Group 4

HEIRS OF LAZARO GALLARDO, vs.

PORFERIO SOLIMAN, VIVIAN VALETE, and ANTONIO SOLIMAN
G.R. 178952
April 10, 2013

Facts:
Petitioners are the heirs of Lazaro Gallardo. Lazaro and Prosperidad are the
registered owners of a 4.3699-hectare parcel of land in Balingcanaway, Tarlac, Tarlac,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) 97603. The land was placed under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27,and
respondent Porferio Soliman (Porferio) was instituted as a qualified farmer tenant-
transferee thereof.
In 1995, petitioners filed a Complaint for collection of land amortizations,
dispossession, ejectment, and cancellation of Deed of Transfer and Emancipation Patent
against respondent Porferio before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), Diwa ng Tarlak, Tarlac City.
It appears that a Kasunduan dated December 10, 1985 and a notarized Deed of
Transfer were executed by Lazaro and Porferio. Under said deeds, Porferio, as sole
farmer-beneficiary and in consideration for the transfer of the whole of the land in his
favor, obliged himself to pay the petitioners 999 cavans of palay in 15 equal yearly
amortizations under the government's Direct Payment Scheme pursuant to PD 27. It
was agreed that an advance payment of 66 cavans and 28 kilos, representing total lease
payments made by Porferio to Lazaro since 1973, shall be deducted from the 999
cavans, thus leaving an annual amortization to be made by Porferio of about 62 cavans
or 16 cavans per hectare per year. However, Porferio paid only a total of 121.2 cavans or
480.9 cavans short of the total amortizations due from 1986 to 1995, or 10 years into the
deed. Petitioners claimed that notwithstanding written demands and the failure/refusal
of Porferio to attend Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) scheduled
mediation and pay amortizations on the land to them or to the Land Bank of the
Philippines, the Tarlac PARO issued Emancipation Patents (EP Nos. 437306 to 308) not
only in favor of Porferio, but also of his children, herein respondents Vivian and
Antonio who were not legally instituted farmer tenant-transferees of the land under PD
27.
In their answer, Porferio and his children alleged the title of the subject land was
already transferred, registered accordingly to their names. Instead they asked for
reimbursement as they claim to have exceeded payment to the land and that there is no
tenancy relationship between them and the petitioners.

RULING OF THE PARAD

PARAD ruled that they are clothed of jurisdiction over the controversy which
partakes an agrarian dispute. Further, the PARAD declared that despite the Kasunduan
and Deed of Transfer being defective for non-compliance with certain requirements of
PD27, said deeds were “within the context of PD27”. However, the failure of Porferion,
Vivian and Antionio to pay amortizations cannot be considered as deliberate because
they “labored under the honest belief that they are now vested with absolute ownership
of the land”. The PARAD ordered the respondents to pay the petitioners what they
owe; 478.24 cavans of palay.

RULING OF DARAB
Petitioners appealed to DARAB who affirmed the decision of PARAD with
modification that respondents pay the petitioners 448.35 cavans of palay or their money
equivalent at the current market value representing the amortizations due accruing
from 1986 up to the year 2000, and 29.89 cavans annually thereafter until the land value
fixed at 999 cavans is fully paid. The DARAB upheld the PARAD’s finding on the
validity of the Emancipation Patents which justifies that the non-payment of
amortizations was not deliberate.

RULING OF THE CA
The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the verification and
certification against forum shopping was signed by only four of the six petitioners and
no special power of attorney to sign in their favor accompanied the petition. The CA
held that the certification against forum shopping must be executed and signed by all
petitioners. Otherwise, it is insufficient.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:
1) CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SIGNING OF THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON- FORUM SHOPPING BY ONLY FOUR (4) OF THE
SIX (6) PETITIONERS IS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE RULE.
2) CA ERRED IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISISNG PETITION ON PURELY
TECHNICAL GROUND

RULING OF SC

Petition is granted.
The petitioners are all heirs of the deceased Lazaro. Thus, they share a common
interest in the land, as well as common claims and defenses, against respondents. The
ground on lack of signatures of the two petitioners in the verification and certification
does not suffice the dismissal made by the CA.

