The Isvarapratyabhijnakarika of Utpaladeva With The Author'S Vrtti
The Isvarapratyabhijnakarika of Utpaladeva With The Author'S Vrtti
The Isvarapratyabhijnakarika of Utpaladeva With The Author'S Vrtti
LXXI
RAFFAELE TORELLA
THE ISVARAPRATYABHIJNAKARIKA
OF UTPALADEVA
WITH THE AUTHOR’S VRTTI
ROM A
ISTITUTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE
1994
R O ME ORIENTAL SERIES
A lre a d y p u b lis h e d
i. — T u c c i G., The Tomhs o f the Tibetan Kings.
u. — P e t e c h Lm Northern India according to the Shui-ching-chu.
in. — F r a u w a l l n e r E . , On the date o f the Buddhist Master o f the Law Vasubandhu.
IV. — R o c k J.F., The ' Na-2khi Nâga cult and related ceremonies. Part I a n d II.
V. — C onferenze, Vol. I. Containing lectures delivered at Is.M.E.O. by G . C o e d è s , J.L.
D u yvendak , C. H e n tze , P .H . P o tt .
VI. — Co nze E., Abhisamayâlahkâra. Introduction and traslation from the original text,
with Sanskrit-Tibctan indexes.
vn. — Conferenze, Vol. II. Containing lectures delivered at Is.M.E.O. by H. C o r b i n , N. E g a -
m i , M. E l i a d e , J. F i l l i o z a t , P. H u m b e r t c l a u d e , J. M a s u i , E.H. d e T s c h a r n e r .
DIRETTA DA
GHERARDO GNOLI
Vol. LXXI
ROM A
Is. M. E. O.
1994
S E R I E O R I E N T A L E R O M A
LXXI
RAFFAELE TORELLA
THE ISVARAPRATYABHIJNAKARIKA
OF UTPALADEVA
WITH THE AUTHOR’S VRTTI
ROMA
ISTTTTJTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE
1994
Distributed by Herder, International Book Centre,
120, Piazza Montecitorio, 00186 Rome, Italy.
Grafica: «Cristal», Via degli Orti di Galba, 26 - 00152 Rom a - Stampa «STI», Via Sesio Celcre, 3 - 00152 Rom a
To R aniero G noli
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
R affaele T o rella
vn
INTRODUCTION
IX
dimension of Brahmanic orthodoxy, characterized by the ancient popular
devotion to Siva and Visnu, and to the pantheon connected with them. A
series of texts, linked to the cult of Siva and Visnu, were already becom
ing stratified probably a couple of centuries before the period under con
sideration (but some are definitely much older). These express ideals and
thrusts that are absent in the Brahmanic sphere, mainly since they have
been consciously excluded because of their non-conformity to existing
social and religious structures, or even their possible disruptive force.
These texts give voice to a need for a more direct participation in the
experience of the divine, no longer seen as a transaction managed by
specialized personnel with a view to obtaining clearly defined and cir
cumscribed benefits - culminating in an impersonal liberation projected
into an indefinite future - but as a transfiguration here and now of the
whole person, whose components, including the purely physical, become
the very protagonists of the path of liberation and not the unwelcome
extras. In this framework, and by carefully observing the nature of these
texts and of their addressees, it becomes immediately clear that we
cannot propose a scheme of interpretation centring on the polarities
Brahmanic ortodoxy - popular thrusts, or ritualism - ecstatic anti-ritualism.
In general, the Tantric adept, as Sanderson (1988: 662) has correctly
described him, is in actual fact a hyper-ritualist, who does not cancel the
inherited ritual but replaces it, often only by modifying, enriching and
making it more complicated2. He sometimes goes as far as to transform
it into a labyrinthine religious play, the highest and most complex ex
ample of which is perhaps the Saivasiddhànta ritual, analyzed in such a
masterly manner by Hélène Brunner (see Bibliography). The ritual elem
ent rests on a basis that is broadly shared both by Vaisnava and Saiva
Tantrism, even in the currents that are ideologically more far-removed
from each other.
In ninth-century Kashmir the Vaisnava school of Pàncaràtra and the
various currents of Tantric Saivism had begun to follow different paths.
The Pàncaràtra was already heading towards an inexorable decline which
was gradually to lead to its disappearance from Kashmir and its firm
transplantation in the South of India. However, this was not without
producing as its final fruits some original figures of thinkers poised bet
ween the Vaisnava and Saiva faith, such as Vâmanadatta (cf. Torella
forthcoming) and Utpalavaiçnava, aware of the affinity of the two tradi-
2 In any case, never totally negating it (cf. Sanderson 1990: 77, 82-83).
X
tions, which appears also, on the scriptural level, in a line of Pâncarâtra
texts marked by non-duality.
The Saiva tradition, which would continue to characterize social and
religious life in Kashmir, is for its part far from being unitary and if the
skein of texts, subdivisions and orientations is now beginning to be
unravelled, we are particularly indebted to a series of penetrating studies
by Alexis Sanderson3 - to which I refer here. What is evident is the
presence in Kashmir during this period of a sharp distinction between a
dualist tradition and a non-dualist one with extremist tendencies. The
former, the so-called Saivasiddhânta, which embodies a kind of ‘normal
ized’, mild, Tantrism - so much so that some scholars tend even to
exclude it from the Tantrism proper - perpetuates many of the social and
religious institutions of the ‘orthodox’ order which it aims to replace: it
basically accepts the caste system, prefers to understate the non-vedic
nature of their Àgamas and tends to identify with the establishment, in
maintaining a marked separation between pure and impure. It creates a
self-sufficient and all-pervasive ritual system, which, integrated by yoga,
leads the individual soul by degrees on a journey towards itself and the
reappropriation of its own true nature of Siva: the last station is the
achievement of the state of liberated Siva, for ever distinct from the
other monads of liberated individuals and from the supreme Siva, who
alone performs the five functions on the cosmic plane.
Opposed to the Saivasiddhântins in many respects, the non-dualist
Saivas follow the teachings embodied in another great division of the
Saiva Agama, that of the Bhairava Tantras, in which the terrific form of
the God - at least in the most radical texts - expresses first and foremost
the overthrow of the behavioural norms, conventions and distinctions
through which an attempt is made to give a definite and recognizable
structure to reality - fragile fences that the Power of the God, his Sakti,
sometimes superordinate to him, now derides now disrupts. The adept
enters into harmony with this Power, or rather he is possessed by it,
through practices and behaviours that here and there reveal their more or
less remote rooting in the practices of the Kàpàlikas, who challenge what
the Indians see perhaps as the horror par excellence, the macabre fré
quentation of the cemeteries, where they evoke the terrible Mothers by
eating putrefying human flesh etc. Some divinities of important Bhairava
Àgamas still display the animal features and hideous attributes, as well
XI
as the names, that link them to this ancient substratum (cf. Sanderson
1988: 670, 674-75). At other times, instead of this (or alongside this), we
find that sex is resorted to as the central moment of the rite: the adept
worships the Goddess by offering her a cup containing the kundagolaka,
or mixture of sperm and female secretions that the ritual union with his
partner has just produced. Gradually relieved of its original burden of an-
tinomianism and orgiastic transgression - and later totally eliminating the
funerary aspect (Sanderson 1985: 202) - , this mobilization of energies
through practices that challenge the current concept of purity and tend
towards the overflow of the powers of the senses becomes the charac
teristic of the so-called kaula way (kaulaprakriya) to liberation.
Several of the Bhairava Tantras are kaula in nature, especially the
Yamalas, but also, though to a softened and subtler degree, the so-called
Trika Tantras. Among them an older stratum may be distinguished, con
sisting of the Siddhayogesvarimata, the MV and the Tantrasadbhava, in
which the term trika does not yet appear and which feature the essential
doctrines but not the awareness of forming a group or school4, as is the
case for the later Devyayamala, Trikasadbhava, Trikahrdaya (or °sara),
Nisisamcara etc.5.
S o m An a n d a (875/900-925/950)
4 Cf. Dyczkowsky 19882: 187 n.189. On the three phases in the development of
the Trika see Sanderson 1986: 170 n. 6; etc.
5 In the light of current knowledge, it is not easy to define what is really meant
by one Tantra belonging to a particular ‘school’. Every Tantra contains a mass of
elements - at times even contradictory to one another - a portion of which may be
shared also by Tantras belonging to different currents that are sometimes even far-
remoted from each other ideologically. For instance, cf. the long, important passage
on the ‘voids’ etc. in chapter I (prasnayogadhikara) of the Tantrasadbhava (MS,
National Archives, Kathmandu, No.A363, f.8a 1.6 - f. 1lb 1.1) - an old and ‘radical’
Trikatantra of the Vidyapltha - , that is present almost verbatim in a ‘mild’
Bhairavatantra, in many respects close to the Saivasiddhanta, like the SvT (IV.234-
296), belonging to the lower Mantrapltha.
XII
flowering of an extraordinary series of works and masters that between
the ninth and twelfth centuries constituted one of the highest achieve
ments of Indian speculation and spirituality af all time. The complex
work of exegesis of the scriptures6, the reformulation of their teaching
and the organizing and hierarchizing of their contents indicate first and
foremost its decision to emerge into the open, to escape from the dimen
sion of a restricted circle of adepts - which is what must have been the
original nature o f these schools - and to offer itself implicitly as an
alternative to the dominant Saivasiddhanta, or at least to establish itself
within it as a non-extraneous element (or rather as an element which,
though not intended to constitute the whole, was able to give it its
ultimate significance). In order to do this it was necessary to extract a
homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; to purge it,
without changing its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be
proposed to a wider circle - in other words, of all that was bound to
create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance - by attenuating the
sharper points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally
translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its ad
dressees and engaging in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront
rival doctrines.
Vasugupta and Kallata with the doctrine of the Spanda, on the one
hand, and Somananda, on the other, were the first to undertake this task.
The former chose a plan that was more closely connected with spiritual
experience, the latter one that was more in terms of conceptual elabora
tion (though his work is clearly based on direct experience7, which is
sometimes visionary and ecstatic). But both the teachings and the tone of
the SS and SK and of the $D are perfectly compatible: Somananda is
certainly aware of the doctrines of the Spanda which echo here and there
in the SD (even the term spanda is to be found8), they all implicitly refer
6 The first to take this path must have been the philosophers of the Saivasid-
dhanta. Sadyojyotis and VySkhySni (cit. $D III. 13cd-14) were certainly Somanan-
da’s predecessors (though their date cannot be fixed more precisely). Earlier than
Somananda is probably also Brhaspati, the author of the Sivatanuiastra repeatedly
quoted by Abh. in the TA, who is coupled with Sadyojyotis in the introductory stan
za of Ramakantha’s commentary on the Mokfakarika.
7 Cf. the vrtti on IPK IV. 16, sak$atkrtaparamesvarabha((arakakarair bhaffa-
srlsomanandapadaih.
8 SD V11.19a, 24b.
XIII
to the authority of the VBh9. A late tradition (Chatterji 19142: 25 n.3)
even includes Somânanda (along with the other masters of the Pratya-
bhijnâ) in the spiritual line descending from Vasugupta. Somânanda
knows and criticizes (for his Sâkta tendencies) Pradyumna Bhatta, who
comes immediately after Kallata in the Spanda lineage. I will not dwell
here on the Spanda school, to which an exhaustive monography has
recently been devoted (Dyczkowsky 1987), except to say that its teach
ings, which had already emerged as a post-scriptural elaboration, were
subsequently re-elaborated, especially by Ksemarâja, and incorporated in
the synthesis of Abh.’s Trika, not without being to some extent strained
and depersonalized10.
All the scant information we have on Somânanda indicates his close
relationship to the Trika and the Krama. At the end of the SD he himself
informs us that he belongs to the Tryambhaka (or Terambha) mathikd
founded by the son of Durvasas, who was asked by Siva himself to save
the secret doctrine from oblivion. This is the same Tryambhaka who in
the TÀ is considered the depositary of the non-dualist Saiva tradition, in
other words especially the Trika11. We learn from Abh. that he wrote a
commentary - now lost - on the Pam trim sika, which belongs to the
ekavira form of the Trika. A surviving passage of the Kramakeli of
Abh., quoted and commented on by Jayaratha (TÀV III p. 192), men
tions Somânanda as a disciple of the Krama teacher Govindarâja, who,
before dying, passed on to him the doctrine of the Kâlîs taught in the
DevTpancasatika; this doctrine was transmitted by Somânanda, through
his spiritual line, down to Abh. (ibid. p. 194).
The only work by Somânanda that has come down to us, the §D (cf.
Gnoli 1957, 1959), is considered to be the first of the Pratyabhijnâ
school. In this difficult, discordant but fascinating work, he alternates
expositions of a non-dualist doctrine that is felt to be still very near to its
9 K$emaraja connects the Spanda, first af all, with the Krama (SN p. 74 evaqt
copakramopasamhârayor mahârthasampuflkâram darsayan ...) and, secondly, with
the Trika (§adardha) and the Mata (p. 49, 47). The concept of spanda (Sanderson
1988:695) is present in the Jayadrathayâmala and in other texts linked to the Kali
cult.
10 See, for instance, in the SSV the superimposition on the §S of the doctrine of
upayaSy which Abh. had derived from the MV.
11 TÀV vol. I p. 28 nikhilasâstropaniçadbhütasya çadardhakramavijnânasya
traiyambhakasantânadvàrena avatârakatvât; TÀ XXXVI. 12 tryambhakâmardakâbhi-
khyasrïnâthâ advaye dvaye / dvayâdvaye ca nipunâ kramena Éivasâsane (Jayaratha:
advaye iti trikakulâdau).
XIV
scriptural sources - though these cannot be clearly distinguished - logi
cal justifications, visionary tirades and summary dismissals of opposing
doctrines; he presents an exceedingly long and malevolent demolition of
the theories of the Grammarians. The central nucleus is the powerful and
effective affirmation of Siva as the only reality: he does not render the
universe so pale that it is transformed, as in the contemporary Vedántic
schools, into an indefinable play of shadows, but illuminates it from
within and constitutes its life. In this universe where everything is
penetrated by Siva nothing remains in the margins, all is mirrored even
in the humblest thing and the whole nature of Siva is present in it (SD
III. 18ab svanisthe sivatá deve prthivyadav apldrsam) - directly, just as
gold is directly gold in the jewel, though it assumes a particular form.
The doctrine of the sarvasaivátmaváda is the other face of the ekasivata.
Though this was already a long-standing concept12, here it acquires very
special importance and implications because it serves as the theoretical
context for the experience of the Tantric adept who has set out on the
path of the expansion of consciousness and energy: the object, though
maintaining its own identity, must not act as a dam, nor oppose itself
rigidly, but allow itself to be bent and, finally, uprooted, become an
integral part of this free flowing.
The principal argument in favour of this doctrine clearly derives
from the Vijñánaváda. If there were a real diffence in nature between
consciousness and things, the phenomenon of knowledge would be im
possible, because things, whether they have a concrete form or not
(atoms), cannot become the object of consciousness (IV.30). No relation
between things themselves would be possible, if they did not share one
and the same principle (V.l); this principle is precisely consciousness,
which exists equally in all things (V.l2). ‘Being’ is, actually, being
united with the manifestation of consciousness (cidvyaktiyogitd; cf.
IV.29; IV.7ab sarvabhdvesu cidvyakteh sthitaiva paramarthata). Thus
everything is pervasive, incorporeal and endowed with will, like con
sciousness (V.4). If things can be efficient, it is because they ‘want* one
particular action that is peculiar to them (V.l6,37). And if they want it,
they must also know it, in other words be conscious - first and foremost,
12 This conception is already referred to in the MBh (Wezler 1982). See also
Wezler 1992.
XV
of themselves. All things are in all conditions13 knowing their own self
(V. 105ab saw e bhavah svam atmanam janantah sarvatah sthitah). And
that self, continues Somananda in a visionary crescendo, is the same as
mine, as that of other subjects: “The jar knows by my own self. 1 know
by its self; I know by the self of Sadasiva, Sadasiva knows by my self ...”
(V.106 ab). All things have the essence of all others, because every thing
has the form-nature of all things. Everything is in everything, with the
various configuration of forms. I have the nature of the jar, the jar has
mine. In knowing himself through the different things, Siva resides
autonomously, being constituted by the manifestation of consciousness
and differentiated in the manifold differentiations (V.107cd-109). Once it
has been established that everything has the nature of Siva, the question
of the unity and multiplicity of the universe becomes pointless, and so
does the question of its reality-truth; even as regards the so-called ‘er
roneous’ cognition there is no real falsity (mithyatva), because even in
the eyes of the opponent it has, anyhow, some kind of efficiency (IV. 18-
20). Though the world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) is said to be
unreal, the reply is that the Lord is also manifest in unreality14 (m.77).
But what is then the nature of manifested things, which on the one hand
are limited and, on the other, enjoy a state of expansion, being united
with the supreme pacification of Siva (V.6)? Like everything that exists,
they are states in which Siva freely manifests himself (IV.47). It is true
that they have power, they are sakta, but, as everyday experience also
shows, having power, or being able to do something, does not mean
being independent15. If they are saktis, Siva is the possessor of these
saktis, though being inseparable from them; he is the only real sakta in
ways as infinite as his powers (IV.4-5). If they are states (avastha,
bhava), he is their substratum16.
We are, therefore, in a markedly saiva or sambhava context, in the
sense that the Power - though being inseparable from Siva (III.2cd) - is
subordinate to him. Once this premise is established, it is possible to let
it take the stage and see it rise in many points of the work to the role of
13 The subject cannot be insentient even with regard to the mere ‘being’ or
‘standing’ (V.14).
14 And also in pain (V.9).
15 If things were in themselves totally independent, the unification {anu-
samdhana) of their cognitions would be impossible ($DVf p. 147).
16 Cf. (punning on the root bhu-) IV.51ab tasmad svayam svabhavena bhavair
bhavT bhaved bhavah.
XVI
protagonist17. Somananda, following the teaching of the Trika, distin
guishes a triad of powers - iccha, jhana and kriya - (connected with the
level of Sakti, Sadasiva and Isvara respectively), which in fact are never
really separated from each other. Prior to them, at the top of the Saktitat-
tva plane, there is a moment in which they are completely mingled and
about to unfold: this is the state called unmukhitata, aunmukhya ‘proten
sion’ or prathama tutih ‘first moment (of the will)’ (I.18cd), ‘wawe’
(SDVr p. 16 tarahga, urmi). When these powers are totally dissolved in
unity with Siva, we have the supreme state, characterized by the supreme
lysis (nirvrti) and the conscious beatitude (cidrupahlada). But in no case
can one speak of Siva as quiescent or isolated (,santa, kevala) (III.87b-
88), insofar as devoid of power (m .90ab)18, nor can one speak of cessa
tion of the perception of the self, since Siva would then be insentient
(jada; IIL90cd-91ab). His turning to creation - and more generally to his
five functions - springs out of his own joy (amoda); he plays at conceal
ing himself and assumes the nature of maya down to the Earth (1.32).
Thus it cannot be said that the universe is ‘imagined’ as Siva, or vice
versa, because the one is directly the other (III.83). Just as gold is not
‘imagined’ as such neither in the simple jewel of solid gold nor in the
earring in which the work is so refined as to set aside, as it were, its
nature of pure gold, so Siva is ‘formed, arranged’ (klpta) as universe -
in the sense that he has become such, or freely presents himself in this
form (SDVr p. 133, klptah sampannah svayam sthitah)\ kalpana is, on
the contrary, imagining something where it is not (III.87c-91ab). There
fore, the nature of Siva is present in everything, whether we know it or
not (VII.led). Even differentiation has Siva as its essence19, hence there
is not really a bond nor, consequently, liberation (111.72). Furthermore, it
is the very belief in the actual existence of bond and liberation that con
stitutes the basic impurity (VII.87cd). All the ritual prescriptions, sastras
and teachers only serve the purposes of everyday life and are in any case
a way in which Siva manifests himself (III.48-49ab). Ritual bathing,
17 This is anything but an isolated case in the Saiva scriptures and treatises (see
also, in the Paricaratra tradition, the LaksmJtantra etc.).
18 If we admit the reality of Siva’s stale of inactivity, we are obliged to admit
that, in spite of everything, the three powers are present in it; it is precisely this
meeting of the three powers that constitutes the requisite of reality (111.56).
19 Even if in Saiva scriptures themselves we sometimes find the unreality of the
world affirmed, there is no real contradiction here, since this is merely a device to
promote detachment (II1.95cd).
XVII
offering to the fire, puja etc. (VTI.87 ff.) are external forms whose core is
the awareness that everything is resolved in Siva. He who worships, he
who is worshipped and the act of worship are in reality all one - Siva
(VII.94cd). The Siva principle, whether it is known or not, does not
suffer any real obstruction (VII. 1 ff.). Fire, whether externally perceived
or not, still generates light, and gold, if it is not known, does not there
fore become a stone. All this is doubtless true; it is true that the gem of
desires remains such even if it is not known, but only if man knows it as
such can he enjoy its effects (VII.4). The same may be affirmed regard
ing individuals’ identification with Siva. It has been said that even a fire
that is not known generates light, but so much more will be generated by
a fire aptly arranged for this purpose, such as a lamp in a house
(Vll.lOcd ff.). Thus a means must be taught whereby the attained aware
ness of the nature of Siva produces visible effects in the souls
(VII.12ab). This means is represented by logical argumentation, the
scriptures and the teacher20 (VII.5cd). The SD condenses all this.
It is therefore easy to imagine on which arguments in particular
Somananda challenges the opposing doctrines. First of all he attacks all
those who in various ways claim that the external world is unreal, espe
cially the various types of Vedantins (VI.3 ff.), who consider it as an
illusory manifestation (vivarta) of Brahman, caused by nescience, or the
Vijrianavadins (VI.33-34) who affirm the reality of knowledge but make
unreal objects arise from it and, moreover, do not admit a subject of this
knowledge - whereas every action, and therefore also the action of
knowing, is necessarily dependent on an agent subject. The thesis of the
Saktivadins is also rejected for a similar reason: they consider Power as
the sole reality, without taking into account that a power, even though it
is supreme, is implicitly dependent on a subject that possesses it. Then
there are those who admit agent subjects but make each of them an en
tity that is separate and distinct from the Lord; those who sharply divide
bond and liberation, like the followers of the Nyaya-Vaise§ika (VI.28cd);
and those who claim a Brahman devoid of consciousness, and hence
jada (VT.29). Even those who claim the reality of the external object,
like the bahyavadin Buddhists, are wrong because they do not admit a
unifying principle of reality, and thus make the passage from the moment
of sensation to the moment of mental elaboration impossible (IV.80cd
20 Cf. p. XXXVII.
xvm
ff.), and likewise the operation of apoha, through which they seek to
elude the universal.
It is essentially on the basis of these arguments, used either in isola
tion or together, that the opposing doctrines (apart from those already
mentioned, Jaina, Pahcaratra, Saivasiddhanta, Samkhya etc.) are gradually
dismissed. Several of these objections are concentrated in the criticism
of the doctrines of the Grammarians - namely of Bhartrhari - which
differs from the others for its disproportionate length (the whole of
ahnika II) and its aggressive, sarcastic tone.
These Grammarians who think themselves so clever - says
Somananda quoting passages from the VP and the vrtti - claim that the
supreme Brahman is to be identified with Pasyantl-vac, but the latter at
the most is identifiable with the power of Knowledge, that corresponds
to the plane of Sadasiva - definitely not to the highest plane. In fact, as
the word itself says, Pasyant! ‘sees’ something. But what is the nature of
its objects? If we say that they are externalised images that it itself has
produced, we must ask ourselves whether they are real or unreal. In the
first case the distinctive feature of this philosophy is lacking, namely
seeing the manifestation as illusory (vivarta); the unreality of what it
sees would have repercussions on it, rendering it asatya, which is inad
missible. If the cause of this perceiving unreal things is nescience, it is
the latter that must be established as being real or not: if it is real, then
Pasyant! is contaminated by it; if it is not real, it is not understood how
there can be a relation between a real thing and a unreal one. The same
is also true of its creation. Moreover, this nescience can be seen neither
as an attribute of Pasyant! (for the above-mentioned reasons); nor of
something else, since nothing real exists apart from it; nor is it to be
considered as independent, because then it would be impossible to sup
press it. Neither can avidya be imputed only to the middle level, because
in any case it is Pasyant! that is the cause of it. If Pasyant! is to be iden
tified with the sphota, we must ask ourselves how words, unreal as they
are, can manifest it. No means of knowledge can prove its existence,
since for you nothing is real except it. Even the belief that pronouncing
a correct word leads to heaven results in attributing to the only reality
that can be its subject characteristics which are contrary to its nature,
such as the desire for particular fruitions, etc. It is not possible to posit
as the highest reality that which, because of its very nature, always
remains - however you put it - an instrument of action {vac). Not even
identifying the sabdatattva without beginning and end with Para Vac
makes sense, since this means identifying the object (sound) with the in
XIX
strument (voice). If, then, Pasyanti is said to be only a proper noun and
hence to escape all the criticism concerning the fact of seeing, etc., and
that it is only the feminine ending that counts - which is intended to
express its being the power of Knowledge - , the reply is that, if it has
nothing to do with seeing, it is insentient and therefore cannot be the
power of Knowledge either. Then, the attributes that a verse21 assigns to
PasyantI are criticized one by one. And so on in this vein, until his final
outburst: But why on earth have you left the sphere of grammar and
taken it into your heads to deal with a field which is not yours, like
philosophy?
U tpaladeva (900/925-950/975)
XX
in the SD, any emotional colouring is banished. This does not mean that
Utp. was solely a logician: the extraordinary intensity of his hymns24,
which were to be collected in the $SA and are still recited daily by the
brahmins of Kashmir, proves it. In a sense Utp. inaugurates what was to
become a salient feature of the whole Trika in Abh.’s synthesis: namely,
the tendency not to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of
religious experience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide
with it (as in the ekantin trends) but to distinguish planes, that are
hierarchically ordered but in which the ‘higher’ does not automatically
cancel the ‘lower’ (as Somananda had already said, Siva is everywhere,
even in differentiation, pain and hell). This is the perspective of the
paramadvaita, such an elevated viewpoint that it does not fear what is
different from itself, is not put in a critical position by it, is not forced to
make a choice. If we take the IS, then we find a still different face. Were
it not for its certain attribution, we would never suspect that the refined
Naiyayika speaking here is the same person as the Saiva theologian of
the IPK or the bhakta of the S sA 25.
But let us return to the IPK and, firstly, let us see how Utp. deter
mines the choice of his opponents. The most important feature is that the
Saivasiddhantins virtually disappear, at least as direct targets, and the
stage is dominated by his critique of Buddhism. This is a message Utp.
addresses to his dualist cousins, whom - as will be seen more clearly in
Abh. - the Trika does not intend to defeat, but to use as a basis for its
emergence from the dimension of a restricted circle and for its establi
shment in the stratum of social normality, by internalizing, or in any case
circumscribing, its own specific difference26. The fact that the MV - that
is, a text containing distinct dualist lines (Chatterji 19142: 10, Sanderson
1992) and as such is venerated also by the Siddhanta - was chosen by
Abh. (following his master Sambhunatha ?) as the basic text for the
tam eva artham upodbalayata "iastratah” ity ayam. Here Abh. is referring to the
well-known passage of the Kiranagama, Vidyapada IX. 14b.
24 We should recall, on the other hand, that the very starting point of Pratya-
bhijfia theology is the state of devotion, the maheSvarasya dasyam mentioned in the
first verse of the IPK. Cf. SSA XV.4 etc.
25 It is only the last verse that enables us to see it in the right perspective.
26 This attitude is aptly outlined by an oft quoted verse: antah kaulo bahih Saivo
lokacare tu vaidikah / saram adaya titfheta narlkelaphalam yatha II (cf. Sanderson
1985: 203-205; id. ¡988: 699)
XXI
Trika is a clear indication of this attitude27. Choosing Buddhism, and
particularly its logical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing
the undeclared alliance with the Saivasiddhántins, who see Utp. siding
with them against those who had already been the opponents of
Sadyojyotis (see for instance the first chapter of his NaresvaraparJksa)
and were to be the opponents criticized by Náráyanakantha and especial
ly by Ramakantha, who displays a particularly vast knowledge of their
works and doctrines. This lengthy examination and criticism of the
teaching of the Buddhist logicians resulted in, or at least was accom
panied by, the peculiar phenomenon of a more or less conscious absorp
tion of their doctrines and their terminology, that was to leave substantial
traces in the structure of the Pratyabhijñá28. This may have been a
deliberate choice by Utp.: to increase his own prestige by assuming the
ways and forms of a philosophical school which was perhaps the most
respected and feared, even by the many who did not agree with it. But
certainly one must also view this in the light of the complex relationship
with the Nyáya.
The Nyáya was also given a wide berth as an opponent. This, too, is
probably part of the manoeuvre to place the Trika in a broader Saiva
context, seeing that the Saiva faith was known to be pre-eminent among
the Naiyáyikas. It is probably for this reason that we see Utp. assuming
a Naiyáyika guise in the IS (Abh. also dealt with the philosophy of this
school in the Kathámukhatilaka, now lost29). Against the realism of the
Nyáya, that claimed the reality of the external object and the actual exis
tence of concepts such relation etc., Utp. sets the criticism of the Bud
27 According to Abh., the Trika - and consequently the MV, which is its es
sence - represents the essence of the entire Saiva tradition and not of the sole non
dualism (TA 1.18 dasasfadasavasvastabhinnapi yac chasanam vibholt / tatsaram
trikaSastrarp hi tatsdrapi matiriimalam If).
28 I will not dwell on this point, which I have already dealt with elsewhere
(Torella 1992). Also Somananda presents and criticizes themes and doctrines of
Buddhist pramana tradition (inference, the universal as exclusion of the other, in-
stantaneity; cf. in particular §D IV.68 ff., V.44 ff. - within a general criticism of the
inference placed outside the context of ekasivatd - , VI.77 ff.) and refers, more or
less explicitly, to two verses by Dharmaklrti (PV III.282 in §D 1.45 and PV III.354
in SD VI.39). In the $D we find peculiar terms of Buddhist logic, such as
svalakfana (IV.71a), apoha (VI.76c), svarthanitmana (V.55a), paranumana (V.61c)
etc., but they are always referred to the opposing doctrines, without showing any
trace of conditioning or appropriation (as it is in Utp. and Abh.)
29 Cf. IPVV I p. 20.
XXII
dhist logicians, but only to show that they would easily get the better of
its relatively ingenuous realism if the Pratyabhijna did not intervene to
support it. After letting the Buddhist logicians demolish the Nyaya
categories, he shows how the Buddhist alternative is in fact equally inad
missible. It does overcome the Nyaya, but remains as though suspended
in mid air, since it is proved - in its fragmented and isolated universe -
to be incapable of accounting for the network of relations and the cir
cularity of the world of human experience. So - Utp. seems to say, and
later Abh. was to put this more explicitly - one might just as well accept
the view of the Nyaya in the sphere of the vyavahara, on condition that
one sees through it the pervasive presence of Siva as constituting its
dynamism and internal coherence. It could equally well resolve the in
consistencies of the Buddhist view and render them acceptable. In this
way, Utp. achieves the result of both showing the superiority of the
Pratyabhijna to Buddhism and warning the Nyaya not to count too much
on its forces alone, detached from those of the new Saiva theologians.
Another important aspect of the strategy of Utp.’s Pratyabhijna is the
glaring reversal of Somananda’s attitude towards Bhartrhari, who, from
being a punctiliously criticized and even derided opponent, becomes one,
of the major inspirers30 throughout the IPK (as I have sought to point
out in the notes to the traslation), and in particular in one of its essential
doctrines. I am referring to the identification in Siva of the dual p ra k a s a -
vim a rsa pole - the first understood as the motionless cognitive light that
constitutes the basic fabric, the founding structure of reality, of the
‘given’; the second as the spark that causes this luminous structure to
pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, freedom of interven
tion, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the na
ture of an unpredictable divine personality, like that of the violent and
loving Siva handed down in the Scriptures and with whom Utp.
dialogues in his mystical hymns. P ra k a sa forms, together with a large
group of synonyms or quasi-synonyms (from the roots b h a -, p ra tib h a -,
bhas-y avabhas-y abhas-y p ra tibhas-y p r a th -)31, a close-knit constellation
30 The fact that the Pratyabhijna shows at one time the influence of the Bud
dhists and of Bhartrhari does not appear as a contradiction, if we take into account
the undoubted relations and mutual exchanges between the doctrines of the Buddhist
schools (Madhyamika, Vijnanavadin, logicians) and the doctrines of Bhartrhari (cf.
e.g. Lindtner 1993).
31 To these must be added another key term, sphur-y where the light is enriched
by a ‘vibrant’, dynamic, connotation - which makes it into the intersection point
with the doctrine of the Spanda.
XXIII
of ‘luminous’ terms indicating the notions of being manifested, emerging
from the dark, coming to consciousness or, more in general, of being the
object of knowledge and finally simply ‘being’, whose use was already
firmly established especially in Vedantic and Buddhist (particularly logi
cal) contexts; prakasa and synonyms frequently occur in the VP.
Apart from isolated and uncertain cases in the Saiva scriptural tradi
tion (cf. Dyczkowsky 1987: 233 n. 10; cf. also SD II.83d, 84c),
vimarsa32, in the pregnant sense Utp. attributes to it, cannot but derive
from Bhartrhari’s teaching, especially if we consider its link with light,
on the one hand, and the word on the other. O f course, I am referring
here to the two very famous and most quoted stanzas 1.131-32 of the
VP33, whose influence, though extending over the whole structure of the
Pratyabhijna, we find concentrated in particular on two closely connected
aspects. One (IPK 1.5.19) concerns the only way deemed possible to ac
count for a common fact in everyday experience, such as the immediate
and seemingly toughtless action that still achieves its purpose - namely,
that of affirming the presence of a subtle reflective awareness even
within the sensation or movement captured at its most direct and undif
32 Vimaria has been translated in various ways and there are good reasons for
each of them: ‘cogitazione, pensiero’ (Gnoli), ‘prise de conscience (Silbum), ‘self-
consciousness, freedom, determinate consciousness’ (Pandey), ‘raissaisissement in
fini* (Hulin), ‘Betrachtung, Urteil’ (Frauwallner), ‘self-representation’ (Sanderson),
‘prise de conscience active, libre activité de la Conscience’ (Padoux) etc. The trans
lation ‘reflective awareness’ that I have generally adopted - drawn from Matilal
1968a, who however uses it to translate anuvyavasâya (also Dyczkowsky uses it fre
quently) - seemed to me broad enough to be adapted to the different contexts and
meanings in which the term is used. Being neither too precise nor too vague, it per
mits me not to disseminate the text of different expressions for the same term.
Vimaria is accompanied by a series of terms deriving from the same root with dif
ferent preverbs (parâ°> pratyava°, ava°y a°). A differentiation between them might
be attempted by identifying a more intimate and analytic element in vimaria, a more
instantaneous and indefinite element in parâmarsa, one more characterized by intro-
jection and return to the subject in pratyavamaria . However, the close reading of
the texts of this school indicates that, even if these different nuances are in principle
not unfounded, they are largely used as interchangeable terms. Another important
notion, closely connected with vimaria - and probably first introduced by Utp. - , is
that of camatkâra ‘astonished, wondrous, savouring’ (see below p. 118 n. 23). It could
be defined as a vimaria enriched with a strong aesthetic connotation.
33 See below p. 125 n. 41.
XXIV
ferentiated moment34. The other aspect regards the two solemn general
formulations (1.5.11 and 13) that define vimarsa (pratyavamarsa in the
vrtti) as the essential nature of light (avabhasa; prakasa in the vrtti) and
indissolubly link consciousness (c/7/ etc.), reflective awareness (pratya-
vamarsa) and the supreme word {para vac)35.
The presence of Bhartrhari, not only in the substance of these
doctrines but often also in their verbal formulation, could not be more
direct - even if the vrtti of VP36 does nothing to emphasize the apparen
tly very general meaning of the verse but, on the contrary, seems to do
its utmost to keep it down to earth. In making this doctrine one of the
crucial points of the Pratyabhijna, Utp. appropriates another prestigious
tradition, that of the Grammarians, and Bhartrhari in particular, whose
teaching on the all-pervasive power of the word is, moreover, connected
with a very ancient speculative trend, which also continues in the
Agamic tradition close to Utp. This is incorporated with no effort in the
philosophy of the Pratyabhijna, enriching it with implications, and -
something that must not be underestimated - it furnishes a further,
penetrating argument in the dispute against the Buddhist logicians, one
of whose basic theses was precisely the absolute otherness of direct
sensation from determinate knowledge. However, it is true that the
criticism of the tripartition of the word held by Bhartrhari (cf. below p.
120 n. 26) remains - according to what appears from the passages of the
tlka sketchily quoted by Abh. in the IPVV. But it seems to sleep into the
background, compared to the general acceptance of Bhartrhari’s teaching
as a whole. One might even say that Utp. criticizes the tripartition also
because this, though unanimously recognized by the contemporary
exegesis of the VP and explicitly mentioned by Bhartrhari himself, appears
XXV
to him not in line with the general plan of the VP, to which a quad-
ripartition like the Šaiva one would be more suited. The mention of a
supreme form of PasyantI made in the vrtti on the ŠD (p. 38) - which
Sománanda had not taken into consideration even if later Utp. con
siders it included in the criticism of Sománanda, might be understood as
Utp.’s airing of a hypothesis of fourth level in Bhartrhari himself. An in
direct confirmation might be represented by the explicit equivalence that
his disciple Rámakantha (Spandakarikavivrti p. 153) establishes between
šabdatattva and Parávác, which, therefore, does not coincide with PasyantI
but of which the latter is an emanation. Moreover, Rámakantha seems in
clined not to underline the illusory nature of the Šabdádvayavádins’
vivaría, but he considers it simply as a different way of denominating
that process of the Lord’s articulation in the multiplicity of the universe
which the Saivas call šaktiprasara ‘flowing of the Pow er’ (ibid.).
