
RCPI doctrine to likewise exclude consequential damages and attorney's fees from execution pending
appeal. 39 The doctrine has since been reiterated in Heirs of Santiago C. Divinagracia v. Ruiz, 40
International School, Inc. (Manila) v. Court of Appeals, 41 Echauz v. Court of Appeals, 42 and Valencia
v. Court of Appeals. 43 Clearly, the RTC committed legal error when it ordered the premature execution
of the awards of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Nonetheless, we recognize
that the RTC had the power to order the execution pending appeal of actual or compensatory damages
in accordance with the cited authorities.
97. Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 150462, [June 15, 2011], 667
PHIL 144-171
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding. It
is fraught with dangerous consequences. Innocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real
properties upon reliance on a judgment which may be reversed on appeal. A Torrens title issued on the
basis of a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the Land
Registration Act which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title
becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds concerned
issues the corresponding certificate of title. Consequently, the lower court acted without jurisdiction or
exceeded its jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of a decree of registration despite the appeal timely
taken from the entire decision a quo.
98. Spouses Topacio v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644,
[November 17, 2010], 649 PHIL 331-350
Whether or not Section 6 of Rule 39 is applicable to an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession? In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex
parte petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action 54 governed
by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by Section 7 of Act No.
3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. This provision
lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the Court, and finally to the execution of the order
by the sheriff of the province in which the property is located. Based on the text of the law, we have also
consistently ruled that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues
as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. In
fact, the issuance and the immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and mandatory
under the law.
Once the writ of possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ
without delay." The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title. The
trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof; it must grant the issuance of the writ upon
compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the provincial sheriff is likewise mandated to
implement the writ immediately. Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the
moment of the issuance of the writ of possession, leaves no room for the application of Section 6, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be applicable only
to civil actions. From another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In sum, based on these
considerations, we find that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of
possession in favor of the respondent.
Section 6, Rule 39 not applicable to special proceedings (Land Registration cases); The provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion, and after
five years but within ten years by an action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is not applicable
to special proceedings, such as land registration cases. This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party
in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and
his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status,
condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought
to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further
proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in
possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom. Unlike in ordinary civil actions
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish
ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such extraordinary proceedings
to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating
such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty exists alike
on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of
registration.
99. Campit v. Gripa, G.R. No. 195443, [September 17, 2014])
Whether or not Gripa et. al can still enforce the decision declaring the title to Campit as null and
void nothwithstanding its failure to execute the decision within ten (10) years from July 19, 1979?
It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever filed by the respondents — the
prevailing party in Civil Case No. 15357, to execute and enforce the August 8, 1978 decision. The
title to the subject property, therefore, remained registered under the petitioner's name. As the
petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible since the Torrens system of land
registration provides for the indefeasibility of the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the registration decree.
Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner can still be compelled
under the law to reconvey the property registered to the rightful owner 16 under the principle that the
property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it
is registered. The party seeking to recover title to property wrongfully registered in another person's
name must file an action for reconveyance within the allowed period of time. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where
the filing of such action does not prescribe, i.e., when the plaintiff is in possession of the subject
property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the property, does not prescribe.
In the present case, Gripa et al., have always been in possession of the subject property. Of course,
Campit has a certificate of title in his favor. But it cannot be denied that he has never been in
possession of the subject property. Neither did he exercise acts of ownership over the said land since
the time he allegedly purchased it from his father in 1977. Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not
able to show that his predecessor-in-interest, Jose Campit, claimed ownership or was ever in
possession of the said land. The defendant-appellant has admitted that he has paid realty tax
covering the subject land only once when he applied for the issuance of title in his favor. On the other
hand, the continuous possession of the subject premises by the plaintiffs-appellees has not been
denied or disputed by the defendants-appellants (sic). The possession in the concept of an owner
by the plaintiffs-appellees has also been confirmed by witness Charlie Martin. Considering that the
action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by the respondents is substantially in the
nature of an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the
fact that the respondents have always been in possession of the subject property, we shall treat the
case as an action to quiet title, the filing of which does not prescribe. Thus, we find the
respondents' filing of Civil Case No. 18421 to be proper and not barred by the time limitations set
forth under the Rules of Court in enforcing or executing a final and executory judgment.
100. Solidum v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161647, [June 22, 2006], 525 PHIL 348-357)
Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a

