Corporate - Social - Responsibility - Article

5 Corporate social responsibility
The move by companies to adopt a philosophy of ‘corporate social

responsibility’1 (CSR) is partly driven by the extreme difficulty which has
been experienced in imposing such a concept on corporations by legally
binding regulations. This difficulty is particularly acute when the corpo-
ration in question is operating in different jurisdictions using branches,
subsidiaries, franchising or exclusive delivery agreements. As we have
seen, because companies are creatures of individual legal systems, con-
trolling operations in different jurisdictions is an exceptionally complex
legal problem,2 compounded by the ‘race to the bottom’ which occurs
when poor countries seek to attract foreign direct investment and are
therefore unwilling to subject incoming companies to strict regulation.
Korten quotes a Philippine government advertisement (1995): ‘To attract
companies like yours . . . we have felled mountains, razed jungles, filled
swamps, moved rivers, relocated towns . . . all to make it easier for you
and your business here.’3
Having moved the landscape, complete with its inhabitants, it seems
unlikely that strict labour or environmental regulation will follow. Can
companies become responsible, thus obviating the need for regulation?
This chapter seeks to show that there needs to be a more fundamen-
tal approach to the problems of controlling companies than by ask-
ing for commitments to human rights or social responsibility. In effect,
both of these cut across the structure of companies and their ethos as
explained in chapters 1 and 2. There needs to be a complete rethink about
corporate structures before social responsibility becomes an embedded
reality within companies. Such an approach is explored in chapter 6.
1 The reality of this move is accepted even by fierce opponents of CSR. See D. Henderson,
Misguided Virtue False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility (IEA, London, 2001).
2 P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Blackwell, Oxford, 1995); J. Dine,
The Governance of Corporate Groups (Cambridge University Press, 2000); J. Woodroffe,
‘Regulating Multinational Corporations in a World of Nation States’ in M. Addo (ed.),
Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer, The
Hague, 1999).
3 D. Korten, When Corporations Rule the World (Kumarian Press, 1995), p. 159.
222
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, on 30 Mar 2020 at 12:44:16,
subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Corporate social responsibility 223
This means that, as well as jurisdictional complexities and the com-

parative economic power imbalance (some TNCs may be considerably
more powerful than the regulating host state), philosophical and struc-
tural problems must be considered. Many of the TNCs based in the USA
or United Kindom are driven by the concept of maximising shareholder
value.4 The introduction of ethical and social concerns is therefore hostile
to the underlying philosophy and thus the way in which the rules regulat-
ing that company are structured. To take a simple example, in UK law,
unless there is criminal fraud, only the shareholders may legally challenge
the directors. The management is seen as responsible to the shareholders
and much of the law concerned with directors’ duties is concerned with
aligning the interests of the directors with those of managers.
Attempts to conceptualise a company responsible to wider social con-
cerns (usually designated as the ‘stakeholder’ debate) have met with sig-
nificant problems. The theories are criticised as suffering from three sig-
nificant and closely related problems. The first is the diffusion of goals,
the second the absence of a yardstick to measure director performance
and the third is the weight to be given to different interest groups.5 Deakin
and Hughes put the first issue well:
A major difficulty with stakeholder theory, at least as it has been applied in Britain,
is that the term ‘stakeholding’ has been used to refer to a very wide range of inter-
ests which are loosely related at best . . . If the category of stakeholding interests
is widened to include those of all potential consumers of the company’s products,
for example, or to refer to the general interest of society in the sustainability of
the environment, there is a danger that the idea of stakeholding will cease to be
relevant.6
The difficulties highlighted here are the problems of defining which
groups or interests should validly be considered stakeholders, since few
on this planet lead lives untouched by corporate activity, and the dangers
of attempting to pursue diffuse (and possibly contradictory) goals. Does
a road-building corporation have a responsibility to ensure a sustainable
environment?
The second problem was the subject of a lively debate as long ago as
the 1930s following the famous insight that the structure of modern cor-
porations entails a separation of ownership and control.7 Berle expressed
the fear that any departure from the view that the board should use its
4 Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups, esp. ch. 1.

5 For a further discussion of this issue and a proposed way forward see chapter 6.
6 S. Deakin and A. Hughes (eds), Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate
Governance, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), p. 4.
7 A. Berle and G. Means, Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, New York,
reprint 1962).
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
224 Companies, International Trade and Human Rights
powers solely in the interests of shareholders was to abdicate responsi-

bility over the board. The interest of the company must therefore remain
co-extensive with the interests of shareholders or measurement of the
directors’ performance becomes impossible.8
The third difficulty is the weight to be allocated to each interest group’s
concerns. This, of course, is closely tied to the yardstick question. If no
mechanism which creates a hierarchy of interests is created, how can
we know that proper weight has been given to the interests of creditors,
employees or the environment?9 Will different interests gain prominence
at different stages in a company’s life?10
These are compelling criticisms and I have seen no theoretical solu-
tion which compellingly answers them.11 However, as many commen-
tators have pointed out, the German system of two-tier boards and
employee participation has operated a stakeholder model, at least so
far as employees are concerned, for some time. The benefit of the com-
pany means more than profit maximisation and includes some concept of
community service.12 The model works in practice without the require-
ment for lengthy debates about how to balance the competing inter-
ests involved or how to ensure management accountability. How is this
possible? It appears to stem from the culture which has grown up over
many years of the operation of the co-determinist system – the proce-
dures of employee involvement and consultation have made it clear that
their interests are internal to the interests of the company. Because of the
difficulties identified above, it would be exceptionally difficult to move
directly from a contractual, narrow understanding of the company to
a stakeholder model: the current cultural understanding of companies
would demand defined answers to the three (probably unanswerable)
questions. It may be that the difficulty in addressing these questions lies
in their relationship with a flawed understanding of the reality of corporate
life.
8 E. Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees’ (1931) Harvard Law Review
1049; A. Berle, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees’ (1932) Harvard Law
Review 1365.
9 C. Riley, ‘Understanding and Regulating the Corporation’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review
595. See also Deakin and Hughes, Enterprise and Community.
10 See discussion in Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups, pp. 33–4.
11 Parkinson seeks to minimise the impact of these difficulties by calling for an ‘ethical’ fidu-
ciary duty but this may be simply another way of attempting to change the culture from
‘outside’, it says nothing as to how to formulate and weight the ethical considerations:
J. Parkinson, ‘The Socially Responsible Company’ in Addo, Human Rights Standards.
12 J.-J. Du Plessis, ‘Corporate Governance: Reflections on the German Two-Tier System’
(1996) Journal of South African Law 315.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
The inability of the law to achieve corporate social responsibility by

‘command and control’ regulation is accepted by Parkinson13 who argues
that the difficulties with ‘stakeholder’ theories identified above can be
overcome by using:
self-regulation, involving filling the gaps in explicit regulation . . . It is not to
replace profit seeking with an open-ended goal of maximising the welfare of
affected groups. Profit accordingly retains its function of guiding management
action, and of steering resources to their most valued uses. Indeed, the latter
function will be enhanced where companies adopt constraints that reduce uncom-
pensated costs (‘negative externalities’).14
It is hard to see why this is so. Payment (or benefits) provided to

non-shareholder stakeholders beyond the minimum contracted for must
decrease the pot available for shareholders if the profit maximisation the-
ory holds and shareholders are entitled to the ‘residue’. Parkinson further
argues that ‘it is no more appropriate to hold that honouring constraints
of this kind renders a company’s objectives indeterminate, however, than
it is to describe as purposeless men and women who, in pursuing their
individual goals, respect the ill-defined constraints of social morality’.15
However, until the last judgment, no one will attempt to assess whether
a person’s life was purposeful or not but accountability of the directors
of companies at present depends on whether they are pursuing a course
which fulfils the objectives of the company. Parkinson accepts that the
imposition of an obligation to have regard to ethical considerations could
not be legally enforceable, thus, at least partially conceding the ‘yardstick’
point. Accountability rests, for Parkinson, on disclosure of information
but this evades the distinction between judging the company and judging
whether the directors have fulfilled their duty in pursuing the objectives of
the company. Where those objectives are seen as maximum profit within
the law, a more generous response to ethical considerations may still be
ultra vires the directors’ powers if not the company’s objects.16 However,
that is not to dismiss the concept of some form of self-regulation as a way
forward out of the difficulties. Nor should the concept of the provision of
further information by companies be dismissed, particularly where it can
be provided to the public in digestible forms and with some guarantees
that it is not merely the product of the public relations department or a
13 The discussion of John Parkinson’s views in this chapter do not imply that I disagreed
with many of his views. I was a friend and admirer of John and was deeply distressed by
his untimely death in 2004.
14 Parkinson, ‘Socially Responsible Company’. 15 Ibid., p. 59.
16 Parke v. Daily News [1962] 2 All ER 929.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
cosy relationship with a friendly auditor. These aspects of CSR will be

returned to later.
Corporate social responsibility: what is it?

According to the UN’s ‘Global Compact’:
The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument or code of conduct, but a
value-based platform designed to promote institutional learning. It utilizes the
power of transparency and dialogue to identify and disseminate good practices
based on universal principles.
The Compact encompasses nine such principles, drawn from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at
Work and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. And it asks
companies to act on these principles in their own corporate domains. Thus,
the Compact promotes good practices by corporations; it does not endorse
companies.
The nine principles are:
Human rights
r Principle 1: support and respect the protection of international human
rights within their sphere of influence; and
r Principle 2: make sure their own corporations are not complicit in
human rights abuses.
Labour
The Secretary-General asked world business to uphold:
r Principle 3: freedom of association and the effective recognition of the
right to collective bargaining;
r Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory
labour;
r Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and
r Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment
and occupation.
Environment
The Secretary-General asked world business to:
r Principle 7: support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges;
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
r Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental
responsibility; and
r Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmen-
tally friendly technologies.
Why should business participate in this initiative? Because as markets have gone
global, so, too, must the principle and practice of corporate citizenship. In this
new global economy, it makes good business sense for firms to internalize these
principles as integral elements of corporate strategies and practice.17
For the EU Commission,18 ‘Corporate Social Responsibility is essen-

tially a concept whereby companies decide voluntarily to contribute to
a better society and a cleaner environment.’19 The European Commis-
sion Green Paper, Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social
Responsibility,20 considers as its first substantive issue, human resources
management: ‘Responsible recruitment practices, involving in particular
non-discriminatory practices, could facilitate the recruitment of people
from ethnic minorities, older workers, women and the long-term unem-
ployed and people at a disadvantage.’
The UK government prefers to define the:
behaviour of a responsible organisation [which] does three things:
1. It recognises that its activities have a wider impact on the society in which it
operates.
2. In response, it takes account of the economic, social, environmental and
human rights impact of its activities across the world; and
3. It seeks to achieve benefits by working in partnership with other groups and
organisations.21
Note that the ‘benefit’ accrues to ‘it’, the corporation since, ‘CSR can
help to build brand value, foster customer loyalty, motivate their staff, and
contribute to a good reputation among a wide range of stakeholders.’22
It has been claimed that CSR is ‘outreach’ which provides education for
the disadvantaged.23 For Hopkins, it means ‘ethical behaviour of busi-
ness towards its constituencies or stakeholders. I define stakeholders as
consisting of seven azimuths or major groups’ which are:
17 www.un.org
18 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/gpr/2001/com2001 0366en01.pdf
19 Commission Green Paper, Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (COM (2001) 366 final, Brussels, 18 July 2001).
20 Ibid.
21 Business and Society: Corporate Social Responsibility Report (Department of Trade and
Industry, 2002).
22 Ibid., ‘Foreword’ by Douglas Alexander.
23 Corporate Citizenship (The Smith Institute, 2000).
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
r owners/investors (share or stockholders);
r management;
r employees;
r customers;
r natural environment;
r the wider community;
r contractors/suppliers.24
The UK Corporate and Social Responsibility Report25 states that ‘[t]he
fundamentals of equal opportunities are a central plank of CSR’.26 It
should be noted, however, that the whole concept of CSR is not with-
out its opponents. A comprehensive attack on ‘global salvationism’ and
CSR in particular can be found in Misguided Virtue,27 where it is argued
that:
CSR embodies the notion that progress in relation to environmental and social
issues lies in making norms and standards more stringent and more uniform,
in part by corporations acting on their own initiative. This approach takes too
little account of costs and benefits of extending regulation in ways that would
reduce welfare. The effects of enforced uniformity are especially damaging in
labour markets. The greatest potential for harm of this kind arises from attempts,
whether by government or businesses in the name of CSR and ‘Global Corporate
Citizenship’ to regulate the world as a whole. Imposing common international
standards, despite the fact that circumstances may be widely different across
countries, restricts the scope for mutually beneficial trade and investment flows.
It is liable to hold back the development of poor countries through the suppression
of employment opportunities within them.28
Others are lukewarm, acknowledging that many companies achieve

admirable results under the CSR banner,29 but raise other concerns:
Many of the arguments against CSR initiatives come down to the idea that they
somehow distort or detract from the primary focus of the company, which is
making money. Or that it will somehow require the imposition of a new regulatory
layer on business.
I would agree that having too many rules, or creating institutions that have
lives of their own, is as dangerous as not having any . . . The new democratic
internationalism ought to be about standards and the rule of law, not controls.
In other words, about ownership, property rights, rule of law, all the issues that
are politely packaged in the politically correct slogan good governance.30
24 M. Hopkins, The Planetary Bargain (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999).

25 Department of Trade and Industry, 2002.
26 Ibid., p. 14. 27 Henderson, Misguided Virtue. 28 Ibid., p. 17.
29 N. Hertz, The Silent Takeover (Heinemann, London, 2001), esp. p. 143; M. Moore, World
Without Walls (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 206 and see chapter 1.
30 Moore, World Without Walls, p. 213.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Hertz points out that ‘there is emerging a new dimension to corporate

activity, one that puts corporations in the role of welfare providers and
social engineers, environmentalists and mediators, in which corporations
assume the traditional functions of the nation state. Business takes over
the role of government’.31 And, of course, they are not accountable to an
electorate.
PR capture
The first and most obvious danger of the vagueness of these concepts and
the focus on the benefit to the corporations is that the voluntary nature of
codes and the imprecision of CSR provides an unparalleled opportunity
for ‘spin’ for companies.
Corporations have . . . set out to persuade the public that the very raison d’etre of
commerce has changed, and to co-opt the environmental debate. Companies are
no longer insidious faceless corporations interested in profit at any cost, they were
now caring corporations concerned about communities, consumers, children.
They were committed to pollution prevention, to people, to the planet. There
was only one problem with this strategy – on the whole, they were lying.32
Rowell alerts us to the huge effort put in by corporations and their
‘white hat’ networks and NGOs in order to present themselves as
environmentally friendly from ‘Paraquat and nature working in perfect
harmony’33 to ‘The Japanese Power Reactor and Nuclear Development
Corporation has created a green cartoon called “Mr Pluto” whose job it
is to teach children that nuclear power is safe. “If everybody treats me
with a peaceful and warm heart, I’ll never be scary or dangerous” says
the Smurf-like creature.’34
It is instructive that many CSR programmes are run by the public
relations departments of companies. It was argued in chapter 2 that CSR
can act as a moral deflection device. Those putting energy into such
programmes can feel good about it while failing to address underlying
issues. CSR as moral deflection also works by blaming companies for
their actions while retaining the structure which pushes them to behave
badly. The CSR movement thus adopts the ‘blame the company’ as a
primary moral deflection device.
So far as monitoring CSR performance, many auditing firms have
lucrative contracts to perform this function. However, as we have seen
31 Hertz, Silent Takeover, p. 172.
32 A. Rowell, Green Backlash (Routledge, London, 1996).
33 Advert in Malay Mail, April 1993, depicting a scene of palm trees, birds and flowering
plants in a rural idyll: Rowell, Green Backlash, p. 104.
34 Rowell, Green Backlash, p. 105.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
with the spectacular collapses at ENRON, WorldCom and Parmalat,

external auditors cannot be relied on even to report on the correct state
of the financial health of a corporation. Information issued on social
responsibility is even less likely to be correct, even if apparently audited;
many codes lie ‘dormant’ in company filing cabinets35 and ‘[o]nly 18%
of the environmental reports of the top 100 firms in Australia, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, the UK and the USA surveyed in 1999 by KPMG were found
to have been independently verified’,36 (and the standard of verification
was poor). That was some time ago and NGOs and the media have been
diligent in pursuing cases of misreporting. Standards appear to be rising
but the information asymmetry remains heavily tilted in favour of the
company.
Vague principles and shaky foundations

