A.C. No.

4947 June 7, 2007

ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment 1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap
Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon him by the
Court. The motion alleges:
4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed pleadings in court
after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or
interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal,
and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred.
Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows:
On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition 2 praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband
respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of
oath as a lawyer committed by the latter.
On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution 3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his
lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4
During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the instant Motion for
Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by
the Court with his continued practice of law.
In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, to
wit:
Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) – Acting on the respondent's motion for
reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice
of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit.
The Court further Resolves to NOTE:
(a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration with leave of
Court;
(b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration;
and
(c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that respondent
be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT
thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or
Disbarment.
After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation 6 , stating that he had
completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he
received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006.
It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another
Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for
such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt.
Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment 7 was filed by
Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that
he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer – disbarment – or to hold him in
contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions.
In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment
to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from members of the
bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the
exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by
attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.
We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension order,
what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one- year suspension from law
practice.9
It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful processes
and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or
the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is
not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. 10 Court orders are to
be respected not because the justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is
to be a government of laws and not of men.11
Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey and
comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his
deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and bypass graft 12 . He likewise expressed
his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order.
Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movant's
counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of the
records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number
of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court. 13 Lawyers should treat
each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility. 14
All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly comply with its
directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a
disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court. 15
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is hereby REPRIMANDED
for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Court's resolution, with WARNING that
a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
In a Decision[2] dated October 18, 2000, the Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for
falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and
abandonment of his family, with the penalties to be served simultaneously. [3] Respondent moved for reconsideration [4] but the
Court denied it with finality in a Resolution [5] dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion [6] to declare in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty. Richard
R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a pleading prepared by
respondent, in violation of the suspension order. [7] Moreover, complainant claimed that respondent appeared before a court in
Dumaguete City on February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension order. [8] On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second
motion for contempt and disbarment, [9] claiming that, on March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and Associates,
in willful disobedience of the suspension order issued against respondent. [10] Complainant filed two (2) more motions for
contempt dated June 8, 2001[11] and August 21, 2001[12] raising the same arguments. Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their
respective comments,[13] and complainant filed her replies[14] to both comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift
Suspension[15] dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002. Thereafter,
respondent admitted that he started accepting new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift Suspension. [16] Also,
complainant manifested that respondent appeared before a court in an election case on July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of
his motion to lift suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for report and recommendation. [17]
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Clarificatory Order [18] on the status of respondent' suspension,
essentially inquiring whether respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's order to lift his suspension. [19] Meanwhile,
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through a Letter [20] dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental. Accordingly, the Court
referred the foregoing queries to the OBC for report and recommendation. [21]
In a Report and Recommendation[22] dated June 22, 2004, the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order declaring that
respondent cannot engage in the practice of law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the Court. [23] Citing case law, the OBC
opined that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court's decision and an
order from the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard,
the OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration with finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to be served simultaneously,
the period of suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.[24] To date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting
the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution [25] dated August 2, 2004, the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and recommendation
on the pending incidents referred to it. Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was constrained to issue a
Resolution[26] dated January 20, 2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding the said incidents. In response, the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline sent a letter [27] to the Court, conveying that the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution
dated April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from the practice of law. [28] However, in view of the pendency of
respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as soon as said
motion is resolved.[29] Thereafter, in a letter[30] dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the Court that it denied respondent's
motion for reconsideration. The Court received the records and relevant documents only on February 15, 2016. [31]
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation [32] dated January 16, 2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents referred to the
IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against respondent which had been resolved
with finality by the Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for falsifying his wife's
signature in the bank loan documents and for immorality. [33]
In a Resolution[34] dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
dated January 16, 2012, with modification decreasing the recommended penalty to suspension from the practice of law for one
(1) year.[35] Aggrieved, respondent Filed a motion for reconsideration, [36] alleging that his administrative liability based on the
charges in the 1995 complaint had been settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision dated October 18, 2000. He
added that to suspend him anew for another year based on the same grounds would constitute administrative double jeopardy.
He stressed that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to
declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a Resolution dated June 7,
2015.[37]
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he was
suspended; and (b) whether the Court should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation
pertain to respondent's alleged violation of the suspension order and his request for the Court to lift the suspension order.
However, the IBP Investigating Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters. Instead, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner proceeded to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995 complaint filed by herein complainant – which
was already resolved with finality by no less than the Court itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of Governors failed to
see the IBP Investigating Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously upheld the latter's report and recommendation;
and (b) it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual
findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and
compelling reasons,[38] as it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. [39] Absent a valid
fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings. [40] However, in
light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own admission that he resumed practicing law even without a
Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the
IBP's factual findings and recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience." [41] During the
suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. [42] It must be stressed, however,
that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. [43] The lawyer must submit the
required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. [44]
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that respondent's suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted
for one (1) year, or until May 22, 2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However, soon
after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted to accepting new clients and
cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the Department of Agrarian Reform. [45] Indubitably,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and
thus, he must be held administratively liable therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully
appearing as an attorney without authority to do so – acts which respondent is guilty of in this case – are grounds for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, [46] to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law [47] shows that the Court consistently imposed an
additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional
suspension of six (6) months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however,
that suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had already been disbarred
from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v. Paras.[48] In Sanchez v. Torres,[49] the
Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred.[50] Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in the lawyer's
personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although
the said penalty can no longer be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon
respondent herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the said penalty
can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording purposes.
That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a pleading dated February 21, 2001 [51] and indicating therein the firm
name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of representing clients before the courts. Thus, he can sign pleadings on their
behalf. The Court cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only
requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the pleading averted to by complainant was dated February 21, 2001, when
respondent's suspension was not yet effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters referred to it for
investigation, report, and recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable dispatch so as to ensure proper
administration of justice. Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that respondent
has already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as a
member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