judgment debtor which may be found owing to such debtor by a third person. It cites some stranger
to the litigation who is debtor to one of the parties to the action. Such debtor stranger becomes a forced
intervenor, and the court, having acquired jurisdiction over his person by means of citation, requires him
to pay his debt, not to his former creditor, but to the new creditor, who is creditor in the main litigation. It
is merely a case of involuntary novation by the substitution of one creditor for another. Garnishment
involves at least three (3) persons: the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor, and the garnishee, or the
person cited who in turn is supposed to be indebted to the judgment creditor. In case the garnishee
asserts his own rights over the garnished property, Section 16 of Rule 39 provides the remedies.
Neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy from the denial of a third-party
claim; From the denial of a third-party claim to defeat the attachment caused to be levied by a creditor,
neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy. Pursuant to [Section 17, 31 Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court], a third-party claimant has two remedies, such as, an action for damages
against the sheriff to be brought within 120 days from the filing of the bond, and a separate and
independent action to vindicate his claim to the property. Pursuant to this provision, nothing contained
therein shall prevent petitioner "from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action." Neither
does the order complained of deprive petitioner herein of the opportunity to enforce his alleged rights by
appropriate proceedings. In short, he has another "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law," and, hence is not entitled either to a writ of certiorari or to a writ of prohibition.
A third-party claimant cannot appeal; since the third-party claimant is not one of the parties to the
action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying its claim, but should file a separate
reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or a complaint for damages against the bond filed by
the judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff. The rights of a third-party claimant should be decided in a
separate action to be instituted by the third person. In fine, the appeal that should be interposed, if the
term "appeal" may be properly employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor
or complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the
sheriff.
In the case at bar, it is plain that Insular, as garnishee, did not avail any of the remedies provided by the
rules. After it was impleaded as garnishee, it wrote letters to the trial court, initially not contesting
petitioner's right to the basic proceeds of Susan Yee Soon's insurance policies. Later on, however, it
changed its stance and resisted payment by filing an Omnibus Motion and Motions for Reconsideration
of the orders of the trial court. It even appealed to respondent court via a petition for certiorari.
101. Esguerra v. Holcim Philippines Inc., G.R. No. 182571, [September 2, 2013], 717 PHIL
77-99
No appeal may be taken from an order of execution and a party who challenges such order may
file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Their arguments are
contrary to Section 1 (f), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 1. Subject of appeal. — An
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from: (f) an order
of execution; In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. An order of execution, when issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, HOLCIM did not err in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
At the execution stage, the only thing left for the trial court to do is to implement the final and executory
judgment; and the dispositive portion of the decision controls the execution of judgment. The final
judgment of this Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or omissions.
Indeed, the final judgment does not direct HOLCIM nor its predecessor Hi-Cement to pay a certain amount
to Esguerra and his heirs. What was required from HOLCIM to do was merely to account for the payments
it made to de Guzman. Apparently, this was not enforced.
It may be deduced from the records that when the Esguerra filed the Omnibus Motion, they asked for the
examination of de Guzman and Hi-Cement (HOLCIM) under Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court. This motion was subsequently granted by the trial court. Sections 36 and 37 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court are resorted to only when the judgment remains unsatisfied, and there is a need for the
judgment obligor to appear and be examined concerning his property and income for their application to
the unsatisfied amount in the judgment. In the instant case, the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 40140 as
affirmed by the Court calls on HOLCIM to simply make an accounting of the royalty paid to de Guzman.
Unfortunately, the trial court, instead of facilitating the accounting of payments made by HOLCIM to de
Guzman, proceeded to adduce evidence on the amount of limestone extracted from the disputed area
and imposed the monetary liability on HOLCIM. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the questioned orders without giving HOLCIM the chance to be heard. Indeed, when the decision
has been rendered unenforceable on account of the undetermined amount to be awarded, it was
incumbent upon the trial court to receive evidence from both parties to determine the exact amount due
to the petitioners. Since HOLCIM was not given an opportunity to rebut the petitioners' evidence,
considering that the former's Manifestation and Motion for Ocular Inspection was denied, justice will be
better served if the trial court determines first the existence of documents relative to HOLCIM's payments
made to de Guzman, and if the same is not done, to receive further evidence, this time, from both parties.
It must be emphasized, however, that the evidence to be adduced here is in relation to the amount of
royalty paid to de Guzman by HOLCIM for marbles extracted from the disputed area of 38,451 sq m
beginning March 23, 1990 up to the time HOLCIM ceased to operate in the subject area.
In the event that the petitioners' claim is beyond the subject area and period, and HOLCIM denies such
indebtedness, the governing rule should be Section 43, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Pursuant to this
Rule, in the examination of a person, corporation, or other juridical entity who has the property of such
judgment obligor or is indebted to him (Rule 39, Section 37), and such person, corporation, or juridical
entity denies an indebtedness, the court may only authorize the judgment obligee to institute an action
against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt. Nothing in the Rules gives
the court the authority to order such person or corporation to pay the judgment obligee and the court
exceeds its jurisdiction if it orders the person who denies the indebtedness to pay the same. An
"[e]xecution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against
one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision
can only bind a party to the litigation and not against innocent third parties."
102. Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, [August 17, 2015])
The uncontested declaration, of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board that
Monico Ligtas was a tenant negates a finding of theft beyond reasonable doubt. Tenants having
rights to the harvest cannot be deemed to have taken their own produce.
Administrative Res Judicata: Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions
in accordance with the hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of
administrative res judicata: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of
persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the
Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata." To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of res judicata cannot
be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof, and that the more equitable attitude is to allow
extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
Res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings
and not to purely administrative proceedings
Elements of Res Judicata:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.
Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action be shown in the two cases, then res
judicata in its aspect as a "bar by prior judgment" would apply. If as between the two cases, only
identity of parties can be shown, but not identical causes of action, then res judicata as
"conclusiveness of judgment" applies.
