G.R. No.

93828 December 11, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO EVARISTO and NOLI CARILLO, accused-appellants.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires,
Cavite, * in Criminal Case No. NC-267, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Santiago
Evaristo and Noli Carillo," finding the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms
in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and accordingly sentencing them to the
penalty of life imprisonment.

The information indicting the accused-appellants (hereinafter referred to as the

appellants) reads:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses SANTIAGO

EVARISTO AND NOLI CARILLO of the crime of VIOLATION of P.D. 1866,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd. day of August 1988, in the Municipality of

Mendez, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being private persons
not authorized by law did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously manufacture, repair and kept (sic) in their possession,
custody and control one (1) caliber 38 revolver (paltik) with two live
ammunition and one (1) empty shell of said caliber, two (2) 12 gauge
home made shot guns, one (1) caliber 22 revolver (sumpak) and two
(2) vise grips and one (1) plier use (sic) in the manufacture and repair
of said firearms without any permit or license from competent (sic)
authority.

CONTRATRY (sic) TO LAW.

Cavite City, August 30, 1988. 1

Appellants having entered a plead of not guilty, trial thereupon commenced, with
the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective witnesses and evidence
to support their divergent versions of the events leading to the arrest of the
appellants.

A careful review of the records and the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, Sgt.
Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of the Philippine Constabulary, indicates
that on the day in question, a contingent composed of Romeroso and Vallarta,
together with a Sgt. Daniel Maligaya, also of the Philippine Constabulary, and two
(2) members of the Integrated National Police, were on routine patrol duty in
Barangay III, Mendez, Cavite. At or about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of
gunfire were heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the approximate source of the
same, they came upon one Barequiel Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant Evaristo prompting
the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the immediate perimeter of the
house, specifically a cement pavement or porch leading to the same, the patrol
chanced upon the slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as to
the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told that he had already
escaped through a window of the house. Sgt. Vallarta immediately observed a
noticeable bulge around the waist of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the
same to be a .38 revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of
the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm, the gun was
confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo's
permission to scour through the house, which was granted. In the sala, he found,
not Rosillo, but a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the
repair and manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became the basis for
the present indictment against Evaristo.

For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of the events in question,
alleging that they were forcibly taken into custody by the police officers and even
subjected to physical and mental indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge
of any of the firearms presented in evidence, contending that these were purposely
planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses and other police
authorities.

After evaluation of all the evidence, the trial court rendered the now-assailed
decision dated 18 April 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, for having possessed firearms in violation of P.D. No. 1866,

accused Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo are hereby sentenced to
serve the penalty provided for under Sec. 1 thereof. The full period of
their preventive imprisonment shall be deducted from the
aforementioned penalty.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED. 2

Hence, this petition, assigning the following as errors of the trial court:

1. The lower court gravely erred in admitting Exhibits "B" to "F" in

evidence considering that those are illegally seized evidence;

2. The lower court gravely erred in finding that said illegally seized
evidence are firearms as contemplated in Presidential Decree No.
1866; and
 3. The lower court gravely erred in giving credence to the arresting
officer's testimonies which are patently contradictory and half truths
(sic) testimonies. 3

First, on the issue of illegal search. The pertinent rule on the matter is Article III of
the Constitution, the relevant portion of which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) . . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit

are unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search to be reasonable under the
law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate
judicial officer. Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a
valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among
these exceptions is the seizure of evidence in plain view, adopted by this
jurisdiction from the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Harris
vs. U.S.4 and Coolidge vs. New Hampshire.  5 Thus, it is recognized that objects
inadvertently falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be introduced in
evidence. 6

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the
appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo
whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for
firearms was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his
discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even accidental.

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the
validly of the firearm's seizure and admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on
authorized warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by which a warrantless
arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as disclosed by the records, the peace
officers, while on patrol, heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate
the matter. This incident may well be within the "offense" envisioned by par. 5 (b) of
Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held in People of the Philippines
v.  Sucro, 7 "an offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer,
within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE DISTURBANCES
CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE THEREOF." 8

The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal knowledge on the part of
the peace officer of facts pointing to the person to be arrested as the perpetrator of
the offense. Again, reference to the records resolves said query. Giving chase to
Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants who were then asked
concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point, Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge on
the waist of Carillo. This visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire,
as well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than sufficient to pass
the test of the Rules. Consequently, under the facts, the firearm taken from Carillo
can be said to have been seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.

The next area to be addressed is the allegation of the appellants that the statute's
coverage does not extend to firearms that are not functional or serviceable. The
Court does not agree.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 penalizes "any person who shall unlawfully manufacture,
deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess  any firearms, PART OF FIREARM, ammunition
or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of
any firearm or ammunition." 9 It is clear that the law makes no distinction as to
serviceable or functional firearms. Indeed, the possession of even a part of a firearm
is sufficient to come within the prohibitive ambit of the statute.  Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

Lastly, the appellants challenge the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, maintaining that these were inconsistent with each other, thereby giving
rise to the conclusion that the entire incident was a contrivance on their part.
Specifically, they point to the apparent conflict in the statement of the prosecution
witnesses that there were only three (3) individuals in the vicinity (aside from the
peace officers) as opposed to the testimony of another peace officer, testifying as a
hostile witness, that aside from the appellants, and Rosillo, there were also other
people in the vicinity, such as Evaristo's mother, brother and other farmers.
The Court sees no such conflict. A recourse to the trial court proceedings easily
shows that the two (2) prosecution witnesses, Sgt. Romerosa and CIC Vallarta,
testified in a straightforward and candid manner, categorically identifying the
appellants as the two (2) individuals they had apprehended and clearly narrating
the circumstances of such apprehension. The defense has given no possible reason
or motivation for these peace officers to make false accusations against the
appellants. Absent the presentation of such defense evidence, the testimony of the
peace officers should deserve full credence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court of Trece Martires, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. NC-267 finding the accused Santiago Evaristo and Noel Carillo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Illegal Possession of Firearms as defined in Presidential
Decree No. 1866, is hereby AFFIRMED.

