BEFORE THE HON’BLE FAMILY COURT OF DELHI

IN THE MATTER OF

VINOD

(PETITIONER)

V.

SHILPA

(DEFENDANT)

COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER-

1.

2.

3.

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Abbreviation 3

2 Index of Authorities 4-6

3 Statement of Jurisdiction 7-8

4 Statement of Facts 9

5 Issues 10

6 Summary of Pleadings 11-12

7 Written Pleadings 13-20

8 Prayer 21

2
ABBREVIATIONS

& And

¶ Paragraph

AIR All India Reporter

ALL Allahabad

Anr. Another

AP Andhra Pradesh

Art. Article

Cr. Criminal

Edn. Edition

Govt. Government

HMA Hindu Marriage Act

Hon‟ble Honourable

i.e. That is

No. Number

PC Privy Council

SC Schedule Caste

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

u/s Under Section

v. Versus

Vol. Volume

www World Wide Web

3
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

1. Rajini v. Ram swaroop (1995) 2 Civ LJ 74 (All).

2. P ardy v. P ardy(1939) 3 All ER 779.
3. Dave Kantilal v. Bai Indumati AIR 1956 SC 115.
4. Santosh Kumar Pandey v. Ananya Pandey, AIR 2013 Chh 95
5. Jiva Magan v. Bai Jethi, AIR 1941 Bom 535;
6. Parbia Ram v. Thopli, AIR 1966 HP 20;
7. Ravinder Kumar v. Kamal Kanta, (1976) HLR 380;
8. Inder Yash v. Manjeet Kaur, (1980) HLR 251.
9. Gajar Narain Bhura v. Kanbi Kunverbai Parbat, AIR 1997 Guj 185;
10. Harvinder Kaur v. Gursewak Singh, (1998) AIHC 1013 (P&H).
11. Chitralekha Kunju v. Shiba Kunju, (1998) II DMC 454 (Bom- DB).
12. Asutosh Mookerjee, Marriage Seperation and Divorce, Ed. 4, 2008, Kamal Law House, Pg-
96.
13. SMT. SAROJ RANI VS. SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA (1984) AIR 1562: 1985
SCR (1) 303
14. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710

BOOKS

1. A.G.Gupte, Hindu Law, (1st ED. : 2003) (Premier Publishers Delhi)

2. Acharya Shuklendra, “Hindu Law”, Reprint 2009, Modern Law Publications, New

Delhi
3. Anjani Kant, “Women and the Law”, A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi

4. Asaf A.A.Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, (5th ED. : 2008) (Oxford

University Press New Delhi)

5. Dr. Paras Diwan, “Family Law”, Ninth Edition, 2009, Allahabad Law Agency

6. Dr.Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce, (5th ED. : 2008), (Universal Law

4
 Publishing Co)

7. M.N. Srinivasan‟s, “Commentary on The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955”, Second

Edition, Delhi Law House

8. M.N.Das, Marriage and Divorce, (6th ED. : 2002) (Eastern Law House New

Delhi)
9. S.P.Gupte, Hindu Law in British India, (2nd ED. : 1947) (Premier Publishers

Delhi)
10. V.P. Bharatiya, Syed Khalid Rashid‟s Muslim Law, (4th ED. : 2004) (Eastern

Book Company Lucknow)

11. Mayne‟s, Treaties on Hindu law and Uses, Edn.17th, (Bharat Law House) 2014

JOURNALS REFERRED

1. All India Reporter

4. Supreme Court Cases

3. Indian Law Reporter

2. Supreme Court Cases

DATABASE REFERRED

1. www.judis.nic.in

2. www.lexisnexis.com

3. www.manupatrafast.com

4. www.scconline.com

5
 LEGAL DICTIONARY
1. Aiyer P.R., Advanced Law Lexicon, (3rd ed., 2005)

2. Garner B.A., Black‟s Law Dictionary, (9th ed., 2009)

3. Greenberg Daniel, Stroud‟s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, (4th ed.),
Sweet and Maxwell, Vol. 4
4. Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, (7th ed., 2008)

6
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONER HAS APPROACHED THIS HON’BLE FAMILY COURT OF DELHI

UNDER SECTION 7 OF FAMILY COURTS ACT, 1984

Section 7 in The Family Courts Act, 1984

7. Jurisdiction.-
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- -(1) Subject to the other
provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall-"
(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate
civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the
nature referred to in the explanation; and
(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district
court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction
of the Family Court extends. Explanation.-The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-
section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:-
(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage
(declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or
restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;
(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the
matrimonial status of any person;
(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the
parties or of either of them;
(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital
relationship;
(e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person;
(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;
(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or
access to, any minor.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise-

7
(a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to
order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974); and
(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.

