Republic of the Philippines members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at

SUPREME COURT least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 Black defines "practice of law" as:

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,  The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
vs. application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
of Budget and Management, respondents. embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf. preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all
legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner. actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office
where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
PARAS, J.:p describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national
existence. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C: considered to be in the practice of law when he:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a ... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar controversies and there, in such representative capacity
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
years. (Emphasis supplied) defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise
stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
Constitution which similarly provides: while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d
and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines 895, 340 Mo. 852)
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders
of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil.
173,176-177) stated:
 The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
matters connected with the law incorporation services, 312)
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by or skill." (111 ALR 23)
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied) The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces make a manifestation which I forgot to do
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of during our review of the provisions on the
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and a very brief statement?
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. The Commissioner will please proceed.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of others, the qualifications provided for by Section
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who
is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold have been engaged in the practice of law for at
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of least ten years".
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours) not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or
for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
 qualified to be considered for appointment as members or Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit. synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
at least ten years is taken up. delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be
one question. organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms,
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates."
(Ibid.).
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in
the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
requirement of a law practice that is set forth in essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which
the Article on the Commission on Audit? lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.:
Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
work of COA, although it is auditing, will [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626
necessarily involve legal work; it will involve [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too
employed in COA now would have the necessary global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
qualifications in accordance with the Provision
on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
is yes. publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage
spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
this is that this is equivalent to the practice of of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
law.
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history,
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in
MR. OPLE. Thank you. this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the
... ( Emphasis supplied) bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied) diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4). procedures in many decisional contexts.

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating
increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast
some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty decision and response in situations of acute danger have
such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice- prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687). electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document therefrom.
drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
employment. (Ibid.). in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the legal research has become a vital necessity.
most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.). early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional business administration or management, functioning at the legal
concept of practice of law. policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for
the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a which are currently engaged in similar types of complex
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers decision-making.
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in problems would require the services of an astute attorney
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making. because of the complex legal implications that arise from each
and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law,"
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
implications of the corporate law research function accompanied
by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts
one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller 4).
and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
handle most legal problems in-house. law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who well into the intertwining modern management issues.
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory current advances which are of particular significance to the
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
law. responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities
other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
is representing. These include such matters as determining policy circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.) "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying
theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work globalization process, including the resulting strategic
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
business. multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate each other — often with those who are competitors in other
lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, arenas.
international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their participating in the organization and operations of governance
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4). Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the complicated as corporations organize for global operations.
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated ( Emphasis supplied)
lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
governmental policies toward the promotion and management of supplied)
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group- responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law.
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
outsiders, promoting team achievements within the that time when transactional or similar facts are being
organization. In general, such external activities are better considered and made.
predictors of team performance than internal group processes.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
(Emphasis supplied) today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos: Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
both planning and pressing immediate problems. An issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
psychological. New programming techniques now make the internally with more complex make or by decisions.
system dynamics principles more accessible to managers —
including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied) This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
 working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops
April 10, 1991, p. 4). Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings
vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
11, 1989, p. 4). freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to
the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be
the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the a member.
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification
of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments the contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
be declared null and void.
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing;
124, Rollo) (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of development policies as key factors in maintaining their
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of
subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to the United States Agency for International Development, during
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
 World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
( Emphasis supplied) performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his
best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
international business specialist or an economist in the the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the
guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment
321). ( Emphasis supplied) in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine
qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission
"They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265). The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall
Court said: any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
 Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say Additionally, consider the following:
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the (1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require the negative.
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a (2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
constitutional intent.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people still reverse the U.S. Senate.
ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way
of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit
that giveth life.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on
what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different agreed on condition that —
from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
No blade shall touch his skin;
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more No blood shall flow from his veins.
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or
petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's
President? eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved,
Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused
We now proceed: the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any
blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack SO ORDERED.
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant
the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
 Republic of the Philippines However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of
SUPREME COURT the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request,
Manila the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 2opined that
petitioner’s term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02,
EN BANC 1999.

G.R. No. 140335               December 13, 2000 Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02,
1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon, wrote the
THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner,  Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner
vs. Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999.
FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents.
On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an
DECISION opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02,
1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent." 3
PARDO, J.:
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued
notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and
The Case emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective
February 02, 1999.4
The case is a special civil action of certiorari seeking to annul and set aside two
"decisions" of the Commission on Audit ruling that petitioner’s term of office as On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-
1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as set forth in her appointment paper. 090 dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the
propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioner’s term of office
The Facts may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which
set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied
Gaminde, ad interim,Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office acquiescence of the Office of the President.5
on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the
appointment. We quote verbatim her appointment paper: Commission on Audit denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129. 6

"11 June 1993 Hence, this petition.7

"Madam: The Issue

"Pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as
COMMISSIONER, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11,
1999. 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on
February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties
of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of The Court’s Ruling
your oath of office."1
The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval
is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: between the expiration of the terms.13

"Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional
seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date
hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. 14
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity." 8
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and
The 1973 Constitution introduced the first system of a regular rotation or cycle in "tenure." "[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
the membership of the Civil Service Commission. The provision on the 1973 incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
Constitution reads: office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
"x x x The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the Prime actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The
Minister for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of the Commissioners tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of
first appointed, one shall hold office for seven years, another for five years, and the incumbent."15
the third for three years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor." 9 In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of
office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-
Actually, this was a copy of the Constitutional prescription in the amended 1935 3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2),
Constitution of a rotational system for the appointment of the Chairman and Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987
members of the Commission on Elections. The Constitutional amendment Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of
creating an independent Commission on Elections provides as follows: the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first
appointees terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no
"Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as
consent of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of this is understood to coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its
nine years and may not be reappointed. Of the Members of the Commission first ratification (on February 02, 1987).
appointed, one shall hold office for nine years, another for six years, and the third
for three years. The Chairman and the other Members of the Commission on On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitution
Elections may be removed from office only by impeachment in the manner provides:
provided in this Constitution."10
"SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
In Republic vs. Imperial,11 we said that "the operation of the rotational plan Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for
requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed
of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or
any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the appointed to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer
term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term."12 than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution." 16

Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term"
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall continue in
of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner
removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office
or appointed to a new term thereunder." The term "unless" imports an exception regular seven-year term. This term must be deemed to start on February 02,
to the general rule.17 Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent 1994, immediately succeeding her predecessor, whose term started on the
members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year common date of the terms of office of the first appointees under the 1987
after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the Constitution. She assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a term expiring February
discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their 02, 2001.
removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of This is shown in her appointment paper, quoted verbatim as follows:
which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity
of the Constitution. "March 5, 1995

However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article "Madam:
IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees
under this Constitution.
"Pursuant to the provisions of Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2, of the
Constitution, you are hereby appointed, ad interim, CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE
At the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent Chairman and COMMISSION, for a term expiring February 2, 2001.
members of the Civil Service Commission were the following: (1) Chairperson
Celerina G. Gotladera. She was initially appointed as OIC Chairman on March 19,
"By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties
1986, and appointed chairman on December 24, 1986, which she assumed on
of the office, furnishing this Office and the Civil Service Commission with copies of
March 13, 1987. (2) Atty. Cirilo G. Montejo. On June 25, 1986, President Corazon
your oath of office.
C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, without any term. He assumed office on
July 9, 1986, and served until March 31, 1987, when he filed a certificate of
candidacy for the position of Congressman, 2nd District, Leyte, thereby vacating "(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"
his position as Commissioner. His tenure was automatically cut-off by the filing of
his certificate of candidacy. (3) Atty. Mario D. Yango. On January 22, 1985, Second line : Commissioner – Five-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos appointed him Commissioner for a term expiring 1992. On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Atty. Samilo N. Barlongay
January 25, 1990. He served until February 2, 1988, when his term ended in Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On February 17, 1988, the Commission
virtue of the transitory provisions referred to. On May 30, 1988, President Aquino on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines, confirmed the nomination. He
re-appointed him to a new three-year term and served until May 31, 1991, assumed office on March 04, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1992. He
exceeding his lawful term, but not exceeding the maximum of seven years, served as de facto Commissioner until March 04, 1993.
including service before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Under this
factual milieu, it was only Commissioner Yango who was extended a new term On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde
under the 1987 Constitution. The period consumed between the start of the term Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02,
on February 02, 1987, and his actual assumption on May 30, 1988, due to his 1999.18 This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September
belated appointment, must be counted against him. 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She
accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by
Given the foregoing common starting point, we compute the terms of the first the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this
appointees and their successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987 connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato
Constitution by their respective lines, as follows: C. Corona19 clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in
error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a
First line : Chairman – seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 01, 1994. nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her
On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas successor20 must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on
Chairman, Civil Service Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commission on February 02, 2006.
Appointments confirmed the nomination. She assumed office on March 04, 1988.
Her term ended on February 02, 1994. She served as de facto Chairman until Third line : Commissioner – Three-year term. February 02, 1987 to February 02,
March 04, 1995. On March 05, 1995, the President appointed then Social Welfare 1990. Atty. Mario D. Yango was incumbent commissioner at the time of the
Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, Civil Service Commission, to a adoption of the 1987 Constitution. His extended tenure ended on February 02,
1988. In May, 1988, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed him Commissioner, Valmores – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1999 to Sept. 08, 2000 to
Civil Service Commission to a new three-year term thereunder. He assumed office (incumbent) Feb. 02, 2006 Feb. 02, 2006
on May 30, 1988. His term ended on February 02, 1990, but served as de 3rd Member Term Tenure
facto Commissioner until May 31, 1991. On November 26, 1991, the President (3-year original)
nominated Atty. Ramon P. Ereñ eta as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. On Yango - 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to May 30, 1988 to
December 04, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Feb. 02, 1990 May 31, 1991
He assumed office on December 12, 1991, for a term expiring February 02, Ereñ eta – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1990 to Dec. 12, 1991 to
1997.21 Feb. 02, 1997 Feb. 02, 1997
Erestain, Jr. – 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 1997 to Feb. 11, 1997 to
Commendably, he voluntarily retired on February 02, 1997. On February 03, (incumbent) Feb. 02, 2004 Feb. 02, 2004
1997, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed Atty. Jose F. Erestain, Jr. Commissioner, The Fallo
Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 2004. He assumed
office on February 11, 1997. WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her
Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.
February 02, 1994, for the first Chairman,22 February 02, 1992, for the first five- However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and
year term Commissioner,23 and February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
Commissioner.24 Their successors must also maintain the two year interval, rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit
namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman;25 February 02, 1999, for Commissioner such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñ eta,
Jr. ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as
they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde
The third batch of appointees would then be having terms of office as follows: and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02,
1999, until February 02, 2000.
First line : Chairman, February 02, 2001 to February 02, 2008; Second line:
Commissioner, February 02, 1999 to February 02, 2006;26 and, Third line: This decision shall be effective immediately.
Commissioner, February 02, 1997 to February 02, 2004, 27 thereby consistently
maintaining the two-year interval. No costs.

The line of succession, terms of office and tenure of the Chairman and members of SO ORDERED.
the Civil Service Commission may be outlined as follows:28
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-
Chairman Term Tenure Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
(7-year original) Bellosillo J., no part. Related to one of parties.
Sto. Tomas – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to Mar. 04, 1988 to Puno J., in the result.
Feb. 02, 1994 March 08, 1995 Mendoza, J., join De Leon’s dissent.
De Leon – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1994 to March 22, 1995 to De Leon, Jr ., J., see concurring & dissenting opinion
(incumbent) Feb. 02, 2001 Feb. 02, 2001
_______ - 3rd appointee Feb. 02, 2001 to
Feb. 02, 2008
2nd Member Term Tenure EN BANC
(5-year original) [G.R. No. 93867 :  December 18, 1990.]
Barlongay – 1st appointee Feb. 02, 1987 to March 04, 1988 to
Feb. 02, 1992 March 04, 1993 192 SCRA 358
Gaminde – 2nd appointee Feb. 02, 1992 to June 11, 1993 to
Feb. 02, 1999 Feb. 02, 2000
 SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity stalemated if the President of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated
as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. an Acting Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem. In any event,
even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the President (could) act
 
