Conducto - v. - Monzon
Conducto - v. - Monzon
Conducto - v. - Monzon
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE , JR. , J : p
In his Order of 30 June 1995, 9 respondent judge denied the motion for
suspension on the ground that:
[T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirang's]
terms (sic) of o ce from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as
Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence,
offenses committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizares
vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension
from o ce relating to a given term may not be the basis of contempt with respect
to ones (sic) assumption of the same o ce under a new term (Oliveros vs.
Villaluz, G.R No. L-346361 May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a
public o cer for acts done prior to his present term of o ce. To do otherwise
would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their o cer. When the people
have elected a man to o ce, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault
or mis conduct (sic), if he had been guilty if any. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, et al., G.R
No. 94115, August 21, 1992).
The prosecution moved for reconsideration 1 0 of the order, alleging that the
court had confused removal as a penalty in administrative cases and the "temporary
removal from o ce (or suspension) as a means of preventing the public o cial, while
the criminal case against him is pending, from exerting undue in uence, intimidate (sic)
witnesses which may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a penalty or
sanction whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy." Accordingly, "while a re-
elected public o cial cannot be administratively punished by removing him from o ce
for offenses committed during his previous term, . . . said public o cial can be
temporarily removed to prevent him from wielding undue in uence which will de nitely
be a hindrance for justice to take its natural course." The prosecution then enumerated
the cases decided by this Court reiterating the rule that what a re-election of a public
o cial obliterates are only administrative, not criminal, liabilities, incurred during
previous terms. 1 1
In his order of 3 August 1995, 1 2 respondent denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecution is
premised upon the act charged allegedly committed during the accused [sic]
previous term as Barangay Chairman of Brgy. III-E. San Pablo City, who was
subsequently re-elected as Barangay Chairman again during the last Barangay
Election of May 9, 1994. Certainly, had not the accused been re-elected the
prosecution will not le the instant motion to suspend him as there is no legal
basis or the issue has become academic.
The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs. Hechanova,
et al., L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58, wherein the Supreme Court subscribed
to the rule denying the right to remove from o ce because of misconduct during
a prior term.
It is opined by the court that preventive suspension is applicable only if
there is [sic] administrative case led against a local o cial who is at the same
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
time criminally charged in Court. At present, the records of the Court shows [sic]
that there is no pending administrative case existing or filed against the accused.
It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by the Honorable
Supreme Court in Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., that "Since petitioner, having been
duly re-elected, is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for any acts
committed during his former tenure, the determination whether the respondent
validly acted in imposing upon him one month's suspension for act [sic] done
during his previous term as mayor is now merely of theoretical interest."
Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No.
26240. In his order of 21 September 1995, 1 3 respondent voluntarily inhibited himself.
The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge
Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City.
On 15 October 1996, complainant led his sworn letter-complaint with the O ce
of the Court Administrator.
In his comment dated 14 February 1997, led in compliance with the resolution
of this Court of 27 January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been "continuously
keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law" since he
passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he issued the two challenged orders "only
after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter," citing authorities in
support thereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguing that to warrant a
nding of ignorance of law and abuse of authority, the error must be "so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that the judge knowingly
rendered an unjust decision." 1 4 He emphasized, likewise, that the error had to be "so
grave and on so fundamental a point as to warrant condemnation of the judge as
patently ignorant or negligent;'' 1 5 "otherwise, to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and that would be intolerable." 1 6
Respondent further alleged that he earned complainant's ire after denying the
latter's Motion for the Suspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which was led
only after Maghirang was re-elected in 1994; and that complainant made inconsistent
claims, concretely, while in his letter of 4 September 1995 requesting respondent to
inhibit from the case, complainant declared that he believed in respondent's integrity,
competence and dignity, after he denied the request, complainant branded respondent
as a "judge of poor caliber and understanding of the law, very incompetent and has no
place in Court of Justice."
Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at
this time, for he had only three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the
compulsory age of retirement of seventy (70); and that for the last 25 years as
municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as presiding judge of the MTCC,
San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity. cdll
In compliance with the Court's resolution of 9 March 1998, the parties, by way of
separate letters, informed the Court that they agreed to have this case decided on the
basis of the pleadings already led, with respondent explicitly specifying that only the
complaint and the comment thereon be considered.
The O ce of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that this Court hold
respondent liable for ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
severely. In support thereof, the OCA makes the following findings and conclusions:
The claim of respondent Judge that a local o cial who is criminally
charged can be preventively suspended only if there is an administrative case
led against him is without basis. Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts) states that:
"Suspension and loss of bene ts — Any incumbent public o cer
against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation. is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office."
It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to suspend any public o cer against whom a valid
information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is led in
court. The court trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether
preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his o ce to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in o ce. All that is required is for the court to make a nding that
the accused stands charged under a valid information for any of the above-
described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the sought for
suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235
SCRA 103).