8
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Vinod and Shilpa got married in the year 1990. At the time of marriage, Vinod was getting
Rs 3500/- per month as his salary from the firm M/s Jain and Company, whereas Shilpa was
working with a multinational company and earning Rs 7000 per month and as well as other
perks. Both were posted at Jaipur.

Subsequently, Vinod got a lucrative job in Delhi where his salary was Rs 6000/- per month.
After joining, he requested his wife to resign from her job and move over to Delhi but the
request was refused by Shilpa on one pretext or the other. She thought that it was necessary
for her to retain the job at Jaipur as her husband’s income was not sufficient to maintain the
family. Further, despite the marriage subsisting for 4 yours, the couple was not having a
child. Though earlier Shilpa at her insistence and initiative got her pregnancy terminated
medically, thrice during the last four years. When Vinod was anxious for a child. Shilpa is of
the opinion that in the initial years of her career she is not ready for a child and she will not
be able to handle both.

Greatly perturbed by the turn of events in the marital life, Vinod files a petition for restitution
of conjugal rights against Shilpa, and in the alternative prays for grant of Divorce on the
ground of wife’s cruelty. Per contra, Shilpa contends that she has a right of equality under
Article 14 of the Constitution and thus, a right to continue her job. Furthermore she contends
that to have a child on the insistence of her husband would be violative of Article 21 which
guarantees right to personal liberty.

Argue the application before the family Court of Delhi.

9
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS BE GRANTED TO

VINOD?

3. WHETHER THE ACT OF WIFE AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY?

10
 SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

A. The respondent has been causing mental cruelty to the petitioner.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Family Court that the respondent has been causing
mental cruelty to the petitioner since the very beginning. She even aborted the child four
times even after continuous warning from her husband. She has never given any importance
to her husband as she had always given reasons for abortion.

B. There has been desertion on the part of wife.

Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with desertion as a ground
for divorce and the explanation of the same reads: “The expression “desertion” means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent of or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect
of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and
cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly”. There are mainly four basic elements
which are primarily to be satisfied to constitute desertion. The first two are to be present in
the deserting spouse.1

1. The fact of separation (factum deserdendi)

2. The intention to desert ( animus deserdendi)

2. WHETHER THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS BE GRANTED

TO VINOD?

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for the restitution of the conjugal rights.
The aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the District Court, for the restitution of
conjugal rights. One of the important implications of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 is that it provides an opportunity to an aggrieved party to apply for maintenance under

1
Dr. P. Diwan and P. Diwan, Modern Hind u Law (Codified and Uncodified) (12th edn.,Haryana:Allahabad
Law Agency, 1998) at118.

11
Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Maintenance can also be obtained by the party
in case when the action is pending under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. So, a
wife who does not want a judicial separation or disruption of marriage can attain maintenance
from her husband without filing a suit for the same under the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956.2 Another important implication of the section is that it provides a
ground for divorce under Section 13(1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on a condition that
there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between them for a period of one year or more
after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.

3. WHETHER THE ACT OF WIFE AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY?

In Bhagat v Bhagat3, the Honorable Supreme Court defined Mental Cruelty as "that conduct
which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not
possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a
nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. ”

In this case, there has been cruelty because-

1. The wife has been living away from her husband on the pretext of job and thus
depriving him of all matrimonial rights and duties.
2. The wife has been not ready to deliver since 4 years owing to the status that she is not
ready for the baby.

All these constitute cruelty.

2
Santosh Kumar Pandey v. Ananya Pandey, AIR 2013 Chh 95
3
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710

12
 WRITTEN PLEADINGS

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE?

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the present petition is maintainable.