CA should have decide the case on the merits considering the vital issues
presented in the petition. There is a need for the CA to resolve whether the
Emancipation Patents issued in the name of Vivian and Antonio were valid,
considering that by the evidence presented, they were never instituted as tenants to the
land. Porferio appears to be the sole tenant of the land, as can be seen from the
Kasunduan and notarized Deed of Transfer. To know on how Vivian and Anotion
acquired patents and certificates of title in their names notwithstanding the fact that
they were never instituted as tenants or beneficiaries of PD 27.

Lastly, PARAD and DARAB’s finding that respondents cannot be faulted  for
they "labored under the honest belief that they were now vested with absolute
ownership" of the land, and that they "cannot be expected to understand the legal
implications of the existing lien/encumbrances annotated on their respective titles
entered into in 1990 to insure payment of the land value" to petitioners, appears to be
anchored not on legal ground. Giving emphasis on the common maxim “ignorance of
the law excuses no one”, the Supreme Court held that such finding cannot be
appreciated. When one party enters into a covenant with another, he must perform his
obligations with fealty and good faith. This becomes more imperative where such party has been
given a grant, such as land, under the land reform laws. While the tenant is emancipated from
bondage to the soil, the landowner is entitled to his just compensation for the deprivation of his
land. Besides the respondents were given written demands on collections of
amortization were served but still Porferio failed to pay.
Thus, case is remanded back to the CA for proper disposition based on the merits of the
case.

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. LINA B. NAVARRO

G.R 196264, June 06, 2019

FACTS:

Lina is the daughter of Antonio Buenaventura and stepdaughter of Jovita

Buenaventura. Antonio and Jovita owned Lot No. 6561, Cad-174 of the Guianga
Cadastre located at Catalunan Grande, Davao City.The property is an agricultural land
with an area of 29.0772 hectares or 290,772 square meters (sq. m.). When Antonio died,
Jovita was appointed as the administratix of his estate. Lot No. 6561 was also
partitioned between Jovita and Lina, Jovita got a 75% pro-indiviso share while Lina
received the remaining 25% pro-indiviso share.

In 1988, the government, pursuant to its Land Transfer Program covered by PD

27, expropriated 21.980 hectares of Lot 6561. The DAR valued it at P49,025.15 based on
the Landowner-Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer's Undertaking (L TPA-FU)
executed between Jovita and the farmer/tenant-beneficiaries over the property. Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) concurred with the valuation of the DAR. Out of the
P49,025.15, Jovita was paid P36,768.86. Lina on the other hand rejected a tender of
Pl2,256.29 for her share.

On August 1995, Lina filed a petition with SAC for the fixing of just
compensation against DAR and LBP. Alleging that the government expropriated their
property by virtue of Emancipation Patents to tenant-farmers. However, that the DAR
valued the property at P0.17 per sq.m, which is ridiculously low, Thus, she did not
accept payment of her 25% pro -indiviso share of P12, 256.29 for being confiscatory,
unrealistic and violative to her right on just compensation and due process. She asked
SAC to consider comparable sales of similar lots situated in the area.
 LBP denied, in its answer, that the valuation of P0.17 per sq.m is confiscatory
because such valuation was made in accordance to the provisions of PD 27 as amended
by EO 228. Further, that the property was not physically subdivided between Jovita and
Lina. Thus, the portion belonging to Lina for purposes of determination of just
compensation, still cannot be identified.

On May 2002, Pre-trial followed, submitting the following stipulation of facts:

1. Out of the total land area of 29 .0772 has. belonging to the estate of Antonio
Buenaventura 21.890 was covered by the DAR under P.D. 27 as shown by TCT Nos. EP-
221 up to EP-234

2. Of the 21.890 that was covered by the DAR, 6.5006 was paid directly by the tenants to
Jovita Buenaventura representing a portion of her 75% share in the 21.890 has. and
these are covered by EP 229 (Exh. "V") for 2.4268 has., EP 228 (Exh. ("U") for 3.8889 has.,
EP 221 (Exh. "O") for 900 sq.m. and EP-222 (Exh. "P") for 948 sq.m.;

3. The remaining 15.2999 has. was paid for by the government through the Land Bank
as evidenced by the Deed of Assignment, Warranties, and Undertaking (or DA WU) to
be marked in exhibit as Exhibit "1" - LBP;

4. Hence, the share of petitioner for which just compensation should be fixed is 5.4725
has. (i.e., 25% of 21.890 has.)

SAC submitted its decision in favor of Lina. It computed the 25% share of Lina,
that out of 234, 702 sq.m, expropriated and distributed to tenant-farmers, her 25%
equivalent is 58, 675.50 sq.m. And since LBP only offered payment after 5 years from
taking of the land, SAC held that the market value approach is the ‘fairer gauge’,
arriving the valuation to P10 per sq.m. Lina filed for reconsideration but was denied.
On November 2003, pending appeal to the CA, Lina filed a motion for execution citing
her old age and sickness and that 14 years has already elapsed since the government
has taken away her property. CA granted her motion and ordered a writ of execution.

In its manifestation/compliance to the writ of execution, LBP stated that based on

their findings, only 3.8249 hectares rightfully belongs to Lina. Thus, they can only effect
the 25% share of Lina in proportion to 3.8249 despite SAC’s pronouncement that Lina is
entitled to 5.8070 hectares. The amount of P1,235,578.93 was paid to Lina by virtue of a
Manger’s check issued by LBP.

The CA required the parties to submit a memorandum regarding the hectarage of the
property.

Lina claimed that there was a typographical error in recording the land under
agrarian reform, that instead of 21.8005 hectares, what was recorded was 21.890
hectares. However, she contends that the issue on this matter has long been settled in
the stipulation of facts on pre-trial. Thus her compensable share should be 5.4501
hectares.

The LBP asserted for its part that, based on LTPA-FU and the Land Valuation
Summary and Farmer’s Undertaking, only 15.2999 hectares were acquired by the
government. That under item #2 on stipulation of facts, 21.890 hectares was covered
under agrarian reform. However, 6.5006 hectares were paid directly by tenant-farmers
to Jovita and the remaining 21.890 was paid for by the government. LBP insisted that
Lina’s 25% share should be based on 15.2999 hectares only. The difference in the area of
about 1.7 hectares may be recovered by Lina from Jovita.

The CA rendered its decision, denying the appeal but affirming the SAC’s decision with
modification; that Lina’s share should be 5.4501 hectares instead of 5.8070. The CA
directed LBP to pay Lina P10 per sq.m plu 12% per annum interest to be computed from
June 1988.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA erred in holding that Lina's compensable share in the property is
5.4725 hectares;

2. Whether the just compensation fixed by the SAC and affirmed by the CA is correct;

3. Whether the CA erred in upholding the imposition of 12% interest over the
compensation awarded.

RULING:

Yes. The total area to which petitioner is entitled should be 5.4501 hectares only and not
5.4725 hectares. Determining the hectarage of the property is crucial in identifying the
compensable area to which Lina is entitled. In this regard, we note that the parties
entered into a Stipulation of Facts before the SAC. Item No. 1 which reads:

1. Out of the total land area of 29.0772 has. belonging to the estate of Antonio
Buenaventura and covered by OCT No. P-2182[,] 21.890 was covered by the
DAR under P.D. 27 as shown by TCT Nos. EP-221 up to EP-234 to be marked in
exhibit as Exhibits "O" up to "BB"[.]56 (Emphasis supplied.)

Lina pleaded before the CA that there was a typographical error in recording the total
area placed under agrarian reform. Instead of 21.8005 hectares, the Stipulation of Facts
stated 21.890 hectares. As proof, Lina presented the 14 EPs derived from the property
and which was subsequently issued to tenants-beneficiaries by the DAR. These EPs
were the same ones referred to in the Stipulation of Facts. Adding up the land area
covered by each of the EPs, Lina concluded that the total area acquired by the
government is 21.8005 hectares only. The CA agreed and reckoned Lina's 25% share
from 21.8005 hectares.
We concur with the CA. As a rule, facts stipulated during pre-trial are considered
judicial admissions which are legally binding on the parties making them. Even if
placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them
unilaterally and must assume the consequence of the disadvantage. However, the rule
on conclusiveness of judicial admission admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake; and 2) when it is shown that no
such admission was in fact made. In Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development
Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, it was ruled that a fact stipulated is
not binding on a declarant if it was proved that it was made through palpable mistake.
In this case, the record shows that a palpable mistake was committed in the arithmetical
computation of the total areas stated in the EPs and the typing/recording of the area
taken pursuant to the agrarian reform program. Our examination of EPs 221 to 234
shows that they cover an aggregate land area of only 21.8005 hectares. Item Nos. 2 and 3
of the Stipulation of Facts also support this conclusion, viz.:

2. Of the 21.890 that was covered by the DAR, 6.5006 was paid directly by the
tenants to Jovita Buenaventura representing a portion of her 75% share in the
21.890 has. and these are covered by EP 229 (Exh. "V") for 2.4268 has., EP 228
(Exh. ("U") for 3.8889 has., EP 221 (Exh. "O") for 900 sq.m. and EP-222 (Exh. "P")
for 948 sq.m.;

3. The remaining 15.2999 has. was paid for by the government through the Land
Bank as evidenced by the Deed of Assignment, Warranties, and Undertaking (or
DAWU) to be marked in exhibit as Exhibit "1" - LBP[.]62 (Emphasis supplied.)

If we subtract the 6.5006 hectares compensation for which were paid directly by the
tenant-farmers from the stipulated 21.890 hectares, the remaining area will be 15.3894
hectares. This will not tally with what was stated in Item No. 3 that there is a remaining
15.2999 hectares. However, if we use 21.8005 hectares as the base area, the remaining
portion will be exactly 15.2999 hectares. Unsurprisingly, the LBP did not refute or
oppose the correction made by Lina that 21.8005 hectares was the correct hectarage. In
fact, in its memorandum before us, the LBP recognized that 21.8005 hectares were
acquired for agrarian reform purposes.

2. The LBP faults the CA for finding that Lina is entitled to a compensable area of 5.4725
hectares. It insists that Lina should receive just compensation for only 3.824975 hectares.
The LBP avers that while it is true that Item No. 4 of the Stipulation of Facts states that
Lina's 25% share is equivalent to 5.4725 hectares, it cannot bind the LBP as a judicial
admission for violating Article 493 of the Civil Code. This provision, the LBP asserts,
mandates that pro-indiviso shares can only be determined with particularity by way of
a partition. Since the property is not yet partitioned, specific portions cannot be
awarded to Jovita and Lina. Hence, Jovita who has 75% pro-indiviso share in the
property, could not have validly transferred 6.5006 hectares directly to the tenant-
farmers if Lina's 25% pro-indiviso share was not included. It thereafter proposes that
Lina's 25% share in the property be determined as follows:

25% or 1.62515 hectares of the 6.5006 hectares sold through the direct payment
scheme; and

25% or 3.824975 hectares of the 15.2999 hectares financed by petitioner LBP for
acquisition by the farmer-beneficiaries.

The LBP further maintains that it cannot be estopped in relation to the facts stipulated
because any act in violation of Article 493 is illegal, and estoppel cannot be predicated
on an illegal act.

The LBP is incorrect.

That Item No. 4 of the Stipulation of Facts states that Lina's 25% share is equivalent to
5.4725 hectares (now, 5.4501 hectares) does not mean that a specific or definite portion
was determined ahead of the property's actual partition. A definite portion of the land
refers to specific metes and bounds of a co-owned property.

Here, the 21.8005-hectare property is owned by Jovita and Lina at a 75% and 25% ratio,
respectively. Following the illustration in Cabrera, the undivided interest of Jovita is
16.3504 hectares while the undivided interest of Lina is 5.4501 hectares. Thus, when the
parties entered into the Stipulation of Facts stating the hectarage of Lina's 25% share,
they did not determine a definite or specific portion of the property; rather, they merely
provided for the undivided interest of Lina.

We also reject LBP's argument that, since the property is not yet partitioned, Lina's 25%
share is necessarily included when Jovita transferred 6.5006 hectares of the property to
tenant-farmers under the direct payment scheme. A co-owner has an absolute
ownership of his/her undivided and pro-indiviso share in the co-owned property.
He/she has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of
substituting a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be
affected.

