People V Lilia Gutierrez
People V Lilia Gutierrez
People V Lilia Gutierrez
SYLLABUS
4. CIVIL LAW; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF, PROPER FOR THE ANXIETY
AND MENTAL ANGUISH SUFFERED BY THE PARENTS OF THE CHILD KIDNAPPED.
— We believe the trial court’s award of moral damages in favor of Hazel’s
parents was proper as reparation for the three days of anxiety and mental
anguish which they suffered before the recovery of their child; the amount,
however, should be increased from P2,000.00 to P5,000.00. We believe the
degree of malice exhibited by the appellant, an unlettered woman, in committing
the offense here involved does not warrant the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
particularly because to date, she has already spent seven years in prison.
DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:
The accused Lilia Gutierrez y Franco is before us on appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, convicting her of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor and sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua.
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1984, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, having been entrusted the custody of one Hazel Elpedes, a
boy, two and a half years of age, and therefore, a minor, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately fail and refuse to restore the said
child to his parents, Frank Elpedes y Sumayod and Lourdes Elpedes, and instead
sell the said child for P250.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 1
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a
decision dated 14 September 1987 finding the accused guilty of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of the decision states: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Lilia Gutierrez y Franco, guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime as charged and hereby sentences her to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment (sic) and is hereby ordered to pay the
sum of P2,000.00 to the parents of the minor, Frank Elpedes and Lourdes
Elpedes, for moral damages and to pay the costs.
x x x
SO ORDERED." 2
Appellant in her Brief, assigns a single error, asserting that the trial court erred
in convicting her because her guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. cralawnad
The facts of the case as found by the trial court may be summarized as follows:
1aw library
chanrob1es virtual
On the morning of 13 July 1984, appellant went to the residence of her sister-in-
law, Lourdes Elpedes, at the Nichols Airbase, Pasay City, and obtained
permission from the latter to take her youngest son Hazel, 2 1/2 years old for
the day because appellant’s husband, Maximiano Mariano, wanted to spend
some time with his nephew at their residence in Paco, Manila. Both women
agreed that the child would be brought back at 4:00 P.M. that same day. When
appellant arrived at her residence, she discovered that her husband, and their
belongings, were gone. For a while, appellant just sat there and cried. She then
proceeded to the residence of her former employers, Mr. and Mrs. Abraham
Felipe, in Intramuros. They executed an "Agreement" under which appellant
surrendered custody of Hazel Elpedes, purportedly her own fatherless son, in
favor of the couple. Appellant received P250.00 from the couple which was
evidenced by a receipt. 3
Meanwhile, Lourdes Elpedes went to appellant’s residence after the latter had
failed to return with her son. Encountering no one there, she and her husband,
Frank Elpedes, spent the next two days looking for appellant along Herran St.
(now Pedro Gil St.). On 15 July 1984, Frank Elpedes spotted appellant in a
telephone booth along said street and accosted her. The Elpedes spouses
brought her to the Western Police District Station along United Nations Avenue,
Manila. Appellant then led Frank Elpedes and at least one policeman, Patrolman
Diosdado Deotoy, to the Felipe residence in Intramuros. But the group found
neither the Felipe spouses nor the child there. Receiving information from the
Barangay Chairman of the place that the child was in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal the
group returned to the police station and then proceeded to Antipolo. There they
recovered Hazel from the residence of the Felipe spouses. During this time,
appellant admitted to the group that she had "sold" the child in order to avenge
herself on her husband, Lourdes Elpedes’ brother, who had abandoned her. On
the evening of 15 July 1984, the group returned to the police station where
appellant was investigated and placed under arrest. She has been under
detention ever since. 4
Patrolman Ernesto Callos’ testimony dealt with the circumstances under which he
investigated the appellant. He mentioned that appellant repeated to him in the
investigation room her admission regarding the "sale" of the child and her motive
for "selling" him. He added that the admission was made voluntarily after
appellant had intelligently waived the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, he did
not insist, in deference to her constitutional rights, when she declined to reduce
this admission into writing. 7
Appellant testified on her own behalf as the sole witness for the defense. She
stated that she had fetched Hazel Elpedes from his parents upon instructions of
her husband. After discovering that her husband had abandoned her, she
entrusted the child to the Felipe spouses merely for temporary safekeeping while
she tried to locate her husband in his homeplace in Cabanatuan City. She
believed that the Felipe spouses, her former employers, could be relied upon to
look after the child responsibly. She misrepresented the child as her own
because the Felipes were aware of her married status. Returning to the Felipe
residence the following day, she received P180.00 from them, never considering
for a moment that the amount represented payment for the child. She admitted
affixing her thumbmarks on Exhibit E but repudiated her purported signatures on
Exhibits D and E because she is illiterate. She added that she did not know why
the Felipe spouses presented these documents to her. Appellant testified that it
had never occurred to her to immediately return Hazel to his parents because
she was in a confused state of mind upon realizing she had been abandoned by
her husband. 8
Appellant contends that the prosecution’s evidence did not establish that she had
deliberately failed to restore the boy Hazel to his parents by "selling" the child to
the Felipe spouses. Elaborating, she argues that Lourdes Elpedes was an
incompetent witness as far as her account of the recovery of Hazel in Antipolo
was concerned, because she was not present when this event took place.