Marriage under all matrimonial laws is union imposing upon each of the spouses certain
marital duties and gives to each of them certain legal rights. The necessary implication of
marriage is that parties will live together. Each spouse is entitled to comfort consortium of the
other. So after the solemnisation of the marriage if either of the spouses without reasonable
excuse withdraws himself or herself from the society of the other then aggrieved party has a
legal right to file a petition in the matrimonial court for restitution of conjugal rights. The
court after hearing the petition of the aggrieved spouse, on being satisfied that there is no
legal ground why the application shall be refused and on being satisfied of the truth of the
statements made in the petition may pass a decree of restitution of conjugal rights.

A decree of restitution of conjugal rights implies that the guilty party is ordered to live with
the aggrieved party. Restitution of conjugal rights is the only remedy which could be used by
the deserted spouse against the other. A husband or wife can file a petition for restoration of
their rights to cohabit with the other spouse. But the execution of the decree of restitution of
conjugal rights is very difficult. The court though is competent to pass a decree of restitution
of conjugal rights, but it is powerless to have its specific performance by any law. The non-
compliance of the issued decree results to constructive destruction on the part of the erring
spouse. At present as per the provisions available under the Indian personal laws, the
aggrieved party move a petition for a decree of divorce after one year from the date of the
passing of the decree and the competent court can pass a decree of divorce in favour of the
aggrieved party. The decree of restitution of conjugal rights can be enforced by the
attachment of property, and if the party complained against still does not comply, the Court
may also punish him or her for contempt of court. But under no circumstances the court can
force the erring spouse to consummate marriage. Decree of restitution of conjugal rights
could be passed in case of valid marriages only.

13
 A. The respondent has been causing mental cruelty to the petitioner.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Family Court that the respondent has been causing
mental cruelty to the petitioner since the very beginning. She even aborted the child four
times even after continuous warning from her husband. She has never given any importance
to her husband as she had always given reasons for abortion.

B. There has been desertion on the part of wife.

Section 13(1) (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 deals with desertion as a ground
for divorce and the explanation of the same reads: “The expression “desertion” means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent of or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect
of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and
cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly”. There are mainly four basic elements
which are primarily to be satisfied to constitute desertion. The first two are to be present in
the deserting spouse.4

 The fact of separation (factum deserdendi)

 The intention to desert ( animus deserdendi)

Desertion is a state which occurs only on the co-existence of both of these elements. If
either of these two ingredients is absent, the petition for divorce on desertion
fails.5The interesting phenomenon in desertion is that either of the elements can precede
the other; however, desertion will result only when both coincide and form a union.6 When a
petition is filed, the first step is proving the fact of separation and the intention separately
while the second step is to prove their union. It is fairly easy to prove the physical act of
separation either from the conductor from the state of minds. The difficulty arises on proving
the animus i.e. the intention for desertion. This intention is required throughout the period of
desertion. The petitioner is expected to prove intention through conduct as a person’s mind

4
Dr. P. Diwan and P. Diwan, Modern Hind u Law (Codified and Uncodified) (12th edn.,Haryana:Allahabad
Law Agency, 1998) at118.
5
Rajini v. Ram swaroop (1995) 2 Civ LJ 74 (All).
6
P ardy v. P ardy(1939) 3 All ER 779.

14
cannot be read. In this process, there are two ways in which the deserting spouse has an
opportunity to misuse the position of law:

There exist cases where the separation was consensual (like when the husband is on a
voyage) with no animus to desert7.While separated, one of the spouses may develop the
intention to bring an end to the cohabitation permanently on the expiry of the
consensual period. With the separation and the consequent formation of intention, the act of
desertion commences which the deserted spouse is expected to prove. The exact duration of
supervening intention is difficult to prove thereby giving an edge to the deserting spouse, and
the deserted spouse is in a worse off position as she had consented to something she could
not object(like a husband leaving for a business trip).8 The quality of permanence in intention
to leave the matrimonial home is one of the essential sub-elements in desertion which
differentiate it from wilful separation. If there is just temporary separation without the
intention to leave permanently, there is no desertion.9

Hence, the petition is maintainable.

7
S. M. Cretney, Principles of Family Law (2nd edn., London:Sweetand Maxwell, 1976) at105-106.
8
Dave Kantilal v. Bai Indumati AIR 1956 SC 115.
9
S. A. Desai, Mulla Hindu Law:II (17thedn., New Delhi:Butterworths, 1998) at 797

15
 2. WHETHER THE RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS BE GRANTED
TO VINOD?

