2017 11-9 3780-4 Exhibit 1 Moore Declaration-2
2017 11-9 3780-4 Exhibit 1 Moore Declaration-2
2017 11-9 3780-4 Exhibit 1 Moore Declaration-2
Exhibit
1
Declaration of Stephen K.
Moore
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received my law enforcement and investigator training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA in
1983-84 and worked for the Bureau for nearly 25 years until my retirement in 2008. During the
international terrorism.
2. From 1996 through September 2001, I was assigned to the FBI's Los Angeles
office and worked on counter-terrorism investigations and highly classified intelligence matters.
3. Within days of the 9/11 attacks, I was placed in charge of the Los Angeles task
force team on PENTTBOM, the FBI's investigation of the 9/11 attacks. The team that I directed
and supervised included at times over 400 team members and was one of the largest components
of the FBI's investigation. My work with the Los Angeles PENTTBOM team continued through
2003.
4. A key part of our work was to investigate the activities in Southern California of
the first two al Qaeda hijackers to arrive in the United States, Nawaf al-Hazmi ("Hazmi") and
Khalid al-Mihdhar ("Mihdhar"), who came to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, stayed there for
several weeks, and then relocated to San Diego. A central focus of that work was to identify the
persons who provided Hazmi and Mihdhar with financial and logistical support.
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made all strategic investigative decisions on our case, and participated in the daily "All S.A.C."
investigative conference calls, which included the head of every U.S. FBI office. I conducted
daily briefings for my task force and provided information on a regular basis to FBI headquarters
for Director Mueller's daily briefing to the President. I prepared or reviewed the PENTTBOM
concluded that diplomatic and intelligence personnel of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia knowingly
provided material support to the two 9/11 hijackers and facilitated the 9111 plot. My colleagues
Saudi Arabia Ministry of Islamic Affairs who was granted diplomatic status by Saudi Arabia and
posted at Saudi Arabia's Los Angeles Consulate. Thumairy also served as an Imam at the King
Fahad Mosque, which was funded by the Saudi royal family and named after the Saudi King.
We learned that Thumairy controlled that Mosque both religiously and fmancially. He had a
reputation for extreme anti-U.S. views and was aligned and inspired a radical faction inside the
Mosque. 8. We determined that Thumairy and another Saudi employee who we believed was
a Saudi intelligence agent, Omar al-Bayoumi ("Bayoumi"), were active participants in a terror
cell associated withal Qaeda that provided substantial financial and logistical support to Hazmi
and Mihdhar.
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9. Based on our investigation we determined that at the time Thumairy provided that
assistance, he knew that Hazmi and Mihdhar were al Qaeda terrorists on a pre-planned complex
mission in the United States that would involve the use of airplanes.
1 0. We learned that the al Qaeda plotters were methodical in their preparations for the
attacks and would not have sent Hazmi and Mihdhar to Los Angeles without a support structure
in place. It would be essential that Hazmi and Mihdhar were given cover and properly handled
upon their arrival. Neither Hazmi nor Mihdhar could speak English. They were completely
unfamiliar with life and customs in the United States and lacked even the most basic skills to
begin pilot training. They would have had zero chance for success without a support structure
1 1. We found that Thumairy was the primary point of contact for Hazmi and Mihdhar
in Los Angeles. We concluded that Thumairy was aware in advance of their arrival and, through
the King Fahad Mosque, had already provided a place for them to stay in Los Angeles.
Thumairy. This included personal visits ofBayoumi to the King Fahad Mosque. We found that
Thumairy and Bayoumi had a history of numerous phone communications during the same
period that Bayoumi and others were providing Hazmi and Mihdhar with essential support.
13. We determined that Bayoumi was instructed to visit Thumairy at the Saudi
Consulate and that on February 1, 2000, Bayoumi came from his home in San Diego to the
Consulate. We learned that Bayoumi drove his car up to the Consulate's non-public gate, where
he was buzzed in by Saudi personnel and parked in the Consulate's interior private garage. We
determined that Bayoumi and Thumairy held a private meeting inside the non-public offices of
the Consulate and that the purpose of this meeting was for Thumairy to direct Bayoumi
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regarding the assistance needed by Hazmi and Mihdhar and to confirm the plans for a lunch
meeting that Thumairy had arranged for Bayoumi, Hazmi and Mihdhar at the "Mediterranean
14. Immediately after his meeting with Thumairy, Bayoumi first mistakenly went to
another "Mediterranean" establishment which he thought was the one that Thumairy had told
him to meet Hazmi and Mihdhar. Realizing his mistake, Bayoumi then found the correct nearby
restaurant where Hazmi and Mihdhar were waiting as planned. They had lunch with Bayoumi
and thereafter Bayoumi took Hazmi and Mihdhar under his care. The investigation detailed how
Bayoumi brought the two men to San Diego, helped them find, lease and pay for an apartment
near to where Bayoumi lived, provided them with funds, assimilation and safety and introduced
them to various others including Mohdar Abdullah, who provided additional assistance to them,
helping them with identification, obtaining a car, language skills, additional help with
15. Our investigation learned that on June 9, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar drove from
San Diego to Los Angeles with Mohdar Abdullah and went to the King Fahad Mosque for a
meeting to discuss their plans, likely with Thumairy and others. We identified the Los Angeles
motel where Hazmi, Mihdhar and Abdullah stayed overnight and how they dropped off Mihdhar
the following day at Los Angeles International Airport for his flight home. We then learned that
Hazmi returned to the King Fahad Mosque before returning to San Diego.
16. We also learned that Thumairy invited Hazmi to lead the prayers at the King
Fahad Mosque where Thumairy was an Imam. We determined that this was a significant and
unusual honor for Thumairy to bestow on Hazmi, a young Saudi visitor who was not even a
member of the Mosque, and showed that Thumairy had an awareness of Hazmi' s mission.
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intelligence officer based on numerous witness statements; the fact that he was paid by Saudi
Arabia with laundered funds in a manner typical of clandestine arrangements used by a foreign
intelligence agency; his regular videotaping of people and events; and the consistent patterns of
18. I have read the statement in the 9/11 Commission Report that "we have not found
evidence that Thumairy provided assistance to the two operatives {Hazmi and Mihdhar]." In
light of the proof assembled in our investigation, this statement is incorrect. There was clearly
"an unlikely candidate for clandestine involvement with Islamist extremists." Again, this
statement is incorrect. Based on the proof in our investigation, Bayoumi himself was a
20. It is noteworthy that both Bayoumi and Thumairy left the United States several
weeks before the 9111 attacks. Thumairy returned to the United States on December 24, 2001.
In 2002, we sought to question Thumairy regarding his involvement with Hazmi, Mihdhar and
the 9/11 plot but were unable to do so before he left the country.
enforcement interview conducted by the actual agents who investigated him, including myself.
22. We believed that Thumairy and Bayoumi were directed to assist Hazmi and
Mihdhar. This was a key subject that we wanted to raise in questioning Thumairy to explore his
employment and the superiors that he reported to inside the Los Angeles Consulate, the
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23. Much of the PENTTBOM investigation remains classified. I have taken care in
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
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