Legal Ethics Cases No. 8 1

LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO.
8 1
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent. The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
Courts; Judges; Inhibitions; A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any
137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he
without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay. relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and
corrupt motive, reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.— Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was hoping he
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.*
could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court,
efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the
Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.
latter should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might
relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his good office. After a
Courts; Judges; Inhibitions; A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and
affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds
CARLITOS D. LAZO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTONIO V. TIONG, Municipal Trial Court, Bolinao, Pangasinan, respondent.
the report to be well taken. Under Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related
Courts; Judges; Inhibitions; A judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting
case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record.— The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule
in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered
137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is disqualified from sitting in the case
upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of
without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing, signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a judge hears the
the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.
as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The purpose of the prohibition is to
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any
questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a
case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, reprimand would be an
appropriate penalty.—Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the
ground that he was hoping he could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute
amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* Respondent’s efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law.
At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the latter
should have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the
integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to
settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for
respondent to make use of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the
evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case.
parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he
The purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part
should have inhibited himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private
in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned and he should administer justice impartially and without delay.
capacity. On the other hand, because there is no showing that respondent’s failure to inhibit
Same; Same; Same; Where there is no showing that a judge’s failure to inhibit himself from a case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any
himself from the case within a reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, the
Court thinks that reprimand would be an appropriate penalty.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the complaint against respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong of the Municipal Trial
Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan for grave misconduct and abuse of authority.
Complainant Carlitos Lazo is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 4384, entitled People
LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO. 8 2
of the Philippines vs. Danilo D. Lazo, for falsification and use of falsified document, which was a careful perusal of the language and examination of the provisions of Section 1, Rule 137,
assigned to respondent judge. In his sworn complaint, dated December 13, 1996, 1 Carlitos Lazo Rules of Court, but if only to give the benefit of the doubt in favor of the complaint for their full
alleged that respondent scheduled the arraignment of the accused on November 14, 1996, satisfaction have earlier announced in open court, to hold in abeyance the self inhibition of the
which was a Thursday, when he knew fully well that no proceedings could be had on that date undersigned on or before the accused have been arraigned. An early inhibition before the
because the trial prosecutor assigned to respondent judge’s sala was available only on Fridays. arraignment may the presiding judge be interpreted to be remised or shrinked from the
Complainant said that because of the cancellation of the arraignment, his time and efforts were performance of his duties and obligations attached to his office knowing pretty well, as it does,
wasted considering that he came all the way from Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Furthermore, he that the evil to be avoided which is suspicion of partiality and biasness finds its vital role only
claimed that the warrant of arrest was not served on the accused, although it had been issued during the trial on the merits of a case. However, on January 3, 1997, before the filling of much
much earlier, until the prosecutor called attention to this fact. In addition, complainant charged said and awaited motion, in order to put to rest the issue of Inhibition, an order of self inhibition
that respondent did not inhibit himself from the case until after two (2) months despite the fact of the presiding Judge was finally issued.
that respondent judge and the accused are related within the fourth degree of affinity, the wife ....
of the accused being the first cousin of the judge. The accused Danilo D. Lazo is a government employee whose office is opposite the court house
across a street just a few meters apart. Time and again from the time of knowledge of the case
In his comment, dated August 7, 1997,2 respondent stated: filed against him has frequented the court inquiring status of his case and manifested before
hand his readiness to file his bailbond as he in fact informed the court that he has already
That the parties in the criminal case in an information filed by the provincial prosecutor’s office prepared his bailbond and further told the court of his desired posting of the said bailbond in the
is between two brothers, the complainant Carlitos D. Lazo and Danilo D. Lazo. amount fixed and recommended by the office of the provincial prosecutor’s office even without
first the issuance of a warrant of arrest having been issued by the court. In all bailable offenses
That before Court can commence initial proceedings and/or early stage, the complainant the right of an accused is both a constitutional and statutory right can be available of anytime of
knowing as indeed correctly stated in his letter complaint, the undersigned to be the first cousin the day during office hours. To deny an accused of the right is a violation of human rights . . . .
of the wife of the accused, the complaint appealed to the undersigned for his intercession in the The accused Danilo D. Lazo simultaneously filed bailbond on the same day the warrant of arrest
settlement of their case, probably on the assumption of moral ascendancy to the accused both was issued by the court who of course like anybody, finds it detestable of being arrested even a
in his private capacity and as official capacity as a presiding judge of the court of Bolinao. moment and jailed especially the accused is a government employee, a law abiding citizen of
good social standing. The posting by the accused of his bailbond in connection of the case
That attempts for the settlement of their case failed, and consequently under normal court against him was all accordance with all.
processes and in line with the rules on criminal procedure, after issuance of a warrant of arrest
by the court with the posting of the bailbond by the accused the amount fixed by the court, the The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator which on November 5, 1998,
case was to be set for arraignment of the accused of which the practice (SOP) of the court is for submitted a report, the pertinent portion of which reads:
the clerk of court to set the initial proceedings of cases filed and pending before the court,
personally at his own sound discretion if only to show trust and confidence to the clerk by the 1.The allegation that respondent Judge scheduled the arraignment of the case on Thursday
undersigned presiding judge, as in this case between Carlitos D. Lazo and Danilo D. Lazo. knowing fully well that the Public Prosecutor assigned in the case appears only in his court every
Fridays, was denied by the respondent. He claims that it was his Clerk of Court who scheduled
That accordingly, the case was set by the clerk of court for November 14, 1996, at 8:30 o’clock, the arraignment on said day without his knowledge. Respondent Judge explains that when it
with subpoena to the complainant dated October 28, 1996, for the arraignment of the accused, comes to initiatory proceedings such as arraignment and pre-trial, he gave his Clerk of Court the
not Friday the official day schedule of the Provincial Prosecutor in attending criminal cases discretion to calendar or schedule the cases if only to show his trust and confidence [on] him.
before the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Bolinao, Pangasinan, and probably an oversight of
the clerk of court without knowledge of the undersigned. We opined that there is nothing wrong in adjudicating the function of scheduling the cases to
the Clerk of Court. A Clerk of Court is the administrative assistant of the Presiding Judge whose
That on the scheduled arraignment of the accused on November 14, 1996, both the complainant duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not
and the accused were present in court, duly represented by their respective legal counsels and involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge ( Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
when the calendar of the court was read, accused counsel manifested that they are filing a Conducted in the RTC, Branches 61, 134 and 137, Makati, Metro Manila , 248 SCRA 25 [1995];
motion to quash, praying for the deferment of the scheduled arraignment until the resolution of Mejia vs. Justice Pamaran, et al., 160 SCRA 457 [1988]).
the court of the said motion to quash they are to file, within (5) days but with no motion filed
within the said period, the arraignment of the accused was reset by the court to November 29, Although a judge has direct supervision over his court personnel, he is more expected to
1996, in the morning which was nevertheless cancelled due to motion for postponement filed by perform his judicial functions, hence, on matters not involving the exercise of discretion such as
the accused. scheduling of cases, the rule provides that the Clerk of Court shall prepare or cause to be
That the proceedings of November 14, 1996, in the morning, set for the arraignment of the prepared a daily court calendar which may include, at the discretion of the Presiding Judge,
accused, despite the absence of the provincial prosecutor, to the humble and honest opinion of cases scheduled for pre-trial, arraignment, trial, hearing on motions or incidents and other
the undersigned has a semblance of propriety and regularity considering that the purpose was matters (Sec. Q on Manual for Clerks of Courts , p. 59; Section 1, Rule 20, 1997 Rules of Civil
for arraignment only, it can proceed since the complainant and the accused who are present in Procedure).
court are both represented by counsel of records, which nonetheless was deferred by the court
for reasons abovestated. In conjunction with this, a Clerk of Court can issue under the seal of the Court all ordinary writs
and processes incident to pending cases, the issuance for ( sic) which does not involve the
That notwithstanding the doubtful application in a mandatory character to the undersigned after exercise of functions appertaining to the Court or Judge only, and may under the discretion of
the Court or Judge, make out and sign letters of administration, appointment of guardians, hoping he could make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering
trustees and receivers and all writs and processes issuing from the Court (Section 4, Rule 136, that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin. Respondent’s efforts,
Revised Rules of Court) praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that
complainant was not willing to listen to respondent’s counsel, the latter should have recused
While the Clerk of Court may have erred in calendaring the case on a Thursday (instead of himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office
Friday) which resulted to the non-appearance of the Public Prosecutor, who has direct control in on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his
the prosecution of criminal cases, it appears that the private complainant (complainant herein) brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his
was not denied his right to counsel as he was duly represented by his counsel de parte. . . . good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable
From the circumstances above, it can be said that no substantial rights of the complainant were settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited
prejudiced. himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity. On the other hand,
because there is no showing that respondent’s failure to inhibit himself from the case within a
2.On the allegation that it was only upon the Prosecution’s motion that respondent caused the reasonable time was due to malice or any corrupt motive, the Court thinks that reprimand would
issuance of the warrant of arrest and required the accused to post bail, it is noted from the be an appropriate penalty.
comment of respondent Judge that there was an attempt to settle the case between the two
brothers upon the prodding of the accused. Nevertheless, upon failure to arrive at an amicable WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio V. Tiong is hereby REPRIMANDED with
settlement, respondent issued the warrant of arrest and the accused promptly posted bail. WARNING that repetition of the same or similar act or omission will be dealt with more severely.
Therefore, the delay, if there is any, in the issuance of the warrant is not entirely the fault of the SO ORDERED.
respondent judge. Bellosillo (Chairman), Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Respondent reprimanded and warned against repetition of similar act.
3.On the issue of inhibition, respondent Judge admits that he is the first cousin of the wife of
the accused. Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court, on disqualification of Judges, provides that: No Notes.—A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that
judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party questions or puts to doubt, however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case pending
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree before him. (Albos vs. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68 [1994])
computed according to the rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is
mandated to disqualify himself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise his discretion whether Impartiality is a state of mind, hence, the need for some kind of manifestation of its
to inhibit himself or not. In the case at bar, respondent Judge falls squarely within the above reality. (Parayno vs. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807 [1994])
provision. Being the first cousin of the wife of the accused to whom he is related in the fourth
civil degree by consanguinity he is related to the accused in the same degree by affinity. At the The rationale of the rule on disqualification of judges is predicated in the long standing
outset, it was therefore mandatory for him to inhibit himself from the case if only to avoid any precept that no judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly,
doubt or suspicion of bias and partiality in favor of the accused. to be susceptible to bias and partiality. (Urbanes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 72 [1994])
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommend[ed] that respondent