The Court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia
found in the possession of the appellants, in favor of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) to be disposed of in accordance with law.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the firearms
and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed to its search
and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and open to eye and
hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion that the bulge in
Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the warrantless search of
his person and the seizure from him of the  paltik.

This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also dissented.
As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not come under any of
the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court,
where a warrantless arrest and search may be made. Paragraph (a) and (c) are
clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b) because although it may be
conceded that a crime had just been committed, the arresting officers had
no  personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed it. In fact, they were pursuing
Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in the air, and not Carillo, whose
assistance they even sought. The circumstance that the search resulted in the
discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and could not retroactively validate the
warrantless search for it was clearly void ab initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of
the poisonous tree and should not have been used in evidence against Rosillo.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the ponencia holds that there was a valid seizure of the firearms
and paraphernalia found in Evaristo's house because, first, he agreed to its search
and, second, the said prohibited articles were in plain view and open to eye and
hand. But I must express my reservations on the conclusion that the bulge in
Carillo's waist provided the probable cause that justified the warrantless search of
his person and the seizure from him of the  paltik.

This case is similar to People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, where I also dissented.
As I did there, I will here also observe that the search does not come under any of
the three situations enumerated under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court,
where a warrantless arrest and search may be made. Paragraph (a) and (c) are
clearly not inapplicable. And neither is Par. (b) because although it may be
conceded that a crime had just been committed, the arresting officers had
no  personal knowledge that Evaristo had committed it. In fact, they were pursuing
Rosillo, whom they actually saw firing a gun in the air, and not Carillo, whose
assistance they even sought. The circumstance that the search resulted in the
discovery of the unlicensed firearm did not and could not retroactively validate the
warrantless search for it was clearly void ab initio. The seized pistol is the fruit of
the poisonous tree and should not have been used in evidence against Rosillo.
G.R. No. 76005. April 23, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RODELIO C. EXALA, RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN and JAIME P. FERNANDEZ, accused,
RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Amador E. Mostajo and Presbiterio Velasco, Jr. for accused -appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR

POLICE CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS
ONE OF THE INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT
PRIOR ARREST OR WARRANT. — There are indeed instances where search and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An
illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or police
checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court.
Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the
contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an
offense. However, lest it be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away
with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his person,
personal effects and belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before Us is an incident to or
an offshoot of a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.

2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE
WAIVED, AS IN THIS CASE. — Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag
of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not
only casts serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure. In one case We held — ". . . When one voluntarily
submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th
Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly."

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT

OF DISPATCHING IN TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC.
4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED, IS LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN
INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR. (A), RULE 113, 1985
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. — The arrest of the three (3)
accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug
in their possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a
crime was committed. This is one of the situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of
Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless
arrest may be made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or
transporting marijuana, in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. — Factual conclusions by the trial court
relative to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and are generally
sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been overlooked
or misconstrued as to affect the result. There is none in this case on appeal.

5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF

EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, AND THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. —
We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in
the light of Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant.
Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not
incident to a lawful arrest. This issue was never raised in the proceedings below.
Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the
same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have
waived his objection on the legality of the search and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the court is bound
to admit evidence.

6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A

PROSECUTION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. — Proof
of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does not
require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted
for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SEARCH AND SEIZURE AT AN ORDINARY

CHECKPOINT IS ILLEGAL FOR LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE AS ENVISIONED IN THE
BILL OF RIGHTS. — I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or
every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without
warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is
not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights. In the case of the ordinary
checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the search. The search is made
as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at random. There is no showing that a
crime is about to be committed, is actually being committed, or has just been
committed and the searching officer has personal knowledge that the person being
searched or arrested is the culprit . . . I realize that this view would result in the
inadmissibility of the seized marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his
inevitable acquittal. But as I have always maintained, we cannot retroactively
validate an illegal search on the justification that, after all, the articles seized are
illegal.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J p:

The admissibility of the evidence seized from the accused at a checkpoint after
being stopped for routine inspection is put to test in this appeal from the decision 1
of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City finding inter alia accused-appellant
Restituto B. Bocalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of
R.A. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972."

On 2 November 1982, at about 8:15 in the evening, a private jeep driven by

accused-appellant Restituto B. Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint in Cavite
City for routine inspection regarding unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items.
With Bocalan were his co-accused Jaime P. Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala. Pfc.
Ricardo Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked
the occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc.
Galang then proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He
noticed a black leather bag measuring about one (1) foot wide and two (2) feet long
with its sides bulging. He asked what it contained. There was deadening silence.
Nobody answered. Instead, the three (3) accused, Restituto B. Bocalan, Jaime P.
Fernandez and Rodelio C. Exala, suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang
ordered the bag opened. He found what he excitedly described as "marijuana,
marijuana, napakaraming marijuana!" At this juncture, the three (3) remained
motionless in their seats and appeared petrified with fear. They were brought to the
police station that same night for further investigation. 2

After laboratory examination, the bag was verified to contain more than two (2)
kilos of Indian hemp otherwise known as marijuana. 3
Thereafter, Rodelio C. Exala, Restituto B. Bocalan and Jaime P. Fernandez were
accordingly charged for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

After trial, Bocalan was held guilty as principal and sentenced to life imprisonment.
A fine of P25,000.00 was also imposed. 4 The other two (2) were convicted as
accomplices and received lighter penalties. Fernandez appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Exala did not.

