CP00107530 2015 1056076

Contemporary Psychoanalysis
ISSN: 0010-7530 (Print) 2330-9091 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uucp20
Relational Psychoanalysis as Political Resistance
Philip Cushman Ph.D.
To cite this article: Philip Cushman Ph.D. (2015) Relational Psychoanalysis

as Political Resistance, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 51:3, 423-459, DOI:
10.1080/00107530.2015.1056076
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Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 2015, Vol. 51, No. 3: 423–459.

C William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis & Psychology and the William
Alanson White Psychoanalytic Society
ISSN: 0010-7530 print / 2330-9091 online
DOI: 10.1080/00107530.2015.1056076
PHILIP CUSHMAN, Ph.D.
RELATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AS POLITICAL

RESISTANCE
Downloaded by [Joshua Davis] at 12:24 06 November 2015
Abstract. The intellectual movement known as the interpretative turn is used to

develop an understanding of relational psychoanalysis as a way of preparing pa-
tients and practitioners to resist the dominant way of being and political structures
of the current era. This interpretation is explored by discussing a newly emerging
configuration of the self—the flattened, multiple self—and its connections to 1)
the growing influence of neoliberal proceduralism, and 2) an increase in both
political indifference and political fundamentalism in the general population. By
providing a brief history of relational psychoanalysis that highlights its moral vi-
sion and political implications, and by drawing on film, television commercials,
online gaming, and psychotherapy practices, it is argued that relational practice
can oppose and offer an alternative to a neoliberal way of being, the political
arrangements it serves, and the psychological attitudes that enable it. By explicitly
recognizing some of the political meanings of relational practice it is hoped that
practitioners will be helped to develop political practices within the clinical hour
more directly than in the past.
Keywords: relational, hermeneutics, neoliberal, dialogue, proceduralism, instru-

mentalism, technicism
S ocial theory, especially feminist, critical, postmodern, and hermeneu-

tic theories, have had a noticeable influence on American psychother-
apy. This is true especially in psychoanalysis, where some philosophical
and sociological concepts have been integrated into what is now called
relational psychoanalysis. Relational theory appeals to therapists of many
stripes, not only because of its intellectual force but also because, like
Address correspondence to Philip Cushman, Ph.D., 17804 Thorsen Road SW, Vashon, WA
98070. E-mail: [email protected]
423
424 PHILIP CUSHMAN, Ph.D.
any popular theory, it fits well with the overall spirit of the times. We
live in a social world characterized by preoccupations with—and the
valorization of—communication, social interaction, and interpersonal re-
lationship: preoccupations linked ironically to their vicissitudes and ab-
sences. It is not a coincidence that these activities are at the center of
contemporary relational psychoanalytic theory and practice.
In this article, I argue that relational psychoanalysis is not only a psy-
chological healing practice; it is also a social phenomenon, a site in
the social terrain in which—strange though it may seem—an implicit
(and perhaps unintentional) political resistance shows up. I draw heavily
on the intellectual movement called the interpretative turn (e.g., Hiley,

Bohman, & Shusterman, 1991) to examine such an unusual idea. The
interpretative turn is constituted by two traditions: postmodern theories
and hermeneutics. Whereas various postmodernisms such as deconstruc-
tionism and poststructuralism are focused on identifying and exposing
the covert exercise of power in texts, hermeneuticists are focused on the
significance of historical traditions and the moral understandings that they
believe frame all aspects of a culture, including the exercise of power (Or-
ange, 2010; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). From an interpretive
perspective (e.g., Derrida, 1974; Foucault, 1975/1977; Gadamer, 1989;
Heidegger, 1927), healing practices such as psychotherapy inevitably
have political effects, and these effects usually reinforce the political
status quo (Cushman, 1995; Mednick, 1989; Portuges, 2009; Samuels,
2001). What is unusual about relational psychoanalysis is that some of
its practices function not to support, but to resist, the moral and political
structures of its time and place.
By referring to the shape of political resistance I mean two things: First,
there is a subtle way in which relational psychoanalysis could be inter-
preted as preparation, or, in its better moments a school, for resistance.
This is because its practices can enable a way of being that is honest,
self-reflective, critical, humble, curious, compassionate, and respectful of
and willing to learn from difference. It is true that these personal quali-
ties can be produced by the practices of different therapeutic schools, but
the commitments relationalists make to honest interpersonal engagement
and the clinical practices that bring it about (see e.g., Aron, 1991; Ehren-
berg, 1974; Levenson, 1991b; Maroda, 1999; Stern, 2010) seem intended
specifically to develop these traits. Further, they are usually justified not
because they are in line with an inflexible theory or have been putatively
RATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AS POLITICAL RESISTANCE 425
“proven” to be the one effective practice for a specific therapeutic mo-

ment, but because they are thought by relationalists to be a good way
to live. “Implicit theory,” Stern (2012) explained, “is the expression of
value positions that we often have not reflected on. It is our positions
about what is good in life . . . that underlie our theories of technique” (p.
33). The relationalists’ commitments to what philosophers call the good
(even though often implicit) oppose the dominant way of being of our
time and could lead to direct political activity. Whether or in what ways
activism would result, however, is an open question.1
But there is also a second meaning of resistance at play here.
Hermeneuticists suggest that each social terrain is like a room that is

lit only by indirect lighting. The shape of the room is determined by
the particular language, customs, beliefs, moral understandings, means
of production, institutions, science, art, and laws—the overall cultural
effects of a society. Due to the particular contour of a terrain, various
things, people, and activities are illuminated and will show up in certain
ways. For instance, in every social terrain there will be sites in which
politics of a certain type will be available, and within this space, various
acts, allegiances, and commitments that fit with that culture will be able
to be lived out. The presence of political alternatives, on the other hand,
are often harder to detect, and their activities and influence more diffi-
cult to recognize. This is particularly true in the first decades of the 21st
century, where the profusion of consumer items, such as smart phones
and designer shoes, tend to obscure from view the moral confusion and
economic suffering that are also significant features of the terrain. With
such elusive and seemingly unconnected social effects, it is difficult to
see the links between glitz and suffering, know what to fight against, and
1
This is a continuing dilemma for political activism in psychology: How to shift from what
Watzlawick, Weakland, and Fisch (1974, p. 10) called first-order change (from psychological
change located in the individual, the dyad, or the family) to second-order change (to larger
systemic, foundational change located in the political arrangements of a society)? Over the
last 100 years, several schools of psychology, such as Reichian body work, interactionism in
social psychology, radical psychiatry, and humanistic psychology have all failed to articulate
and live out real-life solutions to that enormous problem. And of course some forms of ego
psychology, object relations theory, and cognitive psychology were from their beginnings
uninterested or functioned to directly oppose the connection between therapy and political
activism (see Buss, 1979; Sampson, 1981). Could relational psychoanalysis, by drawing on
the interpretative turn’s emphasis on history, critique, and moral discourse, be able to find
a way?
how to do so. Thus, political resistance sometimes appears in surprising

shapes and locations.
The last 400 years of Western society have been marked by an un-
dermining of the public commons (i.e., both the specific social sites in
which meanings are debated and negotiated and a more general sense
of the collective—the public realm). This has been accomplished by
an ongoing weakening of the historical traditions and communal values
that support the commons and keep it vital (see, e.g., Bellah, Madsen,
Sullivan, & Swidler, 1985; Habermas, 1991; Sennett, 1988; Taylor, 1989).
In the last 35 years, conservative and neoliberal rule in the United States
has imposed a regime of privatization and commercialization that has

further shrunk the commons. As a result, in our current social world,
opportunities for effective political activism from the Left have narrowed
(e.g., Bauman, 1999; Gitlin, 1995). It is fortunate that progressive motiva-
tions and commitments have not been destroyed (e.g., Botticelli, 2004),
although explicit opportunities to live them out are increasingly limited.
Thus, the possibility of carrying out some sort of politically meaningful
Left-oriented activity is often available through roles and identities that
sometimes appear benign or apolitical, even to those who live them out.
I mean to suggest that relational psychoanalysis is one of those spaces in
which resistance can quietly, subtly, even unintentionally, show up.
In order to examine relational psychoanalysis’ political effects, I utilize
the hermeneutic concept of the self (i.e., embodied cultural understand-
ings about the correct ways to be human). I first identify the emergence
of a recent and problematic way of being that has become increasingly
prominent in the United States: a flattened, multiple self (Cushman &
Gilford, 1999, 2000; Jacobson, 1997; Orange, 2009). This is a way of be-
ing that has diverged sharply from the emphasis on interiority and the
valorization of “authenticity” of the modern era. Thus it emerges as a
self that is thin or superficial and valorizes flexibility and shape shifting.
This new self is preoccupied with consuming for the sake of creating
and presenting identities in order to fend off danger or attract others. Al-
though an interest in multiplicity is shared by both the flattened, multiple
self and psychoanalytic theory about multiple self states (e.g., Bromberg,
1993, 1996, 1998; Davies, 1998; Davies & Frawley, 1994) they are two
different phenomena (see footnote 2 and the “Is Multiplicity Reflection
or Resistance?” section).
I especially want to examine the flattened, multiple self’s connection
to two of the more serious—and entangled—political problems of our
time. They are 1) the neoliberal proceduralization of American society

(Binkley, 2011; Layton, 2010; Rose, 2007), leading especially to the over-
reliance of procedural concepts such as competencies in education and
health care (Botticelli, 2006; Hoffman, 2009)—what is referred to as the
industrialization of those fields; and 2) a significant increase in either
a political indifference or a rigid political fundamentalism among the
general population. Finally, I indicate how relational psychoanalysis is
a site that sometimes opposes a neoliberal way of being, the political
arrangements that it serves, and the psychological attitudes that enable
it.
I do not mean to suggest that relationality, as a thing in and of itself, is

an unproblematic natural force for good. A concept like relationality is a
cultural artifact—as such, its moral and political meanings are contingent
on how they function in a particular society. For that reason, relational
theory and practice cannot be exempt from ideology and culture critique.
Their worth can only be understood through interpretation that situates
theory and practice within their sociohistorical context. A predominant
way of being in any one historical era, and the social practices that fit
with it, usually have both good and bad aspects. What matters is how
successfully their good qualities can be used to attenuate their more
destructive tendencies.
For instance, the concept of relationality—i.e., the attention to and
valorization of the many forms, activities, and meanings of relational
life—does not only show up in psychotherapy (see e.g., Gergen, 2009;
Sampson, 1993). At the present time, a focus on relationship is pervasive
in American popular culture; for instance, relationships are considered
the bedrock of family life, and are used to sell consumer products, influ-
ence political opinion, and recruit for military organizations. A television
commercial depicted computer competition as an ongoing conversation
between two people, one named “Mac” and the other “PC”; commercials
for medications almost always feature people interacting with friends or
loved ones; politically oriented right-wing radio talk shows consciously
create a personal connection with the host that includes nicknames, in-
group jargon, and the cultivation of group identity; in recruitment com-
mercials, the Army is often referred to as “a band of brothers.” Rela-
tionality, in other words, can be used for diverse, even incompatible,
purposes.
Due to the conservative political traditions from which this flattened,
multiple self and its political arrangements emerge, it stands to reason that
the forces that oppose them will come from the political Left. But let us
remember that potential political resistance exists within a larger cultural
terrain that includes both problems and their alternatives. If political
resistance cannot speak the language of its time and place, it cannot be
persuasive. So it should not be surprising that problematic aspects of the
era (e.g., the flattened, multiple self) and social practices that sometimes
oppose these aspects (e.g., relational psychoanalysis) also have things in
common.2
A Brief Historical Overview
As many historians have noted (e.g., Lears, 1983; Susman, 1984), by

the last decade of the 19th century American ideas about the essential
qualities of the self began to focus on impressing and attracting others
rather than on deeply felt Victorian commitments to living out a tradi-
tional moral code. Several aspects of Western, and especially American,
history have reflected and contributed to that shift. Over the course of
the 20th century, the economy moved from a focus on production to
one of consumption and from an emphasis on physical labor to one
of salesmanship; important personality characteristics shifted from Victo-
rian “character” to Roaring Twenties “personality” and more recently to
communicative (i.e., relational) expertise; psychopathology turned from
hysteria and neurasthenia to what are sometimes called disorders of the
self, that is, to psychological processes identified with narcissism and
more recently dissociation (Guralnik & Simeon, 2010); and psychother-
apy practices moved from an authoritarian style about intrapsychic events
2
Relational analysts such as Bromberg (1993, 1996, 1998), Davies (1998), Davies and Fraw-
ley (1994), and Stern (2010) write about multiplicity and accord the concept of multiple self
states an important place in their work. However, these writers are not valorizing the kind
of flatness prevalent in contemporary pop culture. Psychoanalytic multiplicity reflects the
hermeneutic belief that there is more than one truth in a text or an issue, and in that way
it opposes fundamentalism and reinforces egalitarianism. Psychoanalytic multiplicity also
supports the idea that individuals are constituted by various desires, values, ideals, com-
mitments, cultural traditions, and emotional patterns. Thus, multiplicity opposes the belief
that humans can and should be reduced to one unified unproblematic self. In this way,
the concept opposes the unitary singular Victorian self; it valorizes conflict, variation, and
difference. Of course, relational theories, like all theories, have their good and problematic
aspects. Clinicians need to be mindful of the pitfalls as well as the advantages of multiplicity
and be vigilant in historically situating therapeutic theory and guarding against uncritically
accepting all aspects of any theory. See also “Is Multiplicity Reflection or Resistance?” in
this article.
to a collaborative style about interpersonal or intersubjective events. All

of these more recent phenomena are featured in current relational theory.
Above all, relational psychoanalysis is a combination of some of the
most important intellectual movements of our time: it includes aspects
of the interpretative turn, feminism, critical theory, and anti-racism in
political theory, and interpersonal, object relations, and self psychology
in psychoanalytic theory (Seligman, 2005). But relational psychoanalysis
is not simply an isolated intellectual or scientific theory. It is also a cultural
product, and as such, it inevitably and powerfully reflects and affects
moral understandings and exerts subtle political influence.
Of course, it is not by chance that, even in psychoanalysis, some

sort of left-oriented political potential would show up during the late
20th century. First, soon after mid-century, interpersonal analysts carried
on the social vision of Sullivan, Horney, and Fromm, and then young
analysts from the post-World War II Baby Boom cohort carried on the
idealistic, rebellious, liberationist, socially oriented spirit of the 1960s
in their work, even though in the form of a technical healing practice.
Some of these early relationalists were left-leaning civil rights and peace
activists in their younger days. They turned to psychotherapy for various
personal, political, and financial reasons in the last quarter of the 20th
century, when the war in Vietnam ended, the Left began to unravel, and
intellectual jobs, especially with a social change component, became
increasingly scarce.
As their psychoanalytic careers developed, the Baby Boom analysts
quietly, but determinedly, questioned authority and lived out new and
creative practices. With a style that fit with their times, they were op-
timistic, integrative, colorful, sometimes brilliant. They coined a new
term—“relational”—for the embrace of the newer, nonorthodox, post-
ego psychology theories that appealed to them, synthesized them under
a new philosophical framework,3 and challenged the old guard. It is not
surprising that their new practices featured a less formal, less depriving,
more expressive, egalitarian, emotional, mutual, cooperative exchange
between analyst and patient. These qualities—although obviously reflec-
tions of contemporary popular and intellectual culture—were contained
3
See Levenson (2006) for his concerns that this strategy obscures their meaningful differ-
ences.
in theoretical moves carefully buttressed by textual support from ear-

lier psychoanalytic literature (Seligman, 2003). Thus, this young cohort
fought for a place within the psychoanalytic establishment.
Today, in response to increasingly powerful neoliberal corporate forces
insisting on medicalizing therapeutic practices, quantifying outcomes,
and controlling labor—what is referred to as the industrialization of
health care—many schools of psychotherapy have capitulated by re-
lying increasingly on a medical model of care. This model is highly
technicist and behavioral, using cognitivist language and a physical sci-
ence methodology that ignores social context and interactive process;
it privileges quantified outcomes research that produces what is called