Lourdes’ account of appellant’s alleged admission of the "sale" on the occasion
then constituted hearsay. Furthermore, she contends, Pat. Callos’ testimony that
appellant had admitted giving away the young boy to him during her
investigation was likewise hearsay. Considering this alleged gap in the
prosecution’s evidence, appellant claims the prosecution should have presented
either or both of the Felipe spouses to testify that appellant had indeed "sold"
the child. Finally, appellant argues that the prosecution had not successfully
rebutted her exculpatory testimony regarding her inadvertent failure to return
Hazel to his parents. 9
The offense of kidnapping and failure to return a minor defined and penalized
under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code consists of two elements: 1.) the
offender has been entrusted with the custody of a minor person, and 2.) the
offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
It is clear that appellant admitted the existence of the first element for she had
not disputed the testimony on circumstances under which she obtained custody
for the day of Hazel Elpedes on the morning of 13 July 1984. Furthermore, as
pointed out by the trial court, it was perfectly in consonance with human
experience that Lourdes Elpedes should have readily allowed appellant to take
Hazel temporarily because she is a relative by affinity who, until then, had not
exhibited any conduct which might impair the trust normally reposed on a sister-
in-law. 10
We believe that the second element of the offense charged has been established
by the prosecution’s evidence. In the first place, appellant’s own conduct in
leading Frank Elpedes and Pat. Deotoy to the Felipe residence in Intramuros, in
an initial unsuccessful effort to recover the child, indicated her awareness of the
probable whereabouts of the child. The logical conclusion is that she must have
been the person responsible for originally leaving the child with the Felipe
spouses. 11 In the second place, the precise motive that appellant, might have
had for bringing Hazel Elpedes to the Felipe spouses and leaving him with them,
apparently for an indefinite period, is not an indispensable element of the offense
charged. All that was necessary for the prosecution to prove was that she had
deliberately failed to return the minor to his parents. But appellant herself had
testified that she had indeed left the child with the Felipe spouses in Intramuros.
We find it very difficult to understand how appellant, even in her claimed
disconsolate state, could have inadvertently left the child with the Felipe spouses
in the latter’s home in Intramuros (starting from Herran St., in the opposite
direction from the Nichols Airbase, where the child’s parents live). Moreover,
appellant did not pretend to have tried to return Hazel to his parents by
retrieving him from the Felipe spouses in Intramuros. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Appellant concluded her Brief with a plea that should her conviction be affirmed,
the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon her would be too harsh
because her illicit act was really the result of the bitterness she felt over the
betrayal and humiliation inflicted on her by her husband, the brother of Lourdes
Elpedes. 15 The Solicitor General, in his own Brief, concurs with this view: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The record, however, shows that appellant had no intention to commit so grave
a crime. After she was found, she voluntarily surrendered and accompanied the
police and the minor’s parents to Intramuros, Manila and later to Cogeo,
Antipolo, Rizal, where the minor was later recovered. Although she was alleged
to have received P250.00 from the Felipes when she left the minor with them,
still appellant’s previous admissions and cooperation with the police show that
she did not have a criminal mind or intent to commit so grave an offense. These
mitigating circumstances can not, however, be considered in her favor under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code The imposition of a life sentence on
appellant under these circumstances would indeed be too harsh, considering
further that she can not read and write, and had no educational background
whatsoever.
We agree that in this particular case, the penalty normally imposed for
kidnapping and similar offenses appears too harsh. The record does not indicate
that Hazel Elpedes has been injured emotionally or physically by his experience.
We believe the trial court’s award of moral damages in favor of Hazel’s parents
was proper as reparation for the three days of anxiety and mental anguish which
they suffered before the recovery of their child; the amount, however, should be
increased from P2,000.00 to P5,000.00. We believe the degree of malice
exhibited by the appellant, an unlettered woman, in committing the offense here
involved does not warrant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, particularly because
to date, she has already spent seven years in prison. chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court dated 14 September 1987 imposing
the penalty of life imprisonment (should be reclusion perpetua) upon the
appellant, is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the award of moral damages in favor
of Frank and Lourdes Elpedes is hereby increased to P5,000.00. Pursuant to the
authority granted to it under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
recommends, through the Secretary of Justice, to the President of the Philippines
that executive clemency be extended to appellant Lilia Gutierrez as a means of
mitigating the undue harshness of the criminal law in this particular case. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.