Arzaga Vs Rumbaoa 1952

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-3839. June 26, 1952.]
IGNACIO ARZAGA , plaintiff-appellee, vs . EMILIO RUMBAOA, PLATON

DAMO, ESTEBAN ASENCION, ANTONIO ASENCION, DIONISIO
BATANGAN, and MARCIANO PASCUA , defendants-appellants.
Dominador R. Pedro for appellee.

Vicente Llanes for appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DEPOSIT IN COURT; DEPOSIT IN COURT IS

SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE JUDGMENT. — Although the payment was not
made or offered to defendants, it was actually made to them through the medium of
the court, because after the deposit plaintiff expressly petitioned the court that the
defendants "be notified . . . to receive . . . tender of payment." The deposit by itself alone,
may not have been su cient, but with the express terms of the petition, there was full
and complete offer of payment made directly to defendants-appellants. The petition
made the amount previously deposited available for payment and should be considered
as actual payment.
2. ID.; ID.; TENDER OF PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT INTO COURT IS NOT THE SAME
AS TENDER OF PAYMENT OF A CONTRACTUAL DEBT AND CONSIGNATION OF THE
MONEY DUE FROM A DEBTOR TO A CREDITOR. — Since tender of payment of judgment
into court is not the same as tender of payment of a contractual debt and consignation
of the money due from a debtor to a creditor, the requirements of Articles 1176 and
1177 of the Civil Code are not applicable. "In case of a refusal of a tender of the amount
due on a judgment, the court may direct the money to be paid into court, and when this
is done, order satisfaction of the judgment to be entered." (31 American Jurisprudence,
p. 362).
DECISION
LABRADOR , J : p
This appeal involves the question whether a deposit in court of the amount
required to be paid to the adverse party to secure a reconveyance is a su cient
compliance with the judgment of this Court requiring payment, or whether payment
must be made directly to the adverse party with the formalities of a consignation, in
accordance with articles 1176-1177 of the Spanish Civil Code.
The judgment of this Court reads as follows:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is modi ed so that the appellants
shall reconvey to the appellee the land described in the pleadings, on payment by
the latter, within 30 days from the date of nal entry of this judgment, . . .. Failure
by the plaintiff to pay any of these amounts within the period herein stated will
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
work as forfeiture of his right to repurchase the hereinabove-mentioned land. . . .."
(Exhibit 1; emphasis ours.).
The decision of the Court of Appeals, which it modified, provided:
". . . that within 30 days from the date on which this decision shall have
become nal, the appellee shall deposit in court or pay to the appellants the . . . ."
(Emphasis ours.).
Complying with the above judgments, counsel for plaintiff- appellee deposited
with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte the necessary amount on
December 10, 1949, and gave notice of such deposit to each and every one of the
defendants- appellants and their lawyer by letter dated January 24, 1950 (date for
payment extended to January 31, 1950). (See Annexes D-1, D-2, D-3, D- 4, D-5, D-6, D-7.)
And on January 31, 1950, said counsel led a petition with the court asking that the
amounts deposited be considered as full payment, and that the defendants be noti ed
to receive said amount and be compelled to execute the corresponding document of
conveyance in accordance with the decision. Opposition to the petition was presented
based on many grounds, among which is the failure of plaintiff-appellee to deliver, or
offer to deliver, the amount to the defendants, and his failure to make consignation in
accordance with articles 1176 and 1177 of the Spanish Civil Code. The Court of First
Instance held that the deposit with the clerk of court "had the character and effect of
actual payment in accordance with the decision of the Court of Appeals"; that articles
1176 and 1177 of the Spanish Civil Code are not applicable; and that the amount
ordered to be paid was not a debt which must be paid in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code.
It is contended on this appeal that in order that payment of the amount adjudged
may be considered as having been validly made, it should have been made directly, or
the sum delivered, to the appellants, and upon failure of the latter to receive it, the sum
to be paid, consigned in the manner provided by law and the decisions on consignation.
There is no basis for the claim that payment was not made or offered to defendants. It
was actually made to them through the medium of the court, because after deposit
plaintiff expressly petitioned the court that the defendants "be noti ed . . . to receive . . .
the tender of payment." (Record on Appeal, p. 4.) The deposit, by itself alone, may not
have been su cient, but with the express terms of the petition, there was full and
complete offer of payment made directly to defendants-appellants. The rst error
assigned in the appeal is, therefore, without any merit.
It is also contended that the date of the deposit should not be taken as the date
of actual payment. In answer it may be stated that even assuming that the fact of
deposit did not constitute payment, it appears that on January 31, 1950, the last day
xed therefor, plaintiff-appellee's counsel led his petition to require defendants-
appellants to receive the amount deposited. This petition made the amount previously
deposited available for payment and should be considered as actual payment.
The most important legal issue raised by the appellants is their claim that a
deposit in court can only be considered as payment when such deposit is made in
accordance with the requisites of consignation as provided in articles 1176 and 1177
of the Spanish Civil Code. This claim has already been rejected by this Court on the
ground that "tender of payment of judgment is not the same as tender of payment of a
contractual debt and consignation of the money due from a debtor to a creditor."
"With respect to the second assignment of error, it is obvious that tender of
payment of judgment into court is not the same as tender of payment of a
contractual debt and consignation of the money due from a debtor to a creditor,
and therefore the requirements of articles 1176 and 1177 of the Civil Code are not
applicable. 'In case of a refusal of a tender of the amount due on a judgment, the
court may direct the money to be paid into court, and when this is done, order
satisfaction of the judgment to be entered.' (31 American Jurisprudence, p. 362).
The fact that the money deposited belonged to Ponciano Ong, who succeeded by
purchase into the rights and obligations of two of the six judgment debtors, did
not make the payment inacceptable or insu cient to satisfy the judgment, for a
voluntary payment into court of money due under a judgment by one of several
obligors is a bar to an action against the others for the same debt or obligation."
(Ditto ditto.) (Antonio del Rosario, et al vs. Carlos Sandico, et al., 85 Phil., 170; 47
Off. Gaz., No. 6, pp. 2866, 2872.)
We nd the order appealed from to be justi ed by the evidence and the law, and
the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Bautista
Angelo, JJ., concur.

Arzaga Vs Rumbaoa 1952

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arzaga Vs Rumbaoa 1952

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Arzaga Vs Rumbaoa 1952

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-3839. June 26, 1952.]

IGNACIO ARZAGA , plaintiff-appellee, vs . EMILIO RUMBAOA, PLATON

Dominador R. Pedro for appellee.

1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; DEPOSIT IN COURT; DEPOSIT IN COURT IS

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

You might also like