“evidence-based practices.” All of this has led to an authoritarian man-
agement of the labor force (i.e., therapists) by means of a hierarchical
administrative structure featuring a rigid bureaucratic proceduralism. Un-
like most schools of psychotherapy, psychoanalysis has been less willing
to comply with those pressures. However, recently the neoliberal ethic
has made inroads even there (Botticelli, 2006; Walls, 2007, 2012).
Pockets of resistance in psychoanalysis do remain, and in my opin-
ion, the most explicit and philosophically sound is currently being pro-
duced by the relationalists. Some (e.g., Cushman, 2013; Hoffman, 2009;
Stern, 2013; Tolleson, 2009; Walls, 2012; Warren, 2010) have publicly
argued against the technicism and instrumentalism that frame the in-
dustrialization of psychotherapy. These writers have intentionally drawn
from the interpretative turn, especially feminist postmodernism and philo-
sophical hermeneutics, to make the case for valorizing a nonmanual-
ized, nonscientistic, more interpretive, collaborative, emergent practice of
psychotherapy.
This resistance opposes a way of being that is increasingly dominant
in our time. It is sad that in the United States as a whole, opposition
to the hegemony of neoliberalism, of which the industrialization of psy-
chotherapy is but one manifestation, is difficult to locate today. This is
partly true because any resistance against such a subtle nuanced political
phenomenon must necessarily be equally subtle and nuanced. And U.S.
society, currently, is not exactly known for those qualities.
By making the observation that relational psychoanalysis is a site of
resistance, I am not claiming that it is the best, most effective, or strongest
form of resistance the Left could develop—not at all. I am simply inter-
preting its ideas and practices as expressing and living out certain moral
understandings about the potential limitations, worthy possibilities, and
proper comportment of humans that oppose the emerging technicist,

instrumentalist tendencies of the flattened self and the political arrange-
ments, procedures, and institutions it serves.
This political claim would undoubtedly make most analysts, even many
relational analysts, extremely uncomfortable. I do not mean that relational
psychoanalysis is a conscious, strategic, calculated effort to deceive or
subvert. But I do think relational psychoanalysis functions in ways that
have social effects, effects that reach into the realm of moral and political
meaning, far beyond the limitations that U.S. society popularly ascribes
to healing practices.
In fact, Botticelli (2004) argued that important characteristics of rela-

tional practices—such as egalitarianism, feminism, antiracism, and the
questioning of authority—that might ordinarily lead to more explicit po-
litical expression are curiously limited to events and relationships within
the analytic hour. He believed that they represent an attempt to live out
a circumscribed political vision in a world closed off from other more
explicit political activity, a “replacement” for a more direct and explicit
politics.
The commitments that animate this article arise not from a disagree-
ment with Botticelli but rather with a sharing of his concerns and an
interpretation of the puzzle from a slightly different perspective. Perhaps
we need not only a “rediscovery” of the political, but an understanding of
the political as it does show up in our world. That could lead to a sense
of what lasting political change requires: the capacity for recognition of
and respect and care for the other, and the realization that psychological
relatedness in that spirit must necessarily lead to concrete political action.
What Kinds of Resistance?

Resistance appears to be coming to light in relational psychoanalysis in
three ways. First, relational theory and practice are founded on, and have
been elaborating, a philosophical foundation that directly challenges a
modern-era Cartesianism (e.g., Fairfield, Layton, & Stack, 2002; Frie, 1997,
2011; Levenson, 1972, 1983; Mitchell, 1988; Stern, 1991, 2012; Stolorow,
Atwood, & Orange, 2002). This is an important development, because
much of what is destructive about current political arrangements (e.g.,
Bauman, 1999, 2006; Sennett, 1988) initially rested on the Cartesian split
between matter and spirit, mind and body, and the further political splits
that followed (see e.g., Bernstein, 1983; Bordo, 1987; Flax, 1992; Stolorow
et al., 2002).
Second, the consequences of relational psychoanalysis’ non-Cartesian
foundation are beginning to bear more explicit forms of progressive polit-
ical fruit in therapeutic theory (e.g., Layton, Hollander, & Gutwill, 2006).
There are subtle signs that the connections among philosophical theory,
clinical practice, and progressive political activity are becoming more
visible. For instance, one can see the effects of postmodern thought and
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in Irwin Hoffman’s 2009 article
“Doublethinking Our Way to Scientific Legitimacy,” an article that force-
fully opposes the industrialization of psychotherapy. One can also see the
influence of the interpretative turn in the defense of Hoffman found in ar-
ticles by Cushman (2013), Stern (2013), Walls (2012), and Warren (2010).
The explicit use of Gadamer in contemporary relational theory was first
initiated by Stern in his groundbreaking work in 1989, 1990, and 1991. In
a recent article, Stern (2012) applied Gadamer’s philosophy by discussing
the implicit moral understandings that frame current psychotherapy theo-
ries. By doing so, he demonstrated his long-held awareness that therapy
is a moral discourse—not a technical, procedural practice, but a moral
practice with political consequences.
Also, a cultural history approach to psychoanalysis, used by Harry Stack
Sullivan (e.g., 1964) and Erich Fromm (e.g., 1955), has been drawn upon
by clinicians such as Neil Altman (2005), Rachel Peltz (2005), Susie Or-
bach (2008), Lynne Layton (e.g., 2009, 2010), Orna Guralnik and Daphne
Simeon (2010), Steven Botticelli (2012), and Roger Frie (2014). It is just
such a cultural history approach, I argued in 1994, that if properly de-
veloped can lead to a more explicit, philosophically sound, self-aware
political consciousness (Cushman, 1994). In fact, the earlier philosophi-
cal foundation has made possible the relational leap from a one-person
to a two-person psychology (Levenson, 1991a), and still more so from
a two-person to a more explicit cultural and political (i.e., three-person)
psychology (Altman, 1995; Benjamin, 2009; Cushman, 1995).
Third, the last two decades have witnessed relationalists engaged in
more explicit ventures in political analysis and activity. For instance,
feminists, multiculturalists, queer theorists, hermeneuticists, and post-
modernists such as Altman (1995a, 2000, 2006), Aronson (2007), Bot-
ticelli (2004, 2006, 2012), Cheuvront (2010, 2013), Cushman (2000, 2002,
2014), Dimen (1991, 2011), Goldner (1991), Gump (2000, 2010), Guralnik
(2011), Haaken (1998), Harris (1991, 2000), Harris and Botticelli (2010),
Hartman (2005), Hollander (1997), Layton (1998, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014),
Leary (1995, 2000, 2007, 2012), Orbach (2006, 2008), and Scholom (2013)
are addressing issues related to gender, militarism, class, race, ethnic-
ity, and sexual orientation; Levenasian therapists such as Goodman (in
press), Goodman and Freeman (2015), Huett and Goodman (2012), and
Rozmarin (2007, 2011) have critiqued the consequences of war, scientism,
and managed care in the treatment of the poor and dispossessed; Gerber
(1990) has described attending to explicit political issues in clinical work;
and Division 39 political activists (e.g., Altman, Hollander, Reisner, Soldz)
continue to play a role in the fight to oppose the role of psychologists in
the Bush—and now Obama—administrations’ torture practices.4

