5 Salcedo VS Bollozos

5/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 623

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disgraceful and
immoral conduct against respondent Selima B. Omaga is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta and Abad, JJ.,

concur.
Complaint dismissed.
Note.—While it may be just for an individual to incur

indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a public
officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the
occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably
impair the image of the public office. (Tan vs. Sermonia,
595 SCRA 1 [2009])
——o0o——
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236. July 5, 2010.*

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3083-RTJ.)
RUBEN N. SALCEDO, complainant, vs. JUDGE GIL G.
BOLLOZOS, respondent.
Judges; Writ of Amparo; Had the respondent judge read

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, he would
have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to
“extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof,” not to concerns that are purely property and commercial
in nature.—We agree with the complainant that the respondent
judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor.
Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more
closely, the respondent judge would have realized that the writ, in
its present form, only applies to
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
28
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017209d48a481dd75b9d003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/20
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Salcedo vs. Bollozos
“extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats

thereof.” The present case involves concerns that are purely
property and commercial in nature—concerns that we have
previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.
Same; Administrative Complaints; Only judicial errors
tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively
sanctioned—errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.—The errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to
the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in
the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a
judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.
He cannot be subjected to liability—civil, criminal, or
administrative—for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors
tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively
sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a judge in
the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies.
Same; Same; Disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary—an inquiry into their administrative
liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other
available remedies have been settled.—The propriety of the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the
present administrative case. The proper recourse for the
complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the final
judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this Court under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v. Diaz, 412 SCRA 573 (2003),
we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against judges do not
complement, supplement, or substitute judicial remedies, whether
ordinary or extraordinary; an inquiry into their administrative
liability arising from judicial acts may be made only after other
available remedies have been settled.
29
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 29
Same; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Bias and

Partiality; The fact that the respondent judge and a lawyer of a
party are members of the Masonic fraternity does not justify or
prove that the former acted with bias and partiality—bias and
partiality can never be presumed and must be proved with clear
and convincing evidence; Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be
inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party.—We
note, too, that although the respondent judge erred in issuing the
Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did, that there is no evidence
on record that supports the complainant’s allegation that the
issuance was tainted with manifest bias and partiality, bad faith,
or gross ignorance of the law. The fact that the respondent judge
and Atty. Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does
not justify or prove that the former acted with bias and partiality.
Bias and partiality can never be presumed and must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence. While palpable error may be
inferred from respondent judge’s issuance of the Writ of Amparo,
there is no evidence on record that would justify a finding of
partiality or bias. The complainant’s allegation of partiality will
not suffice in the absence of a clear and convincing proof that will
overcome the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed
justice according to law and evidence, without fear or favor.
Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because
the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge
administratively accountable simply because he erred in his
judgment has never been the intent of the law; reasonable
competence and good faith judgments, not complete infallibility,
are what the law requires.
Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A patent disregard of
simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.—The more significant issue in this case is
the complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against the
respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and
well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges
are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it
properly in good faith. They are likewise expected to keep abreast
of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of
the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him.
We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to the level
of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We
take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ
of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule
30
on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three months
(The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24,
2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot be said to have
been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ
of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that
time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known
rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of
the law.
Same; Same; Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence.”—We take this occasion, however, to remind
the respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.” A judge is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. He owes to the public and to this Court the duty to be
proficient in the law. He is expected to keep abreast of laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just,
correct, and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must
do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness,
impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are men who have
mastery of the principles of law and who discharge their duties in
accordance with law. We mentioned all these to emphasize to the
respondent judge the need to be more judicious and circumspect
in the issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of Amparo.
Same; Administrative Complaints; When the complainant
relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to
substantiate his claim, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit.—We also reiterate that in an
administrative proceeding, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.
We cannot give credence to charges based on mere suspicion or
speculation. Hence, when the complainant relies on mere
conjectures and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim,
as in this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed
for lack of merit.
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VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 31

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the Law.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated

August 29, 2008, filed by Ruben N. Salcedo (complainant),
charging Judge Gil G. Bollozos (respondent judge),
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan
de Oro City, with Grave Misconduct and Ignorance of the
Law in the handling of SPEC. PROC. No. 2008-009,
entitled “Jose Tanmalack, Jr., represented by Jocelyn
Tanmalack Tan v. Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3,
Agora, Lapasan, Cagayan De Oro City, and Insp. Wylen
Rojo.”
The Factual Background
The complaint arose from a verified handwritten

petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of
Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose Tanmalack, Jr. against
the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora, Lapasan,
Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector Wylen Rojo. The
complainant alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of
land (disputed property) covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. O-740 and registered in the name of Patricio
Salcedo. The disputed property is about 126,112 square
meters wide and is situated in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City.
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the
complainant (together with his niece Rebecca R. Lumbay
and his nephew Alan Jose P. Roa) was supervising an on-
going construction over the disputed property, Tanmalack
and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves
inside the fenced premises of the disputed property. The
complainant averred that Tanmalack and his companions
harassed and threatened
32

to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack

uttered defamatory statements and accused him of land-
grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions

occupied the property and destroyed building materials
such as G.I. sheets, lumber and other construction
materials.
The complainant forthwith reported the incident to the
nearby police station. The police promptly responded and
arrested Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning.
That same afternoon at around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack,
represented by his sister, Jocelyn Tanmalack Tan, filed the
petition1 on his
_______________
1 The petition states in full:

June 23, 2008
Hon. Judge Gil Bollozos or the Hon. Executive Judge
Jose Escobido or the Vice Exec. Judge in his absence
RTC-Mis. Or.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Petition for Writ of Amparo
Sir:
Jose Tan Malack Jr., is presently detained at the Agora police precinct
No. 3, under the command of Insp. Wylen Rojo.
Jose was “held in custody” because he exercised self-help in preventing
squatters from putting up improvements inside their titled property in the
name of his sister. Property is titled under TCT No. T-162749.
1) The petitioner is Filipino and a resident of c/o Jocelyn TM Tan at
Capitol Subd., Osmeña Ave., Cag. De Oro City.
2) The police officers under officer Rojo are the respondents, as well as
the alleged squatters.
The petitioner is under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police
stating that he is not arrested but merely “in custody.”
Wherefore, the prayer is to ask the Court to issue a writ of Amparo or
habeas corpus to direct his immediate release.
JAN. 23, 2008. Cagayan de Oro City.
(Sdg.)
Jocelyn Tan
Malack Tan
Sister
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VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 33

behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for

employing “self-help in preventing squatters from putting
up improvements in their titled property.”
Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the

circumstances surrounding the filing of the petition and
how it came to be referred to the respondent judge’s sala,
as follows:
“1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was

received by the Office regarding the procedure in filing a petition
for a Writ of Amparo. We gave the information that the
established procedure is to assign cases to the different branches
by raffling or in urgent cases, by a special raffle upon proper
motions. But since the office has not received any case of that
nature yet, and as the schedule of raffling will still be in the
afternoon of the next day, it will be referred to the Executive
Judge for instruction and or appropriate action;
2. That since the Executive Judge was on leave, I went to
consult the 1st Vice Executive Judge Evelyn Gamotin Nery. Since
Judge Nery was busy at that time, I went to see 2nd Vice
Executive Judge Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo;
_______________
I Jocelyn TM Tan, hereby certify that the above statements are true and correct
of my own personal knowledge and based on true records.
I have also not commenced any similar action in any body and I endeavor to
inform the Court immediately w/in 5 days if I know of such an action exists. That I
have not forum-shopped.
JAN. 23, 2008. Cagayan de Oro City.
(Sdg.)
Doc. No. 14 ATTY. FRANCIS U. KU
Page No. 3 Notary Public
Book No. 54 Until December 31, 2009
Series of 2008 IBP Lifetime No. 00548
PTR No. 1653333; 3 Jan, 2008
Roll No. 36666
Cagayan de Oro City
34

