Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives
Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives
Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives
DEMOCRACY IN THEORETICAL
AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES
IMPLEMENTING
INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY
S USAN S CARROW
IMPLEMENTING
INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY
S USAN S CARROW
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Selecting Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Selecting Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES
NDI would like to thank those who kindly served as informal advisors to the Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and
Practical Perspectives series: Dr. Russell Dalton, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of
California, Irvine; Dr. David Farrell, Jean Monnet Chair in European Politics at the University of Manchester; Dr. Michael
Gallagher, Associate Professor of Political Science at Trinity College, Dublin; Dr. Kay Lawson, Professor Emerita at San
Francisco State University; and Dr. Paul Webb, Professor of Politics at the University of Sussex, Brighton.
Additional contributions to the series were made by Scott Bates, Center for National Policy; John Bruton, Fine Gael, Ireland;
Dr. Dieter Dettke, Friedrich Ebert Foundation; Matyas Eörsi MP, Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), Hungary; Thomas
Melia, Freedom House; Annemie Neyts MEP, Flemish Liberal Party (VLD), Belgium; Dr. Norbert Wagner, Konrad Adenauer
Foundation; and Tony Worthington, Labour Party, United Kingdom.
For more information on NDI’s political party programs or to obtain electronic copies of the Political Parties and Democracy
in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives series, please visit http://www.ndi.org/globalp/polparties/polparties.asp.
PREFACE
A democracy needs strong and sustainable political parties flag potential pitfalls and bumps along the way, and illustrate
with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy the practical considerations of which parties may need to be
choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the public aware. The papers also encourage greater exploration of the
good. With an increasing disconnect between citizens and many excellent resources, articles, and books cited by the
their elected leaders, a decline in political activism, and a authors.
growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces, democratic It is hoped that the Political Parties and Democracy in
political parties are continually challenged. Theoretical and Practical Perspectives series will help readers
For more than 20 years, the National Democratic gain a better understanding of each topic and, in particular,
Institute (NDI) has worked with political parties around the complexities of the issues addressed. This paper,
the world to create more open political environments in “Implementing Intra-Party Democracy,” discusses the
which citizens can actively participate in the democratic advantages and risks of intra-party democracy, examining
process. As a political party institute, NDI approaches its some of the questions parties may face in implementing more
work from a practical viewpoint, offering assistance to inclusive decision-making procedures.
promote parties’ long-term organizational development, The series is an experiment in blending theoretical
enhance their competitiveness in local and national elections, knowledge, empirical research, and practical experience.
and help them participate constructively in government. This NDI invited four eminent scholars to write the papers and
support takes many forms, from interactive training and engaged a range of people—including party leaders,
guided practice to consultations and tailored resources that democracy practitioners, NDI staff members, and other
help parties become more open and representative noted academics—in every stage of the process, from
organizations. developing the initial terms of reference to reviewing outlines
In 2004, NDI began producing a series of research and drafts. NDI is indebted to a large number of people
papers that examine four topics central to the role and who helped bring this series to fruition, particularly the
function of political parties. Two of the papers, “Adopting authors who took part in a cumbersome, collaborative
Party Law” and “Political Finance Policy, Parties, and process and graciously accepted feedback and guidance, and
Democratic Development,” discuss regulatory mechanisms the project’s consultant, Dr. Denise Baer. Special appreciation
that directly impact parties, while the other two, is due to NDI Senior Program Officer Victoria Canavor,
“Implementing Intra-Party Democracy” and “Developments who managed the project from its inception.
in Party Communications,” relate to parties’ internal NDI gratefully acknowledges the support of the U.S.
governance and organization. Together, these papers aim to Agency for International Development (USAID), which
provide comparative information on elements of party provided funding for this project.
politics and to shed light on different methods and their
associated causes and effects. They also examine some of Kenneth Wollack Ivan Doherty
the implications of a political party’s action or strategy in President Senior Associate,
Director of Political
each area. Party Programs
These papers do not offer theories on party organization
or instant solutions for addressing the issues explored. Rather,
they consider obstacles to, and possible approaches for,
creating more effective and inclusive political parties. They
Susan Scarrow is an associate professor of political science at the University of Houston. She is the author of Perspectives on
Political Parties: Classic Readings (2002) and Parties and their Members: Organizing for Victory in Britain and Germany (1996),
and with Bruce Cain and Russell Dalton is co-editor of Democracy Transformed? (2003). Her articles have appeared in such
journals as Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Party Politics, and The European Journal of Political
Research. Dr. Scarrow serves on the editorial boards of Party Politics and West European Politics and is a past president of the
British Politics Group, an affiliated section of the American Political Science Association. She holds a Ph.D. from Yale University.
