14 CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia Inc.

3/2/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 632
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,*** Peralta, Mendoza and Sereno,**** JJ.,

concur.
Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.
Note.—Execution pending appeal in ejectment cases is

governed by Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, not
Section 2, Rule 39. (San Manuel Wood Products, Inc. vs.
Tupas, 249 SCRA 466 [1995])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 184823. October 6, 2010.*
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

vs. AICHI FORGING COMPANY OF ASIA, INC.,
respondent.
Taxation; Value Added Tax (VAT); Prescription; Tax Refunds;

Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) is
the applicable provision in determining the start of the two-year
period for claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input Value
Added Tax (VAT), and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC
are inapplicable as “both provisions apply only to instances of
erroneous payment or illegal collection of internal revenue
taxes.”—The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of the
two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been resolved
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corporation, 565 SCRA 154 (2008), where we ruled that Section
112(A) of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the
start of the two-year period for claiming
_______________
*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per

Special Order No. 897 dated September 28, 2010.
**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per

Special Order No. 903 dated September 28, 2010.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017097102b74bb61c740003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/24
* FIRST DIVISION.
423
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 423
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of

Asia, Inc.
a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C)

and 229 of the NIRC are inapplicable as “both provisions apply
only to instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of
internal revenue taxes.”
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As between the Civil
Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is composed
of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail following
the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.—In Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531 SCRA
436 (2007), we said that as between the Civil Code, which
provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and the
Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a year is
composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that must prevail
following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori. Thus:
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter—the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular
year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days
is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in
the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and
the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Same; Same; Same; Where the taxpayer did not wait for the
decision of the Commission of Internal Revenue or the lapse of the
120-day period, it having simultaneously filed the administrative
and the judicial claims, the filing of said judicial claim with the
Court of Tax Appeals is premature.—Section 112(D) of the NIRC
clearly provides that the CIR has “120 days, from the date of the
submission of the complete documents in support of the
application [for tax refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny
the claim. In case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the
taxpayer’s recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30
days from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after the
120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application for tax
refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to
424
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Asia, Inc.
appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days. In this case,
the administrative and the judicial claims were simultaneously
filed on September 30, 2004. Obviously, respondent did not wait
for the decision of the CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For
this reason, we find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA
premature.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “within
two (2) years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate
or refund” in Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the
Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR) and not to appeals made to
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)—applying the two-year period to
judicial claims would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC,
which already provides for a specific period within which a
taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR.—There
is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support respondent’s
view. Subsection (A) of the said provision states that “any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or
paid attributable to such sales.” The phrase “within two (2) years
x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund”
refers to applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not
to appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first
paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which states
that the CIR has “120 days from the submission of complete
documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B)” within which to decide on the claim. In
fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims would render
nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which already provides for
a specific period within which a taxpayer should appeal the
decision or inaction of the CIR. The second paragraph of Section
112(D) of the NIRC envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is
issued by the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2)
when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both
instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an appeal
with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in

filing an appeal with the CTA.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
425
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 425

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Bernaldo, Mirador & Directo Law Offices for
respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A taxpayer is entitled to a refund either by authority of
a statute expressly granting such right, privilege, or
incentive in his favor, or under the principle of solutio
indebiti requiring the return of taxes erroneously or
illegally collected. In both cases, a taxpayer must prove not
only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance
with the procedural due process as non-observance of the
prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative
and the judicial claims would result in the denial of his
claim.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the July 30, 2008
Decision1 and the October 6, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in the
manufacturing, producing, and processing of steel and its
by-products.3 It is registered with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) as a Value-Added Tax (VAT) entity4 and its
products, “close im-
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 31-A-43; penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova

and concurred in by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate
Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, and
Olga Palanca-Enriquez.
2 Id., at pp. 44-45.
3 Id., at p. 13.
4 Id.
426

pression die steel forgings” and “tool and dies,” are

registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a
pioneer status.5
On September 30, 2004, respondent filed a claim for
refund/credit of input VAT for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 in the total amount of P3,891,123.82
with the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR), through the Department of Finance (DOF) One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center.6
Proceedings before the Second Division of the CTA
On even date, respondent filed a Petition for Review7
with the CTA for the refund/credit of the same input VAT.
The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7065 and was
raffled to the Second Division of the CTA.
In the Petition for Review, respondent alleged that for
the period July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002, it generated
and recorded zero-rated sales in the amount of
P131,791,399.00,8 which was paid pursuant to Section
106(A) (2) (a) (1), (2) and (3) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC);9
_______________
5 Id.,
6 CTA Second Division Rollo, pp. 26-27.
7 Rollo, pp. 79-90.
8 Id., at p. 82.
9 SEC. 106. Value-added Tax on Sale of Goods or Properties.—
(A) Rate and Base of Tax.—There shall be levied, assessed and
collected on every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, a value-
added tax equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling price or
gross value in money of the goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged, such tax to be paid by the seller or transferor.
xxxx
(2) The following sales by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to
zero percent (0%) rate:
(a) Export Sales.—The term ‘export sales’ means:
(1) The sale and actual shipment of goods from the Philippines to a
foreign country, irrespective of any shipping ar-
427
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 427

that for the said period, it incurred and paid input VAT
amounting to P3,912,088.14 from purchases and
importation attributable to its zero-rated sales;10 and that
in its application for refund/credit filed with the DOF One-
Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback
Center, it only claimed the amount of P3,891,123.82.11
In response, petitioner filed his Answer12 raising the
following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative

investigation by the Bureau;
5. Petitioner must prove that it paid VAT input taxes for the period
in question;
6. Petitioner must prove that its sales are export sales contemplated
under Sections 106(A) (2) (a), and 108(B) (1) of the Tax Code of
1997;
_______________
rangement that may be agreed upon which may influence or determine

the transfer of ownership of the goods so exported and paid for in
acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in goods or services, and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
(2) Sale of raw materials or packaging materials to a nonresident
buyer for delivery to a resident local export-oriented enterprise to be used
in manufacturing, processing, packing or repacking in the Philippines of
the said buyer’s goods and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP);
(3) Sale of raw materials or packaging materials to export-oriented
enterprise whose export sales exceed seventy percent (70%) of total annual
production;
xxxx
10 Rollo, p. 82
11 Id., at pp. 82-83.
12 Id., at pp. 91-94.
428

7. Petitioner must prove that the claim was filed within the two (2)
year period prescribed in Section 229 of the Tax Code;
8. In an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is
fatal to the claim for refund; and
9. Claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant for
the same partake of the nature of exemption from taxation.13
Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the

Second Division of the CTA rendered a Decision partially
granting respondent’s claim for refund/credit. Pertinent
portions of the Decision read:
“For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to

validly claim a refund, Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, provides:
SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales.—Any
VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of
creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales,
except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input
tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x
Pursuant to the above provision, petitioner must comply with
the following requisites: (1) the taxpayer is engaged in sales
which are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated; (2) the taxpayer is
VAT-registered; (3) the claim must be filed within two years after
the close of the taxable quarter when such sales were made; and
(4) the creditable input tax due or paid must be attributable to
such sales, except the transitional input tax, to the extent that
such input tax has not been applied against the output tax.
_______________
13 Id., at p. 92.
429
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 429