The vagueness and breadth of the formulations at international, regional
and national levels gives some credence to the claim that there is only
a hollow ‘presumption of agreement’ and that CSR is a concept which
has no real definition.37 This reflects a number of problems, not the least
of which is the power of corporations.38 There are not only persistent
squabbles as to what is meant by corporate social responsibility but also
its basis and its relationship to that equally nebulous term ‘corporate
governance’. Addo writes:
There are practical and doctrinal uncertainties such as the precise scope of the
various designations and the basis upon which social or moral responsibility can
be imputed to an intangible entity such as a corporation which has no soul of its
own to be damned, if necessary. There is a persistently unsatisfactory condition in
which the various groups (NGOs, corporations, inter-governmental institutions
etc.) attribute different meanings and explanations to designations of their choice.
Good governance, good citizenship, or social responsibility can mean anything
to anyone.39
As a way out of this wooliness, Addo starts by looking at the relationship
between the shareholders and the managers, essentially leading us into the
35 Hertz, Silent Takeover, p. 142.
36 Ibid., pp. 142–3, citing KMPG, International Survey of Environmental Reporting (1999).
37 Henderson, Misguided Virtue, esp. ch. 3.
38 George Monbiot, Captive State (Macmillan, London, 2000); Hertz, Silent Takeover;
P. Drahos and J. Braithwaite, Global Business Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2000); Oxfam
Report, Rigged Rules and Double Standards (2002), esp. ch. 7.
39 M. Addo, ‘Human Rights and Transnational Corporations: An Introduction’ in
M. Addo (ed.), Human Rights and Transnational Corporations (Kluwer, The Hague,
1999), pp. 13–14.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
stakeholder debate which has been examined above, eventually arguing

that:
It is not inconceivable . . . to suggest that managers must take a long-term view
of the question of members’ interests and to that extent to include, for example,
the interests of future members of the company in today’s policies and decisions.
Taking into account the interests of future members of a company, who to all
intents and purposes are yet unknown, the majority of whom could arguably be
ethical investors . . . lends credibility to the suggestion that managers can take
account of the interests of the wider community.40
But what if the directors look cynically at the young and decide that
they will surely be a generation of profit maximisers, blind to their social
and moral obligations? They will fall back on their duty to make profit so
beloved of Friedman.41 This form of the stakeholder debate fails to crack
the difficulties in the definition of responsibility or in the ‘stakeholder’
debate at large.
Addo makes much more progress towards a solution to both these
issues by examining the basis for attributing social or moral responsibility
to corporations. As we shall see, it is a route which severely undermines
the call for such responsibility to be ‘voluntary’ and gives us clues into the
way in which such responsibility can be implemented within a company
by redefining the ‘corporate governance debate’.
Addo identifies two bases and three underlying ‘principles’ for attribut-
ing social responsibility/ethical requirements to companies. The bases
are: an analogical extension of individual responsibility42 and attribution
of responsibility to the company as ‘a responsible entity . . . capable of
exercising control and able to make choices’.43 In fact, the two approaches
are very close since the extension of individual responsibility ‘by analogy’
usually accepts that ‘organisations have and maintain different persona
from the people who constitute it’44 and that even if all the individu-
als involved in a corporation are persons of good conscience: ‘having a
conscience in the running of a large corporation does not translate auto-
matically into running a conscientious corporation. The latter requires
an “institutionalisation” of certain values, not simply the possession of
40 Addo, Human Rights and TNCs.

41 M. Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Make Profits’ in G. Steiner
and J. Steiner (eds), Issues in Business and Society (Random House, 1977).
42 See James Coleman, ‘Responsibility in Corporate Action: A Sociologist’s View’ in
K. Hopt and G. Teubner (eds), Corporate Governance and Directors’ Liabilities (de
Gruyter, 1985).
43 Addo, ‘Human Rights and TNCs: Introduction’, p. 16, citing H.L.A. Hart, Punishment
and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 1968). See also Celia Wells, Corporations and
Criminal Responsibility (Clarendon, Oxford, 1993).
44 Addo, ‘Human Rights and TNCs: Introduction’, p. 16.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
those values in one part of the organisation (even if that part is at the top
of the hierarchy)’.45 Neither of these views are acceptable to the ‘nexus
of contracts’ theorists who argue that the conception of a company as an
institution is seriously misleading since ‘companies, being merely a set of
contractual relationships, are not different in kind from markets. It is held
to follow that it is meaningless to suppose that companies can be under
any obligation to operate in a socially or ethically responsible manner’.46
Addo and Wood identify a number of ‘principles’ underlying the impo-
sition of responsibility,47 whose first principle is essentially the concept of
the corporation as existing by virtue of a concession by society: ‘society
grants legitimacy and power to business’.48 As a consequence, companies
must act responsibly. Again this is challenged by the ‘nexus of contracts’
theorists who argue that the risk undertaken by the shareholders means
that they contract for an indefinite return. All other ‘contractors’ agree
to a definite return on their contract. After these are paid, the sharehold-
ers are entitled to any surplus that remains.49 This theory rests on several
misconceptions, the first being that shareholders are entitled to a ‘residue’
when, in UK law at least, they have no entitlement to a dividend. The
only residue that shareholders are entitled to is a division of a surplus in
a solvent winding-up, not a proportion of profits. The second is equat-
ing a shareholder’s right to return with ‘maximisation’ of that return.
As Parkinson points out, even if the ‘contracting shareholders’ could be
considered to be owners, that does not mean that they may insist that
directors attempt to maximise profits in any way at all.50
Wood’s second principle is an:
organisational principle which requires businesses to be responsible for the out-
comes relating to the primary and secondary areas of their involvement with
society. A car manufacturer for example, can be expected under this principle
to share responsibility for environmental pollution, vehicle safety and initiatives
addressing drivers’ education . . . Corporate responsibility under this principle . . .
demonstrates a credible relationship between the effects of corporate activities and
the responsibilities sought to be imposed.51
45 K. Goodpaster, ‘The Concept of Corporate Responsibility’ (1983), Journal of Business
Ethics 1, at 10, cited in Addo, ‘Human Rights and TNCs: Introduction’, p. 16.
46 Parkinson, ‘Socially Responsible Company’, p. 53 (citation of explanation does not imply
agreement with the theory). See F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure
of Corporate Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); Henderson, Misguided Virtue.
47 D. Wood, ‘Corporate Social Performance Revisited’ (1991) 16 Academy of Management
Journal 312.
48 Ibid., p. 314.
49 Parkinson, ‘Socially Responsible Company’, p. 53. For an extensive analysis and critique
of the economic theories underpinning these theories see Dine, Governance of Corporate
Groups.
50 Wood, ‘Corporate Social Performance’, p. 51. The concept of ownership in relation to
companies is addressed in chapter 6.
51 Addo, ‘Human Rights and TNCs: Introduction’, p. 18.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
The third principle focuses on the individual moral choices made by

managers in areas within their discretion.
Addo criticises the second principle on the basis that it ‘can often lead
to short term benefits only and overwhelm the need for long term plan-
ning such as research and development into environmentally friendly
technology and the benefits of quitting smoking and drinking’. However,
this principle seems to contain a much more fundamental flaw in that the
company is essentially being asked to work against its own interests. It
makes incoherent the concept of a decision made ‘in the best interests of
the company’ as a commercial entity and must attract all the detriments
pointed out by those who criticise the ‘stakeholder’ approach. The third
principle may make for certain incremental changes within areas where
discretion may be exercised but it is surely the first basis which is wholly
convincing.
The concept of a delegation of power which requires reciprocal respon-
sibility has been at the heart of the European conception of corporations52
and, coupled with the realisation that the demands or requirements of
society must be internalised in order for them to be effective, begins to
give us a way of coupling corporate social responsibility with ideas of how
the company actually works – corporate governance.
Concession on the international stage