Judge Antonio V. Tiong be absolved of any liability as to the charges for lack of merit except on
the charge that he failed to timely inhibit himself from the case for which this office
recommends that he be SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to inhibit himself from the case
at the outset.
The Court finds the report to be well taken. Under Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court, a judge
who is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity to a party in a case is
disqualified from sitting in the case without the consent of all parties, expressed in writing,
signed by them, and entered upon the record. This prohibition is not limited to cases in which a
judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases in which he acts by resolving
motions and issuing orders as respondent judge has done in the subject criminal case. The
purpose of the prohibition is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of
impropriety on the part of the judge. 3 A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned 4 and he should administer justice impartially and
without delay.5
Contrary to this Rule, Judge Tiong acted in Criminal Case No. 4384 from November 5, 1996 to
January 3, 1997. He inhibited himself from further consideration of the case only on the latter
date, despite the fact that the complainant filed a motion seeking his inhibition on November 14,
1996.
Respondent justifies his failure to inhibit himself from the case on the ground that he was
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286. July 11, 1991.* On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for
ROAN I. LIBARIOS, complainant, vs. JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, respondent. prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin
the Investigating Fiscal from acting on their afore-mentioned motion for reconsideration. Then
Judges; Grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law. —In the absence of fraud, Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain from
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to acting on the said motion for reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary
disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be investigation of the murder charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, However the TRO expired after the lapse of twenty (20) days, without a preliminary injunction
it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal principles. being issued.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was
Same; Same.—A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he himself gunned down in cold blood while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation
is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the killing of Corvera, Sr., another
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the formal complaint for murder was filed against Calo, Jr. and four (4) others.
administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for
reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988 resolution finding a prima facie case for murder
Criminal Procedure; Bail; Where person is accused of a capital offense. —It has been an against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.
established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense,
the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV,
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988, upon motion of the prosecution and
temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant with the approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in form,
case amounted to a violation of due process. x x x. Respondent judge’s disregard of an the same having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing
established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the of said information.
evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of the law,
which is subject to disciplinary action. On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO
BAIL recommendation, was filed with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court. Gross misconduct. papers. The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the RTC of Butuan City, where the
original information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. and/or Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative,
Roan I. Libarios for and on his own behalf. accused sought the fixing of bail for their temporary release. 2 Said motion was set for hearing
on 15 December 1988.
RESOLUTION
Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December 1988. On said
PADILLA, J.: scheduled date for raffle, accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the
holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the parties.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client
Mariano Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers
law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to Criminal Case No. staged a rally demanding the immediate arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After
3464. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: their rally in the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they personally went to see respondent judge
in his chamber to reiterate their demand.
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the
courtroom of respondent Judge Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent judge, the latter issued an order
Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the aforesaid criminal case, while of 8 December 19883 in his capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due
Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of notice to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in the same order of 8 December
Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal’s Office of 1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing
Butuan City against Pablo Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail
Belarmino Allocod, and (2) other “John Does”. Macapas was a bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr. was recommended for the temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod on the ground that they were not
facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.1 charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against
them was merely circumstantial.
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal; however, a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of
the Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. Appeals, assailing the 8 December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
16383. In response to the urgency of the petition, a resolution dated 20 December 1988 was
issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the assailed be shot moments before the appointed time of the killing and pushed the gunman to the place
order, pending the resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, where the victim was? Respondent’s answer was that he would not behave in such manner,
respondent judge and Calo, Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the gunman was reluctant that the
had already put up their respective bail bonds of P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that latter had to be pushed to execute the plan.”6
both have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of the CA temporary restraining While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals
order moot and academic. in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is quite enlightening. That decision, as already mentioned, declared as
null and void the warrants of arrest issued by respondent judge as well as the bail fixed by him
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 setting aside the questioned 8 for the temporary release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The Court of
December 1988 order as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or Appeals said:
excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail bonds filed by the accused in
said Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin “It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or not the
was ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To evidence of guilt is strong in a capital offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was the court which can only be exercised and reached after due or summary hearing. ( People vs.
ordered to conduct a hearing and thus resolve the motion for fixing the bail for the temporary San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that hearing, the fiscal must be
release of the two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals notified and given the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without
became final and executory on 23 February 1989. 5 affording such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated. ( People vs. San
Diego, supra; Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the prosecutor
In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the Court may
granting bail to the accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ask the prosecution ‘questions to ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or judge the
ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the adequacy of the amount of bail.’ (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital x x x x x x x x x
offense can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned
warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also questioned on the ground of his “close association” In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in custody of the
with the accused Calo, Jr. law, the respondent court having granted and fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the
hearing to determine whether or not their guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The argument
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal sounds but casuistic because in Our judgment the respondent court acted deliberately with
Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail, filed by any person precipitate haste and with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it issued the
who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, is applicable only to cases where the order granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private respondents
accused is already in custody, but neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 themselves had requested their motion to be heard on December 15, 1988 yet, when
was being detained at the time their application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In respondent court in the same order directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against private
his capacity as Executive Judge, respondent judge claims that he merely followed the respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous and useless ceremony because with
precedents set by his predecessors, in issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a case in the grant of bail the accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without even
order to avoid delay in the arrest of the accused. seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the records
before Us to show that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private respondents.” 7
In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo,
Jr., claiming that he was a mere employee in the business of said accused, and that he Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of
appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not as an associate. To justify his discretion in fixing the bail of the accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be held
finding that the evidence of guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively, for an erroneous judgment or
respondent judge stated that— decision rendered by him in good faith.8 However, good faith may be negated by the
circumstances on record.
“Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. could have done
the acts of giving a revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial
Macapas into the courtroom to shoot Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But,
the presence of witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and Fernando Casinao, who by their own while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor Corvera. These acts being or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not appear to be a natural conduct principles.9
of man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does not impress herein respondent as having In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
that kind of mental intelligence. Respondent has known accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. 10 Respondent
practitioner and as a person for about twenty years already. Respondent finds accused Calo to judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an order fixing bail for the
be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when respondent reviewed the findings of the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to
investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao, respondent established principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to
entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent’s mind. Respondent know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more
asked himself the questions that if he were the mastermind, would he give, in the presence of than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in
some individuals, the gun to the gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of
the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 11
The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against the accused is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of
respondent judge’s act of fixing bail without a hearing.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a
capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the
prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to
produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the
issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing
bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process. 12 Irrespective of respondent
judge’s opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not strong, the law and
settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the
temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent
judge’s disregard of an established rule of law by depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to gross ignorance of
the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo,
Jr. as a former employee of the said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge
demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said accused and from
concluding that the evidence against him was merely “circumstantial”, in order to avoid any
doubt as to his judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the
case and allowed the judge to whom the case was actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing
the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality and integrity.13
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND

PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his
duties as a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more
severally.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., On leave.
Respondent fined of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
Note.—It is the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong x x x. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, We are not prepared to substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court. ( People vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA
219.)
RTJ No. 90-474. October 4,1991.* (6) criminal cases with prisoners, 36 criminal cases without prisoners, and forty-five (45) civil
CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, RTC, cases. Worse the records of two (2) criminal cases and twelve (12) civil cases were missing.
BRANCH 16, NAVAL, LEYTE, respondent. While the records of six (6) criminal cases were not in the Court but acknowledged by
Respondent Judge to have been in his possession.
Judges; The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's pay check but an instrument
by which the courts can fulfill the constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy Deputy Court Administrator Bernad also noted the dismal state of the Courthouse of the RTC,
disposition of cases.—A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day Branch 16, which he described as "bereft of any dignity as a court of law" showing "a lack of
requirement, but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is financial and moral support of the local authorities," and observed that the Municipal Court was
not merely a means to one's paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts Can fulfill the even better housed.
Constitutional mandate of the people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.
On 31 October 1990, Complainant further furnished the Court with an Affidavit of Judge
Same; Same; Negligence; The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct Dulcisimo Pitao of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, stating that Respondent had
and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge.— Additionally, we have to hold respondent intervened for the accused in Criminal Case No. 959 then pending with the said Municipal Court.
inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) We considered the foregoing as a supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal
criminal cases. "A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala case.
are intact. There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not
one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming On 23 November 1990, Complainant again brought to the attention of the Court seven (7)
of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the additional cases submitted for decision, at the earliest since April 1986, still unresolved by
ethical standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of Respondent (p. 44, Rollo), even though the transcripts were ready as early as 1984 in one (1)
the prestige and prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out." case.
Same; Judicial Ethics; Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in In his Comment filed on 20 December 1990, Respondent claimed that the Complaint was more
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence for harassment and vengeance, otherwise, Complainant would not have filed a criminal case
of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality.—Cardinal against him for Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code before the
is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all Ombudsman, based on the same facts alleged in his Complaint before this Court. Respondent
activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing further claimed that he had not violated the 90-day rule since 1 February 1990 when the Court
in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule required the adoption of the continuous trial system. He did not deny, however, that before said
2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing date, there were other cases not decided within the 90-day rule, including those listed in the
the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but Complaint allegedly because the transcripts were incomplete. He added that he had no hand in
also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality. the preparation of his monthly reports of pending cases; that after he had ordered the person-
in-charge of preparing the Certificates of Service to explain why she had made it appear that
Same; Administrative Law; Evidence; In administrative proceedings, mere preponderance of said cases were decided within ninety (90) days from its submission when actually they were
evidence suffices to establish the charges.—Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, not, she stated that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the monthly report except to
in point of fact, is of no moment as Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case sign after she had prepared them.
seals his fate. In administrative proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence
suffices to establish the charges. On 18 April 1991, acting upon a second Report from Deputy Court Administrator Bernad, the
Court resolved: (1) to refer the supplemental charge regarding undue interest in a particular
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court. Falsification of Certificates of Service. criminal case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr., of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation; (2) to order Respondent to decide with dispatch cases still
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. unresolved beyond the 90-day-period; and (3) to inform the Court immediately regarding steps
he had taken to retrieve lost records and to personally put his records in order.
PER CURIAM:
To date, Respondent has been unheard from on those directives.
In an Affidavit-Complaint, dated 7 March 1990, Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr., a practicing
lawyer in Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, charged respondent, Judge Adriano R. Villamor of On 12 July 1991, Complainant followed up with another letter complaint stating that the seven
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, with falsification of his monthly Certificates of cases mentioned in his letter of 23 November 1990 remained undecided, adding that five (5)
Service by making it appear that he had resolved all cases submitted for decision within the cases handled by him were unresolved since January 1987, not to speak of cases handled by
ninety-day period required by the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5, when actually he had fifteen other lawyers.
(15) cases undecided from five (5) years back or from March, 1985.
Judging from the Deputy Court Administrator's two Reports, there is validity to Complainant's
On 7 August 1990, the Court directed Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad to make an charge that Respondent had failed to decide cases within the 90-day reglementary period
on-the-spot audit of the cases pending in the sala of Respondent Judge. On 2 October 1990, notwithstanding "Second Ex-parte Motions to Decide Case" filed by Complainant (Annexes A to
Deputy Court Administrator Bernad reported that there were, indeed, eighty seven (87) cases L, Complaint), and that Respondent had falsified his Certificates of Service for 2 September
undecided beyond the ninety(90)-day reglementary period as of 3 July 1990, consisting of six 1986, 3 October 1987, 3 October 1988, 3 November 1989, and 1 March 1990 (Annexes N to R,
Complaint). Respondent's defense that incomplete transcripts of stenographic notes dissuaded administrator that he is capable of delegating to his personnel those tasks which properly
him from deciding those cases for fear of "rendering an injustice" is controverted by his own pertain to them, maintaining, likewise, their trust and confidence in him."
stenographic reporter who stated that the transcripts in some of those cases were ready as far
back as 1984 (Comment, Annex "2"). A member of the bench can not pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement, but should, in
fact, persevere in its implementation. The Certificate of Service is not merely a means to one's
Respondent, however, shifts the blame on his Clerk of Court, Atty. Rogelio Jocobo, who, he paycheck, but an instrument by which the Courts can fulfill the Constitutional mandate of the
claims, was inefficient in the management of Court records. Respondent forgets, however, that people's right to a speedy disposition of cases.
he sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay but that his responsibilities
include being an effective manager of the Court and its personnel. Canon 3, Rule 3.08, of the "The people's faith in the administration of justice, especially those who belong to the low
Code of Judicial Conduct, provides: income group, would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial
courts which unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberation, could be
"A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional expected to act with dispatch" (Magdamo vs. Pahimulin, Adm. Mat. No. 662-MJ, 30 September
competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions 1976, 73 SCRA 110).
of other judges and court personnel."
Additionally, we have to hold respondent inexcusably negligent for failure to account for the
Also expected of a Judge under Rule 3.09 is that: records of twelve (12) civil and two (2) criminal cases.
"A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient "A judge is expected to ensure that the records of the cases assigned to his sala are intact.
dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of high standards of public service There is no justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight
and fidelity." records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge. For
true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical standards of
As we held in Secretary of Justice vs. Legaspi (A.M. No. 997-CFI, 10 September 1981, 107 SCRA a judicial office and Whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and
234): prerequisite attached to said office must be weeded out" (Longboan vs. Polig, Adm. Mat. No.
704-RTJ, 14 June 1990, 186 SCRA 557).
"Respondent, as the incumbent judge, ought to know the cases submitted to him for decision,
particularly those pending for more than ninety days. As a matter of fact, he is supposed to We come now to the supplemental charge of undue interest in a pending criminal case, subject
keep his own record of cases submitted for decision so that he could act on them promptly and of the Investigative Report submitted on 9 August 1991 by Justice Fermin A. Martin, who found
without delay, mindful of the mandate in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 296, also known as the the imputation sufficiently substantiated, and has recommended the imposition of a fine of
Judiciary Act of 1948 . . . It is expected that he should be more diligent and more vigilant in P10,000.00.
attending to cases submitted for decision as well as in the preparation of his monthly certificates
of service by verifying every now and then whether there are cases pending decision for more From that Report, we gather that on 16 July 1987, Respondent, as Executive Judge of the
than ninety days; because he could be held accountable for any error or falsification in his Regional Trial Court, Branch XVI, Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte, designated Judge Dulcisimo
certificates. Thus, respondent cannot now escape liability for falsification of his certificates of Pitao, of the Municipal Trial Court of Maripipi, Leyte, as Acting Judge of the Municipal Circuit
service with the lame excuse that he has no knowledge of those cases pending decision for Trial Court of BiliranCabucgayon, Leyte, which was then vacant, with the directive to allocate
more than ninety days at the time he submitted his certificates of service. Nor could he give the two (2) session days a week in his additional sala.
excuse that his attention was not called to the cases pending decision ninety days because he
need not be reminded of his deadlines by a subordinate court employee like the clerk of court. On 19 August 1987, while Judge Pitao was at his residence at Naval, Biliran Subprovince, Leyte,
Court employees are not the guardians of a judge's responsibilities." he received a note handcarried by a woman, whom he came to know later as the wife of
Guillermo Lipango, the accused in Criminal Case No. 959, which had long been pending trial in
In Nidua vs. Lazaro (A.M. No. R-465 MTJ, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 581), we maintained: the 4th MCTC of Biliran Cabucgayon, Leyte.
"It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his Court so that The note (Exhibit "A"), written on Respondent's letterhead, reads:
no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition, particularly those
submitted for decision. A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement "Aug. 19, 1987
by Court personnel. Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is
the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions." "Dear Tete,
And in Cipriano vs. Judge Villamor (A.M. No. RTJ-88-207, 22 June 1989, en banc, Minute "The bearer is the wife of Guillermo Lipango who has a long pending theft case. If you have
Resolution) we ruled, jurisdiction hear and decide. If none, remand it to RTC.
"Take care because I learned Big Man Egane is taking much interest because accused is
"The Supreme Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when competing with his fishing but only in a small scale. Okay? Thanks.
there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the problems of congestion and Sincerely,
delay long plaguing our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence Ading."
and dedication in the performance of their duties. It is a measure of a judge's competence as an
Sometime later, Judge Pitao sought respondent, as the Executive Judge, regarding his but to have the wife of the very accused deliver the letter to the municipal judge who will decide
application for leave of absence which had to be coursed through the latter. During their the case and over whom he (respondent) exercised supervision and wielded a degree of moral
conversation, respondent mentioned the case of "People vs. Lipango," asked Judge Pitao ascendancy as Executive Judge was simply a big letdown in the required circumspection and
whether the latter had received the note, and again warned the latter about a certain "Big Man high ideals expected of a judge. It is a truism that a judge's official conduct and his behavior in
Egane," who was backing the complainant therein and that he (Judge Pitao) better acquit the the performance of judicial duties should be free from the appearance of impropriety (Aleza vs.
accused (Tsn., 15 July 1991 pp. 13-14). Reyes, 131 SCRA 445, 453).
On 25 August 1988, after hearing the case, Judge Pitao rendered his decision convicting the Moreover, respondent Judge, while cautioning Judge Pitao to watch out and exercise care in
accused, Guillermo Lipango, of the crime of Theft (Exhibit "C") "because the evidence against handling the case supposedly on account of the interest of persons not parties to the case,
the accused was very strong" (ibid., p. 14). made a side remark for the acquittal of the accused. Such a statement, which was not denied,
was highly improper and was apt to create the impression that he was for the exoneration of
On 16 November 1988, when Judge Pitao went to the boarding house of Respondent to invite the accused Guillermo Lipango. It tended to influence the trial judge who was going to decide
the latter to a birthday party, and while they were walking together, Judge Pitao confided to the case and thus did violence to the lofty principle that "the office of a judge exists for one
Respondent that he had convicted Lipango "because he could not in conscience acquit him" solemn end: to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially" (Gonzales-Austria vs.
(ibid., p. 17). Irked, Respondent directed Judge Pitao to forward the records to the former's Abaya, 176 SCRA 634, 646)."
Court (ibid., p. 18).
Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
On 23 November 1988, the records of Criminal Case No. 959 were elevated to the RTC, Leyte, all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall refrain from
Branch XVI, over which Respondent presides, but the case was actually docketed thereat on 5 influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court
December 1988. (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in
view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence
From 1 to 3 December 1988, Judge Pitao attended the National Convention of Lawyers in Cebu of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality
City. Upon his return, he learned that Judge Meljohn de la Peña had been designated as Acting (Commentaries on the Code of Judicial Conduct). On this point, Impao vs. Makilala (A.M. No.
Judge of the 4th MCTC Biliran-Cabucgayon, Leyte, and that his designation had been revoked MTJ-88-184, 13 October 1989, 178 SCRA 541) expounds:
effective 30 November 1988 (ibid., pp. 18-19).
"It is an important judicial norm that a judge's private as well as official conduct must at all
On 9 December 1988, Respondent promulgated his decision acquitting accused-appellant times be free from the appearance of impropriety [Lugue vs. Kayanan, G.R. No. L-26826, August
Guillermo Lipango of the crime charged (Exhibit "F"). This, despite the fact that the records of 29,1969, 29 SCRA 165; x x x]. As held by this Court in the case of De la Paz vs. Inutan, Adm.
the case disclosed that no notice had been sent to the parties of the receipt of the entire record Mat. No. 201 MJ, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 540: . . . The judge is the visible representation of the
to enable them to submit their respective memoranda. law and, more importantly, of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to
obey the law. They see in him an intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests,
For his part, Respondent opted to rely on his six (6)-page Comment, dated 19 December 1990 specially in the station of municipal judges, like respondent Judge, who have that close and
(Exh. H, pp. 78-83, Rollo), as his testimony-in-chief. As correctly observed by the Investigating direct contact with the people before nobody else in the judiciary. Thus, for the judge to return
Justice, said Comment contains nothing more than a denial of the charge of falsification and an that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
attribution of ill motive to the Complainant. He then determined that Respondent is deemed not follow."
to have denied:
The Investigating Justice gave one final and pointed observation on respondent's culpability,
"1)that he sent the handwritten note dated August 19, 1987 (Exhibit "A") to Judge Dulcisimo thus:
Pitao through the wife of the accused Guillermo Lipango; 'The clincher though came when respondent Judge decided the same case which was appealed
to his branch although he knew that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk of court to
2)that when Judge Pitao brought his application for leave of absence to respondent as Executive the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the prosecution and the defense to
Judge, respondent took up the matter of the note he sent and the theft case against accused submit memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, Respondent's
Guillermo Lipango which was pending trial before Judge Pitao and even hurried the remark excuse was that under the rules, it was (and still is) the duty of the clerk of court to notify the
"better acquit him;" and, parties of the fact that the original record of the case, together with the transcripts and exhibits,
had been received (Rule 21, paragraph c, Interim Rules and Guidelines). Respondent
3)that he decided the appealed criminal case and acquitted the appellant Guillermo Lipango overlooked, however, that the same rule provides that the RTC judge shall decide the case on
although the record of the case disclosed that no notice had been sent yet by the branch clerk the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda
of court to the parties of the receipt of the entire record to enable the parties to submit and/or briefs, as may have been filed (paragraph D, Rule 21, ibid)."
memoranda pursuant to Rule 21 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines."
Whether or not the accused deserved the acquittal, in point of fact, is of no moment as
Accordingly, the Investigating Justice came up with the following apt observations and findings: Respondent's mere act of interference in a criminal case seals his fate. In administrative
"In sending his handwritten note (Exhibit "A") to Judge Pitao, and through the wife of the proceedings such as this, mere preponderance of evidence suffices to establish the charges (The
accused Guillermo Lipango, respondent failed to exercise due care. It is true that the contents of Court Administrator vs. Hermoso, et al., A.M. No. R-97-RTJ, 28 May 1987, 150 SCRA 269).
the letter may not have directly exhorted the addressee to decide the case in favor of one party
Upon the facts and the evidence, we can not but hold respondent guilty (1) of having made
untruthful statements in his Certificates of Service, of inexcusable negligence and gross
inefficiency in connection with missing records in his Sala, and of utter indifferences ,to the
directives of this Court; and (2) of serious misconduct for undue interest in a pending criminal
case before a lower Court over which he exercised supervision, all in violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct. The dilapidated condition of the Courthouse of the RTC, Branch 16. also
betrays a lack of management capabilities desired of a Presiding Judge and an insensitiveness to
the needs of a Court of Justice worthy of its name. All told, we find him unfit to continue with
his membership in the Bench.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS respondent Judge Adriano R. Villamor, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte, from the service, with forfeiture of all his
accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if any, and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including
governmentowned or controlled corporations.
Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his personal record
SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent Judge dismissed from the service.
Note.—A judge must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to
follow. He should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. ( Ompoc
vs. Teves, 178 SCRA 14.)
A.M. No. MTJ-93-888. October 24, 1994.* in his sala.1
MAYOR ROGER S. PADILLA, complainant, vs. HON. ROBERTO V. ZANTUA, JR., Municipal Mayor Roger S. Padilla alleges that in Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936 (People v. Ventura
Trial Court, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, respondent. Calzada, et al.) for grave coercion and grave threats; Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v. Efren
Dalde, et al.) for highgrading; Civil Case No. 610 (Vicente Enriquez v. Zaldy Suarez) for
Administrative Law; Judges; Respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in Circular trespassing (sic); Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v. Rolando Racasa) for highgrading; and
No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial Criminal Case No. 5998 (People v. Job Riel) for alarms and scandals, the opposing counsel, Atty.
which is to be terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing. —Complainant in Augusto B. Schneider is always seen eating and drinking in the constant company of respondent
the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the cases referred to in the complaint which Judge in public establishments in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
remained undecided after the lapse of the required 90-day period to decide cases; hence, the
dismissal of charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order. The delay in the trial of the Mayor Padilla complains that these cases have been pending since 1991, some have not even
cited cases in the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936, Criminal Case No. been tried and because of delays in the disposition of these cases and the perceived partiality of
5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of herein respondent Judge. The respondent Judge to Atty. Augusto Schneider, the people’s confidence in the judiciary is being
delay was caused by the numerous postponements both by the prosecution and the defense. eroded.
However, respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in Circular No. 1-89 dated
January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous trial which is to be In compliance with the Resolution of this Court dated February 14, 1994, 2 respondent Judge
terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing. Zantua denied the accusations against him in his answer and comment alleging, among others,
that Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936 for grave coercion and grave threats had been lagging
Same; Same; Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the for more than two (2) years because of the numerous postponements of both the prosecution
point that favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to and the defense; that he allowed the presentation of the witnesses without the presence of