Asia, Inc.
The Court finds that the first three requirements have been
complied [with] by petitioner.
With regard to the first requisite, the evidence presented by
petitioner, such as the Sales Invoices (Exhibits “II” to “II-262,”
“JJ” to “JJ-431,” “KK” to “KK-394” and “LL”) shows that it is
engaged in sales which are zero-rated.
The second requisite has likewise been complied with. The
Certificate of Registration with OCN 1RC0000148499 (Exhibit
“C”) with the BIR proves that petitioner is a registered VAT
taxpayer.
In compliance with the third requisite, petitioner filed its
administrative claim for refund on September 30, 2004 (Exhibit
“N”) and the present Petition for Review on September 30, 2004,
both within the two (2) year prescriptive period from the close of
the taxable quarter when the sales were made, which is from
September 30, 2002.
As regards, the fourth requirement, the Court finds that there
are some documents and claims of petitioner that are baseless
and have not been satisfactorily substantiated.
x x x x
In sum, petitioner has sufficiently proved that it is entitled to a
refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate representing
unutilized excess input VAT payments for the period July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002, which are attributable to its zero-rated
sales for the same period, but in the reduced amount of
P3,239,119.25, computed as follows:
Amount of Claimed Input VAT P 3,891,123.82

Less:
Exceptions as found by the ICPA 41,020.37
Net Creditable Input VAT P 3,850,103.45
Less:
Output VAT Due 610,984.20
Excess Creditable Input VAT P 3,239,119.25
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for

Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is
430

Asia, Inc.
hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT

CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner [in] the reduced amount of
THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY NINE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN AND 25/100 PESOS
(P3,239,119.25), representing the unutilized input VAT incurred
for the months of July to September 2002.
SO ORDERED.”14
Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner

filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,15 insisting that
the administrative and the judicial claims were filed
beyond the two-year period to claim a tax refund/credit
provided for under Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.
He reasoned that since the year 2004 was a leap year, the
filing of the claim for tax refund/credit on September 30,
2004 was beyond the two-year period, which expired on
September 29, 2004.16 He cited as basis Article 13 of the
Civil Code,17 which provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is equivalent to 365 days. In addition, petitioner
argued that the simultaneous filing of the administrative
and the judicial claims contravenes Sections 112 and 229 of
the NIRC.18 According to the petitioner, a prior filing of an
administrative claim is a “condition precedent”19 before a
judicial claim can be filed. He explained that the rationale
of such requirement rests not only on the doctrine of
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 53-54 and pp. 61-62.

15 Id., at pp. 95-104.
16 Id., at p. 98.
17 Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset
to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the
number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day
included.
18 Rollo, pp. 98-99.
19 Id., at p. 101.
431
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 431

exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact

that the CTA is an appellate body which exercises the
power of judicial review over administrative actions of the
BIR. 20
The Second Division of the CTA, however, denied
petitioner’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En

Banc via a Petition for Review.21
Ruling of the CTA En Banc
On July 30, 2008, the CTA En Banc affirmed the Second
Division’s Decision allowing the partial tax refund/credit in
favor of respondent. However, as to the reckoning point for
counting the two-year period, the CTA En Banc ruled:
“Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims

were filed beyond the period allowed by law and hence, the
honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the same. In addition,
petitioner further contends that respondent’s filing of the
administrative and judicial [claims] effectively eliminates the
authority of the honorable Court to exercise jurisdiction over the
judicial claim.
We are not persuaded.
Section 114 of the 1997 NIRC, and We quote, to wit:
SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-added Tax.—
(A) In General.—Every person liable to pay the value-
added tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly
return of the amount of his gross sales or receipts within
twenty-five (25) days following the close of each taxable
quarter prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however,
That VAT-registered persons shall pay the value-added tax
on a monthly basis.
[x x x x ]
Based on the above-stated provision, a taxpayer has twenty
five (25) days from the close of each taxable quarter within which
to file a quarterly return of the amount of his gross sales or
receipts. In
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 100-101.