3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be

adopted under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC);
4. That the issue if any judge can immediately act on the
petition was not clearly stated in the Rule but if the case will be
referred to her as the 2nd Vice Executive Judge, she will be
willing to look at the petition;
5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00

P.M. already, direct from the chamber of Judge Lucagbo, I found
out that a Petition for Writ of Amparo was filed at around 4:45
P.M. as stamped in the petition;
6. That since I was out of the office, the Docket Clerk in
charge, Mr. Rudy Exclamador, referred the case to the
Administrative Officer Mary Lyn Charisse Lagamon;
7. That thinking I was no longer around as the personnel to
whom I left the information that I was going to the sala of 1st
Vice Executive Judge Nery was not able to inform the Admin.
Officer of my whereabouts, Mr. Exclamador was instructed by her
to refer the case to you [referring to the respondent judge];
8. That upon learning of the fact, I immediately called Mr.
Exclamador and Ms. Lagamon to explain why they referred the
case to your sala without any instruction from me;
9. That they said that they are of the honest belief that I was
no longer around; that the lawyer was insisting to refer the case
immediately to a judge since it is already 5:00 P.M. and
considering the novelty, urgency and importance of the case, and
fearing that no judge will be left to act on the petition if they still
discuss what to do, Mr. Exclamador, with the concurrence of
Admin. Officer Lagamon, referred the case to you since your sala
was the nearest to our office, it being adjacent to your court;
10. That there is nobody from this Office who brought the
handwritten petition to Judge Lucagbo nor was there any
instruction from her to any of the personnel to have the petition
conform to a form acceptable to the court, such fact was confirmed
by Judge Lucagbo;
35
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 35

11. That the office only acted what it deemed best under the
circumstances and was not motivated by any ill motive or
malice.”2
Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory

questions propounded to Tanmalack’s representative and
counsel, the respondent judge immediately issued a Writ of
Amparo dated January 23, 2008, directing “the police
officers of Agora Police Station 3 or Insp. Wylen Rojo x x x
to release immediately upon receipt of [the] writ but not
later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr.,
to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku.” The respondent
judge also directed the police officers to file their verified
return to the petition within five (5) working days, together
with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of

the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Around 5:30 p.m., the Writ of Amparo was served upon
SPO3 Aener O. Adajar, PNP Chief Investigator. At six
o’clock in the evening of that same day, the police released
Tanmalack to the custody of Atty. Francis Ku.
In his complaint, the complainant questions the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he claims had been
unusually issued with haste. The complainant claims that
the handwritten petition did not give any ground to
warrant the issuance of the Writ of Amparo; that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion, bias,
and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules
and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the
letter-petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The
complainant also alleges that the respondent judge
“accommodated” the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack’s counsel) are
members of the Masonic fraternity.
The respondent judge filed his Comment dated March
30, 2009, in compliance with the directive of the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). In his defense, he alleged:
_______________
2 Comment of Judge Gil G. Bollozos, March 30, 2009, pp. 1-2.
36

(a) [W]hen he received the petition from the Office of the Clerk of Court,
he had no option but to exercise his judicial duty without any bias or
partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioner’s counsel is a
fraternal brother (Mason);
(b) [A]lthough the petition is for the issuance of both writ of amparo
and writ of habeas corpus, he deemed it more in consonance with the
[Rule on the Writ of Amparo];
(c) [I]t was not improper even if the x x x petition was not raffled, and
was immediately assigned to his sala by the Office of the Clerk of
Court, since Par. 2, Sec. 3 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC states that any
judge of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) can issue a writ and the said
Sec. 3 further states that it can be filed on any day and at any time;
(d) [T]he person who filed the petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack
who was detained at the Agora Police Station, Cagayan de Oro City;
that the issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because
the alleged illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late
afternoon of January 23, 2008, which was a Friday, and that if the
Court would not act on the petition, the detainee would certainly
spend the night in jail;
(e) [T]he petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper
because Section 5 of the SC Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only
requires that the same be signed and verified; that he found the
petition sufficient in form and in substance;
(f) [A]lthough the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
issue, he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioner’s
representative and their counsel, thus, the following information
were elicited:
1) That the property of petitioner’s family, which is under their
possession and Tanmalack registered under TCT No. T-1627491,
was intruded by some persons who wanted to fence the area and
put up improvements by constructing “shanties” thereon;
2) That when petitioner Mr. Tanmalack prevented the intrusion it
resulted to heated arguments and alter-
37
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 37