resist.—We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge. Constant company with a opposing counsel provided that the parties and their counsel were properly notified and the
lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be witnesses shall be subject to cross examination pursuant to Section 2, par. (c) of the 1985 Rules
asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent on Criminal Procedure and the case of Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422; that Atty. Schneider has
Judge of eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala never been a counsel in this case because the prosecutor was Pedro Vega and the defense
may well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in counsel was Freddie Venida.3
the impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may undermine the people’s faith in the
administration of justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in Respondent Judge claims that in Criminal Case No. 5973 (People v. Efren Dalde) for highgrading
the locality. wherein Mayor Padilla claims that no hearing has been conducted, records of the case will bear
him out that a hearing had actually been conducted; that the accused, represented by a DAR
Same; Same; A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence in the integrity lawyer, was arraigned, pre-trial was held, and ocular inspection was made.
and impartiality of the judiciary.—A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The prestige of judicial office shall In Civil Case No. 610 (Vicenta Enriquez v. Zaldy Suarez) for forcible entry (not for trespassing)
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to wherein Mayor Padilla complains that it was decided without a hearing, respondent Judge
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. maintains that the case was tried pursuant to Section 1, par. 1-A of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. After an answer was filed, the parties were asked to submit their respective position
Same; Same; Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly papers with their evidence, after which the case was decided in accordance with Section 10
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. — thereof.
Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant The delay in Criminal Case No. 5908 (People v. Rolando Racasa), according to respondent
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be Judge, was caused by the frequent postponements and non-appearance of the private
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. prosecutor and/or defense counsel, and justice requires the presence of lawyers in the trial of
cases where the records show that the accused had already been arraigned and the three
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Serious Irregularities and Grave Misconduct. prosecution witnesses had already been presented.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
In Criminal Case No. 5998 (People v. Job Riel), respondent Judge claims that the delay was due
RESOLUTION to numerous postponements but explains that the accused has already been arraigned and the
last witness is to be presented by the prosecution.
ROMERO, J.:
Respondent Judge denies that he is fraternizing with lawyers with pending cases in his sala,
In a sworn complaint dated October 5, 1993, Mayor Roger S. Padilla of the Municipality of Jose explaining that in the case of Atty. Schneider, he is the only lawyer in the Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte charges respondent Judge Roberto V. Zantua, Municipal Trial Panganiban and it is but natural for respondent Judge to be friendly with him but maintains that
Court of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte with serious irregularities and grave misconduct in their friendship has never been a hindrance to the proper disposition of the cases in his sala as
the performance of his official duties for: (1) failure to decide cases within the prescribed period; his impartiality is known not only in the Municipality of Jose Panganiban, but also in the province
(2) unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases which have been prejudicial to litigants; (3) of Camarines Norte as shown by his decisions in MTC Mercedes, MTC Paracale and MTC Basud.
manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and (4) fraternizing with lawyers who have pending cases
Respondent Judge attributes the filing of the instant complaint against him to local politics in the appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not only in the discharge of their official
Municipality of Jose Panganiban, alleging that since his appointment on February 16, 1983, he duties but also in their everyday life, for as we have earlier stressed, ‘no position exacts greater
has always been neutral and impartial in all the cases he disposed of; that even in the case demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary’ so
against herein complainant Mayor for slander by deed, he displayed his position of being neutral that (a) magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
and impartial, for which reason he has earned the ire of governor Roy Padilla, Sr., complainant’s conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to
father, and Mayor Roger Padilla because respondent Judge refuses to succumb to their influence him as the epitome of integrity and justice.”7
and pressure; that for this reason, he requested his transfer on November 29, 1990 to another
station (MTC, Basud, Camarines Norte) as his life in Jose Panganiban is in imminent danger Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
brought about by the political pressures, and this request was followed by his letter-requests judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
dated May 2, 1991, then August 30, 1993, and most recently, the letter-request dated public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
December 10, 1993 addressed to Hon. Reynaldo L. Suarez, Deputy Court Administrator. viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.8
The case was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby ADMONISHED with a
recommendation. In a Memorandum dated August 4, 1994 addressed to the Hon. Chief Justice warning that a repetition of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Andres R. Narvasa, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, concurred in by Court Respondent Judge is reminded to be prompt in the disposition of cases pending in his sala
Administrator Ernani Cruz Paño, recommended the dismissal of charges for failure to decide pursuant to Sections 3, 4, 5 of Rule 22, Rules of Court and Administrative Circular No. 1-88 and
cases within the prescribed period and for unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases. 4 Circular 1-89.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal records.
We agree with the dismissal of the charges with respect to failure to decide the cases within the Bidin (Acting Chairman), Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.
prescribed period and the charges of unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases against Feliciano, J., On leave.
respondent Judge. Respondent admonished with a warning.
Complainant in the instant case failed to specifically cite any of the cases referred to in the Note.—Failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period of 90 days is not
complaint which remained undecided after the lapse of the required 90-day period to decide excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Longoban vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990])
cases; hence, the dismissal of charges of violation of the 90-day period is in order. The delay in
the trial of the cited cases in the complaint, particularly Criminal Case Nos. 5935 and 5936,
Criminal Case No. 5908 and Criminal Case No. 5998, was not entirely the fault of herein
respondent Judge. The delay was caused by the numerous postponements both by the
prosecution and the defense. However, respondent Judge should be reminded of the directive in
Circular No. 1-89 dated January 19, 1989 requiring all courts to conduct a mandatory continuous
trial which is to be terminated within 90 days from inception of the initial hearing.
However, as regards the allegations of manifest partiality in favor of a litigant and fraternizing
with lawyers who have pending cases in his sala, we note that respondent Judge does not deny
his close friendship and association with Atty. Augusto Schneider. Respondent Judge pointed out
that while it is true that Atty. Schneider has pending cases in his sala, the latter lost in these
cases which is supposed to give the impression that such close association with Atty. Schneider
has not affected his neutrality and impartiality as a Judge.
We cannot fully countenance the view of respondent Judge. Constant company with a lawyer
tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in the future may be asked
from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of respondent Judge of
eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala may well
arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge. This eventuality may undermine the people’s faith in the administration
of justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Augusto Schneider is the only lawyer in the locality.
A judge should behave at all times as to inspire public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.5 The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.6
Once again, we find this case an occasion to remind members of the Judiciary:
“x x x to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and be free from any
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563. September 8, 2004.* to help complainant. The former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand,
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ) persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the Decisions in said cases. But he
LUCILA TAN, complainant, vs. Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent. politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused, and
moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation.
Courts; Judges; Duties; Gross Misconduct; When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of Respondent further stated that complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor
any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even insinuated that she could help
the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself .—We him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent
have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a planning to buy. But he refused the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. He said that he
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of thereafter change the resolution of the cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of
the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions.3
expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Respondent’s act of sending a First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative
member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act case. Only complainant Lucila Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence
of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 dated February 23, 2001 which
judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross was allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent judge’s staff. 5 Respondent judge, on
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. the other hand, presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando
B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of of his witnesses,6 copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, 7 and
Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019). various documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No.
117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court. dated Nov. 13, 2000, front and dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated
March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998, Current Account Inquiry, and
PUNO, J.: Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondent’s
witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.8
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila, 1 for violation of Rule 140 of The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 COMPLAINANT’S VERSION:
and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and
pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by 1. LUCILA TAN
respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in
his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Branch 58, MeTC, San Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two
Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent was asking for cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits with the Prosecutor’s Office in Pasig. After resolution,
P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown copies of the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to Branch 57 and the other one
respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge Quilatan
dismissing the complaints against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and
reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff the two cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of the
member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440. Motion for Inhibition filed by Complainant’s lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand because she believed that she cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent Judge Rosete ( TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of
had a very strong case, well supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce, called up the
dismissed by respondent judge.2 Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for ( sic)
assistance. Joyce gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor ( TSN, pages 17-18,
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was
that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She intercepted by Josie, the Mayor’s Secretary. When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked
even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant answered in the affirmative, Josie
and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy Estrada, made arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge ( TSN, pages 19-21, Hearing of March 3,
to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him 2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October
2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they,
Cravings Restaurant in Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). During the three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there drinking. While Complainant
meeting, Complainant “told the Judge regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind ( TSN, pages 49-50, Hearing of
convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible” ( TSN, page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). March 3, 2003). Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man
When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie were left alone. left. The Complainant said that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she
After she came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give something to understood as a payment, and she told the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say
[the] Judge, “Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo ” (TSN, page 24, that she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went back inside the restaurant ( TSN,
Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give the money
Complainant asked her how much, the former mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). she was still scared because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether
Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) ( TSN, page 25, it will be in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the P20,000.00
Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of P20,000.00 to Josie because her case was very strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she
through her driver after two days ( TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). When Josie promised them that she will give them after she was ( sic) able to collect all the debts.
received the money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from the Office of
Clerk of Court asked her if she sent money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When
said that Josie went there and there was money in the drawer ( TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of Complainant asked why, “Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision.
March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the resolution, Joyce Sabi niya ako na lang ang magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation .” She received the decision
called up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller said that the decision was unfavorable to her
called saying that she had an important thing to tell to ( sic) the Complainant. After Complainant (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
got back to Manila, Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant something.
When they were in Complainant’s car in San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions, Complainant saw that the cases were
dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyce’s request ( TSN, pages 30- 1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00 for She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of
each case. “Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at San Juan, Metro Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was
that time” (TSN, page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). Complainant identified the copy of the already the Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy ( TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003 ). She met
Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440 for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayor’s Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of
marked as Exhibit “A” for the Complainant ( TSN, pages 35-38, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan went to the Office,
Complainant further alleged “Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of P150,000.00 for each together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a
case then they will (sic) going to reverse the Decision” and “Si Judge daw” will reverse the case. She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no
Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 ( TSN, page 39, Hearing of March longer remember how many times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She
3, 2003). Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was
of the Judge. Complainant went again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayor’s help and to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003 ). She denied that she met Lucila Tan at
she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The Mayor called up the Judge but he was not the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty Thousand Pesos
around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of the Mayor and when (P50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for
she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country ( TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of only Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan
March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which was talking about regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even
Joyce gave. Mayor Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with
in (sic) the phone with the Judge, Complainant was in front of the Mayor ( TSN, pages 42-43, Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the Mayor “because his voice is very loud.” He Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which was marked
said, “Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming back? I do not know as Exhibit “1” (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan
what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso gave anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan ” (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003 ). After
that they left the Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada 2. RODOLFO CEA
again. Since the Complainant was still carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be He testified that his acquaintances usually call him “Buboy” and for about two years or more he
promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The Complainant showed the had no occupation. Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58,
decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time ( TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March 3, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan because, when he “was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she
2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when he approached me and asked if I can introduce her to Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a
comes back from New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, favorable decision against her case.” He could not remember anymore when that was because
Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2) “it was a long time ago” (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was
Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the evening, Judge Rosete was still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the
already in the company of several men whom she got to know as Fernan and Buboy ( TSN, Metropolitan Trial Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge
pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003 ). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually
around 10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete “because aside from the introduction, she wants me to ask
anything at all and it was the Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against ( sic) her case and I told her that Judge Rosete
don’t (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction” ( TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 57, who
September 22, 2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, “ may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni Mayor kay
the Court in San Juan was “the first and the last time.” When asked about the claim of Lucila Judge” (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003 ). She did not say anything but Lucila
Tan that he approached her and demanded from her a sum of money to represent an advance Tan asked “may tumawag na ba sa Mayor’s Office? ” and she said “yes, ma’am.” After that there
payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he answered was a hearing and the sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge
“I don’t know about that, sir.” (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003 .) He identified the Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge
Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness Rosete about the case of Lucila “ na pinakikiusap ni Mayor” (TSN, page 12, Hearing of
of the contents of the Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit “2” ( TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former
September 22, 2003). He denied that he met the Complainant at Sang-kalan Restaurant around President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant
8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13, Hearing of September 22, 2003). on March 3, 2003 that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila
Tan by telephone and said that she saw money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA his Office and that she asked the Complainant whether the latter was the one who sent the
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the position money stuffed inside the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her and asked if
Budget Officer III since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget Josie went to their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also
Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). He recalled having met Lucila denied that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan
Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November 2000. The first time he saw Lucila was the one who called her up and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her
Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal Reyes. He something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision and she was surprised when the
went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not been former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the latter did not
together for a long time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant. When he answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her ( TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of
arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were already there. They stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 September 29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and
[eleven] o’clock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He met Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered
Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as Fernan of the that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Mayor asked if she knew the telephone
Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand. She was present
three (3) girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal ( TSN, page when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him ( TSN, page 17, Hearing of
50, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. September 29, 2003). “He said ‘Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo?’ I don’t
He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill because he saw him get a credit card and sign know what was your answer(ed) [ sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ‘ ganun ba?’
something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete sign and give to the then Mayor Jinggoy said ‘o sige, okay na’ and then we left the Office.” She denied that she gave
waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainant’s two cases inside the latter’s parked car in
incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). He San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her the copy in
could not remember the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
nearing Christmas in 2000. “Pumunta siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were decided
katunayan nandito po dala ko.” Lucila Tan asked him to help her in her case with Alfonso Sy. by Respondent Judge, in return for a favorable decision ( TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of
“Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the Complainant who offered to her. She
(P300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003, which was
kaibigan. Matagal na kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko marked as Exhibit “5,” and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof
sa kanya.” He told Judge Rosete about that and the latter got mad at him. In their second (TSN, pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).9
meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that
Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit “3” ( TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of September 22, respondent judge, through his staff, required her to pay the amount of P150,000.00 for him to
2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against Alfonso Pe Sy.
copy was the exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe
other documents that Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as him by offering to pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even
Exhibit “4” and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the
told him the contents of the documents and how the case against Alfonso Sy came about. When complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not like that and
they had been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the
that, the latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the parties’ evidence.
Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-66, Hearing of September 22, 2003 ). Lucila Tan was insisting that
he give Judge Rosete so that her case will win but he answered that his friend was not like that After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary
(TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003). evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s version more trustworthy. Not
only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also presented during the investigation
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent judge’s draft decisions in
because in the year 2000 she had a case in their court. She first came to know Lucila Tan when Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she
pays P150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office
complainant to obtain a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not without salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the SO ORDERED.
court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s disposition if not assured by the judge Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
who drafted the decision. Austria-Martinez, J., On Official Leave.
Respondent judge suspended from office for 4 months without salary and benefits.
The respondent’s evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the Note.—For a judge to be held guilty of misconduct, the act complained of must be such
testimonies of two of respondent’s witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta as to affect the performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects his character
confirmed complainant’s claim that she met respondent judge and his two companions, Espuerta as a private individual. (Bernardo vs. Tiamson, 363 SCRA 279 [2001])
himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on the
other hand, denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never
went out with respondent judge in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judge’s two
witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan
Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed that she met Respondent Judge, a
certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B. Espuerta testified
that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while
the latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant. 10
(citations omitted)
Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainant’s version that she met with respondent
judge and his companions at Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as
regards the dates when he went to New Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines.
Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when complainant claims
that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and
the dates when he entered said country. 11 He did not show to the investigating body the dates
when he left and returned to the Philippines. Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates:
March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant was in the Philippines
before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainant’s testimony, as well as that of
Fernando Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and
Buboy in April 2001.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct.
They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a
judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the judicial system
is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of
the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is
sworn to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount
that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.12
Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of
his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office
hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be observed by members of the Bench.
They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
A.M. No. RTJ-93–1021. January 31, 1997.* ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Serious Misconduct.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR P. DE
GUZMAN, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Branch 142, City of Makati, The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Metro Manila, respondent.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Remedial Law; Lis Pendens; The notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon order of the
court after proper showing that the notice IS for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or The administration of justice is likened to that of a voyage to nowhere—unless it is manned by
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.—Under honest and able magistrates, it drifts aimlessly. Magistracy is after all about character.
Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only upon
order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the In this administrative case, the Office of the Court Administrator 1 filed against Judge Salvador P.
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be De Guzman, Jr., Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, Metro Manila, for
recorded. The cancellation order of respondent was issued pursuant to the second ground, that serious misconduct in connection with the lifting of the notice of lis pendens in the case of
is, the notice of lis pendens was not necessary to protect the right of Norvic which caused it to Norvic Incorporated, represented by its president Atty. Vicente Santos against St. Michael
be recorded. A cautious reading of the records of the instant case reveals that never was Norvic International Institute of Technology, represented by its president Erlinda M. Peñaloza, and St.
the owner of the Yakal property. It was Overseas Superintendence Corporation (OSC) that Michael Institute Corporation, represented by its president Patricia M. Peñaloza, docketed as
owned the Yakal property prior to its transfer to SMIRM. The fact that Norvic was the majority Civil Case No. 91–1123.
stockholder of OSC would not legally clothe it (Norvic) with personality to cause the notice of lis
pendens affecting the property of the corporation (OSC) specially so when the corporation was From the underlying record of Civil Case No. 91–1123, its factual backdrop may be summed up
not even one of the parties to the case. Well settled is the rule that properties registered in the as follows:
name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. A
stockholder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation, nor is he entitled to It appears that Norvic Incorporated (Norvic, for brevity) was the principal stockholder of
the possession of any definite portion of its ,property or assets; he is not a co-owner or tenant Overseas Superintendence Corporation, (OSC, for brevity) which was the registered owner of a
in common of the corporate property. parcel of land (Yakal property) situated in Makati, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
142203. On August 1, 1986, Atty. Vicente Santos, acting as president of Norvic entered St
Administrative Law; Judges; In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in Michael International Institute of Erlinda nology bgy IT, for brevity), represented by its its
issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens the act of respondent which pertains to his president Erlinda M. Peñaloza, into a contract to sell 2 the OSC shares of stock and the Yakal
judicial capacity is not subject to disciplinary action.—In the absence therefore of fraud, property. Subsequently, OSC conveyed the Yakal property to St. Michael International Realty
dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens, this act and Management Corporation (SMIRM, for brevity) pursuant to the Deed of Conveyance and
of respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not subject to disciplinary action. Exchange dated December 21, 1989.3 The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 142203 of OSC was
consequently cancelled and a new one (TCT No. 167832)4 was issued in the name of SMIRM.
Same; Same; A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or judge.—We are convinced, however, that respondent Two years later, Norvic filed this subject case5 (Civil Case No. 91–1123 which was assigned to
approached Judge Cosico at least twice asking him to cancel the notice of lis pendens, thereby, the sala of Judge Cosico) for the annulment of the Deed of Conveyance and Exchange dated
trying to influence the course of the litigation in the subject case in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon December 21, 1989 on the ground that the transfer of the Yakal property was fraudulent. Due
2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: “A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner to the filing of this case, Norvic caused the annotation of lis pendens on TCT No. 167832 on
the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or judge.” April 22,1989.6 SMIIT and SMIRM, the defendants in this Civil Case No. 91–1123, filed a motion
to cancel the notice of lis pendens,7 but, the same was denied by Judge Cosico in his order
Same; Same; Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast dated June 26, 1991.8 As a result of Judge Cosico’s resignation from judicial service on
suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice.—As the visible representation December 31, 1991, Norvic filed a motion to re-raffle the case on January 20, 1992 9 which was
of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance granted by executive Judge Job B. Madayag. 10 Thus, the case was referred to respondent Judge
the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. It is incumbent upon them to so De Guzman following the re-raffling11 of the case on February 7, 1992 before the sala of
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Executive Judge Job B. Madayag. Later on, defendants SMIIT and SMIRM filed a motion for
judiciary. Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast reconsideration12 of the order of denial dated June 26, 1991 of then Judge Cosico and for the
suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should avoid cancellation of notice of lis pendens contending, inter alia, that Norvic was not the proper party
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. In the case at bar, the act of whose rights might be protected by the annotation of lis pendens because it was not the
interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the sala of Judge registered owner of the Yakal property before and after it was transferred to defendant SMIRM.
Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and subverts the On August 5, 1992, respondent De Guzman reconsidered the order of denial dated June 26,
people’s faith in our judicial process. His evident misconduct collides with the established ethical 1991 of then Judge Cosico and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pentens.13 A year
standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to stress that judges are later the parties reached a compromise settlement, thus, a joint motion 14 was filed by both
held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not parties praying for the dismissal of the case which was granted by respondent De Guzman in his
invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor order dated September 23, 1993.15
to the judiciary. Honos habet onushonor carries with it, responsibility. The administrative suit against respondent Judge de Guzman was based on the testimony 16 of
former judge Manuel Cosico which was taken during the investigation of the alleged
irregularities in service of some judges in Makati conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee created
under Administrative Order No. 11–93 which was composed of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa what Justice Salas appropriately stated, “if he (respondent) had, either, a desire manifesting
and retired Justices Lorenzo R. Relova and Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera. financial interest, or to favor somebody, then he should have instead ruled against the lifting (of
notice of lis pendens), considering that Atty. Santos (the president of Norvic) was not only his
The Complaint dated July 5, 1993 17 against respondent Judge De Guzman states, inter alia, that classmate but also a relative of his wife by affinity"; 26 second, the subject case was assigned to
respondent approached at least twice Judge Manuel Cosico, then Presiding Judge of the respondent simply because it was re-raffled to his sala upon motion of Norvic; third, he tried to
Regional Trial Court, Branch 136 of Makati in whose sala the aforesaid Case No. 91–1123 was voluntarily inhibit from the case but the parties themselves asked him to stay on with the case
then pending and asked him to grant the motion to lift the notice of lis pendens filed by one of and to help, as he did help, in amicably settling the case which culminated to the filing of a joint
the parties in the said case, When Judge Cosico denied the motion, respondent came back motion to dismiss by both parties; fourth, he issued the order lifting the notice of lis pendens
asking him to reconsider the order of denial. Following the resignation from the service of Judge after a careful and thorough study of the merits of the motion 27 and opposition28 filed by the
Cosico, the said case was resignation to the sala of respondent who reconsidered the order of parties; and, fifth, respondent was legally justified in issuing the order cancelling the notice of lis
denial issued by then Judge Cosico and cancelled the notice of lis pendens, thereby showing pendens, the pertinent portion of the said order reads as follows:
keen personal interest on the said case to the prejudice of the administration of justice.
“x x x
Respondent, in his Comment dated September 3, 1993 18 denies having approached Judge The Court subscribes to the position of defendants-movants (SMIIT and SMIRM). Plaintiff Norvic
Cosico and asking’ him to take any action in connection with the said case. He asserts that Incorporated is manifestly not the proper party whose rights may be protected by the
Judge Cosico was motivated by vindictiveness when he testified falsely against respondent annotation of lis pendens. It is neither the previous registered owner nor the present registered
during the Ad Hoc Committee hearing. During their several meetings, respondent and Judge owner of the property subject matter of the instant case and presently covered by Transfer
Cosico only talked to each other mostly on matters of law but he never asked Judge Cosico any Certificate of Title No. 167832, hence, bereft of personality to cause the annotation of the
favor nor to act in a certain way in any case except in Civil Case No. 90–1506 involving the subject notice of lis pendens on the said title. The property owned by the plaintiff subject matter
respondent himself who requested Judge Cosico to rule on his motion for execution. He alleges of its transaction with the defendants are plaintiff’s shares of stock in Overseas Superintendence
that he became aware only of the Norvic case when he was informed through telephone by the Corporation. x x x’ “29
President of Norvic Incorporated, Atty. Vicente Santos who was his former classmate in Ateneo
de Manila, that said case was re-raffled to his sala. He offered to inhibit from trying the case Under Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only
because of his friendship with Atty. Santos but both parties requested the respondent to keep upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
the case and help in its amicable settlement. He adds that the reversal of Judge Cosico’s order, adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be
which was done in utmost good faith after several months of efforts in arriving at a settlement, recorded. The cancellation order of respondent was issued pursuant to the second ground, that
was well-taken and accepted by the parties. is, the notice of lis pendens was not necessary to protect the right of Norvic which caused it to
be recorded. A cautious reading of the records of the instant case reveals that never was Norvic
In a Resolution dated October 4, 199319 of the First Division of this Court, this administrative the owner of the Yakal property. It was Overseas Superintendence Corporation (OSC) that
case was referred to Justice Manuel C. Herrera for report and evaluation. Pursuant to the owned the Yakal property prior to its transfer to SMIRM. The fact that Norvic was the majority
authority given, he conducted hearings on November 19, 1993 and December 3, 1993. stockholder of OSC would not legally clothe it (Norvic) with personality to cause the notice of lis
Considering however his request 20 that he be allowed to inhibit from further proceeding with the pendens affecting the property of the corporation (OSC) specially so when the corporation was
said case on the ground that Judge Cosico, the principal witness of the case, was his colleague not even one of the parties to the case. Well settled is the rule that properties registered in the
in the Faculty of the Ateneo Law School, the case was assigned to Justice Jaime N. Lantin. 21 But name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. 30 A
Justice Lantin likewise inhibited from trying the case, so, it was given to Justice Gloria C. Paras stockholder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation, nor is he entitled to
for report and recommendation. 22 On April 13, 1994, Justice Paras asked to be relieved from the the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets; he is not a co-owner or tenant in
investigation of the case which was granted by this Court. Finally, the case was re-assigned to common of the corporate property.31
Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas by virtue of the Resolution dated May 18, 1994. 23
In the absence therefore of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in issuing the order lifting
In his Report dated September 14, 1994, Justice Salas found that respondent, in reconsidering the notice of lis pendens, this act of respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not
the order of denial issued by Judge Cosico and consequently lifting the notice of lis pendens, subject to disciplinary action.32
was not dictated by pecuniary consideration, but nevertheless held-him liable for influencing the We are convinced, however, that respondent approached Judge Cosico at least twice asking him
outcome of the subject case when it asked Judge Cosico to cancel the notice of lis pendens.24 to cancel the notice of lis pendens, thereby, trying to influence the course of the litigation in the
The recommendation of Justice Salas in his Report reads as follows: subject case in violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
“THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the undersigned recommends as a penalty, reprimand, with a “A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
warning of a more severe penalty in case of repetition." 25 pending before another court or judge.”
Upon a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the Justice Salas, in his Report, made the following observation, to which We agree:
allegation that respondent was moved by personal or financial interest in issuing the order dated
August 5, 1992 which cancelled the notice of lis pendens. On the contrary, the explanation “There is, on the other hand, a reason to believe that the respondent indeed approached Judge
offered by respondent and the circumstances prevailing in the subject case are sufficient to Cosico and requested him, from the beginning, to lift the notice of lis pendens. Moreover, the
warrant a conclusion that he in utmost good faith merely discharged his public duty when he respondent went to Judge Cosico the second or third time, on both occasions mentioning the
lifted the notice of lis pendens. The following significant points are worth considering: first, as Norvic Case. Judge Cosico even told the Court, the first time the respondent approached him,
the former was in white barong and even knocking the door loudly before coming in. It is hard
to consider the possibility that Judge Cosico, in testifying before the Ad Hoc Committee, told a
lie, considering that he was facing a panel that was attended not only by the Chief Justice, but
also by Justices Relova and Herrera. Before such Honorable Justices, certainty it will take one
with bravado and cockiness to tell a brazen lie. Secondly, by being a lawyer alone, he knows a
price of telling a lie. Even the respondent admitted, he and Judge Cosico had been on friendly
terms, and that the former talked back against Cosico only in one isolated case involving an
ejectment on appeal from the MTC, of which the respondent was himself a party. Admittedly,
Judge Cosico is by nature a person who is talkative, who possibly would like to be looked upon
as an idealist or reformer or as a person if not conceited or overconfident at least looks at
himself as better than anybody else. However we can hardly reconcile having a situation where
Judge Cosico then appearing before the Ad Hoc Committee would invent a version identifying
the respondent as the person who asked him more than once to lift a notice of lis pendens."33 x
xx
Considering the foregoing. We cannot but give credence to the testimony of former Judge
Cosico who narrated the event in a clear and straightforward manner. It is our finding that he
was not in any way motivated by enmity or bad faith when he testified against respondent. Both
Judge Cosico and respondent even admitted that no animosity existed between them, 34 in fact,
during Judge Cosico’s tenure in office they used to meet and discuss with each other about
many things mostly of law.35 Contrary therefore, to respondent’s claim that Judge Cosico was
motivated by vindictiveness, it is highly improbable for Judge Cosico to prevaricate and cause
damnation to respondent who brought no harm to the former. Well settled is the rule that in the
absence of any evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses should have testified
falsely, the logical conclusion is that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit.
As the visible representation of law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a
manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial system. 36 It
is incumbent upon them to so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 37 Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act
in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. 38
They should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. 39 In the case
at bar, the act of interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the
sala of Judge Cosico clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and
subverts the people’s faith in our judicial process. His evident misconduct collides with the
established ethical standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to
stress that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or
other persons not invested with the public trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and
should bring honor to the judiciary.40 Honos habet onus-honor carries with it, responsibility.
WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent GUILTY OF