to fill the hiatus," as the Solicitor General maintains.
DECISION
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
  Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially executive in
nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the
CRUZ, J.:
discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its
  own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise
of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the Philippines of
on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section
Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission
7.
on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
d' etat attempt. under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its
consent, by the President of the Philippines.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner and are not in
issue in this case. What is the power of the President of the Philippines to make A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and
the challenged designation in view of the status of the Commission on Elections as therefore revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation.
an independent constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Assuming its validity, the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Section 1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at
Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is doubtful if the respondent,
capacity." having accepted such designation, will not be estopped from challenging its
withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101,
where President Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor General as acting It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent cannot be
member of the Commission on Elections and the Court revoked the designation as removed at will from her permanent position as Associate Commissioner. It is no
contrary to the Constitution. It is also alleged that the respondent is not even the less true, however, that she can be replaced as Acting Chairman, with or without
senior member of the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate cause, and thus deprived of the powers and perquisites of that temporary
Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.:-cralaw position.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the Commission The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the
on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary
themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their designation in favor of the respondent. This is still a government of laws and not
independence. He cites the practice in this Court, where the senior Associate of men. The problem allegedly sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not
Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No call for presidential action. The situation could have been handled by the
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary. members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of
the President, however well-meaning.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary
in the case of the Supreme Court because the temporary succession cited is In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on
provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they
Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement, themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis
however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by the thereof were for them and not the President to make.
President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was
"administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the
moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation.
COMELEC.
But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an overstatement to suggest with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the
that the operations of the Commission on Elections would have been disturbed or Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the DECISION
Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its  
members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of  
the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
 
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of respondent
The Civil Service Commission (petitioner) via the present petition for mandamus
Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is declared
seeks to compel the Department of Budget and Management (respondent) to
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent is hereby ordered to desist from
release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a
serving as such. This is without prejudice to the incumbent Associate
determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position
autonomy.
if they so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the
By petitioners claim, the amount of P215,270,000.00 was appropriated for its
appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the Philippines with
Central Office by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2002, while the total
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd
allocations for the same Office, if all sources of funds are considered, amount
SO ORDERED. to P285,660,790.44.[1] It complains, however, that the total fund releases by
respondent to its Central Office during the fiscal year 2002 was
Fernan C . J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco,
only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30.
Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 
Feliciano, J., is on leave. To petitioner, this balance was intentionally withheld by respondent on the basis
of its no report, no release policy whereby allocations for agencies are withheld
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
pending their submission of the documents mentioned in Sections 3.8 to 3.10 and
EN BANC Section 7.0 of National Budget Circular No. 478 on Guidelines on the Release of
  the FY 2002 Funds,[2] which documents are:
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 158791  
Petitioner,   1.           Annual Cash Program (ACP)
  Present: 2.           Requests for the Release of Special Allotment Release Order
    (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA)
  DAVIDE, JR., C.J., 3.           Summary List of Checks Issued and Cancelled
- versus - PUNO, 4.           Statement of Allotment, Obligations and Balances
  PANGANIBAN, 5.           Monthly Statement of Charges to Accounts Payable
  QUISUMBING, 6.           Quarterly Report of Actual Income
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, 7.           Quarterly Financial Report of Operations
  SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 8.           Quarterly Physical Report of Operations
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CARPIO, 9.           FY 2001 Preliminary and Final Trial Balance
MANAGEMENT, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, 10.       Statement of Accounts Payable
Respondent. CORONA,  
  CARPIO MORALES,  
CALLEJO, SR., Petitioner contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon
AZCUNA, independent constitutional bodies of which it is one is a violation of the principle
TINGA, of fiscal autonomy and, therefore, unconstitutional.
CHICO-NAZARIO, and Respondent, at the outset, opposes the petition on procedural grounds. It
GARCIA, JJ. contends that first, petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies as it could
Promulgated: have sought clarification from respondents Secretary regarding the extent of
  fiscal autonomy before resorting to this Court. Second, even assuming that
July 22, 2005 administrative remedies were exhausted, there are no exceptional and compelling
_______________________ reasons to justify the direct filing of the petition with this Court instead of the trial
x - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x court, thus violating the hierarchy of courts.
   
On the merits, respondent, glossing over the issue raised by petitioner on the In Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[8] this Court, in construing the phrase automatic
constitutionality of enforcing the no report, no release policy, denies having release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reading:
strictly enforced the policy upon offices vested with fiscal autonomy, it claiming  
that it has applied by extension to these offices the Resolution of this Court in Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC (Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
Autonomy) issued on June 3, 1993,  [3] particularly one of the guiding principles automatically released to them,
established therein governing the budget of the Judiciary, to wit:  
   
5. The Supreme Court may submit to the Department of held:
Budget and Management reports of operation and income,  
current plantilla of personnel, work and financial plans and Websters Third New International Dictionary defines
similar reports only for recording purposes. The submission automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so
thereof concerning funds previously released shall not be a that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
condition precedent for subsequent fund releases. (Emphasis nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an
and underscoring supplied) automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an
  automatic manner: without thought or conscious
  intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something
Respondent proffers at any rate that the delay in releasing the balance of mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are
petitioners budget was not on account of any failure on petitioners part to submit not required to perform any act  to receive the just share
the required reports; rather, it was due to a shortfall in revenues. [4] accruing to them from the national coffers. x x x (Emphasis and
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent applies underscoring supplied)[9]
only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step  
as a condition precedent to taking action in court. [5] As petitioner is not mandated  
by any law to seek clarification from the Secretary of Budget and Management By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to
prior to filing the present action, its failure to do so does not call for the petitioner, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy,
application of the rule. should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be
  imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the above-cited June 3, 1993
As for the rule on hierarchy of courts, it is not absolute. A direct invocation of this Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no
Court's original jurisdiction may be allowed where there are special and report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. autonomy by the Constitution.[10]
[6]
 Petitioner justifies its direct filing of the petition with this Court as the matter Respecting respondents justification for the withholding of funds from petitioner
involves the concept of fiscal autonomy granted to [it] as well as other as due to a shortfall in revenues, the same does not lie. In the first place, the
constitutional bodies, a legal question not heretofore determined and which only alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated. In the second place, even assuming
the Honorable Supreme Court can decide with authority and finality. [7] To this that there was indeed such a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance with
Court, such justification suffices for allowing the petition. the mandate of above-quoted Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution.
   
