G.R. No.

L-63915 April 24, 1985 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857. to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for
[MABINI], petitioners,  59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123. the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon
vs. the rule may well lead to error'
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433,
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive 436-439. No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround
Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents. standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this
ESCOLIN, J.: question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute character.
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition.
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
implementation and administrative orders. and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought: the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date
359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable
503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant. for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition Code:
1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public
1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
1842-1847. course. provided, ...
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that
205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301- publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, date when it goes into effect.
M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278. object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561- and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431]. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831- individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853- the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders
1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, Justice Grant T. Trent said: decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court
2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244. of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474- proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
 determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to SO ORDERED.
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ... P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
constructive one. hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
"Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is
potestad.5 manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Esteban  9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by
to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be this Court.
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
such publication. publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden
or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles , 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting
official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws
where to obtain their official and specific contents. provide that they shall take effect immediately.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential effect.
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
G.R. No. 187378               September 30, 2013 before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that petitioner shave no
vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETALFOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M. predecessors-in-interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with injunction improper.31
ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN, Petitioners,  whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the said
vs. island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the issuance of the Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by the CA in a
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of their Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official- livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on
Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis The Issue Before the Court
the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was
Occidental,Respondents. not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid
RESOLUTION by Republic Act No.7160, 16 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code and enforceable against petitioners.34
of 1991" (LGC);and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: implementation should be enjoined.17 The Court’s Ruling

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action The petition lacks merit.
September 30, 2008 and Resolution 3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Section 56 of the LGC provides:
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public
Decision4 dated November 26, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions
City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction. publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. – (a) Within three (3) days after approval,
which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall
The Facts any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.(PETAL) is a enforceable. ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and
non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, public investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
The RTC Ruling
which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. 5 In line with its objectives, PETAL On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision 19 declaring the subject resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the
built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL’s protest documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be
square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in 2001 6which it rented has not been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its by the SP; (b) the said ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten
beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin. circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang
timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. authority and control over timberlands belong to the national government,
Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.
through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a (DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, (c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or
building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of to desist from closing Capayas Island to the public. 21 However, the petitioners resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang
Presidential Decree No. 1096, 8 otherwise known as the "National Building were ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without valid building Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such
Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on permits22 since they were found to have no title over the disputed property. 23 ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA, corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
was issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002, 9 but still the same docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN.
remained unheeded. (d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within
The Proceedings Before the CA thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 10 (subject ordinance) On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision 24 granting respondents’
which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, appeal. In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed
corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; 11 and (b) the construction of Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still
any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within30 days after pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the
by the local government. 12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. 25 It also gave SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more than 30 days have already elapsed
ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and from the time the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the
of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the published in conspicuous places in their municipality, and in the bulletin SB;36 hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56
matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including board.26 Moreover, public consultations were conducted with various groups (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:
Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and before the subject ordinance was passed. 27 The CA further ruled that the
prohibiting ingress and egress thereto. 13 Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the
Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the
directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan
reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. x x x.
also served against individual petitioners on October 25, 2002. powers as a municipality and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law, the CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30 This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a construction that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner
temporary restraining order, injunction and damages 15 against respondents as to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as
contradicting each other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or
that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the
enactment of the statute.37 All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding
the validity of the subject ordinance.
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that the subject
ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title 44 to the property in
the LGC.38 It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own evidence reveals that a public dispute to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s order directing the
hearing39 was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. removal of the structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building
Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any permits was not appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final
evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was and conclusive upon them.
made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30,
publication and posting requirements. 40 While it is true that he likewise failed to 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld
in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by SO ORDERED.
law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar
case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v. Cristobal, 42 the Court upheld
the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public
hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of
controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance
with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of
action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner
Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings
were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the
other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were
indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it
likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment. In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged
that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not
been submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the
Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant appealed to this
court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was adopted without
authority on the part of the municipality and was therefore unconstitutional. The
appellant argues that there was no proof adduced during the trial of the cause
showing that said ordinance had been approved by the provincial board.
Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty of the provincial board to
approve or disapprove ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the
different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
that the law has been complied with.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires
them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to
petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the
party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut
the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge
the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the
G.R. No. 187587               June 5, 2013 Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,  Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434
vs. Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, on the same day. respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of
x-----------------------x Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, likewise
Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
G.R. No. 187654 Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their
Board of Directors, Petitioner,  respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Court.
vs. Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99- THE ISSUES
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. 434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas
they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
DECISION
public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. I
SERENO, CJ.: 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and (3) the
Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of subject lot to its bona fide occupants. 4 ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE
Court assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925. On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS
(WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
THE FACTS reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan. 5 II

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution  granting the 6
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED
Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. 7 THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort PETITIONER.
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The III
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or
inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less
Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO). displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of Republic indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of the BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND
Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO.
into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads: or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no authority Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals
to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of
field of the legislature. President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was THE COURT’S RULING
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above- We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
quoted addendum. MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the
COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President
Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the
Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code,
(subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however,
President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation
just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476. private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included the legislature. issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy
when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette. sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
disposable lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby
President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
the Civil Code expressly provides: be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this
also to a valid delegation. Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This xxxx pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been
Code shall take effect one year after such publication. rendered moot. No costs.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the SO ORDERED.
give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including
"unless otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting
fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the Official him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera, 16 in which we had the occasion to enforce.
rule thus:
xxxx
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with
but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
was "otherwise provided." of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. 1âwphi1 This
is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law information on this vital law.
shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not xxxx
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking
would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber
affect before they can begin to operate. that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases
xxxx supplied)

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code,
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law "the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain
G.R. No. 162155               August 28, 2007 Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
his official capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049 A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
(Makati), Petitioners,  If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days it may contain." 28 It is the "period of time running from the
vs. number of days which they respectively have. beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent. corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
DECISION (emphasis supplied) month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be
CORONA, J.: Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January
of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.30
1
This petition for review on certiorari  seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is
days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more
February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.3 reglementary period.15 recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one). 31Section
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 16 Hence, it filed an 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in appeal in the CA.17
1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Sec. 27. Repealing clause.  — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation,
Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), 4 he On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. 18 It or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year accordingly.
obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the real and a leap year. According to the CA: A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause
estate industry to slowdown. 5 As a consequence, while business was good because it fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished. 32 Thus, the
during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a
particular year is a leap year.19 provision above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the
₱71,879,228 that year.6 Administrative Code of 1987.1avvphi1
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by
April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been
income taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the
tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in be counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear
and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed. 20 subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and
the total amount of ₱26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax they cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.33
refund or tax credit.9 Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. 21 Thus, this appeal.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter — the
submit additional documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but should be strictly construed against claimants. 22 Section 229 of the NIRC computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent   to 365
its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for should be strictly applied  against respondent inasmuch as it has been days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative
review11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 irrelevant.
credit.12 It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC): or within 730 days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. --  No suit or legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For
proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the CTA this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without correct. Its basis, however, is not. periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the final adjusted return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or computed? filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar
not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. months, computed as follows:
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Year 1 1st calenda April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
(2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any Marketing Corporation v. Tecson, 25 we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 r month
supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however,  That the days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.26
Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax,
where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted.   2nd calenda May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied) Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: r month
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Sec. 31. Legal Periods.  — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar
Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13 months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in   3rd calenda June 15, to July 14, 1998
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific r month 1998
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
  4th calenda July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998   20th calenda November to December 14, 1999
r month r month 15, 1999

  5th calenda August 15, to September 14, 1998   21st calenda December to January 14, 2000
r month 1998 r month 15, 1999

  6th calenda September to October 14, 1998   22nd calenda January 15, to February 14, 2000
r month 15, 1998 r month 2000

  7th calenda October 15, to November 14, 1998   23rd calenda February 15, to March 14, 2000
r month 1998 r month 2000

  8th calenda November to December 14, 1998   24th calenda March 15, to April 14, 2000
r month 15, 1998 r month 2000

  9th calenda December to January 14, 1999 We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed
r month 15, 1998 on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
  10th calenda January 15, to February 14, 1999 Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the
r month 1999 Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A.
Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
  11th calenda February 15, to March 14, 1999
r month 1999 No costs.
SO ORDERED.
  12th calenda March 15, to April 14, 1999
r month 1999