Here, the LBP admitted that the 6.5006 hectares were taken from the 75% share of Jovita.
Item No. 2 of the Stipulation of Facts is clear, viz.:

2. Of the 21.890 that was covered by the DAR, 6.5006 was paid directly by the
tenants to Jovita Buenaventura representing a portion of her 75% share in the
21.890 has. and these are covered by EP 229 (Exh. "V") for 2.4268 has., EP 228
(Exh. ("U") for 3.8889 has., EP 221 (Exh. "O") for 900 sq.m. and EP-222 (Exh. "P")
for 948 sq.m.
 As explained earlier, facts stipulated by the parties during pre-trial are binding
on them as judicial admissions. Since the LBP did not deny that it made the admission
nor allege that the admission was made through palpable mistake, it is bound by the
admissions it made in the Stipulation of Facts. It cannot now argue that a proportionate
part of the 6.5006 hectares should be charged to Lina's 25% share. Further, the LBP
failed to present any evidence to support its contention or to refute its admission. In
fine, the CA did not err in ruling that Lina's compensable area which represents her 25%
share in the property is equivalent to 4.501 hectares.

3. With the passage of RA 9700, the LBP abandoned its original theory that just
compensation of the property should be fixed in accordance with the valuation formula
provided in PD 27. It alleges, however, that while the CA is correct that Section 17 of RA
6657 should govern the determination of just compensation, the appellate court erred in
sustaining the valuation made by the SAC because the court a quo did not actually
apply Section 17. Instead, the SAC determined just compensation solely on the basis of
the market value of the property. The LBP asserts that the SAC should have applied the
factors stated in Section 17 as well as the pertinent provisions of DAR AO No. 5, in
computing the valuation of the property.

Lina, for her part, avers that the issue of non-compliance with DAR AO No. 5 was not
raised by the LBP during trial or on appeal. Thus, she maintains that the LBP is barred
from raising it for the first time before us.

We are not persuaded. The rule that no questions will be entertained on appeal unless it
has been raised in the proceedings below admits of exceptions. These exceptions
include: (1) the issue of lack of jurisdiction which may be raised at any stage; (2) cases of
plain error; (3) when there are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues; and (4)
when the issues raised present a matter of public policy. As will be seen shortly, the
second, third and fourth instances obtain in this case. Accordingly, we shall proceed to
resolve the LBP's contention that the SAC and the CA committed reversible error in
fixing the just compensation of the property.

When the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by
RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due to the landowner has yet to be
settled, as in this case, just compensation should be determined and the process
conducted under RA 6657, as amended, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only
suppletorily.
Notably, in its Decision, the CA correctly ruled that the provisions of RA 6657,
particularly Section 17, apply in this case. The property was taken pursuant to PD 27
but the issue of just compensation was not yet settled when RA 6657 took effect in 1988.
Further, while the case was still pending before the CA, RA 9700 extending the agrarian
reform program under RA 6657 was passed into law. Section 5 of RA 9700 states that
"all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners
shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657,
as amended." Section 17 reads:

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the

cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing crop, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and seventy percent (70%)
of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic
formula by the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper
court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers
and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation.

It should be noted that the DAR's expertise as the concerned implementing agency,
courts should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended, as translated into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just
compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their
judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted
under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they may deviate or depart
therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is supported by a reasoned
explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess
the power to make a final determination of just compensation.

We note that the SAC decided the issue of just compensation on June 17, 2002, well
before the passage of RA 9700 in 2009 and DAR AO No. 7 in 2011. Nevertheless, Section
17 of RA 6657 was at that time translated into a basic formula under DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998. As the applicable law and rule at the time, the SAC should have
considered their applicability for purposes of arriving at a valuation of Lina's property.
This it did not do. What the SAC applied, instead, was the market value approach,
which it deemed to be the "fairer gauge" of just compensation. Similarly, the CA, in
sustaining the SAC's ruling, did not test whether the latter applied the appropriate
formula. It merely noted that courts are not bound by the reports of commissioners as to
the surrounding circumstances of the property and their recommendation as to the
valuation of the property. Consequently, we reject the just compensation of the
property as determined by the SAC and affirmed by the CA for failure to observe the
statutory guidelines for fixing just compensation.