At any rate, it is clear that we are far removed from the attitude of
Sománanda37, who minimizes even that aspect which by contrast was to
strike Utp. so forcefully - namely, the inevitable presence of language at
the heart of every cognitive activity (ŠD II. 19-20)38. And I like to think
that the vidvad0 Utp. places in front of Bhartfhari’s name when, in ŠDVr
p. 84, he quotes in full a verse of the $addhátusamlksá39> which
Sománanda is fiercely attacking at the time, is a kind of veiled apology,
37 Furthermore, the conception of the Absolute that results from an overall view
of the VP appears close to that of the Pratyabhijñá. Positions such as that expressed
in the Sadhanasamuddeša (vv. 39-41) could easily have been subscribed to by
Sománanda himself (who refers only to the Kanda I), even if we do not read it in
the light of Helárája explanation (Prakirnakaprakaša 1 p. 262 ekam eva samvin-
mayam param šabdabrahma tatha tathavasthitam ili kárikarthah). The very notions
of avidya and vivarla, examined in the whole of the VP, seem to escape
Somananda’s criticism. Avidya, in fact, is not a principle extraneous to Brahman but
a šakti (VP 1 Vrtti p. 9) and, as such, does not weaken but rather accentuates Brah
man’s centrality. Similarly, the term vivaría (and related forms) seems to be used by
Bhartrhari to underline the continuity of Brahman in the manifold world of
manifestation rather than to signify a de-realization of the latter. Sománanda,
however, is certanly not the only one to interpret Bhartrhari in this way; while some
of his early critics, like Jayanta or Šántaraksita-Kamalašila, show they are at least
aware of the problems in interpreting these key-terms, the later Vedántins will not
seem to have any doubts about reading them in the light of the subsequent
Sarikarian doctrines.
38 The verse figures as an objection that Sománanda essentially pass over.
39 Quotations of this work attributed to Bhartrhari (Iyer 1969: 9-10), now lost,
are also to be found in the Spandapradipiká (pp. 4, 22). Of the two different titles
XXVI
a timid dissociation from what he finds himself commenting on with the
devout diligence of a disciple.
A further original contribution by Utp. to the philosophy of the
Pratyabhijna is the doctrine of the abhasas. Somananda had not develo
ped his own idea of the ontological status of the manifested world, but
had only asserted strongly and repeatedly its reality (satyata) and its
having the nature of Siva (sivarupata). Things are ‘states’ (avastha,
bhava) of Siva, and their emergence is due solely to his will, brought
about by nothing other than a natural overflowing of energies, whose
characteristic feature is ‘jo y ’ (am oda) as well as ‘play’ (k n d a ). Utp.
includes the world of manifestation in his great luminous metaphor.
Every aspect of reality is a light; it is a reflection in the mirror of
consciousness and has its ultimate reality in consciousness.
By combining elements drawn from the Vaiyakarana and the Bud
dhist pramana tradition, Utp. presents these ‘manifestations’ (abhdsa) as
having the nature of universal (in fact, each one of them is connected
with a word). They can appear in isolation or aggregated around a
dominant manifestation and are provided with a single or complex causal
efficiency, on the basis of a compatibility that has its ultimate foundation
in the law of Necessity established by the Lord. United among themsel
ves, thus becoming more and more particularized and, finally, combined
with three manifestations endowed with a special individualizing force -
space, time and form - they constitute the world of everyday experience.
It is easy to glimpse in this conception elements drawn from the
Vijnanavadins (consciousness as the receptacle of everything that is
gradually manifested), from the Vaiyakaranas (the idea of a hierarchy of
universals) and from the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism (cf.
Torella 1992: 332 ff.). In this case, too, the word abhdsa as a philo
sophical term, was not invented by Utp., but was commonly used in the
Vedantic and Buddhist schools. It also occurs in the §D40, but, even
XXVII
when it does not appear in a context where explicit reference is made to
opposing doctrines (various kinds of vivarta), its use seems to be merely
sporadic and casual, and in any case devoid of a precise technical con
notation. In one respect, abhasa is not distinguished from prakasa (and
related terms), and the two terms often seem interchangeable (svabhasa,
svaprakasa etc.; cf. SSA I.lc sivabhasah). In another (namely, in its
more technical use, as in the so-called abhasa theory), though the essen
tial unity of nature remains, abhasa is seen as a particle, an individual
ized and extroverted form of the ‘great light’41, ‘cut out’ in it. This frag
mentation of the light is accompanied by, and also presupposes, an
analogous descent of consciousness to the state of fragmented subjec
tivity of the manifold individual subjects (the true subject is avic-
chinnabhasa; cf. TPV II p. 138); see in particular Abh.’s commentaries
on IPK II.3.1-2. The relation between consciousness and abhasa is that
between the mirror and the reflected image, subtly analyzed in Chapter
III of the TA (cf. also MMP pp. 147-53). The ontological status of the
abhasa is therefore a mixture of autonomy and eteronomy, without its
basic reality ever being called into question: reality is precisely being
manifest (IPK 1.4.14 and vrtti; cf. APS 5ab evam apy avabhasanusakta
sattocita bhavet). Though he never explicitly repeats Somananda’s
extreme formulations (“the jar exists, knowing itself’), by using a typically
Vijrianavada argument, Utp. underlines the necessarily common nature of
consciousness and its object: only that which is itself light, i.e. sen
tience42, can shine in knowledge; to say that something is insentient is
like saying it is inexistent (APS I3ac). Even when an abhasa is viewed
as external - as ‘this’ —the ‘this’ continues to have its foundation in the
I; it may also be said that the reflective awareness of something in terms
41 In this case the Saiva tradition interprets abhasa as ‘limited light’, by attribut
ing to o° the meaning of Tsar, in this sense, the supreme Siva is nirabhasa (IPVV III
p. 271).
42 Among the rare passages in the Saiva scriptures that explicitly touch on and
philosophically elaborate this point, see that of the Ucchu$mabhairava (cit. SSV p.
4; Torella 1979: 39): “How is it possible, O Dear One, that these be objects of
knowledge, without being also subjects of knowledge. It is for this reason that im
purity does not exist.”, and of the Kalikakrama (cit. SSV pp. 57-58; Torella 1979:
112): “Knowledge shines within and without, in various forms, and there is no exis
tence of object that is outside knowledge. The whole world is, therefore, constituted
by knowledge, and no entity is perceived without knowledge. Knowledge has the
same nature as the object. [...] The single nature of knowing and the knowable
comes out of their mutual implication in the cognitive act.”
x x vm
of separation, of ‘this’, has been fully achieved only when it rests in its
innermost being, thus becoming the reflective awareness T (APS 16). It
is the same light of the self that is manifested as self and as other (APS
13cd).
Conceiving of the supreme reality as an absolute I is another innova
tion made by Utp. (cf. Dyczkowsky 1990), though in my opinion there
are no substantial differences between this and Somananda’s dynamic
Self-Siva which underlies the whole universe and express himself in it.
Utp. is the one who chose to use this word regardless of the associations
generally attached to it in Indian thought, being aware of the fact that the
risk of a reification that has always weighed heavily on the word atman
was even more negative, and that this makes it less suitable for expressing
the umpredictable overflowing of the divine personality. The term T is
implicitly aimed against the two conceptions that are, after all, closest to
the Pratyabhijna and which it most aspires to differentiate itself from: the
consciousness devoid of a subject of the Vijrianavada and the static
atman-brahman of the Vedanta. “The resting of the light in itself, or the
supreme condition of the I, is absolute independence from every other,
autonomy (svatantiya), agency, Lordship “ (APS 22cd-23).
I will not present in detail all the argumentations Utp. develops in
the Jhana° and in the Kriyadhikara (regarding which I refer directly to
the translation and notes). They mainly take the form of a debate with
the Buddhist logicians and also betray, as has been pointed out, their
strong influence. Utp.’s constant preoccupation is to show, in every con
text he deals with, the need for a single, dynamic subject that unifies and
animates the discontinuity of reality and constitutes the substratum of every
limited subject, as well as of every form and activity of everyday life.
This I or Consciousness is, on the religious plane, Siva. In his
highest form, the supreme divine personality is solely T - consisting of
consciousness and beatitude - in whom all the principles are contained
though in a state of complete dissolution. He is present throughout the
IPK as the ultimate essence of every reality and is also directly men
tioned here and there, even if the stage is generally occupied by a less
extreme form of him, which balances between transcendence and im
manence. In fact, being an expository work, which requires an object to
teach and a recipient of this teaching; it cannot but deal with that form
of the God which is open to the world of manifestation, whilst firmly
remaining its sovereign. On the supreme plane there is only the I resting
in his fullness and no trace of the knowable remains; even the Pratya
bhijna has to withdraw from this plane, leaving it in the background. In
XXIX
the various models of tripartition that the IPK presents, following in the
wake of the Trika (a h a m , a h a m -id a m , idam ; su d d h a , su d d h a su d d h a ,
su d d h a ; p a r a , p a r a p a r a , a p a ra ), this more accessible form of the God is
connected with the second level. It is mainly indicated as Mahesvara,
Isvara, Isa, Prabhu, whereas the supreme form is often given the name of
Siva or Paramesvara, but there certainly are exchanges between these
two series - which indirectly points out the fact that it is a question of a
sole reality and that every distinction of degree and figure is purely
instrumental to the expository requirements.
After leaving the sole force of independent argumentation to work in
the first two Adhikaras, Utp. - though in a subordinate way, as may be
seen from the disproportion between these sections - allows revelation to
take the floor43, being aware that there is a marked limit beyond which
experience and reasoning no longer suffice (cf.lPV II p. 213). And thus
in the first a h n tk a of the A g a m a d h ik a ra he goes on to describe the
principles that constitute reality - from Sadasiva to the Earth - without
expressly mentioning Siva or Sakti but considering them, or so it appe
ars, as fused in the figure of the supreme knowing subject (III. 1.1c), of
43 Utp. does not name any of the scriptural sources of the IPK. Abh. in IPV II
p. 231 expressly mentions the $adardhasara (see below p. 193 n. 13, probably the
same as the Trikahrdaya (or Trikasara) quoted for the first time by Bhaskara in the
Sivasutravarttika (p. 31) and then, repeatedly, by Abh., K§emaraja and Jayaratha
(Dvivedi 1983: Upodghata pp. 39-40). The nature of this text - belonging to the
so-called second stratum of the Trika scriptures, but also quoted by Abh. as an
authority for the Krama cult of the twelve Kalis - indirectly confirms Utp.’s position
in the Saiva tradition. According to Jayaratha’s explanations (TAV in p. 194), the
Krama doctrine taught in the DevTpancasatika, as well as the Trikadarsana, had been
handed down to Abh. through the lineage deriving from Somananda - that is,
through Utp. and Laksmanagupta (the latter, in particular, also being his teacher in
the Pratyabhijna) . In a definitely Krama context Ksemaraja (PH p. 20) quotes as an
authority a short passage from the lost \?tlka, and a Krama flavour can be noticed
here and there in the SSA (see e.g. chapter VIII). Regarding a passage from the vrtti
on IPK IV.5, vastutah saktivikaso visvam, Abh. names the Snmangalasastra as
being the source; and, in fact, elsewhere (SDVf p. 107) Utp. textually quotes the
passage of this Tantra which Abh. alluded to. The Mangala (or Sarvamangala) is in
cluded in the list of Bhairavatanlra given by the Srlkanthisamhitd. Abh. (IPV II p.
228) also mentions the Raurava (but with reference to a doctrine referred to but not
accepted by Utp. ; see also the quotations from the Kalottara in the $DVr) and,
in particular, the MPA, a text belonging to the Saivasiddhanta but whose peculiar
emphasis on the role of knowledge (presented as a more prestigious alternative with
respect to ritual) is well-known.
XXX
the Isitr (III. 1.2 vrtti). Abh. (IPVV Eli p. 258) identifies this supreme
principle, which is apparently placed at the top of the scale of tattvas and
not beyond it, with the sivatattva . By integrating, as seems possible, the
scant indications of the IPK with what Utp. says in his commentary on
the SD, one can state it is the sivatattva that presents itself as constituted
by all the tattvas (p. 22 sarvattavamayataya sivatattvavasthanam). Still
according the SDVr, it is the supreme Lord Siva, endowed with the two
powers of consciousness and lysis, or light and beatitude (p. 23
svarupanupravistacinnuyrtirupasaktidvayah prakasanandamayah pilrnah
paramesvarah sivah prasrtah); he assumes the form of the various
principles, beginning with Sakti (SD 1.29). Cf. IPK IV.14ac saiyatha tv
antaralTnanantatattvaughanirbharah sivas cidanandaghanah; SDVr p.
106 evam suvarnavat paramesvara eva pwyoktecchddisaktiman tatha
tattvabhuvanakaiyakaranadiprakaravaicitiyena [...] sthitah; in SD
III.21d and in the vrtti he is called sivatattva. In passages like these, we
seem to witness the overlapping and merging of Siva seen as the first or
last tattva and of the highest divine personality who is beyond the very
dimension of tattva - even if supreme - containing and transcending all
the tattvas without exception. This impression is reinforced when Utp.
passes from the noetic register of the IPK to the emotional register of the
bhakti in the SSA.
A great deal of space is devoted to the structure of the limited sub
ject in the second ahnika of the Agamadhikara. The divine subject
(pati) - whose body is constituted, as it were, by the universe - is
counterposed with the ‘beast’ (pasu), the fettered soul, in its various
forms depending on the maculations that characterize it. In the concep
tion outlined by Utp. there are two components from different sources:
the hierarchy of subjects - which is a peculiar element of the Saivasid-
dhanta44 —and a version of the three maculations which, though deriving
from the analogous doctrine of the Saivasiddhanta, has an utterly monis
tic qualification. The anava, mayiya and karma maculations45 completely
lose their original nature of ‘substances’ that physically obstruct the self
of the pasu from without and resolve themselves into erroneous attitudes
of the individual consciousness46. The anava maculation, with its
XXXI
obliterating the one or the other of the components of subjectivity (con
sciousness and freedom, bodha and svdtantiya) determines that identity
crisis onto which the other two are grafted: the màyic one - which
causes the I to see the world of objects as separate from himself - and
the karmic one - which makes him consider his own actions as the
causes of the series of rebirths, miring him in the samsara. The cause of
all three is the power of màyà, which has its roots in the very will of the
Lord (III.2.5 vrtti). The individual knowing subject, variously con
taminated by these three maculations, is then distinguished according to
the four levels which he tends to identify with (void, vital breath, mind
and body) and the conditions (avastha) in which his experience of reality
may take place (waking, sleep and deep sleep, corresponding to direct
perception, to mental costruct and to partial or total suspension of all
activity and knowledge). The fourth state, in which duality is overcome,
corresponds gradually to the conditions of Vijnànâkala, Mantra,
Mantresvara and Isa; the state beyond the fourth is the one in which
every trace of the knowable is dissolved in the absolute I of Siva.
As we have seen above, the limited subject tends to identify with
four aspects progressively higher in rank, which are however still in
cluded in the sphere of the objects: the body, the mind, the vital breath
and the void. Their predominance causes the eclipse of the two com
ponents of his authentic subjectivity, consciousness and freedom (bodha
and svâtantrya-kartrtâ). Liberation, therefore, consists in inverting this
relation - namely, in the consciousness-freedom establishing themselves
at the centre of the individual, while pushing the components of the fic
titious I in the margins47 - and takes on the form of a knowledge that is
‘characterized by penetration in it’ tatsamâvesalaksanam (ÏPK III.2.12d).
Here we have one of the key words of the Kashmiri Tantric tradition,
which, furthermore, possesses the particular feature of allowing one to
glimpse the succession, or rather, the coexistence of two different con
ceptions of the individual I ’s escape from his limits. In fact, in samâvesa
the meanings of ‘to enter, to penetrate into’ and ‘to be penetrated, pos
sessed by’ coexist, thanks to the dual transitive and intransitive sense of
the root v /i-48. In the earlier stages of these schools the term must
doubtless have been mainly used to mean the loss of individual identity
and the paroxysm of energies which derive from being possessed by the
xxxn
terrible divinities linked to the funerary and sexual transgressions,
evoked in the Kàpàlika rites49. In the later phase represented by the
Trika and the elaboration of its teachings, the prevalent use of the term
in its active meaning sometimes appears as a conscious declaration of
new intentions - even a kind of damnatio memoriae of a past that has
become uncomfortable for those aiming at new integrations50. Utp. uses
avis- with the active meaning in the first of the final verses of the IPK
(‘... entering in the Siva nature ...’). Also in the first verse of the SD51
samâvistah is definitely active, but, since it is referred to Siva, the result
is that it is my form that is penetrated by the God. As Utp. explains, it is
Siva who has become one with my form, in the sense that he has entered
realities such as the vital breath etc., which in themselves are not dif
ferent from the other inert things such as the jar and so on, in order to
make them into centres of individual conscious life; indeed, the more in
tensely he penetrates them, the more the extraordinary powers emerge
(p. 3 yâvatyâ ca mâtrayâ samâvesas tâvanmâtrasiddhisambhavah). And,
therefore, he who seeks these powers must increasingly deepen this
‘entry’ into himself. However, Utp. concludes, we can imagine that both
Siva and man enter and ‘are entered’, since the movement towards unity
is the same in both. These considerations have left their mark in the way
Abh. develops the laconic text of the kârikâ, tatsamâvesa0, which is only
glossed in the vrtti with tacchaktisamavesa0. Abh. says (ÏPVV III p.
327) that this word is intended to refer to the two forms of liberation in
XXXIII
life. In the one case it has the meaning of ‘complete and perfect entry
into the own true nature’ (satyasvarûpe samyag â samantât pravesa-
laksanam; active meaning) and corresponds to the state beyond the
fourth in which the adept, after becoming aware of the supreme nature of
the I, becomes as though withdrawn from the knowable which formed
his fictitious identity. By contrast, in the other the various components of
the levels of the limited subject are gradually penetrated by the elixir of
the I, until they become, so to speak, transfigured, removed from their
nature of knowable realities. This experience, which corresponds to the
fourth state, can be extended further, until it flows into the state beyond
the fourth, where the components of limitation, including samskâra, are
totally dissolved and incorporated in the I. The passive sense of the
second explanation of samavesa and its relation with the above passage
of the SDVr become evident from what Abh. adds later (ibid. p. 330),
this time apparently referring to tacchaktisamavesa° in the vrtti: tasya
samviddharmâh saktivisesâh samyag âvisanto vibhütlr utthdpayanti (cfr.
above n. 49)52.
The fourth state and the state beyond the fourth can be attained
through the practices centred on the vital breaths, described in the
Àgamas. Utp. briefly touches on this point at the end of the
Âgamâdhikdra. The duality of the prdna and apdna that characterizes the
waking and dream states is overcome with the entry into the samdna,
which suspends and unifies them, corresponding to the state of deep
sleep. The subsequent level, represented by the udâna, marks the end of
the limited condition, which culminates - with the all-pervasive presence
of the vydna - in the supreme condition of Siva.
XXXIV
In the Tattvasamgrahadhikara the path to liberation passes through
the overcoming of the activity which, throughout the IPK, is considered
as the very core of the condition of limited subject: the vikalpa - the
dualizing, discursive thought, that unfolds through antinomies and or
ganizes reality in terms of separation - in all its forms. The two different
methods taught by Utp. give the same result - liberation in life - the one
by the gradual attenuation and elimination of mental constructs through
the cultivation of their opposite (the nirvikalpa), the other by allowing
them to flow and progressively purifying their contents. I shall return to
these later.
The whole of Utp.’s work, however, is built around teaching the
‘recognition’ of the Lord, which also the two above-mentioned forms are
part of (IPVV III p. 354 pahcabhih [the last five stanzas] pratya-
bhijhdtmakam moksatattvam). This new and easy way is merely the trig
gering in the devout of an act of identification, which does not reveal
anything new but only rends the veils that hid the I from himself; a
cognition is not created but only the blur that prevented its use, its enter
ing into life, is instantly removed. The way by which the master creates
the premises for this to occur may, on the contrary, be gradual: this is
what Utp. does with his work, which aims through a series of arguments
at bringing to light the powers of the I and those of the Lord, until iden
tification is triggered. The practice of such a linear (avakra) path is
enough to enter into the nature of Siva and achieve the condition of
liberated in life, which may also be accompanied by the extraordinary
powers (IPVV I p. I l l Tsvarapratyabhijhakrto 'bhyudayo jlvanmuk-
tivibhutilaksanah). This ‘penetration’ still presupposes a body and, in any
case, a state in which the distinction between the I and Siva has not yet
been dissolved53. This occurs within everyday reality just as it is. The
light of liberation does not cause its colours to fade, does not cover them
but brightens them, performing the miracle of eliminating otherness
whilst maintaining the richness of individual flavours.
Says Utp.:
“Dwelling in the midst of the sea of the supreme ambrosia, with my
mind immersed solely in the worship of You, may I attend to all 'the
to which the avyatireka- of the vise$adar$anas is opposed). Utp. and Abh.’s inclina
tions lie towards the latter.
53 IPV II p. 258 dehapate tu paramefvara evaikarasah iti kah kutra katham
samavesah.
XXXV
common occupations of man, savouring the ineffable in every thing.”
(SSA XVIII. 13)
“May my desire for the objects of the senses be intense, O Blessed
One, like that of all other men, but may I see them as though they
were my own body, with the thought of differentiation gone”. (VIII.3)
“May I aspire to liberation by worshipping You, without withdrawing
from experience and the world, and without even seeking the
dominion [of the extraordinary powers], but becoming intoxicated
with the abundant liquor of devotion”. (XV.4)
T he fu ture o f th e P r a t y a b h i j AA
XXXVI
Somananda54 in southern scripts (for example, it is to be noted that the
only complete MS of the IPvrtti is in Malayalam characters).
The doctrine of the upayas, stated briefly and as though in passing in
the MV (11.20-23), is taken up again with great emphasis by Abh. and
comes to constitute one of the main structures of the Trika, serving as a
device to incorporate diverse spiritual traditions in this great synthesis,
without levelling away their individuality. I will spare the reader yet
another exposition of the doctrine of the upaya55 (just as I spared him
that of the tattvas) and confine myself to some considerations par
ticularly on the first two: the non-means (anupaya) and the divine means
(sambhava). Firstly, we must remember that, according to Abh., there is
no real difference between anupaya and sambhava - the former only
representing the higher plane of the latter56 - and that the sambhava is the
sole ‘direct’ means (saksat, TA 1.142a), whereas, of the two others, the
anava is only a means of access to the sakta and the sakta to the
sambhava (142b and Jayaratha’s commentary). In the non-means57 the
adept immediately establishes himself at the centre of the supreme con
sciousness without the need of a jumping off point. The teaching of a
master pronounced once only, or a series of arguments, or faith in the
scriptures are sufficient (TA II.49ab). Even if these causes may be
endowed with succession, the phenomenon they trigger is not; in fact, in
particularly privileged cases, it may arise by itself, without any of these
detonators. The intensity of this state of penetration is such that even a
mere chance encounter with a subject who has entered it may in certain
cases determine instantaneous liberation (11.40). Everything appears dis-
54 Which shows that the early Pratyabhijna texts continued to be studied also in
dependently of Abh.’s interpretation.
55 One of the most concise and clear enounciations is to be found in the
Tantroccaya: (anupaya) p. 161 tatra sa parameivaraprakasah kasyacid aviratapra-
bandhataya punar upayanirapeksataya bhati ekavaram guruvacanam Tdriam samyag
avadharya; (sambhava) p. 163 kasyacit tu parameivaraprakasas tadlydyam svd-
tantiyasaktau nirjndtdyam prakasate /.../ ahamsvdtantryasaktibhdsitaviivdbhasah
parameivaro vibhur eko nitya iti muhur muhur bhdvayan sa eva; (sakta) p. 165
yasya tv ittham apy avikalpakah samdveso nodeti sa savikalpabhavanaya sat-
tarkarupaya samskurute vikalpam; (anava) p. 167 yas tu sattarkena na nirmala-
svabhavam asadayati tasya dhyanadikam ucyate.
56 TAV I p . 182 sa eva pardm kastham praptai canupaya ity ucyate.
57 The expression ‘non-means’ is not to be taken literally; it alludes to the far
more subtle nature of this means - which, however, remains such - with respect to
the others (cf. TA II.2-3 and Jayaratha’s commentary).
xxxvn
solved in the Bhairavic fire of consciousness to him who has entered this
state (11.35).
While this kind of samâvesa58 concerns the innermost aspect of con
sciousness, in the divine means the stress falls on its power of Freedom
(TSâ p. 10, Tantroccaya p. 163), or its manifesting as the universe. Here
there is indeed a means-end relation, though in a very subtle form. The
adept can start from any aspect of the knowable, taken in its dimension
that is closest to consciousness and not yet differentiated from it, and see
it as an image reflected in a mirror - distinct but inseparable from its
support. This experience, strictly devoid of discursive representations
characterized by the scission between subject and object, rests on the
Lord’s power of Volition, in which the manifestation is still completely
enclosed within the desire to create: “All is born of me, is reflected in
me, is inseparable from me” (TÀ III.280ab). Unlike the anupaya where
everything happens in an instant, once and for ever, this experience is to
be repeated essentially the same and progressively extended to all the
aspects of reality (TÀ III.274 ff.). Through repetition and succession
(TÀV II p. 1 sâmbhavopâyam kramaprâptam, TÀ 111.271 a bltilyo blulyah,
Tantroccaya p. 163 muhur muhuh) the adept reaches liberation in life,
the fourth state. One can only speak of liberation in life with respect to
the divine means; in the anupaya it cannot even be said that one is
somehow liberated from something; in it, means and end coincide (TÀ
111.272-73).
The Pratyabhijna is traditionally connected with the anupaya. Abh.
does not say this explicitly; he just refers, towards the end of the treat
ment of the anupaya, to two authorities: the Ormimahâsâstra and
masters such as Somananda etc. Regarding the latter, Jayaratha’s com
mentary only mentions the SD and quotes the well-known passages
VII. 10led and VII.5-6, the second of which, moreover, also appear
through in the final stanza of Âhnika II of the TÀ. In fact, it is
Somananda who expressly mentions ekavaram (VII.5c), which consti
tutes one of the essential features of the anupaya (which always takes
place sakrd ‘once and for ever’). The central teaching of the Pratya-
bhijhâ seems less extreme: we might say a sâmbhavopâya in the broad
sense which leaves room within it for both experiences - sovereignty
58 Even though the modem authors sometimes tend to use apaya and samavesa
as synonyms, an obvious distinction between them remains (cf. TSa p. 9 para-
mesvara samaveso nirupayaka eva, etc.).
xxxvm
and complete dissolution in the I, turya and turyatlta, seen as forms of
liberation in life. The end of the Pratyabhijna is, indeed, jlvanmukti (iPVr
on IV. 16 etatparisTlanena sivatavesat JJvann eva mukto bhavati) - a con
dition which Abh. does not connect with the anupaya but with the
sambhava (TA III.272). The Pratyabhijna furnishes a series of prelimi
nary arguments to the act of recognition, which, though with a different
intensity, is at the basis of both the anupaya and the sambhava. In fact,
also the anupaya requires ‘purification through the composition of a
series of arguments’ (TA II.49a yuktipracayaracanonmarjanavasat)59;
and, in the ambit of the sambhavopdya, Jayaratha (TAV I pp. 239-40 on
TA 1.216) notes that it is only thanks to the teaching that leads to the
recognition of the true nature of the self that these practices can be
productive, while those same states exempt from discursive representa
tions which from time to time are spontaneously produced in the
unaware and fettered subject (pasu) remain sterile.
Also the practice outlined in IPK IV. 11, with its emphasis on vikal-
pahana and krama60, is typically sambhava. Ksemaraja in PH p. 40
makes this clearly understood by quoting this passage to illustrate an
experience he defines vikalpam akinciccintakatvena prasamayan, which
echoes the definition of sambhavasamavesa in MV 11.21.
But in the IPK other means are also taught. If we want to read it in
the light of Abh.’s systemization, we will have to classify as anava the
practices and experiences centring on the vital breaths hinted at in
III.2.19-20 and recognize in the experience described in IV. 12 - “He
who, having all as his essence, thus knows: ‘All this multiform de
ployment is mine’, he, even in the flow of mental constructs, attains the
state of Mahesa” - the elements that characterize the saktopdya, i.e. the
progressive purification of discursive representation and its transfor
XXXIX
mation into pure reflective awareness61 (Sivopadhyaya is explicit in con
cluding his commentary on VBh 109, p. 95, where this verse is quoted
as an authority: iyam sakti bhuh).
The teaching of the Pratyabhijna, in both its aspects of philosophical
elaboration and spiritual achievement, was transmitted by Abh. and his
disciple Ksemaraja, thus influencing the diverse currents of Tantric
Saivism which, either explicitly or implicitly, were to tend to model their
theoretical structure upon it.
The case of Ksemaraja deserves special mention. With the PH he
composes a kind of catechism, of Pratyabhijna in nuce, addressing the
many who would have been unable to deal with the dialectical subtleties
of the major work (the IPK and its commentaries). In the PH - a work
perhaps modest in itself, but important because of its wide circulation
and the influence it exerted especially over the Saiva-sakta schools of
South India (cf. Mahesvarananda; the texts connected with the Tripura
school etc.62) - we witness a kind of apotheosis of the Pratyabhijna:
from a single school accepted and valued within the great synthesis of
A bh.’s Trika it ends up by constituting the very framework, in which
Ksemaraja also inserts teachings from other schools, especially the
Krama63.
T he IS v a r a p r a t y a b h u n A k A r i k A a n d it s c o m m e n t a r i e s
The IPK - which made the name of Utp. famous - must have been
an early work, given the fact that all his other philosophical writings
presuppose it and contain specific references to it.
His other works include the following. SDVr, named Padasangati in
the third introductory verse (Mahesvarananda calls it by this name in the
MMP), which has come down to us only up to IV.74. IS and vrtti: a
demonstration of the existence of the Lord written from a Naiyayika
viewpoint, arguing against Mlmamsa, Samkhya and Buddhists. SS and
vrtti: the exposition of his own conception of relation against the oppos
61 Cf. the vrtti: paramarsamatran asesan vikalpan sampadayatah. See also the
commentaries on this verse by Abh. (IPVV III p. 393 vikalpa avikalpa bhavanti)
and by Ksemaraja (PH p. 28 suddhavikalpasaktim utlasayanti).
62 The Yoginihrdaya-Setubandha and Lak$mlrama*s commentary on the
Paratrimsika call it Saktisutra.
63 On the possible connection of Utp. with the Krama see above p. XXX n. 43.
XL
ing theories, especially the Buddhist ones (see below pp. 95 ff.). APS:
restatement of his conception of subjectivity and its relation with object,
first expressed in the EPK64. The SSA deserves a separate mention65:
twenty mystical hymns composed by Utp. at different times during his
life and later collected and ‘edited’ by his disciples66. In them, moments
of exaltation alternate with moments of discouragement, enriching and
cracking the mask of the impeccable theologian of the major works67.
Utp. devoted two commentaries to the IPK, a short one (vrtti) -
edited and translated here - and a long one (yivrti or tlka)6s, of which
only fragments have come down to us (Torella 1988). Neither of these is
really and truly a word for word commentary. The vrtti confines itself to
presenting the content of the stanzas in another form and briefly pointing
out its implications; the vivrti takes the karikas and the vrtti as its start
ing point and often develops into far-reaching excursuses. The link bet
ween the sutras and the vrtti is a particularly close one. Despite the fact
that they are presented as being artificially differentiated, they substan
tially constitute a single work, since - according to Abh. (IPVV I pp. 16,
183) - they were composed at the same time. Proof of this lies in the
fact that the namaskara, present in the sutras, is not repeated at the
beginning of the vrtti, whereas it is in the tika {ibid. pp. 2-3). This
makes the vrtti specially important for grasping the ‘original’ meaning of
64 The commentary that Utp. certainly composed on this work (see MMP p.
133) has not come down to us.
65 Sdstraparamarsa v. 8 (cit. Pandey 1963: 163 n. 3) “There are, it is true,
everywhere thousands of rivers of beatiful verses, but none of them resembles the
divine river of the StotravalT'.
66 Two other verses attributed to him, but not included in the SSA, are quoted
in the Mahdnayaprakaia of Sitikantha p. 12 (yat kimcit eva bhutanam bhavava-
ranam prati / na kimcid eva bhaktanam bhavadavaranam II; sarvasamvinnadibhe-
ddbhinnavisrantimurtaye / namah pramatn>apu$e sivacaitanyasindhave //, see also
Bhavopaharavivarana p. 43); YoginJhrdayadTpika p. 287, after quoting the latter
verse as belonging to the PardpancaSika, quotes another one {yatra yatra milita
marlcayah / tatra tatra vibhur eva jrmbhate II) and attributes it to the Stotravali (is
it that by Utp. ?).
67 The MS given as *Mantrasara by Utpaladeva’ in the Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute Library, indicated by Rastogi (1979:134) as a possible un
published work of Utp., actually contains the PTLV of Abh., whose second verse
says, in fact, sadagamapravdhesu bahudha vyakrtam trikam / snmadutpaladevlyam
tantrasaram tu varnyate II.
68 His length must have been equivalent to 6000 or 8000 ilokas (Torella 1988:
141).
XLI
the stanzas. In the tlka, that was composed later on, we already find mul
tiple interpretations of the same verse, all considered equally possible but
evidently being the outcome of further reflections.
The karikas, the vrtti and the tikd represent three distinct and relative
ly autonomous stages in the exposition of the Pratyabhijna doctrine and,
accordingly, it is as though Utp. has taken three different roles (bhumikd)
- karika0 or sutrakara, vrttikdra and tikakara (IPVV I pp. 2-3) - almost
three different persons, capable of dialoguing and disputing with each
other, and yet remaining within the higher unity of the granthakara or
sastrakara. The karikas, the vrtti and the tika are seen by Utp. in the tlka
- as we can gather from the IPVV - as respectively linked to the three
planes of PasyantI, Madhyama and Vaikhari on which the Supreme Word
(Paravac) is articulated. On the supreme plane the essence of the doctrine
still lies in the consciousness of its author Utp., undivided from Siva,
and it is given the name of ‘heart’, precisely because of its quintessential
nature. On the PasyantI plane it takes the form of sutra, insofar as a
differentiation begins to be outlined (dsutrana), which is necessary if it
is to become an object to be taught and explained to other men. Then,
on the Madhyama plane, the essence is disclosed (unmllita) in the vrtti
and finally, on the Vaikhari plane - which corresponds to the vivrti
having now become clear through the refutation of the opponents’ pos
sible objections, it is fully differentiated and thus accessible to the com
prehension of all (IPVV I p. 16).
To this distinction between the planes of the doctrine corresponds the
diversity of levels in the recipients of the teaching. Both the sutras and
the vrtti are aimed at those who are not impregnated with the latent
traces of their earlier adhesion to other doctrines. The study of the
sutras-vrtti as a whole prepares them for the subsequent phase which
consists in the study of the sutras alone, independently of the vrtti. On
the contrary, those who are under the influence of erroneous conceptions
deriving from the profession of different doctrines, are obliged to follow
the whole course beginning with the tlka. When the tikd has removed
these errors, they can have access to the sutras accompanied by the vrtti,
and subsequently to the sutras taken alone, until they reach the heart of
the doctrine in identity with the consciousness of the sastrakara (ibid.).
Abh. devoted two of his most important works to the doctrines of
Utp. The one (Viniarsini) is a commentary on the stanzas alone, the other
(VivrtivimarsinT) a commentary on the vivrti or tikd, which, as we have
seen, was in its turn a commentary of the complex karikas-vrtti. No
commentaries predating A bh.’s have come down to us, even though an
XLII
exegetic tradition must already have existed (cf. IPVV II p. 210), which
was probably only oral. From Abh.’s sporadic annotations we come to
know that the texts of the Pratyabhijna69 were already beginning in his
time to present some doubtful readings and variants for some points
were already circulating.
Information on the chronological order of A bh.’s two commentaries
is contradictory. What would appear to be the more naturale sequence -
first the lengthy commentary on the tika and then a reduction of the vast
and varied material to a smaller size and a more concise and incisive
form - seems to be confirmed by what Bhaskara says at the beginning of
his sub-commentary (I p. 3)70. But Bhaskara has not proved to be a reli
able source in this respect, since he later (Bh I p. 316) does not hesitate
to invert the order71. However, a passage from the TPVV, which
unequivocally mentions the V im arsinf2, is decisive on this point.
Abh.’s contribution to the Pratyabhijna - in the light of what can be
inferred from the hints at and quotations of the tika contained in the
IPVV and other passages of the tika which have been handed down to us
in various ways - appears far less original than is generally thought.
Despite the inevitable difficulty in reading a text like the IPVV, which is
an extensive and diffuse commentary on a work that has not come down
to us, it seems clear that the majority of the themes and subjects that
Abh. touches on find their direct correspondence - or at least their start
ing point - in Utp.’s tika. In fact, the TPV itself, which according to Abh.
is intended to be a commentary on what the karikds are in themselves73,
accomplishes its task through a carefully gauged and considered sys
tematization of a rich speculative material whose early origin is to be
glimpsed in the tika . In his interpretation of the stanzas Abh. essentially
echoes the interpretation or interpretations of Utp., sometimes enriching
them with new arguments. He only diverges from Utp. in four instances
69 The later authors often refer to one or the other of the three texts (IPK, vrtti
and vivrti) only by the mention 77/ pratyabhijndyam .
70 On this basis Pandey 1963: 32 maintains the priority of the IPVV.
71 The first passage, too, was incorrect in considering the SDVr as the first of
Utp.’s works, whereas, on the contrary, it often refers to the IPK and its commen
taries.
72 III p. 230 anenaiva asayena asmabhih sutravimarsinyam ekarasatvena idam
sutram vyukhyatam, ilia tu yavadgati vicarayitum ittham vibhagena apeksd
vydkhydtd.
73 TPV I p. 39 astndkam tu sutravydkhyana eva udyamah.
XLIII
(1.3.4b bhranter arthasthitih katham; I.4.4ab naiva hy anubhavo bhdti
smrtau purvo 'rthavat prthak; 1.7.lc akramanantacidnlpd\ II.4.10d sthi-
rasvdrthakriyakaram) - in the last instance this is explicitly declared; see
p. 179 n. 14 - but in none of them is the overall thread of discourse sig
nificantly altered. Discrepancies are sometimes to be found between the
text of the karikas and vrtti as has been established here on the basis of
the MS tradition and Abh.’s quotations from it. This is often due to the
fact that these are not actual quotations, but paraphrases, which some
times expand and sometimes contract the text; at other times, it is a
question of errors that have crept into the MS tradition of the IPVV or
of errors already present in the text of the vrtti that Abh. had before him
(see the Apparatus).
That the IPV of Abh. ended up by eclipsing all the other com
mentaries - including those by Utp. him self74 - and that it has become
established as the standard commentary, thanks both to its intrinsic
quality and to its author’s great prestige, may also be seen from the fact
that it is the only one for which sub-commentaries were composed, such
as the vyakhya of Bhaskarakantha or the anonymous commentary in the
Madras Government Oriental MSS Library75, and others only extant in
fragmentary MSS, like the iPV-vyakhya in Trivandrum Library
(No.l5413C) or the IP-anvayadTpikd (by one Sadhananda?) in Mysore
Library (No.B.187 of the old Catalogue)76.
74 This is proved by the scant MS tradition of these works (only one complete
MS of the vrtti and a short fragment of the tlka have come down to us) and the very
few quotations from them. While K§emaraja and Jayaratha (obviously, besides Abh.)
show their knowing the fika, also independently of the IPVV, the only mentions of
the vrtti I am aware of are in late works and by authors belonging to South India
(Mahesvarananda and Krsnadasa; see text notes p. I n. 9 and p. 63 n. 218.
75 I have learnt from N. Rastogi that the edition of this text was prepared long
ago by K.C.Pandey and himself, but its publication has been as yet stopped by
problems concerning precisely this joint authorship.
76 There are also at least two other (late) commentaries on the karikas alone,
one by Nagananda in the Adyar Library (No.28. B. 24, mentioned in Raghavan
1981: 31) and the other by the Kashmirian Bhattaraka Sundara (IPKaumudi;
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1083). The colophon of a MS of the
vrtti (see below p. LIII) mentions Bhattaraka Sundara as he who would have
composed a commentary to take the place of the final part of Utp.’s vrtti (missing in
all the Kashmirian MSS). During my last visit to Srinagar, I tried - without success
- to see the MS of the Kaumttdl, possibly misplaced.
XLIV
B ib l io g r a p h ic n o t e
The IPK with Utp.’s vrtti has been edited in the KSTS (see Biblio
graphy); the text of the vrtti, corrupt in many points, breaks off at the
beginning of III.2.9. The text of the karikas is obviously included also in
the two editions of the IPV77 and in that of the IPVV.
The karikas have been integrally translated into English (twice: Pan-
dey 1954, together with the IPV; Kaw 1975-76); partially - Jnanadhikdra
and ahnika I of the Kriyadhikara - into German (Frauwallner 1962). The
vrtti has never been translated.
77 If I chose to quote the IPV according to the edition which also contains
Bhaskara’s sub-commentary, it was not because of my considering it the more cor
rect (it is rather the opposite!), but only in order to be able to give a single reference
for both texts.
XLV
ABOUT THIS EDITION
This edition is based on nine MSS (and the comparison with the in
complete text edited in the KSTS). O f these, eight are in Sarada script
and are indicated with the letters from Gh to T (the MSS K Kh G are
those used for the KSTS ed.; the reference to them is limited to the read
ings quoted in the foot-notes of that edition). The ninth MS, marked with
the siglum T, comes from Kerala and is in Malayalam characters.
A first division is to be made between the MS T - on the one hand -
which is the only one complete and generally gives better readings, and
the Sarada MSS - on the other - which all break off at the same point
(beginning of the vrtti on III.2.9), have lacunae and corrupted passages
and, in general, less satisfactory readings (cf. text notes Jndnadhikara
35, 41, 59, 72, 92, 279, 293, 371, 384, 388, 381, 408, 417, 461; Kriya°
8, 89, 148, 151, 155, 167, 170, 181, 186; Agama° 9, 39, 46, 64, 74, 77;
etc.).
Moreover, within the Sarada MSS (dating from XVII to XIX cen
tury) we can distinguish between a very homogeneous group of seven —
Gh N C Ch Jh N T (to which we may add K Kh G) - and J. This MS,
though sharing many of the features common to the seven others, is the
only one that shows a considerable amount of readings identical with, or
sometimes similar to, those only found in T (cf. text notes Jnana° 53,
105, 237, 242, 263, 281, 322, 383, 404, 427, 432, 444, 445, 449; Kriyd°
21, 43, 70, 87, 116, 120, 130, 159, 165, 218; etc.).
Already on the basis of these first considerations it is possible to at
tempt to outline a stemma codicum, bearing however in mind the factors
of uncertainty determined by the peculiar features of the Indian MS
tradition, and particularly of the Kashmiri one. The transmission of texts
in Sarada script (as pointed out by Biihler 1877) is normally the work
not of simple scribes or devotees, unaware of the content of what they
are copying, but of learned pandits, of scholars, who mostly do not limit
themselves to passively copying the MSS, but compare them with others,
record various readings in the margin, choose between alternative read
ings found in the exemplar, make - explicitly or not - emendations of
their own. Moreover, in the case in question, they often have before
XLVI
them - besides other MSS of the vrtti. - also other commentaries on the
IPK, first of all the IPV which seems to be felt as the standard one, as
the inclusion in the text of glosses drawn from it and sometimes the par
tial or complete reproduction of its colophons shows (see below)1. In
spite of these difficulties, met with in any contaminated tradition, the
picture that comes out is relatively clear, at least in outline.
[a]
T [b]
[c]
K Kh G Gh N C Ch Jh N T
We start from a work which probably did not have a large circula
tion and was reproduced in few copies. The scrutiny of the extant MSS
permits us to assume an archetype [a] in Sarada characters, complete,
which however some corruptions have already crept into (at least those
indicated in JPianadhikara text notes 92 and 167, Kriya° 155 and 205)2.
This MS, or a faithful apograph of it, was brought from Kashmir to
1 N even reproduces large portions of the IPV in the margin and between the
lines. In other cases (Kh G) it is the vrtti that may be found in the margin of a MS
of the IPV.
2 Abh. in the IPVV had already noticed various readings in the MSS of the vrtti
at his disposal.
XLVII
Kerala, probably around XII-XIII century when the Trika school spread
over South India. T derives from it, although not directly. The exemplar
of T (which belongs to XVIII century) was already in Malayalam script,
for some mistakes in T can be explained as misreadings of Malayalam
characters. The good quality of T is a further example of the high stan
dard of the Kerala MS tradition. From [a] at least another MS also
derives, which was probably the only one that later survived Muslim in
vasion, although with the loss of the last portion; we shall refer to it as
the hyparchetype [b]. From [b], incomplete and with a certain number of
corruptions but still relatively correct, derive J and the hyparchetype [c].
In this manner it is possible to explain, on the one hand, the many read
ings that J, alone, shares with T and, on the other, the still more substan
tial affinity of J with the other Sarada MSS. As regards the latter, which
constitute a very compact family, we may assume a common ancestor,
i.e. the hyparchetype [c], which further corruptions have crept into. Be
sides these corruptions shared by the whole family, there are some others
that are peculiar to single MSS or groups of them3. Probably, it would
be possible to go farther on and identify genetic connections within the
family K Kh G Gh N C Ch Jh N T, too. But, at this point, the con
tamination of the MSS and the scribes* work of collation and emenda
tion4 makes this attempt rather complicated and its result, anyhow,
doubtful. These considerations and, above all, the awareness that such
further investigation is bound not to have any direct bearing on the es
tablishment of the text have induced me to refrain from it.
For this edition the testimony of T PW , which sometimes quotes literal
ly, sometimes paraphrases or simple gives the contents of the vrtti, has
been largely made use of. Since it mostly proves unvaluable in confirm
ing or discarding a reading, choosing among equivalent ones, or even help
ing to restore passages corrupt in all MSS, I have decided to include it in
the critical apparatus on a par with the MSS, though being well aware that
in so doing I have departed from the established usage of classical philol-
3 A passage from the Jnanadhikara seems particularly fit to illustrate the progres
sive corruption from [a] to the above group of Sarada MSS (cf. text note 405):
°jnanamibhavena na bhinnasyatltasya rilpyajndnasydprdmanyam (correct reading,
only found in T), °jnananubhavena bhinnasya rupyajnanasydpramanye sa J,
°jnananubhave jndnasyapramanye sa N, jndnasyapramanye sa Gh Ch (°syad ) Jh N
T (C Jh then corrected into the reading J).
4 See, for instance, the isolated concordances of single MSS with correct read
ings only found in T ( J Jiidna0 n. 253; C Jiidna0 n. 395; Ch Jh Kriyd° n. 118; etc.).
XLVIII
v **j^ r*ífi5 3 s yv»£?#^
^ r ^ f î il 1t
3 £ ^ % f '3* r a « T3^ w f t 3£ to
-rg^ ïR T ^ T H c s
¥ $ * i ^ ! T O £ |C 9 * r ç t
V T T R V g ^ t^ îfJ )|
M S C h, f. 19a
MST, ff. 19b, 20b, 21b
ogy. But I have preferred to put together in a single apparatus what (MSS
and testimonia) is in this case equally important for the constitution of the
text, so that the reader is not compelled to continually go from one ap
paratus to the other.
Abh.’s commentary composed around 1015 represents the oldest
evidence for our text - older than any extant MS. This constitutes its uni
que importance; however, I have made a cautious use of it and followed
it only when I could find some kind of support in the MSS. For in many
a case, even when IPVV seems to quote literally, it is apparent from the
MSS evidence that Abh. is giving a text either approximately remembered,
or reworded, or mixed with his own glosses. In these cases, if all the MSS
agree on a different but equally satisfactory (and often more concise) read
ing, I have accepted the latter.
I have followed the division of the text into adhikaras and ahnikas, as
in the IPV and IPVV, though the MSS vary greatly on this point, some
of them even showing no division at all. I have given the colophons in
the simplest form, like that often found in T. There is some doubt as regards
the Tattvasamgrahadhikara, which is taken by the IPV as consisting of a
single ahnika5 whilst the IPVV divides its commentary on the adhikara
into two vimarsas (third and fourth, first and second being devoted to the
two ahnikas of the Ágamadhikara6). In the respective introductions the
IPVV refers separately to 15 (IPVV m p. 355) and 3 slokas (ibid. p. 400).
Considering that no MS of the vrtti shows a division into two ahnikas1
and that this division might have been introduced by the tlka - which the
ÍPVV directly refers to - , I have taken this adhikara as a unitary section.
In the text, < > angle brackets enclose what has been added to the
transmitted text by conjecture; [ ] square brackets indicate editorial dele
tions. No mark has been used for conjectural emendations of transmitted
readings; they are acknowledged as such and accounted for in the
Apparatus. Sandhi has been normalized8.
XLIX
T h e M a n u sc r ip ts1
Gh
The MS belonged to the personal collection of Pt. Dinanath Shastri,
Srinagar, who, with great kindness and generosity, allowed me to
photograph it. This MS no longer exists, having been destroyed along
with the entire collection in the course of the recent Muslim desorders in
Srinagar (Dinanath Shastri’s personal communication).
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 28
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 28, with 16 lines per page, measur
ing cm. 21,4 x 17,6. On the first page the vrtti on the first seven karikas,
omitted in the text, was added in the margin and on a small streap of
paper pasted in the left margin; the hand is apparently the same.
Beginning: om namah sarasvatyai II om namah pratyaksasva-
rupayatmane 11
End: kartryoge ’pi bodhandm karmottlrndndm vidyesvarakhyanam
bhinnavedyabhaktvena maydmalam II Then, karika III.2.10.
There is only a division into adhikaras; within each of them the
numeration of the karikas is continuous. Rare corrections in the margin.
N
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 824.02.
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 48
folios numbered on the verso from 2 to 49, with 11 lines per page,
1 The MSS K Kh G are described in KSTS Ed. as follows: “(K) Ms. belongs to
Pandit Harabhatta Shastri. On Kashmiri paper in Sharada character. Size 10" x 6". It
is in the Talapatra form. (Kh) and (G) Ms. - These are, in fact, the Manuscripts of
the Ishvarapratyabhijna-Karikas with the Vimarshini and their margins contain the
Vrtti in question. The Ms. (Kh) belongs to Rajanaka Maheshvara. In Sharada charac
ter, on old Kshmiri paper. Correct, Size V4 foolscap, paper-bound. The (G) Ms. - Got
on loan from Pandit Rama Kokila, a well known Pandit of Srinagar. Size V4 foolscap,
bound in leather, almost without mistakes, on old Kashmiri paper, in beatiful Shara
da character.” (p. 3). The printed edition is referred to in the Apparatus as E.
L
measuring cm. 18,7 x 14,1. It has been profusely annotated by a dif
ferent hand with single glosses or long passages (mostly drawn from the
IPV) between the lines and often entirely covering the margins. There is
only a division into adhikdras; within each of them the numeration of
the kdrikas is continuous. Between ff. 35 and 40 there are a few pages
without glosses. A passage based on the IPV is inserted in the text bet
ween f. 2a line 8 and f. 2b line 6.
Beginning: (The first page is missing) °hetvare / ajadatma ... (kar.
1. 1.2).
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining kdrikas without com
mentary. Finally: samapteyam pratyabhijna / subham astu saivajagatam.
Ch
LI
Second part: ff. llb-22b. 14-18 lines per page, neither glosses nor
corrections. F. 13 is missing, lacuna from °sakalasparsat (vrtti 1.5.14) to
atmasabdac caham iti (vrtti 1.5.17). Colophons: iti srimaddcaryabhina-
vaguptaviracitayam pratyabhijndsutravimarsinydm jhanasaktininlpanam
pancamam ahnikam; iti snmadacdryabhinavagupta0 etc. apohasaktini-
rupanam sastham ahnikam. The colophons of the six ahnikas are derived
from IPV; the portions of slokas found at the beginnning of each ahnika
also come from the opening slokas in the IPV. No division between
ahnikas VII and VIII.
Third part: ff. 23-3la. 23-28 lines per page. Some glosses in the mar
gins drawn from the IPVV. Neither division into ahnikas nor numeration
of verses. End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas
without commentary. Finally: sampurneyam (sic) pratyabhijhasastram.
J
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 1662.
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 37
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 37, with 21 lines per page,
measuring cm. 13,4 x 16,9. Corrections in the margins or between the
lines, generally tending to replace the readings that J shares with T with
those found in the other Sarada MSS. The numeration of the karikas is
continuous, but there is a division into ahnikas within each adhikara\ the
colophons are derived from the IPV.
Beginning: om namah sivaya.
End: same passage as in Gh; then, kar. III.2.10.
Jh
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 860
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 22
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 24, with 16-17 lines per page
(from f. 13 onwards, 20 lines), measuring cm. 21,9 x 14,8. F. 17 (from
II.3.1 idam etadrg ity evam to II.3.7 aviruddhdvabhasanam eka°) and f. 20
(from n.4.9 °kramena janayed ghatam to vrtti II.4.9 tatah pari°) are miss
ing. Some folios are misplaced. Notes and corrections by different, much
more recent, hands in the margins and between the lines. The numeration
of the karikas is continuous; no division into ahnikas.
Beginning: om namo mahamayesvaiyai // om namah sivaya sasivaya
¿ivadaya namo namah.
LII
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas without
commentary. Finally: snmatsundarabhattarakena pratyabhijnavrttih sam-
purmkrteti subham astu devadlnam manusyakitdnam I.
N
Research Department Library, Srinagar, No. 2352
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 16
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 16, with 22 lines per page,
measuring cm. 26 x 17,9. Neither division into ahnikas nor numeration
of verses. Rare corrections in the margins.
Beginning: om srlgurur jayati om srlman paramasivo jayatitamam II
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas without
commentary. Finally: tattvasamgrahadhikarah iti srimadutpaladevacarya-
viracita pratyabhijnavrttih
T
University of Baroda, Central Library, Sanskrit Division, No. 807.
The MS is on paper, written in Sarada characters, consisting of 56
folios numbered on the verso from 1 to 55 (no number on the last folio),
with 12 lines per page. Neither division into ahnikas nor numeration of
verses. Rare corrections by other hand in the margins.
Beginning: om srlganesaya namah om namah sivaya (to be noted: f.
14a in the margin: om namo bhagavate vasudevaya).
End: same passage as in Gh; then the remaining karikas without
commentary. Finally: sampurneyam pratyabhijhasastram / subham astu /
sivayom namah.
T
Oriental Research Institute and Manuscripts Library, Trivandrum,
No. 8900A.
The MS is in palm-leaves, written in Malayalam characters2, consist
ing of 21 folios (corresponding to ff. 4-24 of the whole codex), with 11-12
2 P.L. Shaji, MSS Assistant, provided me with a devanagarl transcript. The colla
tion of the MS, however, is based on my own reading of the Malayalam text. In this
connection, 1 would like to tell a very instructive story, which should caution against
LIII
lines per page, measuring cm. 27,2 x 7,5. According to the information
kindly supplied by P.L. Shaji, the MS was collected by Ramasubha
Shastri, Kadinamangalam, from Chirakkal Palace .Library on 9/9/1941.
On paleographic evidence, it is not later than XVII-XVIH century. The
iPV r begins on f. 4b, 1.2, after an incomplete anonymous work dealing
with the theories of error. The palm-leaves have become dark, especial
ly at the edges, from which small fragments are missing here and there;
in some places they have been eaten by insects. No numeration of ver
ses; there is a division into ahnikas, with some inconsistencies {prathamam
ahnikam\ dvitlyam ... etc.; iti jhanadhikarah; navamam ahnikam; dasamam
ahnikam\ kriyadhikare trtlyam\ dvadasamam ahnikam; kriyadhikarah\
agamadhikare prathamahnikam\ dgamadhikarah\ neither division into
ahnikas, nor mention of the title for the last adhikara). The MS often
has voiceless stops instead of (correct) voiced stops, evidently due to the
absence of the latter class of sounds from the scribe’s own language (i.e.
Malayalam).
Beginning: kathamcid asadya .... (kar.I.1.1)
End: samapteyam Tsvarapratyabhijhavrttih I/3 bhirunam abhayaprado
bhavabhayakrandasya hetus tato hrddhamni prathitabhlravarucam Iso
’ntakasyantakah / bheram vayati yas suyoginivahas tasya prabhur
bhairavo visvasmin bhararxadikrd vijay ate vijhanarupah pa rah / subham.
the widespread practice of working with South Indian MSS using devandgarl copies.
Prof. H. Alper (whose untimely death in 1987 saddened all of us) came across this
MS, too. Having realized its importance but not knowing Malayalam script, he asked
for and obtained - through the good offices of Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja - a transcript
by a pandit of Madras. W hen Alper came to know that I was already working on the
IPVr, he was so kind as to send me his transcript. The comparison of the pandit’s tran
script and mine was startling. The differences were so m any as to make me doubt
about my actual understanding of Malayalam. Thus, I carefully checked some por
tions of both transcripts with my photographs of the original MS. It soon became clear
that the astute pandit - besides definitely having an imperfect knowledge of M alaya
lam script - had prepared his transcription keeping the KSTS Ed. before him: som e
times he (badly) copied from the MS, sometimes found it more practical to copy from
the printed edition. Also his transcription of the last portion o f the vrtti, not available
in the KSTS Ed., is very inaccurate and full of mistakes.
3 This verse is quoted in M M P p. 173 and ascribed to K§emaraja.
LIV
TEXT
^ fx R T fe c T T :
sT F T T f^ R :
>• \
II 1 II
l
111 «riMlilH ciwfa qft-
d^-M H II 1 II
¿biff* fTTcrf* I
3 T 5 r^ n «n fa fe f ^t
f^vftcT ¿f>: II 5. II
(\ 1<Ji'T
># T F I^ q 5TFT fevqT ^ I 'N 'H ^ d d O l ^ H \
16lJ^!id4HN, l y r l ^ 5 R ^ T ^ ’^ ¿ M l W l t W
II % II
8 pratyabhijnapaydmi cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 23, 31-2. 9 tasyapi paramartha0
cit. ibid. p. 30; cf. the paraphrase ibid. yena asyapi labhena tu$yeyam; paritupycyam cit.
and commented on ibid. pp. 33-4. The whole passage is quoted in Kr?nadasa*s Anuttara-
trinisikdlaghuvrttivimarsini (OR1 and MSS Library, Trivandrum, MS No. C2108 D, f.
152b). 10 sarvc$am svatmanah cit. in iPVV I p. 50; svatmanah is indicated as a subjec
tive genitive depending on jnanam kriya ca (kartari epa $a$fhi / tatkartrkam hi jnanam
karanam ca, na in sambandha$a$thT). 11 sarvarthasiddhi0 cit. ibid. p. 49; °samasrayasya
results from the paraphrase ibid. p. 52 sarve tasmat pramatur anye ye 'rthah te$am yd
siddhih prakdsamanata, tasya yatah sa pramata nibandhanam visrantisthanam
vimarfarupataya samasrayah. 12 °san>dr!ha° omitted in E. 13 krodikrtasiddheh cit. and
commented on ibid. p. 67 krodikrtasiddhikatvam yad uktam vrttau ddisiddhatvasphutika-
randbhiprayena ... tena pramatrd svatmano nijasya rupasya siddhih prakasah prameya-
siddhyaiva krodikrta krodopalakfitahrdayanlpatam gala krta hfdayahgamikrtety arthah.
14 pun'asiddhasya cit. ibid. p. 67. 15 puranasya commented on (and differentiated from
the close piin'asiddhasya) ibid. p. 51 idantadesakdlasvarupaniyamarudham prathanam ya-
sya mlasukhadikasya, tasya bhavas tanni$edhopalak$itah san pramata prakdsate ca
praka.iiffha ca prakaiipyate ceti ydvat / ata eva purdnah purvasiddhas ceti na paryayau,
pitrdno 'pi hi na piirvasiddhah pisdca iva, purvasiddho 'pi na purdno dhiima iveti ubhayok-
tih. 16 T omits eva. 17 tena cit. ibid. p. 50. 18 jaddndm evodyamah cit. ibid. p. 49 and
commented on p. 78.
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57 smrtikale cit. ibid. p. 122. 58 purva°: purvartha° T, but cf. the paraphrase ibid. p.
122 anubhave piirvabhdvini; piirvanubhavdbhdvat N. 59 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T omit
°artha°, but cf. the analysis of the compound ibid. p. 122 purvo yo 'rthavifayo 'nubhavas
tasya yo 'vaftambhas tadrilpaparityagah sa dharmo yasydh. 60 smrtir jay ate yadi: smrti-
smrtau di N. 61 tadapi cit. ibid. p. 122 “tadapi" iti smrtikale smrtirupatdyam ity arthah.
62 nanuvarteta: nanuvartate N J, navarteta E C ft. 63 aneka°: piirva° N. 64 kenatha: ke-
napi T. 65 °dbhdsa°: °avabhasa° Gh Ch. 66 °avalambaniyo vi$ayo 'py atra: °alambamyo
'py artho E N, °dlambaniyo vifayo 'py artho Gh N C Ch J Jh T (vi?ayo is added in the
margin in C and deleted in J). 67 saty apy atmani omitted in Ch. 68 'pi only found in
T; asato 'pi cit. ibid. p. 126. Cf. the paraphrase of the whole passage in the tJkd, cit. ibid.
p. 126 “katharn sa natfasya vi$ayena vi$ayavat7' iti. 69 yadi cit. ibid. p. 126 yadifabde-
na athasabdasya sambhavanam dyotyatvena aha.
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of the vrtti is recalled at the beginning of the IPVV on the following karika (ibid. p. 183):
svanlpena anyasambandhitayd ceti ... / yuktya pramanavydpdrena badhitatvam svarupa-
ta uktam “na sdpy ekd kramikd" iti, anyasambandhitayd tu uktam “ekasya kramikd katham
bhavet”. 95 T omits api, which is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 183 kriydpi na yuk-
ta iti vfttir vydkhydta. 96 purvapanbhutdvayavaika (cf. §DVr p. 91) kdrakavydpararupa
paraphrased ibid. p. 184 kdrakasya phalasiddhihetubhutakriyanimittasya svakriyapekfaya
vd kartuh sambandhi tatsamavdyl taddtmd vd vyaparo rupam svant lakjanam yasyah, sd
kriya yasyah sapibandhino bhdgdh pundpanbhutdh kramavrttayah iti yavat.
°aikdkdravydpdra° T Ch. 97 na omitted in E. 98 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 191 ekd
katham kramikd iti sutram sphufayitum vfttau kramikatvam vydcafte / anekakalasprkh'am
hi kramikatd / ekas ca tatkdlo ’tatkdlas ceti katham bhavet, tadatadau vd kdldv ekam
katham bhavet iti svarupatas tavad aikyam kriydydm badhitam: 99 Cf. ibid. p. 193 dsraya-
bddhakanirupanam sutramsam vydcasfe vrttikrt “napi kalakramavydpi ca” iti / cakarav
anyonyavirodhadyotakau. 100 Cit. ibid. p. 194 kevalam gamana ity ddind vrttigranthena,
p. 196 parindma iti (cit. by the (ikd, which comments on it). 101 °rupa: °rupam T.
102 kdyadinam ... matram paraphrased ibid. p. 195. 103 tu omitted in T J N. 104 Ch omits
anyasya. 105 kriydvac ca na kriyakarakasarribandhah kascit cit. ibid. p. 198;
kriyakdrakddi0 E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.
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106 Cf. ibid. p. 198 nanyad iti atra p uneasya hetutvam vfttav uktam bhinnasya vya-
tiriktasya asya sambandhasya kriyaya iva anupalambhad ity anena; T omits asya. 107 In
stead of vastilndm T has an almost illegible word (perhaps /7/a, which would be equally
good). 108 Cf. ibid. p. 203 ekatvam hi abhinnarupat\’am, tadviruddhena ca bhinnanlpa-
tvena vydptani dvayor yugapatsvarilpasarvasvena avasthdnam; °sthitir E Gh N C Ch J Jh
N T. 109 na ca dvayoh cit. ibid. p. 204. 110 anyonyapek$a° cit. ibid. p. 204; E Gh N Ch
J omit °atmd, °apek$anapi C N, °apek,se T. 1,1 paratantryanlpah cit. and commented on
ibid. p. 204 tena “paratantryanlpah santbandha" ity atra itthani yojana - paratanttyam
bhavad api sambandho na siddhyatlti. °svanlpah T. 1,2 yatha ... kalpitam ... kartftvam
api cit. ibid. p. 206, where the whole passage is commented on. 113 iti katham dtmd sar-
vesvarah cit. ibid. p. 206; mahesvarah T. 114 T adds iti purvapakso, Ch iti pun'apakyavi-
vftih, J iti pihvapakyanirupanam.
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130 na ca cit. ibid. p. 236 asamanjasam iti vrttau \yakhydtam neti samastavdkyartha-
nifedhena / cakdrena dsahkddyotakena atha iti vyakhydtam. 131 E omits ca. 132 suktau
cit. ibid. p. 236. 133 T reads iti vd°, which, if corrected to itiva°, would be equally
acceptable. 134 The whole sentence up to the danda cit. ibid. p. 238. 135 °sampramose:
°asampramo$e C. 136 pur\>dnubhutdrtha° cit. ibid. p. 239, where this point is dwelt on at
length; cf. in particular na asyam [smrtauj kimcit prakasate yena vaiparityam dsankatc I
etadartham eva vrttau purvdnubhutagrahanam anumanavikalpanddav iva apurvaprakdSa-
tanirdkaranatdtpaiyena prayuktam. 137 purvanubhavasparse ca tadbhinnayogakyemayd
paraphrased and commented on ibid. p. 240 purvanubhavendsparso 'sadrsyam anavesas
ca saptamya hetutvena nirdi$(o vrttau bhinnayogak$ematve sadhya iti vivrnoti “tatah” iti
/ yoga 'labdhalabhah, iha tu tadupalak$ilam prakaSalakfanam svarupam, k$emam labdha-
parirak$anam, tadupalakfitas tu iha vi$ayamsah / tadubhayam anubhavat bhinnam smrteh
prakafasya apur\>atvdt vipayasya ca avastutvat iti. T omits ca. 138 bhranteh samskdrajat-
ve ko grahah cit. ibid. p. 240; p. 241 Abh. records a different reading (ity anye patanti):
°jatvam. 139 grahah: bhramah G Ch (in T bhramah, deleted, precedes grahah); hetuh K
C N.
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140 adhyavasaya eva cit. ibid. p. 242. The whole passage is paraphrased and com
mented on pp. 242-43 bhrantya bhramarilpena upalakfito yo vi$ayavyavasthapaka uktah,
so ’dhyavasaya eva, na lu svasamvit / napi svasya prakdkamanasya rupasya samvit nir-
vikaiparupd. E (but not G) Gh omit sva°. 141 sa ca cit. ibid. p. 243, where the rest of
the vrtti is also paraphrased, sa tarhi adhyavasayo jado vyavati$\hdpayi$ite bahye 'rthe ta-
sya aprakasarupatvat / yadi tu tatra prakakarupah syat, yogina iva tatra purvasminn arthe
vikalpaniyabhimate sphutataya pumaprakasah syad iti na smrtita, napi adhyavasayata
bhaved anubhavaikarupatvat / atha na bdhye 'sail prakako yena anubhavarupatvam, napi
sarvathaiva aprakaso yena jadah, kimtu svatmani s\’ollekhe ca svakare prakasarupa eva
asau, tarhi punar api arthe bahye jada eveti bdhydrtha\yavasthayd hetuh syat / sa hi
samvinniffha bhavati, na tu kadacit jadani$theti i bhramarilpena ca yad abahyabdhyayor
ekikaranam, na tena bahyasya kimcit spr$tam tatsparse bhrdnta-t\>dyogat / na hi raja-
tajnanena satyarajatasya kukter vd vyavastha kacid iti tdtparyena vrttyarthah / evam siitre
vrttau ca adhyavasayamatrasya rtlpam du$itam, taddvarena tu smrtyadhyavasayasyeti /
atitagrahanam ca vrttau vikalpopaiaksanam utprcksavikalpasyapi piirvdnubhavopajlvana-
pravesena vastuto 'titatvad eveti. 142 °matram only found in T. 143 jnanani svatmamatra0
cit. in the tika (Torella 1988: 144); cf. also IPVV I p. 253. 144 svasamvidrilpataya cit.
in the (Ika (Torella 1988: 144). 145 aparasamvedyani: naparasamvedyani E Gh N Ch J
Jh T, na parasamvedydni C N, na parasparasamvedyani T. I have accepted the reading
as quoted and glossed ibid. p. 255; see also the fika (Torella 1988: 144). 146 te?am cit.
IPVV I p. 268. 147 anyonya0 cit. in the flka (Torella 1988: 150); cf. IPVV I p. 268 vrttau
vifayasamghapanaydh pradhanyat ... and the tika (Torella 1988: 150) vrttau ca vi$aya-
samghatanapek$ayd $a$(h7\ samghattana0: samghatana0 E Gh C N T (also possible).
148 paramartha0 cit. ibid. p. 269 and in the (ika (Torella 1988: 151).
13
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149 katham cit. IPVV I p. 272. 150 cittatt\’am eva and ato 'tiriktasya cit. in the fika
(Torclla 1988: 152); riktasya Ch. 151 Cf. the quotation in IPVV I p. 276 vrttikrd aha
aSeyapadarthajhananam anyonyanusamdhanam cittatvam iti. 152 asyaiva cit. ibid. p. 285.
153 °ddikdh: °adi° T. 154 C Ch J T add paradarsananupapattih. 155 pascad api cit. in
IPVV II p. 4. 156 °anubhavitrtvat: °anubhavitrtayd E C N (°tvat is also the reading of
Kh). 157 The whole passage (from pur\’a°) is paraphrased and partly cit. (through the
fika) ibid. p. 4 “tasya ekasya purvanubhfitatvena yah pratyavamarsali” iti ubhayakala-
samsparsi “atra” iti pranapttryaytakadehadau samkucitasya “purvdnubluilarthdsampra-
moyarupa smrlir nama vyaparah” iti sambandhah / ekatvat hi sa ubhayakalasprk / kar-
trtaiva ca vibhuta svairitvam iti vrttiyojand; p. 11 atra iti vrttipadam; p. 13 vrttau ca
uktani vibhoh iti. vibhoh kartuh Ch.
14
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158 smrtišaktyá cit. ibid. p. 19. 159 anyathd cit. in IPVV II p. 22. 160 prakašitasya
cit. and commented on ibid. p. 22 pfíivaprakášitatvena tatprakdšandnulagnah kat haní pa-
rdmaršo bhavet / yadi ca na bhavet purvaprakdšita-tvena parámaršanam, tat sa iti bhuta-
prakášaparámaršo na syát / tena “prakašitasya” iíi vrttau prakrtyarthe ca pratyayárthe
ca bharah kartavyah; cf. also p. 31. 161 parámaršo: parámaršo ’pi Ch. 162 svasattákála
eva ca cil. ibid. p. 31; ca omitted in J. 163 tena cit. ibid. p. 23. 164 Cf. ibid. p. 23 tathd
hi naše arthena smrter na dosah, sadbháve vd na podaly na d usy at i cit. ibid. p. 25,
where the whole argumentation of the vrtti, as developed in the tíká, is summarized. 165
°sat(d°: °sattva° Gh Ň J Jh T T. 166 °anyatama° cit. ibid. p. 29 ghatábhásašabdah sutre
kevaldbhdsopalaksandrthah iti vrttau vydkhydtam anyatamapadena. 167 My conjectural
emendation for asydsphufdvabhdsah Gh Ň C J Jh Ň T T, asydh sphutavabhdsah E Ch.
The emendation is suggested by the argumentations in IPV, IPVV and in the (ika (To-
rella 1988: 154-55, 168-69) and by the (probable) gloss sphuta eva added to the following
tathaiva in Ch J T (see also the tiká: tadd sphuta evdbhdsaiy Torella 1988: 155). The read
ing asydh sphutavabhdsah, to which asydsphutdvabhdsah might be reduced by assuming
the omission of the visarga before samyoga, could only be acceptable if we toke asydh
as referring to smrti (which does not seem likely). 168 anyadd tu cit. ibid. p. 29 and in
the i tká (Torella 1988: 155). 169 sarvdtmandrthitvena: sarvárthitvena J. 170 T J (and Ch,
in the margin) add sphuta eva (being probably only a scribal gloss of tathd eva). 171 Cf.
ibid. pp. 29-30 antarayati sdntaram karotlti antaram vijátiydmšo malam, tadabhdvo nai-
rantaryam; atišayanirantara0 cit. in the tiká (Torella 1988: 155). 172 Cf. ibid. p. 30 ane-
na drstárthašabdo vydkhydtah. 173 °pratyakyikdra cit. ibid. p. 29.
15
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174 Cf. ibid. p. 34 anubhavena saha arthah smarandd abhinnah iti vrttya tatparyad-
vayam sautram vyakhyatam. 175 tatkdlika0: tatkalike Ch. 176 °sm^tiprakase cit. ibid. p.
33; T omils °smrti° and reads °prakdso. 177 prakasad bhinnasya cit. ibid. p. 34; cf. p.
33 prakasad bhinnasya md bhut prakasamanata; prakasyamanata0 T. 178 ca only found
in T T. 179 °samviddm: °samvid° N. 180 tat ha hi cit. ibid. p. 37. 181 *nubhuta°: ’nubhtlto
T G. 182 bhali: ’vabhati T. 183 yas ca cit. ibid. p. 40; anekakalo, cit. ibid. p. 41, is quo
ted on the same page in a slightly different form (probably meant to clarify its meaning)
nanu ca samvidah kdlasparsa eva nastfti katham vfltih anekakalagata iti / anekakalaga-
te$u vedyefu yad unmukhatvam, tavanmatrad eva sa bodho ’nekakala iti upacarena acarya-
te ... tad-unmukhas ca ekah svasamvedanapramata. 184 Cf. ibid. pp. 43-4 nanu yogi
kriyasaktiprakar$avan api ¡ha darsane, tat katham jhanasaktiprakar$amatram asya vrttau
nirupitam\ cf. also ibid. p. 47 sarvajhagrahanam ... . 185 pramatrantaragatopalambhah
cit. ibid. p. 42.
16
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IPVV II p. 52; dbhdseran E, avabhdseran K G Gh N C Ch J Jh N T- 187 otas ca: ata
eva T. 188 yoginam paratmatapattir eva cit. in the flka (Torella 1988: 158) (as parama0,
which is also the reading of Kh Gh J). 189 tattvam cit. and commented on in IPVV II p.
47 “tattvam” iti vivrnoti “paramatmavedakani’ ity anena tattvam paramatmavekatvam ity
arthah (cf. Torella 1988: 158, n. 54) [...] sarvajnagrahanam prdgupakrantaparasamveda-
nopakramdt paratmavedakaparyayatam ellti bhavah. 190 api: eva vd T, also possible.
191 pratisvikena cit. ibid. p. 52. 192 °bodhdtmana rupena: bodhena E, but cf. the paraph
rase ibid. p. 52 ayam ca atra bhavah svasmin svasmin darsane yadrsam bodhasya suddha-
rupam ... . 193 Cit. (as bhaseran) ibid. p. 52. 194 T omits tatha, but cf. ibid. p. 53 yadi
tatha iti na tu etat sambhavatiti; tada Ch. 195 maya drtfam cit. ibid. p. 54. 196 In T
°darsana° is added under the line; °paramarsana° T; °dtmika Gh N. 197 Cf. ibid. p. 54
kathanaSabdena (from the tika). 198 etad omitted in T. 199 T adds drsot being probably
a gloss. 200 Ch adds smxter vyakaranam eva. 201 The text cit. ibid. p. 55 is a little
different: ity evam vrttau vyakhyato “darsanam eva tat pratyavamrsyate>y iti vacanena.
17
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pratyaksddhyavasdye ca adaranam eva purahsarapiln’ddisabdair darsitam. 203 In Ch °pa-
ramarsa0 is added after dfk° under the line. 204 °nirdesena: °nirdese T N C Jh ft T; in
Gh °na is added in the margin. 205 sarvatroika°: sarvatrdtraika0 T. 206 Cf. ibid. p. 62
nanu mdyakrtavicchedav iti yad uktam ... . 207 Cf. ibid. p. 57 apitabdo bhinnakramah,
bhinnav api ekatra abhasate iti vrttyanusarena vd yojand. 208 prakasete: prakaseta J.
209 It is out of question that bhavanam is the original reading of the kdrika (cf. vrtti:
arthanam). Bhaskara holds, instead, that the text which Abh. had in front of him had bhin-
nandm, glossed by him with vicchinnanam. Also the editors of Bh accept this thesis. I
would say that the text commented on by Abh. also had bhavanam and that bhinnanam
- as well as the further explanation vicchinnanam - are meant to elucidate the sense of
bahirbtmand; bhavanam is simply understood in ye$am ... tefdm ... bhinnanam etc. (IPV
I p. 196). Furthermore, bhava is mentioned in the paraphrase in IPVV II p. 68 atyakta-
samvidabhedasyaiva bhavasya kalpitapramatrapekjayd vicchedena yat prakasanam ... (it
is worth noting that bahirdtmana is here paraphrased as vicchedena prakasanam; as bhe-
dendvabhdsah in the vrtti). 2,0 Cf. ibid. p. 68 vrttav apisabdo ydvacchabdas ca siltrate,sal
vena pathitah. 211 °antar°: °antara° N C ft.