SERIOUS MISCONDUCT for influencing the course of litigation in Civil Case No. 91–1123 in
evident violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, a fine of
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more SEVERELY.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Respondent meted a P10,000 fine for serious misconduct, with a stern warning against
repetition of similar act.
Note.—Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of

judges. (Panganiban vs. Guerrero, Jr., 242 SCRA 11 [1995])
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1663. March 26, 2010.* certain household items for safekeeping before she filed the case of theft against Rencio. On
ROLAND ERNEST MARIE JOSE SPELMANS, complainant, vs. JUDGE GAYDIFREDO T. August 28, 2002, however, after conducting a preliminary investigation in the case, Judge
OCAMPO, Municipal Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato, respondent. Ocampo dismissed Villan’s complaint.
Judges; Gross Misconduct; A judge is not a warehouseman for personal properties of Only in 2006, according to Judge Ocampo, when he received a copy of Spelmans’ complaint
litigants in his court. —For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampo’s for grave misconduct did he learn of the couple’s separation and his unwitting part in their legal
offense as falling merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as battles. As a last note, Judge Ocampo said that instead of hurling baseless accusations at him,
amended, which is a less serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, punishable by Spelmans should have thanked him because he kept his personal properties in good condition.
either suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more
than three months or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. On the In a supplemental complaint dated August 30, 2006 5Spelmans further alleged that Judge
other hand, impropriety is treated as a light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less than Ocampo requested him to sign an affidavit which cleared the Judge and prayed for the dismissal
P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 or by censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning. of the administrative complaint.6
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, Section 1 of Canon 2, and On October 17, 2006 OCA found Judge Ocampo guilty of committing acts of impropriety
Section 1 of Canon 4. From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. He was not a and maintaining close affinity with a litigant in violation of Canons 1 and 4 of the New Code of
warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. 7Since, under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of Court, as amended, a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars constitutes a
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court and tainted the less serious charge, punishable either with suspension or fine, the OCA recommended the
judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly. imposition of a fine of P5,000.00 on Judge Ocampo with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.8
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not Judge Ocampo’s taking and keeping of the personal
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. items belonging to Spelmans but supposedly given to him by the latter’s wife for safekeeping
constitutes a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
ABAD, J.:
The Court’s Ruling
This is a case about the improper conduct of an MTC judge who kept properties owned by
the complainant while conducting a preliminary investigation.
The evidence of Spelmans is that his wife, Villan, made it appear that she filed a complaint
for theft against Rencio, the lessor or caretaker of the rented house, before Judge Ocampo’s
court but that this was a mere ploy. Her true purpose was to get certain properties belonging to
The Facts and the Case Spelmans from that house. During the preliminary investigation of the case, Judge Ocampo held
an ocular inspection of the house and another one that also belonged to Spelmans and took
On April 8, 2006 complainant Roland Ernest Marie Jose Spelmans (Spelmans), a Belgian, some of the personal properties from these places.
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, a complaint for theft and graft and
corruption against respondent Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo (Judge On the other hand, Judge Ocampo insists that Villan gave him the personal items mentioned
Ocampo) of Polomolok, South Cotabato.1 by Spelmans for safekeeping before she filed in his court the complaint for theft against Rencio.
This did not influence him, however, since he eventually ordered the dismissal of that complaint.
Spelmans alleged in his affidavit that in 2002 his wife, Annalyn Villan (Villan), filed a But this explanation is quite unsatisfactory.
complaint for theft against Joelito Rencio (Rencio) and his wife from whom Spelmans rented a
house in Polomolok, South Cotabato. Spelmans claimed, however, that this complaint was but First. Judge Ocampo did not explain why, of all people in Polomolok, South Cotabato,
his wife’s scheme for taking out his personal properties from that house. In the course of the Spelmans’ wife, Villan, would entrust to him, a municipal judge, certain personal items for
investigation of the complaint, Judge Ocampo, together with the parties, held an ocular safekeeping. This is essentially suspect because she would subsequently file, according to Judge
inspection of that rented house and another one where Spelmans kept some of the personal Ocampo, a case of theft of personal items that Rencio supposedly took from Spelmans’ houses.
belongings of his late mother.
Second. Judge Ocampo does not deny that he conducted an ocular inspection of the houses
During the ocular inspection, Judge Ocampo allegedly took pieces of antique, including a that Spelmans used in Polomolok. But the purpose of this ocular inspection is suspect. Judge
marble bust of Spelmans’ mother, a flower pot, a statue, and a copper scale of justice. A week Ocampo did not explain what justified it. The charge was not robbery where he might have an
later, Judge Ocampo went back and further took six Oakwood chairs and its table, four gold interest in personally looking at where and how the break-in took place. It was a case of theft
champagne glasses, and a deer horn chandelier. 2 In the meantime, the Bureau of Immigration where it would be sufficient for the complainant to simply state in her complaint-affidavit where
happened to detain Spelmans in Manila and let him free only on January 28, 2003. 3 the alleged theft took place.
The Ombudsman, Mindanao, referred Spelmans’ complaint against Judge Ocampo to the Office Third. If Judge Ocampo received the pieces of antique from Villan for safekeeping, this
of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his comment of August 8, 2006 4Judge Ocampo denied the meant that a relation of trust existed between them. Consequently, Judge Ocampo had every
charge, pointing out that Spelmans’ wife, Villan (the complainant in that theft case), gave him reason to inhibit himself from the case from the beginning. He of course claims that he
dismissed the case against Rencio eventually but this is no excuse since his ruling could have
gone the other way. Besides, Spelmans claims that the complaint was just a scheme to enable
Villan to steal his personal properties from the two houses. This claim seems believable given
the above circumstances.
Fourth. By his admission, Judge Ocampo returned the items only after four years when
Spelmans already filed a complaint against him. He makes no claim that he made a previous
effort to return those supposedly entrusted items either to Villan or to Spelmans. His years of
possession obviously went beyond mere safekeeping.
For the above reasons, the OCA erred in regarding Judge Ocampo’s offense as falling
merely under Section 11(B), in relation to Section 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended, which is a less
serious charge of violation of Supreme Court rules, punishable by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months or a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. 9 On the other hand, impropriety is treated
as a light charge and is punishable by a fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00 or by censure, reprimand, or admonition with warning.10
Respondent judge should be made accountable for gross misconduct 11 constituting violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Section 6 of Canon 1, 12Section 1 of Canon 2,13 and
Section 1 of Canon 4.14 From the circumstances, his acts were motivated by malice. 15 He was not
a warehouseman for personal properties of litigants in his court. He certainly would have kept
Spelmans’ properties had the latter not filed a complaint against him. He was guilty of
covetousness. It affected the performance of his duties as an officer of the court16 and tainted
the judiciary’s integrity. He should be punished accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo GUILTY of gross
misconduct and IMPOSES on him the penalty of SUSPENSION from office without salary and
other benefits for six (6) months.17 He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Judge Gaydifredo Ocampo suspended from office without pay and other benefits for six (6)
months for gross misconduct, with stern warning against repetition of similar act.
Note.—There is serious or gross misconduct when judicial acts complained of are corrupt or
inspired by an intention to violate the law or are in persistent disregard of well-known legal
rules. (Sevilleja vs. Laggui, 362 SCRA 715 [2001])
A.M. No. MTJ-94-985. February 21, 1995.* Complainant filed a complaint 3 against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of
APOLINARIO MUÑEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE CIRIACO ARIÑO, MCTC, San Francisco, judicial function with the Office of the Ombudsman as well as an administrative complaint 4 for
Agusan del Sur, respondent. violation of the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur.
Administrative Law; Criminal Law; Usurpation; Elements Involved in the Crime of Usurpation of
Judicial Authority.—Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial After preliminary investigation, the investigating officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
authority involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive case5 for usurpation of judicial function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial
branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution Court of Loreto, Agusan del Sur. Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case
of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. was later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of the first
judge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mayors have no longer the power to conduct preliminary Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the acts complained of did
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.—No longer does the mayor have at this time the not constitute a crime under the law. He contended that under § 143(3) of the former Local
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were authorized to issue warrants of
Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered arrest.6
functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people. On July 28, 1992, respondent Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on the ground that the
power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist as of February 2, 1987 when
Same; Judges; Respondent showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal the Constitution took effect.
principles.—Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari
was not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, For its part the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the
there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and accordingly ordered
a criminal case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On appeal, however, the Department of
resolving the motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the ground that what the mayor had issued
gross ignorance of basic legal principles. to the complainant, although denominated "Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or
a summons.
Same; Same; While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of
occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be On September 21, 1992, Mayor Irisari filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of
conversant with basic legal principles.—In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the respondent judge, invoking the resolution of the DILG.
acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on In an order dated February 15, 1993, respondent Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order
account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that and dismissed the case. Respondent said in his order:
they should be conversant with basic legal principles.
The accused, in his Motion for Reconsideration, asserts that since the question about the
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment. warrant of arrest issued against Apolinario Muñez has been resolved in an administrative
proceeding as not the warrant of arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. now before this Court against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the subject matter
in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the same incident and it
MENDOZA, J.: involved the same parties.
This is an administrative complaint 1 against respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño of the Municipal Courts are not bound by the findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if
Circuit Trial Court of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious
as defined and penalized under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was error. . . . The Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91
originally filed with the Office of the Ombudsman which, after dismissing the case for lack of is not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or palpable and
probable cause for filing in court, nevertheless referred the case to this Court "for possible serious error, therefore, it must be respected (Mangubat vs. de Castro, G.R. 33892; July 28,
administrative action against respondent." 1988; Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico, Jr., et al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988; Cuerdo
vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October 27, 1988).
It appears that on December 26,1989, Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur
summoned to his office herein complainant Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated July 5 and 12, 1993 to the
dispute which Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference, Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, charging respondent Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly
Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. 2 rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was
indorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman which, as already stated, referred it to this Court for
The warrant was served on complainant by CFC Redelio Caballes and Cpl. Rolando Limayan and possible disciplinary action against respondent judge.7
by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor Irisari, although no investigation was later
conducted. We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman that while respondent judge may have acted in
good faith, he should nevertheless be administratively held liable. warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of the Revised Penal present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority involves the following elements: (1) that the found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution—who, aside from judges, might
offender is an officer of the executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.
judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within
his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not make the order against
the executive branch. him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the opinion of DILG.
On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him no criminal case, but
It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a warrant of arrest. only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear, only made it worse for the mayor, for it
It was. In plain terms it stated: would then appear that he assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done.
All the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the criminal case against
Republic of the Philippines the mayor.
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or summon Muñez to his
Office of the Mayor office because he had precisely done this the day before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he
27 December 1989 ordered the arrest of complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the difference between a
WARRANT OF ARREST summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons read:
TO: ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW Republic of the Philippines

This Municipality PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR
MUNICIPALITY OF LORETO
GREETINGS: Office of the Mayor
You are hereby requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez of Poblacion, Loreto, 26 December 1989
Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the Summons dated December 26, 1989, and
bring him before the Office of the Municipal Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in SUMMON
connection with the complaint of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office. TO: Mr. Apolinario Muñez
Loreto, Agusan del Sur
FOR COMPLIANCE.
GREETINGS:
(Sgd) ASUERO S. IRISARI
Municipal Mayor You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the Municipal Mayor on 27 December
For and in the absence of 1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and there to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection
the Municipal Circuit Judge with a certain complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.
Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a warrant for the PLEASE FAIL NOT under the penalty of the law.
arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. As a matter of fact Mayor Irisari justified his order Loreto, Agusan del Sur, Philippines.
on the basis of § 143(3) of the former Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which
expressly provided that "in cases where the mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the (SGD.) ASUERO S. IRISARI
mayor shall, upon probable cause after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order Municipal Mayor
the arrest of the accused." This provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, § 2 of the
1987 Constitution, as this Court held in Ponsica v. Ignalaga,8 in which it was explained: Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the accused Mayor Irisari
had filed on the ground that the authority (B.P. Blg. 337, § 143(3)) invoked by him as basis for
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself
much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this on the ground that the decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty, "must be
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution respected." He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like the DILG
which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after respected."
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The Respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was not
constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency and, therefore, there was
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of evidence. What was before him was a criminal
case and he should have considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the
motion to dismiss of the accused. At the very least, he showed poor judgment and gross
ignorance of basic legal principles, for which he should be reminded of what this Court said in
Libarios v. Dabalos:9
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But,
while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes
or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles.
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law
unswayed by partisan or personal interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.... A judge owes it
to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be
a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.10
But there is more than just gross ignorance of legal principles shown here. Although he denies
it, what the respondent judge appears to have actually done in this case was to rely on the
opinion of the DILG which found the mayor not guilty of serious misconduct in office on the
ground that he had not really issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant but only an
invitation or a summons. To justify his reliance on the opinion of the DILG, respondent judge
invoked the rule in administrative law that the findings of facts of administrative agencies, when
supported by substantial evidence, are binding on the courts in the absence of a showing of
fraud, imposition or dishonesty. We have already stated why that is grossly erroneous. What we
are here concerned is that by relying on the opinion of the DILG, disregarding a previous ruling
he had made which was in accordance with law, respondent judge showed lack of capacity for
independent judgment.
WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño. He is