[ Adm. Case No. 778, August 14, 1936 ]

BENEDICTO M. JAVIER, COMPLAINANT, VS. SILVERIO Q. CORNEJO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
LAUREL, J.:
The respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo, a practising lawyer of Lipa,  Batangas, is  charged  with  malpractice  (a)  for trying to collect
from a brother attorney a sum of money by means of threat, and (6) for having instigated Severina Paz Teodoro to file a
complaint against the herein  complainant,  Attorney Benedicto M.  Javier, for malpractice (Administrative Case No. 757) 
knowing fully well that the charges therein preferred were malicious,  flimsy and unfounded.

The complainant in support of his first charge refers to a letter dated December 2, 1935, in which demand was made upon him
by the respondent for the delivery of P195 representing the amount collected and received by the said complainant by virtue of
a judgment rendered in a certain civil case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal wherein Severina Paz Teodoro was the
judgment creditor and the herein complainant was her counsel.   In the same letter the complainant was given ten days  within
which to turn over the said P195, otherwise a complaint  would be filed against him in this court.  He was furthermore urged to
settle the matter in due time for the preservation not only of his good name but also that of the legal profession.

We find nothing improper  in this letter of the respondent to the complainant which would justify us in taking disciplinary action
against the respondent.  The letter is an extra-judicial demand for the payment of a sum of money which Severina Paz Teodoro
had represented to the respondent as owing to her and which she sought to recover through his professional services.   It was 
an  honest effort on the part of the respondent to serve the interests of  his client. The lawyer owes  entire "devotion to the 
interest of his client,  warm zeal  in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability", to the end that nothing  be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules  of law, legally applied (Code of Ethics,
adopted by the American Bar Association and the Philippine Bar Association, No. 15; In re Tionko  [1922], 43 Phil., 191, 194).

As to the second ground, it  is alleged that the respondent in connivance  with one Gregorio Tapia,  induced  Severina Paz 
Teodoro to  accuse the herein  complainant before this court of malpractice.  It appears that herein complainant was
respondent in Administrative Case No. 757 of this court upon a charge of unlawful conversion of a judgment fund amounting to
P195 pertaining to his  client, Severina Paz Teodoro.  This charge, however, was dismissed by resolution of this court on July 10,
1936.  Now the complainant comes back against the herein respondent and charges him with having maliciously instigated the
filing of  the complaint in the aforesaid Administrative Case No. 757.

We find that Administrative Case No. 757 was instituted in this court on March 18,1936 and that respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo
intervened as counsel for the complainant therein on December 2,1935.  But long before these dates, Severina Paz Teodoro
and her son Feliciano Patefla had already been demanding from the herein  complainant the return of the amount alleged to 
be due them (Exhibits B and C).   The last demand letter (Exhibit C) was made on March 23,1931, and its  receipt acknowledged
by the herein complainant in the same month (Exhibit E).  This  letter demanded the payment of the remaining balance of
P166.50 from the sum which the herein complainant had collected and received  as judgment fund of his erstwhile client
Severina Paz Teodoro, and also advised that upon his failure to remit the amount demanded, the matter would be brought to
the attention  of this court.  The complainant in Administrative Case No. 757, therefore, already knew  on March 23,1931, long
before the  respondent Silverio Q. Cornejo entered the scene, where to seek  relief.

It should be observed,  in this  connection, that mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother attorneys
detract from the dignity of the  legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.

The  complaint against the respondent is dismissed for lack of  merit.  So ordered.
 
CANON 8CAMACHO V PANGULAYAN
VITUG; March 22, 2000(kiyo miura)
NATURE
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Violation of the Code of Professional Ethics
FACTS
- 9 students from the AMA Computer College (AMACC), all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, allegedly published
certainobjectionable features- the Student Disciplinary Tribunal found them guilty and the students were expelled- the 9
students appealed but were denied by the AMACC President giving rise to a civil case calling for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with Camacho as their counsel and Pangulayan and associates representing the
defendant,AMACC- while the case was pending, letters of apology and re-admission agreements were separately executed by
and/or in behalf of thestudents by their parents- following this, the Pangulayan Law Offices filed a Manifestation stating, among
other things, that 4 of the students hadacknowledged their guilt and agreed to terminate all proceedings- apparently,
Pangulayan procured and effected the re-admission agreements through negotiations with said students and theirparents
without communicating with Camacho
ISSUE
WON Pangulayan is guilty of disregarding professional ethics
HELD
YES, this action violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which states:
“A lawyer should not in anyway communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much
less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he
should not undertake to
advise him as to law.” 
 
CAMACHO VS PAGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICEA.C. 4807MARCH 22, 2000PRINCIPLE:
CANON 9: Lawyer should not communicate upon subject of controversy with aparty represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate
orcompromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer mustavoid everything that may tend to mislead party not represented by
counsel andshould not advise him as to law.
FACTS:
9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be publishedobjectionable features or articles in the school paper.Denial of the appeal to
AMA President Aguiluz gave rise to Civil Case 97-30549.CAMACHO was the hired counsel of the expelled students in an action for theIssuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injuction in the said civil case. While thecivil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements wereseparately
executed by the expelled students without the knowledge of CAMACHO.CAMACHO led a complaint against lawyers comprising the PANGULAYAN
ANDASSOCIATES Law firm (lawyers of AMA)because without his knowledge they procuredand effected on separate occasions compromise agreements
(letters of apology and Re-admission Agreements) with 4 of his clients which in effect required them to waive allkinds of claims they may have with
AMA.CAMACHO averred that such an act was unbecoming of any member of thelegal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension.PANGULAYAN
in his defense claimed that the agreements were executed for thesole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case.
ISSUE:
 W/N PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES SHOULDBE SUSPENDED/DISBARRED?
HELD:
YES.It would appear that when individual letters of apology and Re-admissionAgreements were formalized, CAMACHO was already the retained counsel of
theexpelled AMA students.PANGULAYAN and associates having full knowledge of this fact still proceededto negotiate with the expelled AMA students and
their parents without at leastcommunicating the matter to their lawyer CAMACHO. This failure of PANGULAYAN and associates, whether by
design or oversight, isan excusable violation of the canons of profession ethics and in utter disregard of aduty owing to a colleague. The excuse
that agreements were executed for settling the administrative casewas
belied by the Manifestation which states “9
 signatories agreed among others toterminate ALL civil, criminal and administrative proceedings they may have againstAMA arising from their
previous
dismissal”
. Hence, PANGULAYAN should besuspended for 3 months.