Year 2 13th calenda April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

r month

  14th calenda May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

r month

  15th calenda June 15, to July 14, 1999

r month 1999

  16th calenda July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

r month

  17th calenda August 15, to September 14, 1999

r month 1999

  18th calenda September to October 14, 1999

r month 15, 1999

  19th calenda October 15, to November 14, 1999

r month 1999
G.R. No. 183449               March 12, 2012 Complainant had the incident blottered at the police station as evidenced by an to the barangay captain and to the community because some people were in
extract thereof. panic as he was bringing a bolo, and not for attacking the Barangay Captain.
ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, Petitioner, 
vs. On cross-examination, complainant testified that he went to the benefit dance Anatolio Lozada Bangahon, another defense witness, testified that he saw the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. to stop it since it was already 1:00 o'clock in the early morning and the benefit accused coming out from his house carrying a bolo, and when he asked him
dance was still going on when it was supposed to end at 12:00 o'clock midnight why he was bringing a bolo, the accused replied that he was going to look for
DECISION as the permit he gave was only up to 12:00 o'clock midnight. As a result of the the persons who stoned his house. The accused was roaming around to look
PERALTA, J.: stoppage of the benefit dance, many persons got angry, and he heard that the for the persons who stoned his house, but he was not looking after the
house of the accused was stoned which made the accused angry. In fact, he Barangay Captain.6
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions dated saw the accused murmuring as his house was stoned by unknown persons.
September 21, 20071 and May 19, 2008 2of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in When the accused came near to him, the former did not ask for assistance On December 29, 2005, the MTC issued its Judgment 7 finding petitioner guilty
CA-G.R. CR No. 00410 which dismissed the petition for review filed by from him. of the crime of direct assault. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads:
petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of time, and denied WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALFREDO MONTAJES y JACA guilty
reconsideration thereof, respectively. Prosecution witness Rodelio Laureto corroborated the declaration of the
complainant that it was the accused who hacked the complainant with the use beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Assault as defined and
In an Information3 dated June 5, 2003, petitioner was charged with the crime of of a "lagaraw," but failed to hit him. penalized under Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him
Direct Assault before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Buenavista, Agusan to suffer an indefinite prison term of FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE DAY of
del Norte, the accusatory portion of which reads: Accused Alfredo Montajes testified that in the evening of December 7, 2002, he arresto mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE
was at home listening to the disco as there was a benefit dance near their MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of prision correccional in its medium period, as
That on or about the 8th day of December, 2002, at 1:00 early morning, more house. The benefit dance started at 7 o'clock in the evening and ended at 1 maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the
or less, in Purok 10, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, and o'clock in the early morning of December 8, 2002 when it was stopped by commission of the offense charged. The accused is likewise ordered to pay a
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did Barangay Captain Jose Rellon. It was then that trouble started because many fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,000.00) Philippine Currency, without
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and hack one of those who have paid but were not anymore allowed to dance complained to subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.8
JOSE B. RELLON, an elected Punong Barangay, while in the performance of the Barangay Captain and requested that they be given one more music so
his duties, and accused fully know that Jose B. Rellon is a Barangay Official, to that they could avail for what they have paid for on that benefit dance, as they On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Butuan City, rendered its
the damage and prejudice of said Jose B. Rellon. were not refunded with their payments. When this protest went on, the CVO's Decision9 dated January 23, 2007 affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
reacted by clubbing them using their jackets. Then a stoning incident followed. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied in an
CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 148 of the revised Penal Code.4 One of those hit by stones was his house. This made him wild prompting him to Order10 dated May 4, 2007.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.5 get his "lagaraw" to look for the people responsible for stoning his house. While
looking for these persons along the road, he saw Barangay Captain Jose Petitioner filed with the CA a petition (should be motion) for extension of time to
Thereafter, trial ensued. Rellon who was then two (2) meters away from him, and he responded by file petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court praying for an
telling him that he was looking for those persons responsible for the stoning of extended period of 15 days from May 21, 2007, or until June 5, 2007, within
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense is summarized by the MTC which to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition for review on
his house. The complainant wanted to get the "lagaraw" from him but he
as follows: June 5, 2007.
refused.
To substantiate the alleged commission of the crime of direct assault by the On September 21, 2007, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the
The accused explained, when confronted with a document (Exh. "B") wherein it
accused, complaining witness Jose B. Rellon declared inter alia, that he has petition outright for being filed out of time. In so ruling, the CA said:
was stated that he asked for apology from the Barangay Captain during the
been the Barangay Captain of Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte barangay level conciliation, that it was for the sole purpose of not elevating this
since the year 2002. On December 8, 2002, at about 1:00 o'clock in the early As borne by the records, the petitioner received the copy of the resolution
case and that they would settle amicably.
morning, he was at the benefit dance sponsored by the Sangguniang Kabataan denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007, Thus, the 15-day
at Purok 4, Barangay Abilan, Buenavista, Agusan del Norte. He met accused The accused also vehemently denied the accusation that he attacked the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review expired on May 21,
Alfredo Montajes who uttered to him the words "YOU'RE A USELESS barangay captain. 2007 (Monday) considering that the last day fell on a Saturday, May 19, 2007.
CAPTAIN." Other words of similar import were likewise uttered by the accused It appears that petitioner reckoned the extension from May 21, 2007 (Monday)
against him which he could no longer recall. After uttering the said words, the Defense witness Luis A. Cajeles, Jr., a Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Abilan, and not from May 19, 2007 (Saturday). Petitioner should have reckoned the
accused then drew his bolo locally known as "lagaraw" and approached him. Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, testified that at about 1:00 o'clock in the early 15-day extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007. It is well
He then moved backward, but the accused came near to him and struck him dawn of December 8, 2002, he heard of stoning and shouting, in fact the settled that when the day of the period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal
once with the "lagaraw." Luckily, complainant was not hit as he managed to window grill of his house was hit and he heard the people in panic. As a holiday, and a party is granted an extension of time, the extension should be
move backward. Complainant's daughter named Vilma Dector and his wife, barangay kagawad assigned to the Peace and Order Committee, he went out counted from the last day which is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.11
approached him and brought him home. Many people, including two (2) CVO immediately from his house and went to the road across the basketball court
(Rodelio Laureto and Victorio Trinquite), witnessed the incident. where the stoning was. He then saw accused Alfredo Montajes holding a bolo. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May
The accused was shouting that he was looking for the persons who stoned his 19, 2008.
During the mediation in the barangay hall, an investigation was conducted. The house. He also witnessed that the barangay captain asked the accused why he
accused, according to the complainant, asked for forgiveness from him which was bringing a bolo and the accused replied that he was looking for the Petitioner is now before us on the issue of whether the CA erred in denying
he declined, as he was of the impression that the law must be applied and the persons who stoned his house. He did not know what else happened because due course to his petition for review for being filed out of time.
accused should instead ask for forgiveness in court. he tried to drive the teenagers to their homes, because it was already very late Petitioner argues that he filed the motion for extension of time to file a petition
in the evening. for review with the CA pursuant to Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court;
As proof that the accused asked for forgiveness, complainant presented a
document (Exh. "B") to that effect. On cross-examination, he declared that the accused asked for forgiveness that based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition falls on a Saturday,
during the confrontation at the Barangay because of the disturbance he made the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the
reglementary period within which to file the said petition for review with the CA
fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was moved to the next occasion to expound on the matter. In that case, we held that the extension WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of
working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in granted by the court should be tacked to the original period and commences Appeals are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is ORDERED to reinstate the
asking the CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and immediately after the expiration of such period. Petition for Review filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. CR No. 00410.
not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. Nonetheless, petitioner asks for liberality in
the interest of justice taking into consideration the merit of his petition claiming In the case at bar, although petitioner's filing of the motion for extension was SO ORDERED.
that his conviction was not supported by the evidence on record. Moreover, he within the period provided by law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time.
claims that his petition for review was filed with the CA on June 5, 2007, which Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days within which to file the
was long before the CA dismissed the same on September 21, 2007 for being petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8,
filed out of time. He prays that the CA resolutions be reversed and set aside 2006. Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.13
and the CA be directed to give due course to his petition and to resolve the Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the
case on the merits. period for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
We grant the petition. legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court relied upon by petitioner provides: review with the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioner's filing of his
motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on May 21, 2007, the
Section 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday,
or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for extension
statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time that he be granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within
begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last which to file his petition. He then filed his petition for review on June 5, 2007.
day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal The CA did not act on the motion for extension, but instead issued a Resolution
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out
working day. of time.
We then clarified the above-quoted provision when we issued A.M. No. 00-2- We find that the CA correctly ruled that the petition for review was filed out of
14-SC dated February 29, 2000 (Re: Computation of Time When the Last Day time based on our clarification in A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC that the 15-day
Falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal Holiday and a Motion for Extension on extension period prayed for should be tacked to the original period and
Next Working Day is Granted) which reads: commences immediately after the expiration of such period.14 Thus, counting
xxxx 15 days from the expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the
petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late. However, we find the
Whereas, the aforecited provision [Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court] circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in
applies in the matter of filing of pleadings in courts when the due date falls on a the interest of justice and fair play.1âwphi1
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case, the filing of the said pleading
on the next working day is deemed on time; Notably, the petition for review was already filed on June 5, 2007, which was
long before the CA issued its Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing
Whereas, the question has been raised if the period is extended ipso jure to the petition for review for being filed out of time. There was no showing that
the next working day immediately following where the last day of the period is a respondent suffered any material injury or his cause was prejudiced by reason
Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, so that when a motion for extension of of such delay. Moreover, the RTC decision which was sought to be reversed in
time is filed, the period of extension is to be reckoned from the next working the petition for review filed in the CA had affirmed the MTC judgment convicting
day and not from the original expiration of the period. petitioner of direct assault, hence, the petition involved no less than petitioner’s
liberty.15 We do not find anything on record that shows petitioner's deliberate
NOW THEREFORE, the Court Resolves, for the guidance of the Bench and intent to delay the final disposition of the case as he had filed the petition for
the Bar, to declare that Section 1, Rule 22 speaks only of "the last day of the review within the extended period sought, although erroneously computed.
period" so that when a party seeks an extension and the same is granted, the These circumstances should have been taken into consideration for the CA not
due date ceases to be the last day and hence, the provision no longer applies. to dismiss the petition outright.
Any extension of time to file the required pleading should therefore be counted
from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact that said due date is a We have ruled that being a few days late in the filing of the petition for review
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. does not automatically warrant the dismissal thereof. 16 And even assuming that
a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of
In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc.,12 we said: substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent
Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the circular, is clear. Should a party desire to application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. 17
file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, and the Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair
last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the the proper administration of justice.18After all, the higher objective of procedural
next working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar. rule is to insure that the substantive rights of the parties are
However, according to the same circular, the petition for review on certiorari protected.19Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in case a motion for and not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded ample
extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall be counted opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from the
from the original due date, not from the next working day on which the motion unacceptable plea of technicalities.20
for extension was filed. In Luz v. National Amnesty Commission, we had
G.R. No. 174238               July 7, 2009 checks against the respondents was [based] on the failure of the prosecution to However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on
identify both the accused (respondents herein)? 10 account of the dismissal of the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner,  was deemed to have also elected that such civil action be prosecuted together
vs. Essentially, petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and TESSIE SY, Respondents. January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated
on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only prospective With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure to establish the identity of
DECISION application. She further contends that that her case falls within the following the accused, the question that arises is whether such dismissal would have the
NACHURA, J.: exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent to the criminal action same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put differently, may
is deemed instituted with the latter— petitioner’s action to recover respondents’ civil liability be also allowed to
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of prosper separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were dismissed?
the Order dated January 2, 2006 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch (1) additional evidence as to the identities of the accused is necessary
18, Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled Anita Cheng v. Spouses for the resolution of the civil aspect of the case; Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
William Sy and Tessie Sy. states –
(2) a separate complaint would be just as efficacious as or even more
The antecedents are as follows— expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case;
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, xxx
Manila against respondent spouses William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. (3) the trial court failed to make any pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused amounting to a reservation of the right to have (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
98-969952 against Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
William Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos. the civil liability litigated in a separate action;
civil action separately shall be allowed.
171762 and 71860 for ₱300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of (4) the trial court did not declare that the facts from which the civil
which were dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a liability might arise did not exist; Upon filing of the joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in
closed account. full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
(5) the civil complaint is based on an obligation ex-contractu and not ex- considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed delicto pursuant to Article 3111 of the Civil Code; and also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts
Blg.) 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila (6) the claim for civil liability for damages may be had under Article alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages [is]
(Criminal Case Nos. 341458-59). 2912 of the Civil Code. subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the estafa cases for Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. The Order the BP Blg. 22 proceedings. Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
dismissing Criminal Case No. 98-969952 contained no declaration as to the commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
civil liability of Tessie Sy.3 On the other hand, the Order in Criminal Case No. The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against
respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
98-969953 contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any liability of the actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
accused, the same is purely ‘civil,’ not criminal in nature."4 reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil
action to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Later, the MeTC, Branch 25, Manila, dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.13 Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
cases in its Order 5 dated February 7, 2005 on account of the failure of Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in
petitioner to identify the accused respondents in open court. The Order also did This rule applies especially with the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Thus, during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already
not make any pronouncement as to the civil liability of accused pending at the time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
respondents.1avvphi1 Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability was impliedly instituted and
remained pending before the respective trial courts. This is consonant with our somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their retroactive
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, ruling in Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 14 that the possible single civil liability arising application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6 for collection of a sum of money with damages from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
(Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount of ₱600,000.00 deemed instituted with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation of BP adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is
covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the complaining party, without traversing that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
cases. the prohibition against forum shopping. 15 Prior to the judgment in either the laws.18
estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant, cannot be Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP
In the assailed Order7 dated January 2, 2006, the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the
said criminal proceedings to the exclusion of the other. 16 checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate
to collect the amount of ₱600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a
111 of the Revised Rules of Court. elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt—where in Criminal Case No. separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the
98-969952 there was no pronouncement as regards the civil liability of the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 8 which the court denied in its accused and in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 where the trial court declared proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal
Order9 dated June 5, 2006. Hence, this petition, raising the sole legal issue – that the liability of the accused was only civil in nature—produced the legal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and
effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate separately the civil criminal cases. Thus, where petitioner’s rights may be fully adjudicated in the
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate
and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code.17 action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata,
and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this
present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing
special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents, as they may now conveniently
Code is not applicable.19 evade payment of their obligation merely on account of a technicality applied
against petitioner.
Be it remembered that rules governing procedure before the courts, while not
cast in stone, are for the speedy, efficient, and orderly dispensation of justice There is unjust enrichment when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2)
and should therefore be adhered to in order to attain this objective.20 such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. This
doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich
However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner himself inequitably at another’s expense. One condition for invoking this
would be left without a remedy to recover from respondents the ₱600,000.00 principle of unjust enrichment is that the aggrieved party has no other recourse
allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice even the petitioner’s Notice of based on contract, quasi-contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision of
Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings No. 98-88390 law.26
(Petition for Voluntary Insolvency by Kolin Enterprises, William Sy and Tessie
Sy), which case was reportedly archived for failure to prosecute the petition for Court litigations are primarily designed to search for the truth, and a liberal
an unreasonable length of time. 21 Expectedly, respondents would raise the interpretation and application of the rules which will give the parties the fullest
same defense that petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil action to opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out the truth. The
recover the amount of the checks along with the BP Blg. 22 cases. dispensation of justice and vindication of legitimate grievances should not be
barred by technicalities.27 For reasons of substantial justice and equity, as the
It is in this light that we find petitioner’s contention that she was not assisted by complement of the legal jurisdiction that seeks to dispense justice where courts
a private prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their
indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do
cause when he failed to have her establish the identities of the accused during so,28 we thus rule, pro hac vice, in favor of petitioner.
the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed impliedly
instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 05-112452 entitled
Anita Cheng v. Spouses William Sy and Tessie Sy is hereby ordered
Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner’s recourse REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have been to appeal the
civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents corresponding to the SO ORDERED.
bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within
the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy
to recover the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake
of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from
this rule.
It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of
their counsel.22 But this rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s
mistake is so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day
in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the
client’s deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law. 23 Tested
against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws
and rules and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and
jurisprudence. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be
able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the Bar.24 Further, lawyers in the government service are expected to be more
conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.25 Apparently, the public prosecutor
neglected to equip himself with the knowledge of the proper procedure for BP
Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such that he failed
to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only
remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she
loaned to respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer.
By this failure, petitioner was denied her day in court to prosecute the
respondents for their obligation to pay their loan.
Moreover, we take into consideration the trial court’s observation when it
dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal Case No. 98-969953 that if there was
any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in nature. Hence, if the loan
be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount would be
G.R. No. 150429 August 29, 2006 On March 30, 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision evidence to support the same, the Court cannot, on its own accord, decide
which dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner’s motion for against the unreasonableness of the consideration. 19
ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, Petitioner, reconsideration was denied, hence, the present petition for review raising the
vs. following issues: It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes frowned upon and are
THE COURT OF APPEALS (Spc. Fmr. Seventh Division) and BARBERSHIP considered as ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the
MANAGEMENT LIMITED and NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION worker’s right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does not amount
INC. Respondents. AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN UPHOLDING to estoppel. 20 The reason is plain. Employer and employee, obviously do not
THE VALIDITY OF THE RECEIPT AND RELEASE SINCE PETITIONER’S stand on the same footing. 21 However, not all waivers and quitclaims are
  CONSENT THERETO WAS VITIATED THEREBY MAKING THE SAME VOID invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
DECISION AND UNENFORCEABLE. and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may
not later be disowned simply because of change of mind. It is only where there
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
1
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision   of the HOLDING THAT THE PRESCRIPTION PERIOD APPLICABLE TO THE law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 dated March 30, 2001 which CLAIM OF THE PETITIONER IS THE 3-YEAR PERIOD PROVIDED FOR the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what
affirmed the Decision 2 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) UNDER THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND NOT THE 10-YEAR he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
dated March 31, 1998 dismissing petitioner’s complaint for payment of PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding
disability and other benefits for lack of merit and the Resolution 3 dated October undertaking, 22 as in this case.
5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and Release voluntarily or
freely because he was permanently disabled and in financial constraints. To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in clear and unequivocal
The antecedent facts are as follows: These factors allegedly vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt and terms, leaving no doubt as to the intention of those giving up a right or a benefit
Release void and unenforceable. that legally pertains to them. 23 We have reviewed the terms and conditions
In 1989, respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. hired the services
of petitioner Roberto G. Famanila as Messman 4 for Hansa Riga, a vessel The petition lacks merit. contained in the Receipt and Release and we find the same to be clear and
registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent, Barbership unambiguous. The signing was even witnessed by petitioner’s wife, Gloria T.
Management Limited. It is fundamental that the scope of the Supreme Court’s judicial review under Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila. The Receipt and Release provides in
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is confined only to errors of law. It does not part:
On June 21, 1990, while Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, extend to questions of fact. More so in labor cases where the doctrine applies
California, U.S.A. and while petitioner was assisting in the loading operations, with greater force. 14 The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have already determined That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND TWO
the latter complained of a headache. Petitioner experienced dizziness and he the factual issues, and these were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus, they HUNDRED DOLLARS (US$13,200.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency
subsequently collapsed. Upon examination, it was determined that he had a are accorded not only great respect but also finality and are deemed binding THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FOUR PESOS
sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a ruptured cerebral upon this Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 15 We (365,904.00), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged to my full and
aneurysm. 5 Petitioner underwent a brain operation and he was confined at the reviewed the records of the case and we find no reason to deviate from the complete satisfaction x x x I, ROBERTO G. FAMANILA, x x x hereby remise,
Emmanuel Hospital in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. On July 19, 1990, he findings of the labor arbiter, NLRC and the Court of Appeals. release and forever discharge said vessel "HANSA RIGA", her Owners,
underwent a second brain operation. operators, managers, charterers, agents, underwriters, P and I Club, master,
A vitiated consent does not make a contract void and unenforceable. A vitiated officers, and crew and all parties at interest therein or thereon, whether named
Owing to petitioner’s physical and mental condition, he was repatriated to the consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement. Under the Civil Code, the or not named, including but not limited to BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT
Philippines. On August 21, 1990, he was examined at the American Hospital in vices of consent are mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or LIMITED, NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. and
Intramuros, Manila where the examining physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis fraud.16 If consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices of consent, ASSURANCEFORENIGEN GARD from any and all claims, demands, debts,
declared that he "cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for 120 the contract is voidable. 17 A voidable contract is binding unless annulled by a dues, liens, actions or causes of action, at law or in equity, in common law or in
days, he is being declared permanently, totally disabled." 6 proper action in court. 18 admiralty, statutory or contractual, arising from and under the laws of the
United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the Philippines
Thereafter, authorized representatives of the respondents convinced him to Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability vitiated his consent and/or any other foreign country now held, owned or possessed by me or by
settle his claim amicably by accepting the amount of US$13,200. 7 Petitioner to the Receipt and Release thereby rendering it void and unenforceable. any person or persons, arising from or related to or concerning whether directly
accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt and Release However, disability is not among the factors that may vitiate consent. Besides, or indirectly, proximately or remotely, without being limited to but including the
dated February 28, 1991. 8 His wife, Gloria Famanila and one Richard save for petitioner’s self-serving allegations, there is no proof on record that his said illness suffered by me on board the vessel "HANSA RIGA" on or about
Famanila, acted as witnesses in the signing of the release. consent was vitiated on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof 21st June 1990 at Portland, Oregon and disability compensation in connection
of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and Release must be upheld. We therewith.
On June 11, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint 9 with the NLRC which was agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that:
docketed as NLRC OCW Case No. 6-838-97-L praying for an award of This instrument is a GENERAL RELEASE intended to release all liabilities of
disability benefits, share in the insurance proceeds, moral damages and In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner’s any character and/or claims or damages and/or losses and/or any other
attorney’s fees. On September 29, 1997, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter consent was vitiated when he signed the agreement. Granting that petitioner liabilities whatsoever, whether contractual or statutory, at common law or in
Voltaire A. Balitaan dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription. has not fully recovered his health at the time he signed the subject document, equity, tortious or in admiralty, now or henceforth in any way related to or
Petitioner appealed the decision with the NLRC. On March 31, 1998, the NLRC the same cannot still lead to the conclusion that he did not voluntar[il]y accept occurring as a consequence of the illness suffered by me as Messman of the
promulgated its decision 10 finding the appeal to be without merit and ordered the agreement, for his wife and another relative witnessed his signing. vessel "HANSA RIGA", including but not limited to all damages and/or losses
its dismissal. When the motion for reconsideration 11 was denied by the NLRC
Moreover, the document entitled receipt and release which was attached by consisting of loss of support, loss of earning capacity, loss of all benefits of
in its resolution dated June 29, 1998, 12 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
petitioner in his appeal does not show on its face any violation of law or public whatsoever nature and extent incurred, physical pain and suffering and/or all
with this Court. On December 2, 1998, we resolved to refer the case to the
policy. In fact, petitioner did not present any proof to show that the damages and/or indemnities claimable in law, tort, contract, common law,
Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
consideration for the same is not reasonable and acceptable. Absent any equity and/or admiralty by me or by any person or persons pursuant to the laws
Labor Relations Commission. 13
of the United States of America, Norway, Hongkong or the Republic of the
Philippines and of all other countries whatsoever.
I hereby certify that I am of legal age and that I fully understand this instrument
which was read to me in the local dialect and I agree that this is a FULL AND
FINAL RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all parties and things referred to
herein, and I further agree that this release may be pleaded as an absolute and
final bar to any suit or suits or legal proceedings that may hereafter be
prosecuted by me or by any one claiming by, through, or under me, against
any of the persons or things
referred to or related herein, for any matter or thing referred to or related
herein. 24
It is elementary that a contract is perfected by mere consent and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been
expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their
nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. 25 Further, dire
necessity is not an acceptable ground for annulling the Receipt and Release
since it has not been shown that petitioner was forced to sign it. 26
Regarding prescription, the applicable prescriptive period for the money claims
against the respondents is the three year period pursuant to Article 291 of the
Labor Code which provides that:
ART. 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
xxxx
Since petitioner’s demand for an award of disability benefits is a money claim
arising from his employment, Article 291 of the Labor Code applies. From the
time petitioner was declared permanently and totally disabled on August 21,
1990 which gave rise to his entitlement to disability benefits up to the time that
he filed the complaint on June 11, 1997, more than three years have elapsed
thereby effectively barring his claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50615 which affirmed the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission dismissing petitioner’s complaint for
disability and other benefits for lack of merit, and
the Resolution dated October 5, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41171               July 23, 1987 Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March Paulo Borromeo
13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. Anecita Borromeo
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner, 
vs. On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu Quirino Borromeo and
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament Julian Borromeo
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents. left by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and
Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and 2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special his brothers and sisters predeceased him.
No. L-55000               July 23, 1987 Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly
signed and thumbmarked by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio 3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo who acted as a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
PILAR N. BORROMEO, MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, witnesses.
JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B. MORALES, AND CANUTO V. b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the
BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,  Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due death of Vito Borromeo. He was married to Remedios Cuenco
vs. trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an only son-Atty. Jose
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee. deceased was a forgery. Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.
probate of the will was affirmed in Testate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H.
No. L-62895               July 23, 1987 Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19 SCRA 656). 4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an
only daughter, Aurora B. Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the
JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,  The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several following children:
vs. parties came before the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
presiding Judge of the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII,
RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. The following petitions or claims were filed: b. Ramon Ocampo
Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and DOMINGO L. 1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme c. Lourdes Ocampo
ANTIGUA, respondents. Borromeo filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination of
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x heirship. There was no opposition filed against said petition.
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose
No. L-63818               July 23, 1987 2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for
Barcenilla, Jr.
declaration as heir. The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme
DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition. 5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war
Intestate Estate of VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional and left the following children:
Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON. JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as 3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de
Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, as a formal Castro, Ramon Ocampo, Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani a. Marcial Borromeo
party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre, Lamberto Morre, and
Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife,
ESTENZO, petitioners, 
of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Remedios Alfonso, and his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO Borromeo.
c. Asuncion Borromeo
BORROMEO, and PETRA O. BORROMEO, respondents. 4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo,
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe
Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco Borromeo, Crispin e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
No. L-65995               July 23, 1987 Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo
represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim. f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO,
and JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO,petitioners,  When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following The last three died leaving no issue.
vs. facts were established:
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV,
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter and left the following children:
Regional Trial Court of Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate
of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R; and DOMINGO L. having predeceased the former), were survived by their eight (8) children,
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
ANTIGUA, respondents. namely,
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Jose Ma. Borromeo
children:
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court Cosme Borromeo
aa. Federico Borromeo
of First Instance of Cebu. Pantaleon Borromeo
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
G.R. No. 41171 Vito Borromeo
 cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr. be declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid,
he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit
dd. Jose Borromeo made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were
ee. Consuelo Borromeo forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their
acknowledged illegitimate child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also
ff. Pilar Borromeo equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and
child. legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the
gg. Salud Borromeo court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera of the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948 legal heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared
June 25, 1973. as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946 that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the
children: basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a signatories to the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was
Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud document itself.
bb. Luz Borromeo Borromeo, Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion
Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo, Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to validity of the waiver of hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that
Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary rights took place after the court
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of the nature
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court
asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver agreement is void as it was because it was executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having been that the probate court loses jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of
order declaring the following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate is distributed to those
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo: inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. entitled to the same.
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the
five declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
3. Vitaliana Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo. continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975. from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the
5. Salud Borromeo
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may
6. Asuncion Borromeo Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into
order, denying the motion for reconsideration. possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event
7. Marcial Borromeo retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of the Civil
The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
of the claim of respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo against the decedent but a claim for properties, real and personal, which Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in
constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's estate, heirs who 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent
shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable under the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
shares among the 9 abovenamed declared intestate heirs. of a creditor of the heirs which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential:
private respondent under the waiver agreement was filed beyond the time (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3)
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22,
B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after there had
been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order of August 15, clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a
1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty Jesus 1969), the approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the
administrator to partition the estate (August 15, 1969), when in a mere party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an
Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was brought out.
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J., 311). (Fernandez v.
ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid from this segregated Hereditary Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been
portion. cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver
Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because there can document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia
as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid
acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a
proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on April 10, 1969, The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed
proposed to concede to all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all when the estate was ordered distributed. of assignment, the deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of
properties, personal and real, including all cash and sums of money in the the deed of assignment and deed of reconveyance all argue against the
hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested or They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of purported waiver of hereditary rights.
claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of waiver of hereditary right in the present case because there was no object,
Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested which is hereditary right, that could be the subject matter of said waiver, and, Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171
lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that the therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab initio but that the trial court acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver
petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the was inexistent. agreement because the trial court's jurisdiction extends to matters incidental
deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any settlement of the estate.
"Waiver of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now formal pleading filed by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of
purports it to be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason the waiver agreement and without notice to the parties concerned, two things The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to which are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with authority and
settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver agreement, G.R. No. 62895
deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs nevertheless, the lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and
executed an Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno,
without asking for the requisite pleading. This resulted in the issuance of the representative of some of the heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate
This Agreement of Partition was approved by the trial court on August 15, appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the validity of the
1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others, signed a document closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar motion dated May 29, 1979
waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the fact that
entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.
respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of
rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary the estate since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.
deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said assignment was rights in favor of Fortunato Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to
P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent Tomas, tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance and by virtue of the same act, resolve the aforesaid motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition
and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) they lost their rights because the rights from that moment on became vested in for mandamus before the Court of Appeals to compel the respondent judge to
in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors Fortunato Borromeo. terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
named in the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was
P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions
Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on is no need for a person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or to compel the petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real
October 15, 1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he is certain of the death of properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash in his hands, pending
24, 1969. the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. At the claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not lie to compel the
time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the petition
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had the waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and on May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted they were also certain of their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower court disallowed the probate document itself.
of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the decision The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion
of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire filed on April 28, 1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot
several parties came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging jurisdiction over the claim because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its be justified by the filing of the motion for inventory and accounting because the
themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee asserts that on August 23, 1973, latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that under the then
impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying the said claims the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors to the Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or resolve a case
or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and or matter within three months from the date of its submission.
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the setting the same for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers
that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the inheritance involves no question of title to The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had
settlement of the estate.
property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the question. already been resolved when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December incidents previously set in his court in an order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to
24, 1974, is hereby SET ASIDE. The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining
appellants in this case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are him to maintain status quo on the case.
G.R. No. 55000 contesting the validity of the trial court's order dated December 24, 1974,
declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the under the waiver agreement. the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the trial
declaring the waiver document earlier discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court
appellate court certified this case to this Court as the questions raised are all of be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of
law. convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case. the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of
also question the jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action eight (8) intestate heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated and reserved for attorney's
filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo. to the respondent and to Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) fees.
contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967, some of the According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982,
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the
July 31, 1967, Pilar Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any (p. 197, Rollo, G. R. No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine
respondent. (9) declared heirs the properties due to the following circumstances:
hereditary right in the intestate estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo because
 1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order of 16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to
segregate the 40% reserved for attorney's fees; October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various state herein that respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown
motions for reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that undue interest in pursing the sale initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua,
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as as owners they cannot be deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons et al. Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos is
beneficiary of the 5/9 of the estate because of the waiver agreement advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the motions for reconsideration, married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
signed by the heirs representing the 5/9 group which is still pending Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for production of titles.
resolution by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1); 17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate
7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirs-distributees
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his incident involving Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of because the certificates of title are already registered in their names
accounting; and herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and Amelinda B. Talam In Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco P.
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based on
annotations of notices of lis pendens on the different titles of the tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among the rationale that proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn
properties of the estate. others, Atty. Sesbreno insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands interest more than the present income of the so called estate. Most of
to receive "fat commission" from the sale of the entire property. Indeed, the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to say their
Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in contempt of piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have
some of the declared heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his had the courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly
pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this Court in its resolution of June profession. But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of favored by respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos.
15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, contempt and suspension. Atty. Sesbreno chose rapproachment and
to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who, together, x x x           x x x          x x x
the co-administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real continued to harass administrator 20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the
properties of the estate and to render an accounting of cash and bank deposits shotgun motion of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents
realized from rents of several properties. x x x           x x x          x x x
now pending in the court below which smack of harassment against the
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995. 9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents,
of the Hon. Presiding Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent
Considering the pronouncements stated in: Antigua. Hon. Francisco P. Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No.
916-R by reason of the following circumstances:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial 10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who
court dated December 24, 1974; are agitating for the sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual (a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as
heirs, on the one hand, and the herein movants, on the other, who are initiated by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the not willing to sell their distributive shares under the terms and brother of respondent.
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of
and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the harassment has become apparent against the herein movants, (b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the case especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the harassments employed conformity of the heirs-distributees, and petitioners have openly
to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of refused the sale, to the great disappointment of respondent.
and administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces (c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents tecum issued to the bank which seeks to invade into the privacy of the clearly intended to harass and embarrass administrator Jose
from further acting on any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the other matters Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him into acceding to the
916-11 because of the affirmation of the decision of the Intermediate mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are proposed sale.
Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818. expected until the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed
sale. In such a situation, the herein movants beg for an entirely (d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said by failing to resolve the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose
subject to the submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate incidents. Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin Borromeo. Similar claims
and an accounting of the call and bank deposits of the petitioner, as co- by the other lawyers were resolved by respondent after petitioners
administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by this Court 11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate cognizance of this proceeding, including the incidents above-
speed. mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in favor of On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the
Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein movants. Incidents petition for certiorari and/or prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P.
G.R. No. 63818 which may create this impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916-R. The
39-41, Rollo) court also ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
filed a motion for inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their
presided over by Judge Francisco P. Burgos to inhibit the judge from further motion for reconsideration having been denied, the private respondents filed a A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court
acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants alleged, among others, petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction before the on April 11, 1983. Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the
the following: Intermediate Appellate Court. decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and
inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case of Intestate
x x x           x x x          x x x In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive
following: Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.
6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for
the production of the certificates of title and to deposit the same with the x x x           x x x          x x x The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because
Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the ready inspection of interested Judge Francisco P. Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu sometime before the latest reorganization of the judiciary. However, we and produce all the owners" copies of the titles in the court presided order by names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending inhibition case elevated
decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the judge to whom this case Judge Burgos. before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
will be reassigned and others concerned.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been tecum commanding Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the 916-R requires only the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-
harassed. They contend that Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in titles in court. claimants who were individually hired by their respective heirs-clients, so their
the proposed sale of the entire estate for P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers attorney's fees should be legally charged against their respective clients and
of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the judge's order of All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, not against the estate.
March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00. They 1979, before the date of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying
add that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the private respondents' motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one
the estate to pay the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the the subpoena.1avvphi1 and barred by res judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No.
inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been unreasonable because his orders 54232 directed the respondent Judge to expedite the settlement and liquidation
It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. of the decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution, which was already
against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to give an Burgos is not inhibited or disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there
accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate
would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the past twelve years, he had not Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 — when it granted the
They claim that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to sell the
the resolution of this Court directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement petition for certiorari and or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P.
properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 916R as
and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232. And finally, they state that the at 6.7 million pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15
disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to the Executive
million pesos. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983,
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with the 47
volumes of the records of the case. The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more which was appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No.
specifically, the insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at 63818).
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs objected, cannot easily be ignored.
countered that Judge Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the
Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided at all costs. In obligation of the estate but of the individual heirs who individually hired their
of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet Borromeo was singled out to make an the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno (81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as rentals for the land respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the Order of August 15, 1969,
upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to ... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market value of
February 1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau parties litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be
of Internal Revenue. In order to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to his actions, whether well deleted.
Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio Barredo, Jr., to a series of grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty. from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a G.R. No. 63818, we grant the petition.
Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his
presumably to cover up the projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua. honest actuations and probity in favor or of either partly or incite such WHEREFORE, —
state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of (1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated
petitioner Domingo L. Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such December 24, 1974, declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the
to file an inventory when he has already filed one to account for cash, a report circumstances is to disqualify himself "That way he avoids being estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order dated July 7, 1975,
on which the administrators had already rendered: and to appear and be misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is preserve ed. denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also what is more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of justice is aforementioned order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and
prayed that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the lived up to. VOID;
Manager of the Consolidated Bank and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records
in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his wife as well as the In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound (2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver
appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir reasons. As Earlier stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify document valid is hereby SET ASIDE;
distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and (3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the
Domingo Antigua, Atty. Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the Intestate Estate of decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering
subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive the inhibition of Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing Special
Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the Province of Judge of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic. The judge who
Cebu and another subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo. decision is not only valid but the issue itself has become moot and academic. has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum G.R. No. 65995 immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the
to the Managert of the bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the proceedings. In the event that the successor-judge is likewise
Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu. and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo. The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court directing the
all incidents in Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the
On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of petition and No. 63818. They also pray that all acts of the respondents related case shall be implemented:
the heirs of Marcial Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the respondent
joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by filing a motion for relief of the Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void and (4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue
administrator. without force and effect whatsoever. seeking to restrain Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in
G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents
subpoena duces tecum to private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring in Special Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs- (5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily
distributees to the estate, of the distributed properties already titled in their terminate the close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
 accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioner-
administrator of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution
dated June 15, 1983; and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the
market value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and
paid should be, as it is hereby DELETED. The lawyers should collect
from the heirs-distributees who individually hired them, attorney's fees
according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which
should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property
the latter acquired from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-18176            October 26, 1966 jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at the records show that he would not hesitate to lie when it suits his purpose.
least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum. 8 Since Thus, for instance, when plaintiff contracted marriage with the defendant, he
LAZARO B. RAYRAY, plaintiff-appellant,  plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court said that he was single, although, he admitted, this was a lie, because,
vs. had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject- sometime in 1940, he married in Baguio, one Adelaida Melecio or
CHAE KYUNG LEE, defendant-appellee. matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of Valdez.10 But, then he would, also, have us believe that his marriage with the
Jaime R. Nuevas for plaintiff and appellee.  the marriage between the parties herein. latter was illegal or fictitious, because Adelaida and he did no more than sign,
Rafael Jose for defendant and appellant. on a small window in the City Hall of Baguio, certain documents the contents of
As regards the substantial validity of said marriage, plaintiff testified that he met which he did not read.
CONCEPCION, C.J.: the defendant in Pusan Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a
nightclub; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, affirmed,
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. were married in Pusan Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their with the costs of this instance against plaintiff-appellant. It is so ordered.
marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953,
Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June
formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage
provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing
declared in default, she not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then
the reception of his evidence. Before acting on this motion, the lower court noticed that, on February 16, 1958, defendant was already married, according
referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in
a collusion between the parties exists. Said officer having found no such Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant
collusion, the case was heard on the merits. In due course, thereafter, decision confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean,
was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon the ground: adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage
(1) that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now
the facts proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A reconsideration of this unknown to him.
decision having been denied, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
certified the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower court being The lower court considered plaintiffs evidence insufficient to establish that
in issue in the appeal. defendant was married to another person prior to March 15, 1953, and we
agree with this conclusion. To begin with, Exhibit A is not signed. It merely
In relation thereto, the court a quo  found that it had no jurisdiction to pass upon purports to bear the seal of the Chief of Pusan National Police. Secondly, the
the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in record does not show who prepared it, much less that he had personal
Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is erroneous. In order that a given case could be knowledge of the truth of the entry therein concerning defendant's status on
validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over (1) the February 15, 1953. It should be noted, that defendant was a native, not  of
subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in Pusan but of Seoul, Korea. Hence, Exhibit A could, at best, be no more than
actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.1 hearsay evidence. Again, when plaintiff allegedly confronted the defendant with
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage the contents of Exhibit B, defendant did not  say that she had been married
to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first before. Plaintiff declared that she admitted having previously lived  with several
instance,2 and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations. 3 other men, adding, however, that she had no impediment, thus, in effect,
negating the alleged previous marriage.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in
consequence of the filing of the complaint herein. 4 Defendant was placed under Thirdly, if Exhibit A was obtained on February 16, 1953, in order to establish
the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication. 5 defendant's qualification to contract marriage, why is it that the wedding took
place, despite the entry in said document to the effect that defendant was
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and married already? There is no competent evidence to the effect that Korean
status affects or binds the whole word. The res  in the present case is the laws permit bigamy or polygamy. Moreover, the presumption is that the foreign
relation between said parties, or their marriage tie. 6 Jurisdiction over the same law is identical to the lex fori, or, in the case at bar, the Philippine Law. 9 In fact,
depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of the statement, imputed by plaintiff to the defendant, to the effect that, although
celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.7 Plaintiff here is a citizen of she had cohabited before with other men, there was no impediment to her
the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our marrying him, clearly suggests that a previous marriage on her part would have
jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — been, in her opinion, a legal obstacle to her marriage with the plaintiffs. Then
theory still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower too, the marriage certificate Exhibit D contains spaces for the entry of data on
court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff whether any of the contracting parties had been previously married; whether
herein. the prior marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce; and, if there had
been such decree, the date thereof. Surely, these data would be absolutely
Indeed, marriage is one of the cases of double status, in that the status therein irrelevant if polygamy were sanctioned in Korea. And, again, why is it that
involves and affects two persons. One is married, never in abstract or a Exhibit D states that defendant had had no  previous marriage?
vacuum, but, always to somebody else. Hence, a judicial decree on the
marriage status of a person necessarily reflects upon the status of another and Last, but not least, plaintiff cannot possibly secure the relief prayed for unless
the relation between them. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has full faith and credence are given to his testimony, but we cannot believe him for
G.R. No. 178551               October 11, 2010 directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and
solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF awarded to overseas workers.
PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,  Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties
vs. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent. court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present petition for review on deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective
certiorari was filed. obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
DECISION public order or public policy.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondent’s
CARPIO MORALES, J.: employment contract specifically stipulates that her employment shall be It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health conclude that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the appellate court presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s
of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two- to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a deciding the present case.
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically
monthly salary of US$1,200.00. Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not provided for in the
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of (POEA) Rules relative to master employment contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, Being the law intended by the parties ( lex loci intentiones ) to apply to the
Contract No. 2. company policies and labor laws and legislation of the host country." contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the
termination of the employment of Gran.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are
employment on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the applicable, given that the foreign principal is a government agency which is In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
probationary period. immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is
jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for reconsideration, she returned so since the Ministry’s liability had not been judicially determined as jurisdiction labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to
to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare. was not acquired over it. know only domestic or forum law.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations The petition fails. Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the
Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI matter; thus, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity
as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is
and the Ministry, as the foreign principal. for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign
abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
neither showed that there was just cause to warrant respondent’s dismissal nor principal’s liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held
that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was jointly and solidarily liable. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must
illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party
representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of her contract. In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what
decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners’ motion for is due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad 8 explains: SEC. 24. Proof of official record.  — The record of public documents referred to
reconsideration having been denied by Resolution 5 of April 22, 2004, they in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, . . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
failure to meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
should not be liable as an officer of petitioner ATCI. and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)
Resolution. of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted as agent of the The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and solidarily liable with it, the to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. 9 Verily, to allow must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a
appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s liability before official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and severally petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability inutile. court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or
contract of employment. As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between
employment are not applicable since it was expressly provided in respondent’s respondent and the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host
No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy 11 (Arabic
to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that she did not pass
the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated
copy of the certificate of termination,12 both of which documents were certified
by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of
Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s
letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein she noted that in her first
eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove
that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under
Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti
labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as
required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications
attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws
differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was
validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to
English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to this Office for review
and certification and the same was/were found to be in order. This Office,
however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for
whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is
in order too following the express provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary,
the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety
(90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for
any and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision
shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and
directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and
solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
TUNA PROCESSING, INC., 5. Bank account. TPI shall open and maintain bank accounts in the Ruiz of Branch 61, to which the case was re-raffled, in turn, granted
United States, which will be used exclusively to deposit funds respondents Motion for Reconsideration and dismissed the petition on the
Petitioner, that it will collect and to disburse cash it will be obligated to ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines. [20]
-versus-  spend in connection with the implementation of this Agreement.
Petitioner TPI now seeks to nullify, in this instant Petition for Review on
PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC., 6. Ownership of TPI. TPI shall be owned by the Sponsors and Certiorari under Rule 45, the order of the trial court dismissing its Petition for
Licensor. Licensor shall be assigned one share of TPI for the Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award.
Respondent. purpose of being elected as member of the board of
directors. The remaining shares of TPI shall be held by the  Issue
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Sponsors according to their respective equity shares.  [9] The core issue in this case is whether or not the court a quo  was correct in so
  xxx dismissing the petition on the ground of petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue.
DECISION The parties likewise executed a Supplemental Memorandum of Our Ruling 
PEREZ, J.: Agreement[10] dated 15 January 2003 and an Agreement to Amend The petition is impressed with merit.
Memorandum of Agreement[11] dated 14 July 2003.
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but  The Corporation Code of the Philippines  expressly
which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a Due to a series of events not mentioned in the petition, the licensees, including provides:
foreign arbitral award? respondent Kingford, withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly
reneged on their obligations. [12] Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration Sec. 133. Doing business without a license.  - No foreign corporation
 In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 ,[1] petitioner Tuna before the International Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, transacting business in the Philippines without a license, or its
Processing, Inc. (TPI), a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the United States and won the case against respondent. [13] Pertinent portions of the successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
Philippines, prays that the Resolution [2] dated 21 November 2008 of the award read: any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City be declared void and the case be the Philippines; but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against
remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.In the assailed Resolution, the 13.1 Within thirty (30) days from the date of transmittal of this Award to before Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of
RTC dismissed petitioners Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and the Parties, pursuant to the terms of this award, the total sum to be paid action recognized under Philippine laws.
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award[3] against respondent Philippine by RESPONDENT KINGFORD to CLAIMANT TPI, is the sum of ONE
Kingford, Inc. (Kingford), a corporation duly organized and existing under the MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED It is pursuant to the aforequoted provision that the court a quo  dismissed the
laws of the Philippines, [4] on the ground that petitioner lacked legal capacity to FORTY SIX DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS ($1,750,846.10). petition.  Thus:
sue.[5] (A) For breach of the MOA by not paying past due Herein plaintiff TPIs Petition, etc. acknowledges that it is a foreign
The Antecedents assessments, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the corporation established in the State of California and was given the
total sum of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY NINE THOUSAND THREE exclusive right to license or sublicense the Yamaoka Patent and was
  On 14 January 2003, Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the HUNDRED AND FIFTY FIVE DOLLARS AND NINETY CENTS assigned the exclusive right to enforce the said patent and collect
licensor), co-patentee of U.S. Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Letters Patent ($229,355.90) which is 20% of MOA assessments since September 1, corresponding royalties in the Philippines. TPI likewise admits that it
No. 31138, and Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 (collectively referred to as 2005[;] does not have a license to do business in the Philippines.
the Yamaoka Patent), [6] and five (5) Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel
Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources,  (B) For breach of the MOA in failing to cooperate with CLAIMANT There is no doubt, therefore, in the mind of this Court that TPI has been
Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as TPI in fulfilling the objectives of the MOA, RESPONDENT doing business in the Philippines, but sans a license to do so issued by
the sponsors/licensees)[7] entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), KINGFORD shall pay CLAIMANT the total sum of TWO HUNDRED the concerned government agency of the Republic of the Philippines,
[8]
 pertinent provisions of which read: SEVENTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY DOLLARS when it collected royalties from five (5) Philippine tuna processors[,]
AND TWENTY CENTS ($271,490.20)[;][14] and namely[,] Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy
1.      Background and objectives. The Licensor, co-owner of Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc. and respondent
U.S.Patent No. 5,484,619, Philippine Patent No. 31138, and  (C) For violation of THE LANHAM ACT and infringement of Philippine Kingford, Inc. This being the real situation, TPI cannot be
Indonesian Patent No. ID0003911 xxx wishes to form an the YAMAOKA 619 PATENT, RESPONDENT KINGFORD shall permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit or proceedings in
alliance with Sponsors for purposes of enforcing his three pay CLAIMANT the total sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY any court or administrative agency of the Philippines. A priori, the
aforementioned patents, granting licenses under those patents, THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($1,250,000.00). xxx Petition, etc. extant of the plaintiff TPI should be dismissed for it does
and collecting royalties.   not have the legal personality to sue in the Philippines.[21]
 The Sponsors wish to be licensed under the aforementioned xxx[15] The petitioner counters, however, that it is entitled to seek for the recognition
patents in order to practice the processes claimed in those and enforcement of the subject foreign arbitral award in accordance with
patents in the United States, the Philippines, and Indonesia, To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed on 10 October 2007 a Petition for Republic Act No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 ),[22] the
enforce those patents and collect royalties in conjunction with Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award  before Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Licensor. the RTC of Makati City. The petition was raffled to Branch 150 presided by drafted during the United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Judge Elmo M. Alameda. Arbitration in 1958 (New York Convention), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on
xxx International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),[23]as none of these
At Branch 150, respondent Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss. [16] After the court specifically requires that the party seeking for the enforcement should have
4. Establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. The parties hereto agree to denied the motion for lack of merit,[17] respondent sought for the inhibition of
the establishment of Tuna Processors, Inc. (TPI), a corporation legal capacity to sue. It anchors its argument on the following:
Judge Alameda and moved for the reconsideration of the order denying the
established in the State of California, in order to implement the motion.[18] Judge Alameda inhibited himself notwithstanding [t]he unfounded In the present case, enforcement has been effectively refused on a
objectives of this Agreement. allegations and unsubstantiated assertions in the motion. [19] Judge Cedrick O. ground not found in the [Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
 of  2004], New York Convention,  or Model Law.  It is for this reason that SEC. 45. Rejection of a Foreign Arbitral Award.  - A party to a (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
TPI has brought this matter before this most Honorable Court, as it [i]s foreign arbitration proceeding may oppose an application for arbitration under the law of that country; or
imperative to clarify whether the Philippines international obligations recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance
and State policy to strengthen arbitration as a means of dispute with the procedural rules to be promulgated by the Supreme Court (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to
resolution may be defeated by misplaced technical considerations not only on those grounds enumerated under Article V of the New the public policy of that country.
found in the relevant laws.[24] York Convention. Any other ground raised shall be disregarded by Clearly, not one of these exclusive grounds touched on the capacity to sue of
the regional trial court. the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.
Simply put, how do we reconcile the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines on one hand, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 , It also expressly adopted the Model Law, to wit: Pertinent provisions of the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
the New York Convention and the Model Law on the other? Resolution,[31] which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, likewise support
Sec. 19. Adoption of the Model Law on International
In several cases, this Court had the occasion to discuss the nature and Commercial Arbitration.  International commercial arbitration shall this position.
applicability of the Corporation Code of the Philippines , a general law, viz-a-viz be governed by the Model Law on International Commercial Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]ny party to a foreign arbitration
other special laws.Thus, in Koruga v. Arcenas, Jr.,[25] this Court rejected the Arbitration (the Model Law) adopted by the United Nations may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award. The
application of the Corporation Code and applied the New Central Bank Act. It Commission on International Trade Law on June 21, 1985 xxx. contents of such petition are enumerated in Rule 13.5. [32] Capacity to sue is not
ratiocinated: included. Oppositely, in the Rule on local arbitral awards or arbitrations in
Now, does a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Korugas invocation of the provisions of the Philippines have legal capacity to sue under the provisions of the Alternative instances where the place of arbitration is in the Philippines, [33] it is specifically
Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar Dispute Resolution Act of 2004? We answer in the affirmative. required that a petition to determine any question concerning the existence,
antecedents, we ruled that: validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement [34] available to the
Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004  provides parties before the commencement of arbitration and/or a petition for judicial
The Corporation Code, however, is a general law that the opposing party in an application for recognition and enforcement of the relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding
applying to all types of corporations, while the New arbitral award may raise only those grounds that were enumerated under or declining its jurisdiction[35] after arbitration has already commenced should
Central Bank Act regulates specifically banks and Article V of the New York Convention, to wit: state [t]he facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent
other financial institutions, including the dissolution have legal capacity to sue or be sued.[36]
and liquidation thereof. As between a general and Article V
special law, the latter shall prevail generalia Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforecement of a
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the foreign arbitral award, we deny availment by the losing party of the rule that
specialibus non derogant. (Emphasis supplied)[26] request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party bars foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the
Further, in the recent case of Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters
Agrarian Reform Council,[27] this Court held: enforcement is sought, proof that: into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract,
Without doubt, the Corporation Code is the general law providing by the arbitration and by the result of arbitration, conceding
for the formation, organization and regulation of private law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing thereby the capacity of the otherparty to enter into the contract, participate in
corporations. On the other hand, RA 6657 is the special law on the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. Although not on all
agrarian reform. As between a general and special law, the latter any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award
was made; or fours with the instant case, also worthy to consider is the wisdom of then
shall prevailgeneralia specialibus non derogant .[28] Associate Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her Dissenting Opinion in Asset
Following the same principle, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of (b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals,[37] to wit:
2004 shall apply in this case as the Act,  as its title - An Act to Institutionalize notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode of settlement, is gaining
the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its tested
Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling mechanism can simply be ignored by an aggrieved party, one
-  would suggest, is a law especially enacted to actively promote party within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions who, it must be stressed, voluntarily and actively participated in the
autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, it will destroy the
own arrangements to resolve their disputes. [29] It specifically provides exclusive that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be very essence of mutuality inherent in consensual contracts. [38]
grounds available to the party opposing an application for recognition and separated from those not so submitted, that part of the award which
enforcement of the arbitral award. [30] contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award
recognized and enforced; or should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws and
Inasmuch as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 , a municipal procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly erased any
law,  applies in the instant petition, we do not see the need to discuss (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure conflict of law question.
compliance with international obligations under the New York Convention and was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
the Model Law.  After all, both already form part of the law. agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the Finally, even assuming, only for the sake of argument, that the
arbitration took place; or court a quo  correctly observed that the Model Law, not the New York
In particular, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004  incorporated Convention, governs the subject arbitral award,[39] petitioner may still seek
the New York Convention in the Act by specifically providing: (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been recognition and enforcement of the award in Philippine court, since the Model
SEC. 42. Application of the New York Convention.  - The New York Convention set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in Law  prescribes substantially identical exclusive grounds for refusing
shall govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards covered by the which, or under the law of which, that award was made. recognition or enforcement.[40]
said Convention. 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be Premises considered, petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do
xxx refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and business in the Philippines, may seek recognition and enforcement of the
enforcement is sought finds that:
foreign arbitral award in accordance with the provisions of the Alternative under Rule 45 is a typographical error. As correctly pointed out by
Dispute Resolution Act of 2004. respondent Kingford, the order sought to be assailed originated
from Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61. 
II
27. xxx Upon confirmation with the Regional Trial
The remaining arguments of respondent Kingford are likewise Court, Makati City, Branch 61, a copy of petitioner TPIs motion
unmeritorious. was received by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, Branch
First.  There is no need to consider respondents contention that 67. On 8 January 2009, the motion was forwarded to the Regional
petitioner TPI improperly raised a question of fact when it posited that its act of Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 61. [48]
entering into a MOA should not be considered doing business in the All considered, petitioner TPI, although a foreign corporation not
Philippines for the purpose of determining capacity to sue. We reiterate that the licensed to do business in the Philippines, is not, for that reason alone,
foreign corporations capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofar as precluded from filing the Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before a Philippine court.
Second.  Respondent cannot fault petitioner for not filing a motion WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated 21 November 2008 of the
for reconsideration of the assailed Resolution dated 21 November Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati City in Special Proceedings No. M-
2008  dismissing the case. We have, time and again, ruled that the prior filing of 6533 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
a motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari  under Rule 45.[41] Branch 61 for further proceedings.
Third.  While we agree that petitioner failed to observe the principle SO ORDERED.
of hierarchy of courts, which, under ordinary circumstances, warrants the
outright dismissal of the case, [42] we opt to relax the rules following the
pronouncement in Chua v. Ang,[43]  to wit:
[I]t must be remembered that [the principle of
hierarchy of courts] generally applies to cases involving conflicting
factual allegations. Cases which depend on disputed facts for
decision cannot be brought immediately before us as we are not
triers of facts.[44] A strict application  of this rule may be excused
when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case, as in the
present case, where the issues are not factual but purely legal. In
these types of questions, this Court has the ultimate say so that
we merely abbreviate the review process if we, because of the
unique circumstances of a case, choose to hear and decide the
legal issues outright.[45]
Moreover, the novelty and the paramount importance of the issue herein raised
should be seriously considered. [46] Surely, there is a need to take cognizance of
the case not only to guide the bench and the bar, but if only to strengthen
arbitration as a means of dispute resolution, and uphold the policy of the State
embodied in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004, to wit:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. -  It is hereby declared
the policy of the State to actively promote party autonomy in the
resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their
own arrangements to resolve their disputes. Towards this end, the
State shall encourage and actively promote the use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) as an important means to achieve
speedy and impartial justice and declog court dockets. xxx
Fourth.  As regards the issue on the validity and enforceability of
the foreign arbitral award, we leave its determination to the court a quo  where
its recognition and enforcement is being sought.
Fifth.  Respondent claims that petitioner failed to furnish the court
of origin a copy of the motion for time to file petition for review
on certiorari before the petition was filed with this Court. [47] We, however, find
petitioners reply in order. Thus:
26. Admittedly, reference to Branch 67 in petitioner
TPIs Motion for Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967 Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the property may be found.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.  "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.  residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors- legitimate children by his first and second marriages. nation of the decedent.
appellants, 
vs. On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees. respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were Code, stating that —
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants. heirs of the deceased.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al. those which have for their object public order, public policy and
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. executor.1 agreed upon in a foreign country.