Two concepts of Res Judicata: Bar by Prior Judgment and Conclusiveness of Judgment:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action,
the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose,
or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Thus, if a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment, between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of
cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue.
The DARAB Decision finding for the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties was
declared by this court as conclusive on the parties and that it attained finality when the landowner
did not appeal the Decision. This court ruled that the doctrine of res judicata applies. What is decisive
is that the issues which have already been litigated in a final and executory judgment precludes, by
the principle of bar by prior judgment, an aspect of the doctrine of res judicata, and even under the
doctrine of "law of the case," the re-litigation of the same issue in another action. It is well established
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them. The dictum therein laid down became the law of the case and what was once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision, continues to be binding between the same parties
as long as the facts on which the decision was predicated, continue to be the facts of the case before
the court. Hence, the binding effect and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be resurrected
anew since said issue had already been resolved and finally laid to rest, if not by the principle of res
judicata, at least by conclusiveness of judgment.
The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property taken belongs
to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner's consent; (4) there was intent to gain; and (5)
the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things.
Tenants have been defined as: persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from within
their immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with
the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the
share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Under this definition, a tenant is entitled to the
products of the land he or she cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the
agreement between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the landowner's
consent.
SYNTHESIS: The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between
petitioner and private complainant negates the existence of the element that the taking was done
without the owner's consent. The DARAB Decision implies that petitioner had legitimate authority to
harvest the abaca. The prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. In this
case, petitioner harvested the abaca, believing that he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate
tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. Personal property may have been taken,
but it is with the consent of the owner.
103. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438
Rationale of the Second Paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code: the provision was included in
the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing
the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien
spouse. Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of
the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim
no right under this provision.
The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign
divorce decree; The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The foreign judgment must be proven as facts under our Rules of Evidence; The starting point
in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action
instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In this case, the records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian
law on divorce. The SC deemed it more appropriate to remand the case to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law and that Article 26 interests will be served
considering also the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court
The recording was legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the
bar to what had been done. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,
affecting a person's legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But while the law requires the
entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree's registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
APPEALS
RULES 40-45
104. Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, [September 14, 2005], 506 PHIL 613-629
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies 31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court. 32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or
partial) or any final order or resolution.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may
be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after
the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an
appeal filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the
President? In the case of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc. v. Bayang, G.R.
No. 194702, [April 20, 2015]), the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period rule"
in Neypes does not apply. We held in Panolino that the "fresh period rule" only covers judicial
proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
105. Macaslang v. Spouses Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL 337-361
(RULE 40)
The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the RTC to the CA or another
proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51, which applies to appeals from the RTC to
the CA, imposes the express limitation of the review to only those specified in the assignment of errors
or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the appellant's brief. But
the petitioner's appeal herein, being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC, was governed by
a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: The judgment or final order
shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of
the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may
be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. As such, the RTC, in exercising
appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors assigned in the petitioner's appeal memorandum, but
could decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such
memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.
106. Heirs of Garcia I v. Municipality of Iba, Zambales, G.R. No. 162217, [July 22, 2015] (Rule
42)
APPEAL: brings up for review any error of judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction over the
subject of the suit and over the persons of the parties, or any error committed by the court in the
exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment.
RULE 41 (ORDINARY APPEAL) vs RULE 42 (PETITION FOR REVIEW)
Ordinary Appeal under Rule 41 (RTC exercising original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals);
The filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by S3R41 sets in motion the remedy of
ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely
filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration
of the time to appeal of the other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.
DOCKET FEES; The non-payment of the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary
period as required by S4R41, is both mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-compliance with
which is fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the appeal under Section 1, 14 (c),
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The compliance with these requirements was the only way
by which they could have perfected their appeal from the adverse judgment of the RTC.
Petition for Review under Rule 42 (RTC exercising appellate jurisdiction to the Court of
Appeals) is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely filing of the petition for review
before the CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs
from that taken under Rule 42; Under Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to
immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the correctness and completeness
of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection
of the appeal (S10R41). This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under Rule 42,
except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary.
MATTER OF RIGHT vs MATTER OF DISCRETION
An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior court of
the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the
discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the
exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion.
Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to the petition for review or not. (The appeal
by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under
Rule 42 is a matter of discretion.)
In this case, Garcia should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC (under S2(A) RULE
41) within the period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same
period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees. Their resort to the petition for review under Rule 42 was wrong to challenge the
order of the court denying their motion for consideration in the RTC. Hence, the CA did not err in
denying due course to the petition for review.
107. Hiponia-Mayuga v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 211499, [June 22, 2015]
The failure of a party to perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court
unavoidably renders the judgment final as to preclude the appellate court from acquiring the
jurisdiction to review and alter the judgment. The judgment becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law. Corollary thereto, an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the
court below. In this case, Belle did not appeal the decision of the RTC, hence it becomes final and
executory. The award of damages against her, in favor of Catherine, as stated in the RTC decision
must be upheld. The CA indeed erred in deleting the award of damages by relying on Section 8, Rule
51 of the Rules of Court.
As a general rule, the CA cannot consider errors on appeal unless stated in the assignment of
errors in the appellant's brief. As an exception, however, even if a question is not raised in the
assignment of errors, the same may still be adjudicated by the appellate court if the unraised issue
or question is closely related or dependent to an assigned error. In this case, the exception
provided under Section 8, Rule 51, where unraised issues may be adjudicated upon if the same are
closely related to an assigned error, cannot be applied in the present case. One of the two issues
raised refers to the alleged fraudulent acts of Belle and Thelma, which would have entitled
Catherine to the award of damages. Clearly, such issue is separate and distinct from Belle's failure
to pay the loan, which resulted in the foreclosure of the security. The other issue, which is the
negligence of Metrobank, is not related either to the issue of Belle's failure to pay the loan. The
liability of Metrobank is capable of being addressed separately and rests solely on its failure to secure
the MRI in favor of Fernando. In sum, the issues assigned on appeal do not require the re-
examination of the RTC ruling with respect to the award of damages against Belle. These issues
cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as closely related with, or dependent on each
other.
Jurisprudence has taught us that the exceptions under Section 8, Rule 51 can only be applied
for the benefit of the appellant. It may at once be noticed that the exceptions are for the benefit of
the appellant and not for the appellee." In the present case, the CA erroneously applied the exception
to benefit the appellee, Belle, and to the prejudice of appellant Catherine, contrary to the clear intent
of the rule.
108. Cruz v. Manila International Airport Authority, G.R. No. 184732 (Resolution),
[September 9, 2013], 717 PHIL 461-468
The appellee's role in the appeal process is confined only to the task of refuting the assigned
errors interposed by the appellant. Since the appellee is not the party who instituted the appeal
and accordingly has not complied with the procedure prescribed therefor, he merely assumes a
defensive stance and his interest solely relegated to the affirmance of the judgment appealed from.
Keeping in mind that the right to appeal is essentially statutory in character, it is highly erroneous for
the appellee to either assign any error or seek any affirmative relief or modification of the lower court's
judgment without interposing its own appeal. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of
the court below. He cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him. He
cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can
do is to make a counter-assignment of errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the
purpose of sustaining the judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the
court a quo nor raised in the appellant's assignment of errors or arguments.
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the CA committed an error in sustaining the dismissal of the
case on the ground of improper venue because the same was not an error raised by Cruz who was
the appellant before it. The CA cannot take cognizance of MIAA's position that the venue was
improperly laid since, being the appellee, MIAA's participation was confined to the refutation of the
appellant's assignment of errors. As MIAA's interest was limited to sustaining the RTC-Pasig City's
judgment, it cannot, without pursuing its own appeal, deviate from the pronouncements made
therein. In particular, records bear out that the RTC-Pasig City, while granting MIAA's motion to
dismiss, found the latter's argument on improper venue to be erroneous. Hence, given that the said
conclusion was not properly contested by MIAA on appeal, the RTC's ruling on the matter should
now be deemed as conclusive. The CA should not have taken this ground into consideration when
it appreciated the case before it. By acting otherwise, it therefore committed a reversible error, which
thereby warrants the reversal of its Decision.
109. Philippine Electric Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168612, [December 10, 2014]
An appeal to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision must be filed before
the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from receipt of the award or decision.
We note that PHILEC filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision. This was not the proper
remedy. Instead, the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's or a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators' decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43, Sections 1 and 3 of the Rules of Court. There being no appeal seasonably
filed in this case, Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision became final and executory after 10
calendar days from PHILEC's receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial reconsideration.
Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez's decision is already "beyond the purview of this Court to act upon."
A Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators has the exclusive original jurisdiction
over grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements. This court first characterized the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators as a quasi-judicial agency. The judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final at some definite time, the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. A voluntary
arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under these rulings, it
follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a
quasi-judicial agency but independent of; and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not
appealable to the latter.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is nothing more but a reiteration of the
exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, as provided for in Section 9,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902. The decisions of voluntary
arbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within its ambit. The fact that [the
voluntary arbitrator's] functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him
within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated
therein. A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should
likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and
commissions enumerated therein.
It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day reglementary
period for filing an appeal. Despite Rule 43 providing for a 15-day period to appeal, we rule
that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within
10 calendar days from receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code. In case of conflict
between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail. The rule, therefore, is that a
Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days
from receipt of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion for
reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, 95 the motion must be filed within the same 10-day
period since a motion for reconsideration is filed "within the period for taking an appeal.
110. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. Aumentado, Jr., G.R. No. 173634, [July 22, 2010],
639 PHIL 255-264 (RULE 41: ORDER OF EXECUTION NOT APPEALABLE)
The general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule, namely:
1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;

2. There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3. Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4. It appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
5. The terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
6. It appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some
remedy available to the aggrieved party. The remedy may either be by appeal or by a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
RULE 47
111. Spouses Manila v. Spouses Manzo, G.R. No. 163602, [September 7, 2011], 672 PHIL
460-477
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions
can only be availed of where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner." It is a
remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a
substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies. The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Sps. Manila assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief
inconsistent with the nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their
answer. We are not persuaded by respondents' asseveration. They could have directly followed up
the status of their case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty. Atienza's hospital
confinement. As party litigants, they should have constantly monitored the progress of their case.
Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible
explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a
lawyer, he is bound by his counsel's actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This
is true especially where he does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit. The
oft-repeated principle is that an action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for
the lost remedy of appeal. In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent
assurances or negligent acts of their counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction is different from an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction; Lack of Jursidiction

as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In a petition for annulment of judgment based
on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court
should not have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
law. There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases
decided by the MeTC, MTC or MCTC. In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in
deciding the appeal of Spouses Manila when, instead of simply dismissing the complaint and
awarding any counterclaim for costs due to Spouses Manzo, it ordered Manzo to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of the Sps. Manila, on the basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of
Lease which granted Sps Manila the option to buy the leased premises within a certain period (two
years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00). This cannot be done in an
ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled to the
physical possession of the property. Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal,
however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise
of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide
a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. 24 The ground for annulment of the decision is
absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance of the petition
because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, the remedy of
annulment of judgment is wrong.
The petition to annul the final RTC decision is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches;
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier — negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 28 There is
no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. Here, Sps Manzo’s failure to assail the RTC ruling in a
petition for review on certiorari before the CA, rendered the same final and executory. Having lost
these remedies due to their lethargy for three and a half years, they cannot now be permitted to
assail anew the said ruling rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Their
inaction and neglect to pursue available remedies to set aside the RTC decision for such length of
time, without any acceptable explanation other than the word of a former counsel who already passed
away, constitutes unreasonable delay warranting the presumption that they have declined to assert
their right over the leased premises which continued to be in the possession of the petitioners.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
RULE 57
112. Lim, Jr. v. Spouses Lazaro, G.R. No. 185734, [July 3, 2013], 713 PHIL 356-364
Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but
to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in
the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such,
it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect
certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a final judgment in the
case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual
or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant cannot be effected. In this relation, while the provisions of Rule 57 are
silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition
of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the
sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the
attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
A writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the
parties; The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection provided
by an attachment lien especially in an instance where one reneges on his obligations under the
agreement, as in the case at bench, where Antonio Garcia failed to hold up his own end of the deal,
so to speak. If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor
can easily escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where
a debtor, in order to buy time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a compromise agreement
he has no intention of honoring in the first place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment
would thus be lost. It would become, in analogy, a declawed and toothless tiger.
Applying these principles, the Court finds that the discharge of the writ of preliminary
attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper. Records indicate that while the
parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved by the RTC,
the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with — particularly, the payment of the total
compromise amount of P2,351,064.80. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the
attachment of Sps. Lazaro's properties should have continued to subsist. In fine, the Court holds that
the writ of preliminary attachment subject of this case should be restored and its annotation revived
in the subject TCTs, re-vesting unto Lim, Jr. his preferential lien over the properties covered by the
same as it were before the cancellation of the said writ. Lest it be misunderstood, the lien or security
obtained by an attachment even before judgment, is in the nature of a vested interest which affords
specific security for the satisfaction of the debt put in suit. 30 Verily, the lifting of the attachment lien
would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.'s rights over Sps. Lazaro's properties which the
Court, absent any justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
RULE 58
113. Buyco v. Baraquia, G.R. No. 177486, [December 21, 2009], 623 PHIL 596-602
A writ of preliminary injunction; order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the main case subject to the latter's outcome.
It is not a cause of action in itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and protect certain rights
and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment
in the case. The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the
result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is
usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties
and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will
cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had
on the merits of the case.
In the case at bar, the writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the lower court upon
respondent's showing that he and his poultry business would be injured by the closure of the subject
road. After trial, however, the lower court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of
right of way prayed for, having failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence,
the writ was lifted. The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact
dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy
having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. This is regardless of whether the period
for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has
expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general
rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. There
being no indication that the appellate court issued an injunction in respondent's favor, the writ of
preliminary injunction by the trial court was automatically dissolved upon the dismissal of civil case.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE – ATTY.