cations which prompted him to go to the police station to

report the incident and be blottered;
3) That when Mr. Tanmalack arrived at the police station in the
late afternoon of January 23, 2008 in order to air his complaint,
the intruders came and introduced themselves as the owners of
the property;
4) That when Police Officer Rojo (Rojo) heard the version of these
intruders and despite the protestations of petitioner and his
relatives, the police did not anymore allow Mr. Tanmalack to leave
the police station; and,
5) That petitioner’s counsel called up Rojo to secure the immediate
release of his client from police custody but to no avail;
(g) [A]fter he assiduously evaluated the aforestated facts, as well as the
allegations in the petition, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his
judicial function, found that the same warranted the issuance of the
writ; the arrest of Mr. Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not
present in the area where the alleged incident happened, so that the
statements of the complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) would be
hearsay;
(h) [I]n the Writ of Amparo the respondents were directed to file a
verified return pursuant to the rules; during the summary hearing of
the petition on 25 January 2008, it was only Rojo who appeared, the
alleged complainants (Salcedo, Lumbay and Roa) who caused the
detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by

the Court, gave the following answers:
1) That he would no longer file his Answer (which should be
a verified return) on the complaint considering that the
petitioner was already released;
2) That he confirmed that it was the petitioner who came
first to the police station to complain, followed by the
person who wanted to fence the property; the conflict
between the petitioner and the other persons is on a
property dispute, of which it was petitioner who is in
possession; and
38

3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and

neither did he detain him but only he could not release the
petitioner because of the complaint and for further
evaluation.
(i) [H]e noted that the police blotter did not state that petitioner
brought heavily armed men with him when he allegedly harassed the
complainant.
[(j) That in the summary hearing on January 25, 2008, the petitioner
as well as the respondent Rojo have arrived into an agreement that
the writ be considered permanent.]
The Report of the OCA
The OCA informed the Court that the case was already
ripe for resolution in a Report dated April 8, 2010, signed
by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and
Deputy Court Administrator Raul Bautista Villanueva.
The Report likewise presented a brief factual background
of the case.
The OCA recommended that the administrative
complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for
lack of merit. The recommendation was based on an
evaluation which reads:
EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, as in the instant case, or of a private
individual or entity. Whereas in other jurisdictions the writ covers
only actual violations, the Philippine version is more protective of
the right to life, liberty and security because it covers both actual
and threatened violations of such rights.
Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the
issuance of the writ of amparo was attended by irregularities. The
detainee’s sister who filed the petition is allowed under Section
2(b) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC).
Also, the petition was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court
“where the
39
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 39

act or omission was committed or where any of its elements

occurred.”
Respondent Judge, in whose sala the said petition was
assigned is deemed to have complied with his oath and judicial
duty when he ordered the issuance of the writ of amparo upon
determination that the right to liberty of Mr. Tanmalack was
being violated or threatened to be violated. These is no showing
that respondent Judge, in granting the petition for a writ of
amparo was motivated by bad faith, ignominy or ill will, thus,
herein complainant’s allegation that respondent Judge’s act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and authority, bias and
partiality, and grave disregard of the rules, deserves scant
consideration.
This Office agrees with respondent Judge’s observation that
“Rojo’s declaration not anymore to contest the petition and that he
(Rojo) did not arrest nor detain petitioner, but admitted that he
could not release the latter for further evaluation because of the
complaint is an admission that he deprived [or threatened to
deprive] Jose [Dy Tanmalack] of his liberty.”
Our Ruling
We concur with the OCA’s recommendation that

