15/10/2018 The Future of Warfare is Irregular

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The Future of Warfare is Irregular

August 26, 2018 Topic: Security Region: Global Governance

These realities suggest that competition between the United States and its main
adversaries will likely be irregular—not conventional.

by Seth Jones

Among the Trump administration’s most significant national security decisions has been
the shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition. The United States is increasingly
engaging in global rivalry with “revisionist” states like China, Russia, Iran and North
Korea. To do this well, some U.S. policymakers have argued that the United States needs to
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develop capabilities to fight—and win—conventional and possibly even nuclear wars

against these states if deterrence fails. As the National Defense Strategy argues, “The surest
way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach
to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting
readiness and field a lethal force.”

While there are good reasons to focus U.S. national security on balancing against global
and regional state adversaries, it would be a mistake to assume that most future conflict
will be conventional or even nuclear. It won’t. The United States remains the world’s
preponderant military power. For Russia, Iran, North Korea and even China, conventional
or nuclear war with the United States would be risky and prohibitively costly. What’s more,
America’s struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the U.S. military is vulnerable
when faced with adversaries that resort to irregular strategies, operations and tactics.

These realities suggest that competition between the United States and its main adversaries
will likely be irregular—not conventional. Russia will likely continue to focus on a suite of
overt and covert actions, from supporting state and nonstate proxies in Syria, Ukraine and
potentially the Baltics to information warfare. Iran will attempt to expand its power through
proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain—not by amassing a more
potent army, navy or air force capable of fighting conventional battles against the United
States. China is already spreading its influence in the Pacific by utilizing economic
coercion, conducting a sophisticated information campaign, and resorting to fishing vessels
and other “grey zone” tactics to lay claim to islands. Even North Korea will likely continue
to develop its special operations and cyber capabilities.

The future of conflict means that the United States needs to prepare to compete with these
states not primarily with divisions, aircraft carriers and strategic bombers—but by, with,
and through state and nonstate proxies, cyber tools, and overt and covert information
campaigns. At the moment, however, the United States is ill-prepared for irregular
competition.

While the United States needs to prepare for the possibility of conventional and nuclear
war, neither will likely be the primary means of competition for at least two reasons.

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First, the United States remains the dominant global military power. Its defense budget is
still larger than the defense budgets of the next eleven countries in the world combined.
More importantly, the United States’ land, air, naval, space and cyber capabilities are
formidable. For Russia, Iran, North Korea and even China, conventional or nuclear war
with the United States would be risky. The gap between the United States and China, in
particular, is narrowing. Beijing is developing more accurate, long-range missiles;
integrated air defense; fourth-generation fighter aircraft; enhanced naval power projection;
more advanced space and counterspace capabilities; and nuclear forces, including a new
generation solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile, the df-41. But U.S. military
capabilities surpass those of its competitors.

Second, the costs of conventional and nuclear war are likely to be staggering. Over the past
several years, the U.S. government and think tanks have conducted numerous wargames
and analyses of conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Straits and South
China Sea, Iran in the Middle East and North Korea on the Korean Peninsula. The results
are generally bleak. Most conclude that war could lead to tens or hundreds of thousands of
dead soldiers and civilians, domestic unrest, billions of dollars in economic damages, a
global economic downturn and the potential collapse of long-held alliances. In addition,
these conflicts might escalate to nuclear war, raising the number of dead to millions of
civilians, create far-reaching environmental destruction and trigger unthinkable global
financial costs.

A U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25
and 35 percent and the American GDP by between 5 and 10 percent, according to a rand
report. As the report concluded:

A long and severe war could ravage China’s economy, stall its hard-earned development,
and cause widespread hardship and dislocation. Such economic damage could in turn
aggravate political turmoil and embolden separatists in China.

Both the United States and China would also suffer huge numbers of military and civilian
deaths and risk large-scale destruction of their military forces. If war expanded to include
their allies, economic and casualty figures would skyrocket even further.

