VERGARA vs.

OMBUDSMAN [GR 174567 March 12, 2009] -On September 27, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner: SEVERINO VERGARA
Respondents: OMBUDSMAN, SEVERINO J. LAJARA, and VIRGINIA G. BARORO ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when he dismissed for lack of probable cause the case against respondents for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019
TOPIC: Determination of Probable Cause
RULING: No. The Ombudsman, in issuing the assailed Resolution, found no probable cause to
FACTS: hold any of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The Ombudsman
- On June 25, 2001, the City Council of Calamba where petitioner was a member, issued found that the subject lots were bought at P3,800 per square meter, an amount lower than their
Resolution No. 115, Series of 2001 which authorized Mayor Lajara to negotiate with landowners zonal valuation of P6,000 per square meter.
within the vicinity of Barangays Real, Halang, and Uno, for a new city hall site. During the
public hearing, the choice for the new city hall site was limited to properties owned by Pamana The Ombudsman dismissed petitioner’s complaint for lack of probable cause based on the
Inc. and a lot in Barangay Saimsin, Calamba. Ombudsman’s appreciation and review of the evidence presented. In dismissing the complaint,
the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
- On October 29, 2001, the City Council then passed Resolution No. 280, Series of 2001,
authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase several lots owned by Pamana Inc. with a total area of Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
55,190 square meters for the price of P129,017,600. Mayor Lajara was also authorized to belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
execute, sign and deliver the required documents. person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, or on evidence establishing guilt beyond
- On November 13, 2001, the City Government of Calamba through Mayor Lajara, entered into reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt, but it
the following agreements: MOA, Deed of Sale, Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and Deed of certainly demands more than bare suspicion and can never be left to presupposition, conjecture,
Assignment of Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). or even convincing logic.
-Calamba City mortgaged to Pamana and Prudential Bank the same properties subject of the
Deed of Sale as security for the balance of the purchase price. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution and Order of the
Ombudsman in OMB-L-C- 02-1205-L dated 17 March 2004 and 22 August 2005, respectively.
- On 19 November 2001, the above documents were endorsed to the City Council. Petitioner SO ORDERED.
alleged that all these documents were not ratified by the City Council.

- Petitioner alleged that with respect to the two lots covered by TCT No. 61703 with an area of
5,976 square meters and TCT No. 66140 with an area of 3,747 square meters, Fr. Sulpico of the
Dominican Province of the Philippines had earlier offered the same for only P300 per square
meter instead of P350. (the alleged overpricing was later on denied by Fr Sulpico himself during
a Sangguniang Panglungsod meeting.)

-On 17 March 2004, the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding no probable cause to hold any
of the respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act)

-The Ombudsman found that the subject properties have been transferred and are now registered
in the name of Calamba City under new Certificates of Title. Moreover, the reasonableness of
the purchase price for the subject lots could be deduced from the fact that Calamba City bought
them at P3,800 per square meter, an amount lower than their zonal valuation at P6,000 per
square meter.