the administrative complaint against the respondent
judge be dismissed for lack of merit.
At the outset, we agree with the complainant that the
respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in
Tanmalack’s favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge
would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only
applies to “extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.”3 The present case involves concerns
that are purely
_______________
3 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
40

property and commercial in nature—concerns that we

have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of
Amparo.4 In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,5 we held:
“To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo—in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands—requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ
must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
“(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such
threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investi-
_______________
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances or threats thereof. [Emphasis supplied]
4 Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768.
5 Id., at pp. 784-785.
41
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 41

gating authority or individuals, as well as the manner

and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act
or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.”
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the
supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.”
In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to

have been issued by the respondent judge since
Tanmalack’s petition is fatally defective in substance and
content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of
“extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the
threats thereof.” The petition merely states that he is
“under threat of deprivation of liberty with the police
stating that he is not arrested but merely ‘in custody.’”6
Whether the respondent judge could be held
administratively liable for the error he committed in the
present case, is, however, a question we must answer in the
negative.
Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge
pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions. As a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to
liability—civil, criminal, or administrative—for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in
good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud,
dishonesty, gross ignorance,
_______________
6 Supra note 1.
42

bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be

administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors
committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through
judicial remedies.7
In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present
administrative case. The proper recourse for the
complainant should have been to file an appeal, from the
final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In Bello III v.
Diaz,8 we reiterated that disciplinary proceedings against
judges do not complement, supplement, or substitute
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary; an
inquiry into their administrative liability arising from
judicial acts may be made only after other available
remedies have been settled. We laid down the rationale for
the rule in Flores v. Abesamis,9 viz.:
“As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies

against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against
errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in
nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in
construction or application of procedural or substantive law or
legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and
appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities
which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are,
inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of
venue, as the case may be.
_______________
7 Planas v. Reyes, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1905, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA
146, 155.
8 A.M. No. MTJ-00-1311, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 573, 578.
9 A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302.
43
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 43

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of
judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-
requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of
the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal
nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been
exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of
criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific
modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments
or orders, on the theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him
“undue injury.” This is impermissible, as this Court has already
more than once ruled. Law and logic decree that
“administrative or criminal remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such
review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.”
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure or
influence from external forces or factors, they should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
they may make in the performance of their duties and functions;
and it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of
statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done within
the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith; and that
exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be had only if
“there be a final declaration by a competent court in some
appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character
of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also evidence
of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said
judgment or order” or under the stringent circumstances
set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.”10
We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred

in issuing the Writ of Amparo, we find, as the OCA did,
that
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 316-317.
44

there is no evidence on record that supports the

complainant’s allegation that the issuance was tainted with
manifest bias and partiality, bad faith, or gross ignorance
of the law. The fact that the respondent judge and Atty.
Francis Ku are members of the Masonic fraternity does not
justify or prove that the former acted with bias and
partiality. Bias and partiality can never be presumed and
must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. While
palpable error may be inferred from respondent judge’s
issuance of the Writ of Amparo, there is no evidence on
record that would justify a finding of partiality or bias. The
complainant’s allegation of partiality will not suffice in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof that will overcome
the presumption that the respondent judge dispensed
justice according to law and evidence, without fear or
favor.11
Likewise, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply
because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge
administratively accountable simply because he erred in
his judgment has never been the intent of the law;
reasonable competence and good faith judgments, not
complete infallibility, are what the law requires.
The more significant issue in this case is the
complainant’s charge of gross ignorance of the law against
the respondent judge.
A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known
rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance
with laws and procedural rules. They must know the law
and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise
expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a
judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble
office and great privilege vested in him.12

_______________
11 Supra note 7, p. 159.
12 Benito v. Balindong, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103 (Formerly OCA I.P.I.