21 Id., at pp. 105-118.
432

Asia, Inc.
the case at bar, the taxable quarter involved was for the period of
July 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002. Applying Section 114 of the
1997 NIRC, respondent has until October 25, 2002 within which
to file its quarterly return for its gross sales or receipts [with]
which it complied when it filed its VAT Quarterly Return on
October 20, 2002.
In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period

provided under Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC should start from
the payment of tax subject claim for refund. As stated above,
respondent filed its VAT Return for the taxable third quarter of
2002 on October 20, 2002. Thus, respondent’s administrative and
judicial claims for refund filed on September 30, 2004 were filed
on time because AICHI has until October 20, 2004 within which
to file its claim for refund.
In addition, We do not agree with the petitioner’s contention
that the 1997 NIRC requires the previous filing of an
administrative claim for refund prior to the judicial claim. This
should not be the case as the law does not prohibit the
simultaneous filing of the administrative and judicial claims for
refund. What is controlling is that both claims for refund must be
filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
In sum, the Court En Banc finds no cogent justification to
disturb the findings and conclusion spelled out in the assailed
January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008 Resolution of the
CTA Second Division. What the instant petition seeks is for the
Court En Banc to view and appreciate the evidence in their own
perspective of things, which unfortunately had already been
considered and passed upon.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the January 4, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2008
Resolution of the CTA Second Division in CTA Case No. 7065
entitled, “AICHI Forging Company of Asia, Inc. petitioner vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent” are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.”22
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc

denied23 his Motion for Reconsideration.
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 41-43.

23 Id., at pp. 44-45.
433
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 433

Issue
Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes

the issue of whether respondent’s judicial and
administrative claims for tax refund/credit were filed
within the two-year prescriptive period provided in
Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.24
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner maintains that respondent’s administrative
and judicial claims for tax refund/credit were filed in
violation of Sections 112(A) and 229 of the NIRC.25 He
posits that pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code,26 since
the year 2004 was a leap year, the filing of the claim for tax
refund/credit on September 30, 2004 was beyond the two-
year period, which expired on September 29, 2004.27
Petitioner further argues that the CTA En Banc erred in
applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in determining the
start of the two-year period as the said provision pertains
to the compliance requirements in the payment of VAT.28
He asserts that it is Section 112, paragraph (A), of the
same Code that should apply because it specifically
provides for the period within which a claim for tax refund/
credit should be made.29
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the fact that the
administrative claim with the BIR and the judicial claim
with the CTA were filed on the same day.30 He opines that
the simultaneous filing of the administrative and the
judicial claims contravenes Section 229 of the NIRC, which
requires the prior
_______________
24 Id., at p. 19.
25 Id.
26 Supra note p. 17.
27 Rollo, p. 21.
28 Id., at p. 22.
29 Id.
30 Id., at p. 24.
434

filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such

procedural requirement is based on the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the
CTA is an appellate body exercising judicial review over

administrative actions of the CIR.32
Respondent’s Arguments
For its part, respondent claims that it is entitled to a
refund/credit of its unutilized input VAT for the period July
1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 as a matter of right because
it has substantially complied with all the requirements
provided by law.33 Respondent likewise defends the CTA
En Banc in applying Section 114(A) of the NIRC in
computing the prescriptive period for the claim for tax
refund/credit. Respondent believes that Section 112(A) of
the NIRC must be read together with Section 114(A) of the
same Code.34
As to the alleged simultaneous filing of its
administrative and judicial claims, respondent contends
that it first filed an administrative claim with the One-Stop
Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the DOF before it filed a judicial claim with the CTA.35
To prove this, respondent points out that its Claimant
Information Sheet No. 4970236 and BIR Form No. 1914 for
the third quarter of 2002,37 which were filed with the DOF,
were attached as Annexes “M” and “N,” respectively, to the
Petition for Review filed with the CTA.38 Respondent
further contends that the non-observance of the 120-day
period given to the CIR to act on the claim for tax
refund/credit in Section 112(D) is not fatal because what
_______________
31 Id.
32 Id., at p. 25.
33 Id., at pp. 161-162.
34 Id., at p. 164.
35 Id., at p. 166.
36 CTA Second Division Rollo, p. 26.
37 Id., at p. 27.
38 Rollo, p. 166.
435
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 435

is important is that both claims are filed within the two-

year prescriptive period.39 In support thereof, respondent
cites Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling
Co., Inc.40 where it was ruled that “[i]f, however, the [CIR]
takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two

years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be
started in the [CTA] before the end of the two-year period
without awaiting the decision of the [CIR].”41 Lastly,
respondent argues that even if the period had already
lapsed, it may be suspended for reasons of equity
considering that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.42
Our Ruling
The petition has merit.

Unutilized input VAT must be claimed
within two years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were
made
In computing the two-year prescriptive period for
claiming a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, the
Second Division of the CTA applied Section 112(A) of the
NIRC, which states:
“SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales—Any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax
due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input
tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against
output tax: Provided,
_______________
39 Id., at p. 166.
40 130 Phil. 12; 22 SCRA 12 (1968).
41 Id., at p. 16; p. 16.
42 Rollo, p. 167.
436

Asia, Inc.
however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)

(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable
foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly
accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where
the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale
and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or

services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid
cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the
transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of
the volume of sales.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into

consideration Sections 114 and 229 of the NIRC, which
read:
“SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax.—

(A) In General.—Every person liable to pay the value-added
tax imposed under this Title shall file a quarterly return of
the amount of his gross sales or receipts within twenty-
five (25) days following the close of each taxable quarter
prescribed for each taxpayer: Provided, however, That VAT-
registered persons shall pay the value-added tax on a monthly
basis.
Any person, whose registration has been cancelled in
accordance with Section 236, shall file a return and pay the tax
due thereon within twenty-five (25) days from the date of
cancellation of registration: Provided, that only one consolidated
return shall be filed by the taxpayer for his principal place of
business or head office and all branches.
x x x x
SEC. 229. Recovery of tax erroneously or illegally collected.—
No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the
recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of
any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been
duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding
may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.
437
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 437

Asia, Inc.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after

the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without written claim therefor, refund
or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been

erroneously paid.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the CTA En Banc ruled that the reckoning of the

two-year period for filing a claim for refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT should start from the date of
payment of tax and not from the close of the taxable
quarter when the sales were made.43
The pivotal question of when to reckon the running of
the two-year prescriptive period, however, has already been
resolved in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation,44 where we ruled that Section 112(A)
of the NIRC is the applicable provision in determining the
start of the two-year period for claiming a refund/credit of
unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C) and 229 of
the NIRC are inapplicable as “both provisions apply only to
instances of erroneous payment or illegal collection of
internal revenue taxes.”45 We explained that:
“The above proviso [Section 112 (A) of the NIRC] clearly

provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT
payments not otherwise used for any internal revenue tax
due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the
relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT
regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As the CA
aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec.
112 (A), “[P]rescriptive period commences from the close of the
taxable quarter when the sales were made and not from the time
the input VAT was paid nor from the
_______________
43 Id.
44 G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 154.
45 Id., at p. 173.
438

Asia, Inc.
time the official receipt was issued.” Thus, when a zero-rated

VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent
transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for
refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The
reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the
pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless when the
input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last
creditable input VAT due for the period covering the progress
billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on
September 30, 1996, any claim for unutilized creditable input
VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years
after September 30, 1996 or, to be precise, on September 30, 1998.
Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on
December 10, 1999 had already prescribed.”
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either
Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of refund,
prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive
limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C) and 229
respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to
Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.—The
Commissioner may—
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally
received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the
value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in
good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion,
redeem or change unused stamps that have been rendered
unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of
destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or penalties shall
be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the
Commissioner a claim for credit or refund within two (2)
years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided,
however, That a return filed showing an overpayment shall
be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
439
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 439