Bocalan, whose punishment is reviewable only by this Court, is now before Us

assailing his conviction; hence, We deal only with him in this appeal.

Appellant Bocalan seeks exculpation by imputing ownership of the bag to Exala

alone. 5 Bocalan claims that while on the way to Cavite City, he and Fernandez
offered Exala a ride. Exala accepted the offer and requested Bocalan to make a
detour to Salitran, Dasmariñas, Cavite, where he was to pick up some clothes. They
agreed and Exala got the bag which he kept beside him all the time until their
apprehension at the checkpoint. 6

Bocalan further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the bag as evidence
against him since it was obtained through a warrantless search. 7

The protestations of Bocalan are devoid of merit. We agree with the trial court that
the conduct of Bocalan was not only unusual but also contrary to normal human
experience. 8 He alleged that he knew Exala only by face and had no personal
association with him; 9 yet, on that eventful day of 2 November 1982, he agreed to
detour to Salitran which was some fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers out of his
way. Thus, his contention that it was Exala who owned the bag containing the
marijuana is hardly credible.

On the other hand, Exala declared that it was he who did not know the contents of
the bag as it was already in the jeep when he boarded it. Exala asserted that it was
either Bocalan or Fernandez who owned the bag. Exala swore that Bocalan and
Fernandez offered him P5,000.00, later raised to P10,000.00, to take the blame
alone, but he refused. 10

Proof of ownership is immaterial where the accused is charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana. 11 Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does
not require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be
prosecuted for dispatching in transit or transporting a prohibited drug. The law
simply provides thus —

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."
Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to prove that Bocalan was directly
involved in the unlawful dispatch in transit or transport of marijuana. The evidence
of the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of Pfc. Ricardo Galang and Pat.
Rosauro de Guzman, belies the defense of Bocalan and establishes beyond cavil
that he was caught in flagrante delicto of transporting the prohibited drug; that he
was the driver of the jeep owned by his father that carried the stuff; and, that he
was in fact the owner of the bag. The trial court noted that Bocalan picked up
Fernandez and Exala one after the other to accompany him to the place where the
bag of marijuana was taken and to help him bring the marijuana to Cavite City. 12
Regardless of the degree of participation of Fernandez and Exala, Bocalan is
correctly punished for his direct involvement in the crime.

Such factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and are generally sustained by the appellate court unless
some material facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result.
13 There is none in this case on appeal.

We turn to the legal question on the admissibility of the marijuana as evidence in

the light of Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant.
Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not
incident to a lawful arrest.

This issue was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the
admissibility of the evidence on the ground that the same was obtained in a
warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on
the legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the
course thereof. 14 In view of such waiver, the court is bound to admit the evidence.
15 But even assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, still appellant's
contention deserves scant consideration.

There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest. 16 An illustration would be the "stop-and-
search" without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of
which has already been upheld by this Court. 17 Vehicles are generally allowed to
pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints
that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have
been instruments in the commission of an offense. 18 However, lest it be
misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that
no person shall be subjected to search of his person, personal effects and
belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion
of a lawful arrest. 19 The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of a lawful
"stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.

The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with "Operational Bakal"
the main object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited
items in the possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. 20 When the
jeep carrying the contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down
and the occupants were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang
noticed a black leather bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the
contents of the bag were. None of the accused answered. At that moment, the
demeanor of the accused changed; they became suspiciously quiet and nervous as
if they were concealing something from Pfc. Galang. The accused clearly appeared
to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such peculiar apprehensiveness if not
restrained reaction of the accused, which did not appear normal, provided the
probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led to the opening of the
bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff. Significantly, there was no sign of any
protest or objection to the search. The accused remained silent even after their
arrest.

Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the
absence of any protest on their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubts on
their professed innocence 21 but also confirms their acquiescence to the search. 22
Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure.
23 In one case 24 We held —

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver
may be made either expressly or impliedly" (emphasis supplied).

The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the
discovery of the prohibited drug in their possession. There was no need for a
warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the
situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, when a warrantless arrest may be made. 25 The accused
were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana, in
violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.

The alleged contradiction between the sworn statements of Pfc. Galang and Pat. de
Guzman was explained in their separate testimonies and, in any event, has been
resolved by the trial court as a factual issue. We find no reason to reverse its
findings.

Anent the argument that the three (3) accused should not have been assigned
different levels of liability, suffice it to say that whether a principal, co-principal or
conspirator, accused-appellant would have been meted out the same penalty
imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from finding
accused-appellant RESTITUTO B. BOCALAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged, the same is AFFIRMED, with costs against him.

SO ORDERED.

Griño-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I dissent, for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinions in Valmonte v. de

Villa, 185 SCRA 665/178 SCRA 211, and People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401, and
the following additional observations.

I am opposed to checkpoints as regular police measures aimed at reducing

criminality in general. I do not agree that in the interest of peace and order, any or
every vehicle may be stopped at any time by the authorities and searched without
warrant on the chance that it may be carrying prohibited articles. That possibility is
not the probable cause envisioned in the Bill of Rights.

In the case of the ordinary checkpoint, there is not even any suspicion to justify the
search. The search is made as a matter of course, either of all vehicles or at
random. There is no showing that a crime is about to be committed, is actually
being committed, or has just been committed and the searching officer has
personal knowledge that the person being searched or arrested is the culprit.

I will concede that checkpoints may be established at borders of states or at

"constructive borders" near the boundary for the purpose of preventing violations of
immigration and customs laws. But in the interior of the territory, the requirements
of a valid search and seizure must be strictly observed. The only permissible
exemption is where a crime like a bank robbery has just been committed or a
jailbreak has just occurred, and the authorities have to seal off all possible avenues
of escape in the area. In all other cases, I submit that the checkpoint should not be
allowed.