“Intra-party democracy” is a very broad term describing THE CASE FOR INTRA-PARTY
a wide range of methods for including party members in DEMOCRACY
intra-party deliberation and decision making. Some
advocates for intra-party democracy argue, on a pragmatic Political parties are crucial actors in representative
level, that parties using internally democratic procedures democracies. Parties can help to articulate group aims,
are likely to select more capable and appealing leaders, to nurture political leadership, develop and promote policy
have more responsive policies, and, as a result, to enjoy alternatives, and present voters with coherent electoral
greater electoral success. Some, moreover, converge on the alternatives. Party cohesiveness in legislatures contributes to
premise that parties that “practice what they preach,” in efficient government, and politicians within the same party
the sense of using internally democratic procedures for tend to be more responsible to one another than they
their deliberation and decisions, strengthen democratic otherwise would be, because of the shared electoral fate of
culture generally. those voted in on the strength of a shared party label. In
Realistic practitioners recognize that intra-party short, parties ensure that voters have significant electoral
democracy is not a panacea: Some procedures are better choices, and they help ensure that choices made in elections
suited to some circumstances than to others. Moreover, will translate into decisions in the public realm. This view
some procedures seem even to entail distinct costs, and of the utility of parties in modern electoral democracies is a
there are stable democracies with parties that lack widely shared one. More disputed is the question of whether
guarantees or regular processes of internal party democracy. and to what extent it matters how parties arrive at the choices
Nevertheless, the ideal of intra-party democracy has gained they present to voters, and specifically, whether and to what
increasing attention in recent years because of its apparent extent parties need to be internally democratic in order to
potential to promote a “virtuous circle” linking ordinary promote democracy within the wider society. Answers to
citizens to government, benefiting the parties that adopt this question differ, depending in part on whether the focus
it, and more generally contributing to the stability and is on processes or outcomes.
legitimacy of the democracies in which these parties Those who emphasize the participatory aspects of
compete for power. democracy place the most value on intra-party democracy
This paper will discuss the advantages and risks of as an end in itself. They see parties not primarily as
intra-party democracy, examining some of the specific intermediaries, but rather as incubators that nurture citizens’
questions parties may face in implementing more political competence. To fulfill this role, parties’ decision-
internally inclusive decision-making procedures. Given making structures and processes should provide opportunities
the diversity of parties’ circumstances and political for individual citizens to influence the choices that parties
outlooks, there is no single, discrete set of “best practices” offer to voters. These opportunities will help citizens expand
for intra-party governance. Party leaders ought instead their civic skills, and inclusive processes can boost the
to judiciously consider the practical effects of internally legitimacy of the alternatives they produce. In this way, party
democratic party procedures and assess their respective institutions can perform useful educative functions while
merits. also transferring power to a broader sector of society.
In Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT) governed a one-party state from the 1950s through the late 1980s. With the end of
military rule in 1987, and the rise of new opposition parties, the KMT was challenged to adopt new ways of holding
onto an electoral mandate. In 1989, the party introduced closed primaries to select candidates for that year’s legislative
elections. The change was pressed for by the party’s national leader, but it was subsequently blamed for contributing to
the party’s loss. Two factors played a role in this: First, the change removed the selection power from local factions; these
factions retaliated by withholding their support if their preferred candidates failed to gain the nomination. Second, the
party members who participated in these primaries turned out to be more conservative than the party’s potential electorate;
as a result, the candidates they chose were not as appealing to voters as they could have been. In the wake of this defeat,
the KMT changed its selection procedures several more times, developing procedures that included roles for individual
members and local party factions, but that also gave the central party latitude to override local choices to provide more
“balanced” slates.1
This is a powerful view, one that differs from what is Another possible divergence between the democratic
sometimes called the “responsible party” view of government. logics of process and outcome follows from the supposition
In this alternative model, parties’ essential contribution to that those who take the trouble to participate in processes
democracy is to offer clear and distinct electoral choices so such as party primaries may be more ideologically fervent
that voters can give their representatives a mandate by which than the bulk of a party’s supporters. If so, candidates selected
to govern, and can subsequently hold them accountable if in this procedurally democratic way may correspond less to
they fail to deliver on promises. From this outcome-oriented voters’ general preferences than would, for instance, a slate
perspective, parties’ organizational structures should be chosen by party bosses who are paying attention to opinion
judged above all in terms of how well they help the parties polls. According to this scenario, procedures that enhance
choose policies and personnel that reflect the preferences of intra-party democracy would, paradoxically, produce
their broader electorates. legislatures that are less reflective of the electorate as a whole.
These models are not necessarily incompatible. Advocates Of course, whether such an outcome would be likely to
of intra-party democracy would argue that their favored emerge depends in part on whether those who participate in
techniques more than meet the “outcomes test”—that parties party life really are politically different than other party
which are more inclusive toward their supporters also offer supporters. Throughout the past century, politicians and
the voters better choices, because such parties are more likely political analysts have suspected that party activists tend to
to be open to new ideas and new personnel, and less likely hold more extreme political views than the rest of a party’s
to concentrate on retaining or enhancing the power of a supporters. This has led many to think that maximizing the
handful of party leaders. Skeptics might agree up to a point, influence of members could potentially reduce a party’s
but may warn that too much democratization could overly electoral appeal, because they will drive the party away from
dilute the power of a party’s inner leadership and make it the more moderate positions that attract other potential
difficult for that party to keep its electoral promises. For supporters.3 But whether this tradeoff actually exists is an
instance, depending on how they are structured, inclusive open question. Although research on this point has not been
candidate selection procedures can weaken the cohesiveness definitive, the assumption behind it has proved remarkably
of legislative parties, because national party leaders may lose enduring. Yet even if it were true that the most active
the power to deny re-nomination or re-election to rogue members are more politically “fundamentalist” than the
members.2 This is just one example of how changes in internal majority of party voters, the effects of democratizing reforms
processes can have direct or indirect effects on political would still depend on the point from which such reforms
outcomes. start. For instance, moving from elite control to procedures
THE GREEN PARTY IN GERMANY: THE PERILS OF TOO MUCH INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY?
Formally founded as a political party in 1980, the Green Party in Germany emerged out of the milieu shaped by the
social-protest movements of the 1970s. From the beginning, the party was committed to developing a new organizational
style, one that left as much power as possible with the “grassroots,” and in which the party’s officeholders were subordinate
to the party, and not vice versa. One early manifestation of these principles was the widespread use of party meetings to
set party policies on various issues. Such meetings, generally held on a local or regional level, were often open to all party
supporters, not just paid-up party members. Given that only a small proportion of party members would attend these
meetings, it was not unusual to have a small group of committed individuals push through resolutions that were
unrepresentative of (or even embarrassing to) the wider party. After several years of experience with this, state Green
parties mostly changed their rules to place less weight on all-member meetings, and more on delegate conventions. They
also began to exclude non-members from decision making.5
In 1983, Argentina overthrew its military dictatorship and reestablished an electoral democracy. One of the early acts of
the newly elected Congress was the 1985 adoption of a Parties Law requiring parties to have formal rules for internal
governance and to use democratic elections to fill party-leadership posts. The Parties Law does not require parties to use
primaries to select candidates. Yet parties have increasingly turned to this method to select candidates for state and
national elections, although the methods that respective parties have used vary from election to election. Most parties
limit participation in their party-run primaries to registered members, though some open them up not only to party
members but also to those unaffiliated with other parties.9
as written rules in determining which are the more coveted see in greater detail below, how changes in inclusiveness affect
positions within a party, and it generally takes at least several these other aspects largely depends on which mechanisms
elections to create a base of loyal and organized supporters. are used to expand inclusiveness.