Asia, Inc.
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally

Collected.—No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue
tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been
excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or
in any manner wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund
or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but
such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not

such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or
duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after
the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that
may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return
upon which payment was made, such payment appears
clearly to have been erroneously paid.
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive
period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty, for
the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both
provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment
or illegal collection of internal revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input
VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to the
buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of
the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or transaction
involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or
effectively zero-rated transaction, does not, standing alone,
deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized
creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous, illegal, or wrongful
payment angle does not enter the equation.
xxxx
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112
(A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period
440

Asia, Inc.
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the

relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the
creditable input VAT, applies to the instant case, and not
to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of
taxes.”46 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the foregoing, we find that the CTA En Banc

erroneously applied Sections 114(A) and 229 of the NIRC in
computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming
refund/credit of unutilized input VAT. To be clear, Section
112 of the NIRC is the pertinent provision for the
refund/credit of input VAT. Thus, the two-year period
should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter

when the sales were made.
The administrative claim was timely filed
Bearing this in mind, we shall now proceed to determine
whether the administrative claim was timely filed.
Relying on Article 13 of the Civil Code,47 which provides
that a year is equivalent to 365 days, and taking into
account the fact that the year 2004 was a leap year,
petitioner submits that the two-year period to file a claim
for tax refund/ credit for the period July 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2002 expired on September 29, 2004.48
We do not agree.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown
Property Group, Inc.,49 we said that as between the Civil
Code, which provides that a year is equivalent to 365 days,
and the Administrative Code of 1987, which states that a
year is composed of 12 calendar months, it is the latter that
must prevail
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 171-175.

47 Supra note 17.
48 Rollo, p. 21.
49 G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 436.
441
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 441

following the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogat priori.50

Thus:
“Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same
subject matter—the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular
year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days
is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the
manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that
Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its
final adjusted return on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
months, computed as follows:
Year 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
month
6th calendar September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
month
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
month
8th calendar November 15, 1998 to December 14,
month 1998
9th calendar December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
month
10thcalendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
month
11thcalendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
month

Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

_______________
50 Id., at p. 444.

442

14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999

18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14,
1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
month
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent’s petition (filed on April 14,

2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from
the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.”51
Applying this to the present case, the two-year period to

file a claim for tax refund/credit for the period July 1, 2002
to September 30, 2002 expired on September 30, 2004.
Hence, respondent’s administrative claim was timely filed.
The filing of the judicial claim was
premature
However, notwithstanding the timely filing of the
administrative claim, we are constrained to deny
respondent’s claim for tax refund/credit for having been
filed in violation of Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which
provides that:
“SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

xxxx
(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes
shall be Made.—In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a
refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes
_______________
51 Id., at pp. 444-445.
443
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 443

Asia, Inc.
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of

submission of complete documents in support of the
application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and
(B) hereof.
In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax
credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the
application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of

the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of
the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or
the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 112(D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the CIR

has “120 days, from the date of the submission of the
complete documents in support of the application [for tax
refund/credit],” within which to grant or deny the claim. In
case of full or partial denial by the CIR, the taxpayer’s
recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days
from receipt of the decision of the CIR. However, if after
the 120-day period the CIR fails to act on the application
for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to
appeal the inaction of the CIR to CTA within 30 days.
In this case, the administrative and the judicial claims
were simultaneously filed on September 30, 2004.
Obviously, respondent did not wait for the decision of the
CIR or the lapse of the 120-day period. For this reason, we
find the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA
premature.
Respondent’s assertion that the non-observance of the
120-day period is not fatal to the filing of a judicial claim as
long as both the administrative and the judicial claims are
filed within the two-year prescriptive period52 has no legal
basis.
There is nothing in Section 112 of the NIRC to support
respondent’s view. Subsection (A) of the said provision
states that “any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two years
after the
_______________
52 Rollo, p. 166.
444

close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,

apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to
such sales.” The phrase “within two (2) years x x x apply for
the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund” refers to
applications for refund/credit filed with the CIR and not to