- respondent violated professional ethics and disregarded a duty owing to his colleague- the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed a resolution suspending Pangulayan for 6 months and dismissed the case against theother respondents since they took
no part in it-
the court concurred with IBP’s findings but reduced the suspension to 3 months
[ A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016 ]
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER, ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL R. MORTA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding partner, Atty. Francisco M.
Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[1] before this Court. Complainant sought the disbarment of Attys. Restitute S. Lazaro and
Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was alleged that
respondents falsely and maliciously accused complainant and its lawyers of antedating a Petition for Review filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005.[2]
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with Criminal Case No. Q-05-
136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano before Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City.[3] Complainant acted as the legal counsel of Soriano in that case while respondents represented private
complainant Michael M. Sandoval.[4]

On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC to seek the cancellation
of Soriano's scheduled arraignment. [5] During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed the RTC that a Petition for Review had been
filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005. The Petition questioned the resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding probable cause to indict Soriano for libel. [6] Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the
Petition for Review before the RTC, and explained that the main copy of the Petition stamped received by the DOJ was still with
the office messenger, who had personally filed the pleading the day before. [7] Citing the filing of the Petition for Review, Atty.
Chavez moved for the suspension of the arraignment for a period of 60 days pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. [8] The RTC, however, denied the motion and proceeded with Soriano's arraignment. [9]

The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge Hilario Laqui of Branch 218
was biased against its client.[10] Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on 18 October 2005 requesting Judge Laqui to
voluntary inhibit himself from the case.[11]

On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for
Inhibition"[12] (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following statements, which have become the
subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that pleading:
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition

COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the case against the accused
when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Department of
Justice.
2. They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment, they have filed the petition.
3. They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it is provided that upon motion,
the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is
pending.
4. We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ on October 10, 2005, why is it
that the accused did not present a copy of the petition stamped "received" by the DOJ? Why did he not make a
manifestation that he forgot to bring a copy? He could have easily convinced the Presiding Judge to suspend the
arraignment upon a promise that a copy thereof will be filed with the court in the afternoon of October 11, 2005 or even
the following day.
5. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition.
[13]
 (Emphases supplied)
The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's Motion for
Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:
4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or mailing of the petition. We cannot
conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of lawyers will admit that on October 11, 2005 that they suddenly or
temporarily became amnesiacs. They forgot that they filed the Petition for Review the day before. [14] (Emphasis supplied)
In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of antedating. [15] As proof that
the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005, complainant attached to its Complaint-Affidavit a
copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ stamp. [16]

In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,[17] respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint against them was a
mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to the Vehement Opposition, Public
Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint. [18] They also contended that the statements they had made
in their pleadings were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication. [19]

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. [20]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,[21] Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found respondents guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility:
We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I petition is violative of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to observe civility and propriety in their pleadings. It was somewhat
irresponsible for the respondents to make such an accusation on the basis of pure speculation, considering that they had no
proof to support their accusation and did not even make any attempt to verify from the DO.I the date and the manner by which
the said petition was filed. Moreover, as held in Asa, we will have to disagree with the respondents argument on privileged
communication, the use of offensive language in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings, constitutes unprofessional
conduct subject to disciplinary action.

xxxx

In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and improper language in her pleadings. Considering that the
respondents' accusation that the complainant and its lawyers antedated the mailing of Bro. Eliseo Soriano's DOJ Petition is
somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting additional attorney's fees for opening doors and serving coffee, we
believe that the penalty of reprimand would be proper in this case.

Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta be
reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.[22]
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted and approved
Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for using improper language
in their pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and Atty. Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a Warning that a repetition of the same
will be dealt with more severely.[23]
On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August 2008. They argued
that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following grounds: (a) complainant's failure to implead the
public prosecutor, who must be considered an indispensable party to the case, since the pleading in question could not have
been filed without her conformity; (b) as the subject pleadings had been signed by the public prosecutor, their contents
enjoyed the presumption of regularity and legality, upon which respondents were entitled to rely; (c) respondents relied in
good faith on the review, supervision and direction of the public prosecutor in the filing of the pleading in question; and (d) the
statements in the pleading were covered by the doctrine of privileged communication. [24] Respondents also contended that
Atty. Chavez should be disciplined for the derogatory statements made against them in the pleadings he submitted during the
IBP investigation.

Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition[25] to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January 2009.

On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the basis of complainant's failure to implead an
indispensable party:
RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's non-joinder of an indispensable
party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according to regulations and in good faith in the performance of their
official duties. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case against
Respondents is hereby DISMISSED with stern Warning to be more circumspect.
To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party questioning Resolution No.
XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as amended by
Bar Matter No. 1645,[26] we must ultimately decide disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, regardless of the acts
of the complainant.[27] This rule is consistent with our obligation to preserve the purity of the legal profession and ensure the
proper and honest administration of justice.[28] In accordance with this duty, we now pass upon the recommendation of the IBP.
OUR RULING

After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP
Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of the complaint inapplicable to disbarment
proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient justification to discipline respondents for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of complainant's purported
failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was not explained at length in its resolution, the
IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to the argument proffered by respondents. They had argued that the
public prosecutor was an indispensable party to the proceeding, and that her non-joinder was a ground for the dismissal of the
case. That ruling is patently erroneous.

In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[29] These proceedings
are neither purely civil nor purely criminal,[30] but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers.
[31]
 Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied, [32] but are construed in a manner that allows us to determine whether
lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and exercise the privileges of their office. [33]

We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public prosecutor has not been
joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court merely calls upon members of the bar to account
for their actuations as officers of the Court. [34] Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of the case is indispensable. No
other party, not even a complainant, is needed.[35]

In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their pleadings contain the
accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The fact that Public Prosecutor Jaban-Fama also
signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these statements is irrelevant to the issue of whether respondents' conduct
warrants the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.

Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public prosecutor as a defense for their own
misconduct.

Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official acts of the public
prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the pleadings subject of the Complaint, was
performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor. Hence, any impropriety in the contents of or the language used in
these pleadings originated from respondents. The mere fact that the public prosecutor signed the pleadings after they were
prepared could not have cured any impropriety contained therein. The presumption that the public prosecutor performed her
duties regularly and in accordance with law cannot shield respondents from liability for their own conduct.

The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise untenable. As
lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility. This obligation includes the duty to
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues, including opposing counsel.
Respondents cannot disregard this solemn duty solely on the basis of the signature of a public prosecutor and later seek to
absolve themselves from liability by pleading good faith.

Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether respondents have
indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by respondents. In the
Comment[36] they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent portions [37] of their pleadings that contained the
allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question left for us to resolve is whether their conduct violates the ethical code
of the profession.

After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 8 [38] and 10[39] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings, in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [40] Their arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both the
court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of such words as may be properly addressed by one honorable member
of the bar to another.[41] In this case, respondents twice accused complainant of antedating a petition it had filed with the DOJ
without any proof whatsoever. This allegation of impropriety undoubtedly brought complainant and its lawyers into disrepute.
The accusation also tended to mislead the courts, as it was made without hesitation notwithstanding the absence of any
evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and unprofessional behavior.

That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the scheduled arraignment
and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the Petition is not an excuse. As this Court
emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April 2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal
profession. It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. [42]
Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial
proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if the publication thereof is privileged.
[43]
 While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability for privileged statements made in their pleadings, they
remain subject to this Court's supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of their duty as members of the
legal profession.[44]

We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
[45]
 Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and sternly warned that
the Court will deal with future similar conduct more severely. [46]

A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each and every disciplinary
action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should bear in mind the purpose of disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the integrity of the legal profession for the sake of public interest.
Needless to state, the Court will not look with favor upon a recommendation based entirely on technical and procedural
grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of Governors is hereby SET
ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to use only respectful and temperate language in the
preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect in dealing with their professional colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.