So higher institutionalization is not something that can be
instantly imposed, nor is it necessarily something that all
Implementing Intra-Party Democracy
party leaders would want to promote. Those who aspire to
build lasting party structures and loyalties may back measures What are some of the ways of expanding inclusiveness
to formalize rules that can help to transfer personal loyalties in party procedures, and what are some of the practical
into party loyalties, thereby strengthening party considerations associated with such techniques? It is
institutionalization, but in weakly institutionalized parties, impossible to give a complete inventory of the many ways in
many leaders—particularly those with strong personal which parties have sought to incorporate supporters within
followings—may view institutionalization as a threat to their their basic decision structures, but it is a bit easier to outline
own power. some of the primary choices that parties must make when
The terms inclusiveness, centralization, and implementing the more common forms of intra-party
institutionalization can help describe organizational democracy. These choices fall under three main headings:
differences among parties, as well as characterize changes selecting party candidates, selecting party leaders, and
over time within individual parties. These terms should not, defining policy positions.
however, be thought of as binary labels. Instead, we can think
of them as describing scales along which parties range, being
Selecting Candidates
more or less inclusive, centralized, or institutionalized.
Thinking of parties in these terms gives us a more precise Recruiting and selecting candidates is a crucial task for
vocabulary for describing what we mean when we talk about parties, because parties’ profiles during elections, and while
the expansion of democracy within parties. Organizational in office, are largely determined by which candidates are
changes that expand intra-party democracy will, almost by chosen and where their loyalties lie. Parties that want to
definition, increase inclusiveness, but what constitutes a include a wide circle of supporters in this process generally
“democratizing” change in any specific case depends on where rely on one of two devices: either a direct ballot of eligible
the party is initially located along the “inclusiveness” supporters, often called a “primary” election, or else
spectrum. Furthermore, to evaluate the impact of changes nomination by some kind of party assembly. The latter can
in inclusiveness, it is important to recognize that these be an assembly of the whole (a “caucus”) or an assembly of
changes generally do not happen in isolation; they are likely representatives chosen for this purpose.
to affect other aspects of the organization also, including Whichever procedure is used, parties must decide who is
levels of centralization and institutionalization. As we will eligible to participate. Generally, parties limit participation
contests. Such rules are intended to ensure that candidates parties have gone even further and implemented the “zipper
are well qualified as both campaigners and representatives of principle,” meaning that lists are constructed in accordance
party principles. They can also make it more difficult for with a strict male-female alternation. Other systems for
those who do not support party policies somehow to “steal” ensuring diversity may allocate seats according to region,
nominations and embarrass the party. (A notorious instance ethnicity, or religious community. Such quota systems aim
of what happens in a party without such a safeguard occurred to produce candidate lists that are “balanced” in ways
in the U.S. state of Louisiana in 1991, when voters in a considered appropriate to the specific political situation.
Republican primary nominated David Duke as the party’s Slate-balancing measures may be more difficult to insert into
gubernatorial candidate. Party leaders could personally decentralized selection processes in districts with few
repudiate the candidate, an outspoken white supremacist and candidates, but such measures are certainly possible. For
former Ku Klux Klan member, but they had no way of example, in 1993, the British Labour Party adopted a system
denying him the use of the party label.) Of course, rules that of “one-member, one-vote” procedures for district-level
limit choices are somewhat at odds with the idea of making candidate primaries. At the same time, the party conference
selection processes more inclusive. If rules for vetting also decided that half of the party’s vacant parliamentary seats,
candidates are overused, they can become tools with which including half of the winnable seats, would be filled by
party leaders may strengthen their own internal power bases. candidates chosen from all-female short lists. In other words,
Some rules limit selectors’ choices in a different way, by some districts were told that they could pick any pre-
imposing demographic quotas on the types of candidates approved potential candidate, as long as the candidate they
who must be chosen. For instance, in some countries that chose was a woman. This system (replaced in 1996 by the
vote using list system proportional representation, certain much weaker mandate of gender-balanced short lists)
parties have required that their selection processes must illustrates one way in which decentralized choices (process
produce gender diversity among some minimum number of goals) can be engineered to fit with other national aims
the top names on the party list. This requirement can be (outcome goals).