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides for the restitution of the conjugal rights.
The aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the District Court, for the restitution of
conjugal rights. One of the important implications of Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955 is that it provides an opportunity to an aggrieved party to apply for maintenance under
Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Maintenance can also be obtained by the party
in case when the action is pending under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. So, a
wife who does not want a judicial separation or disruption of marriage can attain maintenance
from her husband without filing a suit for the same under the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956.10 Another important implication of the section is that it provides a
ground for divorce under Section 13(1A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on a condition that
there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between them for a period of one year or more
after the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The legal grounds for refusing
to grant relief are:

 For instance, any ground on which the respondent could have asked for a decree for
judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce;
 Reasonable excuse for withdrawing from the society of the petitioner;
 Any conduct on the part of the petitioner or fact tantamount to the petitioner taking
advantage of his or her own wrong or any disability for the purpose of such relief;
 Unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding.

The fundamental rule of matrimonial law that one spouse is at liberty to the society and
comfort of the other spouse, forms the foundation of the right to bring a suit for the restitution
of conjugal rights. The court has the duty of granting a decree for restitution in the cases
where either spouse has abandoned or withdrawn from the society of the other. When the
question arises whether there has been reasonable excuse for the withdrawal of the
respondent from the society of the aggrieved party, the burden of proving reasonable excuse
shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society. But this concept is only
secondary in nature11. The primary object of showing proof or onus rests with the petitioner.
Once the petitioner has proved his/her case, the burden of proof then shifts to the other party

10
Santosh Kumar Pandey v. Ananya Pandey, AIR 2013 Chh 95
11
Jiva Magan v. Bai Jethi, AIR 1941 Bom 535; Parbia Ram v. Thopli, AIR 1966 HP 20; Ravinder Kumar v.
Kamal Kanta, (1976) HLR 380; Inder Yash v. Manjeet Kaur, (1980) HLR 251.

16
to prove the defence of a ‘reasonable excuse or cause’. Here the term ‘society’ corresponds to
cohabitation, and ‘withdrawal’ signifies cessation of that cohabitation and bringing to end
consortium. This must be a voluntary act of the respondent.12

In Sushila Bai v. Prem Narayan, the husband deserted his wife and thereafter was totally
unresponsive towards her. This behaviour was held sufficient to show that he had withdrawn
from the society of his wife, and therefore the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights
was allowed. The defence to this principle lies in the concept of a ‘reasonable excuse’13. If
the respondent has withdrawn from the society of his spouse for a valid reason, it is a
complete defence to a restitution petition. The court will normally order restitution of
conjugal rights if:

 The petitioner proves that the respondent spouse has without reasonable excuse
withdrawn from his/her society
 The statements made by the aggrieved spouse in the application are true, and
 There is no legal ground why the petitioner’s prayer should not be granted.

The court has held in various cases that the following situations will amount to a reasonable
excuse to act as a defence in this area:

A ground for relief in any matrimonial cause.

A matrimonial misconduct not amounting to a ground of a matrimonial cause, if sufficiently

weighty and grave.14

Such an act, omission or conduct which makes it impossible for the petitioner to live with the
respondent.

It is significant to note that unlike a decree of specific performance of contract, for restitution
of conjugal rights, the sanction is provided by the court where the disobedience to such a
decree is willful that is deliberate, in spite of opportunities.

Smt. Saroj Rani v/s Sudarshan Kumar Chadha15 was decided on 8th August 1984. It is
considered landmark because it challenged the constitutional validity of Section 9 of the

12
Gajar Narain Bhura v. Kanbi Kunverbai Parbat, AIR 1997 Guj 185; see also Harvinder Kaur v. Gursewak
Singh, (1998) AIHC 1013 (P&H).
13
Chitralekha Kunju v. Shiba Kunju, (1998) II DMC 454 (Bom- DB).
14
Asutosh Mookerjee, Marriage Seperation and Divorce, Ed. 4, 2008, Kamal Law House, Pg- 96.
15
SMT. SAROJ RANI VS. SUDARSHAN KUMAR CHADHA (1984) AIR 1562: 1985 SCR (1) 303

17
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 wherein the two-judge bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of
India upheld the validity of Restitution of Conjugal Rights enshrined under the Act.