In the same case, the Court held that "as applied to criminal prosecutions
under RA 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety (90) days only
if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety (90)
days."
Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful
Appointment, punishable under Article 244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, it was mandatory on Judge Monzon's part, considering the
Motion led, to order the suspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of
ninety (90) days. This, he failed and refused to do.
Judge Monzon's contention denying complainant's Motion for Suspension
because "offenses committed during the previous term (is) not a cause for
removal during the present term" is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo
vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that "the
rule is that a public o cial cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term since his re-election to o ce operates as a
condonation of the o cer's previous misconduct committed during a prior term,
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule,
however, finds no application to criminal cases . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, it was speci cally declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R.
No. L-23220, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1292, that "The ruling, therefore, that
'when the people have elected a man to o ce it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave
his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of any' refers only to an action for
removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case" (Emphasis supplied)
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during
Maghirang's rst term as barangay chairman and the Motion for his suspension
was only led in 1995 during his second term, his re-election is not a bar to his
suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case.
Respondent's denial of complainant's Motion for Reconsideration left the
complainant with no other judicial remedy. Since a case for Unlawful
Appointment is covered by Summary Procedure, complainant is prohibited from
ling a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition involving an interlocutory
order issued by the court. Neither can he le an appeal from the court's adverse
nal judgment, incorporating in his appeal the grounds assailing the interlocutory
orders, as this will put the accused in double jeopardy.
All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his
ignorance of the law in denying complainant's Motion for Suspension of Brgy.
Chairman Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to indicate that he acted
in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that
good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from
liability.
This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, ruled:
"In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for ine ciency on account merely of occasional mistakes or
errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant with basic principles.
A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to
know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called
upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if
there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench
cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles."
In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioner's insistence that he was bene ted
by the ruling in Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija 1 8 that a public o cer should
never be removed for acts done prior to his present term of office, as follows:
There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the
investigation which has been commenced here, and which is sought to be
restrained, is a criminal accusation the object of which is to cause the indictment
and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases
cited, the subject of the investigation was an administrative charge against the
o cers therein involved and its object was merely to cause his suspension or
removal from public o ce. While the criminal cases involves the character of the
mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community is a
party to the case, an administrative case involves only his actuations as a public
officer as [they] affect the populace of the municipality where he serves. 1 9
The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling
(which dealt with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and
not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez the Court ruled
that the reelection of a public o cer for a new term does not in any manner wipe
out the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.
I n Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that the cases of
Pascual and Lizares are authority for the precept that "a reelected public o cer is
no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his
former tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not
barred by reelection of the public o cer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties
attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification from public o ce and it is
patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act . . . that an o cial may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt
practices and thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and thereby launder
his evil acts."
Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the
above-mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been "continuously keeping abreast of
legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law," it was impossible for him to have
missed or misread these cases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact
that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of
his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did not
thoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of
course, would only manifest either incompetence, since both cases were written in plain
and simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or
confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court.
While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a
commendable virtue of judges — and, of course, members of the Bar — comprehending
the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where one's competence may
then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just u cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is
imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled
and authoritative doctrines. 2 3 He should strive for excellence, exceeded only by his
passion for truth, to the end that he be the personi cation of justice and the Rule of
Law. 2 4
Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level
of mastery of a revered doctrine on a simple issue.
On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid
down in Ingco v. Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v.
Provincial Governor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that
he simply wished to enjoy the privilege of overruling this Court's doctrinal
pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote
what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera: 2 5
As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333
337), and reiterated in subsequent cases "if each and every Court of First Instance
could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there
would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of
the nation.
Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to
administer his o ce with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law.
That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended penalty of
reprimand is not commensurate with the misdeed committed. A ne of P5,000.00, with
a warning that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely is, at the very least, appropriate, considering respondent is due for compulsory
retirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his first offense. prLL
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 2-5.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
2. Rollo, 8.
3. Id, 11-12.
4. Id., 13-14.
5. Id., 17-18.
6. Id., 19.
7. Rollo, 20.
8. Id., 26-27.
9. Id., 30.
11. Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija , G.R. No. 11959, 31 October 1959; Lizares v.
Hechanova, G.R. No. L-22059, 17 May 1966; Oliveros v. Villaluz , G.R. No L.-34636, 30
May 1974; Aguinaldo v. Santos , G R. No. 94115, 21 August 1992); Ingco v Sanchez, 21
SCRA 1292).
14. Citing Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog , 144 SCRA 462, 474-475 [1986]; Dela Cruz v.
Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597 [1994]; Roa v. Imbing, 231 SCRA 57 [1994].
15. Citing Negado v. Autojay , 222 SCRA 295, 297 [1993].
16. Citing Bengzon v. Adaoag, A.M. MTJ-95-1045, Nov. 28, 1995.
19. At 1294-1295.