Now on the substantive issues. Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs teaches that [a]n
  interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX inoperative, or nugatory.[11]
(A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides:  
  If respondents theory were adopted, then the constitutional mandate to
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended
approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly every year, or even every month[12] that there is a shortfall in revenues, thereby
released. emasculating to a significant degree, if not rendering insignificant altogether, such
  mandate.
  Development Budget Coordinating Committee and approved by
Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the  
Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be subjected to withholding or  
reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place In contrast, the immediately succeeding provision of the Year 2002 GAA,
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing which specifically applied to offices vested with fiscal autonomy, stated:
with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to  
naught the distinction established by the Constitution. Sec. 64. Appropriations of Agencies Vested with
  Fiscal Autonomy. Any provision of law to the contrary
The agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus notwithstanding, the appropriations authorized in this Act for
be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other the Judiciary, Congress of the Philippines, the Commission on
agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall. Human Rights, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Civil Service
  Commission, the Commission on Audit and the Commission on
Significantly, the Year 2002 GAA itself distinguished between two types of public Elections shall be automatically and regularly released.
institutions in the matter of fund releases. With respect to government agencies in (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
general, the pertinent General Provisions of the GAA read as follows:  
   
Sec. 62. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Clearly, while the retention or reduction of appropriations for an office is
Appropriations. No appropriations authorized in this Act shall generally allowed when there is an unmanageable budget deficit, the Year 2002
be impounded through deduction or retention,  unless in GAA, in conformity with the Constitution, excepted from such rule the
accordance with the guidelines for the imposition and appropriations for entities vested with fiscal autonomy. Thus, even assuming that
release of reserves and the rules and regulations for there was a revenue shortfall as respondent claimed, it could not withhold full
deduction, retention or deferral of releases shall have been release of petitioners funds without violating not only the Constitution but also
issued by the DBM in coordination with the House Committee Section 64 of the General Provisions of the Year 2002 GAA.
on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance.  
Accordingly, all the funds appropriated for the purposes, This Court is not unaware that its above-cited June 3, 1993 Resolution also states
programs, projects and activities authorized in this Act, except as a guiding principle on the Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciarys Fiscal
those covered by Special Provision No. 1 of the Unprogrammed Autonomy that:
Fund shall be regularly and automatically released in  
accordance with the established allotment period and system by 4. After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the
the DBM without any deduction, retention or imposition of Judiciary shall be automatically and regularly released subject to
reserves. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)
Sec. 63. Unmanageable National Government Budget  
Deficit. Retention or reduction of appropriations authorized in  
this Act shall be effected only in cases where there This phrase subject to availability of funds does not, however, contradict the
is unmanageablenational government budget deficit. present ruling that the funds of entities vested with fiscal autonomy should be
  automatically and regularly released, a shortfall in revenues notwithstanding.
  What is contemplated in the said quoted phrase is a situation where total revenue
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover the total appropriations
used in this Section shall be construed to mean that the actual for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy . In such event, it would be
national government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly practically impossible to fully release the Judiciarys appropriations or any of the
budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit entities also vested with fiscal autonomy for that matter, without violating the
of P130.0 billion as indicated in the FY 2002 Budget of right of such other entities to an automatic release of their own appropriations. It
Expenditures and Sources of Financing submitted by the is under that situation that a relaxation of the constitutional mandate to
President to Congress pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the automatically and regularly release appropriations is allowed.
Constitution or there are clear economic indications of an  
impending occurrence of such condition, as determined by the
Considering that the budget for agencies enjoying fiscal autonomy is only a small Thirty Centavos (P5,807,392.30) representing the unreleased balance of
portion of the total national budget, only in the most extreme circumstances will petitioners appropriation for its Central Office by the General Appropriations Act
the total revenue collections fall short of the requirements of such agencies. To for FY 2002.
illustrate, in the Year 2002 GAA the budget for agencies vested with fiscal  
autonomy amounted only to P14,548,620,000.00, which is 2.53% of the total SO ORDERED.
appropriations in the amount of P575,123,728,000.00.[13] In Year 2003 GAA,  Cua v. Commission on Elections | 156 SCRA 582
which was re-enacted in 2004, the budget for the same agencies
was P13,807,932,000.00, which is 2.27% of the total appropriations amounting FACTS: The first division of Comelec rendered a 2-1decision favoring the
to P609,614,730,000.00.[14] And in the Year 2005, the budget for the same petitioner but nevertheless suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
agencies was only P13,601,124,000.00, which is 2.28% of the total appropriations congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of the unanimous vote required
amounting to P597,663,400,000.00.[15] by the procedural rules in Comelec Resolution No. 1669.
  Section 5 of the said resolution states that, “A case being heard by it shall
Finally, petitioners claim that its budget may not be reduced by Congress lower be decided with the unanimous concurrence of all three Commissioners and its
than that of the previous fiscal year, as is the case of the Judiciary, must be decision shall be considered a decision of the Commission. If this required
rejected. number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion, the case may be
  appealed to the Commission En Banc, in which case the vote of the majority
For with respect to the Judiciary, Art. VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution explicitly thereof shall be the decision of the Commission.”
provides: Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the first division was a valid
  decision despite the resolution stated above because of Art. IX-A, Section 7 of the
Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal Constitution. He argues that this applies to the voting of the Comelec both in
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may  not be reduced division and En Banc.
by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and Respondent, on the other hand, insists that no decision was reached by
regularly released.[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) the first division because the required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was
  also argued that no valid decision was reached by the Comelec En Banc because
  only three votes were cast in favor of the petitioner and these did not constitute
On the other hand, in the parallel provision granting fiscal autonomy to the majority of the body.
Constitutional Commissions, a similar proscription against the reduction of
appropriations below the amount for the previous year is clearly absent. Article ISSUE: Whether the 2-1 decision of the first division was valid.
IX (A), Section 5 merely states:
  RULING: YES. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered by the first
Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their Division was a valid decision under Article IX- A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and Furthermore, the three members who voted to affirm the First Division
regularly released. constituted a majority of the five members who deliberated and voted thereon En
  Banc and their decision is also valid under the aforecited constitutional provision.
  Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the two aforecited decisions was a
The plain implication of the omission of the provision proscribing such reduction valid act that entitles him now to assume his seat in the House of
of appropriations below that for the previous year is that Congress Representatitves.
is not prohibited from reducing the appropriations of Constitutional Commissions
below the amount appropriated for them for the previous year.
  Republic of the Philippines
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing SUPREME COURT
discussions, GRANTED. Respondents act of withholding the subject funds from Manila
petitioner due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
  EN BANC
Accordingly, respondent is directed to release to petitioner the amount of Five
Million Eight Hundred Seven Thousand, Three hundred Ninety Two Pesos and
G. R. No. 105628 August 6, 1992 ROSARIO A. VELASCO, petitioner, 
RODULFO SARMIENTO, petitioner,  vs.
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF VIRAC TERNATE, CAVITE, and CONDRADO LINDO, respondents.
and JOSE "CITO" ALBERTO II, respondents. RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 105725 August 6, 1992
EMMANUEL R. ALFELOR, petitioner,   
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF IRIGA DAVIDE, JR., J.:
CITY and JOSE C. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105727 August 6, 1992
The special civil actions for certiorari hereby jointly resolved, filed under Rule 65
LEANDRO I. VERCELES, SR., petitioner, 
of the Rules of Court, seek to set aside the Resolutions of respondent Commission
vs.
on Elections (COMELEC) in the following Special Cases (SPC):
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
CATANDUANES and ROSALIE ALBERTO-ESTACIO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105730 August 6, 1992 1) G.R. No. 105628 — SPC No. 92-266 granting the appeal from
JESUS TYPOCO, JR., petitioner,  the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Virac,
vs. Catanduanes which ordered the exclusion from the canvass of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF one (1) election return;
CAMARINES NORTE, and MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF JOSE
PANGANIBAN, CAMARINES NORTE, respondents. 2) G.R. No. 105725 — SPC No. 92-323 reversing the ruling of the
G.R. No. 105771 August 6, 1992 City Board of Canvassers of Iriga City which ordered the
ALBERTO U. GENOVA, JR., petitioner,  exclusion from the canvass of six (6) election returns and in UND
vs. No. 92-243 ordering the said Board of Canvassers to include in
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF the canvass the election returns involved therein;
CABUSAO, NEBRIDO F. SANTIAGO, and EUGENIO AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 105778 August 6, 1992 3) G.R. No. 105727 — SPC No. 92-288 dismissing the appeal of
MARIO S. MANLICLIC, petitioner,  petitioner from the ruling of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
vs. of Catanduanes which ordered the inclusion in the canvass the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF GEN. certificate of canvass for the municipality of Virac, excluding the
NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA, BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT returns from 48 precincts;
NOS. 12-A AND 13, BARANGAY MATAAS NA KAHOY, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA
ECIJA; BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS OF PRECINCT NOS. 15-A, 4) G.R. No. 105730 — SPC No. 92-315 affirming the ruling of the
BARANGAY PICALEON, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; PRECINCT NO. 25-A Municipal Board of Canvassers of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
OF SAPANG BATO, GEN. NATIVIDAD, NUEVA ECIJA; THE ELECTION Norte which dismissed petitioner's opposition to the
REGISTRAR and APOLONIO PASCUAL, respondents. composition of the said Municipal Board of Canvassers;
G.R. No. 105797 August 6, 1992
FRANCISCO G. RABAT, petitioner, 
5) G.R. No. 105771 — SPC No. 92-271 affirming the ruling of the
vs.
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Cabusao, Camarines Sur which,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF
among others, rejected petitioner's objection to certain election
DAVAO ORIENTAL and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
returns;
G-R. No. 105919 August 6, 1992
DATU MOHAMMAD A. SINSUAT, petitioner, 
vs. 6) G.R. No. 105778 — SPC No. 92-039 dismissing said case for
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DATU MICHAEL SINSUAT and ATTY. RUBEN non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166;
PLATON, respondents.
G.R. No. 105977 August 6, 1992
 7) G.R. No. 105797 — SPC No. 92-153 affirming the rulings of the Special Cases 1 and, in compliance with the above provision of the Constitution,
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental which rejected the two (2) Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and
petitioner's objections to the canvass of some certificates of decide these Special Cases. 2 Rule 27 thereof governs Special Cases; specifically,
canvass; Section 9 of the said Rule provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of
Canvassers are cognizable by any of the Divisions to which they are assigned and
8) G.R. No. 105919 — SPC No. 92-293 dismissing petitioner's not by the Commission en banc. Said Section reads:
appeal from the ruling of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Upi Nuro, Maguindanao; Sec. 9. Appeals from rulings of Board of Canvassers. — (a) A party
aggrieved by an oral ruling of the board of canvassers who had
9) G.R. No. 105977 — SPC No. 92-087 denying the amended pre- stated orally his intent to appeal said ruling shall, within five
proclamation petition, which is an appeal from the rulings of the days following receipt of a copy of the written ruling of the board
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Ternate, Cavite, and denying a of canvassers, file with the Commission a verified appeal,
subsequent motion to resolve the issues raised in said amended furnishing a copy thereof to the board of canvassers and the
petition. adverse party.