enjoined to exercise greater care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge and
warned that a repetition of the similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Judge Ariño meted a fine and warned against repetition of similar offense.
Note.—A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. (Libarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991])
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621. September 27, 2007.* consumers filed a petition to stop the projected sale at auction and respondent admits having
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 01-1121-RTJ) taken the stand for the petitioners. As regards the statement of Judge Melicor in his order
CONCERNED BOHOLANOS FOR LAW AND ORDER, complainants, vs. JUDGE DIONISIO quoted above, the respondent Judge made no mention of it in his Comment.
R. CALIBO, JR., RTC, BRANCH 50, LOAY, BOHOL, respondent.
It was probably because of this Order of Judge Melicor describing the acts of respondent Judge
Courts; Judges; Administrative Complaints; Mitigating Circumstances; The fact that it is the first attempting to influence another Judge who was presiding the injunction petition that prompted
time that a judge has been charged administratively is a mitigating circumstance. —We DCA Bernardo T. Ponferrada to recommend, despite the fact that the complaint is not under
observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge has been charged oath, that an investigation be conducted to determine the extent of Judge Calibo’s liability.
administratively. This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the recommended penalty of fine of xxx
P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.
x x x As it can be seen, the letter complaint is anonymous. For this reason, the undersigned is
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Conduct Unbecoming a Judge and Highly submitting this Report based on the pleadings extant on the record.
Unethical Act.
As regards going on the air to express one’s opinion over a matter of public concern, the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. undersigned believes that respondent Judge cannot be held to answer administratively simply
because he was only exercising his constitutional right to be heard in a petition for the redress
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: of grievances. As a consumer and as a member of the body politic, it was his right, nay his duty
to air what he honestly believed to be an incipient irregularity.
In an anonymous complaint dated August 28, 2000 filed by “Concerned Boholanos for Law and
Order,” Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, However, his two telephone calls to Judge Achilles L. Melicor who was presiding the court where
is charged with conduct unbecoming a judge and highly unethical act for “publicly speaking on the petition to stop the governor was pending, definitely violates the Code of Judicial Conduct,
radio and in public fora regarding his bias and parochial views on certain controversial issues particularly Section 3 of Canon I, which states that “Judges shall refrain from influencing in any
against public personalities and public officials.” manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.”
Required to comment, respondent claimed that the complaint was initiated by the “alter ego” of
the provincial governor because of his objection to the sale of the performing assets of the Rule 140, Section 7, classifies gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
provincial government of Bohol disadvantageous to the latter. Conduct as a serious offense and penalizes the same with “dismissal from the service, with
forfeiture of benefits and with prejudice to reemployment; suspension from office without salary
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo designated retired Justice Pedro A. Ramirez of the for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but
Court of Appeals, former Consultant in the Office of the Court Administrator, as Hearing Officer not exceeding P40,000.00.”
to investigate the complaint. On August 5, 2005, he submitted his Report and Recommendation.
Considering the inappropriateness of the calls made by respondent Judge to another Judge who
After a review of Justice Ramirez’s Report and Recommendation, the Court RESOLVES to ADOPT was presiding the Court where the case was being heard, it is respectfully recommended that
and APPROVE his findings of facts and conclusions of law reproduced as follows: said respondent Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., be made to pay a fine of P25,000.00.
“Respondent Judge relates the antecedents of the controversy. He states that a very We observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge has been charged
questionable and controversial project was being pursued by the Provincial Governor which was administratively. This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the recommended penalty of fine of
to sell the two major performing assets of the Province of Bohol, the Provincial Electrical System P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.
(PES) and the Provincial Waterworks System (PWS) of the Provincial Utilities Division (PPUD),
without consulting its customers in Tagbilaran and Dauis, Bohol, which are the places served by ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr.
these two utilities. It was shocking to the people because it was of public knowledge that these of the RTC, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, is declared guilty of serious misconduct and is ordered to
were the only major profitable ventures of the province. It was no surprise, therefore, that the pay a FINE of P20,000.00, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice.
residents of these two towns went on the air over the three radio stations vigorously protesting SO ORDERED.
this move of the Governor. Puno (C.J., Chairperson), Corona, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr. meted with P20,000.00 fine for serious misconduct.
Respondent Judge narrates that although he is one of the consumers affected by the projected
sale, he kept silent. He claims that since his appointment, he had distanced himself from the Notes.—A judge’s undisputed claim of having disposed of numerous cases in previous
media even if he was previously the head of the Department of Public Information. However, years serves to mitigate his liability. (Gonzalez-Decano vs. Siapno, 353 SCRA 269 [2001])
when it became apparent that the Governor was ignoring the legitimate issues presented by the The Supreme Court is cognizant of the predicament of judges in rendering decisions on
people, he decided to take part in the debate. He studied the documents and concluded that cases, especially those that involve complex questions of facts or law—the Court allows a certain
indeed it was a contract that would be very disadvantageous to the province. He joined the degree of latitude to judges and grants them a reasonable extension of time to resolve cases
oppositors and admits having gone on the air. Although the Governor did not do anything to upon proper application by the judge concerned and on meritorious grounds. ( Office of the
stop him, other provincial officials tried to suppress respondent’s revelations on the air reasoning Court Administrator vs. Joven , 399 SCRA 18 [2003])
that being a Judge, respondent should not involve himself in controversy. The concerned
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. February 22, 2011.* as well, in placing significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of complying with
(formerly A.M. No. 01-2-49-RTC) them. We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the
JUDGE NAPOLEON E. INOTURAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, vs. judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified
JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid, San manner befitting the public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any demeanor
Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, respondent. that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court.
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785. February 22, 2011.* Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 07-1945-MTJ) period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. —The
SANCHO E. GUINANAO, complainant, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., Municipal delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5,
Circuit Trial Court, Valladolid, San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates judges to perform all judicial
respondent. duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In
line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to
Administrative Law; Judges; Case Law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of decide a case within the reglementary period.
the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must be the first to follow the law and
weave an example for the others to follow. —Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Failure to Comply with Directives of the Court
representation of the law, and more importantly of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the and Failure to Decide a Case Within the 90-day Reglementary Period.
first to follow the law and weave an example for the others to follow. Interestingly, in Julianito
M. Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc ., 485 SCRA 1 (2006), a case where Judge The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress upon him the clear Jose Allan N. Maglasang for complainant Sancho E. Guinanao.
import of the directives of the Court, thus: For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution
requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is PER CURIAM:
gross misconduct, and may even be considered as outright disrespect for the Court. The office
of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors. After all, a resolution of Before us are two (2) consolidated cases filed against Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. as the
the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely. Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ( MCTC) of Valladolid, San Enrique-
Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. The first case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply
likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the with the directives of the Court. The second case involves the failure of Judge Limsiaco to decide
judicial system. a case within the 90-day reglementary period.
Same; Same; Obedience to the Court’s lawful orders and directives should not be A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362
merely selective obedience, but must be full.—We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine On September 25, 1998, a complaint was filed against Judge Limsiaco for his issuance of a
C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta, 315 SCRA 438 (1999), and emphasized that obedience to Release Order in favor of an accused in a criminal case before him. 1 After considering the
our lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective obedience, but must be full: [A] evidence, we then found Judge Limsiaco guilty of ignorance of the law and procedure and of
resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. In the decretal portion of our May 6, 2005 Decision, we
officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the ruled:
Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in
administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the “WHEREFORE, Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. is found GUILTY of ignorance of the law
administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary. and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is hereby ordered to pay a
Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to FINE in the amount of Forty Thousand pesos (P40,000.00) upon notice, and is STERNLY
administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.
complaints.
Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to explain, within ten (10) days from notice, why he
Same; Same; Compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is should not be administratively charged for approving the applications for bail of the accused and
one of the foremost duties that a judge accept upon assumption to office. —We cannot ordering their release in the following Criminal Cases filed with other courts: Criminal Cases Nos.
overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the Court is one 1331, 1342, 1362, 1366 and 1368 filed with the RTC, Branch 59, San Carlos City; 67322, 69055-
of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is verbalized in 69058 filed with the MTCC, Branch 3, Bacolod City; 67192-67193 filed with the MTCC, Branch 4,
Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. Bacolod City; 72866 filed with the MTCC, Branch 5, Bacolod City; 70249, 82897 to 82903,
831542, 83260 to 83268 filed with the MTCC, Branch 6, Bacolod City; and 95-17340 filed with
Same; Same; Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel the RTC, Branch 50, Bacolod City, as reported by Executive Judge Edgardo G. Garvilles.
conduct themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding. —Under the SO ORDERED.”
circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear acts of
defiance against the Court’s authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect and Judge Limsiaco twice moved for an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the
indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and above decision and to comply with the Court’s directive requiring him to submit an explanation.
directives. Judge Limsiaco’s actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions. Despite the extension of time given however, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his motion for
Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public reconsideration and the required explanation.
In the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we issued a show cause resolution for contempt and “For a judge to exhibit indifference to a resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations
required Judge Limsiaco to explain his failure to comply with the Decision dated May 6, 2005. In in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered
the Resolution dated December 12, 2006, after noting the failure of Judge Limsiaco to comply as outright disrespect for the Court. The office of the judge requires him to obey all the lawful
with the Resolution dated January 24, 2006, we resolved to impose a fine in the amount of orders of his superiors. After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and
P1,000.00 against Judge Limsiaco and to reiterate our earlier directive for him to file an should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays
explanation to the show cause resolution. not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of
interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system.”
On February 1, 2007, Judge Limsiaco filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Extension of We also cited in that case our ruling in Josephine C. Martinez v. Judge Cesar N. Zoleta 5 and
Time to File Explanation wherein he apologized to the Court and paid the P1,000.00 fine. He emphasized that obedience to our lawful orders and directives should not be merely selective
cited poor health as the reason for his failure to comply with the Resolution dated January 24, obedience, but must be full:
2006. On February 6, 2007, we resolved to grant the motion for extension filed by Judge
Limsiaco and gave him ten (10) days from January 15, 2007 within which to file his explanation. “[A] resolution of the Supreme Court requiring comment on an administrative complaint against
officials and employees of the judiciary should not be construed as a mere request from the
Despite the grant of the extension of time, no explanation for the show cause Court. Nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Respondents in
resolution was ever filed. Per Resolution dated December 15, 2009, we again required Judge administrative complaints should comment on all accusations or allegations against them in the
Limsiaco to comply with the show cause resolution within ten (10) days from receipt under pain administrative complaints because it is their duty to preserve the integrity of the judiciary.
of imposing a stiffer penalty. Verification made from the postmaster showed that a copy of the Moreover, the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference of respondents to
December 15, 2009 Resolution was received by Judge Limsiaco on February 1, 2010. administrative complaints and to resolutions requiring comment on such administrative
complaints.”
In addition, a Report (as of August 31, 2010) from the Documentation Division, Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) showed that the directives in our Decision dated May 6, 2005 As demonstrated by his present acts, we find it clear that Judge Limsiaco failed to heed the
have not been complied with by Judge Limsiaco. above pronouncements. We observe that in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco did not fully
obey our directives. Judge Limsiaco failed to file the required comment to our show cause
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785 resolution despite several opportunities given to him by the Court. His disobedience was
On September 24, 2007, Judge Limsiaco was charged with Delay in the Disposition of a Case by aggravated by his insincere representations in his motions for extension of time that he would
complainant Sancho E. Guinanao, a plaintiff in an ejectment case pending before Judge file the required comments.
Limsiaco. Guinanao claimed that Judge Limsiaco failed to seasonably decide the subject
ejectment case which had been submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. The OCA The records also show Judge Limsiaco’s failure to comply with our decision and orders. In A.M.
referred the matter to us when Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment to the administrative No. MTJ-01-1362, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment/answer to the charge of irregularity
complaint. Under the pain of a show cause order for contempt for failure to heed the OCA pertaining to his approval of applications for bail in several criminal cases before him. He also
directives to file a comment, Judge Limsiaco informed us that he had already decided the case failed to pay the P40,000.00 fine which we imposed by way of administrative penalty for his
on February 4, 2008. Subsequently, we resolved 2 to declare Judge Limsiaco in contempt and to gross ignorance of the law and procedure and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
impose a fine of P1,000.00 for his continued failure to file the required comment to the Incidentally, in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, Judge Limsiaco failed to file his comment on the verified
administrative complaint. The records show that Judge Limsiaco paid the P1,000.00 fine complaint despite several orders issued by the Court.
but did not submit the required comment.
We cannot overemphasize that compliance with the rules, directives and circulars issued by the
Per Resolution dated November 23, 2010, we ordered the consolidation of the above cases, Court is one of the foremost duties that a judge accepts upon assumption to office. This duty is
together with A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, entitled Florenda V. Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, verbalized in Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:
Jr., which case was separately decided on January 19, 2011. “SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge
of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational
The Court’s Ruling independence of the Judiciary.
We shall consider in this ruling not merely Judge Limsiaco’s conduct in connection with the
discharge of judicial functions within his territorial jurisdiction, but also the performance of his SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in
legal duties before this Court as a member of the bench. We shall then take both matters into order to reinforce public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the
account in scrutinizing his conduct as a judge and in determining whether proper disciplinary maintenance of judicial independence.”
measures should be imposed against him under the circumstances.
The obligation to uphold the dignity of his office and the institution which he belongs to is also
A judge’s duties to the Court found in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 2.01 which mandates a judge to
Case law teaches us that a judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
of justice; he or she must, therefore, be the first to follow the law and weave an example for the judiciary.
others to follow. 3 Interestingly, in Julianito M. Salvador v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc .,4 a Under the circumstances, the conduct exhibited by Judge Limsiaco constitutes no less than clear
case where Judge Limsiaco was also the respondent, we already had the occasion to impress acts of defiance against the Court’s authority. His conduct also reveals his deliberate disrespect
upon him the clear import of the directives of the Court, thus: and indifference to the authority of the Court, shown by his failure to heed our warnings and
directives. Judge Limsiaco’s actions further disclose his inability to accept our instructions. penalty would be imposed in case of the same of similar act in the future.
Moreover, his conduct failed to provide a good example for other court personnel, and the public
as well, in placing significance to the Court’s directives and the importance of complying with In Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco , Jr.,15 we resolved to impose
them. a P20,000.00 fine on Judge Limsiaco for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
We cannot allow this type of behavior especially on a judge. Public confidence in the judiciary The Court also resolved in the said case to re-docket, as a regular administrative case, the
can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner charge for oppression and grave abuse of authority relative to Judge Limsiaco’s handling of two
befitting the public office they are holding. They should avoid conduct or any demeanor that criminal cases.
may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme Court.
In Re: Withholding of Salary of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., etc. ,16 we imposed a P5,000.00
Under existing jurisprudence, we have held judges administratively liable for failing to comply fine, with warning, against Judge Limsiaco for his delay in the submission of the monthly
with our directives and circulars. report of cases and for twice ignoring the OCA’s directive to explain the delay.
In Sinaon, Sr.,6 we penalized a judge for his deliberate failure to comply with our directive Moreover, in the recent case of Florenda Tobias v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr .,17 where Judge
requiring him to file a comment. We disciplined another judge in Noe Cangco Zarate v. Judge Limsiaco was charged with corruption, the Court found him liable for gross misconduct and
Isauro M. Balderian7 for his refusal to comply with the Court’s resolution requiring him to file a imposed a fine in the amount of P25,000.00.
comment on the administrative charge against him. In Request of Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena,
etc.,8 we dismissed the judge for his repeated violation of a circular of the Supreme Court. In Lastly, we also note the existence of two other administrative cases filed against Judge
fact, we have already reprimanded and warned Judge Limsiaco for his failure to timely heed the Limsiaco that are presently pending with the Court. The first case is Mario B. Tapinco v. Judge
Court’s directives in Salvador.9 Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr.,18 where Judge Limsiaco is charged with grave misconduct, obstruction
of justice, and abuse of authority in connection with his invalid issuance of an order for the
A judge’s duty to his public office provisional release of an accused. The second case entitled Unauthorized Hearings Conducted
Given the factual circumstances in A.M. No. MTJ-11-1785, the considerable delay Judge Limsiaco by Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., MCTC, et al .,19 is a complaint charging Judge Limsiaco of
incurred in deciding the subject ejectment case has been clearly established by the records and violating the Court’s Administrative Circular No. 3, dated July 14, 1978 which prohibits the
by his own admission. Judge Limsiaco admitted that he decided the ejectment case only on conduct of hearings in another station without any authority from the Court.
February 4, 2008. In turn, the records show that Judge Limsiaco did not deny Guinanao’s claim
that the ejectment case was submitted for resolution as early as April 25, 2005. Thus, it took We find that his conduct as a repeat offender exhibits his unworthiness to don the judicial robes
Judge Limsiaco more than two (2) years to decide the subject ejectment case after it was and merits a sanction heavier than what is provided by our rules and jurisprudence. Under the
declared submitted for resolution. circumstances, Judge Limsiaco should be dismissed from the service. We, however, note that on
May 17, 2009, Judge Limsiaco has retired from judicial service. We also note that Judge
The delay in deciding a case within the reglementary period constitutes a violation of Section 5, Limsiaco has not yet applied for his retirement benefits. Thus, in lieu of the penalty of dismissal
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct 10 which mandates judges to perform all judicial for his unethical conduct and gross inefficiency in performing his duties as a member of the
duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with promptness. In bench, we declare all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, forfeited.
line with jurisprudence, Judge Limsiaco is also liable for gross inefficiency for his failure to Furthermore, he is barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
decide a case within the reglementary period.11 including government-owned and controlled corporations.
The Penalty WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. administratively liable
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC dated September 11, for unethical conduct and gross inefficiency under the provisions of the New Code of Judicial
2001, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, and gross inefficiency are Conduct, specifically, Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1, and Section 5 of Canon 6. For these
categorized as less serious charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from office infractions, we DECLARE all his retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits if any,
without salary and other benefits for not less than one or more than three months; or (b) a fine FORFEITED. He is likewise barred from re-employment in any branch or service of the
of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.12 government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
In determining the proper imposable penalty, we also consider Judge Limsiaco’s work history Corona (C.J.), Carpio, Nachura, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
which reflects how he performed his judicial functions as a judge. We observed that there are Jr., Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
several administrative cases already decided against Judge Limsiaco that show his inability to Carpio-Morales, J., On Wellness Leave.
properly discharge his judicial duties. Velasco, Jr., J., No part due to prior action in Office of the Court Administrator.
Leonardo-De Castro, J., On Official Leave.
In Salvador,13 we penalized Judge Limsiaco for having been found guilty of undue delay in Perez, J., No part. I acted as Court Administrator on the matter.
rendering a decision, imposing on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely. All retirement benefits of Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr. forfeited, except accrued leave
credits, with prejudice to re-employment in government service.
In Helen Gamboa-Mijares v. Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco , Jr.,14 we found Judge Limsiaco guilty of
gross misconduct and imposed on him a P20,000.00 fine, with a warning that a more severe Note.—The office of the Judge requires him to obey all the lawful orders of his superiors.
(Sinaon, Sr. vs. Dumlao, 547 SCRA 531 [2008])

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LEGAL ETHICS CASES NO.

A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998.* MENDOZA, J.:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommend[ed] that respondent

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND

WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent GUILTY OF

Note.—Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of

TO: ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW Republic of the Philippines

WHEREFORE, a FINE of P5,000.00 is imposed on respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño. He is

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