mandated as part of the initial selection process, or it can be Parties adopt such systems of constrained choice because
added as a remedial action, for instance, by stipulating that even if voters in party primaries are alert to the value of having
if the primary ballot does not place a woman as one of the balanced slates, it would be almost impossible for them to
party’s top three candidates, the top female vote-getter will cast their ballots in a way that guaranteed a balanced
be promoted to the number-three spot on the party list. Some outcome. Inserting demographic “safeguards” is an attempt
requirement that members actively participate in party life. subverting them—a possibility that can be of particular
The level of expected financial commitment may reflect the concern when members are given powers to choose leaders
party’s financial needs and the availability of other sources and set policies. As a result, and somewhat paradoxically,
of funding: Parties that rely on supporters to fund important parties that seek to devolve decisions to members (increasing
activities may need to set their dues levels comparatively high. inclusiveness) may simultaneously tighten central controls
And parties that impose dues requirements may scale these over the matter of who is allowed to be a member (increasing
to different income levels, and generally offer reduced rates centralization).
to students, the unemployed, and others for whom the dues Membership centralization. As this problem suggests,
may represent a barrier to membership. But even parties that another question related to the administration of a
do not need members’ funds to finance their work may membership-based political party is: Who is in charge of
nevertheless have a dues requirement, because they want maintaining records and verifying eligibility? Primary
members to show their commitment by subscribing. responsibility may rest with local party officials, or with
Requiring regular (monthly or annual) dues payments also regional or national party authorities. Parties that are trying
gives parties a good way of distinguishing who is, and who to develop locally active membership organizations may rely
is not, a member in good standing. on local organizations to take the lead in recruitment and
Generally, would-be members must in some way apply enrollment. The locus of control over access to membership
for membership. In more highly institutionalized parties, may depend on the distribution of power within the party
application procedures may involve official bodies that can organization (how centralized is it in other areas?) and also
accept or reject applicants, and which can expel members on the organizational capacity of the central party (is it
judged to be harmful to the party’s interest. Other parties equipped to maintain a central membership database?).
may be more informal, such as the British Conservatives in When membership administration is handled solely by local
the 1950s and 1960s, whose large reported membership parties, national parties may lack members’ current contact
figures reflected the practices of local party associations— information. They then have no way of directly mailing
who in turn generally counted all donors as members, information (or ballots) to members, and must rely on the
whether or not they indicated any interest in being considered local parties to report accurate figures, distribute ballots and
“members.” other official communications, and resolve disputes about
Presumably, the more difficult the membership who is and who is not eligible to participate in party decision-
requirements, and the more formal the procedures, the making processes.
smaller the membership is likely to be as a ratio of the party’s Decentralization of this kind may make for a more
supporters. Partly for this reason, parties can hesitate to raise democratic party in one sense: Control over access to
dues rates, fearing that this would scare away members. But membership does not rest with the central leadership alone.
parties generally maintain some obstacles to membership, However, such decentralization does carry the risk that
in order to discourage opponents from “infiltrating” and different areas will use different procedures for determining
to enroll on the Internet, or by contacting a well-advertised democracy.” These models help clarify some of the different
national party address, rather than requiring those who challenges and internal stresses caused by democratizing
are interested to seek out the party’s local offices. reforms. Some of these models have been more characteristic
In any case, whatever the reasons for supporters to join of certain historical eras than others, but none of them are
and remain enrolled in a political party, parties need to have entirely obsolescent: Elements of all the models can be found
a critical mass of members in order for intra-party democracy in contemporary parties in new as well as established
to be effective. The more people who participate, the less democracies. While no individual party perfectly
likely it is that procedures will be hijacked by small groups corresponds to any of these types, recognizing a party’s
of extremists, and the more likely it is that outcomes will general organizational starting point can give us some clues
deliver a mandate respected by the party’s wider circle of about the likely effects of organizational democratization:
possible voters. Luckily, expanded opportunities to participate Which groups are likely to benefit, and what types of
within the party may themselves help boost membership, structure may need to be strengthened or changed to make
both by making it more attractive to people who are politically internal democratization work?
engaged, and by giving existing party members and would- Dominant leader. Parties dominated by a single leader
be candidates greater incentives to recruit their like-minded generally construct their appeal around the popularity,
friends and supporters. perceived integrity, and sometimes financial resources, of that
individual. This leader articulates and embodies the party’s
programmatic aspirations, and the party may even take its
MODELS OF PARTY ORGANIZATION
name (or at least its nickname) from him or her. Many
As all of this makes clear, parties have adopted a wide successful parties in contemporary democracies fit this
range of approaches to their internal organization, and they description, either originating as or becoming (at least for a
are constantly experimenting with new structures and new while) the vehicle for a single dominant leader (for example,
procedures to cope with internal and external pressures. So Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia in Italy). In such parties, the
it is hard to generalize about how democratizing membership leader may be self-selected (perhaps as the party founder),
will affect a party’s overall structure. However, using the ideas may be anointed by an outgoing leader, or may come to the
of inclusiveness, centralization, and institutionalization fore as a result of demonstrated electoral appeal. He or she
presented above, we can distinguish five common may gain the position with the formal endorsement of a party
organizational models: (1) the “leader-dominated” party; (2) conference, but in practice the leader can dominate party
the “party of notables,” sometimes called the “cadre” party; decisions while holding a variety of formal positions within
(3) the party of “individual representation”; (4) the the organization—or even while holding none at all. Such
“corporatist” party; and (5) the party built on “basis parties may use local branches and party assemblies to
Although many of these reforms were quickly reversed, enough of them were sustained to cause significant shifts in
power within the party. State governors gained a much greater role in the nomination of the PRI’s presidential candidate
for the 2000 election, but in turn, governors became even more dependent on the local party bosses who controlled
nominations for state-level offices. The PRI decentralized some of these processes, and also expanded the circle of
participation for selecting legislative candidates. In some locales, the more open selection contests aggravated party
divisions, prompting groups to campaign against the PRI or even join a different party. As well, some of the beneficiaries
of these decentralizing changes were local party bosses who were more interested in shoring up their own power than in
carrying through plans to broaden the party’s appeal through internal democratization. Even so, ahead of the 2000
election, the PRI continued its experiments with intra-party democracy by holding a presidential primary open to all
voters. This strategy was not, however, enough for the PRI to hold onto the presidency, and the party was defeated for
the first time in 71 years.14
More recently, a number of traditionally corporatist illustrate how corporatist principles, which have always given
parties have begun to downplay group representation in favor priority to group representation, were likely ultimately to
of a more direct mobilization of individual supporters. Such conflict with the “one-member, one-vote” principles of
changes have come in the context of efforts to broaden the individual representation.
parties’ support base, something that may seem more urgent Basis democracy. In recent years, some party reformers
when traditional constituent groups (like churches and trade have become critical of representative arrangements based
unions) show a diminishing ability to mobilize political on either individual or group rights, and have advocated
support. At the same time, in some parties, certain factions what might be described as “basis democracy” (after the
have tried to extend the corporatist principle beyond the Green parties’ intentions of representing their party “bases”)
representation of economic sectors, arguing that democracy or “plebiscitary democracy.” This is a model founded on
requires that other groups should have guaranteed highly inclusive procedures, such as the referendum
representation in party structures—so as to ensure that a (“plebiscite”), which prioritizes broad participation in both
range of voices are heard. For instance, many parties have deliberation and decision making. Those who favor such
considered introducing reserved candidacies or executive structures argue that party organizations should provide a
council seats for members of demographic groups that have more direct role for party supporters in important decisions.
traditionally been underrepresented in party ranks (for This model came to prominence among the “new left” parties
example, women, younger people, or ethnic minorities). that emerged in Europe in the 1980s, and it is these parties
When granted, such privileges for favored sub-groups must that have garnered the greatest experience with such
then be reconciled with preexisting arrangements for structures. In many cases, parties that experimented with
distributing power within the party. These complications the procedures of basis democracy found that these