Globalisation means that we are living in a world market. What does
concession theory tell us about the behaviour of corporations in a world
market? What international norms are available to guide us to select the
correct parameters on corporate behaviour?
The first step is to identify the source of the ‘concession’ under which
TNCs operate in a global market. It is then necessary to attempt to iden-
tify agreed norms which should be applied, and finally to identify an
enforcement mechanism which might effectively deliver compliance. The
original concession theories considered that the state, in the form of the
monarch or Emperor, was the concession-granting source.53 While this
retains some resonance because the mechanics of the concession come
via the exercise of state power (the grant of corporate personality and
limited liability), the concession can be seen (at least from the perspec-
tive of democratic societies) in a wider context as a grant from society
as a whole to carry on business provided the expectations of that soci-
ety are met. Thus, the rules imposed on companies may spring from
state apparatus but are a result of individual and collective expectations.
52 This is argued (probably at tedious length) in Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups.

53 See ibid.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
‘Corporations operate under the terms of two charters: a formal, written,

legal charter; and an unwritten, but critically important, social charter . . .
it is the unwritten charter of societal expectations that determines the
values to which the corporation must adhere and sets the terms under
which the public grants legitimacy to the corporation.’54 This may mean
that the shaping and enforcement of the rules comes from state machin-
ery but reflect the wider expectations of society. Where to find those
expectations? They must be found by developing jurisprudence which
refines and makes precise the vague aspirational goals which we see at
present in the CSR debate. That this can be done is evident from the
development over the past fifty years of precise jurisprudence on human
rights; perhaps even more inspirational is the rapid development currently
taking place in the field of economic, social and cultural rights. These
need to be made concrete from just such vague aspirational statements as
appear in the codes and much work remains to be done on this. Further,
having identified society’s concession boundaries, these need to be fed
into the decision-making machinery of a company and extracted from
the PR operation. That this can be done on a domestic front provides
inspiration for the possibility of advances on an international stage.
Relationship between codes and corporate governance

Once it is possible to identify expectations with which companies can
be expected to comply, a vital step in making them effective is to marry
the concept of corporate governance with these expectations. At present,
those concerning themselves with the methods of decision-making within
companies and the enforcement mechanisms to ensure proper decision-
making appear to be inhabiting a different planet from those drawing
up guidelines and codes of conduct. Principally, the ‘governance’ debate
accepts the primacy of shareholders whereas the codes formulation has
extended far into stakeholder territory without concerning itself with
how implementation may change the governance rules. The disparities
between the OECD Guidelines and Principles can certainly be seen in
this light. The Principles start from the premise that ‘[o]ne key element in
improving economic efficiency is corporate governance’.55 It commences
with ‘the rights of shareholders’,56 contains the principle that ‘markets
for corporate control should be allowed to function in an efficient and
transparent manner’57 and ‘[a]nti take-over devices should not be used to
54 I. Wilson, The New Rules of Corporate Conduct: Rewriting the Social Charter (Quorum
Books, Westport Connecticut, 2000), p. 3.
55 OECD Code, Preamble. 56 OECD Code, Principle I.
57 OECD Code, Principle I E.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
shield management from accountability’,58 but only nods to such ‘stake-

holders’ as are ‘established by law’.59 There is no prescription as to which
constituencies should be regarded as stakeholders. ‘The degree to which
stakeholders participate in corporate governance depends on national
laws and practices, and may vary from company to company as well’.60
This clearly adopts a number of principles taken from the UK-American
neo-classical model of corporate governance.
This envisaged model of corporation law:
(1) relies heavily on the fiction of shareholder control over management;

(2) adopts the view that shareholder control over management will in
some way be beneficial rather than simply increase the pressure for
profit maximisation at all costs;
(3) adopts the ‘market forces’ alternative model of control – the market
for corporate control, which if freely available, would prevent the
adoption of corporate structures mentioned elsewhere in the code
such as the representation of employees on boards.61
From the international perspective the most glaring omission is the

absence of any recognition that a drive for economic efficiency on an
international basis is at the root of many of the malpractices in which
transnational corporations have been implicated.62 Indeed, the excessive
reliance on the existing models of corporate governance in member states
could be seen as using the subsidiarity principle to shirk the responsibil-
ity to suggest best practice so far as the adoption of governance mod-
els. In that respect, it is extremely interesting that in the Principles of
Corporate Governance a distinction is drawn between ‘environmental
and ethical concerns’63 which ‘are taken into account’:64 ‘In addition to
their commercial objectives, companies are encouraged to disclose poli-
cies relating to business ethics, the environment and other public policy
commitments’,65 but both the international dimension and the ‘ethical,
environmental and other issues’ are treated more explicitly in the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.66 The two documents read
very differently. While neither document purports to be legally binding,
the extreme difference of tone may perhaps be explained by the distinc-
tion between the suggested standards (Guidelines) and the methods of
58 Ibid. 59 OECD Code, Principle III A. 60 OECD Code, Principle III D.

61 Co-determination has long been accepted as a barrier to take-overs. See J. Dine and
P. Hughes, EC Company Law (Jordans, looseleaf), ch. 12, esp. para. 12.19.
62 Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups; Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises.
63 OECD Code, Preamble. 64 Ibid. 65 OECD Code, Principle IV A2.
66 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (DAFFE/IME/WPG(2000)9), avail-
able from OECD website (www.oecd.org).
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
achieving them (Principles of Corporate Governance). This paper argues

that, because of underlying philosophical difficulties in the structure of
the market place, there is an insufficient match between the exhortations
to achieve moral probity and the suggested governance methods. The
Guidelines arrived at in 2000 continue to adhere to the attitude that ‘sug-
gests that the Member Countries may have a moral duty to ensure that
the activities of their MNEs in host states do not contribute to the detri-
ment of those states’ economies, particularly if they are less developed’.67
Thus, ‘[t]he common aim of the governments adhering to the Guidelines
is to encourage the positive contributions that multinational enterprises
can make to the economic, environmental and social progress and to min-
imise the difficulties to which their various operations may give rise’.68
In particular, this process is to take place within the framework of ‘sus-
tainable development’. The puzzle is why there are two documents rather
than one and the answer may be of more fundamental importance than
would first appear. If the standards articulated in the Guidelines are to be
delivered, this can surely only be through corporate governance mecha-
nisms. Yet there is an evident reluctance to see the sustainable develop-
ment and environmental issues as a ‘corporate governance’ concern; for
example, the Principles of Corporate Governance state that the board
has responsibility ‘to implement systems designed to ensure that the
corporation obeys applicable laws, including tax, competition, labour,
environmental, equal opportunity, health and safety laws’.69 This is in
contrast to ‘[e]nterprises should, within the framework of laws, regulations
and administrative practices in the countries in which they operate, and
in consideration of relevant international agreements, principles, objec-
tives and standards, take due account of the need to protect the environ-
ment, public health and safety, and generally to conduct their activities
in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable development’
(Guidelines).70 Despite the fact that both documents urge the setting up
of systems to monitor environmental performance, it remains clear that
the governance model requires adherence to environmental laws, whereas
the Guidelines exhort adherence to the wider principle of ‘sustainable
development’. The only paragraphs in the Principles which have a wider
reach than proper compliance with law appear in the ‘Disclosure and
Transparency’ section.71 On the basis that ‘[d]isclosure . . . helps improve
public understanding of the structure and activities of enterprises, corpo-
rate policies and performance with respect to environmental and ethical
67 Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises, p. 579.

