Memo

MEMO
TO: EAE AND PMC

FROM: JEAN
RE: PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; DEFAMATION
Date: March 13, 2020
MILAGROS TEJUCO V E.R SQUIBB & SON PHIL. CORP. ET AL

G.R. No. L-11052. April 30, 1958.
On October 18, 1954, Apellant Milagros Tejuco (Appellant Tejuco)

filed a civil complaint for libel against E.R Squibb & Son Phil. Corp. et al
(E.R. Squibb) alleging that her former employers wrote her a libelous letter
of separation, a copy of which was posted in the company's bulletin board.
Upon appellee’s motion, the complaint was dismissed on the ground of
prescription because as admitted by Appellant Tejuco, the complaint was
filed one year and six months after the publication of the libelous letter on
October 18, 1954.
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint on the

ground of prescription and held that:
On the matter of prescription, the applicable provision is

Article 1129 of the Civil Code which states that "actions
prescribe by mere lapse of time fixed by law." This
necessarily leads us to Article 1147 of the Civil Code which
requires that an action for defamation must be filed within
one year. The broad term "defamation" in the absence of any
other specific provisions, includes libel. (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, a civil action for damages for defamation must be filed within
one year from the time the defamatory word was uttered or made. There
being no special provisions which ordains otherwise, that period must be
counted from the day the action could have been brought. (Article 1150,
new Civil Code.)
Gregorio I. Alcantara and Juan Ruelo vs Norberto S. Amoranto
G.R. No. L-15745, October 31, 1960.
On January 5, 1957, plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of

damages allegedly suffered by them as a result of a libelous letter
addressed by the defendant to the Office of the President with the intent of
injuring the plaintiffs and of besmirching their good reputation.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of

prescription, arguing that "from the face of the complaint the alleged
defamatory imputations were made on October 23, 1955," so that when the
complaint was filed on January 5, 1957, more than one year after the action
may be brought had already lapsed.
Plaintiff opposed alleging that contrary to defendants’ claim the

contents of the letter came to their knowledge only on January 6, 1956
when it was translated to them in Tagalog by a certain Honesto Vitug and
not when the letter containing the defamatory statements was endorsed to
them on October 23, 1955 nor when plaintiff Alcantara actually received
the same on January 5, 1956. Simply, plaintiffs argue that the one-year
period of prescription, which should commence from the day the action
may be brought, must be computed from January 6, 1956, when the
defamatory statements contained in the letter came to their knowledge.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the complaint was timely
filed:
“The one-year limitation prescribed by law should be

counted, not from October 23, 1955, when the alleged
libelous letter was sent to the Office of the President, but
from January 6, 1956, when the contents thereof came to
appellant’s knowledge. A written defamation, it is true,
becomes actionable upon its publication — that is to say,
when communicated to third person or persons as the term
is understood in the law of libel. It is evident, however,
that the libelous matter must first be exhibited to the
person libeled before the action could be brought. A
person defamed, as pointed out by appellant, could hardly
be expected to institute the proceedings for damages arising
from libel when he has no knowledge of the said libel. xxx"
Miguel Tolentino vs. Ceferino Inciong

G.R. No. L-15745, October 31, 1960.
On December 20, 1952, Miguel Tolentino (Plaintiff) filed an action to

recover damages for libel committed by Ceferino Inciong (Defendant) for
which defendant was found guilty in a criminal case against him. On
December 13, 1955, after the plaintiff had rested his case, defendant filed
another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by prior judgment and also on the grounds of prescription
and non-suit.
The motion was opposed by plaintiff alleging that the grounds stated
therein had already been raised by defendant in his previous motion to
dismiss which had already been denied, and that the filing of said second
motion to dismiss was irregular as defendant had already filed an
amended answer and has entered into trial on the merits.
In his reply to the opposition, defendant asserted that his motion was
a demurrer to evidence and was distinct from the previous motion to
dismiss. The lower court, however, on February 16, 1956 denied the motion
to dismiss the complaint. Motion for reconsideration was, likewise, denied.
After the reception of evidence for the defendant, the lower court on
October 17, 1956 rendered the decision complained of dismissing plaintiff's
complaint on the ground of prescription. Opining that the decisive
question of whether or not plaintiff's cause of action has already prescribed
is one of law.
The Supreme court ruled in favor of the defendant stating that plaintiff’s complaint is
already barred by prescription. Portion of the decision which reads:
“xxx
Consequently, a written defamation becomes actionable

upon its publication, or when communicated to third person
or persons. In case of a libel committed by a newspaper, the
period for bringing the action should be computed from the
date the publication goes into circulation. (53 C. J. S. 133.) It
appearing that from July 24, 1949, when the libelous matter
was published and circulated in a newspaper owned by
defendant, to December 24, 1952, when the present action for
damages arising from said libelous publication was filed, a
period of three years and five months had elapsed, it results
that the said action has already prescribed whether the
prescriptive period be computed under the new Civil Code
or the laws previous thereto. xxx”

Memo - Damages - Defamation - Civ JIE

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TO: EAE AND PMC

MILAGROS TEJUCO V E.R SQUIBB & SON PHIL. CORP. ET AL

On October 18, 1954, Apellant Milagros Tejuco (Appellant Tejuco)

The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint on the

On the matter of prescription, the applicable provision is

On January 5, 1957, plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of

Plaintiff opposed alleging that contrary to defendants’ claim the

“The one-year limitation prescribed by law should be

Miguel Tolentino vs. Ceferino Inciong

On December 20, 1952, Miguel Tolentino (Plaintiff) filed an action to

Consequently, a written defamation becomes actionable

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