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d M H M Id fa ftrfe : Il S Il
^ c( | Î ^ H ^ | çH ^ « î ^ ï ^ N 'd l r l ^ * 4 I « H H 'S I
^«JT g f t T M k J H M I ^ * e5 F f ^ r q t f^RfčJčTP=RTt f è W î f
»Ť W Č T II ‘l o II
\
f ^ f f ^ T>• ^ T « n I
TO TO ^ 3TTčtn g č W T ^ Í : ,1 f^ iï * ^ 3 ^ -
íííc id l< + > K ^ ^SF^T^T k l-^ d W M *\ ç c M i^
c*T*TFn<TN II “I l II
244 apy omitted in C. 245 äbhäsitam: äbhätam T. 246 gha(ädi° cit. ibid. p. 165 vrttau
“ghafädi” iti äbhäsasya vise,sa na m. 247 tatas cit. ibid. p. 165 . 248 âtmanïva cit. ibid. p.
167. 249 °eka° cit. ibid. p. 167 ekašabdena avašyam eçaniyaniyanlritaya icchayâ bhavi-
tavyam ity âha. °artliakalâpaika° G Ch, also possible. 250 mukhya âtmâ cit. ibid. p. 175.
251 tam vinâ cit. ibid. p. 175. 252 arthabhedita0 cit. ibid. p. 175 “artha" iti / bhedita-
grahanena pratikanna vyavasthâmâlram sidhyatu atah, na tu ajâdyam. 253 apyy only found
in T T, is cit. ibid. p. 177 sût re vrttau ca ayam apišabdah svabhâvântarasamuccayürtha
iti yâvat. 254 camatkrter ab h aval cit. ibid. pp. 177-9.
22
15.12
3ikHM ^cT^T P jf> °b q ip M ir1 °b c { d l- I
dlcM ifuflfcd'kld ^T5TcTn *T % fcleiawi: II 13. II
^0
^^>ouiobcid
C
l <86‘,3TMl«=liyfcRtPpit ,663T-
^TxTT * R tTT ^ddohcfdl * 6l9facqT ^l<+>WI-
<6^ y i!iid \ * te ycq«=iHi?ipHi i * wo*n
23
15.14
d> |J|A f^ W J r l II IV II
^dld’-’-mMd'dMkMId ^dld^'MldGl'MkM-d: I
y ^ rfR T T f^ f^ F ^ f^ rfq °y d e n s e r n ie n
^SR T IJ^f «\ N
F iT c T ^ d ld \
* wwd d l" iV d d iM c|d«>bHkHHH #^R = ftld t
N
^ S rm H F rfc T ^ ld d lft° d d \e !K I « h T II 1£ II
dli'-dli^M^IH^fildld^'Mk'MdkHd: I
a^ W d A d K 'H ^ ¿i> d « d -d l^ d > 4 ddN II ivs II
d c i y M y H i ^ '5* ^ d i^ y ^ d ^ y ^ y ^ q ^ r^ T T i £r -
271 °pratitfharupa cit. ibid. p. 206; °rupam T. 272 hrdayam iti cit. ibid. p. 206.
273 etddrSa°\ etadrga° E Gh N C J Jh N T. 274 E Gh N C J Jh N T add tada, which
seems unnecessary. 275 avaiti: vetti T. 276 ata eva cit. ibid. p. 209. 277 ladamntanam
cit. ibid. p. 209. 278 abhasayati cit. ibid. p. 211. 279 °bhave nahampratyavamrsyasya:
0bhdvendhitapratya\amrkyasya E Gh N C J Jh N T. 280 °pardmarsa°, conjectural emen
dation for °pardmarso E Gh N C J Jh N T, °pratyavamrsyaparamarsa° T.
24
\ ’
I ^«TTF: f ^ W F R r r f r R f ^ t r r f ^ T ^ f f^-Mld'H ^-^'H'^rl *PT-
r q T f^ T^ > ^ ^ T f^ ^ M T c TX I #5^T P T ® ^RN 3TT?iT5T^T^nfftrfcf
q rr^ T ^ r ^ , ^ ^ frftrc P T P ^ rq
II 1V3 II
^ rc n 5 rH W ^ m ^ w n f^ T m fiT : u u 11
y ° b k lM H : ^ “q T iR iR P T Ml^mid-cMI PllcH ^M ^ f^ sf
ir^ rm rp r^ i ^ ^ ^ cTct: * 'uM ^ 5 T fc R * “ * ‘ e3 n * m i
*eoc rp N fa ^ ^ w ra p r p ^ fa: <eip q > p q ts v q ^ R T rq t
ipit^Rsi^fTTpqc^sffci * e* f ^ r fr T ^ II *\C II
t | N H | i |>•M 4 d d g f f R T t T H ^ h r i TN II TS II
<€3^T5llc<+>K<?)^t sTT^sfa f ^ T r f r s if g P T ^ m f s f tc i W H : ,
25
15.19
^ “ o rT E R tllc H l^ ^ frg f^ q r d d d ^ g d M ^ I I ^ M l f c c - H l P ^ l ’H I -
^»o5 1 ' m ^ T % * T ^ T\ II I S II
^ ts-M f^ c ^ tT T ^ n d lH ^ M lirl^ u ri I
M ^ l^ ll> d ^ k ^ d »T ftd d -d -M I II % ° II
II 5.0 ||
^ ^ ^ ^ d ’d ^ ^ ^1 Gf5 1^91 c l I
ftTcTxETFT H N k ld -c ^ l f ^ f M ilfc d - d ^ |o h M -
f ^ f g g g w ^ N 3 0 if ^ f ^ r % w r a 7 -
294 The rest of the vrtti is cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 232-3 atha dhavanasya
adipadasya ca prakararthasya vyakhyandya yat sighrapadam, tasya vyavartyam aha
“k riydp r iti sayanasanadika niranusandhanatrnatrofanddika va / [...] / anyat desanlpam
yat dravyam, adipadena suklapitadilakfano gunah, yadi vd anyadesam anyas\’abhavam ca
yat dravyadi, tadvisaya / “tad aha" iti etad vastu drsyamanasabdena ahety arthah / anu-
sandhanatabdam vivrnoti “tadrgicchdyojanena" iti laksane trtiyd / idam i?tam idam i$ya-
te idam ca esamyam iti hanopadanecchdnam anusandhdnena upalakfitam yad e$aniyat-
vam, tena vina “tat" iti hdnam upadanam ca pratikjanam yad, tat na upapadyate iti sam-
bandhah. 295 ayam iti ghafa iti cit. ibid. p. 241. 296 va: ca T. 297 °atiriktas: °atirikta°
E Gh ft C Ch J Jh ft T. 298 °maya cit. ibid. p. 244. 299 atmeva: dtmaiva Gh ft Ch Jh
ft T. 300 avabhasate: abhdsate Gh N C Ch ft, bhdsate J. 301 Cf. the quotations from the
Ilka, glossed ibid. p. 271 “bodhasydvatfambhah" iti karmani past hi bodhyam avastabhndti,
bodlwh svani rupam tadekalinam karotlti yavat / “athava" iti atra vydkhyaydm kartari
?asthi, bodhasyeti tu karmani. 302 Cf. ibid. p. 272 evam ca atra yojand - jnanadirupataya
ekajatiyah’e 'pi vibhinnadesakaladina uparaktam jndnam api jiidndntardl smaranam ca
smaranad anyad abhdsate iti samastasutravrttitdtparyam samk$ipya [tikakrt] ... . 303 Cf.
ibid. p. 269 e$a ca art ho vrttikrta sp/\s(a adipadena; p. 270 desakalapadasya ca atra pakya
upalakyanah'am vyakhyatam.
26
16.1
cfFePT: I
^ r n fr f t o p ? q : ^ ^ o fjfr
II 1 II
iT O : II *1 II
31,,?T«iT %
f ^ n f r ^ ’TRfr % ^ T T « r e T e r ^ q t# q t: 1
T O R ^I II 5. II
304 prakasyasyatmani: prakasdtmani C J N. Cf. the quotation ibid. p. 274 a ham ity
atmani. 305 pardvdgrupatvdt cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 274-5; para° T. 306 sabhi-
lapo: sabhilaso (then corrected to sabhilapo) Ch J. 307 svabhavabhutah cit. and com
mented on ibid. pp. 278-9. 308 na vikalpah cit. ibid. p. 274. 309 Cit. ibid. p. 274 “sa hF
iti vikalpah. 310 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 274 praliyogini$edhapurvatvad eva niscayasab-
davacyata iti yojaniyam; °ni$edha° cit. ibid. nisedhasabdena nirasanam vyacaste. 311 Cit.
ibid. p. 274 “atra” iti visuddhe prakase and (through the (Jka) p. 279 “a/ra ” iti vrttiga-
tam vyacaste “visuddhe” iti vise$anam mdyapramatur vyavacchedaya. 3,2 tat ha hiy only
found in T, cit. ibid. p. 280. 313 dvitiyasya bhinnasya cit. ibid. pp. 282-3. 314 Cf. ibid.
p. 284 vyapadeSa iti tucchena hi atuccham eva vyapadisyate ity anena samjhapadam
vyakhyatam; °samjnakasya E. 315 anavabhasane: abhasanc T, anavabhdsena Ch. 316 Cf.
ibid. p. 287 itarasabdena iti vrttau. 317 na syat cit. ibid. p. 288. 3,8 anabhdse: ana-
vabhdse E Gh; cf. ibid. p. 288 pratiyogyanabhdse va iti (from the (Jka). 3,9 Ch adds iti.
27
1 6.3 3* ° c m r q
cT^?r?qffTHmTvn i
% fw ^ q t ^ frq q q II 3 II
qtTTcTT
•N® X
9* ’q q F l d ^ * q k d < ^ 3* * d d d < i q f q H F q 3i33T-
dd M lei^d ^ ffc i f^ n rt f^ F q t q rq »i n k ; ii 3 n
ftrd rq F ^ q T F T HN^Id-c-M! ^ q T 3* wq q T f tr f a
qJeTTq
>® x 3<',3TTFT% qT FT ^t d d>o r M dl<+>l^l ?^ q S«xF q Ijq
^
3**faq>fcqctsgfafcT qqj<jqT5|q f ^ f : , ^ d q q T H l'H H M iil'fl -
^ 35iq f ( i q |T q % q q R q T ^ 3*eW t s q f a f t q < i f^ F q l^q 330
II V -4 II
320 tatha ca, only found in T, cit. ibid. pp. 290 and 280. 321 eva cit. ibid. p. 291.
322 °tadatad°: °tad° E Gh N C Ch Jh ft T (in J °tadatad° is corrected to °tad°). 323 ata-
dapohanena cit. ibid. p. 293; °vyapohanena E Gh. 324 °avabhasini: °avabhasinl ft.
325 aware va sparse cit. and commented on ibid. pp. 295-6; va omitted in E Gh ft Ch J
Jh T, awarasparsa C, dwarasparse ft. 326 vikalpite : kalpite E Gh N C Ch J Jh ft T; kal-
pite (kar.) is glossed p. 297 with vikalpanamatraparamarthah. 327 Cf. the paraphrase ibid.
p. 299 tasmin tasmin nijaniyatarupe iariradau ydvad dbhdsamanatvam, tavad eva tasya
iarJrader avasyam pratiyoginah sakasad apohah kriyate iti yo vrttyarthah ...; tad° T.
328 pratiyogyapohanakaranat cit. ibid. p. 299; °pratiyogyo 'pohana° ft. 329 ghafo 'yam
itivat cit. ibid. p. 299. 33° Ch adds iti.
28
^ = rh iR T T f^ ft^ H T I 1 6.6
II £ II
< r^ f «’MM^i^sffcr q ^ F T f^ n f^ r I
^l»-fi*i= iiT i< ifi'M i^-^® 'H i H R T ^5% : II vs ||
331 T omits vicchinna°, but the repetition is confirmed ibid. p. 314 vrttau vipsaya
sarvatriko viccheda uktah. 332 sunya° cit. ibid. p. 315. 333 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T in
vert the last two members of the compound, but the paraphrase ibid. p. 310 follows the
order of T: purvdbhdsena yd aikyayojana adigrahanad ahamkarena tatsamanadhikaranena
ca caitra ityadindmnd ca, sa kalpanaiva iti vrttau sambandhah. 334 aikyayojana cit. ibid.
p. 312; aikyam C Ch. 335 °dbhasa°\ avabhasa0 E N Ch J Jh T. 336 °lakfana°: °lakfanam
C N. 337 pratyabhijna cit. and commented on ibid. p. 314; pratyabhijnana0 T. 338 adi-
sarge va vyavahdrakale 'pi va cit. ibid. p. 324. 339 va: omitted in Jh T, 'pi va C N.
340 maheivaro cit. ibid. p. 317. 341 mayasaktya cit. ibid. p. 3 16. 342 ab/tinivisya: abhi-
nivesya Ch. 343 tam tam: tattad° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 344 kramena cit. ibid. p. 316.
345 kartrsaktya cit. ibid. pp. 316 and 323. 346 bhasayati cit. ibid. pp. 317 and 324.
347 tathabhasanam evotpadanam: yathavabhdsanam cvapun’am evotpadanam E Gh J Jh
T (in Jh evapurvam is added under the line), yathabhasanam evdpilr\>am evotpadanam N
C, yathavabhdsanam evapurvam cvodbhavanam Ch; I have accepted the reading T,
which is confirmed by the quotation ibid. p. 324. 348 tu: tv asya T, tu omitted in J .
29
16.8
^ Ç f f ^ T'> 0 3“ e^ ïf a f c m R T : yyid*ÎçiHfê-y-dxcM
C
ciN 3,103TFT-
>0
f W ^ T fW r çTT% ^ r f ^ m i- H H I r y P d I
^ jfo : ^ o b K o lV y řl II % Il
3w ^ t ^ f^ 5 f^ q ^ ^ T € m N ^ rfíí d f e R m y d i 3^ ^ ^ -
*T*JT*fo q<N
^ T '«H
OOdv c d l f a m R - d d d*}d t
^ m 3l,ef ^ ^ I 360d d W M *f: w ^ î M'dlftd II 1o ||
30
I 6.11
cfr^cr: II 11 II
4f a i le d HT^T II 5. II
36,(s3l^<+>di^<r'HlrilH'^^<=by4ldi^«-yHM
sO C >6
cil'Ll ^>T-
4 o h K « ld liii36‘ « q o ig K ^ H -rc iq H ^FcT II 5. II
361 C adds °kriyct>. 362 ca cit. ibid. p. 336. 363 ca sphufam: sphufam J, casphufam
ft. 364 ca omitted in T. 365 abhasah: avabhdsah TJ, but cf. ibid. p. 341 dbhasa eva atma
iti vrttigrantham ... . 366 sarvasamvitkalavyapi cit. ibid. p. 341. 367 Cf. ibid. p. 342, whe
re the exposition of the kar. merges with that of the vffti: ... api tu tas (a nilasukhadi-
vi$aye$u vibhirtnd yd samvido niscayanlah, tany eva mukhdni updyas fair
nadlsrotahsthdnlyair nenJyamand hafavahenaiva aham iry ekamahasamvitsamudre yada
dbhimukhyena visrdntim yanti, (add e$am jnateyam parasparam svasvdmitdkdrya-
karanabhavddih samanvayo vyavahdratmd upapattya ghafate. 368 °vyavahara°: °vya-
vaha rani ft.
31
>• N
^ T ^ rm ^ T T v q ts ^ T T ^ T m q>: * m ^ rq : n 3 11
a6e^ T ^ q q q H R H R ^R R T | W
VO l -
^ m R T f^ q ^ T ^ N f dH-d-M: I ^ t 3WOs f a ^ T : W t J ^ R r R T
<*>c-Mcl || 3 ||
M cq^M M
>• ««-^TFTf dxin*i»-*m im ld*il*<> I
W R I
^ q fR ^ R rffT ^ ^ T tR ^ RFTTq II 4 II
369 svarupam: svasvarupam H T, but cf. ibid. p. 344 nanu kimartham ayam vrttau
bhedena nirdesah kftah / aha "svarilpa” iti svarupe abhasane prakasananiscayanarupe
yal bhedapraiipadanam .... 370 ’bhinnah: 'bhinna0 T J N. The latter would convey a
meaning slightly different but equally acceptable (however, as I have already pointed out,
the omission of the visarga before a samyoga is frequent in T). The quotation ibid. p. 344
so 'bhinna ityadivrttih is not useful, since 'bhinna might be quoted as being the first part
of the compound; but cf., in a similar context, ibid. p. 351 pramatrlagnatvena yad abhin-
narilpam ... . 371 kriyate only found in T. E C ft have samanvita and the same reading
is cit. ibid. p. 362, but meaning requires asamanvitah T (cf. also dgatyasamanvita Gh N
Ch Jh, °tah J ; in J agatya is corrected to agatya). 372 °sva° omitted in T. 373 °jnapa-
naksTna: °jndnapariksina Ch Jh, °jhapanak$ina corrected to jnanaparikfina T. 374 °sva-
samvedanasya abhavat smrtisvasamvedanam evatraika0: °svasamvedanam evatraika0 N.
375 abhavat cit. ibid. p. 367. 376 smrti°: smftih T.
32
3WeF jc
C
r: qOv^ r ^>oR m R T m r ^ o f r r i-
fo ^d l II ^ II
s m ^ T T O ^ H F its fa * d k H f V d l f a 'i l f c H I H N I
II 6 II
377 atra cit. ibid. p. 368 “atra” ity asya vyakhydnam “purvanubhave” iti. 378 smrti-
svarupa iva pratnanam / smrteh omitted in C N. 379 The whole sentence is paraphrased
and commented on (with some literal quotations) ibid. pp. 368-9 purvdnubhavakala eva
samanantarakjane smrter udbhavo nasti; smrtisamaye tu pur\’ak$ane yadi anubhavah
prakdseta vahnidhumayor iva, grhyetapi karyakaranabhavah, smrtipun>ak$ane tu na
kathamcid anubhavasya prakasah, na tu atra smftikala eveti mantavyam sahabhdvena
prakase karyakarana-tvasiddheh / etadartham api ca vfttau puivagrahanam / snifter na
karyalingata yatah purvasya anubhavasya abhaso nasti yena tasya sniftim prati
karanabhdvah siddhyet iti vrttisahgatili. pun>a°: purvartha0 T. 380 Cf. ibid. p. 372 vrttau
ca vivrtau ca “svai ca abhasas ca” iti “svai ca vipayaf ca” iti yojyam.
381 °mitir: °matir Ch Jh (this is also the reading found in IPV and TPVV). 382 chuktika0:
chukti0 Gh N Ch J Jh T. 383 rajatabhavajndnam: rajatajnandpramatvavedanam J, omit
ted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T- 384 pratyak$am: pratyak$a° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T; cf.
ibid. p. 381 atra aha “tac ca” iti pratyakjam eva badhakam.
33
1 7.8
S>•T ^ T H M slM Id \ \ d td ld ik H d l I
ddkH d: II C II
^ d ^ d d ^ M l^ d e H d ld d k d d l fa tq fc T , d ^ cTdTOT^
f*F d t d ^ fd d W ts fa W t d k c ilf r l II C II
f q iq = r d SR=rer=iPTf td k d id fc d c l: I
cTcd>«i dTcT
>•
d ^ ld fV d i'M lM M d lV H H N II % II
< \ N
3^ 3 W< \k ? f ^ k f c i d^d cR d^d d d fn d d^dT-
fd ^ d 3^ dd frkdd^THTd ^m^tcTN I fV d d d fa id d d d l 3<;ts^
'Md^'ir-M
<\
cM<|pqCcf> ^ q m fc N
d d ’df^ddlfa d>dlfcld
* k td , d ?% d q i q d i* jf gT ^d * d k q q ftfa f^ d t ,
3“ d lf e c q d d d i r l f t d d H 'H d k d d - d 3<rel j d ^ q q |
d id dd: { d k ^ f a ^ it d q ft P ^ H d t f a d d-irdd^q
3e3q ^ r ^ N m q ^ s T ftrfe d ^ d m rd ftrfe : i d d d T 3*“ ' ^ -
o b s lH k H d o H d i^ d T d rd>o W d \ I d ^d s q d d k id 3et,q -
tftfcf: q ^ T ^ fd l^ d 3et9d f a n £ : II S II
385 abhutala°: abhutalam Ch. 386 T adds hi. 387 ca: opi T. 388 sahityam na: sahirye-
na (sahitye na) E Gh C Ch J Jh N T, sahityeva N. 389 ekarupam: e/ram rupam T.
390 tubhaydbhdsasantsarga0: tubhayasamsarga0 T, tubhayatmakasamsarga0 (corrected to
tubhaydbhdsasamsarga0) Jh, tubhayatmakam ekarupam jiidnam ekam tubhayasamsarga0
Ch. 391 ekdbhdsa0: ekabhasam E Gh N C Ch J Jh N 1 392 °abhava°: °bhava° N.
393 pradesadarsanat: °pradarsandt C. 394 °dbhasaika°: °abhasatmakaika° (also possible)
K C N, °abhasakaika° E Gh N Ch Jh, °abhasakaika° corrected to °dbhdsdtmakaika° J
and to °dbhasatmaka° T. 395 °abhavat: °abhavavat E Gh Ch Jh N, 0abhavat corrected to
°abhavavat J (vice versa in C T). 396 pratitih: pratiti0 Ch. 397 tat°: tatha° (also possi
ble) E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T.
34
17.10
ddlted d l ^ d - F I *<=|$IMHfcldkHdWN II 1 ° ||
x ^ K 5 f M W 3e<:q t ^ fT q ^ ^T
Os.
^ C1^ I<=il Salted ,’ ^TT"
^itrfcT 3ee°-Mdeicf
>® W
>a cTH\ II lo ||
3 re^fr \ d ^ ^ k d ^ f ^ i |« T : ^ n «n n
^ i^^lMI«-Mco|ldv V00cT5T ,
^ “ ‘’ ’ s ^ c t s f a *T«TT V0*^ e )°h ^ |i-M » -d T#15n -
I dd'kK-M V033T^THrr
vovd W W c o |ld ^ N ftlfe : II 11 II
V^rfcT^THT^^TT M<4iV d M ir l^ c TN I
^ iditi^Mid^i^: ^•mdmm«^^lfijohi ii n n
^lO
^> dsdM ^d ^vJ|d5lMmid^M ftr « r ffl , ddl-^-dH ^lf^-d-
NO
““ ''fT k T^>
m ^T *T fa-^U-m cfldW ^qWTFT^TTWTrnTHx II “R II
35
^ ^=TcTT ^ « h y M I^ I II *13 II
5lfofclot>l5)Mof>l<i
>©
»T H<=f
<N
TSTrTiTT'PTftrf I rtrf:
tp tf ^ ffr f *TTOT , (r^X R T ^“ 06^ 0^ -
0^ M H ^ V tW I^ H Id fav q fo |
q^TT?Taoe^
N
5 n ^ : < ?R T S R R R r^r q<N^P T T f^ <TRI W10HRRTT%#
MHI'J|i>H-1 Mirf^T *RfcT I ^ l d l s c i |c f > w',1yHI<i<tr|: II *13 II
36
18.1
3TPTRTT cSptrpVTcFRTTf^"
>• II T II
^ q c ^ s n ^ q q ^ q s n ^ q ifc iq q r^ q
viei^oh<rC|b| obM dq“*0f W r^ q fq q R T i M1s - d w ^ qqiq-
II 9. II
^R^':^TSTTqRTRrR^TTtTi
>0 >0 nqRTT9q ■d ^ d ^ d : ^T^cTtsfa q
fTtll^ldli^H^i <j4-cq<ildcdTq q%*T v<iddl'flH1iR m
“*9d< ikdfafW M i 'q qqi°Mi>cdldN II 3 II
37
18.4
“ <v5FcTf^ffT
>8 N
q ^ T f ^ E T T r fN
- ^ v¿O^ M '^Msufe
»o “ i 6 -3nff fa o N -H li^ d>e: II V II
fT tT ^ w m p x R m f ^ t ii ^ n
v5dH R m R f ^ T H m ^ r ^ q ? ^ s f i i w ^ i-
, dl<Mcd % ^ T W fM 1 I 3THT5TT-
3 r4 i° b -m ft h r^ m m n te c r: u e n
3T^cPFq -H ^ lA d - f M 'HxO
- i d l ^ l ^ 'M l 'H l d i W3* ^ T ^ T r^ s f^
424 kutaicit cit. ibid. p. 410. 425 svatantra0 cit. ibid. p. 410 svatantragrahanam sma-
rananirdkaranaya. 426 jatam could also be considered as being compounded with sukhadi
with the meaning of ‘multitude, collection’, without this involving a notable variation of
the general meaning. 427 sarve$am dbhdsananr. bhavdbhdvdvabhdsdnam (which is the
same as the first pada of the kar.) E Gh N C Ch ft T, bhavdbhdvdvabhdsdnam corrected
to sarve?am abhasdnam Jh. 428 bhdvdbhdvavi$aydnum is paraphrased and commented on
ibid. p. 412 nanu evani vrttav abhasandm bhavabhdva visayatvena katham uktdh ... and
pp. 414-15 nanu ca abhasa vi$ayah, yato grdhyah, tat katham te$am vrttau bahuvnhina
vifayitvam darsitam. 429 °dbhasasya: °abhavasya ft. 430 bahirabhavat: bahirdbhasat T;
cf., in a similar context, §DVr p. 130 bdhye prakdtanabhavad ... . 431 °abhdsdndm:
°dbhasabheddndm T (also possible). 432 sada sattve: sadasattve E Gh N C Ch Jh N T.
433 °asraya nartha0: °dsrayandrtha° Ch. 434 'pi: hi E Gh C ft, pi corrected to hi Gh.
435 bauddha°: boddhya0 T. 436 bhidyate: vidyate T.
38
18.7
*ldkd*dT<=l ^ f ts jf a : | TTFTTWcqi
“ ^ W T W T T ^>r© *n^T
>0 M°h>Hfllw3e°'Mirli> -
w fc r aw0^ r % r m r a ^ , “ >ncT<?Tfa c r a F T F c R o ^ fcng-
cT
xD ^ I d H W f a *V9 || \3 ||
m H I^ + k ^ H K d ^ f cTcft % 3l<Udl II C II
fa<*>c-i| ^ m ^> «^ q i R T l M
^
t^ R ts ffc T q^RTmHTK
C N
>o
*'v '1^T5Jcn STT3JFrl:i
aae,d '(sll^ 'k d\ vvyq ^ P v r : 5 F ^ T 5 l U ^ II <: II
437 pratyaksa0 cit. and commented on ibid. p. 422. 438 prakafyamanefu: pra-
kdiamanesu E Gh. This is also the reading cit. ibid. p. 421, but ail the argumentation that
accompanies it presupposes prakasyamane$u: “ata eva" iti yato ’bhimdnamatrasdram
mdyiyam dbhdsate svdtantiyam e$am nlladJndm, tato vrttau pdratantryam e$am ninlpi-
tam, svatantryam tu na sprstam iti darsayati “antarnita” iti svatantrasyaiva hi pradhana-
kriyayani tanni$thavighnasambhdvandnirdsopayogiprai$ddikriyantaravi$ayam paratan-
tryam visaye 'pi prasaratlva mukhyakriyarupe, na tu paramarthatah pradhanakriyaydm
asambhavatsvatantryah prai$ddibhir abhisambadhyate I nanu sutranusarena vrttau
ildbhdsyamane?u” iti vaktavye “prakasa[sya? }mane$u “ iti ka vacoyuktih 4 ... . 439 °a\ya-
tiriktesu: °vyatiriktesu T. 440 bahirabhasa cit. ibid. p. 422. 441 taddpi cit. ibid. p. 423
and glossed with pratyaksatvc ’pi. 442 T adds iti. 443 ahamvimario cit. ibid. p. 426.
444 ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T- 445 bdhyatd omitted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N T
T. 446 sukhddes tu cit. ibid. p. 429, where also ghafddlndm is mentioned. 447 ekantah°:
ckanfa0 Ch.
39
ijR sS ldl H r>•f T t - q ^ W r “'“ s i ’T T f ^ T f ^«TT II 9 II
m tm d«H
>* W H f i | : ^ ‘, ', *#if>: SRTrTT ^ M ^ k H ^ ' s i :
II lo ||
q^ f^ n p ix ^ r f^ P F fa * £ 444: i
f ^ f 5T^ ffF T ^ F ^ *FT: II 11 II
448 ’kyya°: 'kfa° E, which is also the reading of IPV (KSTS Ed.), khya° N; the read
ing ’k$ya° occurs also in Bh and IPVV and is confirmed by the paraphrase ibid. p. 430
akyyadibhitmikadirupanam ... . 449 The text of the vrtti in E Gh N C Ch Jh ft T appear
at first sight corrupted and full of gaps: ullekhasya sukhaduhkhadmam ceivarasya
sakyatkararupo bauddhah prakatah. I have accepted integrally the text of T, even
though one would expect an explicit reference to bahiratmana; the addition of °lajja° is
indirectly confirmed ibid. p. 430 “atadrilpac ca” iti lajja hi na sukham, na duhkham, cit-
tavrttiviseyas ca. The text of J is very close to T (only, it omits °lajja° and reads
sakyatkara0). 450 aikyena: ekena Ch T. 451 na syat: ndsti Gh N Ch J Jh T. 452 hi vya-
vaharah, my conjectural emendation: hi na vyavaharah T, vyavahara E Gh N C Ch J Jh
N T- 453 ekas ca: eka eva E (ekaf ca also in K Kh). 454 ca omitted in E Gh N C Ch J
Jh N T- 455 paramatma0 cit. ibid. p. 433. 456 °akhyena: °akhya° T. 457 °samjhasydhanivi-
marsanam: °samjnakasyahamvimaria J.
40
" '’ " f i t 5 lR f ^ > i|, 18.11
II I*) II
ffcT 5lHl(^obl^sbdHMlfechH II
?fcT 5lMlf^<+>R: ||
41
^ W T T fl^ R
(73f5fer^^eTT?f^T%3f5-^5p'fcft o ^ r q R ^ f^ rn -
II “I II
42
^ f ^ T T S^ m H M H R > T T f ^ ls,lTrT: W R eTT3[ 5 TR?T rR ^ * n i.3
«TI'-I'MIjim■\ ii ? ii
^T t i^TSsrqt i^ ts x ^ m T R R T W ^ H : I
sm iR R T ^ R # W fip rm R n p r: II V II
10q r ^ ohH^d: II V II
4|pr^fV|»41dt ^R FiR Tm R T W R ft I
f^ q itfg r^ q f^ q f^ T ^ =t>W qhH H xflW ^: || 4 ||
*T ts fa I ’ ^ c h 'ir -q cT HRTRT rR R ^ R J R R n ^ fW ^ J F R T f^ -
f ^ T T iR T c T ° h M < 3h H ^ 114 II
^ 6 II
43
II 1.6 % 1wy |o M > |? it cT«iT c I^ F f f H R T rf
^ if^ M ^ m M W , y o b l^ o h ^ M ^ d c^ R ^ q q ^qqcq-
y ° h k m ‘^RTcTX I W R T ^ 'M d 'H * 6d k H d 1
d k ^ V -M d 'l fW ^ m if^ II vs II
44
m w i: ^ c fts ^ q W R * efc T * rp t- II 1.8
II 6 II
fsF q rffe ^ F it q w n % ^ r 11
fe d N H lfe ° b H
^ ^ ifq r if r ^ w N ^ F w q T H ?n: u i n
d^ebH K d/ rT R d ^ f^ q ^ T fT R I
q q ^ R H R i R m r o 3<^ i r q q ^ 3el R ^ q ^ O T m R m q p T ^ R T c T
n % ii
29 Cf. ibid. p. 26 anena vibhagavasayena ... . 30 na ca cit. ibid. p. 26. 31 tasya omit
ted in E Gh N C Ch Jh N J . 32 Cf. ibid. p. 29 kriyatra drtfantatvena upatta.
33 satyabhasah cit. ibid. p. 36. 34 sarvadopayoginam : sadopayoginam T, but cf. ibid. p.
29 “sarvadopayoginam” iti sthairyam uktarn “arthavattvena” iti arthakriyopayogah. 35 T
adds tatraikam (that is, the first two words of the kar.). 36 Cf. the paraphrase ibid. p. 45
antarabhinnam tattvam samvinmatrataya, mdydpramdtuh punah antahkaranabhasat
bahyakaranabhasac ca bahirbhedat vastu phalata ekanekam / anekatve hetuh “bahih" ity
aditi \jttisamgatih\ J has etat instead of eva. 37 bahir° cit. ibid. p. 45. 38 °sarpbheda-
mayaikakasvalakyanabhasanam : °sarfibhedabhasandm Jh T. 39 °ekaika° : °eka° E Gh N
C Jh.
45
II 2.3
“^ ^ U c F T T R ^ fs T R R fa w *T R R : f° F R lfc ^ < R T :
w1yHI<i°-MNK<SHl: II 3 II
-q|^)*.®|<r^ || y ||
* n fcT ^ R R * T R R i * I% R ^ f> R R R I
fW ^ R T : II 4 II
*R T = N ? fr l ^ TTcR t ^ r f e T if a jf t q |^ o b f c H q * b ( -
“h l ^ R l Q i l ^ q ^ T h c i H M i T ^ < flF R T :R R F T R
40 Cf. ibid. p. 47 kayor madhyastham mano vrttau uktam iti sarikitva grahya-
grahakayor iti darsayati. 41 pramatr0 : matr0 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T- 42 viviktabhd :
vivikta va E, viviktata (but in Malayalam script / and bh are rather similar) T.
43 sambandhi0 : sambandha0 E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 44 karakanam : karananam Gh N
C Ch J Jh T. 45 Cf. ibid. p. 62 evam kriydm ekanekanlpam upapadya vrttigranthasya
“matih” ity antasya ... . 46 E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T add bhati, which is very probably to
be expunged.
46
I 'Jlllfls5°'HrV’ ,MI^'<i>'Hli«i*Hc1^: d ®l fd il ^1 *
^ T ^ F T f^ W l^T || £ ||
^ T ^ T iT T ^ T ^T ^ m f^ rrfR ^ fr II V3 ||
TOT:
cT^M s?iioh-M I'H'=IK : I cfiTt ^f d d d ^ ^cT T : II V3
^ ^ A d liO k ^ c (' ^T T ^ I
c R if
>• q J i M «m\ ^ f f s f a II 1 II
^ frs ^ rR irm f^ R T fw 3 * i< = M rfm » ifcfa i
tp ^ rf^ W T fW t ftlrlc U d -m ifV ld l II * II
ild l^ -d l % <11SRrRT:
vD fck* ldlfa* lN u lT\
47
n 3.1-2 u,a^ q ^ i||L ^ H M d l ^ T O T>0: *ck^HH<ic(*<:<=l'1
<N
'^Wr?T ^^
MHIUIH I ^ I*? "qmTCTtsgfafcI focR ffci cT$N
^ s i3 F c rq if^ ^ 5 T g w ^ T ^ r fe*refcqdwm«-<d>r
*M cR 3ft«iM U I^< =b!H ® < idK i| fc R :^ p T ^ T T fc ^ %
d f^T ^ T T W 1RT -yiHk-M^Cl ^RcT^T
vO ^ R R iffs F q T ^ g T ^
qq|U||«-d^n ^3RnfacT',<M h tf gfafcf: yHI<i°qNK: II V5. II
g*4l*pM g ^ i 0-1!V«c n ir i h fS T ^ I
3 im H frs c ^ if II 3 II
^ ^ M i i l l d f ^ c d M vO
^ tn g T ^ PvO
JR R T T S m R nW : II 3 II
48
n 3.4-5
!cW T%
rfSfo ’«<fiC5i0,HePlo--M»t1'*,'*,,4«Cliq'HS I
49
II 3 . 4 -
^ r f ? i « i i 9h -M io b r fr , ^ c it^ ffc i i 3^ i m r i f t s R T ^ % -
€ 33 r f ^ f r q c r , ffc i ea ^r ^ r c n fa tfr q c t ^ °m o ^ m
ffc i ^ R T H ra : I ffc i ^ R q r f^ T m R T T t e 6^ T i f ^ % -
c T ic f ^ i ^ I c ic f t s if R h q i f^ T T II V - 4 II
3 H H R i^ T 5 ^ ri fH'Mdl«f'foh'MI ^Ts I
^ T R F T T fW r^ T q fcW T C T T ^fed R II & II
50
N
č r č>t0 i 101^ ^ o h ^ o b d i % mm- 1136
^TTf^T^T^^FTX II £ II
f^ n : # m r 1 0 i3 T f^ W |J |d N H R T ^ ^ r p í W N 103^
f ^ ' t>fir >o^ r 3 ?t t ^ t:,
1c”<M eTc)|i)10', 5f»íRn: R T ^ R F fg ^ a rtT T :, čT s ftě J -
106l p í I 10<sčí%číčrX ^ I M W l f i l o h ^ H X II V3 ||
c H lfó fo fc d •h l4 c |» K « ld 1 “ l d l - I
tlTl"*»®*«5l®ífll6IKHI HMIwilí + cfl Prf: II C II
51
II 3.9
fTT if>• I
dlcohlf^otjl' i*TTCftMtsi-<4dHMds II 1 II
$m ^ f i ^ 151M ifq T q i r m f r ©R
v ^^ 1 3 ^ >nor F T R f ^ 1Qi
y W y c q y fa ftm ii^ d n <? 11
^ l i ^ d d ’d-m^f^rf ^R tant^ndkH di i
d ld ll-d id ^l d1^<*4 o-»|«+>^l-'M«iTf^ ^T II 1° II
fa-HMHl’H^iSNMIMft Mip-MMHTfTcT: I
Md>'J«r'MdH^lf<p^l^<+>idHi>i<=lli\dHN II 11 II
’^ ^ 6vifc d d d fe ^>od R ^>od ^ lic H I ^%^xRT\14v^Rc5R ^IMT-
>0 N
3Tirf5TTTT
\ \ ’^SHlfadH\ II lo -11 II
52
113.13
>•
'3 H l i V < U u * l " ,s<l<?l<iv ig -M ^ s f^ ^ T H ts^ T iiT II 1 3 II
^>0
l i o T c l ^ l ^ d l i r l ^ ^ ^ l ^ ^ H l i ^ l t l o l l ^ l ^ l M l c \l c TN>©
^ f i S T ^ ^ r f ^\ ^ l°"d l
*>•
P?h * l* < ilf« ifa » f< ? t ^ T ^ n f^ T f^ T cT T I
M H Id lftc ^ ^ d y M ld ^ M M ilc i II 1 « II
13 ^ l ^ n ^ q t s ^ W T F T : w W I 3 F q V - M 13e£ T ^ T -
II I V II
x>
fe « 4 i* u < K i* M tf w m h R f ta ^ n 14 ii
M M Idf> T T Ft w 'H = f d m i d f t j J ^ I
53
II 3.15-16
| dd^ddTia *ddTdldT 1W9crdcyH|Uko)ld\ d d d d
W I W I ^ k -d d>o *dkHd: ddT f^ T ^ T ,’ % dci >0
y filch ^dld^-M IdN I cf ct ’ “ ^ fa P lHNI f^dT dT dT d
d f ^ d ^ S d f a f a ^ i^ - k ^ ilH H tk c l I 1M6d f c ^ S d d t lal9SH'<MHRT-
dTdmfdT d c ^ K ^ 'd ^ d d ld 'S t ly e H N k li> d d ^ lld
X>-H ^ ^ d -
dxddd ^ 0 d d h d F P m fr d T ddT d d l c k f t 1111
f a s ^ i d g v d d i d M i f c ^ i i d V, ^frsffcr dTddV
d T d T d T d T *-d dTdd% d IJ d M H I^ d l 1<,3d d d ’^ d d fc -
d f^ d W T ^ d T f^ d d F T T : m dc4^ II Tvs II
dT dT ^T T dT W ddT d^ % d ^ d f ^ d T c d f i T M H IcJ^^ fa ^ T d fc -
1',6dTddTdd%drq
vO
dTWIcr II Tvs ||
54
Il 4.1
^ M -d íH Í V d T d l^ d d m i-d d c d ^ I
qTTTcn f^f^T ts^^d çifèp d 'T liîd 'C ^ K î$ M * lld N 1', ®fT«lT
T fF d R R 1u,<:3TmRTÍm I ^ ^ ^ ^ l i j I Î V d P î ^ d l 'l p - m
f^R T čTPT II 1 II
^rg^T W
>• ^ *TT STfočT: Wž(J d d -d d : W : I
q ^ R W T F T>0^ t ô ï ï f ^ Č>T
© ^ W d ^ R R t f ^ m R ,’
B fñ fR ÍR % chKUko) 5 fü # N 16*R oM^ícď *T
R -d d II 3. Il
d d - d Tid'd ¿ l° M I ^TTÇrcTî ■d ^ d ^ M d l I
^T cflsfa TT d R : -HtI M | i R w f s « T Il 3 II
o * > l4 d > K « ld l 'd K d f^ 'M ^ d íc fd : I
55
I I 4.5
f^T T I
f9 b d k d 4 fe :ft* -lic l* -d d d l ^ f^ F T -
^ T m R T W R T 16U|ir% s c ^ o f^ T y ^ w ^ t d > 4 ^ lN
166‘^°f•t'H cT^f^T^IW^RdTcid’ c ^ T ■^rrf^TrTT II M II
d i£ * d * A d dcobl'if -Mci-d4dQaFTT I
4M N ^« -m -«il«+dl ^ ft d l i l l - d ^ i U r f c T : II £ II
56
3 ra ira ra ra ^ s tffa ťt fk fW i
« fM l^ ífd d l •ÍlMMtld II c II
s ^\ Of ^ r
n
fa fa rra q ^ R S lra ? : q ra rfa s f r s n -
% ö f^ q ohK«idi f^rraçm
>© rara w"O m n c ii
q ïftM IH ft «ra^ I
■M lP líd M Í^ Id lH T ^ 4 d l uI K d ^ í» lf t - M ^ I
tra iH ra : i iy e f r i ^ r a ^ q q fn ra q -
f a q r a 1¿0^ r q r ^ rvOa r f t r tN ii *n ii
57
II 4.12-13
"ST FR H t tR m R T t
16*
f^ T fc R R rq i ot>d'HIM«-MidJ«-Mmi'Hl^d ’^ d i ^ M l d d d d ^ q -
<T*^T ^ T ts ^ q f^ T T ^ T ^ T W : ,* d l d ^ d * dvo
wv 1<:63Trq^ciqf^afqTcT\ ^dxkM H M -
- d ^ J |ld N IT H T H I H I ^ d R t§ IR f^ ^ c T lf^ R c q R
II 1 4 - 1 3 II
58
qqrrq
" O N i qcTR%cR^ncT\ (\ 1eainq«*f qr*q *Tttt q 114,14
w q q q le a q = fc q ^ T F T i^ S F T : ^W R :
q T ^ T rT T ^ q : II I V II
q>pf q q q w q ^ q r?q q 4 q f^ f
d l-M l^ ^ q q rq rRT^q q jq iei,q*TTqTir$TTqqt q>oq f a q q c q q f
T*Zr{ II 14 II
3T?T i j q f^ q q ^ q if: q q T ^ q rq n rq : i
q q ^ q q ^ q q ic R ^ cH4<*>KU| q U f * l I
i^dAd % ^i-ql-q’^^qiqin II 1V3 ||
ohl4obKU|qV^«-q^M^sLi|oh^o| ^i||-d ’h ? R : || 1vs II
193 samarthyam : samarthye T; cf. ibid. p. 226 etad vastu vrttau vivari$yate / katham
purvasya samarthyam parasya satta. 194 Cf. ibid. p. 223 tatra hi purvasya samarthyam
nama svabhavah sa parasya sattarupo neti vakyyate. 195 pradharta0 and gunavibhakti0
cit. ibid. p. 231. 196 °bhavah : °bhdvakhyah E. 197 °svabhavata : °svarupata Kh G (this
is also the reading of the IPVV and the two editions of the IPV).
59
114.18
ferqr Bf>Miee<3hMMd|| I
tT W rf^ n rrn n n ic n
•T ^ *H
>• R f I
sn H R T ^T ^ f^r fq ^ T c R fH w>• >• u i<? n
d K d ^ s fa *T ^ T R m R T f ^ n it: I
fE n H W ^ 9 i^ N ? 5 r r 7 P R f f^ n fe ^ n n 3.0 h
60
^ ^ f^qTcoR I cT ^ fcldkHI 50'SfT«4lp4<+rniq| II 4.20
N >0
f f T ^ n f r ^ f ^ ^ T t^ T T ^F<f<TT f ^ T II * 1 II
P M ^>
qoq : *<=id<-d*q (c i w ic h h i
>o ^ p ic q fc r
? fci f^ T T f^ R : II
207 ciklr$aya paramrian cit. ibid. p. 250, where the rest of the sentence is also com
mented on: vrttyartham vydkaroti “atra” h r vfttigranthe / dbhasana ca kriya tasya ddya
eva paramarso lak$anam / sa eva bahihkaranatmakabhasanaparyanta / tena trayam etad
upakrame bhasamanam api dvayam eva, vastutas tu ekam apTti tatparyam. 208 tad cit.
ibid. p. 248 “fa/" ity abhasabhedasya ghatanam kriyatvam. 209 jadasyapi : jadasyasyapi
T (also possible); jadasya cit. ibid. pp. 248 and 250. 2,0 Cf. ibid. p. 252 tadabhasas ca
iti svatantryabhavasya nimittam ukta icchabhava iti sarigatih / iyata vrttir ubhayatha
gamita bubhufdyogena yat svatantryam tasya abliavat, ayogena ca yah svatantryabhavas
tata iti. 2,1 akartrh’am : akartrkatvam E; akartrtvam cit. ibid. p. 248. 212 The reading of
T is not clear (pramave?). 213 tam cit. ibid. p. 248 tam iti jadam. 2,4 tena tena : tena
T Gh N J. 2,5 °ddind : °adi° E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 2,6 sa cit. ibid. p. 248 sa iti pra-
mdtd. 2,7 tatha : tada Ch. 218 sthatum : kartum E Gh N C Ch Jh N T; sthatum is also
confirmed by the quotation of this passage (cidvapufah ... °rupa) in MMP p. 39. 219 kriya
mukhya : mukhya kriya N. 220 nakartrkam : nakartrtvam N Ch Jh, nakartftvam correc
ted to nakartrkam J. 221 °upacaratah : °upacdrat E C N , °upacaratah corrected to °upa-
carat J.
61
3TRTTTTftr^R:
g w u lM
fqF^TT '+>l<rf'?bH M J ll I
M l>•
d^d d d - M V - M l f a'■•q * ^ $1M <=b*W l II 1 II
e 3 T T c iH t Ijq ^ r R T 3^ T c n
R h ^ irt vc R F R l f ^ R % ^ '1c R q II *1 II
6 | R l d>©
^ d ^ fe iftq d M -d q fq q T O T ^ t q>0
^T : -Hldl'is-M d r ^ R \,
o t t 11 3. n
f^ iN tsR T : I
q fftfri i^ W lc H d l 10q f c i : II 3 II
1 pramatuh and kriya cit. in TPVV III p. 260 vrttau pramatuh kriya iti sam-
bandha$a$thi, na tu bahiskaranapekyaya kartari. 2 atmano, omitted in T, cit. ibid. p. 258.
3 °anugata : °anugatah T. 4 Cf. the quotation from the (Jka ibid. p. 259 tad etad dar&aya-
ti “parasparaviraha” ity ddind. 5 tasya omitted in C N. 6 Jsitur cit. ibid. p. 265. 7 eva
omitted in E Gh. 8 °antarayor : °abhyantarayor E Gh J. 9 vedyavedakayor omitted in
T. 10 matih cit. ibid. p. 273. 11 suddha0 cit. ibid. p. 273.
62
^N M I ^ f l K c d l t M * 4 |c |'k d d ? i l < * > H l d ■N II « II
3 M im c d » IM M IH d k H ^ d HT^TTrfN I
M 4d lg «-d -M I^ K T d v ^TTRT^TT % *TT II <1 II
H T^T
>• o h>•
cid ftikM -flsfiT *TT I
M l'M k l^ F ^ I *TT f^ T ^ R T *T«iT II 6. II
TT5%55Rf^R5R7: II £ II
12 api only found in T (cf. ibid. p. 274 vcdyadakdm anglkrtavatam api\ anyhow, not
strictly necessary). 13 °pratipattih : °pratipatti° T (but the omission of visarga before a
sibilant is frequent in Malayalam script). 14 aparaivam cit. ibid. p. 275. 15 parata cit.
ibid. p. 275. 16 eva omitted in Ch Jh. Gh N C Ch J N T put a danda before tatrastha.
17 aitvaiyasya : aisvaiyena T. 18 svatmanah : atmanah E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T.
19 pratyabhijiidnam : pratyabhijnane E Gh N C Ch Jh N T. 20 vidyaya : vidya E C N,
vidyaya corrected to vidya Gh T. 21 °bhavo : °bhave E Gh N C Ch J Jh N T. 22 mayaya
: may a E C N, mayaya corrected to may a Gh Jh T.
63
^ q T ^ s g -rd -M M k M 'flfa ft I
5 T fr ^ WT M l-M l^lft-d f t II C II
qqT i* % ^ q q rq r * 3q q q R T ^ s ^ f tr f c i y n i ^ d * wq
^ 6 lfe :, cRT * ^ f tH 4 ^ e i ^ 5 ! d H f t k lf td f t* il iE ! - 'f l qR * * ft-
II C II
64
S R tf W c T O T ^ B F P fa “ «=b^uiUH«+>H I ra 1.10-11
f> q tfW II l o II
o b iifd jf^ II 11 II
^ c q w m ii^ o h i^ q q q q r f ^ q ii
f^ r^ rq ^ n R T ^ ^ rsrfa^ T ii i ii
65
11121 Wtsfil^dldl, fM-dy^qiatsHT^ wf-
ft*jfej£rr<N ^ r f ^ T <\ ii i n
^ w m w i» -^ : ^rcn fr I
ftrarf^ » n f^iw 4 R -* i« iH t w ?T n 9. ii
ve3T W T ^T {^5fqT W
>6
e i: II 9. II
W jf^ ^ W en qfeT: I
n rw t ^ c f ^ r w f f ^ n ? r>•n : w >•: n 3 n
II 3 II
w e r^ q ^ rf^ h T F n M t^ w iM ir a tn I
^TMTTf f^ fT ^T '-M
Os
c d lH R fd « -iftftd e d ld \
fsT^l^led dlfro|ob^'=I^Mf^M'Mi<HI'>-Hrtec|HN II M II
66
h i -m k p 'M’ i in 2.5
w f w < r^ n m> n ^ n
^ S rN ^T mfcT
^ d ^ T d tsfa ^ fa q -M U lIdN d F d T '“ iTFfrq W N
I S T l^<Nd F T fa
°h 4 ull ^ -H li^ 'iet^ N i^ > H i ff^M'Mi^K<Mlt<ki|oheh<|j|fi «+>|4h
i f^ ^ r q f^ r R H g K tr 60r ^ w m r f^ T ^ ^ r n^ n
fa W d l: fa^T T ^
ii e n
>o quiohcicc|s',
(\ C !il<riJc=lld
t\ \ ^ -H ^ M I-
«-■M^d W'vO l fdni^lMX II 5 II
* i N l f « ! < j J * l « i |o M l s f a 6 6 ^ m d * -M V d i^ d c T T I
67
11127 f^m h T T ^ T T ^rm i ^ ^ w1f a 5 i M ^ = i t f i
U i $<r-H-^-M«-rl II V3 II
w f r : q ^qT ^JT : I
^qf q ip fq ^ ts c q f^ tT q i^ fh R r T
>• f^ 'fi^ M c i: II C II
©V Nfi
fk ^ r^ rg q f H iqiM rf ftrd ^ rm q ^ im ii
® ® o h ^ d iq |J ls f^ q tV M f y<q n r h f m N f
f^ -d ^ tl^ q lJ IK H iq H ^ H ^ 3 T ^ q I q y f^ c f^ s n q iq R
N
fa "! I 3i«-*il»-H q ^ 3 <N
H = i° i5 id i ^ q i H ^ %P
K c i HN
W cT II ^ II
68
3 d l< iM i ^ W R I
m 2.io
cT5nffcr o p p f^ N p TT^q
>• « ‘« I ^ K U I H
N II 1o II
W I c K I- r lM I ^ F lfW q q ts fa ^ T tf
Ijq ^ K y q l'J io h : II 10 II
^ -q i^ W r f Jm d -M I II 11 II
^ R n f ^ n it c r ^ q PM dTd ^ c fd i^ M s T fq w m ^ r
tq H ^ q u ic d H || <11 ||
'.O >© \
iK
Ov q i q l C l< 5 « * l 51M
\ >• d c tl* 1 l^ 5 l^ ! n uld % II 1?. II
q?r%q qq; ^ q q fc T R q q t q t^ r c q q q t-
c f ^ f ^ r R m i ^ W O T q's£^
> q rf II 1?. II
d ^ = M liiq M k M « -q g -d ld > c { d lH ^ I
3 R ^ i^ R f ^ R q if^ i ^ q ^ fq T T T n i? n
85 The gender of mala fluctuates between masculine and neuter; see also above n.2.8
karmamalo (kdrmo Gh LPV IPVV, karma° N C 1^ T) and II.2.9 mdydmalam (°malo Gh
IPV IPVV). 86 Cf. ibid. p. 328 tat vrttau prathamanirdesena nirditfasya api ¿unyadeh
pascad gunatapradarsanena vivrtam. 87 My conjectural emendation for kartrtatmano
bodho yad upasarjanatvaste T, evidently corrupt. The expected meaning of the sentence
is sufficiently clear. 88 bodhamayatam apannasya cit. ibid. p. 331.
69
111213 dN«-MNMRr«icfr ^ ' ^ sczt\
3 RvOW S * k d l d N I eod H ^ F T ^ ^ RvOr E n H ^ N : || 13 ||
q T ^ s f^ T T M -tf^ c b lO H c h l II 1 « II
^ H H IH tf^ d M d H II IS II
t>l-M
o\ dW I ^ te m iM k H N IM r iW R : 1, e3M|U||4l W
>o S -
fcfijFTTH I
W ^H H R n ^M H I W HM d W R II IS II
TH:3T5fx^5T
89 My conjectural emendation for arupatve va° T. 90 tavataiva cit. ibid. p. 333, whe
re the rest of the sentence also seems to be confirmed by the quotation from the (Jka :
“tavataiva” iti vrttigatam evakaram vyakhyatum darsayati “samkhyapuru§dnam ca” id /
vi$e$am tu aha “kevalam” iti. 91 The compound is paraphrased and interpreted, following
the dkay in two different ways {ibid. p. 335) : purvavyakhyane vrttau evam vigrahah -
sarvendriyaiaktisadharanam jivanakhyam yat prananadikriydpahcakam pranadivibhaga-
karanabhutam tasya vyaparapancakasya preranatmika aham iti san\rambhalak$ana vftdr
yasya sunyasya, sa tat ha uktah / idanlm tu evam vigrahah - sarvendriyasaktlnam
sadharanam jTvanasabdavacyam pranadivayundm preranalak?anam antarvrttifabda-
vacyam tat yasyeti\ tad dhi tasya sambandhi tasya eva kartrtvat, na tu tdsdm karanatvad
iti. 92 sthitau cit. ibid. p. 338. 93 pranadau cit. ibid. p. 338 “pranadau" iti vrttau “sthi-
tau” iti purvakam yad vaiyadhikaranyena tad apekyaniyam.
70
III 2.16
c IM S II
if dldJd-MI ft*TfT I
fjf^ : ^ T V r^ ft ^ X R T ip n *T ^TR R : II Tvs II
d ^ f: II TC II
II IS II
94 kalantara0 cit. ibid. p. 3 39. 95 purvavad cit. ibid. p. 340. 96 My correction, re
quired by meaning, for °upacaya° T. 97 sa ca cit. ibid. p. 345. 98 prdnatma cit. and
commented on ibid. p. 343 pranatma iti vrttau karmadharayo ’yam iti yavat. 99 T adds sva-
pne, apparently to be expunged. 100 T adds tra (Vra), apparently to be expunged. 101 ta-
ra T, meaningless, is probably to be corrected to tan° (or expunged).
71
1112.20
^T PT t f t 'c U c M * : qq: II * o ||
f?q R F n ^ R ^ fe<fl-MHlfe<+>y II
^cdNIMlf^l<+>K: II
102 Cf. ibid. p. 350 katham pranapanau madhye urdhvena ekatapannau pravahata iti
vfttau bhanitam ... pranapanayos ca katham vyatirekena tiryakpravaha uktah ; parivad-
vaya° cit. (from the fika) ibid. 103 The comparison with the third eye is developed ibid.
p. 350-51. 104 Cf. ibid. p. 350 turyadilakfanam urdhvabhaktvaditi vibhagah. 105 Cf. the
paraphrase of the parallel passage of the fika ibid. p. 352-53 “turyatitapade tu" iti pra-
vahanavyaparasamspartanahetuh, desakalabhedapekjam gamanam pravahanam, deta
ka lav api ca atra ahantaikamatrasarajatau, na tu kathamcid bhinnav iti. 106 °anavac-
chede (or °anavacchedena), my correction for °anavaccheda° T. 107 Cf. ibid. p. 353
*'pranataktih” ity adi paramesvaronme$amdtrarupa cety arthah. 108 °kalpa° cit. (through
the fika) ibid. p. 353 “kalpasabdena” iti vrttigatena / kalpasabdah svabhavavaci.
72
d T o l ^ d l č l í ^ R :
ličT I
f^ R 5 r^ s 5 fW k č q R š n ^ R h í% (T : n i u
T*W - ’g ^ H l M I ^ - M d - i í d i ř l N I H ^ - y í í i á d J J I ^ o h l - y f í r i d ^ a r i n j -
3d « * d l f ó ■U lS + ' R H d l I
H ^ o T R -q ^«TPTŽ|sR:HÍ>dJÍcl čT fW ^R R T F R F T # ajTSÍ
1 Cf. ibid. p. 357 yad aha “adibhumikáyám" iti prathamopadeyata tatah prabhfíi ma-
lavigalanárambhút. 2 My conjectural emendation for °grůhyohamkara0 T. Abh. ibid. p.
357 refers to the ‘long compound’ (mahapadam) in the vrtti, quoting very concisely pas
sages from the commentary devoted to it by the fika, integrated with his own glosses. It
appears that the last word is upabfmhitah and that therefore the reading T is corrupt; in
T the compound ends with grahyo, which might be theoretically admissible if the fol
lowing word hamkara did not give rise to considerable perplexity. The words that Abh.
expressly quotes are: akhanditagrahaka, akhanditagrahya, melana, upabrmhita. It is worth
quoting the whole passage: akhanditagrahaka iry adikam vrttigatam mahapadam vyacatfe
“yat ta ť' iti / anena grdhakapadam vyůkhyatam, akhanditapadam vyčcatfe “yatra” ity adi
nů “akhandita” ity antena / “tatha” ity adinů grahyapadam vyaca$(e, “tatra” ity adina
tadvise^anam “akhandita” iti , “tayoh” ity adina melanápadam / tayor iti grdhaka-
grahyayoh / “paraspara” iti akhanditapadena grůhakasya grahakantarát, grahyasya
grahyantarat na viccheda iti darsitam, amuna tu parasparato ’piti / upabrmhitapadam v/-
vrnoti “nirakahk?a' ity antena. This permits us to establish the general sense with suffi
cient precision; there remains the doubt as to what exactly the word preceding melana
must be. My hypothesis is tan (on the basis of tayoh, which seems referred to it in the
(lká), but it might also be something like ubhaya, or ahamidam (which would be closer
to the corrupt hamkara T). 3 ÍPV (KSTS) TPVV and E read buddhyadi0.
73
IV 2 q fc q ffic f q>if e : q F T ts« ! Os.
d ^ d M l^ d q f tf W ^ W i^ c R II 3. II
cR II 3 II
^l^oh<M
vOfig;y|U||i^', <ciu^d|dN x!|?i‘o bK M ^IH ^ : mNP<!?1M'H!?|: I
q c q q ic q p it q ^ q :, q q k j ^ q q fh q ^ q
II 3 II
^ l^ q Hc-H^tfd i=r»-Hl q qT I
w m p fr^ ^ ijq q ^fr; q ^ q ii v n
4 The same expression cit. (from the flka) ibid. p. 359 in the introduction to the fol
lowing verse: vedyaikadese ’pi ity adi. 5 T has °khandanatapara°\ °khanda° and °apara°
(<aparaparaiabdena is most likely a mistake for aparasabdena) are quoted ibid. p. 360,
°gata° is my tentative emendation for °nata°, evidently corrupt. In the same passage
°aneka° and °parijndna° are also quoted: “anena” iti vfftigranthena / khandasabdena
atidirghagonasasarJragaiabhinnajJvatve khandikarane khandakhandanam prthagjivatvam
punar ekJbhavapattdv ekajivatcti dhvanaia anutvam aparaparafread apara°)sabdena ca
pariniitah’am darsitam i anekatvaparijriane in svasabdenaiva ukte. 6 The lack of com
mentary on the particularly important first pada may induce one to question the integrity
of the vrtti. However, the content of the first pada might be considered as already
explained above (cf. III.2.3).
74
ili> d H d : * liV d < c i I
1J*T
^ dl
>•UI MI d W U |‘+ > l 4 c d H p < u i l i * H W N II 4 II
^ s c i R T m f ^ % ^ c T m n R h >•
i^ : q H t: I
ft f^f^T^TT M V d l i - H cT«TT p q ^ m f ^ T : II VS II
7 Cf. ibid. p. 363 “agame” iti srlmaftgalasastre; the (Tka is probably referring to the
well-known ardhasloka of the Mahgalasastra (or Sarvamahgala) saktayo ’sya jagat
krtsnam, echoed by the vrtti. 8 slefi°, which in E and in the two editions of IPV stands
alone, is to be taken as compounded with the following sattvatamo0, as we can gather
from the vrtti and the other commentaries (only Bh., II p. 291, refers it to rajah); tat-
tvamano0 corrected to satn>atamo° T. 9 The context seems to require the addition of rajah.
10 Cf. ibid. p. 364 atra hetuh parimityam, tatrapi grahyatapadanam. 11 Cf. ibid. p. 367
na kevalam sadyojdtabalader gocankaryah ...; cf. also ibid. p. 368. 12 Cf. the quotation
(from the tika) ibid. p. 368 “aneka” ity adipadena svalak$anatmanah, “prthak” ity adina
tu samdnyalaksanarupa nirdiftah.
75
IV 7 13
IV
îIW Io h K I^ ïï« n d P -d ^ H ld II vs II
à cT
>• fV d M H H T m f: W ^ T T : 4 rq < * lk * H : I
1', rT f^ P R T c W T C n : 16* im k - M k H - d ls q f a ly
ï^ T ts Ç ^Tsft d lg ftirl f^ T ^ q q ^ ^ rf^ c n trfq F ^ -
HUMkHfa: N
ie f ^ p F C R W c q T d d ^ i ^ d d>-0 S l d - t f M ^ -
76
d * < 4 K U l|K u n I IV 9-10
^ N l^ T e v 3 R iT c n n ^ I W I I d d lc H d : II S II
fW ^ rfq F ^ rq T d d iJu f^ p M » q * * p tM q i II 1o ||
30^T ^ ¡H ^ lO d : ^ i c H M M i ^ s y i i^ d i^ ^ t r r q HI-Mlo-MM^^I
d T l^ °h < + > K lfc { 31s r if i i d ! i l d M » - d J | U M I y |U | ^ C i « i 3 i - M ^ - q ^ r l |-
H N -d l 33fa<+>c'MH°q°-MNKI cT«iT==cr: II S - 1 ° ||
?r 3t9^ s : : - d 4 y n i c |u i i ^rf cT ^ q
77
IV 11
I 3<RTT 3€^ M ^ q i f l [ -
^ m i f W ^>c f T : || 11 ||
v ’^ c f f W ^T M P^'JlM d: I
fa ^ M M I q ^ s fa H ^ ld l II 19. II
38 sa caham idam ity etdvat0 cit. ibid. p. 387. 39 bhedanudayat cit. (from the fika)
ibid. p. 388. 40 The text is doubtful and my restoration is only tentative. Here the second
part of the karika is glossed (cf. ibid. p. 388 evam slokdrdham vyakhydtam, which con
cludes the gloss of the first half). T reads tanirantardntarodyatksetrajhavydpdravikalpa-
nirhrasaparasilpanena. I correct tantra° to tatre? on the basis of the quotation ibid. p.
388 tadvrttim “tatrdntara” ity adikam; antarantard is confirmed by its mention in the fika
“yady api” iti I “sahabhave ca antarantard” iti yuktam iti bhavah / “tathapC’ iti na atra
vikalpasffler antarantard sambhava uktah, kintu tannirhrasasya. In the same compound,
after °kfetrajna°> T has some akfaras deleted and corrected, which are read in the tran
script as °vdparakalpa°. Actually, T has vikalpapara, where the part ikalpa is deleted and
va is corrected to vyo, thus forming the word vyapara followed not by kalpa but by vikal-
pa\ °vikalpanirhrasa occurs many times ibid. p. 389. Then I read °pariillanena instead of
°pariSilpanena T (my conjecture is supported ibid. p. 389 tarn eva ca vikalpanirhrdsam
yadi parisilayati .... 41 sarvo : so ’ham E. According to Bh (II p. 305), sarvo, found in
the text of IPV commented on by him, would be the corruption of the original reading
sargo, graphically rather similar in iarada script. In his opinion sargo would fit the con
text better (ayam sargo, that is, the creation of the vikalpas of which it is question), but
the decision is left to the reader’s sensitivity (sahfdaya atra pramanam). However, a clo
se examination of the vrtti induces me to think that the original reading was precisely sar
vo (which is not directly glossed, but which lends itself to not being glossed). I would
even add that Abh.’s commentaries may allow one to suppose that his text had precisely
the corrupt reading sargo (he would gloss it, in fact, with vikalpasfflih), then returned,
by a further corruption or correction, to the original one which was in front of Bhaskara.
Accordingly, Abh.’s interpretation of vibhava is also different from the vrttis. But another
hypothesis may also be put forward. Bhaskara records and immediately discards a further
reading so ’ham (kutrapy adarse “so 'ham” ity api pafho ’sti, sa tu na yuktah). This rea
ding, found in E, is accepted by Sivopadhyaya in the Vijnanabhairavivfti (p. 95) and fier
cely defended against the upholders of the other two (ibid. p. 96) ye tu ilsarvo mamayam,
sargo mamayam” ity adipafhantaram kalpayanti te pdntjiitammanydh ... mudhah). The
78
q ft iT T r i^ r O T F r P T w * r ^R T R *rqt iv 12
f^ F T T f^ m : M ^R ^H M M ilm P-olohc'qi-^M IciqfT t
II 13. II
^ f« n c c lr d 'ils iH M - H H x c f lf e lP lM T : I
IH H k H M * ld * > 4 e T H fs F ^ cT*iT I
first pada of the karika, in this form, would refer to the two aspects of ‘recognition’
(pratyabhijnadvaidham), connected by him with the vv. 109-10 of the Vijhanabhairava.
According to Sivopadhyaya, this would be the reading commented on by Abh.
(pratyabhijhavimarsinlkarena); and indeed IPV II p. 305 (and almost in the same terms
IPVV III p.393) says: na hi sah pratyagatma nama paUih kaicid anyo "ham, api tu pari-
grhltagrahyagrahakapraka.iaikaghanah paro yah sa evaham sa caham eva ... . But this
may also be a mere digression of Abh., not directly dependent on the text of the karika.
Lastly, sahrdaya atra pramanam. 42 Cf. ibid. p. 395 “cidanandaghana” iti sautram
ahampratltau pilrnayam” itlyata vyakhyatam. 43 pasyan yathepsitan arthan : janan yathe-
psltan paSyan C ft (this is also the reading of IPV, IPVV and Bh), pasyan yathepsitan
atmd Ch Jh T (dtmd then corrected to arthan in T)- The text of E T N is the one
presupposed by all the commentaries. 44 This word in T is difficult to read. Among the
various options °nibhrtam (or °nirbhrtam) seems to me the only one that may furnish an
acceptable meaning (the transcript has °nivrtam).
79
IV 16 * * *
ffir w zz ^ *TPÍf ^
**T ftN éf^e^lK ^ *T*ÍT I
ř t t ^d d < * > < {d lH k * H Ï
H «)£ o
^Tts-MMc(oh IT^TftR^t W f: “^ ^ ^ p T W r ^ T O Ť f R ^ F F T -
ftl^ f^ T T f^ Ť q ^ t ^RT
■Mfe-díd^^T^T f^ Ř F Ít^ č T : I l^dcM Î^ÎM ^d f$Mdl4íílldv
öftSF^T U6^ W dt *RŘT II IS II
ď k d ^ d k rM 4*=KyeMÎ*lçîlMmd4ï-m -MW4
(\ h >?M ^
Il IVJ II
80
il i c ii
81
TRANSLATION
1 1.1
SECTION I. KNOWLEDGE
C hapter I
2. What intelligent being could ever deny or establish the cognizer and
agent, the Self, Mahesvara, established from the beginning (adisiddhej?
85
1 1.2 - The Self of all beings, the substratum of the establishment of all
objects6, who embraces the establishment of himself7 - since otherwise it
would be impossible to establish all the various objects - self-luminous,
whose nature is uniquely that of cognizer, formerly8 established, ‘ancient’,
possesses knowledge and action. Sovereignty (aisvaryam) is established
through inner awareness. Therefore only the foolish strive to establish or
deny the Lord. - 2 -
6 According to Abh. (see text note 11), this is to be understood as meaning that
the cognizer constitutes the final stage (viirantisthana) of the cognitive act, at which
the revelation o f the object (prakdfa) becomes reflective awareness (vim arsa).
7 The cognizer becomes implicitly conscious o f himself, of his being ‘light’, pre
cisely through perception (the ‘illumination’ of the object); indeed, the illumination of
the object - its perception - presupposes a light into which it enters, a light that by
definition is not its own but pertains to the subject.
8 The being established o f the subject always ‘precedes’, as an a priori condition
o f knowledge, and for this reason eludes any objectification that attempts to capture
it, so to speak, from behind. That would be like trying to step ahead of one’s own
shadow, as a well-known verse of the Trikahrdaya (quoted in SSV p. 4) puts it. Abh.
(IPVV I p. 51) gives the example of inferring fire from smoke, which, indeed, implies
that it is always the smoke that is already established first: the difference being that
the priority of the self is ad infinitum {yada yada upakramah tada tadd pilrva-
siddhanfam ity eyo ’tra param drthah). This is precisely what the nearness of pilrva-
siddha to purana signifies, which taken singly may apply to various things (see text
note 15); the same theme will be taken up again later.
9 The expression svasam vedanasiddha interprets and orientates, by limiting its
meaning, drste in the karika, which, insofar as it is passive, seems to degrade to the
status of object He who is the subject pa r excellence, the Lord. But, Abh. notes (see
text note 19), this expression, too, is, in the strict sense of the word, inadequate, as
the fika itself has pointed out (napi svasam vedanasiddhatvam dtmanah); it can be
accepted only if understood in a metaphorical sense, as expressing the undeniability
of the experience of the I. The theme of the absolute impossibility of objectifying the
I, Siva, recurs with particular insistence in the work o f Utp. Cf. IPVV III p. 162 yat
pram eyikrto 'smlti s a n ’O 'py atmani lajjate / katham pram eyikaranam sahatdm tan
mahesvarah II ‘Everyone feels ashamed in himself at seeing that he is transformed
into an objel of cognition; then, how might the Great Lord stand this ?’
86
nite knowledge (ahrdayahgamatvat) 10 because of the delusion caused by I 1.3
maya, His mere ‘recognition’11 is here shown - in the form of the acqui
sition of unswerving certainty - through the illustration of that sign of
recognition that is represented by the faculties peculiar to H im 12. - 3 -
10 Lit.: ‘does not reach the heart’, i.e. the plane of vimar&a which alone makes a
cognition fully accomplished and effective (cf. IPVV I p. 80).
11 The reality of the Self is not therefore ‘known’ - as happens with any object
in phenomenal reality, which, not shining itself, needs to be illuminated by con
sciousness - but is simply ‘recognized’. Moreover, this act of recognition is not
something that was not there formerly and must be brought into existence, but eter
nally present and merely concealed, it is only ‘shown’ (darfyate) as predominant, by
placing it near (upa), in contact with the heart (IPVV I p. 87 see text note 26). Thus
Abh. intends to remove the act o f recognition from the sphere o f the \yavaharasddhana
as well (cf. p. 173 n. 3). In fact, there may not be anything asiddha in the Lord, not
even as regards any aspect of vyavahara (prakhya-upakhya, jnana-abltidhana) con
cerning him, for in this case even the establishment of the smallest portion of the
knowable would become impossible (IPVV I p. 87 tadasiddhau pram eyalesasyapi hi
na kacit siddhir ity uktam).
12 That is, above all, the powers of knowledge and action.
13 This means that action, as an inner reality (vimarsa), inseparable from know
ledge, is also self-established. The possibility o f objectification only regards its ex
treme phenomenal form o f bodily movement.
14 If action is examined first in the vrtti, thus reversing the order of the karika
where knowledge is mentioned first, this is because action is the means by which
knowledge (from which it is inseparable) can be inferred in others (IPVV I pp. 104-
105). That bodily action, and the use of the word, presuppose knowledge is a gene-
87
1 1.5 the Self perceived as T in oneself and others, is established insofar as it
is directly experienced through inner awareness. Because of the obscuring
of his true nature caused by the power of maya, the Self is thus15 erro
neously conceived. - 5 -
rally recognized fact; cf. for instance Dharm akirti’s Santanantarasiddhi 1-2 (Kitagawa
1955: 58; Stcherbalsky 1969: 64). But to infer knowledge means to objectify it and
it is for this reason that Utp. in the karika and in the fika prefers to resort to other
expressions, such as to conjecture, suppose, guess etc. (cf. uhanam tarkanam sambha-
vanam ibid. p. 101). The problem, however, arises again and is given an elaborate
solution in IPVV I pp. 105-108. Abh. begins by stating that since it is a question of
an inference founded on the svabhavahetu (see below p. 179 n. 17) - that does not
aim to make known an object not formerly known, but only to rid it of erroneous
conceptions - the real basic self-luminosity of knowledge and o f the subject is not
contradicted. After a series of objections and replies, following the line o f argument
in the fik a , the conclusion is reached: a certain level of objectification in inferring
knowledge in another body is undeniable, but this applies only to the initial and medial
stages, whereas in the end (paryante) knowledge appears in all its luminosity, at unity
with the subject making the inference, as happens at the conclusion of every cognitive
act. In saying prasidhyati the vrtti intends to express the emergence of the natural
self-luminosity of knowledge and to exclude the possibility o f its being a luminosity
induced by the subject, as is the case for the common object of knowledge (siddham
bhavati, na tu sadyam).
15 I.e. in the way that will be described in the following chapter. In understan
ding tasya both as objective and subjective genitive (it is Abh. himself who underli
nes this, see text note 43), the Self becomes both the object and the subject of the
error: the Self in its freedom is mistaken about itself. Indeed, every reality, even error,
has the Lord, the Self, as its ultimate source.
88
1 2.1-2
C hapter II
89
12.1-2 called mental élaboration (vikalpa0,), inseparably connected with dis
course fsâbhilâpamj, which appears in manifold forms. For neither o f the
two is there any necessity to posit any stable perceiving subject, since he
does not appear4 in them. Also the notion of T (ahamprafitihj has in
reality as referent the body etc...
- One type of cognition, consisting in the direct perception of the
clearly manifested {sphutâvabhâsa0) particular reality, is called ‘exempt
from mental elaborations’ (ninnkalpakam); the other type of cognition,
on the other hand, which, permeated by the word, appears in the various
forms of memory, doubt, fantasy etc., is called ‘representation, mental
elaboration’ (vikalpa0). Neither the one nor the other are admissible as
depending on another entity distinct from knowledge itself in the form
of consciousness, since this other entity is not perceived (tasyânupalab-
dheh). Who, then, is this permanent Self? Even on the basis of the no
tion of ‘I’, which is indissolubly connected with discourse, the existence
of a cognizer, who transcends what are simply cognizable realities, name
ly the body and so on, cannot be ascertained5. - 1-2 -
with the Buddhists lies precisely in conceiving of place-time-form not as the intrinsic
nature of the thing but as the contingent contraction of an entity whose real nature
is, on the contrary, expanded (vikasitasvabhava eva, vitatatm a; cf. SD V.6c), ‘open’
(cf. IPVV II p. 27). Though appearing as a unitary entity, the svalaksana, in Utp.’s
view, is in fact formed by a number o f abhasas, i.e. universals, which have become
a particular owing to their mutual delimitation and their connection with space and
time (Torella 1987: 168-69). In the process of particularization space and time are
considered the most essential elements (antarahga). If, already in perception itself,
the svalaksana appears as a unitary reality (the world o f practical experience is,
indeed, made of svalakjanas), this is due to the unifying power of the mind (anu-
sam dhana) which links together a group of abhasas by making them subordinated
to a predominant one (sam anadhikaranya; see below pp. 166-167) Thus the saiva
position may be defined abhdsanikurumbdtmakavdda as opposed to the niramsasva-
laksana\’ada of the Buddhists (on svalaksana in the Buddhist pram dna tradition see
Stcherbatsky 19302: 181-198, Katsura 1992: 135-137).
4 The Buddhist logicians acknowledge the validity of non-perception as the
criterion for establishing the non-existence of something that could (if present) be
perceived (drsyanupalabdhi); this subject will be extensively taken up again later.
5 The Buddhist knows he is laying himself open to an obvious objection: how
is it possible to say that no T is manifested in knowledge when, on the contrary,
we all usually say « I know, I am happy or unhappy, I am thin or fat». But he has
his answer ready: this notion of T does not reveal a permanent subject but refers to
the series of distinct moments of cognition (jnanasantdna) and of body (sarlrasan-
tdna) on which apparent personal identity is based. And in any case this experience
90
3. [Reply] How could we explain memoiy, which conforms to direct 1 2.3
perception when the latter is no longer present, if there were not a per
manent se lf who is the subject o f the perception?
- Since the former direct perception has disappeared at the moment
of the memory, the memory, whose essential quality is precisely its
dependence on that former perception of the object, could not arise,
unless one admits the persistence6 of the awareness of this perception
also at the moment of the memory. And this lasting awareness at dif
ferent times is precisely the self, the perceiving subject. — 3 —
would come into the category o f the vikalpa, since it takes place through verbal
mediation (the word T); and therefore, even if an T existed, it would become trans
formed into object.
6 Or, if we accept the reading avartate or avarteta, ‘the arising again*.
7 This is the reason for the atmavadin's reply; the atm avadin and the Buddhist
purvapakfin completely agree on this point. However, while this admission allows
the atmavadin to elude the criticism levelled at him in the previous verse, he lays
him self open to further, even more radical criticism: once the fundamental role that
the sapiskara plays in memory is acknowledged, resorting to a permanent self be
comes superfluous. The grounds of the Buddhist argumentation are clearly outlined
by Abh. (IPVV I pp. 126-7). Every cognitive act has two levels: an outer and an
inner one. The first (bahirmukha) consists in the illumination or perception of the
91
12.5 From direct perception there derives a latent impression (samskarah);
the memory arising from this conforms to that former perception and
makes that perception - in which the object is immersed - manifest. If
things are explained in these terms, why is it necessary to assume a use
less permanent subject, since even the supporter of the existence of the
self acknowledges the existence of the latent impression and this alone
is enough to account for memory? - 5 -
92
7. I f 9 cognition were conscious (citsvarupam,) then it ought to be per- 12.7
manent like the se lf10; if on the contrary, it were not sentient, how could
it illuminate objects?
- If cognition were by nature conscious, then, unable to be associated
with time and place - which are qualities pertaining to objects - , it would
become permanent etc., like the self11. If, on the other hand, it were not
sentient, how could it illuminate the object? - ! -
9 After confuting those who maintain that the existence of the self is directly
perceptible or inferable, the pilrvapaksin turns to attacking the ‘sovereignty’
(aisvarya) of the self, i.e. its being endowed with the powers of cognition and ac
tion. Cognition as a reality or function distinct from the self is primarily criticized;
this is a conception that may be ascribed to the âtmavâdins in general but - as we
shall see - rejected by the Saivas.
10 This is, of course, the opinion held by the majority of âtmavâdins. The
reasoning is as follows: the self is nitya, because it is citsvarüpa svaprakâsa, and
time can qualify only objects. Abh. (IPVV I pp. 135-6) mentions the positions of
the followers o f the Sâm khya (kâpilânâm tâvat nitya eva asait), of the Mimàmsakas
(jaiminlyâh purusam samvidriipam eva sukhâdyavasthâbhinnam m any ante ...
cidrüpâmsena nityah, avasthâmsena tu anityo ’s d , this is a doctrine which stems from
the Bhâttas, cf. SV, Âtm avâda, vv. 26 ff.) etc. The positions of the âtmavâdins dif
fer greatly as regards whether the self is conscious or not.
11 If cognition, as distinct from the self, is conceived as being conscious by
nature - and such, for instance, is the position of the Vaisesikas and the Prâbhâkaras
- it follows that it, too, is permanent. The contradiction that arises (in the eyes of
the Buddhist) and is not made clear in the vrtti nor, it seems, in the fikâ, is pointed
out by Abh. (ÎPVV I p. 103): if both jfïâna and âtman are nitya, there can be no
relation between them, because, according to the Buddhists, the only relation is that
of cause and effect, which, indeed, cannot exist between two permanent realities.
Abh. (ÎPVV I p. 134) points out a further consequence: cognition thus having the
same properties as the self, would only be another self, and thus the hetu that it
represents in the inference of the self would become asiddha.
12 This is the Sâmkhya theory, according to which the buddhi, though itself in
sentient, cognizes by means of the light that is reflected in it from the purusa. Thus
the buddhi would be both insentient and sentient (cid-acit), which is a position the
pür\fapaksin recognizes as untenable (in order for it to be able to fulfil its function
in the final analysis it must be sentient and therefore the criticism levelled earlier is
valid). The view of the Sâmkhya is inadmissible - it is said, among other, in the
IPV and IPVV - because only a clearer thing can receive the reflection of another
and the buddhi is certainly no ‘clearer’ than the self.
93
12.8 The intellect (buddhih) is cognition13. Though it is itself insentient,
just as it assumes the reflection of the form of the object, so, in the same
way, it also assumes the reflection of the sentience pertaining to the self.
Thus [in assuming them both14], it can illuminate the object. However,
[it is replied] it follows that it must be sentient by nature.
Therefore15 cognition, though it exists, is not related to anything else
[i.e. to a subject], because this has been recognized as untenable. Action,
on the other hand, neither exists in itself, nor as related to anything else.
- 8 -
13 The various reasons for this apparently inappropriate identification (of the
organ with the function etc.), are extensively analyzed in IPVV 1 pp. 149-50.
14 Cf. text note 87.
15 That is, on the grounds o f the arguments put forward in this and the previous
karika from which the conclusion is reached that cognition is neither permanent nor
related to a subject.
16 Cf. e.g. TS 706 deÉantaropalabdhes tu nairantaryena janm anah / sam anapa-
ravastünám gatibhrantih pradipavat II.
17 This is an allusion to Patañjali’s famous definition, karakandm pravrttivisesah
kriya (M ahabha$yay vol. I p. 258), understood in various ways by generations of
commentators (e.g. What is the meaning o f karakanam? The subject, the subject and
object, all the karakas without distinction? etc.). This is the background to the whole
o f the Kriyasamuddesa o f the VP, which is, in turn, the reference point for the Saiva
conception of action (cf. the extensive and repeated quotations from this fundamen
tal text in the iPV V ’s comment on this verse).
18 This is a reply to an implicit objection, formulated in ÍPVV I pp. 186-7: there
are, indeed, collective units such as the army etc., but here the various antecedent
and consequent parts, linked by a reciprocal relation, exist simultaneously; this is
not so in the case o f action.
94
poral succession and is unitary in nature19. Action is only ‘to go’ ‘to 12.9
change and so on, which is but the assumption on the part of bodies etc.
of new states of existence at various and diverse times and places, since
nothing else distinct from this is perceived. - 9 -
10. The various things come into being in concomitance with the
presence o f certain other things: this is what is experienced and nothing
more. There is no relation (sambandhah) other than that o f cause and
effect20.
- What is directly perceived is simply that, when a certain preced
ing thing is present, a subsequent thing comes into being. As was argued
in the case of action, no relation of action and factors (kriyakarakasam-
bandhah) exists, since such a ‘relation’ is not perceived as a distinct
entity. There is no connection between things other than that of cause
and effect. - 10 -
95
12.11 ible]22 since, as it rests on the two related terms23, it cannot be unitary
in nature; since a thing that is [already] accomplished (siddhasya) can-
n o t 4require’ (°apeksanat) another and dependence (paratantrya0) etc. are
not logically tenable24. Thus the agent, too, is merely a mental construct.
o f which is even included in the text (4b ity am ifrah svayam b/tdvas tart yojayati
kalpana, corresponding to v. 5b of the SP). Some verses quoted by Abh. in IPVV
I, without any reference to their source, also come from the SP. It is worth quoting
them in full, also because they differ in some places from the form in which the
same verses are quoted by Devasuri and Prabhacandra (the latter are in square brack
ets): bhavabhedaprafityarthani samyojyante 'bhidhdyakah (v. 6b, cit. p. 195), pasyann
ekam adrptasya darsane tadadarsane / apatyan /Prabh. apasyat] karyam anveti
vinapy akhyatrbhir /Prabh. vina vyakhyatrbhir] janah II darsanadartane muktva
karyabuddher na sam bhavdt [asambhavat] / kaiyadisrutir apy atra laghavdrtham
nivesita II (vv. 13-14, citt. p. 199), ity amisrah svayam bhavas tan yojayati
[misrayati] kalpana II tarn eva canunm dhdnaih kriyakarakavacinah / bhava-
bhedapraCityartham sam yojyante 'bhidhayadah H (vv. 5b-6 citt. p. 200), sam s ca sar-
vanirdsamso bhavah katltam apeksate / apeksd yadi [parapeksa hi; Prabh. inverts
the two hemistichs] sambandhalt so 'san katham apeksate (v. 3, cit. p. 203), ... tan
miSrayati kalpana (v. 5b, cit. p. 204), dvitve sati [Dev. dvisfhe sa ca, Prabh. dvitve
sa ca] katham bhavet (v. 2a, cit. p. 205), siddhe ka paratantratd (v. la, cit. p. 204).
It should be noted that the readings given by Devasuri and Prabhacandra are general
ly more in line with the Tibetan translations.
22 In Dharmaklrti’s opinion the connection between cause and effect is not a
relation (as conceived by the realists), since the essential requisite of a relation is
the simultaneous presence of the two related terms on which it rests equally -
whereas cause and effect must necessarily belong to two different moments in time
(cf. PV III.246 a sat ah prag asam arthyat pascac canupayogatah / pragbhavah
sarvahetunam ...II) - (SP v. 7 karyakaranabhavo 'pi tayor asahabhavatah / prasi-
dhyati katham dvisfho 'dvisthe sam bandhata katham II). Thus, the cause-effect
relation is, in the final analysis, unreal precisely qua relation, being reduced to a
concatenation o f presences and absences (anvaya-vyatireka, bhava-abhava)\ cf. SP v.
17 etavanmatra[i.e. blidvdbhdvau]tattvarthah kaiyakaranagocarah / vikalpd darsayan-
ty arthan mithyarthd ghatitan iva II.
23 The fact that it rests on the two related elements is, as we have seen, the es
sential feature o f a relation, as it is commonly understood by the realists: in the
opinion of the Buddhist opponent this is a contradiction in terms, but precisely be
cause this is the essential requisite it cannot be abandoned without rejecting the very
concept of relation (see SP v . l l a b dvisfho hi kascit sam bandho nato 'nyat tasya
lakjanam ).
24 Here, too, a direct reference is made to the SP the first Slokas of which are
devoted to confuting one by one the various forms in which a relation may be
represented. Utp. expressly mentions and criticizes only apeksd and paratantrya; the
karika, however, adds °adi° and the fika shows that this is intended to refer to
rupaslesa, which in the SP is actually examined in v. 2, after paratantrya and before
apeksd.
96
- A relation is based on two terms (dvisthah) and it is not logically 12.11
tenable for it to rest on both and preserve its unitary nature. Neither is
a relation conceivable in the form of a reciprocal requirement
(anyonyapeksa0) between two things which are already accomplished25
nor in the form of a dependence (paratant\ya°) of two self-contained
things26. On the grounds of what has been said, just as the state of
cognizer is a mental construct, the same holds good for the agent27.
25 I.e. they already have their own independent existence. Primarily one must
distinguish, as Utp. does here, between apeksa and paratantrya, often generically
translated as ‘dependence’. In apekya the sense o f ‘need, requirement, expectation’
predominates: the shoot ‘requires’ the seed (SSVr p. 2 ahkura eva bijam apeksate)\
the genititve rajnah ‘requires’ (‘depends’ on) p u n k a h (apeksa, akarikpa ; see IPVV I
pp. 203-204), without which it would remain incomplete. Dharmaklrti’s criticism (SP
v. 3 parapeksa hi sam bandhah so ’san katham apeksate I sam s ca sarvanirasamse
bhdvah katham apeksate II) is taken up again in the fika and then in I P W (I pp.
203-204). If a cause is existent (sat) it cannot ‘require’ anything else; if it is non
existent (asat) it cannot ‘require’ at all; nor can it be said that a thing ‘requires’ its
effect in order to be qualified as a cause, because this is not anything other than its
very nature, but is identified with it. If one objects that its nature, though being fully
present, may not be realized as such in practical reality (vyavahara), one may reply
that, if the vyavahara is cognition and verbalization (jhana-abhidhana), then it is the
subject (i.e. the mind), not the thing, that is directly involved, and therefore he is
given the responsibility for establishing such unreal relations (cf. SP v. 5b ity
am israh svayam bhavas tan misrayati kalpand). In the case, then, o f rajnah (which
is sat) with respect to purusah (also sat) there is no reciprocal apeksa, but only of
the former towards the latter, (IPVV I p. 204 rajnah satah sati eva pum si apekseti,
na tu anyonyapeksa atra vivaksita); therefore it cannot be represented as sam bandha,
which - we know - must be dvistha.
26 The criticism o f paratantrya (more precisely ‘dependence’ as subordination,
heteronomy) is outlined in the first verse of the SP (paratannyam hi sambandhah
siddhe ka paratantrata). Abh. notes, following in the steps of the fika (IPVV I p.
204), that a reciprocal ‘requiring’ (anyonyapeksa) may well come within the sphere
o f paratantrya; but this is still not enough to fulfil the prime requisite of sam bandha,
which is that it must be equally present in the two related terms (dviytha). In effect,
in the relation of paratantrya anyonyapek?anlpa (glossed in the fika with
parasparonm ukhata and anyonyam aunm ukhya), like that of wife and sacrificer in
the sacrifice or of two lovers milking love, one cannot say that the ‘expectation’ (un-
mukhata) of the one coincides with that o f the other. Thus unmukliata does exist,
but it is not a proof o f sam bandha.
27 It is the use o f language (Dharmaklrti notes) - serving as a means o f dif
ferentiating things - that suggest the existence of relations like that o f factors and
action. This relation has no correspondence in reality, but is merely the result of the
synthesis of discursive thought (kalpana), which, in fact, comes about through lan-
97
12.11 Thus28 how is it possible to claim that the Self is the Lord of all?
- 11 -
98
13.1
C hapter III
1 The author shows that he partly shares the view that the ptlrvapakyin put for
ward regarding memory in the previous âhnika, especially with respect to the im
portance of the function of the samskâras. He departs from this view, however, when
he examines their role, taking into account the impossibility (also recognized by the
Buddhists) of one cognition becoming the object of another.
2 Every cognition - and memory is a form of cognition - is svasam vedana and
it is in this sense that the expression atm aniffham , which generally refers to insen
tient realities (jada), must be understood. It is ‘confined, restricted to itself’ in the
sense that it is only aware of itself and not of other cognitions (cf. ÏPVV I pp. 210-
11).
3 The expression svabhâsa (cf. below p. 161 n. 2, p. 162 n. 4) may be in
terpreted in various ways and my translation of it has been left deliberately vague.
The vrtti understands it as svasamvedanaikariipa. Abh. glosses it in the TPV in two
different ways (âbhâsah prakâsam ânatâ sâ svam riipam avyabhicâri yasyah; svasya
ca âbhâsanam riipam yasyâh, which coincides with the vrtti); in the ÏPVV he even
gives four different interpretations.
4 The sam skâra of the former perception is reawakened by a present perception
- similar to the other - which gives rise to the memory. The sam skâra, therefore,
ensures this ‘similarity’ in the memory, but the memory itself has no direct access
99
13.2 - Every cognitive act is by nature only aware of itself (¿va-
samvedanaikarupa) and does not become the object of another cognition:
if the cognition of shape could grasp the cognition of taste and vice versa,
then the one would perceive the object of the other and in this way every
restriction on the activity of the individual senses would cease to exist.
Since memory arises from the latent impression left by the former per
ception it only bears a similarity to that perception but does not have
direct cognition of the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of
this former perception (tadabhavat) not even the similarity to it can be
maintained. - 2 -
to (cannot ‘know’) the former perception and therefore nor can it, strictly speaking,
establish the similarity between the latter and the present perception which has
reawakened the samskara. This, as will be shown later, is an operation that presup
poses the I. As one can gather from the vrtti, and as Abh. (IPVV I p. 214) explains,
tad in tadgatih has two different meanings, the first of which refers to anubhava
and the second to sadrsya; the first is to be considered the cause of the second: 'na
tadgatih: ity atra dvav arthau tacchabdena anubhavasya sadrsyasya ca param arsat
/ tatra pratham drtho dvifiyasmin hetutvena mantavyah. IPV I pp. 129-30 defines
the question with great clarity (and in this the Sanskrit language is an unrivalled in
strument): sam skarat param savi$ayatdmatram smrteh siddham, natu anu-
bhavavisayatvam, napy asya visayasya purvanubhavavisayikrtatvam iti niscaya esah.
5 This is once again a Buddhist speaking.
6 The former perception and its object.
7 As TPVV I p. 236 (cf. text note 130) explains na negates the whole sentence.
8 The author states the reasons that induced him to consider (in the last pada
o f the previous karika) the opposing thesis untenable.
100
o f objects (arthasthitih) should come about thanks to error9? And, if such 13.4
is the case, what sense is there in claiming dependence on the latent im
pressions left by the former direct perception?
- Memory cannot be identified with something that derives only from
determinative knowledge (<adhyavasayamatrat), the object of the former
perception being absent (tadvisayasampramose) because it [the former
perception] is not made manifest [in the memory, according to your con
ception]. Neither can the definite establishment of an object formerly per
ceived be taken to be due to error. And moreover, [if it is a question of
‘erroť] why insist so much on the fact that memory - conceived of as
error - arises from the latent impressions, when, on the contrary, it is dif
ferent from the former direct perception from every point of view, (tadbhin-
nayogaksemayah) 10, not coming into contact with it in any way? - 4 -
9 The essential core o f memory is the former perception recalled to mind. There
is therefore no new cognition and it is only a new cognition that can be imputed
for error (cf. TPVV I p. 239 and text note 136). The vrtti and, as can be gathered
from the TPVV, also the fika, leave no doubt as to the meaning that Utp. attributes
to the second pada o f the karika (bhrantes carthasthitih katham). It must be pointed
out, however, that the interpretation of the IPV (I p. 132) is completely different. It
essentially says that obviously no establishment of the nature o f the object can derive
from error, since the former is not manifest in error (if one understands error, as the
opponent does, as asat0 or atm dkhyati), and that on the contrary everyone can see
that the organization and functioning of the world of experience depend on memory.
Therefore memory cannot be an illusion. This interpretation of the karika
(misunderstood in Bh.’s commentary) is, in fact, what everyone would give on a first
reading, and it anticipates the argumentation that Utp. actually presents further on.
10 In the expression yogaksem a (according to IPVV I p. 240) yoga (which has
the general meaning of the attainment o f something not formerly possessed) stands
for the object’s own nature characterized by light-knowledge (prakasa), and ksema
(the preservation of what has been attained) refers to the part-object. Thus these fea
tures differentiate sm rti-bhranti from anubhava, since in the former there is no new
cognition (I read anapurvatvat instead of apurvatvat) and the object is not really
present.
11 The_ argumentation o f this verse presupposes the opponent’s objection,
clarified in IPV I p. 133: the determination (adhyavasaya) of the former direct per
ception and its object, which is brought about by memory, establishes a partial
similarity of the latter to the perception; and for this one needs to resort to the
samskaras. The discourse, therefore, turns to the nature of this adhyavasaya (and
101
1 3.5 conceived o f as being sentient, how can it, restricted as it is to it
se lf and to its own ideation (nijollekhaniçthânj, establish objective
reality?
- It is the determinative knowledge (adhyavasâyah) alone that - er
roneously - establishes objects, and not its self-awareness12 (svasamvit).
If such is the case, it is insentient and - being insentient - how can it
cause the establishment of objects? Thus, even if one were to ack
nowledge it was insentient, [this should be understood in a limited way,
that is, in the sense that] it would only be able to. make manifest objects
pertaining to the past, or illuminate only non-external objects - itself and
its own ideation (abâhyasvâtmollekhamâtraprakâsah) - and, therefore, it
could not equally be accepted as the cause of that establishment of ob
jects we are dealing w ith13. - 5 -
this is what the present karika is about) and as IPV V I p. 243 underlines (a-
dhyavasayamatrasya riiparp du$itam, taddvarena tu sm rtyadhyavasayasyeti) through
the confutation o f this conception o f the adhyavasaya in general, the form in which
it operates in the ambit o f memory is also confuted. If the object is illuminated by
it, then one cannot define it error, if it is not illuminated, then this means that
memory does not have access to the object and therefore it does not make sense to
speak o f ‘similarity*.
12 The adhyavasaya is on the one hand insentient (as regards its actual not com
ing into contact with the object, its being bhranti), and on the other sentient as
regards its self-awareness. But only the first aspect is significant in this case.
13 This point is made clear in a passage from the IPVV (I p. 243), which due
to its importance and clarity I have quoted in full (see text note 141). The adhyavasaya
is insentient insofar as it does not illuminate the object it aims at determining. If it
does not illuminate the external object (otherwise it would be no different from direct
experience) and neither can it be said that it does not illuminate at all (otherwise it
would simply be jada), nonetheless, it is acknowledged that at least it illuminates it
self and its own ideation. But even this is not sufficient for it to cause the deter
mination o f external objects, because precisely as regards the latter (and it is this
that counts here) it is insentient. All this criticism o f the adhyavasaya aims at reduc
ing its significance in the phenomenon o f memory, with the ultimate purpose o f
making way for the admission of another principle that may consistently explain the
point, i.e. the self, as we shall see later.
102
- Cognitions are restricted to themselves only (,svatmamatraparini- 13.6
sthitani) and cannot be the object of other cognitions (aparasamvedyani)
being by nature [exclusively] conscious of themselves. But then how
would the dimension of human activity and behaviour (lokavyavaharah)
- culminating in the teaching of the absolute reality - be possible, since
this consists precisely in the interconnection between the objects of
knowledge? (anyonyavisayasamghattanamayah) 14. - 6 -
103
14.1
C h a p t e r IV
1. The Free One (svairij, the perceiver of the object formerly per
ceived, continuing also to exist later, has the reflective awareness: ‘that’.
This is what is called *remembering’.
- The light-perception of the object formerly perceived is not extin
guished [at the moment of memory1], since he [the knowing subject, the
Lord] also continues to exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly
perceived. Having here (atra)2 a reflective awareness of an object in
terms of ‘that’ - as formerly perceived - on the part of he who is one,
the Lord ( vibhuh), agent, is the function called 'memory’. - 1 -
104
(svakale), either as a single manifestation far' or as the totality of its 14.2
components (akhilatmana).
- Thanks to the power of memory (smrtisaktya) the subject, when
having a reflective awareness (paramrsan) as ‘that’ of the particular en
tity formerly perceived, must make it manifest [in the present]
{ahhasayaty eva)5, for there could be no reflective awareness of an ob
ject made manifest [only in the past] (prakasitasya)6; and this manifesta
tion occurs at the very moment of the act of remembering (svasattakala
eva). Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the manifestation,
at the moment of the memory, of an object, which, however, is no longer
present at that moment. At certain times the object appears in the form
of a single manifestation7, i.e. limited to one of the many manifestations
that constitute it, such as - in the case of a jar - ‘jar’, ‘golden’, ‘individual
substance’, ‘existence’ etc., depending on the subject’s intentions8. In these
cases its manifestation in memory is distinct and vivid (,sphuta°)9. At
105
14.2 other times, on the contrary (anyada tu), the object appears in its totality,
since this is the subject’s intention: its manifestation is equally distinct
and vivid (tathaiva), as in the previous case10. And finally, the subject
whose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly
visualizes the object formerly perceived (drstartha0) 11. - 2 -
just been said. Moreover, the ftka adds, the sam anya even when taken singly may
be sphuta (compared to others), when it implicitly contains other broader and more
generic sam anyas (e.g. the sam anya of the dhava tree, compared to the sam anya of
tree in general). See Torella 1988: 168-70. The concept o f a hierarchy of sam anyas
as regards their extension probably stems from linguistic speculation.
10 In IPV I p . 160 the degree o f sphutatva in this case (where there is a com
bination of different dbhasas) is considered greater than the former: i.e. it is ati-
sphnta.
11 It is the case that ibid. p. 160 is defined atyantasphufa. IPVV II p. 29, fol
lowing the fikd%considers it implicit in the expression akhilaimand in the kdrika,
that would therefore be understood as referring in the broad sense to a multiplicity
of dbhasas (bahvabhdsopalak$anam) and with a further differentiation within it
(samagratva and asamagrah'a). Thus the object would appear in the memory as a
combination of many dbhasas: when the latter do not cover the whole (asamagra-
t\>a) of the object this is the intermediate level (introduced in the vrtti by anyada
tu); when, on the other hand, the object is recalled in the totality of its aspects, the
m emory is so vivid that it closely borders on the direct perception from which it
differs only in the fact that its object is a thing ‘already’ seen. The expression
dr$(artha distinguishes this from other forms in which the object visualized had not
been previously seen but experienced in various ways through the revelation of the
scriptures, as in the case o f the visualization of deities etc.
12 In other words, if the object appeared as external to and distinct from the
memory (IPV I p . 163 bhinnatvena bahlnlpatayd), then the requirements for direct
perception and not for memory would exist. The object is present in the memory
only through the manifestation of the former perception, but it is only in it, i.e. in
the past (tada)y that the object bahir avabhdsate. What is manifested in the present
is only the reflective awareness (vimarsana). See Abh.’s lucid formulation o f the
question in IPVV, which may serve as a general definition o f memory according to
the Pratyabhijna: pilrvadrsfataiva savimarsd sail idanlntanavim arsabhum ipatitd sa iti
vim arfa ucyate (II p. 30). This stanza actually shows how the apparent inconsisten
cy between a (present) vimarsana and a (past) anubhava is only resolved by the I
which ensures the possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at different
times. A further clarification is provided by IPVV II p. 32. The prakdsa concerning
the part-object (artham se) in the former perception belongs to the past; but the
prakdsa as grasped by the vimarSa, concerning the part-self (svatm dm se), is not
106
therefore the unity o f cognitions that occur at different times is neces- 1 4.3
saty, and this unity is precisely the knowing subject.
- And the object formerly perceived, manifesting itself together with
the perception in the present ‘light’ of the memory (tâtkâlikasmrtiprakâse)
(directed at that past time), is necessarily not separate from the memory,
since that which is separate from the light cannot shine. There is there
fore a unity of the distinct cognitions such as direct perception, memory
etc. and this unity is constituted by the self, the knowing subject. To
elaborate: - 3 -
limited by time (kalartavacchinna eva). Thus the vimarsa in the memory can connect
itself with the vimarsa in the perception and, through it, with the former light of the
object - in this way meeting both requirements, that is, taking place in the present
and not being divorced from prakasa (tannantarlyakavimarsasahitah punar vimarsas
tu idanlntanah).
13 In the perception the object appeared - due to the power of maya - as if it
were separate, external to consciousness. This may not happen in the memory for
otherwise it would not be memory (IPVV II p. 34 sm aranataiva na bhavet); in fact,
the light of memory embraces, so-to-speak, the object much more strongly (ibid.
artham atitamam krodikaroti). However, this is true only to a certain extent: the
assumption o f externality - in the form of residual traces, as a shadow {ibid.
chayam dtrena) - continues to exist (p. 32 prthagbhdvaprakasabhimdno ’nuvartate),
remaining in the object remembered in the background. In underlining this, Utp. also
implicitly draws a sharp distinction between the ‘external’ thing, on the one hand,
and perception, on the other: unlike the thing, the latter can never be objectified (see
next kdrika). Thus those who think they can do without the I as the unifier of
different cognitions, by claiming that memory has access to its object simply by
embodying (i.e. objectifying) the former perception of it, are mistaken. In IPV I p.
167 Abh. gives an interpretation of the example concerning the status of the object
(arthavat in the karika) both as sadhannya0 and vaidharmyadrstanta ; neither of them
reflects the interpretation found in the vrtti.
107
14.5 5. The cognitions [of others] are not manifested [as an object] even
in that particular cognition belonging to the yogins. The only means of
knowing them is self-awareness. What has just been stated also applies
if they are acknowledged as an object of cognition (meyapade ’pi vaj.
- For the omniscients, too, the cognitions belonging to other subjects
- which can be known only through self-awareness14 - must always be
manifested as resting on their own self (svatmarudha eva); and, there
fore, what in reality occurs (tattvam) is the identification on the part of
the yogins with the self of others15 (paratmatapattir eva). Should one at
tribute [to the cognitions of others] the nature of cognizable object
(prameyakaksyayam api) such as the jar etc., they would have to be
manifested each in its own form of pure awareness (suddhabodhatmana
rupena), whereas that is impossible16. - 5 -
14 I.e. that introspective awareness that one has of every cognition or that every
cognition has of itself. This position had also been accepted by Bhartrhari; see the
last four verses of the Jatisam uddesa, in particular v. 106 yatha jyotih prakasena
nanyenabhiprakafyate / jndndkaras tathanyena na jnanenopagrhyate (Abh. quotes
this verse in another section of the IPVV giving a slightly different reading o f the
second hemistich: jndnanlparp tatha jnane nanyatrabhiprakasyate) ‘Just as light is
not illuminated by another light, in the same way, the form o f cognition is not
determined by another cognition’ (transl. Iyer 1971: 62) and v. 110 yato visayanlpena
jnanarupam na grhyate I artharupaviviktam ca svanlpam navadharyate II ‘As the
form o f the knowledge is not cognized as. an object, its form as distinct from that
of the object is not grasped’ (transl. Iyer 1971: 63). See also Helaraja’s lucid
commentary. For a penetrating analysis of the various theories about ‘knowledge of
knowledge’ I refer to Matilal 1986:141-179.
15 This is the most obvious meaning o f the text of the vrtti. According to Abh.’s
interpretation (IPVV II p. 47, see text note 189), who in turn takes this from the tikd,
tattvam is ‘the being such of the omniscient’ (mentioned at the beginning o f the vrtti),
meaning the condition of subject identified with the Supreme I (paratmavedakatvam);
thus the meaning of the sentence would be the following: ‘the condition of subject
identified with the Supreme I , pertaining to these yogins, means in point of fact the
attainment of identification with the self o f others.’ On the yogin’s cognition of other
minds see Dharmaklrti’s Santanantarasiddhi vv. 89-93 (Stcherbatsky 1969: 89-92,
Kitagawa 1955: 108-10).
16 The nature of every cognition is in the final analysis suddhabodha and it
should appear in this form to the yogin’s cognition: but precisely this is impossible,
because descending to the condition of vedya necessarily entails the flawing of sud-
dhatva (see IPVV II p. 52 svasmin svasmin darsane yadrsam bodhasya suddham
rupam, ... na ladrSam niruparagam vcdyatam paracittajnane 'bhyeti; cf. also IPV I
p. 183). A similar remark is made by Helaraja, commenting on VP III. 1.109: cf.
108
6. The memoty17 expressed as ‘thus that cognition occurred in me' is 14.6
none other than an analysis fvyakaranam) in terms of differentiation o f
the memory expressed as '[that thing] was seen by me'1*.
- The memory presented as ‘thus that perception occurred in m e\ in
which the cognition is mentioned separately, is nothing more than the
analytic exposition of the memory understood as ‘[that thing] was seen
by me’, which is characterized precisely by having a reflective awareness
of the visual perception as residing in the knowing subject. - 6 -
109
14.7 perception one becomes aware of {pratyavamrsyate) has the knowing
subject as its constitutive reality20. - 7 -
20 The T that is the subject o f the determinate cognition is that same T that
constitutes the centre of the anubhava, even if the latter may be such that the I does
not appear in it (‘this is a jar* as opposed to ‘I see this jar’). But the absence of the
I is only apparent and does not concern the anubhava in itself but a particular aspect
of the following adhyavasaya, which, depending on the circumstances, may stress
the objective (i.e. when one is intent on bringing about some practical activity con
nected with it) or the subjective element (cf. IPV I pp. 187-8).
21 I.e. in the determinate cognition (adhyavasaya) that follows the direct
perception. In the construction I have followed Abh.’s indications (see text note 202).
Utp., unlike Abh. (see text note 207), assigns api a different place from the
one it occupies in the karikd. The separateness of the perceiver and the perceived -
Abh. says (IPVV II p. 58) developing Utp.’s remark in the fika - is only apparent
as the very use of the dual form shows. On the basis o f the sahavivaksa principle,
in grahyagrdhakatdbhinnav arthau each term refers both to itself and the other; they
are interdependent (<anyonydpeksau). For the analysis of a similar use of this
grammatical argument see Torella 1987:154-157.
110
15.1
C hapter V
111
1 5.2 - If it did not have light, i.e. the cognizer, as its own nature, the jar,
just as it was not manifest [to the cognizer] at first, would continue not
to be so even at the moment of cognition. What constitutes the object’s
being manifest (prakâsamânatâ) is light insofar as it is its own form (sva-
rûpabhütah) and not a separate reality6. - 2 -
/ vedakam vedyam ekam tu tattvam nasty asucis tatah //. See also SPr 1.12
tvadatmakatvam bhavanam vivadanti na kecana / yat prakasyadasayato naprakasah
prakasate //; etc.
6 In formulating the Saiva position, Utp. is implicitly critical particularly of the
Buddhist and Kumarila theses. According to the Buddhists (ksanikavadin) the
manifestation (perception) of the object is understood as a ‘luminous* moment
produced in a chain of moments, e.g. of a ja r - a luminous moment determined by
a concurrence of causes, such as the operation of the sense of sight, light etc. For
Kumarila, on the contrary, an added quality, ‘being manifest* (prakafata) occurs in
the object, from whose presence a former cognitive act is inferred. In both cases the
light is not separate - as Utp. also maintains - but it is found, so to speak, com
pletely resolved within the object (IPVV II p. 69 arthasarlramagnah) and one is un
able to understand how a thing can be cognized only by some and not by others.
According to Utp. there is an illumination of the thing (whose essence is light) by
the light o f the subject.
7 Cf. text note 216.
8 I.e. it would illuminate all objects indiscriminately.
9 The preceding argumentations may lead to a Vijnanavadin-like conception. In
order to undermine this, Utp. temporarily opposes it with the Sautrantika criticism
(which he agrees with up to a point, at least with the motives for it) and in this con
text presents their doctrine known, at least in later sources, as anumeyabdhyartha-
112
various manifestation lacking in an apparent cause (akasmika°J leads to 1 5.4
the inference of an external object [as its only possible cause].
- The establishment of the being of insentient realities is merely their
becoming manifest (<abhasamanataiva), and this is precisely having
manifestation as their essence (abhasatmataiva). Their true reality, there
fore, lies in the one pure consciousness. The gradually changing manifesta
tion of objects which occurs though there is no diversity in the latter in
duces one to hypothesize an external object, different from consciousness
(tato nyam), not shining («aprakasamanam), as the cause. This reasoning is
analogous to that which establishes the existence of the senses10. —4 —
113
1 5.5 case a new question would arise: what is the cause of the variety o f such
a reawakening?
- The varied reawakening of the karmic residual traces does not
occur outside consciousness; also what might be the cause of this
reawakening is not seen. Consequently the cause of differentiated
manifestations cannot be anything but the external object11. - 5 -
11 The argumentation o f those who claim the existence o f external objects con
tinues with the reply to the expected Vijfiânavâdin objection. A detailed account of
the arguments set forth by the two opponents (Vijhânavâdin’s vâsanâvaicitrya and
Sautrântika’s pratyayavaicitrya) is to be found in SDS pp. 80-84; Vacaspatimisra
also refers to them in the B hâm aü and Tâtparyadipikâ (La Vallée Poussin 1901: 190,
n. 114).
12 At this point the author takes up the discussion in the first person (but the
same thesis with the same arguments might also be put forward by a Vijnànavâdin),
after having voiced the opposing theses of the bâhyârthavâdins. Abh. sees two pos
sible interpretations of the expression syâd etad: the partial acknowledgement o f the
opposing theses and then the exposition of his own, introduced by a kimtu that is
to be understood; or the simple addition to the adversary’s thesis o f another even
more convincing one, his own (the vrtti gives the latter interpretation). But, as can
be seen, the general meaning remains the same.
13 It is understood by this that the external objects themselves ‘inferred’ precise
ly as such - i.e. illuminated, brought to consciousness through inference - are in
separable from the light of consciousness which is their essence; for if they were
outside it, there would be no knowledge of them (cf. I. 5. 9.). This implication is
taken up and developed by Abh. (ÎPV I, p. 222).
14 After the fundamental negative reason given in the previous lines, additional
reasons (<abhyuccayabâdhaka) are put forward. Utp.’s remarks are the same as those
a Vijnànavâdin might make; cf. Vimsatikâ 11-15 and vrtti, Sthiramati’s bhâsya on
114
cognition {pramanabadhitah): this is so if it is considered as having parts, 1 5.6
since this would result in attributing to it contrasting qualities etc.; if it
is considered as devoid of parts it is still contradicted in various ways
(bahusah), because it is simultaneously in contact with the six directions
of space, etc.15 - 6 -
Trim sikd 1, Álam banaparlksd 1-5 etc. Particularly exemplary is the argumentation in
Vimsatika, often taken up again by later authors (cf. M oksákaragupta’s TBh, SDS
etc.; see also Lévi 1932: p. 52 note 2) and, implicitly, also referred to by Utp.
Vimsatika 11 reads: na tad ekam tia cdnckam visayah paramanusah / na ca te
sam hatd yasm at param dnur na sidhyati // «The object is not one; it is not multiple
as composed of many atoms; and it does not even consist in these atoms
agglomerated, since the atom is not established.» The first thesis belongs to the
Vaisesikas who consider the object an individual substance (dravya), a totality
(avayavin) formed by a complex of parts. The Buddhist tradition is unanimous in
rejecting the avayavin as a mere mental costruct (see M ilindapañha pp.26-28 (PTS
Ed.), Samyuttanikaya I p. 135 (PTS Ed.), TS 555-620 and Pañjika, Pandita Asoka’s
Avayavinirdkarana etc.). The second thesis may also be ascribed to the Vaisesikas
who consider the atoms, imperceptible if taken singly, as being the parts that
constitute the avayavin (cf. TBh p. 36 ye 'pi taddrambhakdh param dnavo vaisesi-
kandm ...). The third thesis is upheld by the Vaibha§ikas (see, for example, AK I.35d
sañcita dasa rdpinah - Bhdsya: pañcendriyadhatavah, pañcavisaydh sañcitah para-
mdnusañghdtatvát) and, in a modified form, by the Sautrantikas; the Sautrantika
criticism of the Vaibha§ika conception is expressed in various places in the AKBh.
The Vijñánaváda rejects the theory of the agglomeration of atoms, however
formulated (sañcaya, sañghata, samtuldya etc.); see bhdsya on Trimsika 1, Vimsatika
12-15 and vrtti, M adhydntavibhdgafika p.21 (Stcherbatsky 19362: 93-95). One of the
Abhidharma passages which lends support to this thesis is sañcitdlambandh patlca
vijñdnakayáh. This is also quoted by Dignaga {Vrtti on PS I.4ab; see Hattori 1968:
88-89) who endeavours to show how it is possible for direct perception to have a
group of entities as object while remaining avikalpaka. The same passage is quoted
by Manorathanandin in his commentary on PV III. 194, where Dharmaklrti’s defence
of Dignaga’s controversial statement begins. According to Dharmaklrti, arthdntard-
bhisambandhaj ja y ante ye 'navo 'pare I uktas te sañcitds te hi nimittam jfidnajan-
manah // «Those other atoms which come into being in close relation [Manoralha-
nandin glosses: ‘in close proximity’] to other things ¡i.e. atoms] are called ‘agglom
erated’. They are the cause of the arising of knowledge». In this way Dharmaklrti
tries to show that the agglomeration is not a different thing from the atoms them
selves. This position, too, expressed from a Sautrantika standpoint, is, however,
altogether unacceptable to a Vijñánavüdin like Sthiramati, who concludes his
criticism (Bhdsya on Trimsika 1) by pointing out the internal contradiction: na hi
asañcitdvasthdtah sañcitavasthaydm param anündm kascid dtmátisayah / tasmad
asañcitavat sañcita api param dnavo naivdlambanam.
15 A critical allusion to the Vaibha§ikas’ anusam cayavada. If the ultimate reality,
the atom (param anu), has no parts, it is not understood how this can aggregate to
115
1 5.7 7. Indeed, the Conscious Being, God, like the yogin, independently of
material causes, in virtue of His volition alone, renders externally
manifest the multitude of objects that reside within Him16,
- It is therefore the consciousness-principle alone that, in his sov
ereignty, renders manifest as external the multitude of things such as
the jar, cloth etc., which are spontaneously manifested as being informed
by his very self17. Since his power is infinite, this external manifestation
of objective reality takes place through his volition alone without resort
ing to causes such as clay etc. - 7 -
8. Neither can one speak of inference if the thing that is the objec
o f this has not been formerly directly perceived (anabhatapurve). This is
also the case as regards the senses, whose direct perception may be said
to have occurred through the perception of a reality that has the charac
teristics o f a cause (hetuvastunah), such as the seed e/c.18
- Inference is an act of reflected thought (vimarsanam) which has as
its object a thing that was formerly manifest to consciousness and [as
such] is internal to it (puiydvabhdtantahsthita eva); it occurs on the basis
of the direct perception of an object invariably concomitant with this en
tity and involves the linking [of this entity] with this or that determinate
others, aggregation only being possible through a contact between parts which by
definition it does not possess (see e.g. Vim fatika 11 ff. and vrtti). See also Dignaga’s
Alambanaparlk?a vv. 1-5. In the text bahutah might equally well refer to the
previous pramanabadhitah.
16 Cf. SD I. 44-45ab yoginam icchaya yadvan nandrupopapattita / na casti
sadhanam kimcin mrdadicchdm vina prabhoh II tat ha bhagavadicchaiva tathatvena
prajayate; cf. also 111.35-37.
17 svdtmarupatayopapannavabhasam. Upapanna0, according to Abh. (IPVV II
p. 146), is intended to underline that this manifestation as Self is not something that
has to be proved, but is itself taken for granted and self-evident. This expression in
the text may equally well refer to cittattvam: «which is spontaneously manifest as
Self» (see text note 236).
18 This karika and the following one examine inference, since this is used by
the bahyarthavadin to establish the existence o f the external object. In stating the
inevitable necessity that it should operate on an object which has already been direct
ly present to consciousness (abhata) and that therefore, as was shown earlier, is in
ternal and coessential to it, Utp.’s aim is to exclude the possibility that inference
might establish the existence o f something that is absolutely other than conscious
ness, i.e. the bahyartha. To achieve this he is compelled, as will be seen, to include
the concept of sam anyatodrtfa within the pratyaksatodr$ta.
116
time and place19. The senses, too, are inferred only partially and generi- 15.8
cally (kimcinmatram), as cause, and this was, in fact, formerly directly
present to consciousness, through the perception of the seed etc.20 - 8 -
19 This definition of inference does not only refer to the mode of the cognitive
act, but - as is clarified in this last sentence - it is careful to add that it aims at
proving the existence of an object that is able to propose itself as the possible ob
ject of a purposeful activity (i.e. specified by a definite time and place; cf. text note
243). It is true that the sphere o f inference is constituted by the general (cf. NB I.
16), but its ultimate application is to the particular: its ‘usefulness’ consists in per
mitting one, via an argumentation in which there are only conceptual abstractions,
to establish the existence, for instance, of a ‘determinate’ fire, which at this moment
cannot be directly perceived, and to act consequently (cf. NBT p. 21 anumdnam ca
lihgasambaddliam niyatam art ham darsayati). As Hetubindufika p. 34 puts it, yat
m ahanasadav anagnivyavrttam vastumatram prag anublultam na tat taddesadi-
sambandhitayaivdnumanavikalpena smaryatc kintu yatra pradese prag ananubhutam
tatsambandhitayd (cf. Shah 1967; 278, 280; Katsura 1984: 227).
20 According to the bahyarthavadin the existence of the external object is in
ferable from that o f the abhasa, just as from the occurrence of perception the exis
tence of the sensory faculty is proved, even though the latter is never directly per
ceived. We have, therefore, an inference based on the general correlation
{samanyatodrsta) as understood, for instance, by Jayanta (NM I p . 120 samanyato-
drstam tu yatra sambandhakale 'pi lihga[read lihgijsvarupam apratyaksam nityapa-
roksam eva sam anyato vyaptigrahanad anumlyate yatha sabdadyupalabdhya ¿rotradi
karanam , which Bh. I p. 231 follows very closely), where the object was and con
tinues to be inaccessible to direct cognition. Utp. replies that in this case it is not
the sensory faculty as such, in its particular individuality, that is inferred, but its
generic nature of cause (therefore only one of the many abhasas of which it is com
posed), which it shares with an infinite number of other objects, such as the seed,
and in which it had been perceived several times before. Thus, here too, we are
faced with a case of pratyak$atodrsta, in which there is perception limited to a
general aspect (samanyatodr$(a, but in the Saiva sense of the term), with the
aforementioned consequences. It must be kept in mind that the terms pratyaksato0
and samanyatodryta have been, since Vatsyayana, understood in various ways (see,
e.g., Sabarabhasya on M imdmsdsutra I. 1.5, NM I pp. 120-21, TS 1441-1454; cf.
also Matilal 1985: 29 ff.).
117
15.10 10. The multitude of things cannot but shine resting on the self o f the
Lord, otherwise that act of reflective awareness which is volition
ficchamarsahj could not be produced.
- As in the self of the Lord, whose essence is consciousness, so also
in the objective realities themselves there is a shining without
differentiation21, for otherwise reflective awareness, in the form of voli
tion, which necessarily concerns objects that are already shining [to the
subject], consisting in the state of creator, could not exist22. - 10 -
21 The autonomous shining beyond every duality and scission, which is peculiar
to the self, is a state that also extends to things when they are immersed in the self
(cf. IPVV p. 167 atmani hi nirbhasamane tadabhedasthitam katham na nirbhaseta)
in such a way that the condition of idanta does not develop.
22 The will to produce something - at every level - presupposes an object that
is in some way already present, ‘shining’, in consciousness (see below p. 126 n. 43).
Volition, in order to be such, must be connected with a desired object that ‘limits’
it from within, that gives it a content. The will of the Lord, therefore, presupposes
the shining of the whole of objective reality, which, not being separate from the sub
ject, shines as the I shines (cf. IPVV II pp. 166-167). Furthermore, volition, being
a particular form of reflective awareness (cf. SD 11.84-5), is already in itself the
proof o f the existence of the ‘light’ with which we know it is inseparably connected
(see ibid. p. 167 tena avafyam bhavino vimarsat tatprakdso ’nunuyate; p. 169 icchadi
param arsavisesa eva paramarsaS ca prakasasya svabhavah).
23 Camatkrti, camatkdra, is one of the key-words of this school. Abh. (IPVV II
p. 177) says: «Camatkrti means the act of a person savouring (bhuhjdnasya), that
is, the bliss constituted by the full achievement of fruition». Bhim jana, Abh. explains
later, is he who, engaged in savouring a taste such as sweetness etc., unlike a
voracious glutton, lets the experience rest on the cognizing subject, that is, makes
the ‘subject’ part predominate over the ‘object’ part. C am atkdra, in its highest form,
is therefore both the act of savouring and fullness, absolute independence,
consciousness devoid of obstacles (avighna sam vit) a savouring which is in the Final
analysis a savouring of one’s own self and of one’s own bliss, which eludes every
118
12. Precisely fo r this reason the self has been defined as ‘sentience’ 1 5.12
(caitanyam) meaning by this the activity of consciousness in the sense o f
being the subject o f this activity. It is thanks to sentiency, in fa ct, that
the self differs from insentient reality.
- Sentience - that is, the power of consciousness, perceiving - though
an abstract (bhava°)24, has been said to be the primary nature - the
reflective awareness (vimarsa°) - of the substance self, being that which
distinguishes it from insentient reality. This activity of being conscious
means precisely being the subject of such activity25. - 12 -
screen or intermediation of the world of objects, and even goes beyond that relative
and momentary transcendence that one has in the aesthetic experience o f poetry and
the theatre. T h e terms with which it is glossed or with which it is closely related
may be grouped according to its principal components: cognition, bliss, wonder. The
first group includes, for example, vimarsa (pratyavamarsa etc.), can'ana, asvada,
rasand, pradti; the second includes ananda, n in r ti, vifranti, laya; the third vismaya,
vikasa. This last sense (prevalent in the sphere of rhetoric and aesthetics, and in non
technical usage) refers to the wonder and astonishment that accompanies the return
of reality to its original ‘virgin’ state, the transfiguration that this type of experience
operates on reality in freeing it from the veils of the I and of the mine. Utp. seems
to have been the first to use this word pregnantly. However, already vismaya in $S
(1. 12 vismayo yogabhiimikah), glossed by K.semaraja with dscaryamanata (see also
the verse from the Kulayukti, cit. SSV p. 13, dtmd caivatmana jn ato yada bhavati
sadhakaih / tada vismayam alma vai at many eva prapafyati II) and amoda in SD
(e.g. I. 7b yada tu tasya ciddharmavibhavamodajrmbhayd) glossed by Utp. precise
ly with cam atkara, seem to hint at very similar concepts. On camatkdra see Gnoli,
1968: XLV-XLVII, 59-62; Gnoli, 1975: 32 and n. 90; see also Hulin 1978: 343-58,
Masson-Patwardhan 1969: 46; id. 1970: 17-8 and notes; Larson 1976.
24 Bhava can also be understood here in the sense of ‘quality (of the substance
self)’; the general meaning is basically the same (cf. n. 25). According to Katyayana’s
varttika on P. V. 1.119 tasya bhdvas Catalan (see n. 25), the abstract nominal
suffixes (bhavapratyaya), such as syan in caitanyam, denote an essential quality
(bhava being thus interpreted as guna); cf. the remark o f Helaraja (Praklrna-
kaprakaia I p. 194) ittham atra visesanam svarupena param uparanjayat sutre
bhavasabdena pratipdditam, bhavaty asmat tena prakdrena dravyam iti bhavah.
25 Being ‘conscious’ is the attribute (dharm a) of the substance (dravya, dharmin)
‘self, that is in fact the dravya p ar excellence, because everything without distinc
tion rests on him (cf. TPV I p. 248). Saying ‘the self is sentience’ (SS. I. 1), instead
of ‘the self is sentient’ or ‘in the self there is sentience’, means underlining the ab
solute pre-eminence of this quality over all others (cf. IPVV II p. 33 bhava-
pratyaye<na> taddharmaprddhanyam darsitam ; see also PV 1.61-2). In fact, per
manence, incorporeity etc. may also pertain to other entities, whereas consciousness
only pertains to the self and it alone suffices to characterize it (cf. IPV I p. 248,
119
15.13 13. Consciousness has as its essential nature reflective awareness
(pratyavamarsa°J; it is the supreme Word (paravakj that arises freely. It
is freedom in the absolute sense, the sovereignty (aisvaryam) of the
supreme Self.
- This is the First Word (adya vac)26, in which the expressible is
§SV p. 2). «The suffixes o f the abstract -ta and -tvam - says Katyayana ( varttika
V on Pan. V I 119) - indicate that quality whose presence in the dravya determines
the application of the name (yasya gunasya hi dravye bhavat sabdanivcsas tadabhi-
dhdne tatvau bhavatah; one can guess the quotation in a corrupted passage of IPVV
II p. 186, y a d aha madhyamo munih - yasya gunasya hi ...). In the particular case
of caitanya the abstract is particularly significant: cetana, as Abh. says (IPV I p.
247), is a krdanta and as such its abstract denotes a ‘relation’ (sam bandha) and,
through the relation, the two related elements, i.e. the subject and the action o f per
ceiving, of being conscious (c/7-). Abh.’s argumentation is implicitly based on the
grammatical maxim (see Torella 1987: 158-59) samasakrttaddhitesu sam bandhabhi-
dhanam anyatra rudhyabhinnarupavyabhicaritasambandhebhyah (Kielhom 1874: 537;
cf. Slradeva s Brhatparibhasavrtti 130 and Haribhaskaragnihotri’s Paribhasabhaskarah
132 in Paribhdsasamgraha pp. 272 and 373-74) «(the abstract nominal suffixes)
when suffixed to compounds, to words formed with primary derivational suffixes
and to words formed with secondary derivational suffixes, name relations, except
(when words of the aforementioned types) are idiomatic or have the same phonic
form (as a word expressing a general property or universal), or name an invariable
relation» (transl. Hayes 1983: 710). This paribhd?a is also quoted in Helaraja’s Pra-
klrnakaprakasa on VP III.5.1 (I p. 194) and, in an abridged form (sam asakrttad
dhitesu sambandhabhidhanam) ibid. p. 55 on VP III. 1.47). Kauncja Bhatta (who also
quotes the same maxim in a slightly modified form) in Vyakaranabhusanasara p.
344 refers to the treatment of the matter by Bhartrhari himself in the MBh fika (not
found in the fragmentary text that has come down to us). Tatrvabodhirii on
Siddhantakaumudi 1781 (cf. Hattori 1968:85) even seems to ascribe the authorship
o f the maxim to Bhartrhari himself. Cf. also, from a different point of view, VP
III. 1.34.
26 The vrtti does not dwell on the levels of the Word; it mentions only the
supreme level (adya vac). On the contrary, this subject is developed in the fika - as
is seen from IPVV - where the polemic with the Vaiyakaranas, which Somananda
had started in Chapter II of the SD (Gnoli 1959; Gaurinath Shastri 1959: 69; Ruegg
1959: 11), is also reproposed. Grammarians (particularly Bhartrhari), as is known,
are criticized for having conceived a division of the Word into three levels, instead
of four, and for having consequently identified the supreme level with Pasyanfi. For
a description of the levels of vac see PTV pp. 102-159 (Gnoli 1985: 60-97); Ruegg
1959: 79-81, Gnoli 1959: 55-63, Iyer 1969: 142-145, Aklujkar 1970: 67-75, Padoux
1990:166-222. Though Bhartrhari is unanimously thought (e.g. in the Saiva tradition;
but cfir. Intr. p. XXVI) to be the upholder of the threefold division, the VP seems to
hint at a further level, which may be seen as the supreme form of Pasyanfi (VP I vrtti
120
undifferentiated27, without beginning or end in that* it is constituted by 15.13
perpetual consciousness, autonomous. This is pure freedom, independent
of any other reality, which has the name of ‘sovereignty’. - 13 -
14. It is the luminous vibrating (sphuratta,)28, the absolute being
(mahasatta)29, unmodified by space and time; it is that which is said to
be the heart (hrdayam) of the supreme Lord, insofar as it is his essence.
p. 216, but this interpretation seems more open to doubt) or as para prakrti (VP III.
2. 15 etc.); cf. Iyer 1968: 143-5, Aklujkar 1970: 69-70 and n. 6, Aklujkar 1990.
Among the Vaiyakaranas only Nagesa (MBhUddyota pp. 40-41; Paramalaghumanjusa
p. 68 caturvidhd hi vag asti ...; see also his commentary on the Yogasiitra) explicitly
maintains the division into four levels. It is to be noted that, four centuries before
Nagesa, Sayana in the Rgvedabhasya proposed, among others, the same interpretation
o f the verse catvari vakparimita padani ..., quoted in the Paspasa. It would have
been very interesting to see how Bhartrhari, whose fika on that portion of the MBh
is extant (Bronkhorst 1990), interpreted it, but unfortunately he is completely silent
on that point. The verse, however, is quoted in the Vrtti on VP 1.159 and interpreted
there in terms of tripartition (p. 220).
27 Abh. refers to three different interpretations of abhinnavacya given in the fika
(IPVV p. 191): sasthT or pancamlsamdsa and karm adharaya, that is, ‘in (or from)
which the expressible is undifferentiated’, ‘designated as undifferentiated’.
28 Sphuratta and the closely related term spanda are specially fit to designate
the highest ia kti of Paramesvara due to their paradoxical nature of immovable
movement - ‘oscillation sur place’ (Hulin 1978: 290) - ; kim ciccalanam, Abh. says,
where kimcit stands for the appearance of movement, agitation in something which
is, however, motionless, firm. In ordinary usage, too, the adjective spandavat is
referred to one who is firmly established though being full of the freedom of many
deliberations. In comparison with spanda, sphuratta (Abh. records the use of this
term and concept by Sarikaranandana) also contains a ‘luminous, shining’ connotation.
One may say mama sphurati ghatah only in the sense that this shining-vibrating
which belongs to the I is transferred to the object. Truly speaking, it is the I (whose
essence is light) who - partially departing or, in a sense, not departing at all, from
his nature of consciousness - shines-vibrates as an object {ibid. p. 200).
29 Cf. the concept of mahasatta in Bhartrhari. «It is being [satta] which, being
differentiated according to the object in which it is present, is called the universal.
All words are based on that. That is the meaning of the stem and of the root; it is
eternal it is the great Soul; it is the meaning of the suffixes -tva and -tal.» (VP III. 1.33-
34; transl. Iyer 1971: 25-26). Words, whether one accepts the thesis that they denote
the universal (jati, samanya) or the individual substance (dravya), all express, in the
end, the pure being in the most general form, the mahasatta, i.e. the satta not qualified
by any particular content. This is valid not only for nouns - which refer to accom
plished realities - but also for verbal roots - which express processes to be accom
plished. This, so-to-speak, universals’ universal (mahasamanya), present in all things
and embracing even non-being (cf. Praklrnakaprakasa p. 41 sai’vabhdvesu sadrupam
samanyam anugatam / abhdvasydpi buddhyakarena nirupandt), is Brahman itself.
121
1 5.14 - It is, by nature, luminous vibrating, it is the subject of this luminous
vibrating; it is not to be understood as the counterpart of non-being
(abhavapratiyoginl) [but] it also pervades non-being; it is existing, being,
the subject of the action of being; permanent, because untouched by
space and time. It is the power of the activity of consciousness, whose
essence is reflective awareness. It constitutes the foundation of the self
of the supreme Lord, who is all things; the various agamas call it the
‘heart’30. - 14 -
30 On the ‘heart’ in the Saiva texts and, in general, in Indian tradition see Mul-
ler-Ortega 1989.
31 I.e. towards an object conceived of as independent of him.
32 The subject is by definiton free (svatantra).
33 It is only the Lord’s power of freedom that renders possible this paradoxical
blend o f objectivity and true subjectivity. The terms of the question are lucidly ex
pounded by Abh., in an earlier passage o f IPVV (I p. 108): «Although freedom and
dependence are two diametrically opposed realities and mutually exclude one
another, Paramesvara in his supreme freedom combines them {yojayati) when he
122
17. The variety of notions such as T etc., does not entail diversity15.17
in
the nature of the self, because a self is created precisely as he who lends
himself to being the object of the reflective awareness T
(ahammrsyataiva), like action which is expressed by personal endings
(tirivacyakarmavat,).
- He who is the object of the reflective awareness T on the plane of
the present cognizing subject does not have the nature of ‘this’ (idanta),
which he should have being the object of cognition34. In the diversity of
ways in which the self is definitely apprehended and in which he appears
to perception, what is expresseded [e.g.] by the word ‘Isvara’ is the cog
nizing subject and no other; only, this happens indirectly, through the
reflective awareness T 35. Similarly, that reality, for example, that is
creates differentiated representations such as Isvara, the self etc. Their idanta com
ponent makes them able to become the object of meditation, worship, teaching and
so on, and, on the other hand, their unveiled ahanta component ensures the attain
ment of their true nature».
34 The power of freedom of Paramcsvara, in the sphere of the general process
of the objectification of the self - from which all stems - causes a certain layer to
remain as though suspended between the T and the ‘this’. ‘This’ insofar as con
structed, ‘created’ (nirmita) just like any reality posited as external, but unlike these,
closer to pure subjectivity and capable o f reimmcrsing itself in it by virtue of the
contact with the T . This is the case with notions (and words) such as Siva, Isvara,
self, cognizer, which are on the one hand an objectified reality, separate from con
sciousness, and on the other not completely so (IPVV II p. 210 na ca atyantam
prthak svdtmany eva)\ na ca anlsvaram , Abh. adds elsewhere (IPV I p. 272), other
wise meditating on Isvara or anlsvara would be the same thing, which is con
tradicted by the different fruits that derive from it.
35 The real self, consciousness, is characterized by aham-pardmarsa; on the con
trary, reality and denominations such as Siva, Isvara, Bhagavan, I etc. are charac
terized by idam-paramar&a whose sphere includes the individual param arsas
(sivaparamarsa etc.). The issue raised is how a single reality can be the basis on
which both creator and created (nirmita) rest. According to Utp.’s reply, as developed
by Abh., unification is provided by the aham-pardmarsa which also underlies the
notions of Siva, Isv ara etc. It is the I (aham ) in fact - as Abh. says (IPV I p. 278-
9) - which constitutes the ultimate outcome, the definitive resting place (visranti-
sthdna) of this kind of cognition (but also, he adds later, of all the others, without
distinction); even for the cognition ‘blue’ the final resting place is the I, though this
is more difficult for the average intellect to grasp). This distinction between the two
planes is outlined by Abh., following the fika, in a passage of IPVV (II p. 213). In
the case of the, so to speak, primary aham -paramarsa, from the very beginning
(upakrama eva) there is awareness o f freedom. In the param arsas concerning dtman,
Isvara etc. this is true only as regards the final outcome; at the beginning, on the
123
1 5.17 denoted by the verbal form ‘he cooks’, is expressed by the word ‘action’;
for, as has been said: «The words ‘action’, ‘quality’, ‘universal’, ‘relation’
etc. do not express [directly] the various actions etc. because they are
denoted instead through the verbal form ‘he cooks’ and so on»36. From
the words ‘Isvara' and ‘self’ one reaches the understanding of one’s own
self, but only insofar as one contextually the reflective awareness ‘I’, that
is, not directly. The apprehension of the self, however, effectively takes
place, just as the object previously perceived is known by memory,
through the direct perception37. - 17 -
18. Owing to the power o f may a, for the Lord it has as its object a
cognizable reality differentiated [from self] and is called by the names
of cognition, imagination, determination etc.
- By the power of maya, to Paramesvara38 whose essence is light,
the world - which consists of his own self - is manifested as differen
tiated. This very Consciousness, therefore, appears as sensory cognition;
precisely this reality which is manifested as differentiated39 forms the ob
ject of memory, imagination (samkalpah) and determination (adhya-
vasayah). Though40 appearing in the form of the functions of the inter
nal sense (manas°) and the intellect (buddhi°), what is acting is in fact
none other than Consciousness itself. - 18 -
contrary, there is the condition o f dependence peculiar to the ‘this’, insofar as those
notions arise marked by objectivity, despite the fact that the aham-paramarsa is
present in them and pervades them from within.
36 Untraced quotation. In tenor it may be compared to VP III 6. 1,which Abh.
quotes in TPVV II p. 215.
37 The parallelism is clearly explained by Abh. (ibid. p. 213).
38 In departing from what appears to be the plainest interpretation (‘the power
of maya of the Lord’), Abh. (TPVV II p. 217) follows the indications in the fika. In
the eyes o f the Lord (or rather, o f the limited subject in whom he is freely con
tracted) the world is made to appear as differentiated from the self.
39 According to Abh. (IPVV II p. 218) tasyaiva bhinnasya is not to be under
stood as anubhutasya, which - it is objected - would be all right for sm rti and
aclhyavasaya, but not for samkalpa (samkalpe tu nava ekavisaya utthapyate). It
means the external object in the broad sense of the word, i.e. that which is subject
to the power of maya.
40 The concessive meaning of api refers here, according to IPVV II p. 218, to
the implicit objection: how can cognition, determination etc. have Consciousness as
their essential nature, since they are functions of the intellect, the manas and the
senses, which are in themselves insentient (see text note 291)? Cf. SK I. 6-7.
124
19. Even at the moment of the direct perception (saksatkaraksane ’pi) 15.19
there is a reflective awareness (vimarsah). How otherwise could one ac
count fo r such actions as running and so on, if they were thought o f as
being devoid of determinate awareness (pratisamdhana0) ? 41.
- Even at the time of that cognizing which is characterized by direct
perception there is in consciousness a reflective awareness of the object
(iarthapratyavamarsah), in a subtle form42. In fact, a rapid action - such
41 In other words there can be no prakasa without vimarsa. The two examples
given in the kdrika o f moments that might be considered as not having discursive
articulation - the first moment of direct perception and rapid action - only appear to
be so. The discursive articulation is already contained in embryo in the sensorial
experience, and so too - still in a ‘contracted’ (sam vartita) form - is the linguistic
articulation, inseparably connected with it, for otherwise it would not be able to occur
after the perception; similarly, even the most rapid and thoughtless action cannot but
contain, however sketchily, an articulated awareness of the ends to be achieved etc.
(cf. Hulin 1978: 294-96). In formulating this conception, which may be considered
one of the pivots of Pratyabhijna philosophy, Utp. follows in the footsteps of
Bhartrhari (cf. VP I. 131-32 na so ’sti pratyayo loke yah i abdantigamad rte / anuvid-
dham iva jhanam sarvam i ahdena bhasate II vagrupata ced utkramed avabodhasya
sasvafi / na prakasah prakaseta sa hi pratyavamarsim II) «There is no cognition in
the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined
with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear,
knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification
[or, in a broader sense, ‘reflective awareness’] possible» (transl. Iyer 1965: 110-11;
see Matilal 1990: 133-141) and is constantly aware of Dharmaklrti’s diametrically op
posed position (cf. in particular PV III. 174-19lab; and, obviously, the well-known
definiton of pratyaksa as kalpanapodham in PS; see Funayama 1992).
42 A potential linguistic articulation (iabdabhavana), says Bhartrhari (vrtti on
VP 1.131, p. 188), is present in various degrees in every cognition; it is therefore
also present in the cognition devoid o f mental elaboration (avikalpajhana), though
only in a contracted and hidden form (sam hrtarupa). (But at this point one - and
first of all a Buddhist - might wonder on which basis it is then possible to draw a
distinction between savikalpa and nirvikalpa, and, moreover, what nirvikalpa is. An
elaborate answer to these crucial questions is given by Abh. in IPVV II p. 239-40).
This condition makes the cognition that occurs remain, in one sense, as though it
had not occurred, because it is not able to manifest its effects (karya), namely, to
attain the plane o f verbal communication and practical use (Vrsabhadeva’s Paddhati
p. 188). That this cognition, however, has occurred is proved by the fact that a
suitable occasion (nimitta), such as the subsequent occurrence o f a similar cognition
{Paddhati p. 189 sadrsagrahanader nimittdt) may reawaken it and render it manifest.
Bhartrhari gives the example o f a person walking quickly, wholly intent on reaching
his destination, who seems not to notice anything that he meets along his path -
leaves, clods o f earth - , until, some time later, he finds himself faced with a similar
125
15.19 as reciting, running and so on - necessarily occurs through a determinate
awareness (°anusamdhanena)43 of the intention of reaching or leaving
this or that place etc. which is seen at that moment44. - 19 -
object and this brings to mind the cognition that he did not previously realize he
had had. This is possible, says Bhartrhari, only if we admit the existence_ within the
first perception of a sabdabhavana which, after being ‘contracted’ (cf. IPVV II p.
226) as it was, has now become fully manifest (vyakta). Then let us consider the
case of a sensation taken in its very first moment (Vrtti p. 170 prathamopanipatT)
and not destined to further development. Even the indistinct cognition that derives
from it, based on an inner formulation such as ‘this, that’ is made possible only by
the presence of a sabdabhavana, though in a subtle form. Finally I will quote one
last, particularly significant, example from those Bhartrhari gives. This is the analysis
o f the process that leads from the perception of a group of words to the
comprehension of the meaning of the sentence they form. The text of the Vrtti (pp.
191-92) is ambiguous in some places and I understand it in the light of
Vrsabhadeva’s interpretation (which is, however, questionable; cf. Aklujkar 1970:
147-48). What appears at first is the indeterminate reality of a series o f separate
words-meanings, isolated from one another. Subsequently (uttarakdlanv, Paddhati p.
191 abhinnapadarthaparicchedad uttarakdlam) there is a reflective awareness
(pratyavam arsa), namely a determination of the meanings understood from the words
(Paddhati ibid. padebhyo ’nubhutdndm arthanam dkdranirupand) and a coordination
(anusamdhana) y namely the ascertainment, with mutual connection, of the meanings
obtained from the words (Paddhati ibid. padebhyo ’vagatandm arthaparicchede-
navadharanam); finally, the constitution of a single overall meaning (ekdrthakaritvam).
All this depends on having the word as essence (vagrupatdydm baddham). It is to
be noted that pratyavam arsa and anusamdhana are precisely the two terms on which
Utp.’s Vrtti on this kdrika is centred.
43 A nusam dhana, to be understood also in the sense of ‘coordination’ of the dis
tinct wills to leave one thing and seek another, present in the act of volition (see
text note 294). As stated before (1.5.10), volition is a particular form of reflective
awareness; it must include a vimarsa ‘this is that’, though in a generic form, touching
the desired object in same way. In this state the powers of volitjon, knowledge and
action are united with the light full of consciousness and bliss (IPVV II p. 233 and
SD Vr pp. 91-92). See also SD 1.9.1 lab.
44 According to Abh. (IPVV II p. 233, see text note 294) the expression detadi°
may be understood in two ways: ‘other substances or qualities’ or ‘substances etc.
existing elsewhere or of another nature’.
45 The kdrika is to be understood as a reply to an objection which we find made
explicit by Abh. in IPV and IPVV. The objector admits that the determinate cogni-
126
- The determinate cognition ‘this’ and ‘jar’, beyond the linguistic ex- 1 5.20
pression and the thing signified, which in themselves appear as differen
tiated [from the subject], consists essentially in the power of Conscious
ness: it is manifested, like the self46, in terms of non-differentiation. - 20 -
21. However; insofar as they conform to the time and place of the
differentiated cognizable reality, [perceptive] cognition, memory and
determinate cognition etc. appear to be successive41.
- Differentiated cognizable reality, such as the jar and so on, is made
manifest to the Consciousness48 as differentiated by this or that time and
place due to the power of maya. [Perceptive] cognition, memory etc.,
closely resting on this differentiated reality, are manifested at different
times and places etc. - 21 -
tion in the subtle form the previous karika spoke of may be considered not separate
from the subject or from the ‘light’, as we have seen, but he wonders how one can
continue to claim this once the determinate cognition (adhyavasáya) ‘this is a jar’ -
becomes evident (sphuta) and, on being articulated in words, fully assumes the form
of vikalpa. The word ‘jar’ - like the thing it signifies - is manifested as an objec
tive reality, separate from the light of consciousness, and this cannot but have reper
cussions on the determinate cognition the very essence of which is the linguistic
expression. The meaning of Utp.’s reply is the following. Noone has ever said that
it is the ordinary manifested word (which is only the lowest level of language) that
constitutes the vim arša; it is, on the contrary, on the same level as any reality that
appears as external. This word and the thing it signifies are only the object of
unification by a determinative cognition, which is rooted in the Lord’s pure power
of consciousness (of which it is one of the manifestations). In unifying nama and
rupa (šabda and artha) determinate cognition remains distinct from them, on another
level, retrieving them through the outcome of its very process within the sphere o f
the ‘I’.
46 The various notions of self, cognizing subject, Lord etc. shine directly to the
consciousness as ‘I’ (cf. above karikas 16-17 above).
47 One can explain this karika, too, as the reply to an unformulated objection,
which it is possible to intuit from the thread of the argumentation and with the aid
o f Abh.’s commentaries. If every form of cognizing - the objector wonders - in the
ultimate analysis is resolved in the T , what results is an absolute unity of cognition
in which there is no room for spatio-temporal differentiations (which may charac
terize only the object). And yet this differentiation is evident at every moment of
ordinary experience ...
48 See above n. 38.
127
16.1
C h a p te r VI
1 Without a duality of this - non-this, Abh. remarks (IPVV IT p. 280), how can
the functions peculiar to vikalpa be carried out, that is, how and what to unify, divi
de, imagine ?
2 Utp. refers here critically to the well-known definition of kalpana given by
Dharmakirti (NB I. 5) ahhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasa prafitih kalpana, which in
turn derives, with modifications, from Dignaga (PS I. 3d namajatyadiyojana; cf.
Funayama 1992). During the discussion of this subject in TPVV, Abh. repeatedly
quotes passages from Dharmottara, which turn out to be either paraphrases or sum
maries of passages from the NBT (ad I. 5).
3 On vikalpa in general see Matilal 1986: 313-15. The term vikalpa is analysed
in IPVV II p. 274 in a few different, but compatible (or even complementary) ways,
each of them singling out an aspect of this complex notion, a) vividhakalpana, to be
understood either as putting together what is differentiated in reality (bhinnasyapi ...
yojana) or as conceiving as manifold what is one in reality (ekasyapi vaividhyena kal
pana). b) Cutting (kip- in the sense of vicchedana) another form which has been imag
ined (vividhasya ca sankitasya rupantarasya kalpanam vicchcdanam). c) After divid
ing (vibhajya), removing from the other and protecting by making it enter into the
cognizer’s mind (vi-kal-pa). And later on (p. 281), d) vividham kalpanam , i.e. manifold
conceiving, in the sense that at same time it has something being affirmed and
something being negated as its object (vidhlyamdnanisidhyamanataya).
4 The main characteristic of vikalpa is that o f projecting the object outside the
I, o f knowing it in terms of separation: ‘this’. In analyzing the working of vikalpa,
Ahnika VI dwells particularly on its aspect o f ‘exclusion’. In the avikalpaka state the
thing is ‘full’, just like consciousness, but it cannot become the object of practical
(notes 4 - 5 next p a fies)
128
To elaborate: 16.2
129
1 6.2 reality that is other and differentiable6 from light, 0« f/te plane
(ivaj7, w /10/1possible.
a positive entity and only secondly, by implication, the exclusion of the other, TS
1018 tcisya ca pratibim basya gatav evdvagamyate / sam arthyad anyavisleso
nasyanyatmakata yatah II) and ‘synthetists’ (Jnanasrlmilra and Ratnaklrti: the word
expresses a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other; Ratnaklrti’s
Apohasiddhi p. 59 nasmabhir apohasabdena vidhir eva kevalo ’bhipretah / napy
anyavyavrttimatram / kintu anyapohavisisto vidhih sabdanam art hah, then taken up
again by Moksakaragupta) seems too simplistic and fails to grasp what appears as
a substantial unity with different formulations (Katsura 1986, Siderits 1986). The
Pratyabhijha position is very close to Ratnaklrti’s: the words (and vikalpas) rest on
a reality which is mainly affirmative, qualified by the implicit negation of the op
posite (IPVV II p. 289 antarllnlkrtapratiyogyabhavavisistavidhipradhanavastunisthah;
p. 280 vidhau vifrantatvat niscayasya). In this process three moments may be singled
out: imagining what is other than the object intended, then superimposing it onto the
object and lastly negating it. (ibid. p. 289 vikalpayet, aropayet nisedhec ca. Or,
according to another formulation: every apprehension includes the superimposition
o f the manifestations to be excluded and their negation (ibid. p. 290 sarva prameyesu
pratipattir apohydbhdsaropanisedhavydparantahkdriifi).
5 The countercorrelate of light, its contrary, cannot in fact be either
aprakasamana - because in this case it would simply not exist - or prakasam ana -
because it would be of the same essence as light (IPVV II p. 279).
6 Cf. IPV I p. 307 bhedinah ... apohandtmakabhedanavydparasahifnoh [both Bh
and KSTS Ed. read incorrectly °vydpdrasahisnoh ]. On the plane o f knowable reality
it is possible to imagine, with respect to a ‘blue’, a ‘non-blue’ (and what is other than
blue indeed exists); why then, on the plane of the knowing subject, imagining a rea
lity other than consciousness should be inadmissible ? This objection is put forward
by Utp. and Abh. (IPVV II p. 288) and answered as follows. On the plane of pra-
m eya, created by maya and made of a multitude of abhasas, anekatva and vaicitrya are
not surprising, whereas in pure light a reality different (cf. bhinnasya in the vrtti) from
the nature o f pram atr cannot possibly exist. But even admitting that lights may be
differentiated in their nature owing to a differentiation of space and time, nonetheless,
just as, when a certain ‘blue’ is ascertained, only yellow etc. are negated - not the other
‘blues’ -, likewise, when a light is ascertained the other lights are not negated. The
two parts of this argument unfold what is implicit in dvifiyasya bhinnasya in the vrtti.