appeals made to the CTA. This is apparent in the first
paragraph of subsection (D) of the same provision, which
states that the CIR has “120 days from the submission of
complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)” within which to
decide on the claim.
In fact, applying the two-year period to judicial claims
would render nugatory Section 112(D) of the NIRC, which
already provides for a specific period within which a
taxpayer should appeal the decision or inaction of the CIR.
The second paragraph of Section 112(D) of the NIRC
envisions two scenarios: (1) when a decision is issued by
the CIR before the lapse of the 120-day period; and (2)
when no decision is made after the 120-day period. In both
instances, the taxpayer has 30 days within which to file an
appeal with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period
is crucial in filing an appeal with the CTA.
With regard to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Victorias Milling, Co., Inc.53 relied upon by respondent, we
find the same inapplicable as the tax provision involved in
that case is Section 306, now Section 229 of the NIRC. And
as already discussed, Section 229 does not apply to
refunds/credits of input VAT, such as the instant case.
In fine, the premature filing of respondent’s claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warrants a
dismissal inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed July 30, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008
Resolu-
_______________
53 Supra note 40.
445
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 445

tion of the Court of Tax Appeals are hereby REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. The Court of Tax Appeals Second
Division is DIRECTED to dismiss CTA Case No. 7065 for
having been prematurely filed.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De

Castro and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and

set aside.
Notes.—Under Section 29 of R.A. No. 8800, there are

three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction
over the petition for review contemplated therein—(i) there
must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary, (ii) the petition
must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by
the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be “in connection with
the imposition of a safeguard measure. (Southern Cross
Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association
of the Philippines, 465 SCRA 532 [2005])
As early as 1988, the BIR issued several VAT rulings to
the effect that the sales of gold to the Central Bank by a
VAT-registered person or entity are considered export
sales, and as export sales, the sale is zero-rated, hence, no
tax is chargeable to it as purchaser; Zero rating is
primarily intended to be enjoyed by the seller which
charges no output VAT but can claim refund of or tax credit
certificate for the input VAT previously charged to the
suppliers. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Manila
Mining Corporation, 468 SCRA 571 [2005])
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3/2/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 632

Velasco, Jr.,*** Peralta, Mendoza and Sereno,**** JJ.,

Petition dismissed, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Execution pending appeal in ejectment cases is

G.R. No. 184823. October 6, 2010.*

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,

Taxation; Value Added Tax (VAT); Prescription; Tax Refunds;

*** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per

**** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 423

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of

a refund/credit of unutilized input VAT, and that Sections 204(C)

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of

with the CTA. As we see it then, the 120-day period is crucial in

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 425

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1 Rollo, pp. 31-A-43; penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

pression die steel forgings” and “tool and dies,” are

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 427

4. Petitioner’s alleged claim for refund is subject to administrative

rangement that may be agreed upon which may influence or determine

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Trial ensued, after which, on January 4, 2008, the

“For a VAT registered entity whose sales are zero-rated, to

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 429

Amount of Claimed Input VAT P 3,891,123.82

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

hereby ORDERED TO REFUND OR ISSUE A TAX CREDIT

Dissatisfied with the above-quoted Decision, petitioner

14 Id., at pp. 53-54 and pp. 61-62.

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 431

exhaustion of administrative remedies but also on the fact

merit. Petitioner thus elevated the matter to the CTA En

“Petitioner argues that the administrative and judicial claims

20 Id., at pp. 100-101.

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In relation to this, the reckoning of the two-year period

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the CTA En Banc

22 Id., at pp. 41-43.

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 433

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner interposes

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

filing of an administrative claim.31 He insists that such

CTA is an appellate body exercising judicial review over

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 435

is important is that both claims are filed within the two-

takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two

The petition has merit.

“SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax.—

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)

and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or

The CTA En Banc, on the other hand, took into

“SEC. 114. Return and Payment of Value-Added Tax.—

VOL. 632, OCTOBER 6, 2010 437

Velasco, Jr.,* Peralta, Mendoza and Sereno,** JJ.,