68 OECD Guidelines, Preface, para. 10. 69 OECD Principle V.
70 OECD Guideline V. 71 OECD Code, Part IV.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in which

they operate’, companies are urged to ‘disclose policies relating to busi-
ness ethics, the environment and other public policy commitments’ and
‘risks relating to environmental activities’. However, ‘[d]isclosure require-
ments are not expected to place unreasonable administrative cost bur-
dens on enterprises. Nor are companies expected to disclose information
that may endanger their competitive position unless disclosure is neces-
sary to fully inform the investment decision and to avoid misleading the
investor.’ So far as environmental damage is concerned, only problems
that will affect the decisions of investors are material; informing the con-
sumer is not necessary where a competitive disadvantage may be feared.
This disclosure regime will only work to the benefit of the environment if
we assume that all investors have an ethical approach. Thus, a statement
that ‘mahogany trees are being felled at a significant rate and turned into
garden furniture netting a huge profit for investors’ will be unlikely to
deter non-ethical investors, whereas the other side of the story, ‘we are
chopping down ancient forests and creating a desert’ could be withheld on
the basis that it is not material for investors and it would put the company
at a competitive disadvantage. The Guidelines are much more positive
in the environmental field, requiring the maintenance of systems of envi-
ronmental management, consultation with local communities, adoption
of the precautionary principle and preparation of environmental impact
reports.
There are several problems with the approaches in the Principles and
the Guidelines. Apart from their non-binding nature and the controversy
over the status of corporations in international law (addressed above),
it is also problematic that the Guidelines represent a form of ‘outside
the company exhortation’ and it will be unlikely to be effective unless
mechanisms to achieve sustainable development can become part of the
internal governance systems of companies rather than outside encour-
agement. A third and most fundamental problem is that it will not be
possible to enlist company support for the wider meaning of ‘sustain-
able development’ until the underlying social understanding of the pur-
pose companies serve changes fundamentally, particularly if ‘sustainable
development’ retains its original ambience which included a significant
redistributive agenda. The principal aim of MNEs is to maximise share-
holder profit. It is for this reason that the mahogany statement may be
regarded as acceptable disclosure to investors. Further, since the vast
majority of the shareholders of MNEs live in the developed world, the
repatriation of profits made in environmentally damaging ways represents
a regressive redistribution of wealth which is the precise opposite of the
aim of ‘sustainable development’.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Loss of redistribution from ‘sustainable development’:

the capacity for CSR to ‘backfire’
In order to understand the way in which CSR could be misused, it is
instructive to look at the way in which the concept of ‘sustainable devel-
opment’ has evolved. This is a debate where the opposing values of
responsibility and creating wealth collide, an exact mirror of the CSR/
financial ambitions debate concerning companies. The aim of the Brund-
land Commission’s sustainable development strategy was ‘to promote
harmony among human beings and between humanity and nature’,72
starting from the premise that it is ‘futile to attempt to deal with envi-
ronmental problems without a broader perspective that encompasses
the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality’.73
Adams identifies a ‘subtle but extremely important transformation of
the ecologically-based concept of sustainable development, by leading
beyond concepts of physical sustainability to the socio-economic con-
text of development . . . Our Common Future starts with people, and
goes on to discuss what kinds of environmental policies are required to
achieve certain socio-economic goals.’74 This contrasts with the World
Conservation Strategy which ‘started from the premise of the need to
conserve ecosystems and sought to demonstrate why this made good eco-
nomic sense and – although the point was underplayed – could promote
equity’.75 Where this analysis fails is that the answers suggested by these
two approaches are seen as ‘remarkably similar’. Nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth, as the world trading system is based on an economic
vision which has caused and is causing extreme poverty. Thus, although
there is an emphasis on ‘growth’ in the Brundtland Report it is ‘growth,
Jim, but not as we know it’ and the attempt to keep familiar words such
as ‘growth’ and ‘development’ in the formula have massively backfired.
A huge ‘capture’ operation has undermined the radicalism which should
have led to a complete rethink of world trading systems to create ‘a new
form of growth, sustainable, environmentally friendly, egalitarian, inte-
grating economic and social development . . . and more equitable in its
impact’.76 How has it happened?
The single answer is, of course, the complexity of the issues which
involve every field of human endeavour in a complex interrelation-
ship. How much easier for ‘experts’ on corporate law not to talk to
philosophers, chemists, sociologists and human rights proponents. The
economic proponents of a free trade model of ‘globalisation’ see the world
72 H. Brundtland, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 65.

73 Ibid., p. 3. 74 W.M. Adams, Green Development (Routledge, London, 1990).
75 Ibid. 76 Brundtland, Our Common Future, p. 52.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
as becoming a simpler place77 – the exact opposite is true as a result of