BENGZON, J.P., J.: After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted  the phrase, "notwithstanding the
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
did not provide for legitimes. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
The facts of the case are as follows: of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L- involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he 16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is leave, inter alia, the amount  of successional rights, to the decedent's national
Palma Bellis. not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to
he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that
order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867,
Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is
children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine
of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët national law should govern.
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Civil Code. of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling the capacity to succeed. They provide that — against appellants. So ordered.
P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three the law of the country where it is situated.
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
G.R. No. L-23145      November 29, 1968 It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the
is immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore  have any
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. of the stock certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,  ancillary administrator because the said stock certificates are in existence, they administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines].
vs. are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant. Company, in New York, U.S.A...."4 country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the
Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee. nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates distributed among his heirs."7
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant. cannot be declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there
FERNANDO, J.: was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal. ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002
Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, United States of As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is
America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New challenged order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the to be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in
Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, refusing to accord obedience to a court decree. How, then, can this order be any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, stigmatized as illegal?
the lower court, then presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired, Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was Revenue8 finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares
issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering the motion of called for by the realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that
the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964, as well as the opposition of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the
conduct bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It
filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or tolerated. For the law is
for all purposes in connection with the administration and liquidation of the does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a solution,
Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by 2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather
33,002 shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations. conclusive fashion for the legality of the challenged order, how does appellant,
Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3) directs said Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of
corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the persuasion of precisely demonstrating the contrary? It would assign as the
said corporation to either the incumbent ancillary administrator or to the honor of the judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as lost the
Probate Division of this Court." 1 order, there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the
about by the persistence of the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..."9 More specifically, appellant would stress
From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily submitted itself to the
administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, but by the Philippine that the "lower court could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in
jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance through counsel on question when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge knew, and does
corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15,
prosper. The challenged order represents a response and expresses a policy, know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said stock certificates are in
1963. existence and are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator in
to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem, addressed to the
attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies, with full and ample Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and New York."10
support from legal doctrines of weight and significance. effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That
would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the certainly does not suffice to call for the reversal of the appealed order. Since
The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of what was previously
Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in
ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the
York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete
appellant, the certificates being in the possession of the County Trust decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing
paralysis of judicial authority. unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the
Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the
estate of the deceased.2 Then came this portion of the appellant's brief: "On 1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent
August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a responsibility fulfilled.
appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being
by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is a made to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party or entity, in this
administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as "general rule universally recognized" that administration, whether principal or case domiciled abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in
to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state refusing to yield obedience. Certainly, appellant would not be heard to contend
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered or country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an administrator in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere scrap of
the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another state paper, the court issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary or country."6
administrator did not comply with the order, and on February 11, 1964, the It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court
ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, did not correspond exactly with the facts. To be more blunt, the quality of truth
certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to may be lacking in such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered
name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate however, again to borrow from Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely
considered as lost."3 owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction development."11
of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any
Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate
"were devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if] clumsy and at times corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as though instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."
offensive."12 Some of them have persisted even to the present, that eminent it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person
jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the adopted child, the constructive trust, all of distinct and separate from its individual stockholders.... It owes its existence to It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept
flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if" today." 13 He likewise noted "a law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain specific purposes, the as final and conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental
class of fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, extent of whose existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its charter." 19Dean agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive power by
but which at times hides itself from view till reflection and analysis have brought Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an association of our courts over juridical persons within our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity
it to the light."14 human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter neatly.20 of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien
entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the
What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of bench or the honor of the country.
fictions as such played in the law. There should be then on the part of the which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal
appellant a further refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such entity, independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A corporation as Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which
judicial technique. If ever an occasion did call for the employment of a legal known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its
fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial order being has received the imprimatur of the state according to law. It is logically failure to accept the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal.
disregarded with apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does not succeed. The deplorable
this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion. than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of
obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.
3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above whenever called upon to do so.
contention by its invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot
forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American succeed. It is always easy to conjure extreme and even oppressive
certificate; it would stress that in the event of a contest or the pendency of an law still of persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not settle the issue. What carries
action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the weight and conviction is the result arrived at, the just solution obtained,
lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would appropriate court action to enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its
await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]." 15 judicial control in those instances, where a duty under the law as ascertained in correspondence with what a sense of realism requires. For through the
an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it. appealed order, the imperative requirement of justice according to law is
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply satisfied and national dignity and honor maintained.
such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard
appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express is to confer upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the
admission of appellant that as far as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With
entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the state, the source of its very existence; it is to contend that what any of its costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will. So
and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,22 it was shown
It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a that in a guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United
statute, to which, however, the judiciary must yield deference, when States Veterans Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of
appropriately invoked and deemed applicable. It would be most highly money paid to the minor under guardianship, alleging that the lower court had
unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law would be accorded such a high previously granted its petition to consider the deceased father as not entitled to
estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but yield to its guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the
alleged controlling force. United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of such
order, the Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his
The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled decisions "final and conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any
unless the appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency with one of its by- other American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges
laws does not impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly of the United States court." 23 Reconsideration was denied, and the
constitutes a valid defense, assuming that such apprehension of a possible Administrator appealed.
court action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in the
circumstances as they have developed gives substance to such a fear. In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We
Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to nullify are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected. The provisions of the
the lawful exercise of judicial authority. U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans'
Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims property submitted to
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the
fraught with implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory. Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed
created by operation of law...." 16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act,
purely dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions
corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing its existence through where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits
creation by a sovereign power." 17 As a matter of fact, the statutory language to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to
employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in
decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."18
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,  In the meantime, on June 20, 2000, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for CA-G.R. SP No. 60827 (fundamentally raising the same issues as those in the
LTD., the replacement of Kitamura by a certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the first one) and the instant petition for review thereof.
BBRI Project.[13]
Petitioners, We do not agree. When the CA dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 60205 on account
 On June 29, 2000, the RTC, invoking our ruling in Insular Government v. of the petition's defective certification of non-forum shopping, it was a dismissal
- versus - Frank[14] that matters connected with the performance of contracts are without prejudice.[27] The same holds true in the CA's dismissal of the said case
 MINORU KITAMURA, regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, [15] denied the due to defects in the formal requirement of verification [28] and in the other
motion to dismiss.[16] The trial court subsequently denied petitioners' motion for requirement in Rule 46 of the Rules of Court on the statement of the material
Respondent. reconsideration,[17] prompting them to file with the appellate court, on August dates.[29] The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file the
14, 2000, their first Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 [docketed as CA-G.R. petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification
SP No. 60205].[18] On August 23, 2000, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition and certificationas they, in fact didand stating therein the material dates, within
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x on procedural groundsfor lack of statement of material dates and for insufficient the prescribed period[30] in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.[31]
verification and certification against forum shopping. [19] An Entry of Judgment
DECISION  was later issued by the appellate court on September 20, 2000.[20] The dismissal of a case without prejudice signifies the absence of a decision
on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent
NACHURA, J.:   Aggrieved by this development, petitioners filed with the CA, on September action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced. In other
19, 2000, still within the reglementary period, a second Petition words, the termination of a case not on the merits does not bar another action
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the for Certiorari  under Rule 65 already stating therein the material dates and involving the same parties, on the same subject matter and theory.[32] 
Rules of Court assailing the April 18, 2001 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals attaching thereto the proper verification and certification. This second petition,
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60827, and the July 25, 2001 Resolution [2] denying the Necessarily, because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res
which substantially raised the same issues as those in the first, was docketed
motion for reconsideration thereof. judicata  effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and
as CA-G.R. SP No. 60827.[21]
certification of the second certiorari  petition that the first had already been
 On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd.  Ruling on the merits of the second petition, the appellate court rendered the dismissed on procedural grounds, [33] petitioners are no longer required by the
(Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management assailed April 18, 2001 Decision[22] finding no grave abuse of discretion in the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant
support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, [3] entered into an trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled, among others, that petition for review of the second certiorari petition , the status of the aforesaid
Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because first petition before the CA. In any case, an omission in the certificate of non-
Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. [4] The agreement nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. forum shopping about any event that will not
provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the constitute res judicata  and litis pendentia,  as in the present case, is not a fatal
year starting on April 1, 1999.[5] Nippon then assigned respondent to work as principle of lex loci solutionis.[23] defect. It will not warrant the dismissal and nullification of the entire
the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in proceedings, considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said
the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the  Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the CA in certificate are no longer present. [34]
Philippine Government.[6] the assailed July 25, 2001 Resolution.[24]
 The Court also finds no merit in respondent's contention that petitioner
 When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works  Remaining steadfast in their stance despite the series of denials, petitioners Hasegawa is only authorized to verify and certify, on behalf of Nippon,
and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, instituted the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[25]  imputing the following the certiorari  petition filed with the CA and not the instant petition. True, the
on January 28, 2000, this time for the detailed engineering and construction errors to the appellate court: Authorization[35] dated September 4, 2000, which is attached to the
supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.
[7]  A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING second certiorari  petition and which is also attached to the instant petition for
 Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix
THAT THE TRIAL COURT VALIDLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER THE review, is limited in scopeits wordings indicate that Hasegawa is given the
3.1.[8]
INSTANT CONTROVERSY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT authority to sign for and act on behalf of the company only in the petition filed
 On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PROCEEDINGS A QUO WAS ENTERED INTO with the appellate court, and that authority cannot extend to the instant petition
manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the company BY AND BETWEEN TWO JAPANESE NATIONALS, WRITTEN WHOLLY IN for review.[36] In a plethora of cases, however, this Court has liberally applied
had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be THE JAPANESE LANGUAGE AND EXECUTED IN TOKYO, JAPAN. the Rules or even suspended its application whenever a satisfactory
engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR explanation and a subsequent fulfillment of the requirements have been made.
Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry.[9] B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN [37]
 Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this
OVERLOOKING THE NEED TO REVIEW OUR ADHERENCE TO THE point and appended to their Reply [38] an updated Authorization[39] for Hasegawa
 Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, PRINCIPLE OF LEX LOCI SOLUTIONISIN THE LIGHT OF RECENT to act on behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court finds the same
requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the DEVELOPMENT[S] IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS. [26] as sufficient compliance with the Rules.
BBRI project. Nipponinsisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term
that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.[10] The pivotal question that this Court is called upon to resolve is whether the  However, the Court cannot extend the same liberal treatment to the defect in
subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific the verification and certification. As respondent pointed out, and to which we
 As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by agree, Hasegawa is truly not authorized to act on behalf of Nippon in this case.
respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex The aforesaid September 4, 2000 Authorization and even the subsequent
specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.[11] contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non August 17, 2001 Authorization were issued only by Nippon's president and
conveniens. chief executive officer, not by the company's board of directors. In not a few
 For their part, petitioners, contending that the ICA had been perfected
cases, we have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of
in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, moved to dismiss However, before ruling on this issue, we must first dispose of the procedural directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can bind the corporation, in the
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They asserted that the claim for improper matters raised by the respondent.  absence of authority from the board.[40] Considering that Hasegawa verified and
pre-termination of respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the
Kitamura contends that the finality of the appellate court's decision in CA-G.R. certified the petition only on his behalf and not on behalf of the other petitioner,
proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis  and lex
SP No. 60205 has already barred the filing of the second petition docketed as the petition has to be denied pursuant to Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman .
contractus.[12]
[41]
 Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter that demands strict  In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume
observance of the Rules.[42] While technical rules of procedure are designed not has various aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume
to frustrate the ends of justice, nonetheless, they are intended to effect the controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other
proper and orderly disposition of cases and effectively prevent the clogging of defendant or the respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the State or States.[74] The courts power to hear cases and controversies is derived
court dockets.[43] case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the thing which is the from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of
subject of the litigation. [57] In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties
 Further, the Court has observed that petitioners incorrectly filed a Rule 65 petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction. or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by
petition  to question the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss. It is a well- foreign sovereigns.[75]
established rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory,  Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the
and cannot be the subject of the extraordinary petition for certiorari or mandam sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only  Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens,[76] be used to
us.  The appropriate recourse is to file an answer and to interpose as defenses by law and in the manner prescribed by law. [58] It is further determined by the deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction herein. First, it is not a proper basis for a
the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to trial, and, in case of an allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not
adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course. [44] While or some of the claims asserted therein. [59] To succeed in its motion for the include it as a ground. [77] Second, whether a suit should be entertained or
there are recognized exceptions to this rule,[45] petitioners' case does not fall dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of
among them. claim,[60] the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
[78]
matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the  In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of
 This brings us to the discussion of the substantive issue of the case. claims.[61] dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual determination;
 Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.
 In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the [79]
question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific trial court is not properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject
performance and damages filed by the respondent. The ICA subject of the controversy for, indeed, Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and  Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and
litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable hear the civil case filed by respondent and the grounds raised by petitioners to
nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit by the RTC of Lipa City.[62] What they rather raise as grounds to question assail that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate courts correctly
that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties [46] following the subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex denied the petitioners motion to dismiss.
[state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private International Law. [47] contractus,  and the state of the most significant relationship rule.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
 The Court notes that petitioners adopted an additional but different theory  The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. on certiorari is DENIED.
when they elevated the case to the appellate court. In the Motion to
Dismiss[48] filed with the trial court, petitioners never contended that the RTC is Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony [63] or the  SO ORDERED.
an inconvenient forum. They merely argued that the applicable law which will law of the place where a contract is made. [64] The doctrine of lex
determine the validity or invalidity of respondent's claim is that of Japan, contractus or lex loci contractus  means the law of the place where a contract is
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus .[49] While not executed or to be performed.[65] It controls the nature, construction, and validity
abandoning this stance in their petition before the appellate court, petitioners of the contract[66] and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the
on certiorari  significantly invoked the defense of forum non conveniens .[50] On parties or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly.[67] Under the
petition for review before this Court, petitioners dropped their other arguments, state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state law to
maintained the forum non conveniens  defense, and introduced their new apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
argument that the applicable principle is the [state of the] most significant substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a
relationship rule.[51] contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place
 Be that as it may, this Court is not inclined to deny this petition merely on the of incorporation of the parties. [68] This rule takes into account several contacts
basis of the change in theory, as explained in Philippine Ports Authority v. City and evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the
of Iloilo.[52] We only pointed out petitioners' inconstancy in their arguments to particular issue to be resolved. [69]
emphasize their incorrect assertion of conflict of laws principles.
 Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law
 To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice
phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and of law.[70] They determine which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
enforcement of judgments. Corresponding to these phases are the following substantive issues of a conflicts problem.[71] Necessarily, as the only issue in
questions: (1) Where can or should litigation be initiated? (2) Which law will the this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but
court apply? and (3) Where can the resulting judgment be enforced?[53] also not yet called for.
 Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.  Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by
[54]
 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this the fact that they have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws
state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of
parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state laws rules.[72] Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to provide the
constitutional authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be
the lex fori  will often coincide, the minimum contacts for one do not always pleaded and proved.[73]
provide the necessary significant contacts for the other. [55] The question of
whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from the  It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element,
question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives
judgment.[56] open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because of lack
G.R. No. 162894             February 26, 2008 dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action efforts. In a Resolution25 dated 20 November 2006, the Court resolved to
and forum non conveniens  and prayed for damages by way of compulsory dispense with the filing of a comment.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner,  counterclaim.11
vs. The instant petition lacks merit.
STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent. On 18 May 1999, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Preliminary Hearing
Based on Affirmative Defenses and for Summary Judgment 12 seeking the Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and
DECISION dismissal of the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens and failure to BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be
state a cause of action. Respondent opposed the same. Pending the resolution governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the
TINGA, J.: presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and
of the omnibus motion, the deposition of Walter Browning was taken before the
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Philippine Consulate General in Chicago. 13 witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 and be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 and the In an Order14 dated 13 September 2000, the RTC denied petitioner’s omnibus inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the
dismissal of the civil case filed by respondent against petitioner with the trial motion. The trial court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, dispute necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
court. assuming the same to be admitted, were sufficient for the trial court to render a conveniens.
valid judgment thereon. It also ruled that the principle of forum non
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedents appear: conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court could enforce judgment on Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,26 the Court outlined three consecutive
petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly Philippines.15 jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United Thus, in the instances27 where the Court held that the local judicial machinery
States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the order, which motion was was adequate to resolve controversies with a foreign element, the following
citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its opposed by respondent.17 In an Order dated 31 July 2001, 18 the trial court requisites had to be proved: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the
representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects denied petitioner’s motion. Thus, it filed a Rule 65 Petition 19 with the Court of parties may conveniently resort; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to
in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On Appeals praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and a writ of injunction to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the
11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the set aside the twin orders of the trial court dated 13 September 2000 and 31 Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision. 28
Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. July 2001 and to enjoin the trial court from conducting further proceedings.20
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.3 On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is
On 28 August 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject
On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Decision21 denying the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. It also denied matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution issued on 10 rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign
International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for March 2004.22 forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the
alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of case is filed.29
employment contract.4 On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, The appellate court held that although the trial court should not have confined
Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money itself to the allegations in the complaint and should have also considered Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the
claims.5 Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor evidence aliunde in resolving petitioner’s omnibus motion, it found the evidence Constitution and the law30 and by the material allegations in the complaint,
Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of presented by petitioner, that is, the deposition of Walter Browning, insufficient irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
jurisdiction.6 Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in for purposes of determining whether the complaint failed to state a cause of the claims or reliefs sought therein.31 Civil Case No. 1192-BG is an action for
a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and action. The appellate court also stated that it could not rule one way or the damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature
executory on 09 November 1998. other on the issue of whether the corporations, including petitioner, named as of the action and the amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of
defendants in the case had indeed merged together based solely on the the RTC.
On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an evidence presented by respondent. Thus, it held that the issue should be
action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La threshed out during trial.23 Moreover, the appellate court deferred to the As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
Union. The Complaint,7 docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the
defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was
RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint conveniens. acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.32
essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed
employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine
and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing
dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RAYTHEON Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this
functioned as one company. INTERNATIONAL, INC. state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
In its Answer,8 petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN parties.33 The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the
foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied REFUSING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND
entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS.24 merits proceeds before the trial court.
money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose
of assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies. 9 Petitioner also Incidentally, respondent failed to file a comment despite repeated notices. The Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens , a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases,
referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement Ceferino Padua Law Office, counsel on record for respondent, manifested that may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient"
between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales the lawyer handling the case, Atty. Rogelio Karagdag, had severed relations or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies
Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be with the law firm even before the filing of the instant petition and that it could no elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case
governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. 10 Petitioner sought the longer find the whereabouts of Atty. Karagdag or of respondent despite diligent
are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No.
1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum
non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly
considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only
after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require the court’s desistance. 35
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals
respected its conclusion that it can assume jurisdiction over the dispute
notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to
the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on
this Court.
Petitioner also contends that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1192-BG failed to
state a cause of action against petitioner. Failure to state a cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the pleading. 36 As a general rule, the
elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint
alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.37
The complaint alleged that petitioner had combined with BMSI and RUST to
function as one company. Petitioner contends that the deposition of Walter
Browning rebutted this allegation. On this score, the resolution of the Court of
Appeals is instructive, thus:
x x x Our examination of the deposition of Mr. Walter Browning as
well as other documents produced in the hearing shows that these
evidence aliunde are not quite sufficient for us to mete a ruling that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action.
Annexes "A" to "E" by themselves are not substantial, convincing
and conclusive proofs that Raytheon Engineers and Constructors,
Inc. (REC) assumed the warranty obligations of defendant Rust
International in the Makar Port Project in General Santos City,
after Rust International ceased to exist after being absorbed by
REC. Other documents already submitted in evidence are likewise
meager to preponderantly conclude that Raytheon International,
Inc., Rust International[,] Inc. and Brand Marine Service, Inc. have
combined into one company, so much so that Raytheon
International, Inc., the surviving company (if at all) may be held
liable for the obligation of BMSI to respondent Rouzie for unpaid
commissions. Neither these documents clearly speak otherwise.38
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the question of whether
petitioner, BMSI and RUST merged together requires the presentation of
further evidence, which only a full-blown trial on the merits can afford.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67001 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslim wedding and finding dismissed in due course. However, as of the date of the assailed CA Decision,
Petitioner, that there is no more possibility of reconciliation by and between them, Pacasums appeal from the CSCs dismissal of the administrative case was still
- versus - hereby issues this decree of divorce. pending resolution.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to the provisions of the Quite ironically, soon after amending his petition in Civil Case No.
Respondents. Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, this petition is hereby 6249, Pacasum contracted a second marriage with Catherine Ang Dignos on
x--------------------------------------------------x granted. Consequently, the marriage between Marietta (Mariam) D. July 18, 2004.[4] 
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, Zamoranos de Guzman and Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman is hereby
confirmed dissolved. Meanwhile, on the criminal litigation front, the Office of the City
Petitioner, Prosecutor, through Prosecutor Leonor Quiones, issued a resolution dated
- versus -  Issued this 18th day of June, 1992, at Isabela, Basilan February 2, 2005, findingprima facie evidence to hold Zamoranos liable for
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Province, Philippines. Bigamy.[5] Consequently, on February 22, 2006, an Information for Bigamy was
Respondent. filed against Zamoranos before the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, docketed as
x--------------------------------------------------x (signed) Criminal Case No. 06-12305.[6]
SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR.,
Petitioner,  HON. KAUDRI L. JAINUL Zamoranos filed a motion for reconsideration of the City
- versus -  Presiding Judge[3] Prosecutors February 2, 2005 resolution. As a result, the proceedings before
ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, were temporarily suspended. On April 29, 2005,
Respondent. Now it came to pass that Zamoranos married anew on the City Prosecutor of Ozamis City, the acting City Prosecutor of Iligan City at
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x  December 20, 1989. As she had previously done in her first nuptial to De the time, issued a resolution granting Zamoranos motion for reconsideration
DECISION Guzman, Zamoranos wed Samson Pacasum, Sr. (Pacasum), her and dismissing the charge of Bigamy against Zamoranos.[7]
subordinate at the Bureau of Customs where she worked, under Islamic
NACHURA, J.: rites in Balo-i, Lanao del Norte. Thereafter, on December 28, 1992, in Not unexpectedly, Pacasum moved for reconsideration of the April
order to strengthen the ties of their marriage, Zamoranos and Pacasum 29, 2005 resolution of the City Prosecutor, which was denied in a resolution
  dated August 15, 2005. [8]Posthaste, Pacasum filed a Petition for Review before
renewed their marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio
These are three (3) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. However, unlike in Zamoranos first the Office of the Secretary of Justice, assailing the dismissal of his criminal
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated July 30, 2010 of the marriage to De Guzman, the union between her and Pacasum was complaint for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[9]
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 03525-MIN, dismissing the petition blessed with progeny, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean, and Sam Joon.  In yet another turn of events, the Secretary of Justice, on
for certiorari filed by petitioner Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) in February 7, 2006, issued a resolution granting Pacasums Petition for Review
G.R. No. 193902, thus, affirming the Order [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Despite their three children, the relationship between Zamoranos
and Pacasum turned sour and, in 1998, the two were de facto separated. The and reversed the February 2, 2005 and April 29, 2005 resolutions of the City
Branch 6, Lanao del Norte, in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy filed by Prosecutor.[10] Zamoranos immediately filed an Omnibus Motion and
petitioner Samson R. Pacasum, Sr. in G.R. No. 194075. volatile relationship of Zamoranos and Pacasum escalated into a bitter battle
for custody of their minor children. Eventually, on October 18, 1999, Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration; (2) to Hold
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts. Zamoranos and Pacasum arrived at a compromise agreement which vested in Abeyance Filing of the Instant Case; and (3) to Hold in Abeyance or Quash
primary custody of the children in the former, with the latter retaining visitorial Warrant of Arrest, respectively dated February 20, 2006 and February 24,
On May 3, 1982, Zamoranos wed Jesus de Guzman, a Muslim rights thereto. 2006, before the Secretary of Justice. [11] Unfortunately for Zamoranos, her twin
convert, in Islamic rites. Prior thereto, Zamoranos was a Roman Catholic who motions were denied by the Secretary of Justice in a resolution dated May 17,
had converted to Islam on April 28, 1982. Subsequently, on July 30, 1982, the As it turned out, the agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a 2006.[12]
two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge Perfecto Laguio (Laguio) of flurry of cases against Zamoranos, to wit:
the RTC, Quezon City. Zamoranos second motion for reconsideration, as with her
1. Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed on March 31, 2003 previous motions, was likewise denied.
A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, Zamoranos and De before the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249.
Guzman obtained a divorce by talaq.  The dissolution of their marriage was Subsequently, on May 31, 2004, Pacasum amended the petition into one for  On the other civil litigation front on the Declaration of a Void
confirmed by the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1st Circuit, 3rd District, Isabela, Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging, among other things, that: (a) Marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 6249, the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce on June 18, 1992, as follows: Zamoranos, at the time of her marriage to Pacasum, was already previously rendered a decision in favor of Zamoranos, dismissing the petition of Pacasum
married to De Guzman on July 30, 1982; (b) Zamoranos first marriage, for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, found that Zamoranos
DECREE OF DIVORCE solemnized before the RTC, Quezon City, presided over by Judge Laguio, and De Guzman are Muslims, and were such at the time of their marriage,
subsisted at the time of the celebration of Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage; whose marital relationship was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
Marietta (Mariam) D. Zamoranos de Guzman against her husband, the (c) Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage was bigamous and void ab initio; and
(d) thus, Zamoranos, as the guilty spouse, should forfeit: (i) custody of her the Philippines:
herein respondent, on the ground that the wife, herein complainant, was
previously given by her husband the authority to exercise Talaq, as minor children to their father, who should have sole and exclusive custody; (ii)  From the foregoing uncontroverted facts, the Court finds that the
provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083, her share in the community property in favor of the children; and (iii) her allegation of [Pacasum] to the effect that his marriage with [Zamoranos] on
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. inheritance from Pacasum by testate or intestate succession. December 28, 1992 is a bigamous marriage due to the alleged subsisting
2. Criminal complaint for Bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised previous marriage between [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman is misplaced.
When this case was called for hearing[,] both parties appeared and herein The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzman and [Zamoranos] has long
respondent, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman[,] interposes no objection to Penal Code (RPC), filed on October 25, 2004.
been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The fact that divorce
confirm their divorce, which they have freely entered into on December 3. Separate administrative cases for Zamoranos dismissal from by Talaq was entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband in accordance
18, 1983. service and disbarment before the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the with PD 1083, x x x their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof,
This Court, after evaluating the testimonies of the herein parties is fully Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Bureau of Finance Revenue Integrity [Zamoranos] and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover, the second
convinced that both the complainant and the respondent have been duly Protection Service, respectively. Parenthetically, the administrative cases were marriage entered into by [Zamoranos] and her first husband Jesus de Guzman
under the Family Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being In the light of the foregoing findings, the Court is of the considered view In the present case, [w]e have circumspectly examined [Zamoranos]
unnecessary, it does not modify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage and so hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the Motion to Quash Information and the action taken by the [RTC, Branch
entered into by them under PD 1083. above-entitled case for annulment of marriage entered into under PD 6, Iligan City] in respect thereto, and [w]e found nothing that may
1083, x x x. It is the Sharia Circuit Court that has the exclusive original constitute as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [RTC, Branch
 Likewise, in the case of [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos], their second jurisdiction. 6, Iligan City]. The Order dated December 21, 2009, which first denied
marriage on December 28, 1992 under the Family Code does not in [Zamoranos] [M]otion to [Q]uash Information meticulously explained the
any way modify, alter or change the validity of the first marriage on WHEREFORE, premises considered, the affirmative defenses which factual and legal basis for the denial of the issues raised by
December 20, 1989 entered into by [Pacasum] and [Zamoranos] under are in the nature of motion to dismiss is hereby granted. [Zamoranos] in said motion. We find the [RTC, Branch 6, Iligan Citys]
PD 1083, as amended. In fact, according to Ghazali, one of the stance in upholding the sufficiency of the Information for bigamy and
renowned Muslim author and jurist in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence The above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 06-12305 to be well within the
and concurred in by retired Justice Ra[s]ul of the Court of Appeals and SO ORDERED.[13] bounds of its jurisdiction. Even assuming arguendo that the denial of
also a Professor on Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, in the case of petitioners motion to quash is erroneous, such error was, at worst, an
combined marriage[s], the first marriage is to be considered valid and On separate appeals, the CA and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.[18]
effective as between the parties while the second marriage is merely Civil Case No. 6249 by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City. On April 3, 2009, the
ceremonial, being a surplusage and unnecessary. Therefore, the denial by the Supreme Court of Pacasums appeal became final and executory Interestingly, even Pacasum was not satisfied with the CAs dismissal of
divorce by Talaqdissolved the marriage between [Zamoranos] and her and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. [14] Zamoranos petition for certiorari. Hence, these separate appeals by
first husband[,de Guzman,] being governed by PD 1083, x x x. Zamoranos and Pacasum.
In the meantime, on August 7, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, upon
 Article 13, Chapter I, Title II of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, motion of Pacasum, issued an Order reinstating Criminal Case No. 06-12305 We note that Zamoranos is petitioner in two separate cases, filed
provides x x x: for Bigamy against Zamoranos.[15] by her two counsels, docketed as G.R. Nos. 193902 and 193908, respectively,
which assail the same CA Decision. However, upon motion of counsel for
 Application Not surprisingly, Zamoranos filed a Motion to Quash the Information, arguing Zamoranos, to obviate confusion and superfluity, we have allowed Zamoranos
that the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, had no jurisdiction over her person and to withdraw her petition in G.R. No. 193908 and for her earlier petition in G.R.
 The provisions of this title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein over the offense charged. Zamoranos asseverated, in the main, that the
both parties are Muslims[,] or wherein only the male party is a Muslim No. 193902 to remain.
decision of the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, in Civil Case No. 6249 categorically
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this declared her and Pacasum as Muslims, resulting in the mootness of Criminal Zamoranos posits that it was grievous error for the CA to ignore
Code in any part of the Philippines. Case No. 06-12305 and the inapplicability of the RPC provision on Bigamy to the conclusions made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, and affirmed by the
Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of her marriage to Pacasum. In all, Zamoranos claimed that Criminal Case No. CA and this Court, to wit:
[Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[,] shall be 06-12305 ought to be dismissed.[16]
1. Zamoranos is a Muslim and was validly married to another
governed by the Muslim Code and divorce proceedings shall be On December 21, 2009, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, denied Zamoranos Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites;
properly within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Motion to Quash the Information. Zamoranos motion for reconsideration
Court. thereof was likewise denied.[17] 2. Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage ceremony under civil
rites before Judge Laguio did not remove their marriage from the ambit of P.D.
 Art. 155, Chapter 2, Title II, Book 4 of the Muslim code, provides x x x: Undaunted, Zamoranos filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification and No. 1083;
Jurisdiction The Sharia Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original reversal of the December 21, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City. As
previously adverted to, the CA dismissed Zamoranos petition. The CA dwelt on 3. Corollary to paragraph 1, Zamoranos divorce by talaq to De
jurisdiction over: Guzman severed their marriage ties;
the propriety of a petition for certiorari to assail the denial of a Motion to Quash
 x x x x the Information: 4. Accordingly, matters relating to the marriages and divorce of
 2. All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are A petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an [Zamoranos] and her first husband, Jesus de Guzman[, are] governed by the
Muslims or have been married in accordance with Article 13 extraordinary remedy. As such, it is confined to extraordinary cases Muslim Code and [the] divorce proceedings properly within the exclusive
involving disputes relating to: wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void. The aim original jurisdiction of the Sharia Circuit Court.
of certiorari is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its 5. Zamoranos remarried Pacasum, another Muslim, under Islamic
a)      Marriage; jurisdiction. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to a rites; and
b)      Divorce recognized under this court on the basis alone of an alleged misappreciation of facts and
Code; evidence. To prosper, a petition for certiorari must clearly demonstrate 6. On the whole, regular courts, in particular, RTC, Branch
that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as 6, Iligan City, have no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case for declaration of
xxxx to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. nullity of marriage entered into under P.D. No. 1083 because it is the Sharia
Circuit Court that has original jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The above provision of law clearly shows no concurrent jurisdiction with Simply put, in a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the appellate
any civil courts or other courts of law. And any divorce proceeding court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of For his part, Pacasum, although he agrees with the dismissal of
undertaken before the Shari[a] Court is valid, recognized, binding and jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues Zamoranos petition, raises a quarrel with the aforementioned conclusions of
sufficient divorce proceedings. beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment which is defined the CA. Pacasum vehemently denies that Zamoranos is a Muslim, who was
as one in which the court or quasi-judicial body may commit in the previously married and divorced under Islamic rites, and who entered into a
Moreover, the instant case is one of the several cases filed by exercise of its jurisdiction; as opposed to an error of jurisdiction where second marriage with him, likewise under Islamic rites.
[Pacasum] against [Zamoranos] such as complaints for disbarment, for the acts complained of were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.
immorality, for bigamy and misconduct before the Integrated Bar of the We impale the foregoing issues into the following:
Philippines (IBP) and in the Civil Service Commission which were all xxxx
similar or [based on] the same set of facts. A pure and simple 1. Whether the CA correctly dismissed Zamoranos petition
harassment. for certiorari; and
 2. Whether the RTCs, Branch 2, Iligan City and the CAs separate (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a 4. Satisfied that their marriage and the subsequent divorce were in
factual findings that Zamoranos is a Muslim are correct. specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or accordance with Muslim personal laws, the Clerk of Court
the administration of the estate of a deceased registered their documents;
As a rule, certiorari lies when: (1) a tribunal, board, or officer person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer condition or status of a particular person or his 5. In June of 1993, the old Capitol building, where the Sharia
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of relationship to another, the judgment or final order is Circuit Court was housed, was razed to the ground; and, I found
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or out later that all the records, effects and office equipments of the
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of administration, or the condition, status or relationship Sharia Circuit Court were totally lost [in] the fire;
law.[19] of the person; however, the probate of a will or 6. This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish the
The writ of certiorari serves to keep an inferior court within the granting of letters of administration shall only be prima above statements of fact; and
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of facieevidence of the death of the testator or intestate.
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from 7. This is issued upon the request of Mr. De Guzman for whatever
The requisites for res judicata or bar by prior judgment are: legal purposes it may serve.
arbitrary acts of courtsacts which courts have no power or authority in law to
perform.[20] (1) The former judgment or order must be final; 2. Certification[28] issued by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul (Judge Jainul), which
The denial of a motion to quash, as in the case at bar, is not (2) It must be a judgment on the merits; confirmed the divorce agreement between Zamoranos and De Guzman.
appealable. It is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of an  3. Affidavit[29] executed by Judge Uyag P. Usman (Judge Usman), former Clerk
appeal.[21] (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and of Court of Judge Jainul at the time of the confirmation of Zamoranos and De
Moreover, it is settled that a special civil action for certiorari  and Guzmans divorce agreement by the latter. Judge Usmans affidavit reads, in
prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an  (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, pertinent part:
information.  The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory subject matter, and cause of action. [26]
 1.      I am the presiding Judge of the Sharias Circuit Court in the
order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or  The second and fourth elements of res judicata are not present in this case. City of Pagadian;
prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an Suffice it to state that the judgment rendered by RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City,
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner was not a judgment on the merits. The lower court simply dismissed the  2.      The first time that a Sharias Circuit court was established in
authorized by law.[22] petition for declaration of nullity of marriage since it found that the Sharia the Island Province of Basilan was in 1985, with the Honorable
Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear the dissolution of the marriage of Muslims Kaudri L. Jainul, as the Presiding Judge, while I was then the First
However, on a number of occasions, we have recognized that in Clerk of Court of the Basilan Sharias Circuit Court;
certain situations, certiorari is considered an appropriate remedy to assail an who wed under Islamic rites.
interlocutory order, specifically the denial of a motion to quash. We have  Nonetheless, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, which heard the case for Bigamy,  3.      The Sharias Circuit Council in the Island Province of Basilan
recognized the propriety of the following exceptions: (a) when the court issued should have taken cognizance of the categorical declaration of the RTC, was housed at the old Capitol Building, in the City
the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; Branch 2, Iligan City, that Zamoranos is a Muslim, whose first marriage to of Isabela, Basilan, Philippines;
(b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal another Muslim, De Guzman, was valid and recognized under Islamic law. In
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more  4.      As the Clerk of Court of the Sharias Circuit Court since
fact, the same court further declared that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman 1985, I can recall that in 1992, Mr. Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman,
enlightened and substantial justice;[23] (d) to promote public welfare and public validly severed their marriage ties. Apart from that, Zamoranos presented the
policy;[24] and (e) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it who is a province mate of mine in Basilan, and his former wife,
following evidence: Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos, jointly asked for the confirmation of
essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. [25] The first four
of the foregoing exceptions occur in this instance.  1. Affidavit of Confirmation[27] executed by the Ustadz, Abdullah Ha-Ja-Utto, their Talaq, by the wife; which divorce became irrevocable
who solemnized the marriage of Zamoranos and De Guzman under Islamic pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1083;
Contrary to the asseverations of the CA, the RTC, Branch rites, declaring under oath that:
6, Iligan City, committed an error of jurisdiction, not simply an error of  5.      In June of 1993, all the records of the Sharias Circuit Court
judgment, in denying Zamoranos motion to quash. 1. I am an Ustadz, in accordance with the Muslim laws and as were lost by reason of the fire that gutted down the
such, authorized to solemnize the marriages among Muslims; old Capitol Building in the City of Isabela;
First, we dispose of the peripheral issue raised by Zamoranos on
the conclusiveness of judgment made by the RTC, Branch 2, Iligan City, which 2. On May 3, 1982, after I was shown the documents attesting that  6.      This is executed freely and voluntarily in order to establish
heard the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Pacasum on the both parties are believers of Islam, I solemnized the marriage of the above statements of fact.
ground that his marriage to Zamoranos was a bigamous marriage. In that case, Jesus (Mohamad) de Guzman and Marietta (Mariam) Zamoranos From the foregoing declarations of all three persons in authority,
the decision of which is already final and executory, the RTC, Branch in accordance with Muslim Personal Laws in Isabela, Basilan; two of whom are officers of the court, it is evident that Zamoranos is a Muslim
2, Iligan City, dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for lack who married another Muslim, De Guzman, under Islamic rites. Accordingly, the
of jurisdiction over the subject matter by the regular civil courts. The RTC, 3. Sometime in 1992[,] Mr. Mohamad de Guzman and his former
wife, Mariam Zamoranos came to see me and asked my nature, consequences, and incidents of such marriage are governed by P.D.
Branch 2, Iligan City, declared that it was the Sharia Circuit Court which had No. 1083.
jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof. assistance to have their marriage and the subsequent Talaq by the
wife, which divorce became irrevocable pursuant to the provisions  
Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides for the principle of Presidential Decree No. 1083; registered [by] the Sharia Circuit
of res judicata. The provision reads: Court in the province of Basilan; and, after I was convinced that True, the Sharia Circuit Court is not vested with jurisdiction over
their divorce was in order, I accompanied them to the [C]lerk of offenses penalized under the RPC. Certainly, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.  The [C]ourt of the Sharia Circuit Court; correct when it declared that:
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of
the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or The Regional Trial Courts are vested the exclusive and original
final order, may be as follows: jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive original
 jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body. [Sec. 20 (b), BP Blg. The first provision refers to a situation where in case of conflict between Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq; or faskh . A talaq or
129] The Code of Muslim Personal Laws (PD 1083) created any provision of this Code and laws of general application, this Code shall faskh, as soon as it becomes irrevocable, shall have the following
the Sharia District Courts and Sharia  Circuit Courts with limited prevail. For example, there is conflict between the provision on bigamy effects:
jurisdiction. Neither court was vested jurisdiction over criminal under the Revised Penal Code which is a law of general application and (a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may
prosecution of violations of the Revised Penal Code. There is Article 27 of this Code, on subsequent marriage, the latter shall prevail, in contract another marriage in accordance with this Code;
nothing in PD 1083 that divested the Regional Trial Courts of its the sense that as long as the subsequent marriage is solemnized in (b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
jurisdiction to try and decide cases of bigamy. Hence, this Court accordance with the Muslim Code, the provision of the Revised Penal (c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with
has jurisdiction over this case.[30] Code on bigamy will not apply. The second provision refers to a conflict Article 78 of this Code;
between the provision of this Code which is a special law and another (d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the husband her
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that even in criminal cases, the trial court special law or laws of local application. The latter should be liberally whole dower in case the talaq has been effected after the
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense. In this case, the construed to carry out the provision of the Muslim Code.[31] consummation of the marriage, or one-half thereof if effected
charge of Bigamy hinges on Pacasums claim that Zamoranos is not a Muslim, before its consummation;
and her marriage to De Guzman was governed by civil law. This is obviously On Marriage, Divorce, and Subsequent Marriages, P.D. No. 1083 provides:  (e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to
far from the truth, and the fact of Zamoranos Muslim status should have been  TITLE II. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE give support in accordance with Article 67; and
apparent to both lower courts, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, and the CA.  Chapter One  (f) The conjugal partnership if stipulated in the marriage
APPLICABILITY CLAUSE settlements, shall be dissolved and liquidated.
 The subject matter of the offense of Bigamy dwells on the accused contracting Article 13. Application.
a second marriage while a prior valid one still subsists and has yet to be  (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce For our edification, we refer once again to Justice Rasul and Dr. Ghazalis
dissolved. At the very least, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, should wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines:
have suspended the proceedings until Pacasum had litigated the validity of Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law
Zamoranos and De Guzmans marriage before the Sharia Circuit Court and had or this Code in any part of the Philippines. If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code
successfully shown that it had not been dissolved despite the divorce  (2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, or Muslim law is complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the
by talaq  entered into by Zamoranos and De Guzman. solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil marriage is likewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the
Code of the Philippines shall apply. Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever
Zamoranos was correct in filing the petition for certiorari before the CA when comes first is the validating rite and the second rite is merely ceremonial
her liberty was already in jeopardy with the continuation of the criminal  x x x x
Chapter Two one. But, in this case, as long as both parties are Muslims, this Muslim
proceedings against her. Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise, in the application of this
MARRIAGE (NIKAH)
 In a pluralist society such as that which exists in the Philippines, P.D. No. Section 1. Requisites of Marriage. Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties are Muslims and
1083, or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, was enacted to promote the xxxx when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
advancement and effective participation of the National Cultural Communities x Section 3. Subsequent Marriages accordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occur[s]
x x, [and] the State shall consider their customs, traditions, beliefs and interests x x x x  when the Civil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and
in the formulation and implementation of its policies. Article 29. By divorcee. divorce of the parties, if the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code.[32]
 Trying Zamoranos for Bigamy simply because the regular criminal courts have she has observed an idda of three monthly courses counted from the
jurisdiction over the offense defeats the purpose for the enactment of the Code  Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state that one of
date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at the time of the divorce, the effects of irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers to
of Muslim Personal Laws and the equal recognition bestowed by the State on she may remarry only after delivery.
Muslim Filipinos. severance of matrimonial bond, entitling one to remarry.[33]
 x x x x
Article 3, Title II, Book One of P.D. No. 1083 provides: Chapter Three  It stands to reason therefore that Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as
DIVORCE (TALAQ)  confirmed by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and
TITLE II. Section 1. Nature and Form attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry
Article 45. Definition and forms. Divorce is the formal Pacasum in 1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6, Iligan City, is without
CONSTRUCTION OF CODE AND DEFINITION OF TERMS jurisdiction to try Zamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.
dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be
Article 3. Conflict of provisions. granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation
between the spouses. It may be effected by:  WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 193902 is GRANTED. The petition in
(1) In case of conflict between any provision of this Code and laws of (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); G.R. No. 194075 is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
general application, the former shall prevail. xxxx SP No. 03525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to
Article 46. Divorce by talaq. Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy
(2) Should the conflict be between any provision of this Code and special is GRANTED.
(1) A divorce by talaq may be effected by the husband in a single
laws or laws of local application, the latter shall be liberally construed in
repudiation of his wife during her non-menstrual period (tuhr) within  SO ORDERED.
order to carry out the former.
which he has totally abstained from carnal relation with her. Any
(3) The provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims and number of repudiations made during one tular shall constitute only one
nothing herein shall be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non- repudiation and shall become irrevocable after the expiration of the
Muslim. prescribed idda.
(2) A husband who repudiates his wife, either for the first or
 In Justice Jainal Rasul and Dr. Ibrahim Ghazalis Commentaries and second time, shall have the right to take her back (ruju) within the
Jurisprudence on the Muslim Code of the Philippines, the two experts on the prescribed idda by resumption of cohabitation without need of a new
subject matter of Muslim personal laws expound thereon: contract of marriage. Should he fail to do so, the repudiation shall
become irrevocable (talaq bain sugra).
xxxx
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998] The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall
exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, are sharia courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, like Quezon
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional Trial Court. Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently,
OF APPEALS, respondents . Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it
the sharia court and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
DECISION subject and nature of the action. laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general
BELLOSILLO, J.: original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,[3] Regional Trial
This Petition for Review on Certiorari  seeks to reverse and set aside Courts have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. -  Regional Trial Courts shall
the decision of the Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. marital relations.[4] Personal actions, such as the instant complaint for exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within
39656 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion for reconsideration the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs  resides, or where the defendant or exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x
filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano. any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.[5] There
should be no question by now that what determines the nature of an action and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations Court of Appeals sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the
married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in made by the plaintiff  in this case.[6] In the complaint for declaration of nullity of Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss and
civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of this case be
death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until
also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under terminated.
Lanao del Sur. Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion
to Dismiss  that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in
Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of her Motion for Reconsideration.
Marriage  of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. They
contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction
as divorced  and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage to hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for
contractfalse and fraudulent. Reconsideration  that Estrellita and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim
rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
that Estrellita was not single when she married Tamano as the decision reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint.[7] Jurisdiction
annulling her previous marriage with Romeo C. Llave never became final and over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the
executory for non-compliance with publication requirements. complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. [8]
of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant
action. She alleged that "only a party to the marriage" could file an action suit pursuant to Art. 13, Title II, PD No. 1083,[9] which provides -
for annulment of marriage against the other spouse,[1] hence, it was only
Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner Art. 13. Application. -  (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to
likewise contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
Laws.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim,
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil
case was properly cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Code of the Philippines shall apply.
Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code and not
exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 [2] or the Code of Muslim Personal (3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential
laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence, petitioner requisites and legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and
filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 filiation, guardianship and custody of minors, support and maintenance,
order of respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying claims for customary dower (mahr), betrothal, breach of contract to
petitioners motion to dismiss and the 22 August 1995 order denying marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and divorce, rights
reconsideration thereof. and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Code and other applicable Muslim laws.
Court of Appeals for consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A.
Tamano however filed a motion, which the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in
the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage  ahead of the other accordance with the Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner,
consolidated cases. the Civil Code is applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner
G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964 Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,  This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
vs. settling the case amicably were nil. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant. breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee. in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
BENGZON, J.P., J.: aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated. aforesaid.
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed
by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation. excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be: failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral
and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As
Dear Bet — mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
it. Am leaving on the Convair today. December 29, 1960.)
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
Please do not ask too many people about the reason Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
why — That would only create a scandal. unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
Paquing clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable
1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court award.
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram: as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33)
of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
PAPA LOVE . no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
PAKING
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals  (L-14628, Sept.
default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner,
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay  (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is
and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
Code the provisions that would have it so.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
compensate the latter for the damage."
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution." The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for
a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1).
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility
were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl
of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
1955.
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a
had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
failed to appear. it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day
G.R. No. L-18630      December 17, 1966 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated: be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, 
vs. But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents. wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that allegations there are as follows:
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner. victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents. suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age,
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be
REYES, J.B.L., J.: served with summons;
Civil Code the following rule:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q- "ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the
4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages. defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
morals, good customs or public policy shall
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from compensate the latter for the damage." III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted due time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love
the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of and affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time tender feelings;
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent
love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the outings and dates, became very close and intimate to each other
to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge
P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of with him;
her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the action.
latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in except for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her was out of the country, the defendant through his protestations of
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal
not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's knowledge with the plaintiff;
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
fees. confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. July, 1959;
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows: seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some engagement and his promises.
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal Phil. 123). maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case. intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
And in American Jurisprudence we find: there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals , L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations
Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886. Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we
We find this appeal meritorious. sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be
the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-
appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,  court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a the respondent Court as follows:
vs. besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages. According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and
that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre- just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
to wit: marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to
her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to
DAVIDE, JR., J.: Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings)
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were
This is an appeal by certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to 1987 up to the present;
review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA- taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of 2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper; semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in
Civil Code of the Philippines. Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
and a (sic) high school graduate; Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City,
The antecedents of this case are not complicated: they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the the plaintiff on August 3, 1986. o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
dispositive portion of the decision reads: promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in
his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay
get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that 1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages. convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City,
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
(P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs. defendant is still single.
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she 3. All other claims are denied.6 Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking
their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503. Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is
the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a decision 10 affirming in toto  the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed analysis:
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7 was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is,
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
 as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would ( sic) not court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12 judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, 
have allowed  L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or Code applies to the case at bar. 13 and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and
so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public [1958]); 
photographed with defendant in public in so ( sic) loving and tender policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at ( sic) the town fiesta on and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at ( sic) a beach party the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the
where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was ( sic) some trial and appellate courts must be respected.
to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the And now to the legal issue.
must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and ( sic) arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry  per se  is not an
Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working assumed arguendo  that he had professed his love to the private respondent actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New
and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code,
declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the actionable. 14 from which We quote:
restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988). On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-
before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common- in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict  in this jurisdiction by
or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11 testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15 statute books. 20
and then concluded:
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant- courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
result of the case. defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and
and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest
their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr.,  16 this Court Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions: a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do shall compensate the latter for the damage.
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people xxx xxx xxx
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes
(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
 nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered years of age at the time of the seduction. age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for
have such a right of action. breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would damages to the woman because: she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally  guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
specifically in the statutes. 21 defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his
than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age,
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict  thus: and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she " wanted to bind" him who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
parties, is called a quasi-delict  and is governed by the provisions of this by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit
Chapter. marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
of clergy. recovered:
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts  is an Anglo-American because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
or common law concept. Torts  is much broader than culpa L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30,
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case: 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
aquiliana  because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE
deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge,
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction , hence
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around,
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the has intervened). . . .together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be
are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23 To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos,  30 still subsists,
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence,
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the indemnity.
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it seducer (27 Phil. 123). But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness ( sic),
and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is And in American Jurisprudence we find: the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery. so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely that reason.
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662) parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent
xxx xxx xxx
cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in
their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for: letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality
doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school and dignity.
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p.
51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been SO ORDERED.
offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise
to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of
love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant
disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto  rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto  with the petitioner. Pari delicto  means "in equal fault;
in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it could
be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties,
where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of
undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by 
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should
be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This
rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault
on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one
party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs.
Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
MARY JANE ABANAG,   In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7, 2010, [2] Executive they eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the
Judge Avila reported on the developments in the hearing of the case. The respondents office. They continued their relationship even after the
- versus -  complainant testified that she met the respondent while she was a member of complainant had suffered a miscarriage.
 NICOLAS B. MABUTE,  the Singles for Christ. They became acquainted and they started dating. The
relationship blossomed until they lived together in a rented room near the  Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x respondents office. adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.
[7]
 The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
   The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to
complainant when he joined the Singles for Christ. He described their liaison as marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act
  a dating relationship. He admitted that the complainant would join him at his that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action. [8]
D E CI S I O N rented room three to four times a week; when the complainant became
pregnant, he asked her to stay and live with him. He vehemently denied having  While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to
  brought the complainant to a local manghihilot and that he had tried to force a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on
her to abort her baby. He surmised that the complainants miscarriage could be matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect
BRION, J.: their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
related to her epileptic attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further
testified that the complainants mother did not approve of him, but the they should or should not marry.[9]However, we take this occasion to remind
 
complainant defied her mother and lived with him. He proposed marriage to the judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their
We resolve the administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute ( respondent), complainant, but her mother did not like him as a son-in-law and ordered the obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court
Court Stenographer I in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ( MCTC) of complainant to return home. The complainant obeyed her mother. They have personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with
Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant) for Disgraceful and separated ways since then, but he pledged his undying love for the respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as
Immoral Conduct. complainant. private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity
and the good name of our courts.[10]
 In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint against
the complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent the respondent, reporting that:  WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present
courted her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondents administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the
promise that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became Normally the personal affair of a court employee who is a bachelor and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.
pregnant, but after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her has maintained an amorous relation with a woman equally unmarried
has nothing to do with his public employment. The sexual liaison is  SO ORDERED.
to a manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When
she did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. between two consenting adults and the consequent pregnancy is but a
She became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped natural effect of the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not forced to live
schooling because of the humiliation that she suffered. with Nicolas nor was she impelled by some devious means or
machination. The fact was, she freely acceded to cohabit with him. The
 In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the situation may-not-be-so-ideal but it does not give cause for
Court Administrator, the respondent vehemently denied the complainants administrative sanction. There appears no law which penalizes or
allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and prescribes the sexual activity of two unmarried persons. So, the
fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. He accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated the abortion was
further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the complainants co-employee, was calculated to bring the act within the ambit of an immoral, disgraceful
using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas resented him because he had and gross misconduct. Except however as to the self-serving assertion
chastised her for her arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He that Mary Jane was brought to a local midwife and forced to take the
believes that the complainants letter-complaint, which was written in the abortifacient, there was no other evidence to support that it was in fact
vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in so. All pointed to a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no small
Tagalog; the respondent would have used the waray or English language if she way Mary Jane was also responsible of what befell upon her.[3]
had written the letter-complaint.
The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful,
 The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
letter-complaint. She belied the respondents claim that she was being used by good and respectable members of the community.[4] To justify suspension or
Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him. disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral.[5] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
 In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005, the Court referred the letter-
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
complaint to then Acting Executive Judge Carmelita T. Cuares of the Regional
reprehensible to a high degree.[6]
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan City, Samar for investigation, report and
recommendation.  Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents
comment, and the findings of the Investigating Judge, we find that the acts
 The respondent sought Judge Cuares inhibition from the case,
complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.
alleging that the Judge was partial and had bias in favor of the complainant; the
complainant herself had bragged that she personally knew Judge Cuares. The  We find it evident that the sexual relations between the
Court designated Judge Esteban V. dela Pea, who succeeded Judge Cuares complainant and the respondent were consensual. They met at the Singles for
as Acting Executive Judge, to continue with the investigation of the case. Christ, started dating and subsequently became sweethearts. The respondent
[1]
 Eventually, Judge Agerico A. Avila took over the investigation when he was frequently visited the complainant at her boarding house and also at her
designated the Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan City, Samar. parents residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent and
G.R. No. 175822               October 23, 2013 (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did acts of respondent in trying to evade payment. 27 The appellate court thus held
it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,  employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made
vs. Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and
SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent. the former believed to mean that the item has already been paid. 18 Realizing selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of
DECISION the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon
saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to and Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28
PERALTA, J.: whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to
the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.
Court are the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated August 3, 2006 and talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation
Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment. 20 They under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision 3 of the Regional emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was
Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions. 21 As counterclaim, I.
the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and
Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez). exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 22 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court INJURY.
Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith
that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no motive to II.
Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in
Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30
the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6 under the honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not
find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of The petition is without merit.
While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that
Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of
situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu
employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human
Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees,
She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her
because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate
issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from
respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on
Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued
the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages. 23
then met the Guess employees as agreed upon. 8 by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly portion of which reads: reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the
repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans. 9 They supposedly even WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under
searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte 31 is
argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10 Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle noteworthy:
Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or
of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00). recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated
duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral
the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive SO ORDERED.24 precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for
Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly
investigation for purposes of canceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "
Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment. 25 Contrary to the faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal
apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages 15 before the RTC director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for assistance for prejudicing or injuring another.33
against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation
Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between
and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay. 26 Considering that the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to
demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 16 respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was not privy to discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make
the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the
the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and
overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them. despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would
be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh. 39 In this case,
of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an petitioners obviously abused their rights.
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. 35 Malice or bad faith,
on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20
act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate
the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views the latter for the damage.
insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was
in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages
receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical
have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum. suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the
guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the
respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 42 They are awarded
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent. 1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means,
after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
"was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages
she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that
circumstances of payment, thus: respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly the amount of of₱20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.
left (sic) the store. x x x WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated
expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.
money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then SO ORDERED.
I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination
in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if
she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember."
After asking these simple questions, I am very certain that she is not
completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our
boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in
a hurry and very busy.37
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that
she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the
shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of
the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was,
likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment.
Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop
or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not
have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-
payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015 deduct the amount of P 200.00 from Josephine's salary as well as 50% of her to an employee not only the reliefs provided by our labor laws, but also moral
bonuses and profit sharing. and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Specifically, we have
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for mentioned, in fact, that a complaint for damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21
INC., Petitioner , v.JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent. preliminary injunction before the RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the of the Civil Code would not suffice to keep the case without the jurisdictional
DECISION PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount boundaries of our labor courts -especially when the claim for damages is
the bank had to pay Harrington. interwoven with a labor dispute. 5
BRION, J.: The PCIB filed its answer with counterclaims and a separate complaint with the Nevertheless, when the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any
RTC of Makati City, which was raffled to Branch 149. of the claims provided for in Article 224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine action is with the regular courts. 6 Here, since Josephine's cause of action is
Court1 filed by Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) assailing the and ordered the PCIB to pay her actual damages in the amount of P5,006.00 based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the
May 23, 2011 decision2 and the December 7, 2011 resolution 3 of the Court of plus 12% interest from filing of the complaint; moral damages in the amount of Civil Code, the civil courts (not the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction over the
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68288. The CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 PI 50,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount of P-50,000.00. subject matter of this case.
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC) in toto. The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and To be sure, the case of Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Ernani Cruz Paño  is
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS allowance of Josephine as having been rendered in bad faith and contrary to enlightening:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
morals, good custom, and public policy. This was borne out by the fact that the
PCIB had already deducted from her salary before Josephine received the Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch memorandum finding her liable for the P50,600.00. In addition, while there must be held to belong to the civil courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for
of the PCIB when a certain Colin R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. were other individuals involved in this incident, it appeared that it was only damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest amendment
373-28010-6 with said branch in January 1985. Josephine who was made solely responsible. to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Big. 130 provides
The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated On appeal, the PCIB argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case that all other claims arising from employer-employee relationship are
January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of New Zealand. The first draft was in the because it was a labor dispute, which the labor tribunals are more competent cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for damages is
sum of US$724.57 payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in to resolve. It also maintained that there was no factual or legal basis for the grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private
the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington." RTC to make it liable for damages and to pay Josephine. respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of
The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a certain Sophia La'O, as a In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision. the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. This,
representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for deposit. It held that the PCIB was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith"
Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, because it had filed an answer with counterclaims and even initiated a violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement
Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" separate case before a different branch of the RTC. It upheld the RTC's to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage
were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When Flores findings and conclusion in awarding damages and attorney's fees to Josephine of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.
answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from the bank's foreign because there was no reason to disturb them.
exchange supervision a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts The CA, subsequently, denied the PCIB's motion for reconsideration Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private
reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the on December 7, 2011; hence, the PCIB filed the present petition. respondent Cruz of his job as the latter was not required in the Complaint to
deposits were duly entered in Harrington's savings account. First, the PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions report back to work but on the manner and consequent effects of such
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as were in total and wanton disregard of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had
Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had treated to suffer.7 [emphasis and underscoring supplied]cralawlawlibrary
bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor. Josephine. In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the
Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of Second, the PCIB maintains that the CA gravely erred in awarding moral PCIB based on how her employer quickly concluded that she was negligent
the bank drafts in his name. damages and attorney's fees to Josephine absent any basis for it while and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary. Clearly, without having
The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no averring that bad faith cannot be presumed and that Josephine had failed to to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction of
disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted the bank prove it with clear and convincing evidence. our civil courts because her right to fair treatment was violated.
drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet The discussion in Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc . is just
fully oriented with the various aspects of the job. She further alleged that she OUR RULING as relevant as it is illuminating on the present case, to
had asked the approval of her immediate supervisor prior to receiving the wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
deposits. We DENY the present petition for lack of merit. Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters
On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the
Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask why the deduction was The civil courts have jurisdiction over a case when the cause of action does severance of a preexisting employee-employer relation, his complaint is
made. not have a reasonable causal connection from the employer-employee grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does not ask for
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum relationship. reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and
finding Josephine grossly negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of the consequent effects of such dismissal.
established operating procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to Although the PCIB opted not to raise the issue before this Court, we find it
pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, prudent and imperative to justify why the RTC had jurisdiction to take xxx
bonuses, and profit sharing until the amount is fully paid. cognizance of Josephine's complaint despite the fact that her cause of action
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was arose because her employer arbitrarily deducted from her salary - an act
grossly negligent and liable to pay the amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with
expressly prohibited by our labor laws. 4 the mannerin which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If
RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however, Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have
alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and explained that she was the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges,
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for actual, moral, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits
afforded due process and the deductions made prior to January 15, 1986, were exemplary, and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
merely a withholding pending the investigation. acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21,
relations. The legislative intent appears clear to allow Labor Arbiters to award which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully causes loss or injury to
The PCIB also admitted that as early as January 15, 1986, it had started to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to
the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, Harrington's impostor. When Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for
no. 10. (Cf. Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, L-21962, Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the PCIB
107).8cralawlawlibrary continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and
From the foregoing, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute bonuses.
because it has something to do with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the The trial court and the CA also noted that while Josephine was penalized, other
Civil Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee relation within employees of the bank involved in the subject transactions were not. It was
the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code. Josephine's complaint was, Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without giving any
therefore, properly filed with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC. basis therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been
received by the bank and entered in Harrington's savings account without the
Questions on whether there was a preponderance of evidence to justify participation of the other bank employees. The PCIB could have exercised
the award of damages or whether there was a causal connection between the prudence before taking oppressive actions against Josephine.
given set of facts and the damage suffered by the private complainant are All told, we find nothing in the record which would warrant the reversal of the
questions of fact. position held by the RTC and the CA. Based on the above discussion, we find
the award of moral damages and attorney's fees in Josephine's favor proper.
The Court's jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and
errors of law, which the lower courts may have committed. The resolution of consequently, the May 23, 2011 decision and the December 7, 2011 resolution
factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings, when aptly of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68288 are AFFIRMED in toto.
supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is especially true when the CA SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
affirms the RTC's findings. While this Court, under established exceptional
circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, we do not find this case to be
under any of the exceptions.
Essentially, what the PCIB seeks is a relief from the Court on the issue of the
propriety of the award of damages. On this point alone, the petition must fail,
as a Rule 45 petition bars us from the consideration of factual issues,
especially when both the RTC and the CA were consistent with their rulings.
Nevertheless, we still affirm the assailed CA rulings even if we were to
disregard these established doctrinal rules.
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in this
provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right principle." The legal
sanctions for violations of this fundamental principle are found in Articles
209 and 2110 of the Civil Code. We explained how these two provisions
correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v.
Valenzona:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to
observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial
limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human'
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy
for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper. 11 [Emphasis supplied]cralawlawlibrary
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of
Article 19 of the Civil Code and held the PCIB liable for damages. While the
PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must
not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made
deductions on Josephine's salary even if the investigation was still pending.
Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent
G.R. No. 179736               June 26, 2013 Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving III.
camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners,  of petitioners’ lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED
vs. petitioners’ property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents. meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road. AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY
CONSTITUTES A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE
DECISION IT IS SO ORDERED.20 CORPORATE VEIL.
DEL CASTILLO, J.: Respondents moved for a reconsideration 21 but the RTC denied the same in its IV.
"The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23Thus:
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED
respect for one's personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE
non-interference demands respect."1 merit. Issue a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in consonance with the Order dated MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 18 October 2005. RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY AND GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND
assails the July 10, 2007 Decision 3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution 4 of CONSIDERATION.33
IT IS SO ORDERED.24
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473. Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of
Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari 25 under Rule petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties
Factual Antecedents 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary to this suit.
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Injunction.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint 5 for Injunction and Petitioners’ Arguments
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN- On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly
5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a significant
and Allan Choachuy. grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since
1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in from prying into the private lives of others. 35 Although the said provision
the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. 28 The CA pertains to the privacy of another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes
Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu; 6 that respondents are the owners of alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino. 36 Thus, even assuming
not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the
adjacent to the property of petitioners; 7 that respondents constructed an auto- Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality. 30 Thus, they are not the proper
repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April said provision.37
parties.31 The fallo reads:
2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case,
Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN- WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered petitioners claim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that
5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction. 38 They point out
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the video
its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property; 9 that the court, in that hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to
case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39
substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said SO ORDERED.32
case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed on the Issues Respondents’ Arguments
building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that: Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners
the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a
construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to I. residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the
privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the installation of the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo,
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED the registered owner of the building, 41as additional security for its
video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance. 14 AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE RTC DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 building.42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH
install the video surveillance cameras, 16nor did they order their employees to GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Our Ruling
take pictures of petitioners’ construction. 17 They also clarified that they are not II. The Petition is meritorious.
the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18
THE X X X CA COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws. It is
On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or
TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads: VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
WHEREFORE, the application for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Writ of CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the right of an individual "to be free
Preliminary Injunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
petitioners, which the Court sets at ₱50,000.00, let a Writ of Preliminary CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned." 46 Simply
Injunction issue against the respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES. put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone." 47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to
against the State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54 action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes. 48
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable had violated the legal right of the former."57
of the Civil Code covers business offices expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that
where the public are excluded since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video
pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no
therefrom and only certain individuals different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that
the Anti-Wiretapping Law. respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not
are allowed to enter. automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video
In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, surveillance cameras.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right ruled that:
to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video
against him by other individuals. It states: After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against
temporary restraining order. The operation by respondents of a revolving petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed
of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, of petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but
though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of only focus on respondents’ property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo they did not seem to care, 60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay
action for damages, prevention and other relief: Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; of the land of petitioners. RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a
dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries
xxxx Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was of their respective properties. 62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we
so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a
privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed
without the consent of the latter." 49 The phrase "prying into the privacy of then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. by the Choachuy family.63
another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is Respondents’ camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To
entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino: allow the respondents to do that over the objection of the petitioners would Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that
violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into the privacy of another’s residence." Aldo and conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." 55
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her
because the law covers also "similar acts." A business office is entitled to the The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance
same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals privacy" in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order
as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied) residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that
petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents
should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the and Aldo seem to merge.
where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court
"prying into the privacy of another’s residence," therefore, covers places, All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents
taking cognizance of the case and should not be interfered with, unless there is
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves
grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication
long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper
of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners
his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article parties to this suit.
are not entitled to an injunctive writ.
26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10,
The "reasonable expectation of 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
to this suit.
privacy" test is used to determine CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
whether there is a violation of the right A real party defendant is one who has a Orders dated October 18,2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the
to privacy. correlative legal obligation to redress a Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby
wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the the defendant's act or omission which
"reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines whether a person SO ORDERED.
had violated the legal right of the
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been former.
violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a
person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs,
G.R. No. 159567               July 31, 2007 On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951
Delia and Jesus Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the donation coupled with compliance with certain solemnities required by the Civil
CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO CATALAN, MILA Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration Code in donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which provides:
CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN, ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.11
FLORIDA CATALAN and GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO xxx
CATALAN, Petitioners,  On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
vs. aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute.
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, By virtue of her ownership, the property is completely subjected to her will in
and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights of others
CATALAN, Respondents. OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.12 (Art. 428, NCC).