I know it seems questionable to suggest that the practices of Western-
style psychotherapy could be involved in political resistance, given that
therapy is often criticized as the purveyor of a decontextualized individ-
ualism that encourages a noncommunal, if not narcissistic and certainly
politically disengaged, way of being. In fact, viewed from the perspec-
tive of some forms of social theory (Foucault, 1975/1977; Kovel, 1980;
Rose, 2007), psychotherapy has often been the instrument of a compliant,
regressive, conservative politics.
However, by suggesting other possibilities, I do not mean to imply that
relational psychoanalysis is the only current site of political resistance. In
fact, I believe that political criticisms of relational practice—for instance,
that it does not adequately attend to the world outside the consulting
room, treat an economically diverse population, and make the leap from
the interpersonal to the explicitly political—are, generally speaking, well-
founded. But I have come to believe that it is indeed functioning as a
quiet, somewhat unintended site of Left-oriented resistance and, in fact,
potentially an important site, if therapists could better understand their
place in the history of Western society as it relates to this particular polit-
ical moment. It would take unusually perceptive and skilled therapists to
4
I do not mean to suggest that relational theory either naturally leads to a left-oriented
politics, or that a left-oriented politics inevitably leads to a relational orientation. Certainly
there are relational psychoanalysts whose politics are not oriented to the left. Likewise,
there have been writers who have attempted an integration of psychoanalysis and Marxism
but would not be considered relationalists (e.g., Erich Fromm, Norman O. Brown, Russell
Jacoby, Joel Kovel, Herbert Marcuse). These writers have generated a number of ideas such
as the importance of psychological freedom; a rejection of normalizing therapies through
a privileging of the id; and the description of and opposition to consumer capitalism’s
creation of a “repressive desublimation,” but none of these concepts were understood as
being expressed through relational practices.
understand and live out the kind of relational practice in the detailed po-
litical terms that embrace and extend generalized political resistance into
a more overt activism without violating their therapeutic commitments.
But I believe that extension is possible, in fact plausible, if therapists
could draw more robustly and intentionally from the interpretative turn.
Our Historical Moment: Consumerism, Electronics, and Technicism
There are many disturbing events and institutions in our current social
world that warrant immediate attention; they call out to us as citizens

to oppose certain policies, redesign specific political structures, institute
new processes and do away with others. In this article I only discuss one,
which is intimately related to issues that touch on psychoanalysis in the
United States.
Consumerism continues unabated and in fact has deepened in the last
30 years due in part to the now overwhelming presence of computers,
electronic gadgets, communications systems, social media, and the soft-
ware that controls them. This has had a negative effect on the political
awareness and activism of the population as a whole and the youth in
particular (e.g., Carr, 2010; Lanier, 2010). These devices and platforms
have brought about important transformations in everyday life through
their computational speed, research capacity, and communicative possi-
bilities, but they have multiplied the burdens of middle-class employment
by providing recent reductions of the workforce and worker benefits
with a putatively rational justification. This technological explosion has
also caused a kind of social isolation among the young by retarding
social-skill development, delegitimizing the humanities in the schools,
and negatively affecting brain development (Carr, 2010).
This electronic revolution, in concert with the powerful entertainment
and sports industries, has produced and reflected the growing techni-
cism and instrumentalism5 of American society. When combined with
an omnipresent American racism, homophobia, and misogyny, and an
increasing neoliberal competitiveness that is the product of the economic
and emotional insecurity characteristic of late capitalist societies, instru-
mentalism has exacerbated American militarism to a frightening degree.
5
That is, the belief that others exist to be used in order to achieve one’s personal ends and
that technical advancements are the best means to that end.
And the continuing wounds to a putatively American exceptionalism pro-

duced by the war in Vietnam, the attacks of 9/11, and ongoing failures
of colonial adventures in the Middle East serve only to escalate these
proto-fascist tendencies. The immense popularity of U.S.-style football
and electronic war games reflect this worrisome dynamic.
Escape from the real world of face-to-face relationships has become
ever more possible and seductive with each passing year. The purchase
and consumption of goods and the search for evermore stimulating,
outrageous, and crass entertainment has overtaken much of American
life and especially much of how Americans think of and understand
themselves. Bill Moyers and Michael Winship (2013) have written that
self-deceit and intellectual laziness are destroying the ability to participate
meaningfully in a democratic society. “Ideology and self-interest trump
the facts or even caring about the facts . . . . The ground is all too fertile
for those who will only believe whatever best fits their resentment or
particular brand of paranoia . . . . [The greatest danger] is . . . ‘the self-
deception that believes the lie.”’
Along with the increasing violence, anti-intellectualism, and militarism
in popular culture, and the continuing erosion of historical traditions and
community involvement, has come an increased suspicion and fear of
others. Judging from the introduction of various rigid and self-righteous
ethical codes in business and education, it appears that there is a growing
consensus that the only protection against the aggression, greed, and
violence of others is the installation of detailed, step-wise procedural
practices such as the installation of an overwhelming number of HIPAA
regulations in health-care settings. Procedures are commonly thought
of as the only means of controlling the otherwise unpredictable and
dangerous other.
Above all, there is little organized disagreement with, let alone rebel-
lion against, this state of affairs. The vast majority of citizens go about
their lives either struggling to survive and gain a small amount of secu-
rity for themselves and their families, or so immersed in the electronic
consumer and entertainment culture that they do not seem to care about
much beyond their next purchase, incoming tweet, or participation in a
multiple online role-playing game such as Second Life, Farmville, Siege
Online, Stormfall: Age of War, or Criminal Syndicate. In these games,
participants electronically join a team of other users and invent, design,
name, and direct an avatar. Games continue on indefinitely even though
individual participants sign off. Virtual money is earned and spent, virtual
crops are grown, sold, and consumed, and battles are waged. In the pro-
cess, avatars can even contract PTSD and attend virtual trauma therapy
sessions, which must be completed before returning to battle.
Until we can intelligently and self-reflectively think, study, and coop-
erate with others in order to organize against the forces that have created
our current political arrangements, it is difficult to imagine how any ef-
fective resistance will be able to succeed. The absence of the ability to
effectively engage in those activities, alongside the great political neces-
sity of doing so, is of course not a random coincidence. Research such
as that conducted by Carr (2010), Turkle (2011), and Watkins (2009) in-
dicates that the effectiveness of the strategy that the Roman poet Juvenal
(1918) long ago (late first century, C.E.) called “bread and circuses” is to-
day exacerbated many fold by advances in electronic computational and
communications technology. All eyes are on the screen. The intellectual,
political, and interpersonal characteristics of the flattened, multiple self
will need to be shifted if we as a people can become capable of making
the important changes that are needed. The current practices of relational
psychoanalysis seem to be one of the practices that could be well suited
to shifting the limitations of that self.
From Emptiness to Multiplicity
It seems imperative that we explore the puzzling way Americans are

manifesting the kind of political paralysis, disinterest, and self-deceit de-
scribed above. But instead of interpreting it through the Marxist concept
of false consciousness, let us learn about it hermeneutically by studying
the way of being that brings it about in order to interpret the social con-
text that brings it to light. In 1999 and 2000, Peter Gilford and I suggested
that the United States is witnessing a shift in the early 21st-century way
of being, from the last 100 years of an increasingly empty self (see e.g.,
Cushman, 1990, 1995) to a newly emerging multiple self.
The empty self experienced a deep interior emptiness that needed to
be filled up through the taking in of consumer items, charismatic leaders,
or therapists. But recently there has been a shift, graphically reflected in
popular culture, from an empty self to a shallower, flatter self, suffering
less from being empty of meaning and initiative than anxious about the
dangers of social interaction and searching, always, for opportunities to
be entertained. It is a self populated with a multitude of identities devel-
oped over time by avoiding and controlling aversive social interactions
and purchasing various consumer products that contribute to that avoid-

ance. These multiple identities cluster around the outside of the person,
waiting to be called to center stage, depending on the social needs of
the moment.
A 1998 television commercial opened with a young man racing an
expensive sports car through the deep curves of a rural coastal road. He
was dressed in an unkempt. grungy manner, played hard rock music on
the radio, and wore an insolent, somewhat arrogant look on his face. A
sour-faced, middle-aged motorcycle cop was hiding behind a billboard.
He became instantly furious at the young man, turned on his siren, and
took out after him.

