Gency, ST Cture: Theories of Action Versus Institutional Theories

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~gency,St~cture

The principal issue with which I shall be concerned in this paper is


that of connecting a notion of human action with structural explana-
tion in social analysis. The making of such a connection, I shall
argue, demands the following: a theory of the human agent, or of
the subject; an account of the conditions and consequences of
action; and an interpretation of 'structure' as somehow embroiled
in both those conditions and consequences.!

Theories of action versus institutional theories

'Action' and 'structure' normally appear in both the sociological


and philosophical literature as antinomies. Broadly speaking, it
would be true to say that those schools of thOUght which have been
preoccupied with action have paid little attention to, or have found
no way of coping with, conceptions of structural explanation or
social causation; they have also failed to relate action theory to
problems of institutional transformation. This is most obviously
true of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of action, both in its Wittgens-
teinian form and in versions less directly influenced by Wittgens-
tein. Notwithstanding the great interest of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy for the social sciences in respect of the relations between
language and Praxis, we rapidly come up against its limits in respect
of the theorisation of institutions. Institutions certainly appear in
Wittgensteinian philosophy, and in a rather fundamental way. For
the transition from the ideas of the earlier Wittgenstein to the later
is effectively one from nature to society: language and social
convention are shown in the Philosophical Investigations to be

A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory


© Anthony Giddens 1979
50 Central Problems in Social Theory

inextricably intertwined, so that to explicate one is to explicate the


other. But as expressed in forms of life, institutions are analysed
only in so far as they form a consensual backdrop against which
action is negotiated and its meanings formed. Wittgensteinian
philosophy has not led towards any sort of concern with social
change, with power relations, or with conflict in society. Other
strands in the philosophy of action have operated at an even further
distance from such issues, focusing attention almost exclusively
upon the nature of reasons or intentions in human activity. 2
Within more orthodox sociological traditions, symbolic interac-
tionism has placed most emphasis upon regarding social life as an
active accomplishment of purposive, knowledgeable actors; and it
has also been associated with a definite 'theory of the subject', as
formulated in Mead's account of the social origins of reflexive
consciousness. But the 'social' in Mead's formulation is limited to
familial figures and the 'generalised other'; Mead did not elaborate
a conception of a differentiated society, nor any interpretation of
social transformation. Much the same is the case with the subse-
quent evolution of this tradition, which has not successfully de-
veloped modes of institutional analysis. One of the results has been
a partial accommodation between symbolic interactionism and
functionalism in American sociology: the former is held to be a
'micro-sociology', dealing with small-scale 'interpersonal' rela-
tions, while more embracing 'macro-sociological' tasks are left to
the latter.
Functionalism and structuralism are alike in according a priority
to the object over the subject or, in some sense, to structure over
action. Functionalist authors have normally thought of this in terms
of 'emergent properties' of the totality, which not only separate its
characteristics from those of its individual members, but cause it to
exert a dominant influence over their conduct. The difficulties
Durkheim experienced with this notion, in so far as his writings
are regarded from the point of view of their connections with
functionalism, rather than with structuralism, are well known.
Durkheim wished to emphasise that the characteristics of the social
whole are separate from those of individual agents, and accentuated
various senses in which 'society' is external to its individual mem-
bers: every person is born into an already constituted society, and
every person is only one individual in a system of association
involving many others. But neither in his earlier writings nor in his

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