the construction of complex world trading systems.
Given the problems brought about by simplistic adherence to economic
models, the contributions of ‘green economists’ to the debate about sus-
tainability must be viewed cautiously. On the first page of Blueprint for a
Green Economy78 the following assumption is made:
Development is some set of desirable goals or objectives for society. Those goals
undoubtedly include the basic aim to secure a rising level of real income per
capita – what is traditionally regarded as the ‘standard of living’. But most people
would also now accept that there is more to development than rising incomes.
At first sight this appears to be a softening of the extreme neo-classical
approach but it contains:
(a) the assumption that a rising standard of living is a basic and worth-
while goal (which it clearly is in poorer countries but may not be in
wealthier ones);
(b) the sleight of hand which suggests that rising income is shared
amongst the population, i.e. that growth will produce a rise of income
‘per capita’, which it will if the growth is divided by the population
but not in reality where, as we have seen, unregulated growth leads
to polarisation of incomes.
Distributional issues appear in the book, only to vanish again. Thus,
‘sustainable development places emphasis on providing for the needs of
the least advantaged in society’,79 a concept to be explained in chapter 2
of the book. Indeed, the position of the most disadvantaged is said to
be an indicator of whether a society is developing but ‘[a] society which
does not maintain or improve its real income per capita is unlikely to
be “developing” ’ and ‘[a]chieving economic development without sacri-
ficing an acceptable rate of economic growth may be said to define the
problem of “sustainable development”’.80 The ‘wellbeing’ of a defined
population is the measure of whether or not there is sustainable develop-
ment. However, the wellbeing indicators will be drawn from an aggregate
of the whole population rather than its poorest sector. This ‘optimal’ way
of conceiving the most benefit to society ‘is in fact a utilitarian creation: it
is concerned only with individual preferences, and it measures only totals
for all individuals not distributions between them’.81 Since the analysis
is based on the presumption that satisfying consumer preferences is
77 See, e.g., Regulation Without the State (Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 2000).
78 D. Pearce, A. Markandya and E. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earthscan,
1989).
79 Ibid., p. 2. 80 Ibid., p. 30.
81 M. Jacobs, ‘The Limits to Neoclassicism’ in M. Redclift and T. Benron (eds), Social
Theory and the Global Environment (Routledge, London, 1994).
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
what matters, the results of wellbeing surveys will provide the answer
to the ‘correct’ level of environmental protection. As Jacobs points out,82
the neo-classical approach is founded on methodological individualism,
based ‘on the currently existing preferences of consumers’. At the same
time, it is presented as morally neutral, seeking to discover an ‘optimal’
outcome which is nevertheless not presented as morally best.83 Given a
moral framework which derives from ‘the greatest good of the greatest
number’, the ‘optimal’ elides with the normative ‘morally best’, absent
some mystical dimension which can conveniently be derided by oppo-
nents (see below, discussion of ‘green backlash’). Indeed, ‘on the premise
that satisfying consumer preferences is what matters, most neo-classicists
would argue that [the optimal level of protection] is the level of protection
which society therefore should choose’.84
The foundation of this economic approach is the desire to avoid the
problem of externalities by turning ‘the environment into a commodity
which can be analysed just like other commodities’.85 The motive may
be to retain the economists’ role as governmental advisers86 or to seek
genuine protection for the environment: because it has hitherto been free
it has been significantly overused.
In valuing the environment it is argued that all aspects of the
environment87 can be valued with a money yardstick.88 This is supported
by the view that human life is valued by the amount of resources which
a society will use to save life. This (unsupported) argument is unsound,
confusing as it does the resources available to achieve a certain aim and
the value of that which will be lost if the aim is not achieved. Jacobs89 com-
ments ‘[m]any environmentalists and Greens object to this treatment on
82 Jacobs, ‘Limits to Neoclassicism’, p. 75.
83 Ibid., p. 70. 84 Ibid., p. 72. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p. 69.
87 The apparently simplistic attribution of value to environmental commodities is mitigated
by an attempt to factor into the equation not just ‘use’ value but ‘option’ value (the
value of preserving something in case the consumer wishes to use it), ‘Bequest’ value,
which is the value of options for future generations, and ‘existence’ value, which is
the ‘sentimental’ value placed on the existence of whales etc. The poorer nations are
mentioned as providing a rationale for natural capital conservation (which, to be fair,
is the approach later adopted instead of a substitutability approach) and the process
of exporting an unsustainable quantity of hardwood from poor nations is described as
a policy choice on that basis: ‘If we take the broader view [why broader?], based on
total rather than natural capital only, the hardwood exporting countries may simply be
converting their export revenue into investments which will sustain their future’: ibid.,
p. 70. The ‘choice’ exercised by these countries is then castigated: ‘export proceeds
are often turned into consumption’. The solution to this is foreign aid for sustainable
development, a patronising solution which disguises the lack of choice that plagues these
nations.
88 Pearce, Markandya and Barbier, Blueprint, p. 53.
89 Arguing along lines not dissimilar to R.M. Dworkin, ‘Is Wealth a Value’ (1980) 9 Journal
of Legal Studies 191, discussed in chapter 2.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
essentially moral grounds, namely that it devalues the cultural and spiri-
tual meaning which the environment has for human society and ignores
altogether the rights of other species’.90 This confusion translates into an
attempt to measure the degree of concern, i.e. the willingness of individuals
to pay for the environment.91 A further confusion arises in the assertion
that ‘preserving and improving the environment is never a free option; it
costs money and uses up real resources’.92 Again, the hidden assumption
is that ‘growth is good’ since the cost of preservation may be ‘in terms
of some benefit foregone’. The inexpensive option of not developing is
discounted. Jacobs,93 in investigating the claim of this school of thought
to moral neutrality, points out that in their analysis of the environment
they depart completely from their analysis of ‘public goods’ the value of
which cannot be derived from individual market preference. In departing
from this tenet so far as environmental issues are concerned, they cease to
analyse the real world: ‘They are analysing what might happen if the envi-
ronment were a set of commodities . . . Why should economists analyse a
thing as if it were something else?’ Two answers are given by Jacobs to this
question: the first, that the creation of a pseudo-market creates protection
from the overuse of ‘free’ environmental goods, the second, that individ-
uals do in fact treat the environment as if it were a purchased commodity.
Jacobs advances criticisms of both of these answers. On the issue of pro-
tecting the environment by use of market mechanisms, Jacobs argues that
optimality may not be the sole criteria for allocating resources. We might,
he argues ‘tolerate some inefficiency in total allocation to ensure a more
egalitarian sharing-out – for example, insisting that everyone should have
access to the same quantity of drinking water.’ The construction of hypo-
thetical markets, especially on the basis of ‘willingness to pay’, ‘cannot
be divorced from ability to pay which leads inevitably to inegalitarian
outcomes’.94 The hypothetical market also leads to insufficient weight
being placed on rights over the environment, particularly where destruc-
tion may lead to destruction of a culture. Further, it gives insufficient
weight to the desires and wishes of future inhabitants, based as it is on the
preferences of the present generation. These may ‘express the interests of
the present generation in [future] people’. They do not ‘express the inter-
ests of future people’.95 These alternative bases for social choice expose
the hollowness of optimality as the foundation for action concerning the
environment. Optimality is derived from individually expressed choices.
Even supposing that this works with commodities where a market exists,
90 Jacobs, ‘Limits to Neoclassicism’, p. 74.
91 Pearce, Markandya and Barbier, Blueprint, p. 55.
92 Ibid., p. 56. 93 Jacobs, ‘Limits to Neoclassicism’. 94 Ibid., p. 76.
95 And ignores the interests of other species: ibid. The extinction of species may be ‘optimal’.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Jacobs points out that the individual preferences surrounding the hypo-
thetical market are just that – hypothetical. Thus, ‘in the case of the
environment there are no individually expressed preferences . . . it is no use
invoking the primacy of individual preferences to prove the primacy of
individual preferences. The importance of optimality is simply a value
judgment.’96 The claim to ethical neutrality is a sham and the real issue is
whether, because of the ‘public goods’ nature of the environment, a public
forum should take account of moral criteria rather than individual self-
interest. The second answer is met by evidence from contingent valuation
exercises which tend to show that it is not the case that the environment is
viewed as if it were merely another commodity, and explaining the signif-
icant failure to reach ‘a priced environment’ by the concept of ‘category
mistake’: ‘The environment belongs in the sphere not of monetary but of
moral valuation: people choose what they believe to be right as “citizens”,
rather than what is in their interests, as “consumers”.’97 Jacobs suggests
an alternative approach termed ‘institutional environmental economics’
which would research the way in which people actually value the envi-
ronment, as consumers or citizens, or a complex mixture of them both,
and would therefore address the ethical and moral effects of choices to be
made and the political process through which choices must be processed,
whether public or market-based.98
The sociologists
In order for sociologists to analyse environmental problems ‘some deep-
seated (and in important respects, well-founded) inhibitions need to be
overcome’.99 These include the recent experience of biological deter-
minism, including the holocaust, racism and sexism, as well as the foun-
dations of sociology which deliberately sought to create a human identity
separate from nature. The ‘dualist strategy of thinking about “nature”
and “society” (or “culture”) as qualitatively different realms offers one
obvious and unambiguous way of resisting biological determinism’.100
However, as Benton shows, dualist conceptions spawn a range of
approaches from naturalistic reductionism, through technological deter-
minism to sociological reductionism:
96 Ibid., p. 77.
97 Ibid., p. 81 and see M. Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (Cambridge University Press,
1988).
98 Jacobs, ‘Limits to Neoclassicism’, pp. 86–7.
99 T. Benton and M. Redclift, ‘Introduction’ in Social Theory and the Global Environment
(Routledge, 1994).
100 T. Benton, ‘Biology and Social Theory’ in Benton and Redclift, Social Theory.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
In each case ‘nature’ is counterpoised to ‘society’, but at the polar extremes one of
these opposed terms tends to swallow up the other. In naturalistic reductionism
human society is seen as part of the wider totality of nature, whereas in the
more extreme forms of sociological (or discourse) reductionism, ‘nature’ becomes
transmuted into its symbolic representations.101
That this tradition is alive and well appears from Contested Natures102
in which Macnaughten and Urry argue against the claim that the envi-
ronment is ‘essentially a “real entity”, which, in and of itself and substan-
tially separate from social practices and human experience has the power
to produce unambiguous, observable and rectifiable outcomes’.103
Benton and Redclift argue that a further difficulty arises from the
parameters which have traditionally bounded sociological studies. The
nation state has been seen as of considerable significance and the gener-
alised, abstract nature of many theories ignores or minimises the impact
of space and time.104 The importance of breaking out of this way of
thought is of vital importance given the power imbalance between nation
states and TNCs. Sklair105 introduces the concept of transnational prac-
tices to add to analyses which concern relations between states and state
actors.106 Taking the analysis of O’Riordan107 that environmentalists can
be classified as ‘dry’, ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’, Sklair postulates that the global
environmental elite belonging to the two former categories are able to
understand and work with the global capitalist elite who are active in the
world’s trading systems. This is because that cumulative elite believe in a
‘technical fix’ of problems (dry greens) or in neo-classical ‘shallow green’
economic analysis:
Clearly, the dominant forces in the global capitalist system have no option but
to believe and act as if [the contradiction between capitalist development and
global survival] can be resolved by a combination of economic-technological,
political and culture ideology means. Part of this must involve the ways in which
the capitalist system uses the Third World to resolve the contradiction.108
This powerful analysis would be a doomsday representation, particu-

larly because of the scepticism shown of the ‘deep green’ alternative vision
(see the analysis of social ecologists and the backlash below). However,
101 Ibid., p. 31.