-The Ombudsman added that it was common knowledge that the fair market value of the lots
was higher than their zonal valuation, yet the lots were acquired at a lower price. The Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest
Ombudsman also found that the terms and conditions of payment were neither onerous nor G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
burdensome to the city government as it was able to immediately take possession of the lots even Ponente: Regalado, J.:
if it had paid only less than ten percent of the contract price and was even relieved from paying
interests on the installment payments. The Ombudsman ruled that there was no compelling
evidence showing actual injury or damage to the city government to warrant the indictment of
Facts:
respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. 1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed
for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City
filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
lease contract conditions. upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have,
cutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers
2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a
petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for
building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City its 'interpretation and construction. There are two specific laws
assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. prohibiting private counsels representing the government- Sec. 1683
Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case. of the Revised Administrative Code states "the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial
NO.
government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of
1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall
disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is
private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building. disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision
of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.”
Another is Sec. 3 of Local Autonomy Act, Republic Act No. 2264,
which provides that the municipal attorney, as the head of the legal
Part 2
division or office of a municipality, "shall act as legal counsel of the
Ramos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-53766 municipality and perform such duties and exercise such powers as
FACTS  The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, availed of the services may be assigned to him by the council"
of the law firm of Cruz Durian & Academia (now Cruz Durian
Agabin Atienza & Alday) in a case for land recovery against
Maria C. Ramos et al
 Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and Municipal Attorney of
Hagonoy entered their appearance as supervising counsel in the
case for land recovery
 Ramos moved to disqualify Cruz law firm from serving as
counsel for the municipality
 Trial court denied motion to disqualify since it found that private
counsel only wanted to serve his native town
 Ramos assailed said order by a petition for certoriari with the
Court of Appeals, who sustained the ruling of the trial court, thus
the case is appealed to the Supreme Court
ISSUE WON the finding of the CA that it is legal for a private counsel to
represent LGU is correct
RULING Overturned. As Justice Moreland observes, Where language is plain,
subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of
a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly
harmful. That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what
the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure
the unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal Ideas of what the
Rabuco vs Villegas 55 SCRA 656 Zamboanga Del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga Et. al.
March 28 1968
Facts FACTS:
After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del norte
The constitutionality of RA No. 3120 was assailed by the city officials of the and Zamboanga Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that:
City of Manila contending that the conversion of the lots in Malate area into All buildings, properties, and assets, belonging to the former province of
disposable and alienable lands of the state and placing its administration and
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
disposal to the LTA to be subdivided into lots and selling it to bona fide
occupants thereof in installments constitutes a deprivation of the City of
transferred free of charge in favor of City of Zamboanga.
Manila of its property by providing for its sale without the payment of just Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was
compensation. unconstitutional because it deprived the sites, hospital and leprosarium
sites, and high school playgrounds.
Issue
ISSUES:
Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed without paying just 1. Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial
compensation to the City of Manila? property? 2. Should the city pay for said properties?
Held HELD:
1. If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school
The court held that the assailed RA 3120 is constitutional. The lots in question
are owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and
playgrounds are for public use since it is the only one that is available to
are therefore public property over which Congress has absolute control as the general public, and all the rest are patrimonial property since they
distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it which cannot be deprived are not devoted to public use but to public service. But if we follow the
from the City without just compensation and without due process. RA 3120 law on Municipal Corporation, as long as the purpose is for a public use,
expressly provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of the property should be considered for public use.
communal property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable
lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. It has been an 2. If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties
established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to classify its property involved are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the
under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power province would be deprived of its own property without just
of the state. compensation. If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed,
the properties would be of public dominion, and therefore no
compensation would be required. It is the law on Municipal Corporation
that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code may classify them
as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary private property.
They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise certain
governmental activities would be impaired. Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd
paragraph itself says “without prejudice to the provisions of special
laws.
VILLANUEVA v. CASTAÑEDA, JR. problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic
FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by 3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for
the municipal government. They were led to lease the said land through public use), the petitioners must yield to the police power exercised by
a municipal council resolution in 1961. the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid contract
may be cancelled if it causes danger to the public.
The municipal government demolished the stalls and subsequently
issued a new resolution revoking the right previously granted to the
vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking
space for the town plaza. Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo [G.R.
No. 24950. March 25, 1926.]
Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging FACTS
that they have the right to use the said lang because the resolution The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for
allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between them the two strips of land, consisting of 592 sq.m and 59 sq.m with the
(vendors) and the municipal government. amount of P42,966.40, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated
for widening said street. CFI Ilo-ilo ordered the said municipality to pay
CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from Mrs. Tantoco the said amount, plus its interest. Said judgment was
the area. But such eviction was not enforced and the number of stall appealed, and was affirmed by the Supreme Court. On account of lack
owners even grew. of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the said judgment,
wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property of
After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto
trucks, one police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini
ISSUE: street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to corresponding lots.
the stall owners making them lawful lessees of the land After notice of the sale of said property had been made the
provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the CFI praying that the
2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said attachment be
HELD: declared null and void as being illegal and violate the rights of the
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was municipality. To which the Court agree, declaring the attachment levied
previously used as a town plaza and being such it is considered as upon the aforementioned property of the municipality null and void.
beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any Mrs. Tantoco appealed the decision of CFI Ilo-ilo.
contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the first place to
occupy the disputed premises. ISSUE
2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area
such as Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible unsatisfied obligation?
of fire endangering public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market HELD
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation
 The Supreme Court denied appeal and affirmed the decision of From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were
CFI Ilo-ilo on the ground that the principle governing property of the being reclaimed. A law was passed creating the Public Estate Authority
public domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of the which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in
municipalities as said municipal property is similar in character. The this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a
principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between
commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the
prescription. Likewise, property for public use of the municipality is not Freedom Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay
within the commerce of man so long as it is used by the public and, were going to be transferred to AMARI .
consequently, said property is also inalienable. The rule is that property ISSUE:
held for public uses, such as public buildings, streets, squares, parks, Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to
promenades, wharves landing places, fire engines, hose and hose AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
carriages, engine houses, public markets, hospitals, cemeteries, and
generally everything held for governmental purposes, is not subject to RULING: YES!
levy and sale under execution against such corporation.
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are
classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section
3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain shall be
limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The
157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution
and existing laws. Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly
Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is contrary
to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are
“inexistent and void from the beginning.” The Court must perform its
duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the
Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

Quisumbing vs. Garcia
FACTS:
FACTS:
 The subject COA report stated "Several contracts in the total Whether or not prior approval by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
amount of P102,092,841.47 were not supported with required before Gov. Garcia could have validly entered into the
a Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution authorizing the Provincial questioned contracts. 
Governor to enter into a contract, as required under Section 22 of
R.A. No. 7160." RULING:

Gov. Garcia sought for reconsideration from COA but without The Court held that the case should be remanded to the
waiting for its resolution, she instituted an action for Declaratory lower court and treated as an ordinary civil action rather than as a
declaratory relief action. The lower court was directed to admit
Relief where she alleged that the infrastructure contracts complied
further evidence in order to determine the nature of the questioned
with R.A. No. 9184 bidding procedures and were entered into contracts entered into by Gov. Garcia, and the existence of
pursuant to the general and/or supplemental appropriation ordinances authorizing her acts.
ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, hence a
separate authority to enter into such contracts was no longer
necessary.

The trial court declared that Gov. Garcia need not secure
prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan . It further
declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan does not have juridical
personality nor is it vested by R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue
and be sued. It also ruled that it is only when the contract (entered
into by the local chief executive) involves obligations which are not
backed by prior ordinances that the prior authority of the
sanggunian concerned is required.

Petitioners insisted that prior authorization from the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan should be secured before Gov. Garcia
could validly enter into contracts involving monetary obligations.

The Province of Cebu was operating under a reenacted

budget in 2004. Gov. Garcia entered into contracts on behalf of the
province while this reenacted budget was in force.

ISSUE: