The document discusses the relationship between theories of human action and structural explanations in social analysis. It argues that connecting the two requires a theory of the human agent, an account of how social structures influence and are influenced by human action, and an interpretation of structure as embedded in both the conditions and consequences of action. Current approaches that focus on either action or structure are limited because they do not adequately address this connection.
The document discusses the relationship between theories of human action and structural explanations in social analysis. It argues that connecting the two requires a theory of the human agent, an account of how social structures influence and are influenced by human action, and an interpretation of structure as embedded in both the conditions and consequences of action. Current approaches that focus on either action or structure are limited because they do not adequately address this connection.
The document discusses the relationship between theories of human action and structural explanations in social analysis. It argues that connecting the two requires a theory of the human agent, an account of how social structures influence and are influenced by human action, and an interpretation of structure as embedded in both the conditions and consequences of action. Current approaches that focus on either action or structure are limited because they do not adequately address this connection.
The document discusses the relationship between theories of human action and structural explanations in social analysis. It argues that connecting the two requires a theory of the human agent, an account of how social structures influence and are influenced by human action, and an interpretation of structure as embedded in both the conditions and consequences of action. Current approaches that focus on either action or structure are limited because they do not adequately address this connection.
The principal issue with which I shall be concerned in this paper is
that of connecting a notion of human action with structural explana- tion in social analysis. The making of such a connection, I shall argue, demands the following: a theory of the human agent, or of the subject; an account of the conditions and consequences of action; and an interpretation of 'structure' as somehow embroiled in both those conditions and consequences.!
Theories of action versus institutional theories
'Action' and 'structure' normally appear in both the sociological
and philosophical literature as antinomies. Broadly speaking, it would be true to say that those schools of thOUght which have been preoccupied with action have paid little attention to, or have found no way of coping with, conceptions of structural explanation or social causation; they have also failed to relate action theory to problems of institutional transformation. This is most obviously true of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of action, both in its Wittgens- teinian form and in versions less directly influenced by Wittgens- tein. Notwithstanding the great interest of Wittgenstein's later philosophy for the social sciences in respect of the relations between language and Praxis, we rapidly come up against its limits in respect of the theorisation of institutions. Institutions certainly appear in Wittgensteinian philosophy, and in a rather fundamental way. For the transition from the ideas of the earlier Wittgenstein to the later is effectively one from nature to society: language and social convention are shown in the Philosophical Investigations to be
inextricably intertwined, so that to explicate one is to explicate the
other. But as expressed in forms of life, institutions are analysed only in so far as they form a consensual backdrop against which action is negotiated and its meanings formed. Wittgensteinian philosophy has not led towards any sort of concern with social change, with power relations, or with conflict in society. Other strands in the philosophy of action have operated at an even further distance from such issues, focusing attention almost exclusively upon the nature of reasons or intentions in human activity. 2 Within more orthodox sociological traditions, symbolic interac- tionism has placed most emphasis upon regarding social life as an active accomplishment of purposive, knowledgeable actors; and it has also been associated with a definite 'theory of the subject', as formulated in Mead's account of the social origins of reflexive consciousness. But the 'social' in Mead's formulation is limited to familial figures and the 'generalised other'; Mead did not elaborate a conception of a differentiated society, nor any interpretation of social transformation. Much the same is the case with the subse- quent evolution of this tradition, which has not successfully de- veloped modes of institutional analysis. One of the results has been a partial accommodation between symbolic interactionism and functionalism in American sociology: the former is held to be a 'micro-sociology', dealing with small-scale 'interpersonal' rela- tions, while more embracing 'macro-sociological' tasks are left to the latter. Functionalism and structuralism are alike in according a priority to the object over the subject or, in some sense, to structure over action. Functionalist authors have normally thought of this in terms of 'emergent properties' of the totality, which not only separate its characteristics from those of its individual members, but cause it to exert a dominant influence over their conduct. The difficulties Durkheim experienced with this notion, in so far as his writings are regarded from the point of view of their connections with functionalism, rather than with structuralism, are well known. Durkheim wished to emphasise that the characteristics of the social whole are separate from those of individual agents, and accentuated various senses in which 'society' is external to its individual mem- bers: every person is born into an already constituted society, and every person is only one individual in a system of association involving many others. But neither in his earlier writings nor in his