102 P. Macnaughten and J. Urry, Contested Natures (Sage, London, 1998).
103 Ibid., p. 1. 104 Benton and Redclift, Social Theory, p. 5.
105 L. Sklair, ‘Global Sociology and Global Environmental Change’ in Benton and Redclift,
Social Theory.
106 Sklair, ‘Global Sociology’, p. 205.
107 T. O’Riordan, ‘The New Environmentalism and Sustainable Development’ (1991) 108
Science of the Total Environment 5.
108 Sklair, ‘Global Sociology’, p. 221.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
one significant factor is absent and that is a more detailed examination of

‘capitalism’ which, while it may be presented by neo-classical economists
as inevitable, deregulated, impersonal and global, that is not a universal
vision;109 Hirst and Thompson argue that the globalisation of economic
systems has been wildly exaggerated along with the impossibility of reg-
ulation at national and international level. This vision is therefore of a
controlled capitalism. The lack of political will to control may well stem
from the misrepresentation of free market globalisation as irresistable:110
‘Markets do not regulate themselves and best outcomes do not happen
spontaneously.’111
Formulating a course of action from sociological studies of man’s
interaction with the environment also entails choosing from different
sociological traditions. ‘The first and most pervasive of these contests
is that between approaches which put human consciousness agency at
the centre of analysis, and those which focus attention on the social-
structural conditions for, and constraints on, action.’112 The distribu-
tion of the power to choose is a crucial omission from the neo-classical
economists’ approach. The ‘individualist’ versus ‘structuralist’ debate
has a further dimension in the assessment of risk; whether this can ever
achieve a significant degree of objectivity is a difficult and contentious
issue.113
The technocrats and risk assessment

Benton points out that the capitalist and communist versions of the ‘cor-
nucopian’ vision of the technocrats differed little save for the communist
understanding of competition and private property as a ‘constraint on
the further development of human productive powers, and its emphasis
on distributive justice rather than individual choice’.114 The widespread
perception that the capitalist mode of production has ‘succeeded’ in
bringing material prosperity while the communist mode has ‘failed’ has
left the field wide open to the capitalist elite and their environment
elite brethren imbued with the optimism of the cornucopian vision that
‘[s]cience and technology promise an end to poverty, insecurity and dis-
ease, and a prospect of ever-growing material prosperity and cultural
enrichment’.115 The extent of this ‘capture’ of the environment elite can
109 P. Hirst and G. Thompson, Globalisation in Question (2nd edn, Blackwell, Oxford,
1996).
110 See ibid., esp. chs 6 and 7.
111 Will Hutton, ‘Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton in Conversation’ in W. Hutton and
A. Giddens (eds), On the Edge: Living with Global Capitalism (Cape, London, 2000).
112 Benton and Redclift, Social Theory, p. 7. 113 Ibid., p. 9.
114 Benton, ‘Biology and Social Theory’, p. 32. 115 Ibid., p. 32.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
perhaps be gleaned from The Limits to Growth,116 which was a ‘specific

use’ of scientific method.117 Thus, the ‘core assumptions . . . of a single-
line cumulative growth of scientific knowledge . . . [and] that human well
being, the “good life” consists in the ever-growing gratification of human
desires by way of this technologically mediated mastery of nature’.118
This ‘directs attention away from gross global inequalities in power and
resources which allow tens of millions, especially in Third World coun-
tries, to suffer and die as a result of ecological destruction’.119 Further,
the managerialist approach stems from the dominant vision of growth
and development and therefore contemplates only ‘the long-term sustain-
ability of a particular kind of human culture and its dominant economic
and political interests’.120 The extent to which the ‘technocratic’ under-
standing of risk pervades is evident from examples such as the report
to the European Commission Directorate-General for Science, Research
and Development, reported in Policies for Cleaner Technology,121 which
concluded that developed economies had entrenched technologies that
involved huge costs if radical change was desired.122 An example is car
use in developed nations. The conclusion is that research must be tar-
geted at providing technically ‘greener’ technology and understanding
the obstacles to implementation of these technical ‘fixes’ so that the most
effective means of regulation can be devised. The use of sociology here is
important because studies of the barriers to implementation are vital in
this technological project. However, the study expressly rejects changing
the ‘linear growth’ and development projection which supports only one
particular type of culture.
A more radical approach may be based on Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society,123
which gives us two vital contributions to the present debate. One is the ne-
cessity of understanding the physical risks present in society and the way
in which they cut across boundaries of nations, class and status. The
second is the interdependence between disciplines in assessing these risks:
what becomes clear in risk discussions are the fissures and gaps between scien-
tific and social rationality in dealing with the hazardous potential of civilization.
The two sides talk past each other . . . The scientific concern with the risks
of industrial development in fact relies on social expectations and value judg-
ments, just as the social discussion and perception of risk depend on scientific
arguments.
116 D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. Behrens, The Limits to Growth
(Universe Books, New York, 1972).
117 Benton, ‘Biology and Social Theory’, p. 33. 118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., p. 37. 120 Ibid.
121 A. Clayton, G. Spinardi and R. Williams, Policies for Cleaner Technology (Earthscan,
1999).
122 Ibid., p. 6. 123 U. Beck, Risk Society (translation published by Sage, London, 1992).
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Unfortunately, the subjective nature of risk is difficult to capture in

international regulation. So, for example, the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety124 incorporated the precautionary approach contained in the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development but bases the risk
assessment solely on the absence of ‘scientific certainty’, leaving more
complex evaluations of risk to the parties. We live in a world where ‘[t]he
environment, health, personal safety, and even the planet Earth itself
appear to be under attack from enemies never before encountered. The
goal of wresting society from the mercy of the laws of chance continues to
elude us.’125 It is likely that the decision-makers will take refuge in ‘scien-
tific’ and ‘mathematical’ calculations of risk which are likely to disguise
political consequences. As we have seen, the reduction of risk to mathe-
matical symbols such as monetary value has precisely this consequence.
Some methods of reversing the tendency to ‘detached explication’ and
more concern with ‘engagement and substantive issues’126 are needed. The
mode of scientific explanation seeks to disguise the underlying fact that
human perceptions reproduced in ‘scientific discourses’ define the ‘mod-
ern environmental problem’.127 To simply argue, therefore, that there is
no environmental problem is ‘self-defeatingly reductionist’128 but reflects
the postmodern view.
The introduction of redistributive justice into the Brundtland Report
may have exacerbated the process, identified by Beck, whereby more and
more processes have been made the objects of choice and responsibil-
ity and consequently become subject to individual risk assessment.129
This process ‘produces a condition where modern individuals are prone
to states of heightened uncertainty and anxiety, as decisions prolifer-
ate and the cultural codes used to negotiate those decisions become
more and more complex and varied’.130 Szersynski, Lash and Wynne
represent this tendency as ‘one side of the problem of subjectivity in late
modernity’, with the ‘other side’ of the problem being ‘objectification –
the stripping away of human meanings on both inner and outer real-
ity . . . through the ever-expanding reach of science and technology’.131
However, the co-existence of these two problems may be more complex
124 Agreed 29 January 2000 in Montreal, see A. Quereshi, ‘The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety and the WTO: Co-existence or Incoherence?’ (2000) ICLQ 835.
125 P. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (Wiley, London, 1996).
126 B. Adams, ‘Running Out of Time’ in Benton and Redclift’ Social Theory, pp. 92, 93.
127 S. Lash, B. Szersynski and B. Wynne, Risk, Environment and Modernity: Towards a New
Ecology (Sage, 1996), p. 2.
128 Ibid., p. 3.
129 Beck, Risk Society, and ‘Risk Society and the Provident State’ in Lash, Szersynski and
Wynne, Risk, Environment.
130 Lash, Szersynski and Wynne, Risk, Environment, p. 13. 131 Ibid.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
since the ‘management’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘positivist’ responses have

the overwhelming attraction of permitting a simplification by partition of
the issues. Thus, not only is it possible to factor out cultural complex-
ities but also each problem may be labelled and put in a technical box.
Thus, ‘global warming’, ‘nuclear waste’ and ‘acid rain’ become three
quite separate issues. Thus, the technocrats and economists are attrac-
tive because they reduce the fantastic complexity of our interrelatedness,
particularly as ‘globalisation’ shrinks the size of the world. Thus, the
two ‘problems’ are not just two faces of subjectivity – the technocratic
approach is an attempt, however misguided, to solve the first problem
of the tyranny of choice. Calls for the complexity to be re-recognised
thus become frightening, not just because recognition of political conse-
quences of economic systems132 may lead to rethinking of comfortable
and self-indulgent lifestyles, but because techniques for factoring in this
complexity are not well-developed. Habermas’ concept of communica-
tive discourse, particularly as a method of rule-making133 by rational
discourse amongst all who will feel the consequences of the imposition
of norms, is one method but without a structural map is likely to lead
to inaction.134 However, elements of a number of alternative insights
may be harnessed to afford a plan for breaking the fear of risk and the
dependency cycle on technical fixes that has been the response. First,
we may look to the neo-classical economists for an understanding that
rational decision-making is based on ‘complete information’; secondly,
to the work of Maarten Hajer, who argues that all understandings of the
environment are social constructions which simultaneously express and
disguise preferences about the kind of society we ought to have.135 He
calls for a new discourse which would identify the hidden preferences of
the current lines of thought and use ecology as ‘a keyword under which
society discusses the issues of “life politics” (Giddens) in a way which
allows for a rethinking of existing social arrangements’.136 The third line
of approach might build on Beck’s concept of risk in order to construct a
risk assessment framework which opened up the discourse to value rather
than price on the basis of an understanding of the multiple consequences
of differing actions and inactions, including the type of society which
is implicit in the choices made. This would re-open the debate about
132 As suggested by R. Grove-White, ‘Environmental Knowledge and Public Policy
Needs: On Humanising the Research Agenda’ in Lash, Szersynski and Wynne, Risk,
Environment.
133 J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (W. Rehg (trans.), Polity, Cambridge, 1996).
134 Habermas is surely represented at most academic departmental meetings.
135 M. Hajer, ‘Ecological Modernisation as Cultural Politics’ in Lash, Szersynski and
Wynne, Risk, Environment.
136 Ibid., pp. 265–6.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
redistributive justice that has been buried by fear of the necessity for self-
denial and the complexity of the interrelations between the world trading
system and ecological concerns. It is this central importance of risk and
its assessment that may give us a clue to formulating new methods of
thought which can overcome the difficulties of the polarised and distant
modes of thought considered above and begin to develop an approach to
industrial processes which combines scientific and ethical thought. Some
small steps have been taken in the field of corporate governance which
may provide clues to a framework of thought.
Social ecologists argue that the ecological crisis is the outcome not of a
generalised anthropocentrism but of distorted social relations at work in
hierarchical systems where an elite subjugates others while ‘pillaging the
natural world for prestige, profit and control’.137 The solution suggested
is small societies ‘which recognise that human wellbeing is inextricably
bound up with the wellbeing of the natural world on which human life
depends’.138 Zimmerman’s study of radical ecology shows how deeply
diverse, even confused, its roots can be seen to be. Exposing the risk that
tendencies to enthrone the ‘natural’ can lead to the rise of authoritar-
ianism – ‘[i]n stressful times, people are all too willing to surrender to
leaders promising to end humanity’s alienation from nature’139 – Zim-
merman explores the roots of deep ecology through the 1960s counter-
culture, complete with psychotropic drugs, to religious and specifically
christian roots of the ecological crisis in the ‘domination of man’ over
nature.140 The rejection of modernity’s ‘dark side: its control obsession,
its logic of identity, its anthropocentric humanism’ by the mainstream
postmodernist theorists such as Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Deleuse
have cross-fertilised with deep ecology despite some initial mutual
suspicions.141 Adding to this the feminist perspective that androcentrism
is significantly to blame for the ecological crisis142 (however justified),
lays a fine foundation for a ‘green backlash’ which emphasises elitism,
obscurity, anti-christianity, an out-of-touch attitude, anti-male attitudes
and impossible and illogical solutions. ‘Deep-green perspectives often
rely on some version of an arcadian “golden age” in which humans lived
in harmony with one another and with nature.’143 The suggested solu-
tions ‘are remarkably consistent in their versions of the “cure”: a return
to a materially more simple, egalitarian and convivial, decentralized
communal existence’.144
137 M. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future (University of California Press, Berkeley,

1994).
138 Ibid., p. 2. 139 Ibid., p. 7. 140 See Genesis 2:48.
141 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, p. 92. 142 Ibid., p. 277.
143 Benton, ‘Biology and Social Theory’, p. 39. 144 Ibid.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006
Conclusion
This study of one of the issues which lies at the heart of many of the codes
of conduct, whether they are globally proposed or adopted by compa-
nies, shows how one small element of corporate social responsibility can
become a matter of hot dispute and runs the risk of being subverted by
market fundamentalists or become meaningless by an appeal to ‘golden
age’ values. Much work remains to be done to identify a sound basis for
responsibility, to identify the values that should be espoused by an inter-
national concession theory and to feed them into systems of corporate
governance.145 Some suggestions are made in chapter 6.
145 See end of Bibliography for the list of Websites.
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660139.006

Corporate - Social - Responsibility - Article

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Corporate - Social - Responsibility - Article

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Corporate - Social - Responsibility - Article

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

5 Corporate social responsibility

The move by companies to adopt a philosophy of ‘corporate social

This means that, as well as jurisdictional complexities and the com-

4 Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups, esp. ch. 1.

powers solely in the interests of shareholders was to abdicate responsi-

The inability of the law to achieve corporate social responsibility by

It is hard to see why this is so. Payment (or benefits) provided to

cosy relationship with a friendly auditor. These aspects of CSR will be

Corporate social responsibility: what is it?

The nine principles are:

For the EU Commission,18 ‘Corporate Social Responsibility is essen-

Others are lukewarm, acknowledging that many companies achieve

24 M. Hopkins, The Planetary Bargain (Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999).

Hertz points out that ‘there is emerging a new dimension to corporate

with the spectacular collapses at ENRON, WorldCom and Parmalat,

Vague principles and shaky foundations

stakeholder debate which has been examined above, eventually arguing

40 Addo, Human Rights and TNCs.

The third principle focuses on the individual moral choices made by

Concession on the international stage

52 This is argued (probably at tedious length) in Dine, Governance of Corporate Groups.

‘Corporations operate under the terms of two charters: a formal, written,

Relationship between codes and corporate governance

shield management from accountability’,58 but only nods to such ‘stake-

(1) relies heavily on the fiction of shareholder control over management;

From the international perspective the most glaring omission is the

58 Ibid. 59 OECD Code, Principle III A. 60 OECD Code, Principle III D.

achieving them (Principles of Corporate Governance). This paper argues

67 Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises, p. 579.

standards, and companies’ relationships with the communities in which

Loss of redistribution from ‘sustainable development’:

72 H. Brundtland, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 65.

as becoming a simpler place77 – the exact opposite is true as a result of

This powerful analysis would be a doomsday representation, particu-

101 Ibid., p. 31.

one significant factor is absent and that is a more detailed examination of

The technocrats and risk assessment

perhaps be gleaned from The Limits to Growth,116 which was a ‘specific

Unfortunately, the subjective nature of risk is difficult to capture in

since the ‘management’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘positivist’ responses have

137 M. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future (University of California Press, Berkeley,

145 See end of Bibliography for the list of Websites.

You might also like