DECISION On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees’
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees
PUNO, C.J.: Ownership,13 as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which
that the Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the
Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that
even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a
Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of
giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight
of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and conferred upon such public document with respect to its due execution
damages. void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa
should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow: property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
sale, saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be evidence
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages and that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239
active military service. The Board of Medical Officers of the Department of litigation expenses. SCRA 256).
Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
"schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December
flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
sparce (sic) and pointless speech." 1 17666. SO ORDERED.17
2
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo. On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
complainants was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled "Absolute Deed of sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Donation,"3 wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister MERCEDES Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz: competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due execution NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded of the donation in question must be upheld. 14 It rendered judgment, viz: DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT
on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South by Barrio Road; On the East "THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-
by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an rendered:
area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less. APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE
1. Dismissing plaintiff’s complaint; INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY
Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, 2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED";
issued Tax Declaration No. 18080 4 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters owners of the land in question which is now declared in their
donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Feliciano’s names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4); 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR
name under Tax Declaration No. 18081. 5 DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT "S") AND THE REPORT OF A BOARD
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorney’s fees of OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
On December 11, 1953, People’s Bank and Trust Company filed Special ₱10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic) ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS "S-1" AND "S-2") ARE
Proceedings No. 45636 before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its SO ORDERED.15
Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals via HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY
and Fixing Allowance7 of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. 16 The
People’s Bank and Trust Company as Feliciano’s guardian. 8 People’s Bank NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz: DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
and Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known
as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE
that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the property in dispute was RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
of their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, donated.
to their son Eulogio Catalan.9 4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.18
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Feliciano’s competence to donate schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming
property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they presented more than increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses. 1avvphi1 The condition
the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles.
Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in
the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd
they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and are prone to have
by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of "ideas of reference." The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors
BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that are directed against the sufferers. 27 It has been proven that the administration
Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since 1948 which of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help bring
incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications
August 14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Feliciano’s marriage to Corazon reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or
Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane at the eliminate chances of relapse. 28Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness
time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that the donations similar in many aspects to Alzheimer’s disease. However, the illness will wax
Feliciano executed in favor of his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.29
66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations were
approved and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings. 19 In addition, From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from
petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently dispose
by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951,
registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower
Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this
Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced. 30 Sufficient
innocent purchasers of the property in question. 20 Lastly, petitioners assert that proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the
their case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of the New Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on
Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the December 22, 1953.31
four year period after Feliciano’s death on August 14, 1997 had begun. 21 It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Feliciano’s capacity at
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to question his mental
Appeals and the trial court. competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo
or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts,
or right in favor of another, who accepts it. 22 Like any other contract, an despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the
following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the
matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be contrary is shown.32
spontaneous.23 The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a
vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable. 24 Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell
the property to whomever she chose. 33 Not a shred of evidence has been
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donor’s presented to prove the claim that Mercedes’ sale of the property to her children
capacity to give consent at the time of the donation. Certainly, there lies no was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale
doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given. 25 However, the was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time
sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed. 26 of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus
Basa.
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the
evidence presented by the petitioners was insufficient to overcome the Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches
presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a
1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not
Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, annulled in a proper action in court within four years.34
however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners,
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
presumed capable of attending to his property rights. Schizophrenia was No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a
German psychiatrist, combined "hebrephrenia" and "catatonia" with certain SO ORDERED.
paranoid states and called the condition "dementia praecox." Eugene Bleuler, a
Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelin’s conception in the early 1900s to
include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition
"schizophrenia." According to medical references, in persons with
G.R. No. L-11872       December 1, 1917 usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently, on May 14, shares. Margarita Espiritu, married to Wenceslao Mercado y Ardeno Cruz, had
1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity by this husband five children, Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz, Domingo,
DOMINGO MERCADO and JOSEFA MERCADO, plaintiffs-appellants,  as administrator of the property of his children sold under  pacto de retro to the Josefa, and Amalia, all surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, who, at the death of their
vs. same Luis Espiritu at the price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, mother in 1896 inherited, by operation of law, one-half of the land described in
JOSE ESPIRITU, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet the expenses of the the complaint.
Espiritu, defendant-appellee. maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still
insufficient the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of The plaintiffs' petition for annulment of the sale and the consequent restitution
Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants. to them of two-fourths of the land left by their mother, that is, of one-fourth of all
Vicente Foz for appellee. money aggregating a total of P600; but that later, on May 17,1910, the
plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be of legal age, executed, with their sisters the land described in the complaint, and which, they stated, amounts to 11
Maria del Consejo and Maria dela Paz, the notarial instrument inserted hectares, 86 ares and 37 centares. To this claim the defendant excepted,
integrally in the 5th paragraph of the answer, by which instrument, ratifying said alleging that the land in question comprised only an area such as is customarily
sale under  pacto de retro of the land that had belonged to their mother covered by 21 cavanes of seed.
TORRES, J.: Margarita Espiritu, effected by their father Wenceslao Mercado in favor of Luis It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the
Espiritu for the sum of P2,600, they sold absolutely and perpetually to said Luis plaintiffs' mother conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000,
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from Espiritu, in consideration of P400, the property that had belonged to their
the judgment of September 22, 1914, in which the judge of the Seventh to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of the land now on litigation, or an area
deceased mother and which they acknowledged having received from the such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and that, on account
Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and ordered them aforementioned purchaser. In this cross-complaint the defendant alleged that
to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay the costs of of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of
the complaint filed by the plaintiffs was unfounded and malicious, and that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution,
the suit. thereby losses and damages in the sum of P1,000 had been caused to the the protocols or registers of public documents of the Province of Bulacan were
By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado intestate estate of the said Luis Espiritu. He therefore asked that judgment be burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the widower of the vendor and
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, rendered by ordering the plaintiffs to keep perpetual silence with respect to the father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party Luis
as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being land in litigation and, besides, to pay said intestate estate P1,000 for losses Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1, of the date of May 20, 1901, in his
directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate and damages, and that the costs of the trial be charged against them. own name and those of his minor children Maria Consejo, Maria de la Paz,
of the deceased Luis Espiritu. The plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters In reply to the cross-complaint, the plaintiffs denied each and all of the facts Domingo, Josefa, and Amalia, and therein set forth that it was true that the sale
Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were the children and sole heirs therein set forth, and in special defense alleged that at the time of the of said portion of land had been made by his aforementioned wife, then
of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that Margarita execution of the deed of sale inserted in the cross-complaint the plaintiffs were deceased, to Luis Espiritu in 1894.
Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 still minors, and that since they reached their majority the four years fixed by
hectares in area situated in the barrio of Panducot, municipality of Calumpit, However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901,
law for the annulment of said contract had not yet elapsed. They therefore the widower Wenceslao Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2,
Bulacan, and bounded as described in paragraph 4 of the amended complaint, asked that they be absolved from the defendant's cross-complaint.
which hereditary portion had since then been held by the plaintiffs and their pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an
sisters, through their father Wenceslao Mercado, husband of Margarita After trial and the introduction of evidence by both parties, the court rendered area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to this
Espiritu; that, about the year 1910, said Luis Espiritu, by means of cajolery, the judgment aforementioned, to which the plaintiffs excepted and in writing vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of
induced, and fraudulently succeeded in getting the plaintiffs Domingo and moved for a reopening of the case and a new trial. This motion was overruled, the land in question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in
Josefa Mercado to sign a deed of sale of the land left by their mother, for the exception was taken by the petitioners, and the proper bill of exceptions having order to obtain funds with which "to cover his children's needs." Wenceslao
sum of P400, which amount was divided among the two plaintiffs and their been presented, the same was approved and transmitted to the clerk of this Mercado, the plaintiffs' father, having died, about the year 1904, the plaintiffs
sisters Concepcion and Paz, notwithstanding the fact that said land, according court. Domingo and Josefa Mercado, together with their sisters Consejo and Paz,
to its assessment, was valued at P3,795; that one-half of the land in question declaring themselves to be of legal age and in possession of the required legal
belonged to Margarita Espiritu, and one-half of this share, that is, one-fourth of As the plaintiffs assailed the validity of the deed of sale, Exhibit 3, executed by status to contract, executed and subscribed before a notary the document
said land , to the plaintiffs, and the other one-fourth, to their two sisters them on May 17, 1910, on the ground that they were minors when they Exhibit 3, on May 17, 1910, in which referring to the previous sale of the land,
Concepcion and Paz; that the part of the land belonging to the two plaintiffs executed it, the questions submitted to the decision of this court consist in effected by their deceased mother for the sum of P2,600 and with her
could produce 180 cavanes of rice per annum, at P2.50 per cavan, was determining whether it is true that the plaintiffs were then minors and therefore husband's permission and authorization, they sold absolutely and in perpetuity
equivalent to P450 per annum; and that Luis Espiritu had received said incapable of selling their property on the date borne by the instrument Exhibit to Luis Espiritu, for the sum of P400 "as an increase" of the previous purchase
products from 1901 until the time of his death. Said counsel therefore asked 3; and in case they then were such, whether a person who is really and truly a price, the land described in said instrument and situated in Panducot, pueblo of
that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null and void the minor and, notwithstanding, attests that he is of legal age, can, after the Calumpit, Bulacan, of an area equal to that usually sown with 21 cavanes of
sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that execution of the deed and within legal period, ask for the annulment of the seed bounded on the north by the lands of Flaviano Abreu and the heirs of
the defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of instrument executed by him, because of some defect that invalidates the Pedro Espiritu, on the east by those of Victoria Espiritu and Ines Espiritu, on
the land that fell to the latter in the partition of the estate of their deceased contract, in accordance with the law (Civ. Code, arts. 1263 and 1300), so that the south by those of Luis Espiritu, and on the west by those of Hermogenes
mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products thereof, uncollected since he may obtain the restitution of the land sold. Tan-Toco and by the Sapang-Maitu stream.
1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of the The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu In this status of the case the plaintiffs seek the annulment of the deed Exhibit 3,
suit. obtained title by composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining on the ground that on the date of its execution they were minors without legal
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned each other, in the sitio of Panducot of the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, capacity to contract, and for the further reason that the deceased purchaser
complaint, denying each and all of the allegations therein contained, and in containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59 centares, which Luis Espiritu availed himself of deceit and fraud in obtaining their consent for
special defense alleged that the land, the subject-matter of the complaint, had facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said the execution of said deed.
an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its owner, the lands passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines,
Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the partition of said decedent's estate, the As it was proven by the testimony of the clerk of the parochial church of Apalit
deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due (plaintiffs were born in Apalit) that the baptismal register books of that parish
authorization of her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-seven and odd
hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal pertaining to the years 1890-1891, were lost or burned, the witness Maria
Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion of said land, to wit, an area such as is
Consejo Mercado recognized and identified the book Exhibit A, which she The defendant-administrator, Jose Espiritu, son of the deceased Luis Espiritu, remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-law, Luis
testified had been kept and taken care of by her deceased father Wenceslao testified that the plaintiff Domingo Mercado used to live off and on in the house Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3,
Mercado, pages 396 and 397 of which bear the attestation that the plaintiff of his deceased father, about the year 1909 or 1910, and used to go back and which was assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous
Domingo Mercado was born on August 4, 1890, and Josefa Mercado, on July forth between his father's house and those of his other relatives. He denied contracts, and the totality of the land, consisting of an area containing 21
14, 1891. Furthermore, this witness corroborated the averment of the plaintiffs' that his father had at any time administered the property belonging to the cavanes of seed rice, was sold absolutely and in perpetuity, the vendors
minority, by the personal registration certificate of said Domingo Mercado, of Mercado brother and sisters. receiving in exchange P400 more; and there is no conclusive proof in the
the year 1914, Exhibit C, by which it appears that in 1910 he was only 23 years record that this last document was false and simulated on account of the
old, whereby it would also be appear that Josefa Mercado was 22 years of age In rebuttal, Antonio Mercado, a cousin of Wenceslao, father of the plaintiffs, employment of any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit, in the procuring of
in 1910, and therefore, on May 17,1910, when the instrument of purchase and testified that he mediate in several transactions in connection with a piece of the consent of the vendors who executed it.
sale, Exhibit 3, was executed, the plaintiffs must have been, respectively, 19 land belonging to Margarita Espiritu. When shown the deed of purchase and
and 18 years of age. sale Exhibit 1, he stated that he was not acquainted with its contents. This Considering the relation that exists between the document Exhibit 3 and those
same witness also testified that he mediated in a transaction had between of previous dates, Exhibits 1 and 2, and taking into the account the relationship
The witness Maria Consejo Mercado also testified that after her father's death Wenceslao Mercado and Luis Espiritu (he did not remember the year), in which between the contracting parties, and also the general custom that prevails in
her brother and sisters removed to Manila to live there, although her brother the former sold to the latter a parcel of land situated in Panducot. He stated many provinces of these Islands for the vendor or debtor to obtain an increase
Domingo used to reside with his uncle Luis Espiritu, who took charge of the that as he was a witness of the deed of sale he could identify this instrument in the price of the sale or of the pledge, or an increase in the amount loaned,
administration of the property left by his predecessors in interest; that it was were it exhibited to him; but he did not do so, for no instrument whatever was without proof to the contrary, it would be improper and illegal to hold, in view of
her uncle Luis who got for her brother Domingo the other cedula, Exhibit B, presented to him for identification. The transaction mentioned must have the facts hereinabove set forth, that the purchaser Luis Espiritu, now deceased,
pertaining to the year 1910, where in it appears that the latter was then already concerned either the ratification of the sale of the land of 15 cavanes, in 1901, had any need to forge or simulate the document Exhibit 3 inasmuch as, since
23 years of age; that she did not know why her uncle did so; that she and her attested in Exhibit 1, or the mortgage or pledge of the other parcel of 6 May, 1894, he has held in the capacity of owner by virtue of a prior acquisition,
brother and sisters merely signed the deed of May 17, 1910; and that her cavanes, given on May 14, 1901, by Wenceslao Mercado to Luis Espiritu, as the parcel of land of 15 cavanes of seed, and likewise, since May, 1901,
father Wenceslao Mercado, prior to his death had pledged the land to her uncle may be seen by the private document Exhibit 2. In rebuttal, the plaintiff Josefa according to the contract of mortgage or pledge, the parcel of 6 cavanes, or the
Luis Espiritu. Mercado denied having gone to the house of the notary Tanjutco for the remainder of the total area of 21 cavanes.
purpose of requesting him to draw up any document whatever. She stated that
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it she saw the document Exhibit 3 for the first time in the house of her uncle Luis So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his
was Luis Espiritu who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This Espiritu on the day she signed it, on which occasion and while said document testate or intestate estate is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated
testimony was corroborated by her sister Victoria Espiritu, who added that her was being signed said notary was not present, nor were the witnesses thereto in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by virtue of the title of
nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did not know just whose names appear therein; and that she went to her said uncle's house, conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavanes, and, in
how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu. because he had sent for her, as well as her brother and sisters, sending a consequence of the contract of pledge or mortgage in security for the sum of
carromata to fetch them. Victoria Espiritu denied ever having been in the house P600, is likewise in lawful possession of the remainder of the land, or an area
Roque Galang, married to a sister of Luis Espiritu, stated that the land that fell containing 6 cavanes of seed.
to his wife and to his sister-in-law Victoria, and which had an area of about 8 of her brother. Luis Espiritu in company with the plaintiffs, for the purpose of
hectares less than that of the land allotted to the aforementioned Luis and giving her consent to the execution of any deed in behalf of her brother. The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of
Margarita produced for his wife and his sister-in-law Victoria a net and The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that land, as its ownership was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular
minimum yield of 507 cavanes in 1907, in spite of its being high land and of the purchaser Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in title of purchase and sale; and as to the other portion of 6 cavanes of seed,
inferior quality, as compared with the land in dispute, and that its yield was still order to effect the sale mentioned in the document Exhibit 3, executed on May they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or the
larger in 1914, when the said two sisters' share was 764 cavanes. 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and the sisters Domingo, return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during
Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the his lifetime, received as a loan under security of the pledged property; but, after
Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was the execution of the document Exhibit 3, the creditor Luis Espiritu definitely
a witness for the defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made
in behalf of said purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her acquired the ownership of said parcel of 6 cavanes. It is therefore a rash
the request of the plaintiff Josefa Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument venture to attempt to recover this latter parcel by means of the contract of final
assured him that they were all of legal age; that said document was signed by husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of the vendors of the portion of land
situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan; and in and absolute sale, set forth in the deed Exhibit 3.
the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to them
and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did consideration of the fact that the said vendor Luis Espiritu paid them, as an Moreover, the notarial document Exhibit 1, are regards the statements made
not understand Spanish. On cross-examination, witness added that ever since increase, the sum of P400, by virtue of the contract made with him, they therein, is of the nature of a public document and is evidence of the fact which
he was 18 years of age and began to court, he had known the plaintiff Josefa declare having sold to him absolutely and in perpetuity said parcel of the land, gave rise to its execution and of the date of the latter, even against a third
Mercado, who was then a young maiden, although she had not yet waive and thenceforth any and all rights they may have, inasmuch as said sum person and his predecessors in interest such as are the plaintiffs. (Civ. Code,
commenced to attend social gatherings, and that all this took place about the constitutes the just price of the property. art. 1218.)
year 1898, for witness said that he was then [at the time of his testimony, So that said document Exhibit 3 is virtually an acknowledgment of the contract
1914,] 34 years of age. The plaintiffs' father, Wenceslao Mercado, recognizing it to be perfectly true
of sale of the parcel or portion of land that would contain 15 cavanes of seed that his wife Margarita Espiritu sold said parcel of land which she inherited from
Antonio Espiritu, 60 years of age, who knew Lucas Espiritu and the properties rice made by the vendors' mother in favor of the purchaser Luis Espiritu, their her father, of an area of about "15 cavanes of seed," to her brother Luis
owned by the latter, testified that Espiritu's land contained an area of 84 uncle, and likewise an acknowledgment of the contract of pledge or mortgage Espiritu, by means of an instrument executed by her on May 25,1894 — an
cavanes, and after its owner's death, was under witness' administration during of the remainder of said land, an area of six cavanes, made with the same instrument that disappeared or was burned — and likewise recognizing that the
to harvest two harvest seasons; that the products yielded by a portion of this purchaser, at an increase of P400 over the price of P2,600, making an protocols and register books belonging to the Province of Bulacan were
land, to wit, an area such as is sown by about 15 cavanes of seed, had been, aggregate sum of P3,000, decomposed as follows: P2,000, collected during destroyed as a result of the past revolution, at the request of his brother-in-law
since 1894, utilized by Luis Espiritu, by reason of his having acquired the land; her lifetime, by the vendors' father; and the said increase of P400, collected by Luis Espiritu he had no objection to give the testimony recorded in said notarial
and that, after Margarita Espiritu's death, her husband Wenceslao Mercado the plaintiffs. instrument, as it was the truth regarding what had occurred, and in so doing he
took possession of another portion of the land, containing an area of six In the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita acted as the plaintiffs' legitimate father in the exercise of his parental authority,
cavanes of seed and which had been left by this deceased, and that he held Espiritu conveyed to her brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit inasmuch as he had personal knowledge of said sale, he himself being the
same until 1901, when he conveyed it to Luis Espiritu. lawphi1.net 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed father mortgaged or pledged the husband who authorized said conveyance, notwithstanding that his testimony
affected his children's interest and prejudiced his own, as the owner of any executed the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, have suffered positive and actual
fruits that might be produced by said real property. losses and damages in their rights and interests as a result of the execution of
said document, inasmuch as the sale effected by the plaintiffs' mother,
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as Margarita Espiritu, in May, 1894, of the greater part of the land of 21 cavanes
authentic by one of the plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows of seed, did not occasion any damage or prejudice to the plaintiffs, inasmuch
no evidence whatever that this document is false, and it does not appear to as their father stated in the document Exhibit 2 that he was obliged to
have been assailed as such, and as it was signed by the plaintiffs' father, there mortgage or pledge said remaining portion of the land in order to secure the
is no legal ground or well-founded reason why it should be rejected. It was loan of the P375 furnished by Luis Espiritu and which was subsequently
therefore properly admitted as evidence of the certainty of the facts therein set increased to P600 so as to provide for certain engagements or perhaps to
forth. meet the needs of his children, the plaintiff; and therefore, to judge from the
The principal defect attributed by the plaintiffs to the document Exhibit 3 statements made by their father himself, they received through him, in
consists in that, on the date of May 17, 1910, when it was executed that they exchange for the land of 6 cavanes of seed, which passed into the possession
signed it, they were minors, that is, they had not yet attained the age of 21 of the creditor Luis Espiritu, the benefit which must have accrued to them from
years fixed by Act No. 1891, though no evidence appears in the record that the the sums of money received as loans; and, finally, on the execution of the
plaintiffs Josefa and Domingo Mercado were in fact minors, for no certified impugned document Exhibit 3, the plaintiffs received and divided between
copies were presented of their baptismal certificates, nor did the plaintiffs themselves the sum of P400, which sum, added to that P2,000 received by
adduce any supplemental evidence whatever to prove that Domingo was Margarita Espiritu, and to that of the P600 collected by Wenceslao Mercado,
actually 19 and Josefa 18 years of age when they signed the document Exhibit widower of the latter and father of the plaintiffs, makes all together the sum of
3, on May 17, 1910, inasmuch as the copybook, Exhibit A, notwithstanding the P3,000, the amount paid by the purchaser as the price of all the land
testimony of the plaintiff Consejo Mercado, does not constitute sufficient proof containing 21 cavanes of seed, and is the just price of the property, was not
of the dates of births of the said Domingo and Josefa. impugned, and, consequently, should be considered as equivalent to, and
compensatory for, the true value of said land.
However, even in the doubt whether they certainly were of legal age on the
date referred to, it cannot be gainsaid that in the document Exhibit 3 they For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment
stated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it, and appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in
on that account the sale mentioned in said notarial deed Exhibit 3 is perfectly accordance with law and the evidence of record, we should, and do hereby,
valid — a sale that is considered as limited solely to the parcel of land of 6 affirm the same, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
cavanes of seed, pledged by the deceased father of the plaintiffs in security for
P600 received by him as a loan from his brother-in-law Luis Espiritu, for the
reason that the parcel of 15 cavanes had been lawfully sold by its original
owner, the plaintiffs' mother.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in
fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th Partida;
and the judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser
from the complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to the
sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in consonance
therewith. (Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of April 27, 1860, July 11,
1868, and March 1, 1875.) itc@alf
With respect to the true age of the plaintiffs, no proof was adduced of the fact
that it was Luis Espiritu who took out Domingo Mercado's personal registration
certificate on April 13, 1910, causing the age of 23 years to be entered therein
in order to corroborate the date of the notarial instrument of May 17th of the
same year; and the supposition that he did, would also allow it to be supposed,
in order to show the propriety of the claim, that the cedula Exhibit C was taken
out on February 14, 1914, where in it is recorded that Domingo Mercado was
on that date 23 years of age, for both these facts are not proved; neither was
any proof adduced against the statement made by the plaintiffs Domingo and
Josefa in the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, that, on the date when they
executed it, they were already of legal age, and, besides the annotation
contained in the copybook Exhibit A, no supplemental proof of their true ages
was introduced.
Aside from the foregoing, from a careful examination of the record in this case,
it cannot be concluded that the plaintiffs, who claim to have minors when they
G.R. No. 173822               October 13, 2010 adjusting the cylinder of his gun; that the petitioners then fled the scene of the SO ORDERED.11
shooting; that she rushed to the house of barangay captain Juanito Lagonsing
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADOR MONREAL, Petitioners,  (Lagonsing) to report the shooting; and that she and Lagonsing brought Llona After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration, 12 the petitioners now
vs. to a hospital where Llona was pronounced dead.5 appeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Major Gani testified that the petitioners and Danilo were arrested on May 18, Issue
DECISION 1994,6 based on the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Teodisio R. Dino, Jr. of The petitioners submit that the RTC and the CA erred in finding them guilty of
BERSAMIN, J.: the Municipal Trial Court in Castilla, Sorsogon. murder beyond reasonable doubt based on the eyewitness testimony of
Dr. Abrantes confirmed that Llona died due to two gunshot wounds in the back Mirandilla despite her not being a credible witness; that some circumstances
On May 4, 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Sorsogon, rendered Mirandilla’s testimony unreliable, namely: (a) she had failed to identify
convicted the petitioners of murder. 1 On December 13, 2005, the Court of that penetrated his spinal column, liver, and abdomen. 7
them as the assailants of Llona, because she had not actually witnessed them
Appeals (CA) affirmed their conviction in C.A.-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, but Lawrence and Herminia stated that the Llona family spent ₱30,000.00 for the shooting at Llona; (b) she had merely assumed that they had been the
modified the awarded damages.2 funeral expenses of Llona.8 assailants from the fact that they had worked for Lorenzana, the supposed
The petitioners contest the CA’s affirmance of their conviction in this appeal via mastermind; (c) the autopsy report stated that Llona had been shot from a
Denying the accusation, the petitioners interposed alibi. The witnesses for the distance, not at close range, contrary to Mirandilla’s claim; (d) Mirandilla’s
petition for review on certiorari. Defense were Monreal, Roger Villafe (Villafe), Merlinda Lolos, Joseph testimony was contrary to human experience; and (e) Mirandilla’s account was
We affirm their conviction, but we reduce the penalty imposed on Salvador Lorenzana (Lorenzana), Jesalva, and Lagonsing. inconsistent with that of Jesalva’s.
Monreal because the RTC and the CA did not duly appreciate his minority at The Defense showed that at the time of the commission of the crime, Atizado
the time of the commission of the crime. We order his immediate release from Ruling
had been in his family residence in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla,
prison because he already served his sentence, as hereby modified. Also, we The conviction of the petitioners is affirmed, subject to modifications in the
add to the damages to which the heirs of the victim were entitled in order to Sorsogon, because he had been sick of influenza, while Monreal and Danilo penalty imposed on Monreal and in the amounts and kinds of damages as civil
accord with the prevailing law and jurisprudence. had been in the house of a certain Ariel also in Barangay Tomalaytay, Castilla, liability.
Sorsogon drinking gin; that the petitioners and Danilo had not been recognized
Antecedents to be at the crime scene during the shooting of Llona; and that the petitioners I.
On June 20, 1994, the Office of the Sorsogon Provincial Prosecutor formally had been implicated only because of their being employed by their uncle Factual findings of the RTC and CAare accorded respect
charged the petitioners and a certain Danilo Atizado (Danilo) with murder Lorenzana, the alleged mastermind in the killing of Llona.
The RTC and CA’s conclusions were based on Mirandilla’s positive
through the following information, to wit: As stated, on May 4, 2000, the RTC convicted the petitioners but acquitted identification of the petitioners as the malefactors and on her description of the
That on or about the 18th day of April 1994, at Barangay Bogña, Municipality of Danilo, viz: acts of each of them made during her court testimony on March 6, 1995,13viz:
Castilla, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Salvador q Who were you saying ‘we sat together’?
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and Atizado and Salvador Monreal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a Kdg. Llona, Mr. Jose Jesalva and I was letting my 5 years old
feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation, and without any with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court hereby sentences each child to sleep.
justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill, armed with handguns, attack, of the accused to an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs
assault and shot one Rogelio Llona y Llave, a Sangguniang Bayan member of q Can you demonstrate or described before this Honorable Court
of Rogelio Llona the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, Philippines the size of the sala and the house you wherein (sic)?
Castilla, Sorsogon, thereby inflicting upon him mortal and serious wounds currency, in solidum, as civil indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in
which directly caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of case of insolvency; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of a The size of the sale (sic) is about 3 x 3 meters.
his legal heirs. ₱30,000.00 as actual expenses and to pay the cost.
q Now, please show to this Honorable Court the relative position,
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 Accused Danilo Atizado on reasonable doubt is hereby acquitted of the crime the sitting arrangement of yours, Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Jesalva.
After the petitioners and Danilo pleaded not guilty to the information on charged and he being a detention prisoner, his immediate release from the
provincial jail is hereby ordered, unless he is charged of other lawful cause or a I was sitting on a long bench then my child was on my lap, then
November 7, 1994,4 the trial ensued. Kdg. Llona was infront of me, I was at the right side of Kdg. Llona
causes.
The witnesses for the State were Simeona Mirandilla (Mirandilla), Major q How about Kdg. Jesalva?
Saadra Gani (Major Gani), Dr. Wilhelmo Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes), Lawrence Accused Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal being detained, shall be
Llona (Lawrence), and Herminia Llona (Herminia). credited in full in the service of their sentence. a This Kgd. Jesalva was facing Kgd. Llona and Kgd. Llona was
SO ORDERED.9 facing the door in otherwords, the door was at his back.
Mirandilla narrated that on April 18, 1994 she and the late Rogelio Llona
(Llona), her common-law husband, had attended the fiesta of Barangay Bonga The Court referred the petitioners’ direct appeal to the CA pursuant to People q Was the door open?
in Castilla, Sorsogon; that at about 8 pm of that date, they had gone to the v. Mateo.10
house of Manuel Desder (Desder) in the same barangay; that as they and Jose a Yes, sir.
Jesalva (Jesalva), a barangay kagawad of the place, were seated in the sala of On December 13, 2005, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing: q Was the door immediately found… Rather was this the main
Desder’s house, she heard "thundering steps" as if people were running and door of the house?
then two successive gunshots; that she then saw Atizado pointing a gun at the WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. Accused-appellants
prostrate body of Llona; that seeing Atizado about to shoot Llona again, she Salvador Atizado and Salvador Monreal are hereby ordered to suffer the a That was the main door leading to the porch of the house.
shouted: Stop, that’s enough!; that while aiding Llona, she heard three clicking imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. Likewise, they are ordered to pay the
heirs of Rogelio Llona the amount of: (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) q And from the porch is the main stairs already?
sounds, and, turning towards the direction of the clicking sounds, saw Monreal
point his gun at her while he was moving backwards and simultaneously ₱30,000.00 as actual damages; and (c) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
a Yes, sir.
q Now, what were you doing there after dinner as you said you q So when you said that you saw this man Monreal, can you still reclusion perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
have finished assisting the persons in Bongga about the recognize this man? circumstances:
program, ... after that, what were you doing then?
a Yes, sir. 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
a I was letting my child to sleep and Kgd. Llona was fanning my aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or
child. q Could you be able to point at him, if he is in Court? of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
q How about Kgd. Jesalva? a Yes, sir. 2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
a His head was stopping (sic) because of his drunkenness. q Kindly please go down and tap his shoulder? 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
a (witness going down and proceeded to the first bench and tap stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of
q Can you tell this Honorable Court, while you were on that an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any
situation, if there was any incident that happened? the shoulder of the person, the person tapped by the witness
answered to the name Salvador Monreal.) other means involving great waste and ruin.
a There was a sudden thundering steps as if they were running 4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
and there were successive shots. q You said, when you stood up and face with him while he was
adjusting his revolver and he was moving backward, did you see preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano,
q Simultaneously with these two (2) successive shots can you see other persons as his companion, if any? destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
the origin or who was responsible for the shots? 5. With evident premeditation.
a At the first time when I turned my head back, I saw this Atizado
a Upon hearing the shots, I turned my head and saw Salvador he was already on the process of leaving the place. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
Atizado. suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
q Who is the first name of this Atizado?
q Who is this Salvador Atizado? corpse.
a Danilo Atizado
a He was the one who shot Kgd. Llona. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
q And did they actually leave the place at that moment? person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
q Can you be able to identify him? tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
a Salvador Monreal was the one left. from the defense which offended party might make. 21 For treachery to be
a (Witness identifying the person, and when asked of his name attendant, the means, method, or form of execution must be deliberated upon
answered Salvador Atizado.) Our own review persuades us to concur with the RTC and the CA. Indeed,
Mirandilla’s positive identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her or consciously adopted by the offenders. 22 Moreover, treachery must be
q So when you heard the shots, who was actually shot? declarations on what each of the petitioners did when they mounted their present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.23
sudden deadly assault against Llona left no doubt whatsoever that they had The CA held that Mirandilla’s testimonial narrative "sufficiently established that
a Kgd. Llona, because after looking at the (3) persons I saw Kgd. conspired to kill and had done so with treachery.
Llona sliding downward. treachery attended the attack o[n] the victim" because Atizado’s shooting the
It is a basic rule of appellate adjudication in this jurisdiction that the trial judge’s victim at the latter’s back had been intended to ensure the execution of the
q Then after that what happened? evaluation of the credibility of a witness and of the witness’ testimony is crime; and that Atizado and Monreal’s conspiracy to kill the victim was proved
accorded the highest respect because the trial judge’s unique opportunity to by their presence at the scene of the crime each armed with a handgun that
a Then I stood immediately and I told the persons responsible
observe directly the demeanor of the witness enables him to determine they had fired except that Monreal’s handgun did not fire.24
‘stop that’s enough’, and I gave assistance to Kgd. Llona.
whether the witness is telling the truth or not. 14 Such evaluation, when affirmed We concur with the CA on the attendance of treachery. The petitioners
q Then after that what happened? by the CA, is binding on the Court unless facts or circumstances of weight have mounted their deadly assault with suddenness and without the victim being
been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted that, if considered, would aware of its imminence. Neither an altercation between the victim and the
a My intention was to let Kgd. Llona push-up but I heard three (3) materially affect the disposition of the case. 15 We thus apply the rule,
clicks of the trigger of the gun. assailants had preceded the assault, nor had the victim provoked the assault in
considering that the petitioners have not called attention to and proved any the slightest. The assailants had designed their assault to be swift and
q Then what did you do when you heard that? overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted circumstance. Fortifying the unexpected, in order to deprive their victim of the opportunity to defend
application of the rule is that Mirandilla’s positive declarations on the identities himself.25 Such manner constituted a deliberate adoption of a method of attack
a After which I turned my head suddenly then I saw this Salvador of the assailants prevailed over the petitioners’ denials and alibi.16 that ensured their unhampered execution of the crime.
Monreal but at that time I do not know his name.
Under the law, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an II.
q Then what did you see of him? agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit Modification of the Penalty on Monreal and of the Civil Damages
it.17 Yet, the State did not have to prove the petitioners’ previous agreement to
a I saw this Salvador Monreal stepping backward and he was commit the murder,18 because their conspiracy was deduced from the mode Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the
adjusting the cylinder of the gun. and manner in which they had perpetrated their criminal act. 19 They had acted penalty for murder is reclusion perpetuato death. There being no modifying
q Now, when you saw and heard Atizado three (3) clicks of the in concert in assaulting Llona, with their individual acts manifesting a circumstances, the CA correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
gun, can you see where the gun was pointed at? community of purpose and design to achieve their evil end. As it is, all the perpetua on Atizado, which was conformable with Article 63 (2) of the
conspirators in a crime are liable as co-principals. 20 Thus, they cannot now RPC.26 But reclusion perpetua was not the correct penalty for Monreal due to
a It was pointed towards me. successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in murder. his being a minor over 15 but under 18 years of age. The RTC and the CA did
not appreciate Monreal’s minority at the time of the commission of the murder
q So, there were three (3) shots that did not actually fired towards Murder is defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code probably because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
you? (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which provides:
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below 18 years of age
a Yes, sir. Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of when the crime was committed on April 18, 1994. Firstly, his counter-affidavit
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by
executed on June 30 1994 stated that he was 17 years of age. 27 Secondly, the development, are retroactively applied to Monreal as a convict serving his ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
police blotter recording his arrest mentioned that he was 17 years old at the sentence. Its Section 68 expressly so provides: damages, and ₱30,000.00 as actual damages.
time of his arrest on May 18, 1994. 28Thirdly, Villafe’s affidavit dated June 29,
1994 averred that Monreal was a minor on the date of the incident. 29Fourthly, Section 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences . – Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the
as RTC’s minutes of hearing dated March 9, 1999 showed, 30 Monreal was 22 Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City by personal service.
years old when he testified on direct examination on March 9, 1999, 31 which effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the The Director of Bureau of Corrections shall report to this Court the action he
meant that he was not over 18 years of age when he committed the crime. time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are has taken on this decision within five days from service.
And, fifthly, Mirandilla described Monreal as a teenager and young looking at serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this
Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act SO ORDERED.
the time of the incident.32
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately
The foregoing showing of Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 9344, also known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, 33 viz: Both petitioners were adjudged solidarily liable to pay damages to the surviving
heirs of Llona.1avvp++il Their solidary civil liability arising from the commission
Section 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy of the crime stands, 36 despite the reduction of Monreal’s penalty. But we must
the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in reform the awards of damages in order to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or The CA granted only ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000.00 as actual
older. The age of a child may be determined from the child’s birth certificate, damages, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. We hold that the amounts for
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these death indemnity and moral damages should each be raised to ₱75,000.00 to
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, accord with prevailing case law;37 and that exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other due to the attendance of treachery should be further awarded, 38 to accord with
relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be the pronouncement in People v. Catubig, 39 to wit:
resolved in his/her favor.
The commission of an offense has two-pronged effect, one on the public as it
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the breaches the social order and other upon the private victim as it causes
filing of the information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary personal sufferings, each of which, is addressed by, respectively, the
proceeding for the determination of age before the Family Court which shall prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award of
decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a
pleadings of all interested parties. graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of
in the appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of damages, however is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party
the child in the same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary
said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended. damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that
the child in conflict with the law. should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil liability of
the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, 34 when the offender is over 15 and under circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
18 years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article
Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC,  reclusion temporal is the penalty next 2230 of the Civil Code.
lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of The award of actual damages of ₱30,000.00 is upheld for being supported by
imprisonment imposable on Monreal was prision mayor in any of its periods, as the record.
the minimum period, to reclusion temporal  in its medium period, as the WHEREFORE, the Court affirms the decision dated December 13, 2005
maximum period. Accordingly, his proper indeterminate penalty is from six promulgated in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01450, subject to the following
years and one day of prision mayor,  as the minimum period, to 14 years, eight modifications:
months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
(a) Salvador Monreal is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from the time of his arrest penalty from six years and one day of prision mayor,  as the
on May 18, 1994 until the present. Given that the entire period of Monreal’s minimum period, to 14 years, eight months, and one day
detention should be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to Section of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period;
41 of Republic Act No. 9344,35 the revision of the penalty now warrants his
immediate release from the penitentiary. (b) The Court orders the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City
to immediately release Salvador Monreal due to his having fully
In this regard, the benefits in favor of children in conflict with the law as granted served the penalty imposed on him, unless he is being held for
under Republic Act No. 9344, which aims to promote the welfare of minor other lawful causes; and
offenders through programs and services, such as delinquency prevention,
intervention, diversion, rehabilitation and re-integration, geared towards their (c) The Court directs the petitioners to pay jointly and solidarily to
the heirs of Roger L. Llona ₱75,000.00 as death indemnity,
G.R. No. 166470               August 7, 2009 Respondent was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt and Petitioners moved for reconsideration asserting that the ₱1 million bond was
1
smelled of urine. She later found out that Lulu was occupying a cramped room grossly insufficient to secure Lulu’s ₱50-million estate against fraudulent loss
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-  and NATIVIDAD lit by a single fluorescent lamp without running water. Since she had not been or dissipation.14 The motion, however, was denied.15
CRUZ-HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,  given a proper toilet, Lulu urinated and defecated in the garden. Due to Lulu's
vs. poor hygiene, respondent brought her to several physicians for medical On July 2, 2002, petitioners appealed the September 25, 2001 decision of the
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS, Respondent. examination. Lulu was found to be afflicted with tuberculosis, rheumatism and RTC to the Court of Appeals (CA).16The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
diabetes from which she was suffering several complications.8 No. 75760.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Thereafter, the San Juan family demanded an inventory and accounting of On December 29, 2004, the CA issued a decision affirming the September 25,
G.R. No. 169217 2001 decision of the RTC (in the petition for guardianship) in toto.17 It held that
Lulu’s estate from petitioners.9 However, the demand was ignored.
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C. HERNANDEZ-SAGUN and respondent presented sufficient evidence to prove that Lulu, because of her
TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-VILLA ABRILLE, Petitioners,  On October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for guardianship 10 in the illnesses and low educational attainment, needed assistance in taking care of
vs. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that herself and managing her affairs considering the extent of her estate. With
JOVITA SAN JUAN-SANTOS,2 Respondent. Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and managing her estate because regard to the respondent’s appointment as the legal guardian, the CA found
she was of weak mind. that, since Lulu did not trust petitioners, none of them was qualified to be her
DECISION legal guardian.1avvphi1 Because guardianship was a trust relationship, the
Subsequently, petitioners moved to intervene in the proceedings to oppose the RTC was bound to appoint someone Lulu clearly trusted.
CORONA, J.: same.
Petitioners now assail the December 29, 2004 decision of the CA in this Court
Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu) was born on February 14, 1947 Natividad denied that Marilou Subdivision belonged to Lulu. Since she and her in a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 166470. 18
to the spouses Felix Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez. late husband were the registered owners of the said property, it was allegedly
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications during childbirth. After part of their conjugal partnership. Meanwhile, Lulu moved into 8 R. Santos St., Marikina City (Marikina
Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San apartment) and was provided with two housemaids tasked to care for her.
Juan. Cecilio, Teresa and Ma. Victoria, for their part, claimed that the issue of Lulu’s Sometime in November 2003, Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment.
competency had been settled in 1968 (upon her emancipation) when the court Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police Anti-Crime Emergency
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz. The union produced ordered her legal guardian and maternal uncle, Ciriaco San Juan, to deliver the Response (PACER) division of the Philippine National Police.
three children, petitioners Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez- properties for her to manage.
Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille. The PACER subsequently discovered that petitioners were keeping Lulu
They likewise asserted that Lulu was literate and, for that reason, aware of the somewhere in Rodriguez, Rizal. Despite their initial hostility to the investigation,
Meanwhile, as the only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero, Lulu consequences of executing an SPA. Furthermore, whether or not Cecilio and Ma. Victoria and Cecilio subsequently contacted the PACER to inform them
inherited valuable real properties from the San Juan family (conservatively Ma. Victoria acted within the scope of their respective authorities could not be that Lulu voluntarily left with Natividad because her guardian had allegedly
estimated at ₱50 million in 1997). determined in a guardianship proceeding, such matter being the proper subject been maltreating her.19
of an ordinary civil action.
Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with her father and his new family. She On December 15, 2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus20 in the
was then 10 years old and studying at La Consolacion College. However, due Petitioners also admitted that the property developed into the Marilou CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and were holding her captive in an
to her "violent personality," Lulu stopped schooling when she reached Grade 5. Subdivision was among those parcels of land Lulu inherited from the San Juan undisclosed location in Rodriguez, Rizal.
family. However, because the "sale" between Felix and Lulu had taken place in
In 1968, upon reaching the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her 1974, questions regarding its legality were already barred by the statute of On April 26, 2005, the CA granted the petition for habeas corpus, ruling that
estate.3 Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even finish her elementary limitations. Thus, its validity could no longer be impugned, or so they claimed. Jovita, as her legal guardian, was entitled to her custody. 21
education, Felix continued to exercise actual administration of Lulu’s
properties. Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the task of During the hearing, Lulu was presented and asked to testify on her genealogy Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied
administering Lulu's properties. and experiences with the San Juan and Hernandez families. Lulu identified and in a resolution dated July 12, 2005. 22 Aggrieved, they filed this petition for
described her parents, stepmother, half-siblings and maternal relatives. She review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 169217. This was consolidated with
During the period of their informal administration (from 1968 until 1993), Felix claimed inheriting tracts of land from the San Juan family. However, these G.R. No. 166470.
and petitioners undertook various "projects" involving Lulu’s real properties. In properties were dissipated by the Hernandez family as they lived a "luxurious"
1974, Felix allegedly purchased one of Lulu’s properties for an undisclosed lifestyle. When asked to explain this allegation, Lulu said that her stepmother The basic issue in petitions of this nature is whether the person is an
amount to develop the Marilou Subdivision. 4 In 1995, Ma. Victoria informed and half-siblings rode in cars while she was made to ride a tricycle. incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian over her
Lulu that her 11-hectare Montalban, Rizal property 5 was under litigation. Thus, person and property.
Lulu signed a special power of attorney 6 (SPA) believing that she was Medical specialists testified to explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which
authorizing Ma. Victoria to appear in court on her behalf when she was in fact revealed the alarming state of her health. 11 Not only was Lulu severely afflicted Petitioners claim that the opinions of Lulu's attending physicians 23 regarding
unknowingly authorizing her half-sister to sell the said property to the Manila with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications, 12 she also had an her mental state were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in
Electric Company for ₱18,206,400.7 Thereafter, Cecilio asked Lulu to authorize existing artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her psychiatry. Respondent therefore failed to prove that Lulu's illnesses rendered
him to lease her 45-hectare property in Montalban, Rizal to Oxford Concrete obesity). Furthermore, they unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s her an incompetent. She should have been presumed to be of sound mind
Aggregates for ₱58,500 per month so that she could have a car and driver at intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental state, she and/or in full possession of her mental capacity. For this reason, Lulu should be
her disposal. would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications. allowed to live with them since under Articles 194 to 196 of the Family
Code,24 legitimate brothers and sisters, whether half-blood or full-blood are
In September 1998, Lulu sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin, In a decision dated September 25, 2001, 13 the RTC concluded that, due to her required to support each other fully.
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that petitioners had been weak physical and mental condition, there was a need to appoint a legal
dissipating her estate. She confided to Jovita that she was made to live in the guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus, it declared Lulu an Respondent, on the other hand, reiterated her arguments before the courts a
basement of petitioners’ Montalban, Rizal home and was receiving a measly incompetent and appointed respondent as guardian over the person and quo.  She disclosed that Lulu had been confined in Recovery.com, a
daily allowance of ₱400 for her food and medication. property of Lulu on a ₱1 million bond. psychosocial rehabilitation center and convalescent home care facility in
Quezon City, since 2004 due to violent and destructive behavior. She also had Treble costs against petitioners.
delusions of being physically and sexually abused by "Boy Negro" and
imaginary pets she called "Michael" and "Madonna." 25 The November 21, 2005 SO ORDERED.
medical report26 stated Lulu had unspecified mental retardation with psychosis
but claimed significant improvements in her behavior.
We find the petition to be without merit.
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary witness may
give his opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.27 Lulu's attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her behavior and conclude that
her intelligence level was below average and her mental stage below normal.
Their opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not
necessary.28 The observations of the trial judge coupled with
evidence29 establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice. 30 Here,
the trial judge was given ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when
she testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, 31 persons who, though of
sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes
are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside
aid, are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under
guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was incapable of
taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments
and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an
incompetent would require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the
courts a quo,  it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law in a petition for
review. We only take cognizance of questions of fact in exceptional
circumstances, none of which is present in this case.32 We thus adopt the
factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.1avvph!1
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate courts’
finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian
of Lulu.33 We therefore affirm her appointment as such. Consequently,
respondent is tasked to care for and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her
estate as well.34
Inasmuch as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was
proper, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus  extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.35 Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care
for and protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must
have custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus  after
she was unduly deprived of the custody of her ward.36
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED.
Petitioners are furthermore ordered to render to respondent, Lulu’s legal
guardian, an accurate and faithful accounting of all the properties and funds
they unlawfully appropriated for themselves from the estate of Maria Lourdes
San Juan Hernandez, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. If
warranted, the proper complaints should also be filed against them for any
criminal liability in connection with the dissipation of Maria Lourdes San Juan
Hernandez’s estate and her unlawful abduction from the custody of her legal
guardian.
G.R. No. 184757               October 5, 2011 On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in asking for ₱300 from him after they kissed. Accused-appellant also testified
Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA ("ampun-ampunan
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  sleeping in the second floor of the house, where there are no rooms. AAA was lang").19
vs. roused from her sleep when accused-appellant was already undressing her.
ANICETO BULAGAO, Accused-Appellant. Accused-appellant removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. On January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision in Crim. Case No.
AAA tried to resist, but accused-appellant held her hands. Accused-appellant 197-M-2001 and 198-M-2001, decreeing as follows:
DECISION
then touched her breasts and kissed her. Accused-appellant remained on top WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: of her for half an hour.10 beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, and hereby sentences him
This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.- AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the rape incidents. to suffer:
H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 which affirmed the Decision 2 of the Upon learning of the same, BBB did not believe AAA and whipped her. 11 (a) In Crim. Case No. 197-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant
and Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001 dated January 23, 2006. During cross-examination, the defense, in trying to establish the character and
chastity of AAA, asked AAA about an alleged sexual intercourse between her in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in and the now deceased CCC. AAA affirmed her statement in her affidavit that (b) In Crim. Case No. 198-M-01, the penalty of DEATH. The
separate Informations both dated December 21, 2000. The Informations read CCC took advantage (pinagsamantalahan) of her when he was still alive. This accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant
as follows: allegedly happened five times, the first of which was when she was only seven in the amount of ₱50,000.00.20
years old.12 Answering a query from the court, AAA testified that she was
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 197-M-2001 currently in the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development The RTC observed that AAA was in the custody of the DSWD when she
That on or about the 29th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, (DSWD).13 testified for the prosecution, and was returned to the family of the accused-
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable appellant after her original testimony. It was during the time when she was
The prosecution was supposed to present medico-legal officer Dr. Ivan Richard back in the custody of the accused-appellant’s family that she recanted her
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and Viray as its second witness. However, the latter’s testimony was dispensed
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd testimony for the prosecution. According to the RTC, it is clear that she had no
with upon the stipulation of the parties on the fact of examination of AAA by Dr. other place to go to as she was completely orphaned and was dependent on
designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA],3 14 years old, against the latter’s will Viray on September 5, 2000, and the contents of the examination
and consent.4 the family of the accused, and it was understandable that she may have
report,14 which includes the finding that AAA was in a "non-virgin state." recanted in order to remain in the good graces of the accused-appellant’s
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 198-M-2001 When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year family.21
That on or about the 17th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Bocaue, later, it also presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the As regards the defense of accused-appellant that he was suffering from mental
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable prosecution. This time, she testified that the sexual encounters between her retardation, the RTC noted that the psychological examination of accused-
Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with force and and the accused-appellant were consensual. She fabricated the charge of rape appellant was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd against the accused-appellant because she was supposedly angry with him. complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the
designs, have carnal knowledge of [AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s will She also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who investigated psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological
and consent.5 the incident to say that the accused-appellant used a knife. She also testified condition at the time of the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-
that she was raped by her father CCC when she was seven years old. She was appellant was of such mental state at the time of the incidents, the psychologist
Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was no longer angry testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from wrong. 22
on both counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. with accused-appellant.15
On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of
Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand for the prosecution. AAA On cross-examination, AAA clarified that she fabricated the charge of rape the RTC, except with a modification on the penalty in view of the enactment of
was born on April 13, 1986. According to her late-registered birth certificate, because she was angry with the accused-appellant for making her do laundry Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty. The
her parents are BBB (mother) and CCC (father). AAA, however, testified that work for him. However, when asked if she "consented and voluntarily dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
BBB and CCC are not her biological parents, as she was only adopted when submitted" herself to the accused-appellant when she had sexual intercourse
she was very young.6CCC died in December 1999.7 with him, she answered in the negative. She had been released from the WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional
custody of the DSWD and was alone by herself for some time, but she now Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13, dated 23 January 2006, is
In April 2000, AAA arrived from the province and settled in the house of her AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the penalty imposed and damages
lives with the family of accused-appellant. 16
brother DDD (son of BBB and CCC) and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue, awarded. Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and accused- On redirect examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant did not force perpetua without eligibility for parole, in each of the two (2) counts of rape. He
appellant Aniceto Bulagao, and her younger sister, then six-year-old FFF (who himself upon her. She affirmed that accused-appellant had a little defect in his is further directed to pay private complainant the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
were also the children of BBB and CCC).8 mind. On re-cross examination, AAA testified that accused-appellant was not damages, for each count of rape, in addition to the civil indemnity awarded by
her sweetheart.17 the court a quo.23
On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room
which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma, a clinical psychologist. Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal. Both parties
enter the room. She recognized the accused-appellant as the intruder, and saw She conducted a mental examination on accused-appellant on September 12, manifested that they are waiving their rights to file a supplemental brief, as the
that he was holding a knife. Accused-appellant poked the knife at AAA’s neck, 2002, and found that accused-appellant was suffering from mental retardation same would only contain a reiteration of the arguments presented in their
causing her to freeze in fear. Accused-appellant removed AAA’s clothes, and as he had an IQ of below 50.18 appellant’s and appellee’s briefs.24
then his own. Both AAA and accused-appellant were wearing t-shirt and shorts
before the undressing. Accused-appellant kissed her neck and inserted his Accused-appellant, who was 40 years old when he testified on June 15, 2005, In seeking to overturn his conviction, accused-appellant asserted that the
penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but accused-appellant did claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they prosecution evidence was insufficient, particularly in view of AAA’s withdrawal
not stop and continued raping AAA for one hour.9 ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He of her original testimony.
denied pointing a knife at AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was
We have recently held that "[c]ourts look with disfavor upon retractions, witness. Still, the trial court found that the private complainant’s testimony for A: Yes, sir.
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for the prosecution was the one that was worthy of belief.
monetary considerations. Hence, a retraction does not necessarily negate an Q: And the person[s] who are now taking care of you are giving you shelter and
earlier declaration. They are generally unreliable and looked upon with However, even if we disregard the elusive and incommunicable evidence of the everyday foods [sic] from the family of the accused, is that correct?
considerable disfavor by the courts. Moreover, it would be a dangerous rule to witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, it is clear to this Court
which of the narrations of AAA was sincere and which was concocted. AAA’s A: Yes, sir.
reject the testimony taken before a court of justice, simply because the witness
who has given it later on changes his mind for one reason or another." 25 We testimony for the prosecution, which was taken when she was in the custody of xxxx
have, in the past, also declared that the recantation, even of a lone eyewitness, the DSWD, was clear, candid, and bereft of material discrepancies. All
does not necessarily render the prosecution’s evidence inconclusive. 26 In the accused-appellant can harp on in his appellant’s brief was AAA’s failure to Q: Ms. Witness, if ever the case of Aniceto will be dismissed because you
often-cited Molina v. People,27 we specified how a recanted testimony should recall the length of the knife used in the assaults, a minor and insignificant testify today[, would] you admit for a fact that he [was] also staying in the house
be examined: detail not material to the elements of the crime of rape. She remained steadfast where you are staying now?
on cross-examination even as defense counsel tried to discredit her by bringing
Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the up her dark past of being sexually molested by the accused-appellant’s father A: No, sir.
original testimony if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous when she was seven years old. This is in stark contrast to her testimony for the Q: Where will he stay?
testimony is retracted and a subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony is defense, where AAA, now living with accused-appellant’s family, claimed that
made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is one she fabricated a revolting tale of rape simply because accused-appellant made A: In Mindanao, sir.
of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A her do laundry. AAA’s recantation even contradicts the testimony of accused-
Q: Because that was one of the promise or commitment of the family of the
testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded appellant himself. While AAA claims in her retraction that she had consensual
accused, is it not?
lightly, and before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the sex with her brother, accused-appellant testified that they merely kissed and
subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the that AAA’s purported motive for the rape charges was monetary. A: No, sir.
circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed. x x As furthermore observed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the Q: And how did you know he will stay in Mindanao?
x.28 (Emphases supplied.) cross-examination of AAA as a defense witness revealed that it was taken at a
time when AAA had nowhere to go and was forced to stay with the family of A: Because my other Kuya will not allow him to stay in the house, sir.
These rules find applicability even in rape cases, where the complainant is accused-appellant and upon a reliance on the family’s implied commitment to
Q: Because your other Kuya does not like Aniceto Bulagao to do the things that
usually the lone eyewitness. Thus, in People v. Sumingwa, 29 where the rape send accused-appellant to Mindanao:
you have complaint [sic] against him, is it not?
victim later disavowed her testimony that she was raped by her father, this
Court held: PROS. JOSON:
A: Yes, sir.
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often Q: Where are you staying at present?
Q: And what you are "isinusumbong" is the case today against him, is it not?
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. By A: In our house, sir.
the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the victim A: Yes, sir.31
is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward Q: And your house where you were staying is the house of the parents of the
Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial
and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith accused?
court that he was suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree
and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent
A: Yes, sir. with the finding of the trial court that there was no proof that the mental
and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may
condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he was examined by
be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a Q: And you don’t have any relatives where you can go and stay except from Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone
prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. that house? who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is it with clear and convincing evidence. 32 Besides, this Court observes that
A: None, sir.
exceedingly unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation neither the acts of the accused-appellant proven before the court, nor his
may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through Q: Where [are] your parents? answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of intelligence or free
intimidation or monetary consideration. Like any other testimony, it is subject to will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason
A: I do not know, sir. or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the
the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and, especially, on
the demeanor of the witness on the stand. 30 Q: Are they all dead or still alive? crime.33 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of
the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
In the case at bar, the determination by the trial court of the credibility of AAA’s A: They are deceased, sir. considered.34
accusation and recantation is facilitated by the fact that her recantation was
made in open court, by testifying for the defense. Unlike in cases where Q: All? As previously stated, the RTC imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of
recantations were made in affidavits, the trial court in this case had the death for each count of rape. The Court of Appeals modified the penalty to
A: Both are deceased, sir. reclusion perpetua in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346. It should
opportunity to see the demeanor of AAA not only when she narrated the sordid
details of the alleged rape by her "adoptive" brother, but also when she claimed Q: Do you mean to say that do you have full blood brother and sister? be noted at this point that while Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition
that she made up her previous rape charges out of anger. As such, it is difficult of death penalty, the presence of a qualifying circumstance which would have
to overlook the fact that the trial court convicted accused-appellant even after A: They all separated, sir. warranted the imposition of the death penalty would still cause the award of
examining the young witness as she made a complete turnaround and moral damages and civil indemnity to be increased each from Fifty Thousand
Q: Do you know where they were living? Pesos (₱50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) under
admitted to perjury. The legal adage that the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses thus finds an entirely new significance in this A: No, sir. prevailing jurisprudence. 35
case where AAA was subjected to grueling cross examinations, redirect
Q: From the time you were released from the DSWD you are alone by In the case at bar, both Informations charge a crime of rape qualified by the
examinations, and re-cross examinations both as a prosecution and defense
yourself? use of a deadly weapon. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A when committed with the use
of a deadly weapon is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. This crime
was proven as charged in Crim. Case No. 198-M-2001, which was alleged to
have occurred on June 17, 2000. Since no other qualifying or aggravating
circumstance was alleged in the Information, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.1awphil
On the other hand, while AAA had testified that the accused-appellant used a
knife on June 17, 2000, she said that she hid said knife before June 29, 2000,
the date of Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001. 36 As such, the crime that was proven
in Crim. Case No. 197-M-2001 is simple rape not qualified by any circumstance
affecting criminal liability. However, simple rape is also punishable by reclusion
perpetua under Article 266-B.
In both cases, since the death penalty would not have been imposed even
without the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, this Court affirms the award of
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00, as well as moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00, both for each count of rape. 37 In addition, we have held
that since exemplary damages are corrective in nature, the same can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also
where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. 38This Court believes that the conduct of
accused-appellant herein, who raped her minor adoptive sister twice, falls
under this category and is therefore liable for exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 for each count of rape, in line with existing
jurisprudence. 39
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01955 dated April 14, 2008 finding accused-appellant
Aniceto Bulagao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, for each count of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Accused-appellant Aniceto Bulagao is hereby ordered to pay
AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape, in addition to the amounts awarded by the Court of
Appeals, namely: civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and
moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, both for each count
of rape; and
2) All damages awarded in this case should be imposed with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184528               April 25, 2012 Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is intended to
to have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance that the ward
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,  his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves
vs. Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent. Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence. responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.11
DECISION In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo granted the (respondent’s) In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
Evidence dated July 23, 2006.5 (Citations omitted.)
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who,
Civil Procedure of the Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the The trial court granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other
Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both rendered by the Court of Appeals September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which reads: similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA." without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient placed under guardianship. The full text of the said provision reads:
The Court of Appeals’ issuances affirmed the Order 3 dated September 27, evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his
2006 and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word
Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016, Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6 "incompetent" includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who
which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesa’s petition for guardianship over the are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and
properties of his father, respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and denied Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the trial court in an write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively. Order dated November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of which states: and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed Decision, follow: WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record shows that petitioner-movant mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of
has failed to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs deceit and exploitation.
Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be and to administer his properties, the Court hereby affirms its earlier Order
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be
dated 27 September 2006. anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." 12 We consider that
Oropesa. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and raffled off to
Branch 260. Accordingly, petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
merit.7 In support of his contention that respondent is incompetent and, therefore,
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been
afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his should be placed in guardianship, petitioner raises in his Memorandum 13 the
already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his appeal was dismissed through the now assailed Decision dated February 29, following factual matters:
judgment and memory [were] impaired and such has been evident after his 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads: a. Respondent has been afflicted with several maladies and has
hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to been sickly for over ten (10) years already;
have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, assailed orders of the court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and November b. During the time that respondent was hospitalized at the St.
without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8 Luke’s Medical Center after his stroke, he purportedly requested
for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by the one of his former colleagues who was visiting him to file a loan
Agamata, his girlfriend. Court of Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated September 16, application with the Armed Forces of the Philippines Savings and
2008. Hence, the instant petition was filed. Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills,
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding judge of the court a quo set when, as far as his children knew, he had substantial amounts of
the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social Petitioner submits the following question for consideration by this Court: money in various banks sufficient to cover his medical expenses;
case study and submit a report thereon.
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN "INCOMPETENT" PERSON c. Respondent’s residence allegedly has been left dilapidated due
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court Social Worker conducted her AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT to lack of care and management;
social case study, interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses. The Court WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER GUARDIANSHIP 9
Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding on the d. The realty taxes for respondent’s various properties remain
(respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker. After considering the evidence and pleadings on record, we find the petition to unpaid and therefore petitioner and his sister were supposedly
be without merit. compelled to pay the necessary taxes;
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for
guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Supplemental Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that the assailed rulings of the Court e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to sell his Nissan
Opposition. of Appeals should be set aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible Exalta car for the reason that the former would be purchasing
error when it affirmed the erroneous decision of the trial court which another vehicle, but when the car had been sold, respondent did
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his purportedly disregarded the overwhelming evidence presented by him showing not procure another vehicle and refused to account for the money
testimony, and that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the respondent’s incompetence. earned from the sale of the old car;
(respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the nature and purpose of f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from a joint account
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, guardianship in the following wise: under his name and his daughter’s without the latter’s knowledge
2006 resting his case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of or consent;
evidence. A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one
person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law
regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is designed
 g. There was purportedly one occasion where respondent took a In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
kitchen knife to stab himself upon the "orders" of his girlfriend proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity assailed Decision dated February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
during one of their fights; of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s AFFIRMED.
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend to ransack his state of mental sanity will suffice."18
house of groceries and furniture, despite protests from his SO ORDERED.
children.14 Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that
lack of material evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner’s own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and,
petitioner did not present any relevant documentary or testimonial evidence likewise, the trial court made known its own observation of respondent’s
that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that respondent is incompetent physical and mental state, to wit:
largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition. In fact,
respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states
proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical
his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of capacity to manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositor’s evidence
Neuropsychological Screening," 15 were quoted by respondent in his includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen.
Memorandum16 to illustrate that said report in fact favored respondent’s claim of Oropesa, (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were
competence, to wit: tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to
problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning
participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp,
responses on many of the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his alert and able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
articulation was generally comprehensible. x x x.
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a
xxxx petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts." 20 We
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the domains that only take cognizance of questions of fact in certain exceptional
were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations and keep circumstances;21 however, we find them to be absent in the instant case. It is
track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo- also long settled that "factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings by
Likewise, he was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect, and are deemed final
Drawing Test. x x x. and conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record." 22 We
therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower court and the Court of Appeals
xxxx and rule that the grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence was proper under
the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar.
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest
effective solutions to problem situations. x x x.17 Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the
proof of his father’s incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the
himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father’s real and ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver (who admitted to be If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion
acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include any is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed
expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of to have waived the right to present evidence.
petitioner’s cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to
evidence that was filed by respondent. A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
Even if we were to overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse in failing to make a insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain
formal offer of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of the issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to evidence "authorizes a
certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father’s and his judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit
sister’s names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence
of real estate taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not in any way shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought."24 1âwphi1
relate to his father’s alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of There was no error on the part of the trial court when it dismissed the petition
Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for for guardianship without first requiring respondent to present his evidence
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. precisely because the effect of granting a demurrer to evidence other than
In any event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for dismissing a cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a defendant from
although the report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part presenting his evidence since, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that shown no right to relief.
respondent on the average was indeed competent.
G.R. No. 166803               October 11, 2012 After learning of the death of Jacinto, respondent claimed from petitioners the In a Decision dated February 12, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, after hearing,
payment of death compensation in the amount of US$50,000.00 and burial dismissed the case for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter held that, while it is true
CREWLINK, INC. and/or GULF MARINE SERVICES, Petitioners,  expenses in the amount of US$1,000.00, as well as additional death that Jacinto Teringtering died during the effectivity of his contract of
vs. compensation in the amount of US$7,000.00, for the minor Eimaereach Rose employment and that he died of asphyxiation, nevertheless, his death was the
EDITHA TERINGTERING, for her behalf and in behalf of minor EIMAEREACH de Gracia Teringtering but was refused without any valid cause. Hence, a result of his deliberate or intentional jumping into the sea. Thus, his death was
ROSE DE GARCIA TERINGTERING, Respondents. complaint was filed against the petitioners. directly attributable to him.
DECISION Respondent claimed that in order for her husband's death to be compensable it Teringtering then appealed before the NLRC which affirmed in toto the ruling of
PERALTA, J.: is enough that he died during the term of his contract and while still on board. the Labor Arbiter.
Respondent asserted that Jacinto was suffering from a psychotic disorder, or
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Mood Disorder Bipolar Type, which resulted to his jumping into the sea and his Unsatisfied, Teringtering filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
seeking the reversal of the Decision 1dated July H, 2004 and Resolution 2 dated eventual death. Respondent further asserted that her husband’s death was not Court of Appeals and sought the nullification of the NLRC Resolution, dated
January 17, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, deliberate and not of his own will, but was a result of a mental disorder, thus, February 20, 2003, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated February
setting aside the Resolutions dated February 20, 2003 3 and July 31, 20034 of compensable. 12, 2002.
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed in toto the On July 8, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed Resolution of the
Decision5 dated February 12, 2002 of the Labor Arbiter. For its part, petitioner Crewlink alleged that sometime on April 9, 2001, around
8:20 p.m. while at Nasr Oilfield, the late Jacinto Teringtering suddenly jumped NLRC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows: into the sea, but the second engineer was able to recover him. Because of said WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated February 20, 2003
incident, one personnel was directed to watch Jacinto. is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Crewlink, Inc. and Gulf
Respondent Editha Teringtering (Teringtering), spouse of deceased Jacinto
Teringtering (Jacinto), and in behalf of her minor child, filed a complaint against However, around 10:30 p.m., while the boat dropped anchor south of Nasr Marine Services are hereby DECLARED jointly and severally liable and,
petitioner Crewlink, Inc. (Crewlink), and its foreign principal Gulf Marine Oilfield and went on standby, Jacinto jumped off the boat again. Around 11:00 accordingly, are directed to pay deceased Jacinto Teringtering's beneficiaries,
Services for the payment of death benefits, benefit for minor child, burial p.m., the A/B watchman reported that Jacinto was recovered but despite efforts namely respondent Editha Teringtering and her daughter Eimaereach Rose de
assistance, damages and attorney's fees. to revive him, he was already dead from drowning. Gracia, the Philippine Currency equivalent to US$50,000.00, and an additional
amount of US$7,000, both at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of
Respondent alleged that her husband Jacinto entered into an overseas Petitioner asserted that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits being payment.
employment contract with Crewlink, Inc. for and in behalf of its foreign principal claimed, because Jacinto committed suicide. Despite the non-entitlement,
Gulf Marine Services, the details of which are as follows: however, Teringtering was even given burial assistance in the amount of SO ORDERED.7
P35,800.00 and P13,273.00 on May 21, 2001. She likewise received the Thus, before this Court, Crewlink, Inc. and/or Gulf Marine Services, as
Duration of Contract : 12 months amount of US$792.51 representing donations from the GMS staff and crew. petitioner, raised the following issues:
Petitioner likewise argued that Teringtering is not entitled to moral and
exemplary damages, because petitioner had nothing to do with her late I
Position : Oiler
husband's untimely demise as the same was due to his own doing.
WHETHER A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI
Basic Monthly Salary : US $385.00 As part of the record, respondent submitted Ship Captain Oscar C. Morado's INCLUDES CORRECTION OF THE NLRC'S EVALUATION OF
report on the incident, which we quote: THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL FINDINGS BASED THEREON
OR CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF FACTS IN THE JUDGMENT
Hours of Work : 48 hrs/wk At arround 2000 hrs. M/V Raja 3404 still underway to Nasr Complex w/ 1 OF THE NLRC;
passenger. 2018 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding to drop 1 passenger At
2020 hrs. Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering suddenly jump to the sea, while the boat II
Overtime : US $115.50 cast off from Nasr Complex boatlanding. And the second Engr. Mr. Sudarto
jump and recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering the oiler. WHETHER THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF SUPPOSEDLY FAILING
TO TAKE SUCH MEASURES FOR THE COMFORT AND
Vacation Leave with pay : 1 mo. leave after
2040 hrs. Dropped anchor south of Nasr oilfield and standby. And that time SAFETY OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER, AMONG OTHERS,
12 months
informed to GMS personnel about the accident, And we informed to A/B on WHICH WERE ESPECIALLY EMPHASIZED IN THE ASSAILED
duty to watch Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2230 hrs. The A/B watch man CA DECISION AND WHICH ACTUALLY REFERRED TO ACTS
Point of Hire : Manila, Philippines informed that Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering jump again to the sea. And that time COMMITTED BY THE SHIPMATES OF THE DECEASED, BUT
the wind NW 10-14 kts. and strong current. And the second Engr. jump to the POSITIVELY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONERS AND FOR WHICH
xxxx sea with life ring to recover Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering. 2300 hrs. We recovered THE LATTER ARE NOW BEING HELD LIABLE – ARE IN THE
Mr. Jacinto Tering Tering onboard the vessel and apply Respiration Kiss of life NATURE OF AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SOURCE OF
Teringtering claimed that before her husband was employed, he was subjected Mouth to Mouth, And proceed to Nasr Complex to take doctor. OBLIGATION THAT IS PREDICATED ON QUASI-DELICT OR
to a pre-employment medical examination wherein he was pronounced as "fit TORT AS PROVIDED UNDER OUR CIVIL LAWS AND, THUS,
to work." Thus, her husband joined his vessel of assignment and performed his 2320 hrs. A/side Nasr Complex boatlanding and the doctor on-board to check HAS NO REFERENCE TO OUR LABOR CODE;
duties as Oiler. the patient. 2330 hrs. As per Nasr Complex Doctor the patient was already
dead. Then informed to GMS personnel about the accident. III
On or about April 18, 2001, a death certificate was issued by the Ministry of
Health of the United Arab Emirates wherein it was stated that Jacinto died on I Captain Oscar C. Morado certify this report true and correct with the best of WHETHER THE DEATH OF SEAFARER IN THIS CASE WAS A
April 9, 2001 due to asphyxia of drowning. Later on, an embalming and sealing my knowledge and reserve the right, modify, ratify and/or enlarge this RESULT OF A DELIBERATE/WILLFUL ACT ON HIS OWN LIFE,
certificate was issued after which the remains of Jacinto was brought back to statement at any time and place, According to the law.6 AN ACT DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DECEASED, AND
the Philippines. NO OTHER, AS FOUND AND SO RULED BY THE LABOR
 ARBITER AND NLRC, AS TO RENDER HIS DEATH NOT Indeed, in order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should
COMPENSABLE. occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. The death of a seaman
during the term of employment makes the employer liable to his heirs for death
Petitioner claimed that Jacinto's death is not compensable, considering that the compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute. The employer may
latter's death resulted from his willful act. It argued that the rule that the be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was
employer becomes liable once it is established that the seaman died during the caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.
effectivity of his employment contract is not absolute. The employer may be
exempt from liability if he can successfully prove that the seaman's death was In the instant case, petitioner was able to substantially prove that Jacinto's
caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act, as in this death was attributable to his deliberate act of killing himself by jumping into the
case. sea. Meanwhile, respondent, other than her bare allegation that her husband
was suffering from a mental disorder, no evidence, witness, or any medical
We find merit in the petition. report was given to support her claim of Jacinto's insanity. The record does not
In a petition for review on certiorari, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors even show when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start. Homesickness and/or
of law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of family problems may result to depression, but the same does not necessarily
are devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. We are not a equate to mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact; for
trier of facts, and this applies with greater force in labor cases. Findings of fact insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the usual means of proof.
of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired As no man would know what goes on in the mind of another, the state or
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally condition of a person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior.
accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion testimony which may
Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the person claimed to
clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the be insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person was insane
evidence on record. This case is no different. based on the witness’ own perception of the person, or who is qualified as an
expert, such as a psychiatrist.8 No such evidence was presented to support
As found by the Labor Arbiter, Jacinto's jumping into the sea was not an respondent's claim.
accident but was deliberately done. Indeed, Jacinto jumped off twice into the
sea and it was on his second attempt that caused his death. The accident The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent substantial evidence
report of Captain Oscar Morado narrated in detail the circumstances that led to from which reasonable basis for the grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn,
Jacinto's death. The circumstances of Jacinto's actions before and at the time the Court is left with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be
of his death were likewise entered in the Chief Officer's Log Book and were caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true that labor contracts
attested to by Captain Morado before the Philippine Embassy. Even the A/B are impressed with public interest and the provisions of the POEA-SEC must
personnel, Ronald Arroga, who was tasked to watch over Jacinto after his first be construed logically and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of
attempt of committing suicide, testified that despite his efforts to prevent their employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is that justice is in
Jacinto from jumping again overboard, Jacinto was determined and even every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of established
shoved him and jumped anew which eventually caused his death. facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. 9