The following guidelines shall be observed:

3. Heirs of Bautista v. Lindo, G.R. No. 208232, [March 10, 2014])

Litis pendentia exists when the following requisites are present:

(1) identity of the parties in the two actions;

10. Marilag v. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, [July 22, 2015]

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS

GENERALLY REGARDED AS PERMISSIVE OR COMPLIMENTARY TO RULE 4 OF THE RULES OF

26. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM V. HEIRS OF CABALLERO, G.R. NO.

MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

43. Republic v. Viaje, G.R. No. 180993, [January 27, 2016]

OMNIBUS MOTION RULE

Four grounds under Section 3, Rule 17:

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has

(1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation;

In a demurrer to evidence, may the movant (defendant) present evidence in

OTHER CASES (NOT ASSIGNED)

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of cases

JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY

NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

93. Yu v. Yu, G.R. No. 200072, [June 20, 2016]

EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECT OF

95. Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, [July 8, 2015

96. Tiorosio-Espinosa v. Hofileña-Europa, G.R. No. 185746, [January 20, 2016])

99. Campit v. Gripa, G.R. No. 195443, [September 17, 2014])

Garnishment is a species of attachment or execution for reaching any property pertaining to a

102. Ligtas v. People, G.R. No. 200751, [August 17, 2015])

Elements of Res Judicata:

RULE 41 (ORDINARY APPEAL) vs RULE 42 (PETITION FOR REVIEW)

MATTER OF RIGHT vs MATTER OF DISCRETION

1. The writ of execution varies the judgment;

Lack of jurisdiction is different from an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction; Lack of Jursidiction

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