I realize that this view would result in the inadmissibility of the of the seized
marijuana as evidence against the petitioner and in his inevitable acquittal. But as I
have always maintained, we cannot retroactively validate an illegal search on the
justification that, after all, the articles seized are illegal. That is putting the cart
before the horse. I would rather see some criminals go unpunished now and then
than agree to the Bill of Rights being systematically ignored in the oppressive
checkpoint. Respect for the Constitution is more important than securing a
conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. CONWAY B. OMAWENG, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Joel C. Obar for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUG ACT; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF PROHIBITED

DRUGS; PROOF OF OWNERSHIP THEREOF BY THE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED. — The
accused contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he is the owner of the
marijuana found inside the travelling bag which he had in his vehicle, a Ford Fiera
Proof of ownership is immaterial. Accused was prosecuted for the dispatching in
transit or transporting of prohibited drugs pursuant to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. This section does not require that for one to be liable for
participating in any of the proscribed transactions enumerated therein, he must be
the owner of the prohibited drug. This section penalizes the pusher, who need not
be the owner of the prohibited drug. The law defines pusher as "any person who
sells, administers, delivers, or gives away to another, on any terms whatsoever, or
distributes, dispatches in transit or transports any dangerous drug or who acts as a
broker in any of such transactions, in violation of this Act. [Section 2 (m), R.A. No.
6425, as amended.] In People v. Alfonso, [186 SCRA (1990)] where the accused was
charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana under the aforesaid Section
4, this Court ruled that ownership is not a basic issue.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE COMBINATION THEREOF;

WARRANTS A CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. — The facts, as proven
by the prosecution, establish beyond cavil that the accused was caught in the act of
transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in flagrante delicto. That he
knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond moral certainty by the following
circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was found in a travelling bag, (b) he is the
owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind a spare tire, (d) he was
travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which he loaded the bag was under his
absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court (on
circumstantial evidence), the combination of all these circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such circumstances, unrebutted by
strong and convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to the presumption
that he is the owner of the prohibited drug. [Section 3(j), Rule 131, Rules of Court.]

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE

SEARCH & SEIZURE; WHEN DEEMED WAIVED. — Accused was not subjected to any
search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his Constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. [Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.] If one
had been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the
citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties
and privileges of the Court." [Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 (1937).] He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures As this Court stated in People v.
Malasugui: (63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936]. See also Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689
[1938]; People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]; People v. Rodrigueza, 205 SCRA
791 [1992].)." . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it
made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be secure
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly." Since in the course of the valid search forty-
one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved the officers to seize the same;
no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides, when said packages were
identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally offered in evidence,
the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally indicted for the violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12 September 1988. 1 Upon his failure to submit
counter-affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do so, the court
declared that he had waived his right to a preliminary investigation and, finding
probable cause against the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to the proper
court. 2

On 14 November 1988, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Mountain Province filed
an Information charging the accused with the violation of Section 47 Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The accusatory portion thereof
reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"That on or about September 12, 1988, at Dantay, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
dispatch in transit or transport in a Ford Fiera, owned and driven by him, 10 1/4
kilos of processed marijuana in powder form contained in al plastic bags of different
sizes which were placed in a travelling bag destained (sic) and intended for delivery,
disposition and sale in Sagada, Mountain Province, with full knowledge that said
processed marijuana is (sic) prohibited drug or from which (sic) prohibited drug
maybe manufactured.
CONTRARY TO LAW." 3

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 713.

After his motion for reinvestigation was denied by the Provincial Fiscal, 4 the
accused entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment on 20 June 1989.

During the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses. The
accused did not present any evidence other than portions of the Joint Clarificatory
Sworn Statement, dated 23 December 1988, of prosecution witnesses Joseph
Layong and David Fomocod.

On 21 March 1991, the trial court promulgated its Judgment 5 convicting the
accused of the crime of transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4,
Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered imposing upon the accused herein the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos.

Pursuant to Sec. 20, Art. IV of the aforecited special law, the drugs subject of the
crime are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government.
Accordingly, it is further directed that such drugs so confiscated and forfeited be
destroyed without delay per existing rules and regulations on the matter.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED." 6

Hence, this appeal.

In the Appellant’s Brief, Accused imputes upon the trial court the commission of the
following errors.

"I

. . . IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE

HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JOINT CLARIFICATORY STATEMENT OF THE

ARRESTING OFFICERS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT THE OWNER OF
THE PROHIBITED DRUG SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.

III
. . . IN NOT RULING THAT THE CONTRABAND SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH (sic)
AND SEIZURE." 7

The appeal is without merit. The decision appealed from must be upheld.

After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence, We find to have been fully
proven the following facts as summarized by the Solicitor General in the Brief for
the Appellee. 8

"In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the Mt.
Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to
Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put
up a checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to
Bontoc (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 3-4). They stopped and checked all vehicles
that went through the checkpoint (TSN, April 5, 1990, p. 12).

At about 9:15 A.M., Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod
(sic), saw and flagged down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634
coming from the Bontoc Poblacion and headed towards Baguio (TSN, November 9,
1989, pp. 4-5, 8). The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no passengers (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5).

Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and appellant
acceded to the request. (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 4-5). When they peered into
the rear of the vehicle, they saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the
rim of a spare tire under the passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle (TSN,
November 9, 1989, pp. 6, 10, 11).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Layong and his companions asked permission to see the contents of the bag (TSN,
November 9, 1989, p. 6). Appellant consented to the request but told them that it
only contained some clothes (TSN, November 9, 1989, p. 6). When Layong opened
the bag, he found that it contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes
containing pulverized substances (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7, 9).

Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne Fomocod, who,
after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana (TSN, November 9, 1989, p.
16).

The PC constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and
proceeded to the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC Headquarters
(TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8) The prohibited drugs were surrendered to the
evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling (TSN, November 9, 1989, pp. 7-8).

Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,

Benguet, who has conducted more than 2500 professional examinations of
marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples, conducted two chemistry examinations of
the substance contained in the plastic packets taken from appellant and found them
to be positive for hashish or marijuana (TSN, October 24, 1990, pp. 3, 5-81)." 9

Anent the first assigned error, the accused contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that he is the owner of the marijuana found inside the travelling bag which he
had in his vehicle, a Ford Fiera Proof of ownership is immaterial. Accused was
prosecuted for the dispatching in transit or transporting of prohibited drugs
pursuant to Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. This section does not
require that for one to be liable for participating in any of the proscribed
transactions enumerated therein, he must be the owner of the prohibited drug. It
simply reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited

Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty
thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."cralaw
virtua1aw library

This section penalizes the pusher, who need not be the owner of the prohibited
drug. The law defines pusher as "any person who sells, administers, delivers, or
gives away to another, on any terms whatsoever, or distributes, dispatches in
transit or transports any dangerous drug or who acts as a broker in any of such
transactions, in violation of this Act. 10

In People v. Alfonso, 11 where the accused was charged with the unlawful
transportation of marijuana under the aforesaid Section 4, this Court ruled that
ownership is not a basic issue.cralawnad

The facts, as proven by the prosecution, establish beyond cavil that the accused
was caught in the act of transporting the prohibited drug or, in other words, in
flagrante delicto. That he knew fully well what he was doing is shown beyond moral
certainty by the following circumstances: (a) the prohibited drug was found in a
travelling bag, (b) he is the owner of the said bag, (c) he concealed the bag behind
a spare tire, (d) he was travelling alone, and (e) the Ford Fiera in which he loaded
the bag was under his absolute control, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules
of Court (on circumstantial evidence), the combination of all these circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Such circumstances,
unrebutted by strong and convincing evidence by the accused, even gave rise to
the presumption that he is the owner of the prohibited drug. 12

The second assigned error is devoid of merit. The declaration in the joint
clarificatory sworn statement executed by the apprehending officers, that the
marijuana subject of the case was surreptitiously placed by an unknown person in
the bag of the accused, is not supported by evidence. Said sworn statement cannot
be used as a basis for exoneration because the very same officers who signed the
same reiterated on the witness stand their statements in their original affidavit
implicating the accused, both the criminal complaint before the Municipal Trial
Court of Lontoc and the information in this case were based on this original
affidavit. No probative value could be assigned to it not only because it was
procured by the defense under questionable circumstances, but also because the
affiants therein merely expressed their personal opinion. The trial court’s correct
exposition on this point, to which nothing more may be added, deserves to be
quoted, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the portions of the ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement- of prosecution

witnesses Layong and Fomocod cited (Exhs. "I" to "I-C" ; p 155, Record), the
defense would want this Court to draw the inference that the accused Conway
Omaweng is innocent as confirmed by no less than the persons who apprehended
the suspect in flagranti (sic). In other words, that the said accused is not the owner
of the contraband confiscated but someone else; that to (sic) mysterious individual
placed the prohibited articles inside the travelling bag of the accused without the
knowledge and consent of the latter; and that the identity of this shadowy third
person is known by the PC/INP investigators. The isolated declarations, albeit under
oath are much too asinine to be true and do not affect the credibilities of the
witnesses — affiants and the truth of their affirmations on the stand. As gleaned
from parts of the record of the reinvestigation of this case conducted by the
Provincial Fiscal (Exhs "G" and "D" ; pp. 158 and 161, Record), it appears that
Layong and Fomocod were prevailed upon to affix their signatures to (sic) the
document styled as ‘Joint Clarificatory Sworn Statement’ by interested persons in a
vain ploy to extricate the accused from the morass he got himself into. Testifying in
open court, the same witnesses maintained the tenor of their original affidavit
supporting the filing of the criminal complaint in the lower court (Exh. "C" ; p. 2,
Record) No additional information was elicited from said witnesses during their
examination from which it can reasonably be deduced that a third person instead of
the accused is the culprit and that the suspect is being framed-up for a crime he did
not commit. Nonetheless, granting arguendo that the declarations of Layong and
Fomocod now the bone of contention, are on the level, the same are but mere
opinions and conclusions without bases. Any which way, to believe that any person
in his right mind owning several kilos of hot hashish worth tens of thousands of
pesos would simply stash it away in the travelling bag of someone he has no
previous agreement with is a mockery of common sense. And to think further that
the PC/INP agents know of such fact yet they kept the vital information under
‘confidential Status’ (whatever that means in police parlance) while an innocent
person is being prosecuted and practically in the shadow of the gallows for the
offense would be stretching human credulity to the snapping point. By and large,
the fact remains as the circumstances logically indicate that the accused Conway
Omaweng has knowledge of the existence of the contraband inside his vehicle and
he was caught red-handed transporting the hot stuff." 13

The third assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration Accused was not
subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 14 If one had been
made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen
and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and
privileges of the Court." 15 He willingly gave prior consent to the search and
voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag.
Prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

"PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.

Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A He said ‘you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).’

Q When he said that, what did you do?

A We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q When you said that, what did he tell you?

A He said you can see it.

Q And when he said ‘you can see and open it,’ what did you do?

A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that
was contained in the bag.

Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and
showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was
marijuana." 16

This testimony was not dented on cross-examination or rebutted by the accused for
he chose not to testify on his own behalf.