Comments had been filed only in G.R. No. 105727 and G.R. No. 105797. This Court (b) The appeal filed with the Commission shall be docketed by
dispenses with the Comments in the other cases. the Clerk of Court concerned.

Petitioners impugn the challenged resolutions above specified as having been (c) The answer/opposition shall be verified.
issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, inter alia, the Commission, sitting en
banc, took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to (d) The Division to which the case is assigned shall immediately set
any of its Divisions. the case for hearing. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3, subdivision C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides: xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two A motion to reconsider the decision or resolution of the Division concerned may
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to be filed within five (5) days from its promulgation. 3 The Clerk of Court of the
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation Division shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in Presiding Commissioner of such fact; in turn, the latter shall certify the case to the
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions Commission en banc. 4 Thereafter, the Clerk of Court of the Commission shall
shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Emphasis supplied). calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en
bancwithin ten (10) days from the certification. 5
The 1973 Constitution prescribed another rule. Its Section 3, subdivision C of
Article XII provided as follows: Indisputably then, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, when it resolved the appeals of petitioners in the
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three abovementioned Special Cases without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by Said resolutions are, therefore, null and void and must be set aside. Consequently,
divisions, except contests involving Members of the Batasang the appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to a
Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. . . . Division.

It is clear from the abovequoted provision of the 1987 Constitution that election A resolution directing the COMELEC to assign said Special Cases to the Divisions
cases include pre-proclamation controversies, and all such cases must first be pursuant to Section 8, Rule 3 of its Rules on assignment of cases would, logically,
heard and decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en be in order. However, Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166 6 provides that all pre-
banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance. proclamation cases pending before it shall be deemed terminated at the beginning
In the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, pre-proclamation cases are classified as of the term of the office involved. The said section provides as follows:
 xxx xxx xxx DECISION
PARDO, J.:
All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall
be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office
involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and
shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order seeking to
regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, nullify the order dated June 15, 2000 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec),
proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence First Division,[1] giving notice to the parties of the promulgation of the resolution
thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition on the case entitled Jose T. Ramirez, Protestee, versus Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.,
appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the Election Protest Case No. 98-29, on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 in the afternoon and to
proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been prohibit the respondent Commission on Election from promulgating the so called
issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. Guiani ponencia.[2]
The facts are as follows:
The terms of the offices involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions
commenced at noon of 30 June 1992. 7 These cases have thus been rendered moot Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were
and such a resolution would only be an exercise in futility. candidates for the position of Governor, Eastern Samar, during the May 11, 1998
elections.[3] On May 16, 1998, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor, Eastern Samar, having
Accordingly, the instant petitions are DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing
obtained 46,547 votes, the highest number of votes in the election returns.
by petitioners of regular election protests. If the winning candidates for the
positions involved in the Special Cases subject of these petitions have already On June 4, 1998, respondent Ramirez who obtained 45,934 votes, the second
been proclaimed, the running of the period to file the protests shall be deemed highest number of votes, filed with the Comelec, an election protest [4] challenging
suspended by the pendency of such cases before the COMELEC and of these the results in a total of 201 precincts. [5] The case was assigned to the First Division
petitions before this Court. (formerly Second), Commission on Elections.[6]
On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Japal M. Guiani prepared and signed a
The Temporary Restraining Orders issued in G.R. No. 105727, G.R. No. 105730
proposed resolution in the case. To such proposed ponencia, Commissioner Julio
and G.R. No. 105797 are hereby LIFTED.
F. Desamito dissented.Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco at first did not
indicate her vote but said that she would wish to see both positions, if any, to
SO ORDERED. make her (my) final decision.[7]

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner Guiani retired from
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ. concur. the service. On March 3, 2000, the President of the Philippines appointed
Commissioner Rufino S. Javier to the seat vacated by Commissioner Guiani.
Commissioner Javier assumed office on April 4, 2000.
 
On or about February 24, 2000, petitioner Ambil and respondent Ramirez
EN BANC received a purported resolution promulgated on February 14, 2000, signed by
Commissioner Guiani and Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting.
The result was in favor of respondent Ramirez who was declared winner by a
margin of 1,176 votes.[8] On February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First Division,
[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000] declared that the thirteen-page resolution is a useless scrap of paper which
should be ignored by the parties in this case there being no promulgation of the
Resolution in the instant case. [9]
On March 31, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order setting the
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner, vs.  THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on April 6, 2000,
(FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND DIVISION) and JOSE T.
at 2:00 in the afternoon.[10]However, on April 6, 2000, petitioner Ambil filed a
RAMIREZ, respondents.
motion to cancel promulgation challenging the validity of the purported
Guiani resolution. The Comelec, First Division, acting on the motion, on the same In his comment filed on August 29, 2000, the Solicitor General interposed no
date, postponed the promulgation until this matter is resolved. [11] objection to the petition.[20]
On June 14, 2000, two members of the First Division, namely, Commissioners At issue in this petition is whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the
Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S. Javier, sent a joint memorandum to promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) acted without
Commissioner Julio F. Desamito, presiding Commissioner, stating: jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
We find the petition without merit.
Pursuant to your recommendation in your April 18, 2000 Memorandum to the
Commission En Banc that this case be submitted for a reconsultation by the To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the
members of the First Division, it is our position that we promulgate as soon as Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
possible the Guiani Resolution of the case. This is notwithstanding the Jamil vs.
Comelec (283 SCRA 349), Solidbank vs. IAC (G. R. No. 73777) and other doctrinal Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a
cases on the issue. After all, this Commission stood pat on its policy that what is majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty
controlling is the date the ponente signed the questioned Resolution as what we days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
did in promulgating the case of Dumayas vs. Bernal (SPC 98-137). deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission or by the
In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the promulgation commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by thisconstitution or by law, any
of the subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the
for Reconsideration before the Commission en bancor through a certiorari case Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
before the Supreme Court.[12] receipt of a copy thereof.[21][emphasis supplied]

On June 15, 2000, the Comelec, First Division, through Commissioner Julio F. We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and
Desamito, issued an order setting the promulgation of the resolution in the case decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
on June 20, 2000, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.[13] judicial powers.[22] This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc,[23] not of a division,[24] certainly not an interlocutory order of a
Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution, on June 19, 2000, division.[25] The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an
petitioner interposed the instant petition. [14] interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.[26]
Petitioner Ambil seeks to annul the order dated June 15, 2000 setting the
promulgation of the resolution of the case (EPC Case No. 98-29) on June 20, 2000 The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may
at 2:00 in the afternoon, and prohibiting the Comelec, First Division, from be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under
promulgating the purported Guiani resolution and directing the Comelec, First Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64,
Division, to deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate the resolution reached 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. [27]
in the case after such deliberation.[15]
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that
On June 20, 2000, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
respondent Comelec from implementing the June 15, 2000 order for the course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy
promulgation of the resolution set on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 in the afternoon. At provided by law.[28] Failure to abide by this procedural
the same time, the Court directed the respondents to comment on the petition requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition. [29]
within ten (10) days from notice. [16]
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec
On July 10, 2000, respondent Ramirez filed his comment. [17] Respondent must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before
Ramirez admitted that the proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The
longer valid after his retirement on February 15, 2000. [18] He submitted that pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. [30] Article IX-C,
Comelec, First Division, its membership still constituting a majority, must elevate Section 3, 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
the protest case to the Comelec en banc until resolved with finality.[19]
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and jurisdiction.[42] However, an important moiety in the Kho case was not
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election mentioned in the dissent. It is that the Comelec, First Division, denied the prayer
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be of petitioner for the elevation of the case to en banc because the orders of
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of admission were mere interlocutory orders.[43] Hence, the aggrieved party had
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [emphasis supplied] no choice but to seek recourse in the Supreme Court. Such important fact is not
present in the case at bar.
Similarly, the Rules of Procedure of the Comelec provide that a decision of a We must emphasize that what is questioned here is the order dated June 15,
division may be raised to the en banc via a motion for reconsideration.[31] 2000, which is a mere notice of the promulgation of the resolution in EPC Case
The case at bar is an election protest involving the position of Governor, No. 98-29. We quote the order in question in full, to wit:
Eastern Samar.[32] It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections in division.[33] Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of Pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 18 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and the
the divisions resolution or final decision.[34]  In fact, there was really no resolution Joint Memorandum of Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Rufino S.
or decision to speak of [35] because there was yet no promulgation, which was still Javier to the Presiding Commissioner of the First Division dated 14 June 2000
scheduled on June 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon. Petitioner went paragraph 5 of which states:
directly to the Supreme Court from an order of promulgation of the Resolution of
this case by the First Division of the Comelec.[36] In view of the foregoing, we recommend that we proceed with the
promulgation of the  subject resolution and let the aggrieved party challenge it
Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an election case within
the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a through a Motion for Reconsideration before the Commission en banc or through a
certiorari case before the Supreme Court.
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution or final order of the Division
of the Commission on Elections because the case would not reach the Comelec en
banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the promulgation of the Resolution in this case is hereby set on Tuesday, June
the Division. 20, 2000 at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon at the Comelec Session Hall,
Intramuros, Manila.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the
rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the No further motion for postponement of the promulgation shall be entertained.
filing of a petition.[37] In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election
cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to
The Clerk of the Commission is directed to give the parties, through their
elevate the case to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is
Attorneys, notice of this Order through telegram and by registered mail or
reviewable viacertiorari before the Supreme Court.[38]
personal delivery.
We are aware of the ruling in Kho v. Commission on Elections, [39] that in a
situation such as this where the Commission on Elections in division committed SO ORDERED.
grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the controversy Given this 15th day of June, 2000 in the City of Manila, Philippines.
did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section 2, Rule 3 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to refer
FOR THE
the controversy to the Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its
DIVISION:
present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule
[Sgd.] JULIO F.
65 of the Rules of Court. This is the case relied upon by the dissenting justice to
DESAMITO
support the proposition that resort to the Supreme Court from a resolution of a
Presiding
Comelec Division is allowed.[40] Unfortunately, the Kho case has no application to
Commissioner[44]
the case at bar. The issue therein is, may the Commission on Elections in
division admit an answer with counter-protest after the period to file the There is nothing irregular about the order of promulgation of the resolution
same has expired?[41] The Comelec First Division admitted the answer with in the case, except in the mind of suspicious parties. Perhaps what was wrong in
counter-protest of the respondent. The Supreme Court declared such order void the order was the reference to the memorandum of the two commissioners that
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of was not necessary and was a superfluity, or excessus in linguae. All the members
of the Division were incumbent Commissioners of the Commission on Elections was February 14, 2000, the Division issued an order where Commissioner
(COMELEC) and had authority to decide the case in the Division. What appears to Tancangco expressed her reservations and stated that she wished to
be patently null and void is the so-called Guiani resolution if it is the one to be see both positions, if any, before she made her final decision.[52]
promulgated. We cannot assume that the Comelec will promulgate a void
resolution and violate the Constitution and the law. We must assume that the A final decision or resolution of the Comelec, in Division or en banc is
members of the Commission in Division or en banc are sworn to uphold and will promulgated on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in
obey the Constitution.  advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail
or by telegram.[53]
Consequently, the Guiani resolution is not at issue in the case at bar. No
one knows the contents of the sealed envelope containing the resolution to be It is jurisprudentially recognized that at any time before promulgation of a
promulgated on June 20, 2000, simply because it has not been promulgated! decision or resolution, the ponente may change his mind. [54] Moreover, in this
case, before a final decision or resolution could be promulgated, the ponente
It may be true that the parties received a copy of what purports to be the retired and a new commissioner appointed. And the incoming commissioner has
Guiani resolution,[45] declaring respondent Jose T. Ramirez the victor in the decided to take part in the resolution of the case. It is presumed that he had taken
case. Such Guiani resolution is admitted by the parties and considered by the the position of his predecessor because he co-signed the request for the
Commission on Elections as void. The Solicitor General submitted an advice that promulgation of the Guiani resolution.[55]
the same resolution is deemed vacated by the retirement of Commissioner Guiani
on February 15, 2000.[46] It can not be promulgated anymore for all legal intents If petitioner were afraid that what would be promulgated by the Division
and purposes.  was the Guiani resolution, a copy of which he received by mail, which, as
heretofore stated, was not promulgated and the signature thereon of the clerk of
We rule that the so-called Guiani resolution is void for the following reasons: court was a forgery, petitioner could seek reconsideration of such patently void
resolution and thereby the case would be elevated to the Commission en banc.[56]
First: A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Considering the factual circumstances, we speculated ex mero motu that the
Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot Comelec would promulgate a void resolution.
validly take part in that resolution or decision. [47] Much more could he be
the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision of the The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is
Division must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated. without rudder or compass.[57] We must not speculate that the Comelec would still
promulgate a void resolution despite knowledge that it is invalid or void ab initio.
Commissioner Guiani might have signed a draft ponencia prior to his
retirement from office, but when he vacated his office without the final decision Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before this Court was
or resolution having been promulgated, his vote was automatically invalidated. premature. Petitioner failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies
[48]
 Before that resolution or decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no available before the COMELEC.
valid resolution or decision to speak of.[49] In a long line of cases, this Court has held consistently that before a party is
Second: Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., Clerk of the First Division, allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
Commission on Elections, denied the release or promulgation of the Guiani have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
resolution. He disowned the initials on the face of the first page of the resolution remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
showing its promulgation on February 14, 2000, and said that it was a administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
forgery. There is no record in the Electoral Contests and Adjudication Department comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
(ECAD) of the Commission on Election that a resolution on the main merits of the the courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of courts
case was promulgated.[50] intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.[58]

Third: By an order dated February 28, 2000, the Comelec, First This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion for
Division, disclaimed the alleged thirteen (13) page resolution for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special civil action
being a useless scrap of paper which should be ignored by the parties there for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can convincingly show that
being no promulgation of the resolution in the case.[51] his case falls under any of the following exceptions to the rule: (1) when the
question is purely legal, (2) where judicial intervention is urgent, (3) where its
Fourth: It is unlikely that Commissioner Tancangco affixed her signature on application may cause great and irreparable damage, (4) where the controverted
the Guiani resolution. On the date that it was purportedly promulgated, which acts violate due process, (5) failure of a high government official from whom relief
is sought to act on the matter, and seeks when the issue for non-exhaustion of SO ORDERED.
administrative remedies has been rendered moot. [59]
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, Gonzaga-
This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its Reyes, and  Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the dissent of Mr. Justice
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.  It De Leon.
is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and Kapunan, J., voted for this ponencia during the deliberations on 17 October
convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative 2000.
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative Buena, J., no part.
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the De Leon, Jr., J., see dissenting opinion.
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principal of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not an ironclad EN BANC
rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the [G.R. No. 125129. March 29, 1999]
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a JOSEPH H. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) DECISION
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when PARDO, J.:
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when
there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC [1] Provident Fund Board of
whose acts as an alter ego of the president bears the implied and assumed Trustees, filed this petition with the Supreme Court on June 17, 1996, as an appeal
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies by certiorari under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the
would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) decision[2] of the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowing the refund of the
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the government share in the fund to the employee-members, and the denial of the
rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there motion for reconsideration of the said decision.[3]
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. [60] The
By Resolution No. 89-003, [4] the TLRC Executive Committee created a
administrative authorities must be given an opportunity to act and correct the
Provident Fund the primary purpose of which was to augment the retirement
errors committed in the administrative forum. [61] Only after administrative
benefits of the officers and employees of TLRC. The Provident Fund also provided
remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.[62]
additional benefits[5] to its members, in accordance with the policies and
This case does not fall under any of the exceptions and indeed, as heretofore guidelines approved by the Board of Trustees. The Funds sources of capital were
stated, the exceptions do not apply to an election case within the jurisdiction of from contributions of each member consisting of 2% of his gross monthly salary
the Comelec in Division. and TLRCs or the governments counterpart share equivalent to 10% of the
members gross monthly salary, earnings of funds and others.[6]
Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. Failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a On June 3, 1993, Corporate Auditor Adelaida S. Flores suspended the
dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of transfer of funds from TLRC to the Provident Fund for the years 1990-1991,
cause of action.[63] amounting to P11,065,715.84, per Notice of Suspension No. 93-006 [7]. Auditor
Flores held that under Par. 5.4 of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10, Rules
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity. and Regulations issued under R.A. 6758, [8] fringe benefits were allowed provided
The Court orders the Commission on Elections, First Division, to resolve with that statutory authority covered such grant of benefits. In this case, there is no
all deliberate dispatch Election Protest Case No. 98-29 and to promulgate its law authorizing the grant of fringe benefits to TLRC officers and
resolution thereon adopted by majority vote within thirty (30) days from notice employees. Furthermore, all Provident Funds are covered by R.A. 4537,[9] to which
hereof. TLRC may not qualify.

The temporary restraining order issued on June 20, 2000, is hereby lifted On September 14, 1993, the TLRC Provident Fund Board of Trustees issued
and dissolved, effective immediately. Resolution No. 93-2-21[10], discontinuing the collection of contributions for the
Fund from both the TLRC and the members. It also ordered the members personal
No costs. contributions collected from March 1, 1993 until September 15, 1993, refunded to
them immediately. On September 21, 1993, the Board issued Resolution 93-2- ordinary writ of error or appeal via certiorari to this Court. Only when the
22[11] dissolving the Provident Fund and ordering the distribution of the personal Commission on Audit acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
and corporate shares to the members thereof, on or before October 31, 1993. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court
entertain a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. [17] Hence, a petition for review on
On December 2, 1993, Corporate Auditor Flores issued Notice of certiorari or appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the
Disallowance No. 93-003, disallowing in audit the amount of P11,065,715.84, 1964 Revised Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of
representing the governments share paid to the TLRC Provident Fund refunded to the Commission on Audit.
members, covering the period 1990 to 1991, including all amounts that may have
been transferred to the Fund after 1991.[12] However, setting aside the procedural error pro hac vice, and treating the
petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, we find that the Commission on Audit
Petitioner Joseph H. Reyes, a member of the TLRC Board of Trustees, did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the distribution of the
appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit. On October 12, 1995, the government share in the aborted TLRC Provident Fund to its members. As
Commission on Audit denied the appeal per Decision No. 95-571.[13] The correctly pointed out by the COA in its decision, [18] the government contributions
Commission ruled that the governments share in the Provident Fund must be were made on the condition that the same would be used to augment the
reverted to the TLRC and not be given to the employees. It held that since the retirement and other benefits of the TLRC employees. Since the purpose was not
primary purpose of the Provident Fund was not realized or attained due to its attained due to the question on the validity of the Fund, then the employees are
discontinuance and dissolution, then the employees were not entitled to the not entitled to claim the government share disbursed as its counterpart
governments share in the Fund. contribution to the Fund. Otherwise, it would be tantamount to the use of public
On December 7, 1995, petitioner wrote the Commission on Audit seeking a funds outside the specific purpose for which the funds were appropriated.
reversal of COA Decision No. 95-571. On May 2, 1996, the Commission on Audit There is no merit to petitioner's claim that the members of the Provident
denied the motion for reconsideration per Decision No. 96-236. [14] Fund acquired a vested right over the government contributions. "A vested right
Hence, this petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit. is one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent
Petitioner contends that the dissolution of the Provident Fund does not upon a contingency,"[19] As previously stated, the government contributions were
render illegal the distribution of governments share to the members. He avers subject to the condition that the funds would be used to augment the retirement
that when TLRC made its contributions to the Provident Fund, it had divested and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees.
itself of the ownership of whatever contributions it gave. Furthermore, the money
contributed to the fund became a trust fund for the benefit of the members. Upon What is more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory
the dissolution of the Fund, the legal and equitable titles were merged in the basis. Thus, contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
members, as beneficiaries. He asserts that the members have a vested right, not WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
only on their own contributions, but to the government share as well. He claims decision of the Commission on Audit.
that since the Fund's pretermination or dissolution was not due to the members'
fault, then it would be unfair and greatly prejudicial to deprive them of the No costs.
government share to which they are entitled.
SO ORDERED.
We are not impressed. We deny the petition.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
decision, orders of rulings of the Commission on Audit may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party. [15] Under Rule 64, Section 2,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment or final order of the Commission on
Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party to this Court on certiorari under Rule
65. However, the petition in this case was filed on June 17, 1996, prior to the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, the mode of
elevating cases decided by the Commission on Audit to this Court was only by
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as provided by the 1987 Constitution. [16] The
judgments and final orders of the Commission on Audit are not reviewable by