EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng,
defendant-appellant.

The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from
the tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law
requires that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process
within the State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the
question of his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United
States on this point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is
binding upon the courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in
proceedings in rem or quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the
state, and who does not appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot
lawfully render a personal judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L.
ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an
action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, upon whom service has been effected
exclusively by publication, no personal judgment for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs.
Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)

It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered a
personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.

In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all
cases of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This
step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was
entered contains the following words:

Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y

The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of the
failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy,
China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion
that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that
could be given to a resident of a foreign country.

As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of
due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or
tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be
rendered upon lawful hearing.

Fabella v. CA

In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.13cräläwvirtualibräry
13

Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. Every teacher shall enjoy equitable safeguards at
each stage of any disciplinary procedure and shall have:

a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;

b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;

c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative of his choice and/or by his
organization, adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of his defense; and

c. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity shall be given to any
disciplinary action being taken against a teacher during the pendency of his case.

Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially
by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings: Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.

Non v. Judge Dames

But, as stated in Guzman, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Thus:

. . . There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are,
that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the
right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered
by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. [At pp. 706-707].

Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win
be a violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711]

People v. Nazario

We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of revenue measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of
Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that the
Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the Government that had been making money from the venture.

Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the appellant is
clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such ordinances vague.

Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an
uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if the
fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the tax
payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about the
date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely
established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964, 1965, and
1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation, but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would have been at
most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.

Army navy v. CA

The country's artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise of police power: ". . . which the State may
regulate." This is a function of the legislature. And once regulation comes in, due process also comes into play. When the
classification of property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights
demands that it be done with due process both substantive and procedural. In recognition of this constitutional principle, the
State in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject.

. . . the current general law on the subject is R.A. 4846, approved on June 18, 1966, and amended by P.D. No. 374. The Act
prescribes the manner of classifying historical and cultural properties thus:

Sec. 4. The National Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Museum shall be the agency of the government which, shall
implement the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 5. The Director of the Museum, hereinafter referred to as the Director, shall undertake a census of the important cultural
properties of the Philippines, keep a record of their ownership, location, and condition, and maintain an up-to-date register of the
same. Private collectors and owners of important cultural properties and public and private schools in possession of these items,
shall be required to register their collections with the Museum when required by the Director and to report to the same office
when required by the Director any new acquisitions, sales, or transfers thereof.

Sec. 6. The Director is authorized to convene panels of experts, as often as the need for their services may arise, each to be
composed of three competent men in the specialized fileds of anthropology, natural sciences, history and archives, fine arts,
philately and numismatics, and shrines and monuments, etc. Each panel shall, after careful study and deliberation, decide which
among the cultural properties in their field of specialization shall be designated as "National Cultural Treasures" or "Important
Cultural Properties." The Director is further authorized to convene panels of experts to declassify designated "National Cultural
Treasures."

The Director shall within ten days of such action by the panel transmit their decision and cause the designation-list to be
published in at least two newspapers of general circulation. The same procedure shall be followed in the declassification of
important cultural properties and national treasures.

Sec. 7. In designation of a particular cultural property as a "national cultural treasure," the following procedure shall be observed:

a. Before the actual designation, the owner, if the property is privately owned, shall be notified at least
fifteen days prior to the intended designation, and he shall be invited to attend the deliberation and given a
chance to be heard. Failure on the part of the owner to attend the deliberation shall not bar the panel to
render its decision. Decision shall be given by the panel within a week after is deliberation. In the event
that the owner desires to seek reconsideration of the designation made by the panel, he may do so within
days from the date that the decision has been rendered. If no request for reconsideration is filed after this
period, the designation is then considered final and executory. Any request for reconsideration filed within
thirty days and subsequently again denied by the panel, may be further appealed to another panel
chairmanned by the Secretary of Education, with two experts as members appointed by the Secretary of
Education. Their decision shall be final and binding.

b. Within each kind or class of objects, only the rare and unique objects may be designated as "National
Cultural Treasures." The remainder, if any, shall be treated as cultural property.

c. Designated "National Cultural Treasures" shall be marked, described, and photographed by the National
Museum. The owner retains possession of the same but the Museum shall keep a record containing such
information as name of article, owner, period, source, location, condition, description, photograph,
identifying marks, approximate value, and other pertinent data.

Thus, for Manila Hotel to be treated as special cultural or historical property, it must go through the procedure described above.
Eloquent nationalistic, endorsements of classification will not transform a piece of property into a legally recognized historical
landmark . . . .