CPEC Essay

Introduction:
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a framework of regional
connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have
positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and
the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having improved
road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free
exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing
understanding through academic, cultural and regional knowledge and
culture, activity of higher volume of flow of trade and businesses,
producing and moving energy to have more optimal businesses and
enhancement of co-operation by win-win model will result in well
connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and
development. 

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is journey towards economic

regionalization in the globalized world. It founded peace, development,
and win-win model for all of them.
 
China Pakistan Economic Corridor is hope of better region of the future
with peace, development and growth of economy.

A little more than two years after Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan, which
marked the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and
in the wake of the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing on 14-15 May
2017, it is an ideal time to provide a preliminary assessment of CPEC’s
implications for Pakistan’s domestic politics as well as for the country’s
geopolitical posture. With its $55 billion overall investment, CPEC
represents the flagship project of China’s Maritime Silk Route initiative,
aimed at the construction of ports, infrastructure, as well as road and
rail connectivity in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. What has been
CPEC’s impact so far? According to a recent report by the International
Monetary Fund, CPEC is going to boost investment in Pakistan’s
economy and there is general optimism in the country about the positive
changes that CPEC would bring about.

Following the launch of the economic corridor, Sino-Pakistani relations

are going through the most important qualitative shift in their history of
long-standing, ‘all-weather’ friendship. While until recent years the
relationship was primarily based around a ‘metus hostilis’, namely the
enmity of both countries vis-a-vis India, CPEC has allowed new players
to get involved in the bilateral ties other than the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) and the Pakistani Army. During the recent BRI summit in
Beijing, President Xi Jinping said that Pakistan and China should
‘increase interactions between governments, legislative bodies and
political parties’. As a result, in Pakistan’s post-2013 political setup, the
elected government was able to increase its grip on important CPEC-
related decisions. Paradoxically, a relationship such as the one between
Islamabad and Beijing, which has been centred on the military as the
main interlocutors on both sides of the Karakoram Highway, has de
facto enabled the civilian side to gain some space and leverage in
important decisions. Although the military remain a key player in Sino-
Pakistani ties (as demonstrated by China’s reliance on the Pakistani
Army to provide security to CPEC projects), the elected government
rejected the proposal to institutionalise the military’s role through the
creation of a ‘CPEC authority’ on the grounds that such an authority
would only increase the bureaucracy around CPEC and slow down
significantly the implementation of the tranche of Chinese investments.

With regards to the geopolitical implications of the China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor, a cursory survey of the current regional scenario
presents a picture made of tensions, and a potential for cooperation
which is yet to be fully tapped. CPEC has added an additional element of
strain in Pakistan’s already tense relations with India. Sovereignty issues
were repeatedly raised by the leadership in New Delhi mentioning
CPEC’s route through Gilgit-Baltistan (part of the wider Kashmir issue) as
the main reason why India is not going to take part in CPEC, and the
BRI more broadly. India is also concerned that the port of Gwadar, the
starting point of CPEC, would become a Chinese military outpost in the
Arabian Sea. In November 2016, a Pakistan Navy official was quoted in
a news report saying that China was willing to deploy its naval ships to
safeguard the port of Gwadar. Besides raising concerns in India where
all the main newspapers reported the claim, the latter came in the wake
of reports in the Pakistani media that an Indian submarine was detected
and prevented from entering Pakistani waters, with some headlines
mentioning that the submarine was ‘Gwadar bound’. As this episode
demonstrates, CPEC represents a major source of concern in New Delhi
and of bilateral tensions between the latter and Islamabad.

Iran is another important player on the regional chessboard. Pakistan’s

relations with Iran to date are a story of a great, though unfulfilled,
potential. The early signs related to Iran’s involvement in CPEC seem to
go in the same direction. Iran has expressed its desire to become a part
of CPEC investment and China has also welcomed the opportunity for
Tehran to contribute to the development of the economic corridor. In
particular, the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Sun Weidong, declared
that ‘Iran can also be a very important country along the Belt and the
Road initiative, so we really look forward to enhance our cooperation
with Iran’. However, the recent killing of 10 Iranian border guards by
the Pakistan-based terrorist outfit Jaish-ul-Adl, and Pakistan’s decision to
send the former Chief of Army Staff, General (Ret) Raheel Sharif, to lead
the Saudi-led coalition were not received well in Tehran. All in all, China
is Iran’s main business partner and, under Beijing’s auspices, there is
also potential for increased cooperation between Islamabad and Tehran.

In this cursory view of CPEC’s impact on Pakistan’s geopolitical posture,

the aspect that has recently attracted a great deal of attention is the
development of Pakistan-Russia relations. Before sketching out recent
developments, it is important to mention that beyond the headlines the
relationship between Islamabad and Moscow remains modest, especially
if compared to the long-standing, deep historical ties between Russia
and India. Trade relations remain weak; on the procurement side,
Pakistan is behind India and Bangladesh in terms of arms supplies from
Russia. Nevertheless, the situation is different from both Cold War-era
dynamics and the virtually non-existent bilateral engagement until 2011.
Since the announcement of China’s BRI, Pakistan and Russia signed a
defence agreement in November 2014, conducted the first ever joint
military exercise in October 2016, and a high level Russian military
delegation visited both North and South Waziristan, where the Pakistani
started the operation Zarb-e-Azb in June 2014.

On a more general note, CPEC has enabled the emergence of new

actors other than the PLA and the Pakistani Army, resulting in a marked
transition from a security-centred partnership, towards a quasi-alliance
in which the economic dimension has become an important pillar. As far
as Pakistan is concerned, the early harvest projects are now under
construction and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) government is
hopeful that these will be completed in time for next year’s election.
Making tangible the first effects of CPEC for Pakistani citizens by ending
electricity shortages might be the first visible impact of the Chinese
investment bonanza, as well as the ticket for the incumbent party to
another five years in office. With the recent unfolding of the Panama
Gate investigation about Nawaz Sharif family businesses, CPEC will be
certainly played up by the PML-N in the run up to the 2018 elections.
The latter is eager to be seen by the public as a government able to
deliver on his electoral promises and will most likely craft a campaign
around the benefits of CPEC in the attempt to overshadow the political
repercussions caused by the Panama Gate investigation.