Thus, the accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures As
this Court stated in People v. Malasugui: 17

". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of (sic)
his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I, page 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be
made either expressly or impliedly."cralaw virtua1aw library

Since in the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found,
it behooved the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such
seizure. Besides, when said packages were identified by the prosecution witnesses
and later on formally offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection
whatsoever. Thus, in the accused’s Comments And/Or Objections To Offer of
Evidence, 18 We merely find the following:chanrobles law library

"EXHIBIT COMMENTS AND/OR OBJECTIONS

"A" The bag was not positively identified to be

the same bag allegedly found inside the

vehicle driven by the accused. The

arresting officers failed to show any

identifying marks; thug, said bag is an

irrelevant evidence not admissible in court;

"A-1" to "A-40" Objected to also as irrelevant as the 40

bags now being offered are not the same

bags alleged in the information which is 41

bags. The prosecution failed to proved (sic)

beyond reasonable doubt that Exhibit "A-1"

to "A-40" are the same bags allegedly taken

from inside Exhibit "A" because what is

supposed to be inside the bag are 41 bags

and not 40 bags."cralaw virtua1aw library

x           x          x

WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial t of Bontoc, Mountain

Province of 21 March 1991 in Criminal Case No. 713 finding the accused CONWAY B.
OMAWENG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-63630               April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third
Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel
Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the appellant alleged:

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN y
BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control
and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate
weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City,
without authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)

The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
was based is narrated by the trial court as follows:

It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late
evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L.
Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod
Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner
Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando,
Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against persons who
may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may be
engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by
informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed
a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and
they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo
and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to
accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside
the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and
weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and
the reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel
Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to
 deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that
Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's
Report (Exhibit F).

It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning
or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat.
Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special
training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the
marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo
conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive
result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the
marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto
Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when
examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At
pp. 9-10, Rollo)

Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court
as follows:

The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife
begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry
farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he is engaged in
the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used
to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in
connection with his business and whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-
rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila; that he never
left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982,
he went to Subic to collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and
to buy C-rations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the
evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he had a
drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to
Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by
9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner Bus that he rode and
because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San
Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at
San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the street to wait for a bus going to
Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he came to know later
as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence
certificate; that when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and
took all the money inside the wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan
told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for verification as he
may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman,
identified by him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened
when he arrived that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out
everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may get
the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat.
Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but that it
was never returned to him; that he was thereafter placed under detention
 and somebody told him that he is being charged with possession of
marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help
him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he told his wife that
Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not
to complain anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)

Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment
of error in his appeal:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND

FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND
DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)

The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower
court's findings.

However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty.
Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty.
Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of
Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied
and, in her brief, raised the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF

MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED

PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM
ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED
TO PROVE THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)

It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product
of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

This contention is devoid of merit.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provides:
 Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:

. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his
arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless
search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with
the same issue, held that:

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did
not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante
delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself
lawful. (Nolasco V. Paño, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in
the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163

SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an
informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached
him as he descended from the gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he
was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that the
marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. The
records show, however, that there were certain facts, not sing in the case before us,
which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:

The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting

declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at react two days
within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And
from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant.
Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head
of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."

In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's
decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there
was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN,
pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot
therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search
warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would
make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.

Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly

seized from him was never authenticated and therefore should not have been
admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package
brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination
did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since
Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package together with a
letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise
testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said
letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper
authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package
examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized
from accused.

Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was
not properly authenticated, still, we cannot discount the separate field test
conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana.

Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was
insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.

In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer
should have been presented before the lower court. We discard this argument as a
futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several
cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely
corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v. Asio,
G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16,
1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA
538).

As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court
on the issue of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great
respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since
credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who
had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of
witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA
278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings:

The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and

Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clean to show the commission
by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution witnesses
 have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense
against the accused. The knowledge on what these witnesses testified to
were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of their duties and
then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused,
their testimonies deserve full credit.

The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the
possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the
examination findings conducted by Pat. October to Salangad of the PCCL,
with station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1).
(Rollo, p. 11)

Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that
Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was accosted at the
Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet otherwise he will be
"salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal
Building for interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be
exposing his identity to the accused? This is unnatural. And this is also true
on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso
bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any
money from the accused and that the marijuana leaves do not belong to the
accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court as evidence that
expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and
which contained the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere
fabrication?

As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the
prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge acquired by
the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their official duties
and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias (sic) or
that they have any prejudice against the herein accused. Between the
testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the uncorroborated
and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo,
p. 13)

Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could
have availed himself through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to
buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor was any
justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and
uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the positive
testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.

Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly
observed by the lower court, is an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt.

We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:

The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs
one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear from the
 testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other things, that
when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he
(accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover,
considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the possession of
the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the
intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo,
pp. 13-14)

The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he
categorically denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to
Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the
accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v.  Duero  104 SCRA 379
[1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that
before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly
and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This
ruling was reiterated in People v.  Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court
added that:

In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity
of official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full adoption of
the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the
prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant
was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.

The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and
from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may
be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be
approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves
testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams Such amount is not a
considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to
transport the marijuana leaves.

Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact
that the accused was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his
residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be based
on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case.

What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport
the marijuana leaves but his actual session.

The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8

of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand
(P6,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P.

Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio
L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant
No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the earlier order.

It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the

Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by
respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an
application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms,
etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente,
Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
alleged, among others, as follows:

1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to
believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and
ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense which the said NEMESIO
PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the following premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:

a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and

Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground
floor;

b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP,

Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor;

2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a

fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to
enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and
bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

 b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and,

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C.

Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of
Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge.
In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared, inter alia, as follows:

Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the

applicant for a Search Warrant?

A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action

Division, Western Police District.

Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of

the Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila

A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our
surveillance and observation during the past few days.

Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said

premises is kept the following properties subject of the
offense of violation of PD No. 1866 or intended to be used
as a means of committing an offense:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;

b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with

ammunitions?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons

who has or have control of the above-described premises?

A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the

Polytechnic University of the Philippines.

Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the

offense of violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended
to be used as the means of committing an offense?

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance

conducted for several days, we gathered information from
 verified sources that the holder of said firearms and
explosives as well as ammunitions aren't licensed to
possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the
premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are
not students who were not supposed to possess firearms,
explosives and ammunition.

On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No.
87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining

under oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness
FLORENIO C. ANGELES that there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe (probable cause) that NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in
the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St.,
Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the above
offense or intended to be used as the means of committing the said
offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time

in the day or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, more particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground
floor; (b) office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith seize and take
possession of the following personal properties, to wit:

a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;

b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;

c. explosives and hand grenades; and

d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be

dealt with as the law directs.

On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy
Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.

In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the

searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash
room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live
fragmentation hand grenades separately wrapped with old newspapers, classified
by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.—M33 Fragmentation hand grenade
(live); (b) one (11) pc.—M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.
—PRB—423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed
that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal
knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of the search
warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching
questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a general warrant, for the
reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that it
failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in
violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to
allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was
urgent. 5

The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal
Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to
the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8

Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the

petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided
a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions
of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in issuing the disputed orders.

For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 12 The probable cause
must be in connection with one specific offense 13 and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and
answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness he may
produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14

The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause
must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the
witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. 16

Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was
issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal
knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his
application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has
been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in his control and possession" the
firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the report and
found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio
C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several
days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said
fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the
applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned search
warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof  only through information from other
sources or persons.

While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major
Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier received  that
petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is nothing in the record to
show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information
acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such information to be a
fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and
answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers,
whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.

What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only
support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on
hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted
continuous surveillance for several days of the suspected premises and, as a result
thereof, they "gathered information from verified sources"  that the holders of the
subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them.

In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in
determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a
supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not—

The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant

issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner
that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for
damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant,
and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person
whom one considers to be reliable.

Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his
deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much
so that he cannot be held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the
issuance of the questioned search warrant.

In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a
search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider
to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
money lender, challenging usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court
held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.

In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had
been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said
premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence and records," this was likewise
held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the
allegations contained in the application of P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for
the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:

The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause.

Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required
by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record."

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too
brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching
questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they
called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the
questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are
not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to
the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."

Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable
cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post
facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted
weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the
supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand grenades were
itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP,
according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.

The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as
enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the purpose
is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable
search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.

Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed
to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were
several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP.

The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place
intended .22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at
the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP,
Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to
be searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there were
several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.

Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it
was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in
connection with one specific offense. The search warrant issued by respondent
judge, according to petitioner, was issued without any reference to any particular
provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes
several offenses.

In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon

applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no specific offense had
been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that it would be a legal
hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code"
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.

In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For
Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the
phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the
term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search
warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the particular
provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized
under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized
under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of
the various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives;
such illegal possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses
or belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by respondent
Judge: 24

The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title

of PD 1866 can only mean that illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives, have been codified under Section 1 of
said Presidential Decree so much so that the second and third are
forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms under Section (1)
thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and prosecution
arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of
firearms, etc.' The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal
 Procedure does not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for
illegal possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of
ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither
is the filing of three different informations for each of the above
offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted
by the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Describably,
the servers did not search for articles other than firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-
14 is deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore
valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the
applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search
warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned
warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19, dated 14 August
1987, which reads:

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and

holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any
judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but
in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath,
to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an
otherwise valid search warrant.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned
orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y.
Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of
petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal
recruitment.
The facts are as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,

Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay

narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang

panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang

pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya

ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan
ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa
Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako
ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC
Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez

to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the
following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE

MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH
FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF
LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no
license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No.

1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of
your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of

Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal

prosecution under existing laws.

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November,

1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation

Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents
Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as
members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order
No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of
News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the
place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain
Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the
premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance
Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any.
Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting
outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora
Salazar.
 6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro

Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at
her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the
ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the
owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or

hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine

Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and

five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private
residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as
well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to
our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave
abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery
and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN

THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were
already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within
twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall
feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to
protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these

important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner

filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts
sought to be barred are already  fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late,
we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest
involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of
search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue
squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power:

x x x           x x x          x x x

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been
described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law
has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of
arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this
power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered  functus officio  by
the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date
of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested
that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and
issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants,
may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the
elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the
counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from
judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises,

or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the
 existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his
case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not
necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands,
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him
to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him
both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to
our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall

have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person
engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment.
The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to
cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to
further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure
of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized

representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention
of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it
is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in
illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of
workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of
authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v.  Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct
Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have
ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the
President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final
decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

x x x           x x x          x x x

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco
Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125).
That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems
such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds
that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is
injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of
express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16
Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued

presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified
(Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the
Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other
cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti,
that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No.