Considering the foregoing, we do not find any reason to discredit the evidence WHEREFORE, the petition Is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
presented as well as the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Settled is the rule that in CA-G.R. SP No. 79966, dated July 8, 2004, and its January 17, 2005
factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but ASIDE. The February 20, 2003 and July 31, 2003 Resolutions of the National
even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR OFW Case No. (M) 01-06-1144-
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as 00, affirming the February 12, 2002 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, are hereby
adequate to justify a conclusion. More so, when there is no showing that said REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. SO ORDERED.
Likewise, the provisions of the Code of Commerce are certainly inapplicable in
this case. For precisely, the issue for resolution here is the obligation of the
employer to its employee should the latter die during the term of his
employment. The relationship between the petitioner and Jacinto is one based
on contract of employment and not one of contract of carriage.
Under No. 6, Section C, Part II of the POEA "Standard Employment Contract
Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On-Board Ocean-Going
Vessels" (POEA-SEC), it is provided that:
xxxx
6. No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman,
provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity,
disability or death is directly attributable to him. (Emphasis ours)
.R. No. 188978               June 13, 2012 his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ. She Dr. Filio, an Assistant City Health Officer in Iriga City who conducted a physical
resisted the Accused-Appellant’s ravage acts by kicking him several times, but examination on AAA, testified in fine that he did not find any laceration on the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee,  was overcome with fear because he had a knife about five (5) inches long. victim’s vagina or seminal fluid inside it.
vs. After an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00 o’clock in the same evening, the
MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA, Accused-Appellant. Accused-Appellant again raped her by undressing her and inserting his penis Finally, Carlos Bayrante, an uncle of the Accused-Appellant, corroborated
into her vagina. Again, she felt pain in her vagina. Thereafter, the Accused- BBB’s testimony that at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of February 20,
DECISION 2002, they saw AAA and the Accused-Appellant together. He wondered why
Appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: the two (2) were together, but he did not bother to ask anyway.
AAA also testified, among others, that the Accused-Appellant took her away
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ Decision 1 dated November 11, from their house in one (1) evening of February 2002 when her parents were The Version of the Defense:
2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778, entitled People of the Philippines v. then already asleep. They walked the streets and later rode a Palces bus in The Accused-Appellant testified that he and CCC are cousins and that he
Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina, which affirmed with modification the Joint which no other passengers were on board as it was already nighttime. stayed in the house of the latter and his [CCC’s] family since October 2001 to
Judgment2 dated February 7, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, help in lumber-cutting. He denied forcing AAA into a relationship with him and
Camarines Sur, Branch 31 in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 & P-3287. The trial BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open court that the Accused-Appellant, who had
been staying in their house, is AAA’s uncle because the Accused-Appellant added that during his stay with CCC’s family, he courted a female neighbor
court found appellant Marcial Bayrante y Boaquina guilty beyond reasonable with whom AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings for him. He
doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Rape as defined and penalized under and her husband, CCC, are first cousins. Preliminarily, BBB testified that AAA,
who was born on April 16, 1982, attained an educational level of Grade 6 only dissuaded her at first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. become sweethearts. He even consulted a friend for he entertained the idea
because of her low comprehension and that she cannot even be relied upon to
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed November 11, 2008 Decision run errands as she can only follow simple instructions or tasks if well-explained that AAA might actually carry out her threat to commit suicide. Also, on one
of the Court of Appeals, are as follows: to her. AAA is unlike any normal child because she cries and scampers away occasion, AAA went inside his bedroom and suggested that they should leave
when there are visitors around; she has never attended any party, dance the place since her parents will not approve of their relationship.
On April 3, 2000, AAA3 filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pili, events, or any social gathering; and had poor grades in school.
Camarines, two (2) separate complaints against Accused-Appellant Marcial The Accused-Appellant further testified that on or about February 9, 2002, he
Bayrante y Boaquina for the crime of Rape. Finding probable cause that the BBB also testified that the Accused-Appellant disappeared in the evening of and AAA left the house, stopped by at Baao and proceeded to Pili, Camarines
Accused-Appellant may have committed the crimes charged, the Presiding February 14, 2002, together with her daughter, AAA. She and CCC looked for Sur at about 5:00 or 6:00 o’clock the following morning. They first went to his
Judge of the MTC ordered the filing of the appropriate Information(s), to which their whereabouts, but located them only on February 20, 2002, in Poblacion, friend’s house where AAA changed her clothes and, later, to his uncle’s house
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor concurred. Pili, Camarines Sur. When they saw AAA and the Accused-Appellant standing in Minalabac, Camarines Sur, where he left AAA because he had to go back to
near a market, waiting for a ride going to Manapao, Minalabac, Camarines Sur, Baao to get his own clothes. He returned to his uncle’s house in the afternoon
Consequently, on September 4, 2002, two (2) separate Informations were filed they immediately approached and embraced AAA and took her away from the of the same day and stayed there with AAA for five (5) more days. While in
before the RTC charging the Accused-Appellant of two (2) counts of Rape latter. Forthwith, they reported the matter to the Barangay Tanod of the place Manapao, AAA suggested that they go to the office of the Barangay Captain to
under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. whereupon the Accused-Appellant was brought to the police station for execute an affidavit to the effect that AAA’s act of going with him was
8353. The Information in Crim. Case No. P-3286, which was raffled off to Br. questioning. voluntary.
31, reads:
At home, BBB interviewed her daughter as to where the Accused-Appellant The Accused-Appellant further testified that he and AAA went to Old San
That on or about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 19, 2002 at Brgy. Old brought her, to which AAA replied that she was brought to a certain place in Roque when they learned that the latter’s parents were looking for them. They
San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Pili, Camarines Sur, where the Accused-Appellant raped her twice and checked in at El Alma Hotel in Pili, Camarines Sur, where they spent the night
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design using force, threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. Upon learning the and checked out of the following morning on February 20, 2002. In the said
threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously same, she brought AAA to Dr. Pablo B. Filio, Jr. (Dr. Filio) on the following day morning, however, when they went to the house of his cousin, William Rañon
have carnal knowledge with his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old mental retardate for a physical examination and, thereafter, to Dr. Imelda Escuadra (Dr. (Rañon), to pick up their personal belongings, AAA’s parents were there.
whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will, to her damage and Escuadra) for further check-up.
prejudice. Marilyn Mendoza (Mendoza) testified that she personally knows AAA as she
Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist II at the Bicol Medical Center and in charge (Mendoza) was previously introduced to her by the Accused-Appellant. The
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW. of the Women and Children Protection Unit, particularly in the psychiatric next time that she met AAA was sometime on February 12 or 13, 2002 when
evaluation and management of patients, is the one who conducted psychiatric the Accused-Appellant requested if they could stay at her (Mendoza) parent’s
The other Information, which was raffled off to Br. 32 of the RTC and docketed house. She, however, refused to entertain them because her parents will not
as Crim. Case No. P-3287, is similarly worded as to date, place, the elements and psychological tests on AAA. Dr. Escuadra testified that AAA suffers from
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She also diagnosed AAA with mild approve of it. Thus, AAA and the Accused-Appellant stayed there only for a
of the crime charged, and the persons involved, except for the time of the while.
commission of the crime, which is at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of mental retardation because of her intellectual quotient (IQ) of only 55, which
February 19, 2002. meant that her mental age is equivalent to that of nine (9) to ten (10) – year old Rañon, a Barangay Tanod in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, testified that
child. Dr. Escuadra elaborated that the psychiatric tests and psychological tests at about 6:30 in the morning of February 19, 2002, he was in front of the store
As the cases involved the same parties, cause of action, and reliefs sought, a performed on AAA are different from each other because the former refers to of his relative in Old San Roque, Pili, Camarines Sur, when the Accused-
consolidation thereof was decreed. Thereafter, the Accused-Appellant, duly the examination of the patient’s mental capacity while the latter refers to the Appellant arrived together with a woman (referring to AAA). He noticed that
assisted by counsel during the arraignment, pleaded not guilty to both charges. evaluation of the patient’s intelligence quotient. She also averred that AAA was when the Accused-Appellant left some things in the store, the latter’s right arm
After the pre-trial, proceedings on the merits ensued. poor in arithmetic and economics; that it took her some time to answer even was placed on AAA’s shoulder. When he saw them again at about 5:00 o’clock
simple questions; that her answers were short and monosyllabic; and that AAA in the morning of the following day, in front of the public market, the Accused-
The Version of the Prosecution: cooperated during the sessions only when BBB is present. Finally, Dr. Appellant’s right arm was lazing on the woman’s shoulder while the latter were
AAA testified that at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of February 19, 2002, Escuadra testified that AAA disclosed to her the events that transpired during leaning on the Accused-Appellant’s shoulder. At around 7:00 o’clock in the
the Accused-Appellant brought her to Poblacion, Pili, Camarines Sur, the rape incident in February 2002. morning of even date, BBB and her husband CCC approached him and sought
particularly to a house, which she described to have many rooms. Thereat, the his help in apprehending the Accused-Appellant on the allegation that the latter
Accused-Appellant undressed her and himself, laid on top of her, and inserted raped their daughter. As the Accused-Appellant was only about ten (10) to
fifteen (15) meters away from him, he called the former and told him to place The provision of law pertinent in this case is Article 266-A of the Revised Penal A normal mind is one which in strength and capacity ranks reasonably well with
his hands on his head. He then conducted a body search, and thereafter, Code, which states that: the average of the great body of men and women who make up organized
brought him to the police station in Pili, Camarines Sur, for an investigation. human society in general, and are by common consent recognized as sane
The woman, who was with the Accused-Appellant at the time, said that she will Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed – and competent to perform the ordinary duties and assume the ordinary
go with him at the police station because they love each other. 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under responsibilities of life.
Barangay Captain Zenaida Regis (Brgy. Capt. Regis) of Barangay Manapao, any of the following circumstances: The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental
Minalabac, Camarines Sur, testified that on February 19, 2002, the Accused- a. Through force, threat or intimidation; retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual
Appellant, together with AAA, came to her office requesting the preparation of factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b)
an affidavit to the effect that AAA voluntarily went with the Accused-Appellant. b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life
While interviewing AAA, Brgy. Capt. Regis noticed that it took some time for otherwise unconscious; equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child; (c) moron or
AAA to answer the question of whether or not she was forced to go with the feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in
Accused-Appellant. She qualified, however, that AAA finally answered in the c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists
negative.4 (Citations omitted.) of authority; and psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years between 70 to 89. In People v. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape
After due proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. P-3286 and P-3287, the trial court when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a
found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present; "borderline mental deficiency."11
of Rape that were charged against him. We quote the dispositive portion of the
trial court’s Joint Judgment dated February 7, 2007 here: 2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by Medical Specialist II and officer-in-charge of the Women and Children
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered convicting Protection Unit at the Bicol Medical Center who personally conducted the
the accused for TWO (2) Counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established that the victim is afflicted with mild
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each count. To pay [AAA] the amount mental retardation. She further testified that AAA was also suffering from post
of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity person. (Emphasis supplied.)
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55 with a
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count, or in the total amount It is settled in jurisprudence that, under the foregoing provision of law, carnal mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-year-old person. 12
of ₱250,000.00. knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape because
such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. 8 In a recent In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadra’s testimony, appellant argued that Dr.
With cost de oficio.5 Escuadra admitted that the psychological test result was only furnished to her
case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim suffering from
Unperturbed, appellant elevated his case to the Court of Appeals but the trial mental retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being by the psychologist who conducted AAA’s psychological exam and that the
court’s ruling was merely affirmed with modification by the appellate court in its sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual congress between the said psychologist was not presented in court. 13 We find this argument
Decision dated November 11, 2008. The appellate court disallowed the award accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.9 unmeritorious. What was clear from Dr. Escuadra’s testimony was that her
of exemplary damages for the reason that the same may be awarded only psychiatric evaluation yielded the same diagnosis as the psychological
when one or more aggravating circumstances exist and that no such Previously in People v. Dalandas, 10 we described in detail the nature of mental examination with respect to the victim’s mental retardation. 14 The presentation
circumstance is present in the case at bar. The dispositive portion of the retardation as well as its different degrees as defined in the modern and the old of the psychologist who conducted the psychological examination could be
appellate court’s Decision reads: intelligence quotient (IQ) scales: dispensed with as the same would have merely been corroborative.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the determination of mental
amount of Twenty[-]Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) as exemplary and characterized by impaired intellectual functioning measured by retardation is deeply rooted in medical psychology, we had previously ruled
damages is DELETED. No costs.6 standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily that evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can prove mental
demands of the individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardation or abnormality. 15 Furthermore, we held that mental retardation can
Thus, appellant interposed this appeal before this Court. He merely adopted retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as be proved by evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as the
his Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals and no longer filed a well as impaired learning capacity. testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the trial court. 16 We find no
supplemental brief on the belief that the Appellant’s Brief had adequately error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it likewise gave weight to the
discussed all matters that are pertinent to his defense. 1awp++i1 In the present Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental testimony of BBB (AAA’s mother) regarding AAA’s difficulties in school due to
appeal, he put forth a single assignment of error: deficiency," the latter term is usually reserved for those without recognizable low comprehension and failure to complete even simple chores.17
brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level of
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- intellectual function are illustrated, thus: Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the mental retardation of
APPELLANT WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND the victim was not proven, we likewise uphold the appellate court in finding that
REASONABLE DOUBT.7 Mental Retardation AAA’s testimony adequately showed how appellant utilized force and
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT intimidation to succeed in having carnal knowledge with her. AAA testified that
In his Brief, appellant maintains that AAA was his lover and that she voluntarily she initially resisted appellant’s carnal desire but was eventually overcome by
eloped with him as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before Brgy. Capt. (IQ RANGE) the latter because he used a knife to threaten her. At one point in her
Regis. Furthermore, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish testimony, AAA could not continue with her narration of the events that
the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped a woman I Profound Below 20
transpired during the alleged rape incidents as she was overwhelmed by
who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived of reason. In other words, he emotion, even weeping on the witness stand. Consequently, it was necessary
II Severe 20-35
asserts that the prosecution was not able to prove that AAA suffers from for the trial court to call a recess in order to give AAA the chance to collect
mental retardation. For these reasons, appellant urges this Court to exculpate III Moderate 36-52 herself. These were evident in the following excerpts from the court transcript:
him from guilt.
IV Mild 53-68 Pros. Solano:
We are not persuaded.
Q – Miss Witness, sometime on February 19, 2002 at about 8:00 o’clock in the Pros. Solano: A – Many times, your honor.
evening do you recall where were you? Q – Miss witness, you testified that accused undressed you and after he xxxx
A – I was at Centro Pili, sir. undressed you he also undressed himself, what happened next, if any? Court:
Q – You are referring to Pili, Camarines Sur? A – He inserted his penis to my vagina. Q – You said that you were raped, do you recall where was that house
A – Yes, sir. Q – So what did you feel, if any? where… you were brought by the accused located?
Q – Particularly where in Pili, Camarines Sur were you at that time? A – I felt painful. A – There at Pili, Camarines Sur.
A – In the house. Q – Now, at about 10:00 o’clock of the same night, February 19, 2002, where Q – Do you know who owns that house?
Q – Why were you in that house located at Pili, Camarines Sur on that were you at that time? A – No, your honor.
particular date and time? A – I was still at the house, sir. Q – Can you describe that house?
A – I was brought there by Marcial. Q – Tell us what happened, if any? A – Plenty of rooms, your honor.
Q – When you said Marcial you are referring to Marcial the accused in these A – Again, I was undressed by accused. Q – Does it has name?
two (2) cases? Q – After you were undressed again by the accused as you said, what else A – I was not able to see, your honor.
A – Yes, sir. happened, if any? Q – And you said you bore a child that died right after you gave birth tell us the
Q – By the way, have you gone to El Alma Hotel? A – Again he inserted his penis to my vagina. father of your child?
Atty. Obias: Q – Again, what did you feel? A – (At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man who when asked his
No basis, your honor. A – It was painful, sir. name responded as Marcial Bayrante.)18
Pros. Solano: Q – If you can estimate the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina on In People v. Manjares,19 we reiterated the basic principles that:
Preliminary, your honor. February 19, 2002 at Pili, Camarines Sur as you can estimate these two (2)
Court: insertion was made by the accused? In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of
Reform. A – (No answer.) the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
Pros. Solano: Q – Now, after the accused inserted his penis to your vagina at 8:00 o’clock on human nature and the normal course of things, as in this case. There is a
Q – As you were there as you said tell us what happened? February 19, 2002 in that house, what happened as you said was painful? plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding
A – I was undressed. A – I got pregnant, sir. that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all
Q – By whom? Q – And what happened to your pregnancy? that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her
A – By Marcial, sir. A – And so I gave birth to a baby girl. testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the
Q – After you were undressed by Marcial, tell us what happened? Q – Do you know the name? basis thereof. x x x.
A – He got on top of me, sir. A – Yes sir, Jose. That the victim suffers from a mental abnormality or deficiency would not
Q – After Marcial Bayrante got on top of you as you said tell us what happened Court: detract from the reliability of her testimony. We observed in a similar case that:
next? Q – Where is now the child?
Pros. Solano: A – He died. While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental retardate may be
I will withdraw that question. Q – When did your child died? difficult to determine, still, it can be ascertained by deducing from the manner
Pros. Solano: A – Right after my delivery, your honor. she testifies in court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed. For as
Q – What happened to Marcial Bayrante when you were already undressed, Court: long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and unflawed by
what did he do, if any? Continue. inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, and her demeanor is
A – He also undressed himself, sir. Pros. Solano: consistent with one who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with
Q – After Marcial Bayrante undressed himself as you said, what next Q – Do you have any death certificate? the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience, thus, must be given full
happened? A – Yes sir, I have. (At this juncture, the witness is producing her birth faith and credit.
A – (At this juncture, the witness is crying.) certificate.)
Court: Q – And so, as far as you can recall miss witness during these two (2) Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally
Q – Why are you crying? incidents that the penis of the accused inserted to your vagina, did you not retarded [person] may be a credible witness. The acceptance of her testimony
A – Because I remembered what he did to me, your honor. resist? depends on the quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make them
Q – And so tell us what did he do to you, the accused in this case? A – Yes, sir. known to the court.20
A – (No answer.) Q – And what happened to your resistance? In People v. Arpon, 21 we discussed the jurisprudential principle of affording
Court: A – I was afraid. great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
Continue. Q – Why were you afraid? of witnesses:
Pros. Solano: A – Because he had with him a knife.
Q – You testified earlier that you were undressed by the accused and he Q – What kind of knife, how long was it? Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the
himself undressed also and so what happened to his penis and your vagina, if A – (At this juncture, the witness is demonstrating the length of the knife which credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial court's
any? is about five (5) inches long including the handle.) observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded
A – (No answer.) Court: finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment
Atty. Obias: Q – You said that you resisted how did you resist? and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame,
Maybe, your honor we can suspend the proceedings. A – (No answer.) hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
Court: Q – You said that when the accused inserted his penis to your vagina, how realization of an oath" are all useful aids for an accurate determination of a
To give the private complainant witness to regain composure as she is crying were you resisted? witness' honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine
and cannot answer to the question of the public prosecutor, the hearing is A – I was kicking at him, your honor. if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting
suspended for ten (10) minutes after which we will resume the hearing of the Q – Was he hit when you kicked him? testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
same. A – Yes, your honor. which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
Hearing resumed at 10:00 in the morning. Q – How many times did you kick him? respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an propriety of the award of exemplary damages but increased the same from
even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the [Court Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos
of Appeals].22 (₱30,000.00).31
We further agree with the Court of Appeals that AAA’s emotional outburst on WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 11, 2008
the witness stand strengthens the trustworthiness of her testimony. According of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02778 is
to jurisprudence, the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
credibility of the rape charge with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience.23 (1) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is ordered to pay Thirty Thousand
Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages for each count of
In a seemingly desperate effort to secure an acquittal, appellant maintains that SIMPLE RAPE, and
the alleged rape could not have occurred because both he and AAA were
lovers. In other words, he proffers the "sweetheart theory" as a defense but his (2) Appellant Marcial Bayrante is further ordered to pay the private
assertion is bereft of substantial proof. The appellate court did not err in finding offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of
that the testimony of the witnesses presented by appellant utterly failed to six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
satisfactorily prove the alleged romantic relationship. judgment.