The driver spied the cop in his rear view mirror and smiled knowingly.
Before the cop could catch up and pull him over, the kid quickly pulled
on a tweedy conservative sport coat, scholarly glasses, switched to a
classical music station, and took out a portable electric razor and shaved.
By the time the cop appeared at the driver’s side window, the young
man’s appearance had radically changed. The cop looked astonished,
completely taken by surprise, confused and disoriented. He stumbled
away, muttering to himself, unable to follow through with an arrest or
any kind of punishment.
The young guy watched in the rear-view mirror as the cop weaved
back to his motorcycle. A small, quiet, self-satisfied smile played on his
lips. He had used various consumer products to change his appearance,
and by doing so he presented to the world a different identity. This new
identity allowed him to escape a dangerous unreasoning authority—
something he could not have accomplished otherwise. It was a shift in
his outward appearance that saved him, a new identity, not an inward
transformation of his private true self.
I believe this shift from an empty to a flattened multiple self has be-
come more entrenched in the last 15 years. I discussed the relationship
between electronic living such as online computer use and participation
in multiple online role-playing games, on the one hand, and the on-
going undermining of historical traditions, communal experiences, and
the public commons on the other (Cushman, 2011). The flattened, mul-
tiple self is also reflected in the fascination with psychological theory
that describes human thinking as the product of information processing
equipment (not thoughtful self-reflection), pop culture that depicts su-
perheroes as cyborgs, and television commercials that portray humans
as poorly functioning computers that need an infusion of electronic or

metal components in order to succeed.
Noticing these changes in cultural images that prescribe ways of being
human can help us understand why there is little resistance against the
beliefs that brains are organic computers; that sociobiology and neuro-
science hold the keys to understanding (and by extension normalizing)
human behavior; and that the secret to creating a safe, law-abiding society
is to develop and enforce the correct set of procedural rules. Comput-
ers do not possess deep interiors with the capacity for thoughtfulness
and creativity. They work because they follow simple orders, encoded in
their software—they are procedural all the way down. Our social world
is increasingly characterizing humans in the same way.
Think about all the digitized procedural forms one must fill out or
procedural rules with which one must comply during an average day.
From medical forms to insurance forms to tax forms to the procedural
menu provided by an outgoing recorded phone message, an increas-
ing amount of our daily lives is given over to the restricted choices of
procedural living. In higher education, the concept of academic compe-
tencies (defined by hyperconcrete behavioral results) determines what
teachers teach and students learn. In psychotherapy, therapists are being
pressured to follow manualized treatments and encouraged to administer
postsession consumer satisfaction surveys to patients in order to ascertain
how well the therapist is complying with what quantitative research has
determined to be proper therapeutic procedures. It seems humans are
becoming thought of as poorly functioning electronic machines that sim-
ply need to become more robot-like, i.e., better at following the orders
of manuals, procedures, and decision trees.
A young man is in a business meeting, populated by several well-
dressed people, all sitting around a large conference table. He takes out
his new smart phone called, it is important to note, a “Droid,” which
technically is a human-like mechanical robot (e.g., R2D2 from the Star
Wars movies). He begins to search for information or calculate some
problem or key-in some data. The calculation gets increasingly detailed,
and his fingers move at an ever-faster rate, almost as if the phone itself
has taken over his actions. And then, as his fingers work faster still, they
begin turning into a robot’s fingers, and his hands and then his wrists and
arms all turn into metal parts of a machine. The voice-over states that the
Droid, in order to hook “you up to everything you need to do,” will turn
“you into an instrument of efficiency.” The man’s fingers are now almost
a blur, racing at superhuman speed. His Droid has turned him into an
android.
This commercial illustrates a self that is machine-like and controlled
through obedience to various official behavioral procedures that demand
strict compliance. But of course Americans, who pride themselves on
being highly individualistic and autonomous, would never tolerate being
described as robots. So the description is disguised with pseudo-scientific
technical terms and the inflated claims of a physical-science method ap-
plied to human problems (i.e., scientism). This disguise is made especially
effective by the ethic of consumerism, enacted today through a multitude
of social practices that help us live out the embodied understanding that
persons are consumers. Consumers live in a social terrain that resembles
a giant supermarket: everything is available to them as long as they have
the money (or the credit). Autonomy and intelligence are important to
consumers primarily because they need to make micro-decisions about
what to buy, supposedly unencumbered by moral or political constraints
and the opinions of others. Autonomy is valuable primarily because it
allows for unencumbered purchasing, intelligence because it enables the
correct choice of competing consumer items. When efficiency becomes
the most prominent element of success, and success the most prominent
producer of purchasing power, we don’t notice that humans are thought
of as robotic, because efficient performance facilitates consumption.
In the world of the supermarket, consumer items are thought to
be important to the degree that they match the momentary wishes of
the consumer. Items such as clothing, breakfast cereals, computer ac-
cessories, home furnishings, and automotive accessories are available
in any number of combinations—what matters is that they are suffi-
ciently compatible so that they can be mixed and matched at the con-
sumer’s whim. Things increasingly come to light in this world as discrete,
simple, individual components readily available to be combined and
used.
In the realm of psychotherapy, this way of being comes to light in the
more recent DSMs through Axis I diagnostic categories, in which persons
are thought to be composed of simple hyperconcrete behaviors that can
be mixed and matched according to specific symptom descriptions—
a kind of Lego-like picture of human being. This view is reflected in
various advertising and marketing practices, such as the recent television
commercial for a computer notepad called The Surface. It is a sunny
day, and there are many good-looking young people of many shapes,
genders, and colors in the picture, but they do not seem to be interacting.
One young man takes out his notepad, turns it around, and attaches a flat
keypad to it with a loud, satisfying “click.” Others immediately notice, and
one by one they begin clicking their notepads in unison, and then in time
to a rhythm, then in time to a loud upbeat song. They sing and dance,
handing off their notepads, exchanging keypads and screens of different
colors, and the clicking is intoxicating. The notepads and keypads fly
from one person to another, exciting, engaging, uniting everyone in a
joyous dance. The equipment seems to have a life of its own, flying
and spinning through the air in time to the music, unifying and inspiring
everyone.
The commercial is like a dance celebrating interchangeability, compat-
ibility, and plasticity—all different colors and shapes and functions coop-
erating and enjoying one another’s easily accessible (i.e., “surface”) parts.
Consumer items—and by implication, humans—are therefore thought to
be composed of simple components that can be cobbled together in
various shapes and designs, limited only by the desires of the individual
consumer, the effectiveness of the latest technology, or in psychology the
putative accuracy of the most recent assessment tool. The revolutionary
change that DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) introduced
was the shift from large complex configurations of personality to the
conceptual simples of the behavioristic Axis I. Gone is the concept of the
DSM-II (American Psychiatric Association, 1968) neurosis, for instance,
and in its place are various combinations of behavioral signs of anxiety
and depression.
If consumer desire is too extreme or unrealistic for everyday fantasies,
which more and more appears to be the case, there is a consumer solution
for that as well. Electronic games can transport us to a world in which
one’s avatars are famous, possess superhuman qualities, or live a life
free from the restrictions of ordinary laws or rules. This relation with
alternative selves is graphically portrayed in the film Avatar. Jake Sully’s
life as a career soldier at the beginning of the movie was crass, superficial,
cruel. He had been marked, in fact disabled, by it: he could no longer
walk. But then, through futuristic science, his avatar was transported to
a radically different physical and social world, one that was beautiful,
spiritual, proud, authentic. He comes to be influenced by these new
values and tries to convince those in control of his old world that the
destructive and cruel path they were on was wrong, but to no avail. By
the end of the film (no surprise here), he chooses to remain permanently
in his avatar and live forever after in this new world. It is a kind of
sci-fi version of the previously described television commercial about
the young man, the sports car, and the old, sour-faced motorcycle cop.
Escape, by shifting into a new identity, was the only option.6
We might say that this film portrays a new kind of a healing technology:
a virtual, behavioral therapeutic for a flattened, multiple, self. Purchase
the proper product, such as an expensive pair of basketball shoes, an
ultra-stylish purse, a luxury car, an exciting video game or DVD, and
you will be delivered into a new world—and a reconfigured self—that
previously you could only imagine. Multiplicity, and the morphing it
enables, saves the day.
A Relational Alternative
Many political observers have commented on the increase in working-

and middle-class Americans who oscillate between political disinterest
or right-wing fundamentalist politics. This is a trend developed suc-
cessfully in Richard Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, his so-called
“Southern Strategy” that attracted Southern Democrats to the Republican
Party. It was carried further by Ronald Reagan’s highly successful pur-
suit of blue-collar Democratic voters, dubbed “Reagan Democrats,” in
the presidential campaign of 1980 (see, e.g., Berman, 2012). This trend
is currently reflected in the political climate’s discernible shift to the
right.
Rather than interpreting this phenomenon by using the idea that the
working- and middle-classes are victims of a false consciousness, I pre-
fer a hermeneutic approach. This perspective suggests that, in fact, their
consciousness is true to the way of being of their time and place. We
live out a flattened multiple self. We are constituted as consumers, and
in fact, a particular kind of consumer—one who focuses on purchas-
ing and consuming items or experiences in order to 1) avoid or escape
potentially dangerous interpersonal situations through shape-shifting; 2)
impress others and become a minor celebrity on social media; and 3)
6
The story line is reminiscent of the 1990 film Dances With Wolves (Costner, 1990), also
drawn from the genre of the American frontier and the European encounter with the
Plains Indian tribes. But in that encounter, we see a transformation in the deep self of a
Victorian man. In Avatar, the hero’s deep self does not seem to exist and therefore cannot
be transformed. Instead, the change is accomplished primarily by transporting him into
another identity: an avatar.
be entertained. Americans are isolated individualists who usually don’t

organize against bad communal or national policies because they don’t
really see them or consider them important. All too often, those who do
organize do so on behalf of anti-intellectual hate-mongering leaders who
offer one-dimensional solutions to complex moral and political dilem-
mas. The need and motivation for political resistance rarely or episodi-
cally come to light or sometimes come to light in racist and misogynist
shapes because of the way the self is currently configured. By living out
a flattened, multiple self, Americans are busily preoccupied with visions
of the good, different from those valued by postmodern or Left-leaning
academics—visions best thought of as different, perhaps wrong, but not

false.
Thus, from a hermeneutic perspective, any political resistance move-
ment from the Left would have to develop ideas about how to help shift
that configuration of the self and the understandings of the good that it
serves. Viewed from this perspective, relational psychoanalysis seems to
be engaged in just such a process, although implicitly, not exactly con-
sciously, and for the most part through individual, not societal, change.
This is a tall order indeed, and one limited by an important flaw: At some
point, psychological change must lead to political activity if it is to effect
political change (see e.g., Botticelli, 2004; Tolleson, 2009).
Still, relational efforts inspire hope and do imply, as Botticelli (2004)
suggested, expanded political meanings. Relational theory began emerg-
ing explicitly in the early 1980s. In 1983, Jay Greenberg and Stephen
Mitchell (see also Mitchell, 1988) began a remarkable synthesis of in-
terpersonal, object relations, self psychology, and attachment theory,
drawing heavily on the interpersonal tradition of Sullivan, Fromm, Lev-
enson, Ghent, Racker, and Ehrenberg, among others, and called it “rela-
tional psychoanalysis.” Mitchell argued that a new therapeutic paradigm
was emerging, one that was exquisitely attuned to the powerful om-
nipresent reality and meaningfulness of relationship. Infants grew, friend-
ships arose, psychopathology developed, lovers loved, therapists treated,
all in the context of relationship. By riding the cultural trends of the day,
Mitchell called classical and ego psychoanalysis into question because
of their reliance on a Cartesian framework, a one-person psychology,
and scientistic tendencies. He challenged analytic concepts, such as the
analyst as blank screen, as the only “healthy” member of the dyad, and
as the unquestioned arbiter of reality.
Susie Orbach (2008) recently suggested that usually when relational

writers offer brief historical sketches of the relational movement in psy-
choanalysis, they do not properly recognize the influence of social move-
ments such as the New Left, radical therapy and radical psychiatry, and
especially feminism. However, in 1982 Orbach and Luise Eichenbaum,
aware of the political perspectives that these movements brought to psy-
chotherapy, consciously applied such perspectives to their work at The
Women’s Therapy Centre of that era (e.g., Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1982).
Orbach mentioned that an emphasis on “the actual” affected most psy-
choanalytic schools in the 1970s and 1980s, including the attachment
literature and the infant research conducted by Beatrice Beebe and col-
leagues. Of course, humanistic psychology (e.g., Grogan, 2013) was also
influenced by this orientation. It is not difficult to see how an emphasis
on the political arrangements of gender, race, class, and sexual orienta-
tion led to a more focused clinical awareness of lived experience and
its effect on psychological patterning. Practices such as women’s con-
sciousness raising groups and self-help groups for mental patients and
Vietnam veterans were at that time thought to reflect what Eichenbaum
and Orbach referred to as “social object relations theory” or “feminist
object relations.” Orbach (2008) eventually accepted Mitchell’s term, “re-
lational,” and added to it an emphasis on the democratic nature of the
movement’s practices.
Meanwhile, in 1983, Donnel Stern published a treatment of the un-
conscious from a non-Cartesian perspective. Stern reenvisioned the un-
conscious as dissociative experiences that remain “unformulated,” not
repressed and fully formed artifacts buried in a Freudian-style Cartesian
archeological warehouse. This opened up a new approach to memory,
awareness, and psychological change. Change, therefore, is built first of
all on experiencing that which has been unformulated. This requires a
different kind of therapeutic process that looks for gaps, absences, and
puzzles; it calls forth interpretations that rely not simply on the past but
also on present experiences, not on the unquestioned authority of the
therapist who discovers an already existing singular truth and delivers
it unilaterally, but on the collaborative interpretive relationship between
therapist and patient. Mutual interpretative processes, Stern wrote, de-
velop emergent and contingent truths.
Also in 1983, Irwin Hoffman, drawing on his research with collab-
orator Merton Gill, made an important addition to early theory with
the article, “The Patient as the Interpreter of the Analyst’s Experience.”
This was a radical attack on the blank-screen concept and those writ-
ers who claimed to agree with the attack but still held to the Cartesian
frame—what Hoffman called the conservative critic. Hoffman showed
how this was a major philosophical contradiction and encouraged the
more robust radical critic who could reconceptualize (and thereby
depathologize) transference–countertransference dynamics and directly
challenge the Cartesianism of the one-person approach.
Jessica Benjamin published The Bonds of Love in 1988. This was a com-
plex feminist study of human development, attachment, and Western ar-
rangements of gender. Her work and the work of other feminists such as
Muriel Dimen, Virginia Goldner, and Adrienne Harris have added a great
deal to the meanings of gender and oppression. Over the years, Benjamin
elaborated on her initial research, developing it into a sophisticated and
nuanced (and implicit) project of moral development. Her discussion
of the instrumentalism present in everyday forms of sadomasochism—
what she refers to as the “doer–done to” relation—and her subsequent
application of that concept from interpersonal to political venues (Ben-
jamin, 2004), has been an important contribution to relational theory and
practice. Recently her concept of “mutual recognition”—the opposite of
“doer–done to” dynamics—has contributed to relational psychoanalysis’s
(partially disguised) vision of the good, and has been applied to both
interpersonal and international politics. Drawing on that concept, Judith
Butler (2009, p. 20) wrote that “loss makes a tenuous ‘we’ of us all,” to
explain the ongoing global difficulty with living through collaborative,
respectful, peace-loving ways of being.
Stern’s work—and by extension relational psychoanalytic theory—
were greatly enhanced when he found Gadamer’s philosophical work
in the late 1980s. With Gadamer’s help, Stern came to describe psycho-
analysis as an emergent process. Its material is the moral understandings
and cultural meanings that have been embodied by the patient and can-
not be forced by some sort of scientistic proceduralism or simplistic
manualized script into a previously designed mold. “Courting Surprise,”
published in 1990, is a poetic clinical application of Gadamer’s insights
into the mysteries of the creative unbidden, processes at the heart of
art, literature, and psychotherapy. In 1991, Stern wrote the more theo-
retical “A Philosophy for the Embedded Analyst,” a description of how
hermeneutics could be applied to therapy. Stern drew on Gadamer in
order to broaden psychotherapy by extending theory into a fuller appre-
ciation of the mysteries of a non-Cartesian world, one in which a human
being is both constituted and yet not fully determined by the historical
era. Relationship is the water humans swim in and self-contained indi-
vidualism is a wrong-headed ideology. Interpretation is not something
specific, universal, and certain that the therapist has privileged access to,
but rather something contingent, local, and questionable. The therapist,
as well as the patient, brings his or her own limitations, foibles, and strug-
gles to the therapy hour, and both are affected by the mutual influence
of the dyad. In Stern’s hands, Gadamer’s concept of dialogue therefore
becomes a way of describing the moments in which, through respectful
listening and care, the therapeutic partners come to understand, educate,
and influence one another and in the process experience meaningful