1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of
your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
 (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under

Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under

existing laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized,
otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

x x x           x x x          x x x

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration

constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized
in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo

equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the
printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of
prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and

other publications to promote the objectives and purposes
of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the

"WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP

665; and
 5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472
with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the

search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the
Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise"
have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute
dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to
be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable
chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and
Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges,

and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable

aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may
order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19550             June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P.
de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason
and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges 2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named
and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and
take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins
(cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search

warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in
any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted
or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of
the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found
and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only  by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, 9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal  and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging

to the corporation  did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants.
If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of
or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation  and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only  by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or
the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions
need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if
the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable  cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly  describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible  for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular  acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that
the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to
be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general  warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors

maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
 As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on
the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of

the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse
of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against
that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared

enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches
and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without
that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard
as a freedom  "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
 enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion
of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential
part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing
the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible  for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition
is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that
violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street,
and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore,
the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under
their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of

and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not  in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration,
or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and
other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the
facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any
rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other
effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that
the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-
nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and
from the import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following
distinct conclusions:

1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in

this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in
violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution;

2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said
search warrants were consequently illegal;

3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1,

should be, and is declared, abandoned;

4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners

are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized
in the said residences is made permanent; and

5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily

demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of
the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three
residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants
served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made
therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases
in the future."

It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately
preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the
nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and
the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof.
In my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated
by the environmental political and moral developments of this case should not deter
this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well for
future cases and future generations. All  the search warrants, without exception, in
this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore
admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things
and effects seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in
any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search
warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void
and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No
inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or
the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the
lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings
submitted to this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for
the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized
from places other than their family residences.

Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived

almost verbatim  from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional
provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement
made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.

The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or
return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search
and seizure, may be summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers
and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession — actual or
constructive — of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved
person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search
warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved
person," gives "standing."

An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting
three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the
petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted
named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises"
mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of
the petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see
pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to
be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned
by or under the control of the petitioners.

Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion
to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones
vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a
friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir.
1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an
apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492,
493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962)
(papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the
defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it
was held that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and
seizures, a person places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:

Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature

and scope of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment
protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office,
his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from unwarranted
governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the
Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of
differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment
have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S.,
87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72
S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents

seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to emphasize that the
petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises searched
(Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey
Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the corporate
offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy
Club); and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling
stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if
not all, of the premises searched therefore independently gives them standing to
move for the return and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized
therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and
extent of the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to
suppress. After reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):

We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We
are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into
the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due
consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions
such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures
ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).

It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to
return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a
Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose apartment the corporate records
were seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's president
successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:

The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his

own or the corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. Under the circumstances in the case at bar, the search
and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of
seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should be
granted. (Emphasis supplied).

Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place
searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection
of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948),
Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that
"even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and
was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in
1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a
step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the
Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to
include "anyone legitimately on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of
a corporation had standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d
650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the defendant had standing
on two independent grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property
seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just
like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation'
premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:

Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should
not have been precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records or a
substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir.
1962). In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the
defendant's place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either;
he asserted that several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The
Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that there also was an
invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano  considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296
F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.

In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and
went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his
standing to move to quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum  directed to
the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the petitioner had no
standing because the books and papers were physically in the possession of the
custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court
rejected the contention, holding that

Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal

rights in the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable
search and seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of
compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against
said person gives  "standing."

The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F.
Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney
certain files and papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time
of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of
the records at his home in the country and on a farm which, according to Dunn's
affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out
to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate books and
records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless,
the search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing"
to move for the return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155
F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that

It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were

directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in
the papers as having violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant
described the records as having been used "in committing a violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of
America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to

move to suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records
stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises
searched. See also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell  case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United
States did not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell  is strikingly
similar to the case of the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and
corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences; as
in Birrell,  the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY"
against the petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell  because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection
with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants
regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of
the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to
the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal
capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to
the petitioners all personal and private  papers and effects seized, no matter where
these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other
place or places. The uncontradicted  sworn statements of the petitioners in their,
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things
seized from the corporate offices and other places
were personal and private  papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which
where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping
should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises
owned and/or possessed (actually or constructively) by them as shown in all the
search and in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and
(b) purely corporate  papers belonging to corporations. Under such categorization or
grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers  will have to
be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.

And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners

likewise have clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely
corporate  papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations
involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my

disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional
proscription on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.

Footnotes

1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special
Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and
Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila.

2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon.
Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon.
Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Quezon City.

3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.

4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development
Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc.,
Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural
Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management
Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and
Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The
Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real
Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
6
Inter alia.

7
"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to
be rendered in the case, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us in this
case against the use of the papers, documents and things from the following
premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg.,
Arzobispo St., Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta
St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts., Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario
St., Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp., Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San
Vicente St., Mla.; (8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9)
Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San Francisco & Boston, Port Area,
Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg.,
San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis,
Manila; (13) American Asiatic Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila;
(14) Room 91, Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15) Warehouse Railroad
St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club,
Manila, South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila;
(18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts.; Dewey Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc.,
Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21) Premises of
24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg.,
San Luis, Manila; (23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24)
IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis, Manila; (25) United Housing
Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil.
Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin
St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases Nos. R-953 and 955
against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The
preliminary injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things
found in the other premises namely: in those of the residences of petitioners,
as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra Road,
Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village,
Makati, Rizal."

8
Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9
Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.

10
In re  Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 60 2d 916; Lusco vs.
U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F. Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11
U.S. vs. Gass 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.

12
On March 22, 1962.

13
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.

14
Reading: . . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath
 or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

15
. . . A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the
peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule
126.)

16 
People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.

17
Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

18
Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19
Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341;
emphasis supplied.

20
Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed, 647, 41 S. Ct. 261;
Olmstead vs. United States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564,
Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United
States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp vs. Ohio
(1961), 367 US 643, 6 L. ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.

21
Even if remote.

22
Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 49:
U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct. 93: Villano vs, U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs.
U.S., 296 Fed. 2d 650.

CASTRO, J., CONCURRING AND DISSENTING:

*
Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.