Witness Marilyn Mendoza’s testimony revealed that it was only appellant who No pronouncement as to costs.
claimed that AAA was his sweetheart and that AAA never spoke to her much SO ORDERED.
less told her that both she and appellant were romantically involved with each
other.24 Likewise, witness William Rañon’s testimony is afflicted with the same
infirmity. He merely averred that he saw appellant’s arm on AAA’s shoulder
and from that fact assumed that they had a relationship. Still he admitted in
open court that he had no personal knowledge of the purported love affair
between appellant and AAA.25
Neither could the purported affidavit signed by AAA before Brgy. Captain Regis
be relied upon by appellant. All that the affidavit stated was that AAA
"voluntarily went with [appellant]" 26 but such statement does not preclude that
any sexual relation between them was not consensual. Moreover, given AAA’s
mental state, it was highly doubtful that she understood the significance of the
affidavit that she signed or that she signed it voluntarily. We note, too, Brgy.
Captain Regis’s testimony that (a) it was appellant who insisted on the
execution of the affidavit27 and (b) the reason AAA was asked to sign the
affidavit was so that appellant would have no responsibility or liability as
regards AAA.28
We have previously held that:
For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed
relationship must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to
adduce such evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative
value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a corroboration by their
common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship
such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.29
Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic
relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man
cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée and worse, employ violence
upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust.30
As to the civil liability, we affirm the trial court’s award of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages for each count of simple rape that appellant
had been proven to have committed. However, we disagree with the Court of
Appeal’s decision to delete the trial court’s award of exemplary damages in the
amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00).
In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary
damages are awarded in order to set a public example and to protect hapless
individuals from sexual molestation, we agree with the trial court regarding the
G.R. No. 193237               October 9, 2012 1973. It was only after a lapse of several years or more specifically on June 17, Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His
1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before the RTC Branch 18 of proclamation as the elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,  Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its
vs. Probation Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on finality, and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents. March 19, 1987 and the corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued.
Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and Probation Administrator WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is
x-----------------------x denied for utter lack of merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and
Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent Jalosjos,
G.R. No. 193536 Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This ordered to CEASE and DESIST from occupying and discharging the functions
Certification was the one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the provisions of
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,  of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as the Local Government Code on succession apply.
vs. SPA No. 04-235.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON SO ORDERED.8
ELECTIONS, Respondents. This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237,
of the Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, while Cardino filed his petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No.
DECISION former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of 193536.
CARPIO, J.: violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on
December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No.
These are two special civil actions for certiorari 1 questioning the resolutions of complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. A portion of the 193237.
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. decision of the Sandiganbayan is quoted hereunder:
No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
2010 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution
Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., unwarranted benefits and advantage because the dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-
his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In subject certification, which was issued by the accused without adequate or 076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.9
G.R. No. 193536, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 official support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as basis of
the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which applied the rule on succession judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for
under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office of the with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to
issue the Order dated February 5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140- Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court
Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of resolved11 to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos then
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with the order of probation
and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic] filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from
The Facts arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said probationer and the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which
became the basis for the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte,
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes." 12 Jalosjos’ resignation was made "in deference with
August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private complainant James Adasa for the
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as
disqualification of the probationer from running for re-election as Mayor of
third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013." 13
Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of 2004. 5
Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material The COMELEC’s Rulings These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that Jalosjos’ Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s Petition
he was eligible for the Office of Mayor. On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and in G.R. No. 193536, we address not only Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public
cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division office and the consequences of the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy,
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws
Jalosjos had already been convicted by final judgment for robbery and his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for relating to the conduct of elections.
sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final
Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served." 6 The The Issues
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave
stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the probation was fraudulently issued; thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled
RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate sentence of that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2) ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to
refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5 February one year, eight months and twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte; and (3)
2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. four years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum. The cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that
Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a COMELEC First Division ruled that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his Jalosjos committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as
petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.4 disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160." 7 Jalosjos relied in good faith upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for eligible for the same position from which he is now being ousted. Finally, the
record as follows: reconsideration. The pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read: Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in violation of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing
robbery on January 22, 1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco that he has not yet served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave
Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found him and his co- for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well as political rights have been violated. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to
accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of prision Having been convicted by final judgment, the dispositive portion of its 11 August 2010 Resolution that the provisions of
correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this the Local Government Code on succession should apply.
decision to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9,
This Court’s Ruling Section 40, Local Government Code: Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties
of prisión mayor and temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is imposed as
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a for any elective local position: an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.
proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving xxxx
eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the case;
highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. 1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of allegiance to the Republic;
the COMELEC First Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the 2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any
COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions erroneously limit the remedy (d) Those with dual citizenship; popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local Government Code. (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and
abroad; for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run
for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is
petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Sections 74 and 78 read: acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall last during the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and term of the sentence.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office (g) The insane or feeble-minded. 4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Section 12, Omnibus Election Code: office formerly held.
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or temporary special
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce the following
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving effects:
faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, 1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. affected.
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed 2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or either perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five the extent of such disqualification.
true to the best of his knowledge.
years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A becomes disqualified. Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code: temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
(Emphasis supplied) performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage which the offender
candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same
right to run for the public office. 14 If a candidate is not actually eligible because
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office,
6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective law,15 the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code,
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the requirement provided for in the election laws. right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a such office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the
Revised Penal Code: same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a
person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender
under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his
pertinent provisions read: disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify
public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in time his judgment of conviction became final. Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes gravely errs
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of when it holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under the
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, Revised Penal Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under
explained the import of the accessory penalty of perpetual special which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office, contrary to Section 68 of the OEC and not for cancellation of COC under Section 78
disqualification: the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As used in thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other than
Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run
appellee’s conviction of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court declared:
for public office. As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 17 the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility." One who The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised Penal suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and
voting if he had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
imprisonment. office," as expressly required under Section 74, then he clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As this A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the statements: (1) a statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized
convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last Court explained in Fermin:
Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the candidate is not a permanent resident
only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, & Article 30, Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the candidate is
Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13 CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s
October 1961. candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. 20
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that
the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run
accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that Jalosjos
hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from temporary special was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos
disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the
CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under
Penal Code, provides: Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification which is a ground for a petition
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion of Justice
temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that is not a
deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what specific
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any proclamation of the winning candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied) provision of law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate
public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be of candidacy.
permitted to hold any public office during the period of disqualification. Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to
which perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the a ground for a petition under Section 78. However, since the false material
be applied distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under
"perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind of special disqualification, while the 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local
phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary special crimes under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice
disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code: whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
special) are necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law
their durations into one period, states that such duration is "according to the Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether the penalty is the which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, belongs to the petitioner.
perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied) or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void
Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special performing electoral functions; certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of
disqualification "deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy,
hold public office perpetually." (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his and much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a valid
this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab
or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of
Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the
office during the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified
judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino – who received the
office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the highest number of votes.
vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run election laws. (Emphasis supplied)
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of
winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible 22 should be limited Justice and the Department of Interior and Local Government so they can
to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos,
the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of Jr. due to his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final judgment issued by
law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then XIV-140-CEBU.
legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a
candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are SO ORDERED.
stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be
a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing
jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. 23 If a
certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the
certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more
equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the
same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the
COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.
The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars
the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not
only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to
implement the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final
judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is addressed to the
COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC is duty bound to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election."24 The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the
Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is
part of the enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to the conduct
of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of one suffering from perpetual special disqualification
will result in the anomaly that these cases so grotesquely exemplify. Despite a
prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and served twice
as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to
"enforce and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does
not motu proprio bar from running for public office those suffering from
perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED,
and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10
May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the COMELEC First Division and the
COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May
2010 elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The
COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of
Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the duly elected Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
G.R. No. L-16439             July 20, 1961 damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,  parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that,
vs. unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents. transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner. Without costs.
A.P. Salvador for respondents. invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child ( conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the
REYES, J.B.L., J.: limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that
a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
physician who caused the same.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs.
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am. Rep.
Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against
defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all.
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished
special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and
as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion. physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or
services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows: damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant
the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art.
she became pregnant by her present husband before they were 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also
again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with
Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the
the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner.
where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have
aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant.
fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a
province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record,
was clearly exaggerated.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action
and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
granted certiorari. It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has
the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the highminded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead
a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which
1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations. not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
G.R. No. 182836               October 13, 2009 she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. 5 According to the Certificate of Fetal personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel
Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,  Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.6 person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that
vs. never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not
HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it ever
NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION- denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of acquire the right to be supported.
SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND the death and accident insurance.7
REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), Respondents. Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA,
DECISION bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted
machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: parties still failed to settle their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to file a Notice to definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits
Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region – bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Resolution2 dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. (NCR).9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and
101697, affirming the Resolution 3 dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union,
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano to Article X, Section 2 were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child. personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. 10 The parties mutually chose Atty. the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue. 11 employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted "company practice."
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Arbitrator, issued a Resolution 17 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Papers, 12 Replies,13 and Rejoinders14 to Atty. Montaño. bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other
claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X,
Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave
(CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads: the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel "death"; (2) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; and (3) such
xxxx Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), dependent must be "legitimate".
sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs. On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident
bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the
employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is
sisters) based on the following: employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which "death"; (b) such death must be of employee’s "dependent"; (c) such
had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity dependent must be "legitimate"; and (d) proper legal document to be
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between presented.18
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days his union and Mayer Steel.15 Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and
died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s
xxxx weeks in the womb and only died during labor. legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the
parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother.
xxxx MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were
death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following who signed the existing CBA with the Union. lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
manner: Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:
xxxx doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
the safety of and decent living for the laborer. WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered
4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano
(Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00),
(parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand
covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total
document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).4 benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of amount of ₱16,489.00
which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s and 4216 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical of merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death qualifies as death.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus
dispositions. never acquired a juridical personality. Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for We are not persuaded. support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
Review on Certiorari,19 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, someone else." Under said general definition, 26 even an unborn child is a
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697. As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39
X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee;
death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death;
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide
(2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born
since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and
not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without
(4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense,
Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term certificate.
death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.
status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation
such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,27 we have expounded on who is a
Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death legitimate child, viz:
the CBA were lacking. benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms "death" and
"dependent" as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
interpreted death to mean as follows: neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA. of the parents are legitimate." (Emphasis ours.)
the term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,28 we identified an illegitimate child to be as
irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived follows:
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a
with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such extinguished by death. eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children --
event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
"death" as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid
loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, (Emphasis ours.)
significance to the term "death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for which reads:
granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited
[Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of "death" to speak of. Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife
equated with anything less than "loss of human life", especially for the Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage,
expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are may be lost. hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.1avvphi1
meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth
them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.
certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the
point.20 child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death
instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been
Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals granted by Continental Steel.
reads: death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn
and UPHELD. those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].21 And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. 24 Life is not delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first subsequently.
In a Resolution22 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
Reconsideration23 of Continental Steel. than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, 25 that Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave
the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor,
such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 29  In the same way, the CBA and
CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v.
National Labor Relations Commission,30 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the
assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and
the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor."
While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor
Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is
the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons.
What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in
our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we
are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC  [183 SCRA 451
(1990)], we categorically stated that:
When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales
of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced
by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC  [199 SCRA
265 (1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February
2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P.
Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (₱4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (₱11,550.00), respectively, grounded on
the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 after the death of the testator, shall annul the WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to
CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs. If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee. testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of 'representation.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code
Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee. declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does
not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of
REYES, J.B.L., J.: Article 291. It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall
be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article"
Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
denying amendment of the same pleading. right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows: become entirely useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th
Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the this out:
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties were neighbors in
Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant Icao, Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus  no son
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que
became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados
had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, 'derechos en estado de pendenci';  el nacimiento del
damages and attorney's fees. sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no
determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos (que ya
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho
since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after que tiene efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit.,
hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed page 271)
the complaint.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original
the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim
sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
appealed directly to this Court.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the for the damage.
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support
from its progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
child is only "en ventre de sa mere ;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet following and analogous cases:
unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code,
and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such
child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code). xxx xxx xxx

