Spouses Genato v.

Viola
February 5, 2010
GR No. 169706

SUMMARY: 34 individuals including Viola against Sps. Genato for the alleged refusal of the latter to accept
amortization payments verified a complaint. HLURB granted the motion of the individuals against the Spouses. On the
other hand, since Viola would have to pay the Spouses Genato, HLURB seized her property but subsequently granted
Violas Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. OP Affirmed. CA Affirmed. The issue in this is whether the HLURB
acquired jurisdiction over Viola eventhough she was not included in the title of the complaint. Yes, For clarity, the
complaint should have been amended to reflect in the title the individual complainants. There being a "defect in
the designation of the parties", its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the action provided no
prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. In the present case, the specification of the individual complainants
in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. Only their names were omitted in the
title but they were already parties to the case, most importantly, they were heard through their counsel whom they
themselves chose to prepare the complaint and represent them in the case before the HLURB. No unfairness or surprise
to the complainants, including Viola, or to the Sps. Genato would result by allowing the amendment, the purpose of
which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to correct a technical error.

DOCTRINE: If the error or defect is merely formal and not substantial, an amendment to cure such defect is expressly
authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

NATURE:
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners assail the September 9, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89466 which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President. The Office of the President
affirmed the Decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), First Division which granted the
motion to quash the writ of execution issued in HLURB Case No. REM-102491-4959 (REM-A-950426-0059).

FACTS:
A complaint titled "VILLA REBECCA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. versus MR. WILLIAM GENATO
and spouse REBECCA GENATO" was filed with the HLURB. The said complaint was verified by 34 individuals,
including the respondent herein, who referred to themselves as the "Complainants" who "caused the preparation of the
foregoing Complaint". The complaint stated that on various dates, complainants executed Contracts to Sell and/or
Lease Purchase Agreements with the Sps. Genato pertaining to housing units in Villa Rebecca Homes Subdivision.
Sometime thereafter the HLURB issued a cease and desist order (CDO) enjoining the collection of amortization
payments. This CDO was subsequently lifted. Thereafter, complainants went to the Sps. Genato with the intention of
resuming their amortization payments. The latter however refused to accept their payments and instead demanded for a
lump sum payment of all the accrued amortizations which fell due during the effectivity of the CDO.

From the disorganized, bordering on incomprehensible, complaint, it can be gleaned that the following reliefs are
prayed for: 1) That Sps. Genato accept the complainants' monthly amortization payments corresponding to the period of
effectivity of the (subsequently lifted) CDO, without any penalty; 2) That the computation of interest on delinquent
payments be at 3% per month and not compounded; 3) That Sps. Genato be responsible for correcting the deficiencies
in the construction and replacement of sub-standard materials to conform with the plans and specifications; 4) That Sps.
Genato be held answerable/liable to make good their undertaking to provide individual deep wells for the homeowners;
5) That Sps. Genato be responsible for maintaining the street lights and payment of the corresponding electric bills; 6)
That Sps. Genato maintain the contract price of the units for sale and not increase the prices; and 7) That Sps. Genato
be made accountable for the unregistered dwelling units.

HOUSING ARBITER RULED IN FAVOR OF THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS BUT MR GRANTED

Ordering complainants to resume payment of their monthly amortization from date hereof pursuant to the agreement.
Likewise, it is hereby ordered that respondents (herein petitioner) correct the deficiencies in the construction of the
complaining occupants' units so as to conform to that which is specified in the plans and specification of the buildings,
as well as observe proper drainage requirements pursuant to law. Likewise, respondents are hereby directed to
immediately put up commercial wells and/or water pumps or facilities in the Villa Rebecca Subdivision and to
reimburse complainants and unit occupants of their total expenditures incurred for their water supply. On appeal to the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Decision was modified, inter alia, by the additional directive for the
complainants to pay 3% interest per month for the unpaid amortizations due from June 29, 1991.

This Decision, after being revised and then reinstated, subsequently became final and executory.
Arbiter Torres issued the Writ of Execution. In connection therewith, the sheriff seized Rita Viola's two delivery trucks
and 315 sacks of rice. Respondent Viola then filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Execution, with Prayers for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, Clarification and Computation of Correct Amount of Money Judgment and Allowance
of Appeal. After various incidents and pleadings by the opposing parties, the two trucks were ordered released. The 315
sacks of rice, however, were sold at public auction to the highest bidder,petitioner Rebecca Genato in the amount of
P189,000.00. On December 15, 2000, Arbiter Torres issued an Order denying respondent Viola's motion to quash the
writ of execution and directed her to pay the Sps. Genato the amount of P739,133.31.

UPON APPEAL OF VIOLA TO HLURB FIRST DIVISION: The movants' respective Motions to Quash the Writ of
Execution are hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Orders dated December 15, [2000] are hereby SET ASIDE. The
respondents are directed to credit as payment the value of the 315 sacks of rice in the amount of P318,500.00, which
were seized and auctioned to the account of movant Viola.

OP AFFIRMED HLURB FIRST DIVISION

CA AFFIRMED OP

ISSUES:
1. Whether CA erred in ruling that the HLURB has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Rita Viola?
– Yes!
2. Whether after the decision has become final and executory the HLURB could still rule on the lack of jurisdiction
over the person of Rita Viola? – No!
3. Whether respondent Viola can claim an amount higher than what appears on sheriffs certificate of sale? – No!
4. Whether that findings of facts and conclusions of any adjudicative body should be considered as binding and
conclusive on the appellate court, is applicable in the case at bar? – No!