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Wargames that involve a conflict between NATO and Russia, including scenarios with
Russian forces invading one or more Baltic countries, often escalate to include the threat—
or use—of tactical nuclear weapons. Even a conventional war in the region could led to
substantial destruction. If one or both sides used nuclear weapons, the number of casualties
would be virtually unthinkable.

These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and even
Pyongyang pause. During the Cold War, Moscow and Washington confronted a similar
bleak reality, which meant that most competition was irregular.

The Cold War offers a useful historical lens to assess the risks of conventional and nuclear
war between major powers. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw
Pact invasion of Western Europe. The United States and other NATO countries deployed
forces close to the intra-German and Czech-German border to stop Warsaw Pact forces
from conducting an armored blitzkrieg into West Germany. NATO also planned for nuclear
war, limited or otherwise. The United States amassed a vast nuclear arsenal and adopted
strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD), which assumed that a full-scale use of
nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the
attacker and the defender.

The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962
Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and Soviet Union nearly went to war after a U.S.
U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately
assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held.

Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the
irregular level across Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe. Both countries backed
nonstate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan
Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anti-
Communist governments and resistance movements to roll back Communist supporters
across the globe. For its part, Moscow adopted an aggressive, irregular approach best
captured in the Russian phrase aktivnyye meropriatia, or “active measures.” It involved
overt and covert actions designed to influence populations across the globe, from Europe
and Asia to Latin America and Africa. The kgb conducted disinformation campaigns using
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forgeries, orchestrated political operations by recruiting or planting journalists as agents of

influence, supported front organizations in the West that spread false information and
lobbied in favor of pro-Soviet causes and orchestrated targeted assassinations. The Soviets
used active measures as an offensive instrument of foreign policy to extend Moscow’s
influence and undermine U.S. power throughout the world.

George F. Kennan argued that a significant component of U.S.-Soviet competition could be

characterized by what he called “political warfare.” This type of warfare refers to the
employment of military, diplomatic, intelligence and other means—short of conventional
war—to achieve national objectives. As Kennan argued, the tools of irregular warfare

range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as [the Marshall
Plan]), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of
“friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of
underground resistance in hostile states.

This type of irregular war was anything but “cold.” There were on average 180,000 deaths
per year because of insurgencies from 1950 to 1989, or approximately seven million dead.
Moscow and Washington aided rebels or governments in many of them.

Today, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries—not one. But U.S.
policymakers have failed to learn important lessons from the Cold War. The U.S. Air Force,
Army, Navy and Marine Corps are concentrating on developing forces, platforms, systems
and capabilities for conventional and nuclear war. Examples include longer-range air-to-
surface and air-to-air missiles, counterspace systems and short-range air defense systems
(SHORADs) for cruise missile defense against China; heavy brigade combat teams and
their sustainment for Baltic scenarios against the Russians; high-capacity, close-in defenses
for surface vessels against Iran; and layered missile defense capabilities against North
Korea’s ballistic missile program. The U.S. military is also committed to modernizing the
nuclear triad—strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Professional military education has shifted
toward a focus on conventional and, to a lesser degree, nuclear war.

Some of these capabilities are clearly necessary. But based on the high costs of
conventional and nuclear war, most U.S. competition with Russia, China, North Korea and

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Iran will likely be irregular. The United States is vulnerable. Just look at Afghanistan,
where the Taliban has fought the United States to a stalemate despite lacking the U.S.’s
high-tech weapons. Instead, the Taliban—which receives some support from Pakistan, Iran
and even Russia—has focused on guerrilla tactics like ambushes, raids, suicide attacks and
targeted assassinations. The U.S. military has struggled against poorly-equipped insurgent
groups in Iraq, Libya and Somalia, just to name a few other examples. U.S. adversaries
have noticed.