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
children may be accepted by those persons who 28 ....
would legally represent them if they were already Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying,
born. plaintiff herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether doubly in error.
living at the time of the execution of the will or born
G.R. No. L-39110             November 28, 1933 employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made The second question that presents itself in this case is whether the trial court
arrangements for the hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant,  the City of Manila, where she was cared for during confinement. of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and
vs. that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to
CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant. When Antonio was able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, with her mother acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil
and the baby, to a house at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, where they Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our opinion, to justify the
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants. lived together for about a year in regular family style, all household expenses,
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant. conclusion of the trial court on this point, and we may add here that our
including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, conclusion upon the first branch of the case that the defendant had
however, the defendant's ardor abated and, when Antonia began to show signs acknowledged this child in writings above referred to must be taken in
of a second pregnancy the defendant decamped, and he is now married to connection with the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is
another woman. A point that should here be noted is that when the time came undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it
STREET, J.: for christening the child, the defendant, who had charge of the arrangement for and the mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation
this ceremony, caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time,
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Cesar Syquia, Jr., as was at first planned. when the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes
Loanco de Jesus in her own right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the
friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants, children of the The first question that is presented in the case is whether the note to
the padre, quoted above, in connection with the letters written by the defendant status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to evince
first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering from the defendant, Cesar the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he
Syquia, the sum of thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first- to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within
the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point we abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action was started is
named plaintiff from breach of a marriage promise, to compel the defendant to unimportant. The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil
recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural children begotten by him with Antonia, have no hesitancy in holding that the acknowledgment thus shown is sufficient.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, Code does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but
and to pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
per month, together with costs. Upon hearing the cause, after answer of the becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living
defendant, the trial court erred a decree requiring the defendant to recognize person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of What has been said disposes of the principal feature of the defendant's appeal.
Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn child is really With respect to the appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial
of fifty pesos per month, with costs, dismissing the action in other respects. not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a court was right in refusing to give damages to the plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for
From this judgment both parties appealed, the plaintiffs from so much of the child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily
decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant from of identification are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral proved, and we may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no
that feature of the decision which required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and evidence to connect the particular individual intended with the name used. standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
to pay for his maintenance. It is contended however, in the present case that the words of description used advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
in the writings before us are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there
At the time with which we are here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
was of the age of twenty-three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our opinion, well founded.
The words of recognition contained in the note to the  padre are not capable of recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable property in his own right.
His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, two constructions. They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to Finally, we see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the
where the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial attention. In the month be born in June and which would thereafter be presented for christening. The amount of the maintenance which the trial court allowed to Ismael Loanco. And
of June Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl of the age of twenty years, was baby came, and though it was in the end given the name of Ismael Loanco in this connection we merely point out that, as conditions change, the Court of
taken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia was not long in making her instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant First Instance will have jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the
acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which intended to acknowledge is clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is pension as circumstances will require.
Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931. The removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters the defendant
defendant was a constant visitor at the home of Antonia in the early months of makes repeated reference to junior as the baby which Antonia, to whom the The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed, without costs. So
her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he wrote and placed in her hands a letters were addressed, was then carrying in her womb, and the writer urged ordered.
note directed to the padre who has expected to christen the baby. This note Antonia to eat with good appetite in order that  junior might be vigorous. In the
was as follows: last letter (Exhibit J) written only a few days before the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and ofjunior also.
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February 14, 1931 It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the
sufficiency of acknowledgment is whether the acknowledgment contemplated
Rev. FATHER, in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a single
document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it. authenticity, written by the recognizing father. Upon this point we are of the
CESAR SYQUIA           opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting together the
admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in
The occasion for writing this note was that the defendant was on the eve of his one letter by an admission or admissions made in another. In the case before
departure on a trip to China and Japan; and while he was abroad on this visit us the admission of paternity is contained in the note to the  padre and the
he wrote several letters to Antonia showing a paternal interest in the situation other letters suffice to connect that admission with the child then being carried
that had developed with her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in by Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall
order that "junior" (meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is merely required that the
promising to return to them soon. The baby arrived at the time expected, and writing shall be indubitable.
all necessary anticipatory preparations were made by the defendant. To this he
G.R. No. L-770             April 27, 1948 business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was netting him of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner,  about P1,440 a month. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him
vs. his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE, deceased, respondent. before it, that his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved
Angel Limjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner. plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent. its conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the
Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a right was Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be
HILADO, J.: property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in
denied application, although under the facts of the case, the commission that proceeding.
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain
Commissioner Fidel Ibañez, rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336
Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain admits (page 3) that the certificate of public convenience once granted "as a of the Civil Code, respectively, consider as immovable  and movable
and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, whereby said commission held rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such certificate would certainly things rights  which are not material. The same eminent commentator says in
that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying with the the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently
be promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to drafted in that it is not sufficiently expressive of all incorporeal rights which are
maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the his estate and judicial administrator after his death. also property  for juridical purposes.
municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a
Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term,
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission, land and during the life of the option he died, if the option had been given him property includes, among other things, "an option", and "the certificate of the
therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the in the ordinary course of business and not out of special consideration for his railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page 748 of
provisions of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended a person, there would be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it the same volume we read:
certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the would have survived to his estate and legal representatives. In such a case However, these terms (real property, as estate or interest) have
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special there would also be the possibility of failure to acquire the property should he also been declared to include every species of title, inchoate  or
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent or his estate or legal representative fail to comply with the conditions of the complete, and embrace rights  which lie in contract, whether
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive option. In the case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and executory or executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to acquire the desired certificate of public convenience — the evidence
sell the ice produced from said plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in established that the public needed the ice plant — was under the law Another important question raised by petitioner is whether the estate of Pedro
the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in Quezon City", subject to the conditioned only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act.
conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34). and operate the service. Of course, such right to acquire or obtain such
certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the following doctrine
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follows: through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in different from the legal standpoint from that of the option in the illustration just As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a
accordance with law. given. forgery committed after the death of the man whose name
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not the intent to defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55,
reasonably supported by evidence. defend actions, among other cases, for the protection of the property or rights
of the deceased which survive, and it says that such actions may be brought or 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner defended "in the right of the deceased". The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case
and the Ice and Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as of forgery committed after the death of one Morgan for the purpose of
existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the increased Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor
or administrator, the making of an inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, defrauding his estate. The objection was urged that the information did not aver
demand. that the forgery was committed with the intent to defraud any person. The
credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an knowledge, or to the possession of any other person for him. Court, per Elliott, J., disposed of this objection as follows:
unwarranted departure from its announced policy with respect to . . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the
the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366,
367) the present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from law does not regard the estate of a decedent as a person. This
brief.) intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is
the decisions cited by him:
In his argument petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the a person in legal contemplation. "The word "person" says Mr.
commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any action Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes
Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending affecting the property or rights  (emphasis supplied) of a deceased artificial as well as natural persons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs.
before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the person which may be brought by or against him if he were alive, Pacific, etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrews, 8
certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law. may likewise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another work that 'persons are of two
administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money, debt or kinds: natural and artificial. A natural person is a human being.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural
have had the right to prosecute his application before the commission to its because death extinguishes the right . . . . persons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of property to which
final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. As declared by the the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The
commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited
35,000, and from what the commission said regarding his other properties and convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the extent in our law. "Examples are the estate of a bankrupt or
foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which
 deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our own cases The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is
inferentially recognize the correctness of the definition given by the personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood considered extended so that any debts or obligations left by, and surviving, him
authors from whom we have quoted, for they declare that it is — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of his
sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for
designate the defendant as the estate of the deceased person, Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not
naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless we accept this death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said
where, as here, the forgery is committed after the death of a basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise proceeding, if successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same
person whose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The reason and creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not allege any
can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante
avoiding such a result; for, to our minds, it seems reasonable that why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such
the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and
person. It is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality.
disposition of the assets to be properly made, and, although of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate,
natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in deceased person. creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment
the property, the artificial creature is a distinct legal entity. The amounting to P35,000, which he has already made in the ice plant, not
interest which natural persons have in it is not complete until there Petitioner raises the decisive question of whether or not the estate of Pedro O. counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, from the
has been a due administration; and one who forges the name of Fragrante can be considered a "citizen of the Philippines" within the meaning of Public Service Commission of this Court.
the decedent to an instrument purporting to be a promissory note section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the proviso
must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the thereof expressly and categorically limiting the power of the commission to We can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the
decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in issue certificates of public convenience or certificates of public convenience constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal
it, since ha cannot be presumed to have known who those persons and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States or to principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law
were, or what was the nature of their respective interest. The corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stock companies indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of
fraudulent intent is against the artificial person, — the estate — constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines", and the further Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein,
and not the natural persons who have direct or contingent interest proviso that sixty per centum of the stock or paid-up capital of such entities we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the
in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.) must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States. extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

In the instant case there would also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view
Pedro O. Fragrante is considered a "person", for quashing of the proceedings the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the
for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial results to his person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one
investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its
the expenses and disbursements which the proceeding can be presumed to legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the
have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone those defrayed by the estate indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to support the same rule service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself.
thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may
estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality State, supra, when the Supreme Court of said State said: be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple
independent of their heirs. Among the most recent cases may be mentioned expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be
that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, wherein the principal regarded as an artificial person. it is the creation of law for the Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution
plaintiff was the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion,
judgment in favor of said estate along with the other plaintiffs in these words: made . . . . both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
Within the framework and principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
that defendants Concepcion and Whitaker are indebted to he example, under the bill of rights it seems clear that while the civil rights
plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . . guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term Decision affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or
Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in juridical persons, for otherwise these latter would be without the constitutional
contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the guarantee against being deprived of property without due process of law, or the
provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it was the
and obligations of the decedent by the mere fact of his death. It was so held by intendment of the framers to include artificial or juridical, no less than natural,
this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. However, after the enactment of persons in these constitutional immunities and in others of similar nature.
the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code was abrogated, as Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of deceased persons.
held in Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as well as Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of
in many others decided by this Court after the innovations introduced by the Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course,
been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights
and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death.
vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his One of those rights was the one involved in his pending application before the
demise. Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice would
ensue from the opposite course.
G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1976 that Oria was already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662,
was filed.
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalf and in his capacity as Administrator of
the Testate Estate of the late Pedro Oria; FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were aware
DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-appellants,  of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the said heirs were
vs. estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
After hearing the lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and
Castillo & Castillo for appellants. the other defendants in Civil Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary
appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith because he did not
Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee. apprise the court that Oria was dead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired
jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the judgment was valid as to him.
From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.
AQUINO, J.:p
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled down to the
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case issue as to the validity of the lower court's judgment against the deceased
No.  Pedro Oria who, being already in the other world, was never served with
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, summons.
Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal rate of There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction was acquired
interest from November, 1958. The lower court directed that in case the over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa
defendants failed to pay the said amount before its decision became final, then and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97; Gorostiaga vs.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond, Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
Exhibit A, in accordance with law, for the satisfaction of the judgment". (Under As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil
that bond the four sureties bound themselves to answer solidarity for the Case No. T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and
obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain real properties of the he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil
sureties were "given as security for" their undertaking). personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
decision had become final, the lower court, on motion of Quality Plastic The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counsel also appeared as
Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at counsel for Oria, there was a voluntary appearance which enabled the court to
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria which he had given as security under acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23, Rule 14 of the
the bond. Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel could not have validly appeared for
28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and a dead co-defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale was
confirmed by the lower court in its order of November 20, 1962. But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. in order to annul the judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are
It turned out that Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties herein
when the action was filed. Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was
Products, Inc. Nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc. unaware of Oria's death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the
aware that in the same Tayug court Special Proceeding No. T-212, Testate appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was pending.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack
No.  of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on also void. No costs.
Soliven, the principal in the bond, who acknowledged such service by signing
on the back of the original summons in his own behalf and again signing for his SO ORDERED.
co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed
Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality
Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the
judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao
also sued in his capacity as administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment was lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873). It was only when Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned
G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990 Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
(petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder. relations;
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, 
vs. Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch pregnancy in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated functions:
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29
Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for " Habeas and 30 September 1988 were then issued by respondent court, directing xxx xxx xxx
Corpus", namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents. its autopsy. jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the issue of custody and
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990. Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court
motion to dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,  over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5
vs. Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch petitioner argued, is not applicable to a dead person but extends only to all
20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course,
cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person. rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-
CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS- Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees. below) were granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil
knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the action for such relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner. filing of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged for habeas corpus.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents. that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary
wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of
and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in Court8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and
the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Section 1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
PADILLA, J.: Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was finally
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988. . . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the
for certiorari and prohibition with application for restraining order and/or allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty
injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge before the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the
from proceeding with the H abeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody and burial
Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but
Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the respondent Sheriff from enforcing and Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government
implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court
pathologist. 4 strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to entertain and sit
September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a
resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required comment from the Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body
respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that: because the body of the petition controls and is binding and since this
restraining order. case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10
The records disclose the following: petition, up to the second amended petition that the ultimate facts show
that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the persons entitled of rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The
brevity), her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased. order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the
(Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for  habeas The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the
corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) already dead on August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common
alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another woman. 11
and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis over the nature and subject matter of this case because it may entertain
Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary
this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R.
liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of
alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to
the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof, for those raised in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of
Tomas Eugenio. the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. both cases. 12 On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ 129, which reads as follows: issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo pending appeal, which this
of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases . — Regional Trial Courts shall Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs a decent
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained (1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further
a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health, incapable of pecuniary estimation; pleadings.
authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
x x x           x x x          x x x Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
 1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other suitable liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old female, person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What hereinbelow specified:
single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by the records be not
sisters and a common law husband. allowed to continue. 17 x x x           x x x          x x x

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in (b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,
treat the action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury the the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment  of the petition for habeas and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
deceased/recovery of the dead. corpus, not dismissal,  was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines
pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined on its expenses.
new Family Code) which states: real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.
persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order: inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like,
which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by SO ORDERED.
x x x           x x x          x x x respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule (1) From
102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil spouse;
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification;
procedure that what controls is not the caption of the complaint or petition; but hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of
the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without the Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed,
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman
court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
warrant. 13 represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed
to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. 19
certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of
right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of
such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case
presented as, in his judgment, prima facie  entitle the petitioner to the law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
in form and substance, the writ should issue if the petition complies with the marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for relief. another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite,  22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice
very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted
commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the however that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse'
petition. 15 (not common-law spouses)."
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez,  16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, "spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from
stating: criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament
should not have been dismissed. The court below should not have or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this view
overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of
the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous relation between the the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against all when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner
principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
expressed preference for remaining with said respondent, because the legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law
repudiate. Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised
xxx xxx xxx Administrative Code provides:
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial .  — The immediate duty
should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not originally of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate
made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection.
Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award
G.R. No. L-5426             May 29, 1953 "Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,  days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
vs. cause the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent. San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of
refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law. Act No. 129, now section 69 ( ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed
Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner. article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil Code. It is
Leonardo Abola for respondent. "At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that
TUASON, J.: Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela
Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters, Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to have died
This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25." at the same time.
the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela
Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the
them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant
decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision, Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the
modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and reasons to be presently set forth.
Court for review. insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate
Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated: Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence
of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children, all of whom "It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established
were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must be
adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have
accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or
Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the German Club
more persons who would inherent one from the other, the persons who
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified
alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence
that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a
of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no
latter was declared to have survived his mother. scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we may infer the
transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.
condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable interval from
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute
by the petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela Joaquin de All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular
Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that it her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she could have died reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present is one in
radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present almost immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is
petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no
adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent, edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are unknown and unknowable,
son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage. shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation
can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot
the Court of Appeals as follows: support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled In In re  Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the
to fall back upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our
"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging,
purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code of
the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with their three
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:
daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the 30, must be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be
building known as the German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. ( ii), Rules of inferred" that one died before the other it means that there are
Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was packed with Court). circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may
refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. "The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same does not mean circumstances which would shown, or which would tend to
building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters were calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs.
hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone,
son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity, presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by
friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some may die from the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship
As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards cannot rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in
soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then the
the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already the presumption of survivorship. statue of the presumption."
on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela
Joaquin. "We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the It is manifest from the language of section 69 ( ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the
Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it
may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir. speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against
does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls. them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near the to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have
Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference entrance, because most of the people who were shot by the Japanese kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap
of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their
Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a were among those killed. ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor was
better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the building
testimony, which was described by the trial court as "disinterested and xxx     xxx     xxx
was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to
trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence." Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief
Lopez testified: minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I think, because space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.
those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those
Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club trying to escape. It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to
Yes, sir. xxx     xxx     xxx exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to
Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down. Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule
— . There were many people shot because they were trying to escape. can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be
Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir. plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd.
xxx     xxx     xxx
Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were out 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs.
15 meters away from the building but I could see what was going on. Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have said, it
building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to escape probably. is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the
xxx     xxx     xxx survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.) "Juries
Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an
events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed inference that the main fact in issue existed from collateral facts not directly
German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital question in such
you know, you are confused. inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely,
mother.
Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen according to experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain
minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable. While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us
must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must yield to the of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person
Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes. more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around. who was caught firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same animal also
xxx     xxx     xxx
and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the
Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir. have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that circumstances in the illustration leave greater room for another possibility than
interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin do the facts of the case at hand.
Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? — A. Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old
Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club, which In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her
lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried
was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure
hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother outlived her
xxx     xxx     xxx fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities that she did seem very remote. son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common
True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to Lopez, experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the
Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this
evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro, and Japanese troops. It was not very likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence to attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her husband and Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on
the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire. the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired
did not see her actually die, but when the building collapsed over her I
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of
saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I
give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
presumed she died there.
at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant
xxx     xxx     xxx to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can
were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The
collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the
Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's wife? — A. particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew
son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case, the
Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between
people outside, so we thought of running away rather than be roasted. correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law, not
Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1
xxx     xxx     xxx Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed
inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An incredible
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or
the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already
building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity of
wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes.
which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed
thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all
the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court."
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence
refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By substantial evidence
is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable men may
disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures
come within the exception to the general rule.
We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon
the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical
theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without
costs.
G.R. No. 177728               July 31, 2009 Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an
176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the ‘Family Code of the admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument" within the
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ Philippines’"]) provides that: contemplation of the above-quoted provision of law.
"AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, 
vs. Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of summons,
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo respondent was declared in default.
City, Respondent. 7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the
DECISION 7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and affirmed
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Birth or in a separate document. yet unborn child.11 She offered Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela 7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten "A") as her documentary evidence-in-chief. 12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph
Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie’s declarations. 13
(Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of registration is supported by the following documents: By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack
marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents Domingo B. 8 of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2,
Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, a. AUSF
Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of
Rizal. b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A.
1
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died.  After almost two months, or on filing of the document. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father
November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s parents, may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the
gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" paternity between the father and the child: 2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an instrument executed in the handwriting
at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to
1. Employment records the child. (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of 2. SSS/GSIS records The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten
which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth, 2 Affidavit to Use the Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of
Surname of the Father3 (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and 3. Insurance
paternity.1avvphi1
Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch 4. Certification of membership in any organization
Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that 5. Statement of Assets and Liability raising this purely legal issue of:
his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a
6. Income Tax Return (ITR) WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime,
wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read: DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he was CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY  IN A "PRIVATE
born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T. HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH
AUTOBIOGRAPHY back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S
Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). (Underscoring
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE SURNAME.15(Underscoring supplied)
supplied)
TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. 5 I RESIDE AT PULANG- Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not
LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for injunction/registration of expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing the
YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add that
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is
AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child’s sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of
x. name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly signed"
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
xxxx by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted provision of
9255,10 which provides: Article 176 of the Family Code. 16
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and unmistakable"
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND recognition of the child’s paternity. 17
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father  through the
FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THAT’S record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that
ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, respondent’s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with the
By letter dated November 11, 2005, 7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits that
Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for registration non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy but not
of the child’s name in this wise: consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb."18
underscoring supplied)
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing Rules Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255  ["An Act Allowing Illegitimate illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly
recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and
civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten following: about two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child – they
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is Dominique’s.
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
separate action for judicial approval is necessary.19 judgment; or In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the
following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an
that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in concerned.
conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that 1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: by: compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a the acknowledging parent; and
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. legitimate child; or 2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
xxxx (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
laws. filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
following: The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant sections other evidence.
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final of Rule 130 provide:
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
judgment; or SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a consideration" in resolving questions affecting him.22 Article 3(1) of the United
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where signatory is similarly emphatic:
concerned. it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word Article 3
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the 1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
pedigree. consideration.23(Underscoring supplied)
the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely
articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
176 as claimed by petitioners. tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate
pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or
Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engraving on conditions prejudicial to their development."25
requirement of the law. rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to bear the
relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late Christian
brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These circumstances record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of
indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his made by the putative father himself and the writing must be the writing of the Births.
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE putative father. A notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is
WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to SO ORDERED.
LIVE TOGETHER." the mother vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of
on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part: live birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone, neither a
certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
Establishing Filiation (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows: In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. together with the other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during his
lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses for several
xxxx months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa,
G.R. No. 181174               December 4, 2009 Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in the Art. 17118 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register. in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. 1avvphi1
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE
ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners,  Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
vs. marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, represented by petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries  in Patrick's birth record filed before the court a quo.
LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR,Respondents. with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
DECISION Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Cariño v. Cariño  was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for
CARPIO MORALES, J.: Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing  to determine his paternity and filiation; the return of one-half of the death benefits received by the first after the death
and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with the husband
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled
(Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad Braza," were married 1 on January 4, and Pablo as bigamous. on the validity of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of
1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on June On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by
4, 1980. Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it In Lee v. Court of Appeals , the Court held that contrary to the contention that
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is the petitions filed by the therein petitioners before the lower courts were actions
5
Pablo died  on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the petitioners are
Indonesia. action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to
Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the establish that they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor impugn as there was no blood relation at all between
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the
thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth November 29, 2007, they filed the present petition for review. cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and
certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus,
Occidental with the following entries: Petitioners maintain that the court a quo  may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial
civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of Appeals 12 and Republic proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL
TITULAR v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.14 of the entries in their respective birth records to reflect that they were
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. to be made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular proceedings under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the lower
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis  Article 412 of the Civil Code 15 charts court’s grant of the petition.
the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
Father : Pablito S. Braza It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil those obtaining in the present case.
Date Received at the January 13, 1997 registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Local Civil Registrar : understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly SO ORDERED.
Annotation : "Late Registration" misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father observed.16
Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that
petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with
marriage of parents on April 22, which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child
shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring Patrick’s birth records17 and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
supplied) thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that
declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and
Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-
impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule
petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and
NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS, substituted by FRANCISCO BALDOS and In its 8 August 2005 Decision, 9 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s in default of the same, by either parent or a responsible member of the family
MARTIN BALDOS, Petitioners,  vs. Order. The appellate court held that P.D. No. 651 did not proscribe the late or any person who has knowledge of the birth.
COURT OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a. REYNALDO registration of births of persons born before 1 January 1974. The Court of
ESTARES BALDOS, Respondents. Appeals explained that the purpose of the decree was to encourage The parents or the responsible member of the family and the attendant at birth
registration of births as well as deaths. or the hospital or clinic administrator referred to above shall be jointly liable in
CARPIO, J.: G.R. No. 170645               July 9, 2010 case they fail to register the new born child. If there was no attendant at birth,
Nieves Baldos died on 17 May 1999. Her lawyer filed a motion for or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity clinic, then the parents or
The Case substitution10 six years later or on 20 October 2005. In its 22 November 2005 the responsible member of the family alone shall be primarily liable in case of
This is a petition for review 1 of the 8 August 2005 Decision 2 and the 22 Resolution,11 the Court of Appeals granted the motion for substitution. From failure to register the new born child. (Emphasis supplied)
November 2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 65693. then on, Bartolome’s brothers, Francisco Baldos and Martin Baldos, substituted
for Nieves Baldos. Presidential Decree No. 76612 amended P.D. No. 651 by extending the period
The 8 August 2005 Decision affirmed the 16 August 1999 Order 4 of the of registration up to 31 December 1975. P.D. No. 651, as amended, provided
Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 79-0-95. The Issue for special registration within a specified period to address the problem of
The 22 November 2005 Resolution denied petitioners’ motion for under-registration of births as well as deaths. It allowed, without fine or fee of
reconsideration. The sole issue is whether the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is valid. any kind, the late registration of births and deaths occurring within the period
The Antecedent Facts The Court’s Ruling starting from 1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became
effective.1awphi1
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. The petition lacks merit.
However, his birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth
roughly 36 years later or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live Petitioners insist that the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is not authorized is outside of the coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of
birth5indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his by P.D. No. 651. They claim that P.D. No. 651 applies only to births within the Reynaldo’s birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil
father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live period from 1 January 1974 up to the date when the decree became effective. Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a general law, Act
birth. They point out that Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, outside of the No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D.
period covered by the decree. Thus, petitioners submit the Court of Appeals No. 651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo violated basic rules of statutory construction when it interpreted P.D. No. 651 to that the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth took place in 1985, National
City a complaint,6 docketed as Civil Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the include births before 1 January 1974. Petitioners contend the late registration Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
late registration of Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really of Reynaldo’s birth amounts to simulation of birth. 198313 governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
her son.
Respondent Reynaldo counters that P.D. No. 651 does not proscribe the late Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office
The Trial Court’s Ruling registration of births of persons born before 1 January 1974. He maintains that of the local civil registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. 14 Any report of
he has sufficiently proven, by clear and convincing evidence, birth made beyond the reglementary period is considered delayed. 15 The local
The trial court treated the complaint as a petition. In its 16 August 1999 civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed registration of birth, is
Order,7 the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The trial court the fact that he is the son of Nieves and Bartolome Baldos. He asserts that a required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending application
reasoned as follows: certificate of live birth is a public document covered by the presumption of for delayed registration.16 If after ten days no one opposes the registration and
regularity in the performance of official functions. the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be
A thorough examination of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff vis-a-vis the
evidence of the defendant shows that apart from the scornful denial of plaintiff Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act Requiring the registered, he should register the same.17
that defendant is her son, all documentary evidence available points to the Registration of Births and Deaths in the Philippines which Occurred from 1 Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is
contrary. The declaration of two disinterested persons, who were neighbors of January 1974 and Thereafter, provides: presumed to have gone through the process prescribed by law for late
the petitioner and his deceased husband, has never been refuted. registration of birth. It was only on 8 March 1995, after the lapse of ten long
Sec. 1. Registration of births. All babies born in hospitals, maternity clinics,
No one was presented by plaintiff to corroborate her stand. private homes, or elsewhere within the period starting from January 1, 1974 up years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application for delayed
to the date when this decree becomes effective, irrespective of the nationality, registration of Reynaldo’s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She
In the realm of the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the oppositor is race, culture, religion or belief of their parents, whether the mother is a should have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law.
petitioner’s son. Petitioner’s reason for disowning the oppositor is obvious; he permanent resident or transient in the Philippines, and whose births have not Records18 show that no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil
did not live up to her expectation; his wife is ungrateful to everything she did for yet been registered must be reported for registration in the office of the local registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for delayed
her and the oppositor. Bad blood runs in the veins of the parties. But while civil registrar of the place of birth by the physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the
oppositor may have done an act that caused plaintiff to rue she gave him life, hospital or clinic administrator who attended the birth or in default thereof, by facts stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping
such acts however, are not justifications of what she prays from this Court. either parent or a responsible member of the family or a relative, or any person statements of Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.
An ungrateful act is not a ground to cancel a validly executed document, nor a who has knowledge of the birth of the individual child. Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The
reason to strip a person of one’s filiation. It may be a ground for disinheritance The report referred to above shall be accompanied with an affidavit describing books making up the civil register are considered public documents and
though. The documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration. (Emphasis supplied) are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. 19 As a public
parties’ relationship.8 document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of
Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. The registration of the birth of babies validity.20 It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live
Undeterred, Nieves appealed to the Court of Appeals. She insisted that the late referred to in the preceding section must be done within sixty (60) days from birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged
registration of Reynaldo’s birth was contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 the date of effectivity of this decree without fine or fee of any kind. Babies born falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court
(P.D. No. 651). after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the office of the local of Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals civil registrar of the place of birth within thirty (30) days after birth, by the registration of Reynaldo’s birth.
attending physician, nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or,
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 8 August 2005
Decision and the 22 November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. CV No. 65693 affirming the 16 August 1999 Order of the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 74) of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 79-0-95.
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010 spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
GENERAL, Respondents. the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the provision was Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
DECISION enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
BRION, J.: married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 21 In both cases, the Court refused to
to the Filipino spouse."11 acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on THE PETITION recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition). From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition. 13 between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as
2006.5 who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert’s provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite position. the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
(NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6 THE COURT’S RULING recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved ( petition) with the RTC. Although of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead Filipino spouse exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the
a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
Gerbert’s. voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
national law.26
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the Family Code Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
reads: legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted Executive Order second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as as follows:
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with provision.
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the divorce law. the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the
Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states: before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of
have the effect of res judicata 32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33 Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of which
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment or final order is as follows: In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
or final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and 26 of the Family Code provides. may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
their successors in interest by a subsequent title. cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
mistake of law or fact. Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
her national law.27 The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38that the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35 parties to the proceedings; 39and that the time and place for hearing must be
give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of Court.
or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for divorce decrees in the civil registry:
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense. Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
status of persons, in which shall be entered: decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court naturalization; and (j) changes of name. 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If xxxx or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the applicability of the foreign
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons: of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
(1) Birth and death register; WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages. the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and costs.
naturalization register.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189476               February 2, 2011 The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but interest.17Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as
it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, 11 hence, it, thru the one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of
vs. law. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN Philippines.18 In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent. The Republic assails the decision in this wise: use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to
DECISION I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…INVOLVES THE use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.
CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her
CARPIO MORALES, J.: LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies
Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna PROCEEDINGS… his legitimacy.
Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his
DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF RESPONDENT’S legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a underscoring supplied)
Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and
Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in proceedings . . ."
COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
COSETENG." proceeding.13 Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date
Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in of marriage and the name of respondent’s father from the entries in SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event,
[its] National Indices of Marriage." 2 Respondent also submitted his academic respondent’s birth certificate, 14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded
records from elementary up to college 3 showing that he carried the surname order not being in accord with respondent’s prayer reading: in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
his surname.4 In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the corresponding civil registry is located.
elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of name of petitioner from
M.L. COSETENG."5 JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD xxxx
6
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,  respondent amended his the Local Civil Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement the said change of name in their records. register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7 interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the proceeding.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was premises.15 (underscoring supplied)
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. 8 And a copy of the Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). in nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ten days before the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
ex parte.9 of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should
By Decision of January 8, 2009, 10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or
and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to: weeks; and the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.16
corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND The petition is impressed with merit. claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to
PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s the proceeding.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME)
Certificate of live Birth]; using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-
the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a thereto.
the [respondent]; and sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote 20 in support of his claim that
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary
FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public proceeding.
supplied; capitalization in the original)
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or 108.1awphi1 Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether
provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry only upon meritorious grounds. . . . earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under
(emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied) which would tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. 24 (emphasis, italics and granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these underscoring supplied) aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or
two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently paramour. x x x x.
complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:
he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as xxxx
respondents in the case. SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover
change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring
interestthat would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of province. supplied)
status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change
of entry in the civil registry. SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho, 27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within the civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of
a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor
the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for supplied) children. Carlito and his siblings requested the correction in their birth
the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to "Filipino," instead of
Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of
Emperatriz alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice marriage of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not
which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is married. And Carlito requested the correction in the birth certificates of their
appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual date of their
Bulan" are erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing
the one who furnished the data in said birth certificate. as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which Maribel to "Marivel."
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within
local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her children’s birth which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she
certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in publication). was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
Victoria’s birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of
marriage to "no marriage." This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that The trial court granted the petition.
case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries in the
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents
the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings
order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural
child Victoria in light of the following observations: "CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of
court granted the petition. hearing cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable Court noted that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in
parties should have been made respondents. They include not only After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the
the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change of petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected June’s family name to Gustilo. respecting the actual date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the
thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their
notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not
system of justice. Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that married to their father.
Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial court’s Order as Mary
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo. What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3
impaired if her status would be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar and the parties who would naturally
Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment resulting The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in- and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or cancellation of
from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.  The fact intervention. entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is
that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not Nadina’s petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is
change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the notified through publication.
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained: register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those on
Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish, increase or
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED.
The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.