therapeutic change.
In 1991, Lew Aron published “The Patient’s Experience of the Ana-
lyst’s Subjectivity.” In this article, he expanded on and supplemented
Hoffman’s work with insights especially from Benjamin’s work on in-
tersubjectivity. He emphasized the mutual but asymmetrical nature of
analysis, the importance of the analyst’s emotional and psychological life
becoming known to the patient, and the crucial need of the analyst to
be able to tolerate being seen by and vulnerable to the patient. These
efforts, taken together, developed a nonauthoritarian, anti-fundamentalist
practice that stressed respect for the other.
RoseMarie Perez Foster’s (1992) examination of bilingualism from a
relational perspective explicitly brought race and ethnicity into the re-
lational literature. This was soon followed by Altman’s groundbreaking
book The Analyst in the Inner City (1995a) and several articles on race
(e.g., 2000, 2004, 2006), and Leary’s (1995, 2000, 2007, 2012), Gump’s
(2000, 2010), Suchet’s (2004, 2007, 2010), Guralnik’s (2011), and Lob-
ban’s (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012) important work on racial issues and
enactments in the clinical setting. These authors focus on the damaging
effects of racism on all races and ethnicities in the United States, and es-
pecially the ways that shame is embodied in both the privileged and the
oppressed. Altman (2006), in fact, noted that psychoanalysis, in order to
appear more acceptable to American society, often distanced itself from
people of color in various unconscious but subtle ways. The effects of
economic class and sexual orientation (e.g., Botticelli, 2004; Cheuvront,
2013, 2014; Hartman, 2005; Layton, 2004) have also been acknowledged,
but much work remains to be done.
In 2010, Stern, demonstrating his indebtedness to Philip Bromberg’s in-
fluential contributions to trauma theory and the postmodern concept of
multiplicity in psychoanalysis (e.g., Bromberg, 1998), published Partners

in Thought. This book was dedicated to a description of how dissociative
processes, both everyday selective inattention and extreme dissociation
caused by trauma, force certain feelings, ideas, and events to remain un-
formulated. These form into multiple self states that are usually out of
awareness and unknown to one another. They remain so, Stern wrote,
until revealed by unintentional enactments during intense interactions
with others. In this view, the analyst—sometimes the recipient of the
process, sometimes the unintentional initiator—is caught up in the mu-
tual misery of an enactment by virtue of his or her own vulnerabilities,
limitations, and problems. Somehow, sometimes, through care and some

combination of skillful noticing, wisdom, and luck, the therapeutic dyad
pulls out of the enactment, is able to come to interpret the enacted
drama, and ultimately the therapy is enriched. More of the patient’s his-
tory is experienced, more self states are identified and therefore brought
into conflict with one another and, as a result, more comes to light, and
more becomes formulated, but it is mostly an unbidden process. It can-
not be forced (although wisdom and a commitment to the other can help
prepare for it): it just happens, and then the two can meet the moment
and struggle through it.
Is Multiplicity Reflection or Resistance?
A confusing aspect of the current social terrain is that at the same time
relational psychoanalysis can be interpreted as a form of resistance to the
flattened, multiple self, an important theme in current relational theory
is the concept of multiplicity and especially multiple self states. Is this a
contradiction, and if not, how can we understand the similarity between
terms? First, there are important differences between the two concepts,
as discussed briefly in footnote 2. Second, it seems obvious that a pre-
occupation with change—especially psychological change—is in the air.
Do persons in therapy change because of electrical events in the brain,
or insight and the resolution of conflict, or empathic resonance and the
internalization of a good object, or a shift in perspective? Or, is it the very
nature of the self that it is composed of multiple self states that alternate
in prominence, thereby giving the appearance of change? And what does
all this have to do with one’s identity or identities? Throughout the his-
tory of psychoanalysis, and certainly today, how psychological change is
theorized is the subject of intense interest.
However, a crucial hermeneutic insight about theory is that, whether

we draw from Freud’s tripartite model of conflict, unconscious object
relations, or dissociation, enactment, and multiple self states in order to
explain change, we will always do so by drawing from the era’s cultural-
historical traditions. From a political perspective, this is just fine, as long as
we don’t take the theory so seriously that we come to believe it transcends
our time and place. If we do make that mistake, then the particular
cultural frame of our era will be all we can see, and we will drown in
it. We will think the moral understandings and political arrangements of
our time—and the psychological ills they produce—are the only ones
possible. In doing so, we will become blind to the political causes of

our suffering, or we will explain them away by proclaiming them to
be universal unchanging elements of human culture—permanent aspects
of all human societies we can do nothing to prevent. We will simply be
reproducing the status quo without realizing it. We will think we are being
revolutionary, but we will be wrong. This is a mistake psychotherapy
theorists have made repeatedly in psychology’s relatively short history.
As long as relational theories of dissociation and multiple self states
are held lightly, not treated as objective, universal, singular truths but
recognized as historically situated, sometimes useful ways of organizing
our current world, then those theories will be differentiated from the
historical interpretation of the flattened, multiple self. Relational theories
and the current self both draw on the concept of multiplicity, but they
use it differently.
However, there is a problem if relational theories are thought to be
the latest version of the one truth—if, to borrow the critique that Lay-
ton (1990) applied to Kohut, they see appearance and call it essence.
Then the same problem arises for relational thinking that I (Cushman,
1995) have suggested arises for so many other theories of process and
change in psychotherapy: The theories, originally devised to be avenues
of liberation, instead become part of the enforcement of the political
and moral status quo. Commitment to a point of view—in this case rela-
tional psychoanalysis—is perfectly consistent with hermeneutic inquiry.
Commitment is not the problem, because commitment can and must be
questioned. From a hermeneutic perspective, our job is to respect and
learn well the traditions we were thrown into at birth and have consti-
tuted us, and then continuously and conscientiously critique them. “The
problem arises,” Stern recently observed,
when commitment becomes unthinking belief. When this happens, ideas

that were originally closely tailored to their contexts start to be treated
as timeless truths. To whatever extent the mainstream psychoanalysis of
decades ago continues to be defended by its adherents, it is being treated
as just that kind of timeless truth. Relational psychoanalysis was devised,
in part, as a corrective to that objectivism. Now the trick will be for the
new ideas to avoid the same fate. (D. B. Stern, personal communication,
February 25, 2014)
Conclusion
There is much more to relational psychoanalysis than the few contribu-