Russia employs a mix of technologically-sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities, covert

action, and information operations to expand its power and compete with the United States.
Moscow has implemented overt information campaigns using platforms like RT and
Sputnik. It has also conducted covert campaigns to support influential figures and
opposition political parties in Western and Eastern Europe; waged offensive cyber
campaigns against the United States, France, Germany and other NATO countries; and
supported state and nonstate proxies in Ukraine, Libya, Syria and Afghanistan to increase
its power in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and even Africa. Russia’s approach involves the
use of high volumes of information, provided rapidly, repetitively, and without a
commitment to objectivity and facts. In short, Moscow has warmly embraced the tous
azimuts use of irregular warfare.

Iran possesses formidable irregular capabilities led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF), the special forces unit of the IRGC responsible for
international operations. Iran has adopted a strategy of “forward defense,” which involves
supporting sub-state proxies across the Middle East and beyond. The Islamic Republic has
used local militias, employed religious ideology to recruit and inspire militants, utilized
economic influence as a means of political leverage, engaged in psychological warfare to
promote the Islamic revolution’s ideology, and engaged in cultural and religious diplomacy
efforts. Iran’s proxies, for example, play a prominent role in Tehran’s irregular warfare
strategy.

The IRGC-QF is responsible for training pro-Iranian militants across the Middle East and
beyond in countries like Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen. Iran has encouraged
militias to establish political organizations, with Lebanese Hezbollah serving as the most
successful example. At the same time, Iran backs competing militias to provide it with

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strategic options and to prevent any one group from becoming too powerful. In addition,
Iran has developed substantial cyber capabilities. It has penetrated U.S. and allied networks
to conduct espionage for future cyberattacks. Tehran likely views cyberattacks as a
versatile tool to respond to perceived provocations. Iran’s cyberattacks against Saudi
Arabia in late 2016 and early 2017 involved data deletion on dozens of networks across
government and the private sector.

China has used fleets of fishing vessels and created artificial islands by dumping millions
of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs to assert its territorial and resource claims in the
Pacific. Beijing has also utilized economic inducements and coercion, aggressive cyber
activity by government and nonstate hacktivists, and covert support to foreign government
officials to expand its power and influence. While China is modernizing its army, air force
and navy, much of its activity will likely be irregular warfare. In a concept known as the
“three warfares,” the Chinese Community Party and People’s Liberation Army have
focused on improving China’s propaganda, psychological operations and “lawfare”—the
use of law as a weapon of warfare.

Even North Korea has developed irregular capabilities. It has conducted offensive
cyberattacks against corporations like Sony and countries like South Korea, as well as
orchestrated broader attacks like the WannaCry ransomware campaign that crippled
hospitals, banks and other companies across the globe in 2017. North Korea is also
developing more robust special operations capabilities, including establishing forward-
deployed hovercraft bases closer to South Korean islands in the West Sea for possible
clandestine activity. More broadly, the North Korean leadership has focused on developing
special forces, chemical weapons, and biological weapons and delivery systems. In fact,
North Korea’s special forces are among the largest in the world and could greatly
complicate any conflict by striking behind South Korean lines in “second front” operations.
North Korea has a robust inventory of chemical weapons, estimated at 2,500–5,000 metric
tons of chemical agents.

America’s adversaries are unlikely to compete with the United States directly in a series of
set-piece battles. Instead, they will likely continue to engage in cyber, proxy and
information campaigns. Thus far, the United States has failed to compete effectively in this
field, except for some efforts by U.S. special operations forces. Washington has been far

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too reactive, defensive, and cautious—not to mention discordant among multiple U.S.
government agencies.

Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have embraced irregular warfare. But the United
States has not. It isn’t too late to adjust course.

First, U.S. policymakers across government agencies need to recognize that irregular
warfare—not conventional warfare—will likely be the norm in inter-state competition.
Irregular warfare has not been adequately captured in U.S. government documents, such as
the National Security Strategy or National Defense Strategy. The unclassified version of the
National Defense Strategy, for example, devotes almost no attention to irregular warfare.
This may be, in part, because the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps would
prefer to spend their procurement dollars on big-ticket items like strategic bombers, stealth
fighters, aircraft carriers, guided-missile destroyers and nuclear-powered attack submarines
that are primarily designed for conventional or nuclear war.

The likelihood of irregular competition has not been well-articulated by U.S. officials in
public statements, nor have the dangers of Russia, Iranian, Chinese or North Korean
irregular warfare been sufficiently emphasized. Irregular warfare has also not been taken
seriously by most NATO countries. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan and CIA
director William Casey made a concerted effort to educate the American public about
Russian irregular activities through Congressional hearings and other forums, including
allowing CIA case officers to testify using pseudonyms. For example, the administration
held hearings using such titles as “Soviet Covert Action” and “Soviet Active Measures,”
and the United States released several previously classified reports on Soviet active
measures. The United States needs to conduct an aggressive public information campaign
today about Russian, Iranian, Chinese and North Korean irregular capabilities and actions.

Second, the U.S. Department of Defense should ensure that its forces are adequately
educated and prepared to conduct—and respond to—irregular warfare. Professional
education at military schools needs to include more in their curriculums about irregular
warfare—such as cyber activity, support to proxies, information operations, civil affairs and
related issues. Many of these topics have become backwater issues because of a declining
interest by the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps to wage irregular warfare.
These issues likely remind the services about the bloody counterinsurgency campaigns in
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Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis Department
is one of the few organizations that spends significant time and effort educating soldiers
about irregular warfare, but its students are primarily special operations forces. Other
defense institutions—such as the U.S. Army War College and National Defense University
—should increase their focus on educating soldiers about irregular warfare.

In addition, other U.S. government agencies—including at the CIA, U.S. Agency for
International Development and State Department—need to ensure that their personnel are
sufficiently focused on irregular activities. Some organizations, like the Special Activities
Center at CIA, should continue to increase their focus on political and information
operations, not just paramilitary activity. These organizations also need to step up efforts to
coordinate strategy and operations across agencies. During the Reagan administration,
documents like National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-32 (U.S. National Security
Strategy), NSDD-75 (U.S. Relations with the USSR), and NSDD-54 (U.S. Policy towards
Eastern Europe) effectively integrated irregular warfare into U.S. national security strategy.
The Reagan administration also created bodies like the Active Measures Working Group
designed to identify and counter Soviet propaganda. The United States currently lacks an
effective interagency body—such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for
terrorism—to help integrate intelligence collection, analysis and actions for irregular
warfare.

Third, U.S. agencies that already engage in some aspects of irregular warfare need to shift
more attention from counterterrorism to irregular warfare against state adversaries. This
might include, for example, providing more training and equipment to countries like
Hungary and Slovakia to conduct an effective resistance campaign against irregular action
by Moscow. Or it might involve putting greater political pressure on countries like Iraq and
Syria to decrease the number and activity of Iranian proxies. It could also include beefing
up the resources of organizations like U.S. Special Operations Command, the Assistant
Secretary of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Special Activities
Center at CIA to conduct irregular warfare.

Kennan urged U.S. policymakers during the Cold War to disabuse themselves of the
“handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to better
understand irregular warfare and “the realities of international relations—the perpetual

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rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice is even more pertinent today.
America’s adversaries certainly think so.

Seth G. Jones holds the Harold Brown Chair and is director of the Transnational Threats
Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is the author of A
Covert Action: Reagan, the CIA, and the Cold War Struggle in Poland (W.W. Norton,
2018).

Jordanian soldiers watch smoke rising during an artillery drill, part of the "Eager Lion"
military exercise near the southern town of Al Quweira, 50 km (30 miles) from the coastal
city of Aqaba, June 19, 2013. Eager Lion military exercise, set to take place in Jordan
between June 9-20 is an annual multi-national exercise designed to focus on facing
irregular warfare, as well as terrorism and national security threats. The exercise also aims
to promote military relationships among the participants consisting of 8,000 participants
from 19 countries. REUTERS/Muhammad Hamed (JORDAN - Tags: MILITARY)

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