Petitioners'Arguments

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in applying the case of Duero v. Court of Appeals, which held that the lack of
jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived. They submit that "jurisdiction of the court over an action" is
different from "jurisdiction over the person". They say that the latter was what the HLURB was referring to because it
stated that Rita Viola was never impleaded. They contend that jurisdiction over the person can be conferred by consent
expressly or impliedly given, as in the case of Rita Viola.

Petitioners also assert that the HLURB Decision subject of the writ of execution has long been final and executory,
hence, said Decision can no longer be modified. They further assert that the execution of the said Decision is a
ministerial duty of the HLURB.

Petitioners further argue that the best evidence of the value of the 315 sacks of rice seized and auctioned off is the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; hence the Board's ruling crediting to the account of Viola an amount other than that stated
in the Certificate of Sale has no sound basis.

Finally, the petitioners contend that the findings and conclusions of an adjudicative body resulting from an erroneous
application of law are not binding on the appellate courts.

Respondent'sArguments

On the other hand, respondent contends that the HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person since she was not
a party to the case; hence, the HLURB decision is a nullity as against her and therefore never acquired finality. With a
void judgment, the resultant execution was likewise void.

She also argues that, since the levy and auction were illegal, the correct valuation of the 315 sacks of rice is not the
price paid at the auction but its actual value of P318,500.00.

HELD:
1. The HLURB acquired jurisdiction over Viola
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the names of all the
parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the
rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the
names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the
body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is specially true
before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in the
courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, application or other proceedings.

Respondent Viola, although her name did not appear in the title as a party, was one of the persons who caused the
preparation of the complaint and who verified the same. The allegations in the body of the complaint indicate that she is
one of the complainants. She categorically considered, and held out, herself as one of the complainants from the time of
the filing of the complaint and up to the time the decision in the HLURB case became final and executory. To repeat,
the averments in the body of the complaint, not the title, are controlling. Hence, having been set forth in the body of the
complaint as a complainant, Viola was a party to the case.

For clarity, the complaint should have been amended to reflect in the title the individual complainants. There
being a "defect in the designation of the parties", its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the
action provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. In the present case, the specification of the
individual complainants in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity of the parties. Only their
names were omitted in the title but they were already parties to the case, most importantly, they were heard through
their counsel whom they themselves chose to prepare the complaint and represent them in the case before the HLURB.
No unfairness or surprise to the complainants, including Viola, or to the Sps. Genato would result by allowing the
amendment, the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to correct a technical error.

It is now too late to dismiss this petition, and, in effect, nullify all proceedings had before the HLURB on the ground
that Viola does not appear to have been impleaded as a party. The error or defect is merely formal and not
substantial and an amendment to cure such defect is expressly authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court.

Moreover, it was only when the final and executory judgment of the HLURB was already being executed against Viola
that she, for the first time, reversed her position; and claimed that she was not a party to the case and that the HLURB
did not acquire jurisdiction over her. Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions. Where a party, by his or
her deed or conduct, has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel effectively bars the former from
adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct that causes loss or injury to the latter. The doctrine of
estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one
to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who
reasonably relied thereon. After petitioners had reasonably relied on the representations of Viola that she was a
complainant and entered into the proceedings before the HLURB, she cannot now be permitted to impugn her
representations to the injury of the petitioners.

At this point, it may be beneficial to elaborate on the matter of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and
authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to
dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Elementary is the
distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by
virtue of the party's voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes.
Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is neither subject to agreement
nor conferred by consent of the parties. In civil case, courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the
manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.

The act of filing the complaint with the HLURB is unequivocally a voluntary submission by the complainants,
including Viola, to the authority of the HLURB. Clearly, the HLURB acquired jurisdiction over Viola, who was one of
the complainants, upon the filing of their complaint.

2. Final and executory judgment may no longer be modified

The April 27, 1999 HLURB Resolution, reinstating the December 18, 1996 Decision, has long been final and
executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The
only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this case. The HLURB
decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint and, as discussed above, with jurisdiction over the parties. Hence, the same can no longer be modified.
3. Amount to be credited on account of the sale of property levied upon

After a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court or quasi-judicial tribunal to order its
execution. In the present case, the final and executory HLURB decision was partially executed by the sale of the 315
sacks of rice belonging to Viola.

In determining the amount to be credited to the account of Viola, we look at the Sheriff's Partial Report and the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale. Both documents state that in the auction sale of the 315 sacks of rice, Mrs. Rebecca Genato
submitted the highest bid in the amount of P189,000.00. Drawing from Section 19, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
states that "all sales of property under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder," it naturally
follows that the highest bid submitted is the amount that should be credited to the account of the judgment debtor.

4. Non-applicability of the doctrine on the binding effect of findings of facts and conclusions of an adjudicative
body

Indeed findings of fact and conclusions of an adjudicative body like the HLURB, which can be considered as a trier of
facts on specific matters within its field of expertise, should be considered as binding and conclusive upon the appellate
courts. This is in addition to the fact that it was in a better position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the
contending parties and the validity of their respective evidence. However, these doctrines hold true only when such
findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.

In the present case, we find it difficult to find sufficient evidential support for the HLURB's conclusion that it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Viola. We are thus persuaded that there is ample justification to disturb the
findings of the HLURB.