No. 07-2664-RTJ), February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 41.
45
VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 45

We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise

to the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by
jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the
time he issued the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for
barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo
became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the
respondent judge cannot be said to have been fully
educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of
Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at
that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and
well-known rule that its patent disregard would constitute
gross ignorance of the law.
More importantly, for full liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or
actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties
must not only be found to be erroneous; it must be
established that he was motivated by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred or some other similar motive.13 In the present case,
the complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence
that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith and
bias or partiality in the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.
We take this occasion, however, to remind the
respondent judge that under Canon 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.” A judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-
settled authoritative doctrines. He owes to the public and
to this Court the duty to be proficient in the law. He is
expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing
jurisprudence. Judges must not only render just, correct,
and impartial decisions, resolutions, and orders, but must
do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
_______________
13 Visbal v. Vanilla, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1651 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.

04-1576-MTJ), April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 11.
46

fairness, impartiality, and integrity, for good judges are

men who have mastery of the principles of law and who
discharge their duties in accordance with law.14 We
mentioned all these to emphasize to the respondent judge
the need to be more judicious and circumspect in the
issuance of extraordinary writs such as the Writ of
Amparo.
We also reiterate that in an administrative proceeding,
the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations
in the complaint by substantial evidence.15 We cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion or speculation.
Hence, when the complainant relies on mere conjectures
and suppositions, and fails to substantiate his claim, as in
this case, the administrative complaint must be dismissed
for lack of merit.16
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
RESOLVES to DISMISS the administrative complaint
against Judge Gil G. Bollozos, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Cagayan de Oro City, for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Abad** and

Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Administrative complaint dismissed.
Notes.—A judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

and grave abuse of judicial authority if he precipitately
adjudges a person guilty of indirect contempt in utter
disregard of the
_______________
14 Id.
15 Licudine v. Saquilayan, A.M. No. P-02-1618, February 14, 2003, 396
SCRA 650, 656; Montes v. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1627, April 17, 2001,
356 SCRA 539, 545; Barbers v. Laguio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1568,
February 15, 2001, 351 SCRA 606, 634.
16 Supra note 7, p. 161.
** Designated additional Member of the Third Division effective May
17, 2010, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17, 2010.
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5/13/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 623

Carpio (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta and Abad, JJ.,

Note.—While it may be just for an individual to incur

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236. July 5, 2010.*

Judges; Writ of Amparo; Had the respondent judge read

28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Salcedo vs. Bollozos

“extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 29

Salcedo vs. Bollozos

Same; Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges; Bias and

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Salcedo vs. Bollozos

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 31

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

We pass upon the verified Letter-Complaint, dated

The Factual Background

The complaint arose from a verified handwritten

32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

to kill and to harm him and his workers; that Tanmalack

grabbing; and that Tanmalack and his companions

1 The petition states in full:

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 33

behalf while Tanmalack was detained by the police for

Clerk of Court Atty. Herlie Luis-Requerme narrated the

“1. In the late afternoon of January 23, 2008, a query was

34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3. That I clarified from Judge Lucagbo the procedure to be

5. That when I went back at the Office at a little past 5:00

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 35

Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory

with supporting affidavits, in conformity with Section 9 of

2 Comment of Judge Gil G. Bollozos, March 30, 2009, pp. 1-2.

36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 37

cations which prompted him to go to the police station to

detention of the petitioner were absent; P/Insp. Rojo, when asked by

38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

3) That he denied that he had arrested the petitioner and

The Report of the OCA

EVALUATION: The complaint is bereft of merit.

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 39

act or omission was committed or where any of its elements

We concur with the OCA’s recommendation that

3 Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

property and commercial in nature—concerns that we

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 41

gating authority or individuals, as well as the manner

In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to

42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be

“As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies

9 A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997, 275 SCRA 302.

VOL. 623, JULY 5, 2010 43

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary

We note, too, that although the respondent judge erred

10 Id., at pp. 316-317.

44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED