Manarang V Ofilada
Manarang V Ofilada
Manarang V Ofilada
FACTS:
Manarang obtained a loan from Esteban, and executed a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed materials as a security. Upon
default, Estaban brought an action to foreclose the property mortgaged. At Manarang’s request, the house mortgaged was to
be sold at public auction to satisfy the debt. However, before the property could be sold, Manarang offered to pay the sum. But
the sheriff refused the tender unless the additional amount is also paid representing the publication of the notice in two
newspapers. Manarang contended that the house in question should be considered as personal property and the publication of
the notice of its sale at public auction in execution considered unnecessary. The Court of First Instance held that although real
property may sometimes be considered as personal property, the sheriff was in duty bound to cause the publication of the
notice of its sale in order to make the sale valid or to prevent its being declared void or voidable.
ISSUE:
Can the house of Manarang be classified as personal property since it was considered as such in a chattel mortgage? -- NO
HELD:
The house of mixed materials levied upon on execution, although subject of a contract of chattel mortgage between the owner
and a third person, is real property within the purview of Rule 39, section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a
permanent fixture on the land, which is real property.
There cannot be any question that a building of mixed materials may be the subject of a chattel mortgage, in which case it is
considered as between the parties as personal property. The matter depends on the circumstances and the intention of the
parties.
The general principle of law is that a building permanently fixed to the freehold becomes a part of it, that prima facie a house is
real estate, belonging to the owner of the land on which it stands, even though it was erected against the will of the landowner,
or without his consent. The general rule is otherwise, however, where the improvement is made with the consent of the
landowner, and pursuant to an understanding either expressed or implied that it shall remain personal property. Nor does the
general rule apply to a building, which is wrongfully removed from the land and placed on the land of the person removing it.
Among the principal criteria for determining whether property remains personally or becomes realty are annexation to the soil,
either actual or construction, and the intention of the parties. Personal property may retain its character as such where it is so
agreed by the parties interested even though annexed to the realty, or where it is affixed in the soil to be used for a particular
purpose for a short period and then removed as soon as it has served its purpose.
These considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the rules on execution do not allow, and we should not interpret them in
such a way as to allow, the special consideration that parties to a contract may have desired to impart to real estate, for
example, as personal property, when they are not ordinarily so. Sales on execution affect the public and third persons. The
regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of proceedings prescribed for each kind of
property is suited to its character, not to the character which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. When the rules
speak of personal property, property which is ordinarily so considered is meant; and when real property is spoken of, it means
property which is generally known as real property. The regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties,
may have privately given to the property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the convenience or
agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the proceedings. We, therefore, hold that the mere fact that
a house was the subject of a chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties does not make said
house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale at public auction. This ruling is demanded by the
need for a definite, orderly and well-defined regulation for official and public guidance and which would prevent confusion and
misunderstanding