tions discussed above, but space does not allow for further elaboration.
Even so, I hope the political ramifications of these relational concepts
are by now obvious. We live in a Cartesian world that splits mind and
body, rationality and emotion, male and female, individual and commu-
nity, physical science and philosophy, objectivity and subjectivity, doctor
and patient, heterosexuality and homosexuality and—most important—
imputes to the first position in the split a privileged unquestioned right
to dominate over the second. Many other relationalists, such as Hirsch
(1997), Ghent (1989), Ogden (1990, 1997), Orange (2009, 2010), and
Racker (1988), also contributed to articulating a philosophical foundation
for the new theory that attacked Cartesianism and thereby critiqued the
therapeutic practices predicated on it. By doing so, they
1. began describing a therapeutic process much less rigid, more egal-

itarian, more personal, and one far more fitting for the last third
of the 20th century, when young Baby Boomer therapists were
coming of age professionally;
2. initiated a tradition that over time has moved some analysts into ex-
plicit opposition to the scientism and technicism that is approach-
ing hegemonic proportions in the profession of psychotherapy (for
instance, Stern’s 2012 effort that identified psychotherapy theories
with implicit moral values directly challenged the objectivist scien-
tistic claims of mainstream theory);
3. explored and extended the ramifications of relational theory into
explicit practices that have important political uses. Stern’s (1991)
application of Gadamer’s concept of dialogue, in combination with
multiculturalism’s concept of an encounter with difference (e.g.,
Cushman, 2005a, 2005b, 2009), can be thought of as a description

of how one can come to listen to foreign experiences and opposing
points of view, be open and nondefensive enough to learn from
them, and have the flexibility and integrity to shift one’s allegiances
accordingly. This is in line with the therapeutic stance Orange
(2009) called “contrite fallibilism,” Cheuvront’s (2013) description
of diaspora experiences, and Frie’s (2011) and Guignon’s (2004)
descriptions of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. In a similar
vein, Benjamin’s condemnation of “doer–done to” relations and her
subsequent valorization of “mutual recognition,” and Hoffman’s
(2009) jeremiad against “the desiccation of human experience”

provide us with glimpses into an interpersonal and international
morality of care, respect, and cooperation;
4. built a philosophical foundation from which other relationalists
could catapult relational practice into a far more explicit politi-
cal discourse, such as fighting racism, voter suppression, misog-
yny, compulsory heterosexuality, war, torture, colonial occupa-
tions, and economic stratification.
What can be seen in all this work is a consistent interpretation, a par-

ticular moral vision, of relationality. It is a vision that focuses on the
care of and engagement with the other, a recognition of the inevitable
hurts and mistakes that happen with interpersonal involvement, the hon-
est recognition of one’s culpability, the awareness of one’s imperfections
and limitations, and the importance of attempting reparation. It is an at-
tempt to resist the temptation to collude with an American status quo
that demands that therapists comply with the predominant ideology of
the moment by normalizing instead of encountering the other and pathol-
ogizing instead of contextualizing difference. There is an attempt to resist
the status quo that privileges quantification, manualization, and physical
science method over hermeneutic interpretation, emergent meaning, and
the realization that transference–countertransference dynamics are com-
mon and nonpathological clinical experiences.
My aim in this article has not been to evangelize for relational psy-
choanalysis, but to notice a historical event: What is showing up in the
site we call relational psychoanalysis is a description of processes that
bring about change, change that can be applied to political as well as
psychological life. In fact, I suppose we could say that getting better
at what Stern (1990) called “courting surprise” (i.e., developing the fa-
cility for experiencing psychological change), which could well lead to
getting better at courting political surprise (i.e., developing the facility
for creating political change, finding political allies, and entering into
collaborative political ventures with them; see, e.g., Layton, 2005).
Participating in relational psychoanalysis either as a therapist or a pa-
tient might mean that one has begun preparing oneself for, or has en-
rolled in, a subtle school for political resistance. If, how, or to what
degree all this gets extended by relational psychoanalysis into explicit
political activity remains an open question. But perhaps, in some small
way, through its activities, the bedrock of democratic citizenship in the

21st century might be strengthened. Because democracy in the United
States is now seriously in doubt, various attempts to develop an engaged,
knowledgeable, self-reflective, respectful, humble, and yes, relational
citizenry—like the practices of relational psychoanalysis are essential el-
ements in the reclaiming and rebuilding of democracy. The viability, the
very survival, of a democratic peace-seeking Western society might well
depend on the success or failure of those types of brave but uncertain
ventures.
As mentioned earlier, Butler noted that “[l]oss has made a tenuous ‘we’
of us all” (Butler, 2009, p. 20). But realize that Butler’s statement highlights
both the heartbreaking limits and exquisite possibilities of human life: a
tenuous “we” is far preferable to no “we”—and perhaps it is the most
we can hope for or aspire to in our current historical moment, as we
hurtle through the enormity of space on our little blue planet, trapped
and liberated as we are—tragically, beautifully, always and forever east
of Eden.
Acknowledgment
An earlier version of this article was presented at the symposium “Psy-
choanalysis and Social Theory,” Simon Fraser University, Institute for the
Humanities, November 16, 2013.
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Contemporary Psychoanalysis

ISSN: 0010-7530 (Print) 2330-9091 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uucp20

Relational Psychoanalysis as Political Resistance

Philip Cushman Ph.D.

To cite this article: Philip Cushman Ph.D. (2015) Relational Psychoanalysis

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00107530.2015.1056076

Published online: 18 Sep 2015.

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Download by: [Joshua Davis] Date: 06 November 2015, At: 12:24

PHILIP CUSHMAN, Ph.D.

RELATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AS POLITICAL

Abstract. The intellectual movement known as the interpretative turn is used to

Keywords: relational, hermeneutics, neoliberal, dialogue, proceduralism, instru-

S ocial theory, especially feminist, critical, postmodern, and hermeneu-

on the intellectual movement called the interpretative turn (e.g., Hiley,

“proven” to be the one effective practice for a specific therapeutic mo-

Hermeneuticists suggest that each social terrain is like a room that is

how to do so. Thus, political resistance sometimes appears in surprising

has imposed a regime of privatization and commercialization that has

time. They are 1) the neoliberal proceduralization of American society

I do not mean to suggest that relationality, as a thing in and of itself, is

A Brief Historical Overview

As many historians have noted (e.g., Lears, 1983; Susman, 1984), by

to a collaborative style about interpersonal or intersubjective events. All

Of course, it is not by chance that, even in psychoanalysis, some

in theoretical moves carefully buttressed by textual support from ear-

it privileges quantified outcomes research that produces what is called

proper comportment of humans that oppose the emerging technicist,

In fact, Botticelli (2004) argued that important characteristics of rela-

What Kinds of Resistance?

the Bush—and now Obama—administrations’ torture practices.4

Our Historical Moment: Consumerism, Electronics, and Technicism

world that warrant immediate attention; they call out to us as citizens

And the continuing wounds to a putatively American exceptionalism pro-

From Emptiness to Multiplicity

It seems imperative that we explore the puzzling way Americans are

and purchasing various consumer products that contribute to that avoid-

took out after him.

as poorly functioning computers that need an infusion of electronic or

enables, saves the day.

Many political observers have commented on the increase in working-

be entertained. Americans are isolated individualists who usually don’t

academics—visions best thought of as different, perhaps wrong, but not

Susie Orbach (2008) recently suggested that usually when relational

and influence one another and in the process experience meaningful

multiplicity in psychoanalysis (e.g., Bromberg, 1998), published Partners

limitations, and problems. Somehow, sometimes, through care and some

Is Multiplicity Reflection or Resistance?

However, a crucial hermeneutic insight about theory is that, whether

possible. In doing so, we will become blind to the political causes of

when commitment becomes unthinking belief. When this happens, ideas

There is much more to relational psychoanalysis than the few contribu-

1. began describing a therapeutic process much less rigid, more egal-

Cushman, 2005a, 2005b, 2009), can be thought of as a description

(2009) jeremiad against “the desiccation of human experience”

What can be seen in all this work is a consistent interpretation, a par-