This judgment thus concerns itself with the following Act/Sections:

(1) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955- Section 9

(2) Constitution of India- Article 13, Article 14 and Article 21

The Court held therefore quite apart from the fact that there was no pleading which is a
serious and fatal mistake, there is no scope of giving any opportunity of amending the
pleadings. Therefore, no amendments to pleadings. Further, Court said – We reach this
conclusion without any mental compunction because it is evident that for whatever be the
reasons this marriage has broken down and the parties can no longer live together as husband
and wife if such is the situation it is better to close the chapter. This is so as an inducement by
the court in appropriate case when the court has decreed restitution for conjugal rights and
that the court can only decree if there is no just reason for not passing decree for
restitution of conjugal rights to offer inducement for the husband or wife to live together in
order to give them an opportunity to settle up the matter amicably. It serves a social purpose
as an aid to the prevention of break-up of the marriage. It cannot be viewed in the manner the
learned single judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court has viewed it and we are therefore unable
to accept the position that Section 9 of the said Act is violative of Article 14 or Article 21 of
the Constitution if the purpose of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights in the said Act is
understood in its proper perspective and if the method of its execution in cases of
disobedience is kept in view.

18
3. WHETHER THE ACT OF WIFE AMOUNTS TO CRUELTY?

It is humbly submitted to this Honorable Court that the actions of respondent do amounts to
Mental Cruelty. According to the Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 which defines the
grounds for divorce which is available to both the parties to the marriage and one of the
grounds available to both parties to a marriage is ‘cruelty’. That is the ground on which the
appellant herein, had filed an application for a decree of divorce. Every matrimonial conduct,
which may cause annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere trivial irritations,
quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount to
cruelty. Cruelty in matrimonial life may be of unfounded variety, which can be subtle or
brutal. It may be words, gestures or by mere silence, violent or non-violent.

To constitute cruelty, the conduct complained of should be "grave and weighty" so as to

come to the conclusion that the petitioner spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with
the other spouse. It must be something more serious than "ordinary wear and tear of married
life". The conduct taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be
examined to reach the conclusion whether the conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in
the matrimonial law. Conduct has to be considered, as noted above, in the background of
several factors such as social status of parties, their education, physical and mental
conditions, customs and traditions. It is difficult to lay down a precise definition or to give
exhaustive description of the circumstances, which would constitute cruelty. It must be of the
type as to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the relationship between the parties had
deteriorated to such extent due to the conduct of the other spouse that it would be impossible
for them to live together without mental agony, torture or distress, to entitle the complaining
spouse to secure divorce. Physical violence is not absolutely essential to constitute cruelty
and a consistent course of conduct inflicting immeasurable mental agony and torture may
well constitute cruelty. Mental cruelty may consist of verbal abuses and insults by using
filthy and abusive language leading to constant disturbance of mental peace of the other
party.

Section 13(1)(1-a) specifically states that:- (1) Any marriage solemnized, whether before or
after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the
wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party(i-a) has, after the
solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty.

19
The term ‘Cruelty’ constitutes both acts of Physical and Mental cruelty. Even though the act
doesn’t define mental cruelty as such, the Apex court has in ample verdicts defined and
established the grounds for mental cruelty.

In Bhagat v Bhagat16, the Honorable Supreme Court defined Mental Cruelty as "that conduct
which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain and suffering as would make it not
possible for that party to live with the other. In other words, mental cruelty must be of such a
nature that the parties cannot reasonably be expected to live together. ”

In this case, there has been cruelty because-

3. The wife has been living away from her husband on the pretext of job and thus
depriving him of all matrimonial rights and duties.
4. The wife has been not ready to deliver since 4 years owing to the status that she is not
ready for the baby.

All these constitute cruelty.

16
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710

20
 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, the Counsels on behalf of the Petitioner humbly pray before this
Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. The petition is allowed

2. To declare restitution of conjugal rights.

Or pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the light of equity, justice
and good conscience and for this Act of kindness of Your Lordships the Petitioner
shall as duty bound ever pray.

Sd/-

Counsels for the Petitioner

21