Therefore, even if there were a ‘second’ (etc.) light, this would not be subject to exclu
sion. However, a ‘second’ light is not admissible as a reality (IPV I p. 308 na ca
prakasasya svariipadesakalabhedo yena dvifiyah prakdsa ekasmad apohyate). A
‘second’ light as the product of mental construction cannot constitute a pratiyogin in
the same way as ‘being cause, effect, instantaneous’ cannot be considered a pratiyo
gin with respect to ‘blue’ (IPVV II p. 282 svakalpanakalpitena dvifiycna na pratiyo-
giparipuranam kriyate / na hi nllasya kdranatvakaiyaftaksanikat\’ddi pratiyogipaksc
vartate, na hi tat prthak kihcit). See also above n. 5.
7 What is needed for two entities to be termed pratiyogin is precisely their op
posing each other while remaining on the same plane. My translation makes the
130
- Otherness with respect to light (prakasetaratvam) is not possible, 1 6.2
since an opposite reality, second to and distinct from light, called non
light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion
(vyapohanayogat), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one can
not, therefore, speak of mental construct (vikalpata°) [with reference to
ahampratyavamarsa]. - 2 -
Likewise:
value of iva explicit and in so doing follows Abh.’s commentary. Bh., loo, insists
on this point (II p. 307) tulyakaksya eva hi pratispardhitaya hhedena purah sthatum
¿aknoti iti tulyakaksyasyety uktam; Abh. (IPVV II p. 282) adds pratiyogitvam hi tat-
sthdnapannatvam.
8 The Buddhist description of vikalpa's modus operandi thus seems liable to be
shared also by the Saivas. Moreover, on a close scrutiny, it is only within the saiva
context that it may logically stand and elude criticism. Indeed, if one accepts the
Buddhist presupposition of things being self-confined, it results that what appears
from the cognition o f a thing is only that same thing and the awareness of its cogni
tion, and one does not understand where the ‘other’ things and their negation spring
from. But this difficulty concerns only the Buddhist (IPV I p. 308 evam takyah parya-
miyojyo na tu vayam), not the saiva conception centred in a cognizer who is not
bound to the present object and its cognition (IPVV II p. 291 visayataddarsa-
nadiparatantryam ujjhatd) but is free to dynamically aggregate, separate and merge
all the various cognitions. The centrality of the I, which characterizes the saiva con
ception, is pointed out by the particle eva in the karika (mdtraiva) and in the vrtti
(pram atur eva).
131
1 6.4-5 which arises precisely from the manifestation of an opposite reality to he
excluded9.
- The reflective awareness T as the knowing subject, which because
of the power of maya (mayasaktya) of the Consciousness-principle itself,
of the Lord, addresses realities that are manifested as separate such as
the body, the intellect, the interior tactile sensation10 or that imagined11
entity which is the void (.sunya), beyond them, similar to ether12 - this
form of reflective awareness T is nothing other than a vikalpa, like ‘this
is a jar’, since it excludes the various opposite entities that are manifested,
such as the body and so on. - 4-5 -
132
unity (aikyayojana) with former manifestations, with an individuality, 16.6
with a name, (a connection) made possible by the latent impressions
which ensure the internal permanence of the former manifestations, - this
connection in unity, which is essentially an activity of the knowing sub
ject (pramdtrvydpararupa), is merely a mental construct and precisely
that called ‘recognition’. - 6 -
7, Thus also in the course o f ordinary reality14 the Lord, entering the
body etc., renders externally manifest by his volition the multitude of ob
jects that shine within him.
- At the moment of the original creation, as in the course of everyday
reality, Mahesvara, by virtue of the power of m aya15, by entering the
body etc. conceived of as self, creates the [limited] knower and thanks
to the power of doer (kartrsaktya) gradually16 renders the various objects
133
1 6.7 that shine within him externally manifest. Creating is precisely rendering
manifest in this way (tathâbhâsanam eva). On the contrary, if he does
not enter the body etc., then the whole manifestation of objective reality
will take place spontaneously and simultaneously in the form of ‘I am all
this’17. - 7 -
134
10. It is also spontaneous in the case of the vikalpa that acts 16.10
autonomously fsvairacarinij rendering particular configurations manifest
in the mental sphere at will.
- However, the independent (svatantrah) vikalpa22 renders this or that
thing manifest, whether new or characterized by a different organization
of its parts, making it the object of the mind even if it has never entered
the field of the senses such as sight etc.; and it renders it manifest at
will without considering its having been previously perceived23. Within
the sphere of this form of vikalpa the manifestation of the object is spon
taneous, too. - 10 -
135
I 7.1
C h a p te r VII
136
connections pertaining to practical reality (°vyavaharasamanvayam), such I 7.2
as, for instance, the cause-effect relation and so on. - 2 -
137
I 7.4 in which they make known one after the other their respective objects,
and are not able to display any mutual dependence7. - 4 -
138
6. Also the invalidating-invalidated relation (badhyabadhakabhavahj I 7.6
between cognitions which are restricted to themselves and do not contradict
one another (svatmanisthavirodhinamj may exist only by virtue of their
resting on a single knowing subject.
- What contraddiction can there be between cognitions which are only
directed to the single manifestations that are their own (bhinnasvabhasa-
mdtranisthdnam)]0 and, consequently, how can one speak of an in
validating-invalidated relation with reference to them?11 On the contrary,
this relation is admissible if they rest on a single knowing subject. - 6 -
that knowing subject they wanted to avoid, who, as we have seen, is identified with
the continuity of self-consciousness on which memory is based.
10 Or also: «that insist only on themselves (°sva°) - i.e. on their own self-aware
ness - and on the manifestation (°dbhdsa°) that is their object», following IPVV II
p. 371 svasmin visaye dlmani ca svasamvedane (also IPV I p. 365, which substitutes
svariipe for svasamvedane). This is an interpretation that does not basically differ
from the text of the vrtti but constitutes the development of what is there implicit,
apparently following the indications in the Cikd (cf. IPVV II p. 372 vrttau vivrtau ca
svas ca dbhasat ca iti svas ca visayas ca iti yojyam). Or, Abh. continues, only the
abhasa (the content o f the cognition) may be considered mentioned in this expres
sion, since the invalidation can concern only that and not the ‘self-awareness’ com
ponent (pp. 372-73 atha va svasamvedanabhage badhasam hhavad dbhasamdtram
eva sam bhavadbadham iha nirdistam); in this case the svdtm a0 of the kdrikd is to
be understood in the sense of abhasa (p. 373 tada ca sutre ’p i svdtmagrahanam
dbhdsatatpaiycna yojyam). Abh. (IPV I pp. 265-6) indicates yet another possible in
terpretation of the kdrikd as a whole, which is really rather contrived, but is, in the
end, not far removed from the general meaning considered so far. As regards the
sense in which the expression svabhasa is used in the logical schools of Buddhism
(grahakabhasa and svasamvedana) cf. Hattori 1968: 101 ff.
11 Also the invalidating-invalidated relation is therefore possible only thanks to
the subject’s freedom to act on cognitions that are themselves unrelated and there
fore incapable, except in a uselessly general way, of being in opposition to one
another. According to the Saiva view, an invalidating condition is one which inter
rupts the continuation of the result of another (IPVV II p. 372 yat yasya pha-
Idnuvrttibhahgam karoti, tat tasya bddhakanv, cf. Rastogi 1986) which presupposes
precisely the continuity and oneness o f the knowing subject. See also SD IV. 15 ff.
12 This kdrikd voices an objection expressed from the point of view of the Bud
dhist logicians (IPVV II p. 376 dharmottaropadhyayddidarsitam), according to
139
I 7.7 - The cognition of the absence of the jar - ‘on this surface there is
no ja r ’ - is precisely the cognition of the empty surface (kevala-
bhutalajnanam eva), since the empty surface appears as the absence of
the jar. Analogously, one may say that the cognition of mother-of-pearl
whom the invalidating-invalidated cognition relation does not need any single sub
ject on which to base itself, but it is the correct cognition that entails by itself alone,
implicitly, the non-validity of every other different cognition o f its object. The prin
ciple is the same - as pointed out in the karika - as the one underlying the explana
tion o f the concept o f non-being (abhava) and non-perception (anupalabdhi) given
by Dharmottara in the NBT- The cognition of the absence of the jar, though being
in itself distinct from that o f the empty surface, is essentially connected with it, just
as determined cognition is linked to perception and represents its subsequent stage:
the same cognitive act embraces both o f them (cf. NB T pp. 122-123). Dharmottara
here depends directly on Dharmaklrti, who had extensively debated the question in
several o f his works (PV, PVSV, HB, NB). The essential points o f Dharm aklrtrs
conception - which he sharply distinguishes from his teacher Isvarasena’s adarsana-
matra (Steinkellner 1966: 75 ff; 1992: 315) - may be summarized as follows (1 refer
to HB pp. 21-28*). Non-perception is not a distinct pram dna connected with a par
ticular pram eya o f its own {abhava), as for instance Kumarila maintains. It consists
in a positive perception o f something that exists, a perception and object that
however are different from the cognizefs expectation (anyopalabdhi, anydbhava,
vivaksitopalabdher anyatvdi) and in this way reveal an absence. From the positive
perception o f an ‘other’ thing one may pass to the cognition of the absence of the
thing intended only on determinate conditions: First o f all, that the two things pos
sess an equal capacity to suscitate a certain cognition {avisiffayogyata) and that
therefore they are necessarily associated in a single cognitive act, and, furthermore,
that for the thing that is the object of negation there subsist all the conditions neces
sary for its perception (listed in NB II. 13-14). The cognition of the absence is im
mediate: the perception of the one thing alone entails the determination o f the ab
sence of the other {bhavasiddhir evaparasyabhavasiddhih). Seeing that a surface is
empty - in the classical example - is knowing that the vase is not there {tasya
kaivalyam aparasya vaikalyam). If this is possible, it is because it is the very na
ture o f every cognition to define its object contextually by excluding the other {tat
paricchinatti tadanyad vyavacchinatti). As Dharmaklrti states several times using dif
ferent arguments, we are not dealing with an inferential process here, by which from
the being there of the other we arrive (via mediation) at the not being there o f the
thing aimed at, because between the two there is no real sambandha on which the
relation of linga-lihgin may rest {na vai kutaScit sam bandhad anyabhavas tada-
bhavagamaka is (ah, kim tv any abhava eva tadabhavah). The non-perception there
fore directly reveals the absence o f a thing {abhava) and promotes the use (ver
balization etc.) of this notion in practice {abhdvavyavahara). Anupalabdhi may be
used as a hetu to establish abhdvavyavahara, but only when it is a question o f il
luminating and guiding a torpid intellect {mudhapratipattau) that needs to arrive by
degrees at a notion that is, on the contrary, immediate in a normal person.
140
is, at the same time, the cognition of the absence of silver, since there I 7.7
is no mutual identification between mother-of-pearl and silver. And there
fore it is the very perception that constitutes by itself the invalidating
cognition (pratyaksam badhakam). - 1 -
141
I 7.9 9. The surface is always a separate and distinct reality (viviktam),
since things are self-contained (svatmanisthitehj; and therefore how can
the cognition of it sometimes (jatu) lead to establishing the not being
there of a thing distinct from it?
- The surface is always separate from what is other than itself and
so how can the cognition of it establish only in some cases (kadacid eva)
the absence on it of a distinct entity, such as the ja r14? The separation
from a distinct jar (bhinnaghataviviktata) might be an occasional aspect
(kadacitkam rupam) of the surface only provided that also the associa
tion with that jar (ghatasahitatapi) sometimes constitutes its own form.
But this is not the case: there are always two things, each self-contained,
and the association (sahityam) between them is not another individual en
tity which, though distinct from them, comprises both of them (tadatirik-
tam ubhayatmakam)[5. However [the objector replies], a single cognitive
act in which the two manifestations appear associated (ubhayabhdsasam-
sargatmakam) constitutes in itself the absence of another cognition in
which only one of the two is manifested (ekabhdsajhandntardbhavaru-
14 Utp.’s objection serves to induce his opponent to play the last card he was
saving, in a sense his most important one, that on which the Buddhist conception of
the anupalabdhi rests, and which gives it its originality. In order that the non-per
ception of a thing A may define its absence, all the conditions of perceptibility must
exist (both as regards the thing and the subject), and there must be the positive per
ception of a thing B (and this is the essential point) which enters into such a rela
tion with A that a single cognitive act must necessarily grasp both of them (NBT
p. 101 ekendriyajndnagrdhyapi locanddipranidhdnabhimukham vastudvayam anyon-
ydpeksam ekajňanasamsargi kathyaté). If this cognitive act takes place and only B
is perceived this means that A is absent. It is in this sense that the Buddhist equa
tion - perception of B equals absence o f A - must be understood (NBT p. 118 ar-
thajiidne eva pratyaksasya gliatasydbhava ucyate). This is - as we have seen (Jkarika
7) - perfectly homologous to the Buddhist explanation of bddhd: cognition of
mother-of-pearl equals invalidation of cognition of silver.
15 W hat guides Utp.’s criticism, here as elsewhere, is his intent to underline the
immobility of phenomenal reality (objects, cognitions taken in themselves etc.), in
order to make the affirmation of an T necessary, as the only source o f that dynamism
which is present at all levels of practical reality, and which renders it possible. In
doing this he cannot but find himself continually disputing with the Buddhists, who
in certain respects take the opposite path. Here he denies that sdhitya, ghatasahitata,
is something that may be perceived when space is perceived, as its nature; it is not
an objective given, it is merely a mental construct (ÍPVV II p. 384 vikalpanamdtram
etat). This subject is dealt with extensively by Abh. following on from the fiká (cf.
ibid. p. 383).
142
parný6. [A cognitive act] nevertheless [it is replied] delimits the object I 7.9
as being self-contained: the determination of the absence of the jar does
not occur as a direct consequence of the datum (na vastubalena), as is
the case, on the contrary, in the determination of the existence of the
place, which depends on the perception of the place. However [the ob
jector says] it can be arrived at through the absence of the effect, that
is, through the absence of a single cognition in which the two things are
manifested17. Not even this is admissible: it would be a cognition arrived
at through mediation (vyavadhanena prafitih), whereas the establishment
of the [empty] place derives immediately from the sight of it (pradeša-
darsandd ev<?)18. — 9 —
16 The opponent shows that he is perfectly aware (who can be more so than a
Buddhist?) that sahitya does not belong to the sphere of things, but to the sphere of
cognitions (cf. e.g. PV I. 87 samsrjyante na bhidyante svato ’rthah pdram arthikah /
nipam ekam anekam ca tesu buddher upaplava/i) and reformulates his position in
less equivocal terms. Utp.’s reply is developed by Abh. in IPVV II pp. 384
(prativisayam paryavasyat ...) - 385. Dharmaklrti for his part might say that if such
an ‘association* {sahitata, samsarga) is not a given fact (vastu), it is however present
in cognition and it is reverberated by cognition on the things that gave rise to it (in
the background lies the principle expounded in PV I. 109 ekapratyavamaršasya
hetut\>dd dhlr abhedinl / ekadhlhetubhavena vyakfínam apy abhinnata II).
17 The Buddhist opponent, put on the spot, thus ends up by presenting the nega
tive judgem ent «on the surface there is no jar» as an inference, coinciding substan
tially with the first o f the eleven types described in NB II. 30 ff. (reduced to three
in HB), svabhavanupalabdhi; as Kamalasila points out in TSP p. 587 and as results
precisely from its formulation in the vrtti, it is resolved in a katyanupalabdhi. The
Buddhist has therefore illicitly changed plane and Utp. promptly points this out. Bud
dhist logic is perfectly aware o f the dual level of the negative judgem ent (NBT p.
123 ato dršydnupalambho 'bhavajňanam krtam pravartayati na tu akrtam karofity
abhavanišcayo ’nupalambhát pravrito ’p i pratyaksena krto 'nupalambhena pravartita
ukta iti) and, as has been seen (cf. above n. 12), admits the presentation o f the nega
tion in terms of inference only to demonstrate the abhavavyavahara in certain cases.
This Final shift in perspective is thus equivalent to a surrender.
18 This is also the Buddhist position restated so often (cf. e.g. HB p. 27*
daršanánantaram vyavadhanena vinedam astidam tu nasfiti), that the Buddhist in
terlocutor ended up, however, by contradicting.
19 After criticizing the opposing thesis, Utp. now puts forward his own; it is
‘unknown to the ancients’ (ÍPV I p. 376 cirantanair aparidr$tam; Bh. ibid., ciran-
143
1 7.10 - The verbal formulation and relative behaviour (vyavahartum) ‘there
is the absence of the jar on this surface» there is no jar* can be legimately
brought about by sight or another sense (álokádi)20 only once they have
directly perceived in the place in question a beam of light or, in the
shadows, a warm, soft etc. tactile sensation constituting in the first case
the absence of the shape of the jar, and in the second of its tangible form.
- 10 -
144
12. Thus the cognition o f mother-of-pearl may appear as the non- 17.12
being o f the cognition of silver; however; it cannot reveal the non-validity
o f the former cognition o f silver22.
- The cognition of mother-of-pearl in itself appears as the non-being
of the cognition of silver; but through the direct cognition of mother of
pearl which takes place at that particular moment (tadanlntana°) one does
not obtain the non-validity (aprdmanyam) of a distinct cognition of sil
ver that occurred in the past. - 12 -
13. Not even inference can account for the invalidation o f a cogni
tion, due to the property-possessor not being established (dharmyasid-
dhehj23; on the contrary the invalidation, established on the basis of
everyone's inner experience (svasamvedanasiddhaj24, is coherently ex
plained fyuktaj as deriving from a unitary knowing subject.
- At the moment of the cognition of mother-of-pearl the former
cognition of silver no longer subsists. Therefore, since the property-pos
sessor is not established, the invalidation may not be explained in terms
of inference25. On the contrary, it is explained (sidhyati) by maintaining
that it is in the self-awareness (svasamvedane) - consisting in the unitary
145
17.13 knowing subject - that the relation constituted by the two cognitions
referring to a single object is manifested (ekadesavastambhyubhayajha-
namayasambandhabhdsanat). The congruence with reality which is subse
quently ascertained (pascatsamvadah), and which causes one to say that
the one cognition is valid and the other is not, can take place insofar as
the former cognition is also manifested in the self-awareness of the
present direct perception. The determination of the congruence also
depends on the unitary knowing subject26. - 13 -
146
I 8.1
C h a p te r VIII
3. Even if pleasure etc. and the causes of the states of pleasure etc.
are real (vastu^uj and their manifestation exists (sadbhave), nevertheless,
147
I 8.3 because they belong to the past, an effective similar4 condition of
pleasure is not5 produced (tathasthitihj.
- The manifestations of pleasure, pain etc. and those of the factors
that cause them, though they always exist internally6, do not bring about
a state of joy etc. because, due to their belonging to the past [in the case
in question], they have no external existence at the present moment and
only the manifestations that exist at the present moment {tadatva-
visistanam) are able to produce the above mentioned state. - 3 -
4 Similar to that experienced in the past, when that particular pleasure and its
causes were present.
5 The negative, required by meaning and supported by all three commentaries,
is based on reading the compound tathasthitih as tatha-a-sthitih, thus attributing to
the negative particle the sense of prasajyapratisedha (the only one to say so explicit
ly is Bh I p. 406). Tatha may also not be considered part o f the compound that fol
lows, but tathasthitih must, in any case, appear joined (as it stands for tatha asthitih);
however it is only so in Bh’s yojana and never in the karikas or quotations in IPV
and IPVV.
6 United with the I.
7 I.e. like that deriving from an ‘external’ pleasure.
8 Utp. specifies that it is vikalpa ‘autonomous’ in order to exclude memory,
which - like determinate knowledge or judgement - is strictly dependent on direct
perception (cf. text note 425). The role of memory is limited to supplying the ob
ject for the mental evocation, which having freed it from its ties with a particular
past time, place and subject, brings it so vividly back to consciousness that it ap
pears as if it were altogether new (see ibid. p. 411; cf. also karika I. 4. 2).
9 On vikasa (‘expansion’, joy) see Gnoli 1968: 46-47.
148
- All the various manifestations, concerning both being and non-be- I 8.5
ing, even if they do not appear as external, nonetheless have an existence
(sattasty eva), for instance in memory and so on. The fact that they exist
externally is only an accessory condition and not their own form. The
same is true of the manifestation of ‘non-being’, even though this [only]
has an internal existence (<antahsattayam api), since it does not exist
externally10. - 5 -
10 Cf. SD Vr p. 130 tad avast\> api prakasam anam cidrupam eva, kevalam bdhye
prakdSanabhavad avastu ucyate. See SD III.78ab.
11 In other words, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition: in order for
a manifestation to produce a determinate effect a series of specifications and rela
tions with other abhasas are also required. On causal efficiency (arthakriya) see
below p. 166.
149
I 8.7 by the power of maya to appear (prakasyamanesu)12 externally as the
object of direct perception13. But even when they are directly perceptible
(tadapi) they do not cease, for this reason, in the final analysis to be in
ternal. On the contrary, in the case of intending to create and so on
(sisrksadau) even things come to be internal. - 7 -
12 By using the causative form the vrtti seeks to underline the heteronomy
(paratantrya) of the manifestations of objective reality which ordinary experience
dominated by the power of maya tends to consider extraneous to and independent
o f consciousness. On the other hand, grammatical speculation is able to place the
correct limits on a statement such as this, which, if taken literally, runs the risk of
leading one just as far from the truth as that against which it was advanced. If the
responsibility for the action of becoming manifest, of shining (prakas-) rested sole
ly with the primary subject of the causative (Item) or, in other words, with con
sciousness, this would mean that the subject were completely extraneous to the
reality of light - and in that case truly bahya, or from the Saiva point of view, a
mere nothing. But as Bhartrhari says (cf. VP 111. 7. 122-128), the subject of the ac
tion induced, in the causative form, can only be someone who possesses the require
ments to act as a free agent of it (cf. the passage in Abh.’s lost Sivadrftyalocana
quoted in PTV p. 225, preryo ’p i sa bhaved yasya saktata nama vidyate) (Torella
1987: 157-58). The meaning of the causative does not go beyond the, more or less,
cogent stimulation of the hetu so that the kartr performs the action in question: only
what is in itself able to shine or, in other words, that which is essentially light, may
be made to appear or shine (cf. also TA X. 38-45a). The status o f the abhasa is
thus to be found in this delicate balance between svatantrya and paratantrya.
13 Abh. (IPVV II pp. 21-2), following the thread of the fika, deals at length with
the various implications contained in the expression ‘as directly perceptible’
(pratyaksah'ena), and he begins by imagining the surprise of those who expected to
see also the vikalpas (particularly those termed ‘independent’) mentioned in this con
text. Utp. is here primarily concerned with underlining what contrasts with what is
commonly accepted - in this case claiming the ultimate internality of what is con
sidered external p a r excellence (the object of pratyaksd) - , whereas the internality
o f the vikalpas is generally taken for granted and thus it is not worth expressly slat
ing it. On the contrary, what has to be demonstrated - and this once again conflicts
with the general opinion - is precisely the real externality of the vikalpas and this
is done in the following stanza. Later this externality ultimately comes to rest on a
fundamental internality, which is common to every reality. But pratyaksatvena in the
vrtti may also have another function: this expression may refer to all types of abhasa
- whether sensory or mental - being directly present to the consciousness, and thus
to their indiscriminate satyata.
150
knowing subject ('pramàtraikatmyamj, externality is separation from I 8.8
him14.
- The mental representation of the. jar etc. in the sphere of discur
sive thought, though not the object of the senses such as sight, is non
etheless external insofar as it is manifested as separate [from the sub
ject]. Indeed, intemality is the reflective awareness T (ahamvimarsah),
externality is the reflective awareness ‘this’15. Thus for things - such as
the jar and so on - there are two kinds of externality, that is, they are
the object of cognition through both the external and internal senses; for
pleasure and so on there is one, in that they are cognised only by the
internal senses. - 8 -
14 One must keep in mind the background against which this discussion of the
externality of the âhhâsa in direct perception and in vikalpa takes place. Indeed ex
ternality has been declared the sine qua non condition on which the existence of
causal efficiency depends (and it cannot be denied that the vikalpas, too, are able to
produce effects); and this dependence is invoked in order to refute the satyatâ-ar-
thakriyükâritvam identification, upheld by the Buddhists. The vrtti distinguishes
between two forms o f this general externality, according to whether the âbhâsa is
the object of both the external and internal senses, or internal only.
15 Or to put it more clearly, becoming conscious of the object in terms of T
(unity, intemality) or of ‘this’ (separation, externality).
16 Once again the problem arises of how to translate the term praküÈa, whilst
preserving its density of meaning (light, manifestation, presence to consciousness and
therefore also coming to light, perception, knowledge etc.).
17 If this knowing is called bauddha - in spite of the fact, a hypothetical objec
tor notes, the actual grdhaka is in this case the manas - it is because it is concluded
by the act of the n itcaya, which is pertinent to the buddhi (ÏPVV II *pp. 430-31).
18 Isvara is the ultimate source of all manifestations. This is so not only in the
case of those that are the object of perception as external objects, which appear more
151
18.10 10. On the basis of what has been said (tad) without a unity o f cogni
tions ordinary worldly activity would not be possible. It is on the unity
of light that the unity o f the various cognitions is based and this unitary
light is precisely the one knowing subject. This has been definitively es
tablished.
- Indeed, practical activity is based on the unification ifanusamdha-
nena) of the various cognitions, which are in themselves separate from
one another, and the unification of the cognitions is constituted by the
light-principle, which is unitary in itself. This unitary light is precisely
the knowing subject, one, called the Supreme Self. - 10 -
as independent from the limited subject, but also in the case o f those that might
seem solely determined by the individual’s will, such as mental representations, fan
tasies etc. Similarly, as Somananda says (see ¿ D I. 44 and vrtti), the jar is produced
by the potter but only insofar as his creativity is contained within the all-pervading
creativity o f the Lord.
152
II 1.1
SECTION n. ACTION
C hapter I
1. Therefore, also the objection raised earlier - 4an action that is both
unitary and successive, belonging to a unitary subject is not admissible’ 1
- was rejected through the demonstration of the existence o f the unitaty
[consciousness].
- Through the demonstration of the unitary consciousness-principle
the activity related to the unitary subject is proved unitary. Thus even
the objections against action are found to be confuted. - 1 -
3. Time is the transit o f the sun etc., or the birth o f this or that flower
and so on, or also heat and cold. Or time, in reality, is nothing but the
succession (krama evaj characterized by these elements.
153
II 1.3 - Time consists of various actions that are common knowledge in
everyday experience3, or of cold and so on. Or rather, time is the suc
cession itself - characterized by these - which is an accessory qualifica
tion (°upadhi°) of all the various realities in their being manifested as
differentiated; time is nothing but this succession, because it is through
it that temporal differentiations are established. - 3 -
3 The same idea (that the name ‘time’ is given to those realities able to act as
a reference point, or ‘measure’ for the others) is found expressed in VP III. 9.77
kriydntaraparicchedapravrtta y d kriyam prati / nirjiidtaparimdnd sd kala ity abhi-
dhlyate II. ‘That (activity), the measure (of time) of which is well-known and which
is employed in measuring (the duration of) any oyher activity, with regard to (any
other) activity, is called time’ (transl. Sharma 1972: 101).
4 This is my translation of the expression °anyonydbhdsasunya°, guided also by
a passage in TPV (II p. 16), which recurs in almost the same terms in IPVV. Dif
ferent manifestations may implicate each other, referring to a single substratum, such
as ‘red’, ‘jar* etc. or may be completely distinct from each other such as ‘jar’, ‘cloth’:
obviously not in the first case, but not even in the second - where the two things,
though unrelated, may coexist in a single cognitive act (yugapad evaikajnanena
sphuranat Bh II p. 16) - is there succession. On the contrary, succession is only
possible if the manifestations are such that the presence of the one necessarily ex
cludes that of the other, as in the case o f autumn and winter.
5 On kala I kriya and desa / murti see VP 1.1 Vrtti pp. 2, 9 (and Paddhati pp.
5, 9); see also VP IU.7.153 and Helaraja’s commentary; Praklrnakaprakasa I p . 117.
6 Together with growth, decline and disappearence they constitute the six
modifications of existence (bhavavikara; cf. Nirukta 1.2.8-9).
154
6 . In all things (sarvatra) the diversity of the manifestations is the II 1.6
source of temporal succession for those knowing subjects such as the void
etc., whose light is discontinuous (vicchinnabhasah), but not fo r the
knowing subject who shines once and fo r ever (sakrt).
- In every object diversified manifestation determines the appearance
of temporal succession [exclusively] for the knowing subject who iden
tifies himself with the void, the body and so on. Indeed, apart from
memory, what was manifested in the past (prakkalah) does not shine in
the same manner at the present moment7, and it is with reference to his
own present (svavartamanapeksaya) that the subject may use the notions
of past and future in everyday experience. On the contrary, for the [true]
knowing subject who shines uninterruptedly once and for ever (sakrdvi-
bhatasya)8, there is no temporal differentiation, neither in himself nor as
regards objects, since, as the shining is never interrupted, it is not pos
sible to speak of repetition. - 6 -
7 That is, connected with preceding manifestations o f the limited subject (cf. text
note 17). Only through memory can the former shining of the object be revived, in
some way; but this is a totally different question, already dealt with at lenght above
(Jnanadhikara, ahnikas III-IV).
8 This is a reference - through a saiva text (Sarasvatasam graha according to
IPV V III p. 33, Sivasutra according to Spandasamdoha p. 25) to sakrdvibhata in
Chandogya Up. VIII.4.2, later taken up again by Gaudapada in M andukyakdrika
111.36, IV.81; see also PTV p. 199. Consciousness shines ‘once only’ (this is the
primary meaning of sakrt ), but as this shining is never interrupted the expression
may also be taken in its secondary meaning of ‘constantly, always, once and for ever
(cf. Abh.’s explanation in IPVV III pp. 21-22; see also IPVV II p. 262
sakrcchabdena tu ekavaravacina sadarthaparyayena va vicchcdaSanka nivdrita).
Sankara similarly glosses sakrt in the passages quoted above with satatam.
9 Lit. ‘a compact mass of light’ (prakasaghanasya).
155
II 1.8 8. Nevertheless, the manifestation o f such a differentiation between
subject and object o f knowledge is the very creative power
(nirmanasaktih) o f the Lord (Isituh), who knows thus.
- The fact that the various entities existing as subject and object of
knowledge are determined as differentiated from each other and from
Paramesvara (or from the self), is [due to] the creative power of
Paramesvara, who, yet, thus shines in absolute fullness, neither does his
own permanent form ever in any way cease to exist as a consequence of
this determination. - 8 -
156
n 2.1
C hapter n
157
II 2.2 2. In action etc. (tatra)5 there is one internal reality (antaram tat
tvam); this, once it has become the object of sensory knowledget becomes
manifold depending on place, time and the specific shapes it assumes.
- The essential reality (tattvam) - which is by nature absolutely un
divided (abhinnam eva) - becomes one and manifold because of the
division into internal and external manifestation6. [It becomes manifold]
because of the multiplicity of the manifestations of the individual realities
(°svalaksana°), constitued as they are by the different combinations of
external manifestations such as place, time, shape. - 2 -
5 The vrtti does not indicate the interpretation to be given of the word tatra.
Abh. in his two commentaries suggests three interpretations that he considers equal
ly possible: ‘in action etc.’, ‘given the reality of action etc.’, ‘as regards the unity and
multiplicity of action etc.’. The p k a , from which Abh. quotes the expression evam
sati (probably referring to tatra) glossed with vidyamane kriyadau tadgate ca
satyatve (IPVV III p. 45), seems to indicate the second interpretation.
6 A reality, when it is completely identified with consciousness, in other words,
when it is only consciousness (cinmatrataya), may not even strictly be referred to
as one since the unity-multiplicity opposition only arises at a later stage. This is seen
from the vrtti, from its paraphrase in IPVV (see text note 36) and from what Abh.
states a few lines earlier in IPVV III p. 45 mlddinam bhdvanam param arthikam y a d
antaram samvinmatralak$anam tattvam, tatra na kaland kacid abhedaghanat\fad
ekataya api tatra abhdvdl. The karika and the vrtti become clearer once various
levels of meaning have been recognized in the word antaram. The primary mean
ing o f antaram is the absolute reality identified with the I; it coincides with the first
of the two types of antaram spoken of in IPVV II p. 416 (antaratvam dvidha ahan-
taya sapiskdrataya ca), later articulated (pp. 416-417) and dislocated along the scale
o f the principles (the highest antaratvam corresponds to the plane o f Paramesvara);
it is called abhinnam in the vrtti. This absolute antaratvam constitutes the ultimate
foundation from which unity and multiplicity come into being on the phenomenal
level. Unity is understood as a relative antaratvam, which may be taken in more
than one way (see IPVV III p. 45 yat tit antaram abhdsdntardnamisram antarahgam,
antaram ca antahkaranamatravedyam tatrvam ekam, tad ekam), and multiplicity is
knowability on the part o f the external senses, temporality, spatiality etc. Thus it be
comes one-many (ekanekam).
7 This is apparently the meaning indicated by TPV II pp. 43-44, aindriyake nir-
vikalpake ... / pascadbhavinam vyavasdyam ni&caydtmakam vikalpakam anuvyavasdya-
sabdavdcyam. According to IPVV III p. 46 anuvyavasaya is the mental operation
that occurs after the determinate awareness of the direct experience {anuvyavasayam
sdksatkaravimarsasya pascadbhavinam vimarsam ...). In any case, the term is not
used here in the particular sense attributed to it in the Nyaya.
158
elaborations such as action and so on, which are based on these two8 II 2.3
and substantiated by the activity o f the knowing subject9.
- The conceptual elaborations such as action etc., carried out by the
mind (manasyah) and regarding both the external and internal plane -
the mind being half way between them - are essentially the activity of
the knowing subject (pramdtrvydpararupah). - 3 -
8 I.e. ‘on the external and internal plane’ (according to the vrtti), ‘on unity and
multiplicity’ (according to Abh.). The two interpretations are equivalent in the light
of the preceding karikd.
9 As Abh. clarifies very well in the introduction to this stanza in his com m en
taries, Utp.’s intention here is to reply to the objection that might be raised by a
Buddhist: these conceptual elaborations - which is what they are - do not take place
at the time of the direct perception but later, when any contact with reality is
precluded; therefore they are, in the absolute sense, unreal. In Utp.’s reply it is the
continuity and dynamism of the I that guarantees the contact between these two m o
ments of time, thus legitimating the working of the mind.
10 The absolute difference and self-containment of things, which is one of the
pivots o f Buddhist doctrine and the school of Dignaga in particular, finds its most
well-known and rigorous expression in PV I 40ab (later taken up again in PVin; see
Steinkellner 1973: I, 40-41) sarve bhavah svabhavena svasvabhavavyavasthiteh-.t.-
11 The two terms of the servant-king relation have an autonomous reality on the
external level, but they cease to be separate once they are linked in the conscious
ness of the knowing subject. This does not mean that they become one, because in
that case it would no longer be a relation: there is unification in separation
{bhedabheda).
159
II 2.5 configuration of cow and by the configuration of a particular man seen
as a whole, and the multiplicity of manifestations typical of the individual
realities (svalaksana°) and the various parts12. - 5 -
160
n 3.1-2
C h a p ter III
161
II 3.1-2 another means of knowledge4. The object of such knowledge - which is
an activity of the subject [pramatrvyaparah) - is that entity which is
162
manifested to the consciousness, taken separately5, as a universal6, 3.1-2
devoid of spatial differentiations etc., denoted by a single word in con
formity with the specific reflective awareness (vimarsabhedanusari°) and
endowed with its own causal efficiency (svakarthakriyaprapte). — 1-2 —
163
II 3.3 there are different manifestations depending on the will, practical require
ment, and experience of the subject8. - 3 —
To elaborate:
4-5. Just as the various manifestations are differentiated as 'long\
Wound,'talF, 'm a d ,4smoke\ 4made o f sandalwood1 and so on, without this
entailing a spatial-temporal differentiation, so one also has various dis
tinct manifestations such as 'being1, 'jar1, 'individual substance1, 'made o f
gold\ 'shining1 and so on; each has its own separate efficiency. They are
the object o f the word.
- Given an object unitary in itself9, for example a jar, depending on
how a subject regards it (avadhitsavasat) what appears to him may be
the lenght, or the triangular, circular etc. shape. What appears of a man*
may only be his ‘being erected’ if the subject is only looking for a
reference point, or a shelter, or shade. ‘Man’ as such, however, appears
to those who regard him entirely (nyaksena)9a, seeking the services that
crete realities that may not be strictly reduced to anything other than temselves (as
in the context o f Dharmaklrti’s argumentation), and to account for the synthesization
o f a group of distinct abhasas in the apparent unity of the object which confronts
us in practical reality (as in the context o f Utp.’s argumentation). The expression
ekapratyavamarsa may be understood either as ‘single, same reflective awareness*
concerning different things, which, owing to this, are assumed as being one (cf.
PVSV p. 41 ekam ekakaram pratyabhijnanam commenting on ekapratyavamarSa° v.
73a); and as ‘reflective awareness of things as being one* (ekatvena pratyavam arsah).
The meaning is basically the same. Utp. and Abh. use this expression in both senses.
8 Here, too, there is an evident reference to a remark made by Dharmaklrti (PV
1.58 and vrtti), according to whom a thing that appears to perception as an undif
ferentiated entity is in fact grasped at the moment o f determinate knowledge, depend
ing on which o f its components the subject is inclined to foreground (a female body
may be seen as an object of desire, a corpse, something to eat; a person may at
times be seen as a father and at times as a teacher). A similar remark had already
been made by Bhartrhari (VP m .8 .6 4 acaryo matulaS ceti yathaiko vyapadisyate /
satpbandhibhedad arthdlma sa vidhih paktibhavayoh II). See also PVSV p. 41 evam
SimSapadayo’p i bhedah [...] janayanti any dip va yathapratyayarp dahanagrhadikarp
katfhasadhydm arihakriyam .
9 I.e. a svalak?ana (see the previous karika). The multiplicity o f manifestations
does not entail the loss of the object’s individuality, the object being a collection o f
abhasas, distinguished by a particular collocation in space and time and by a specific
form (akara).
9a On the meaning of this uncommon word cf. Vrsabhadeva’s Paddhati on VP
1.3 (p. 20) nyaksena iti abhimukhyena kartsnyena va (Abhyankar-Limaye 1965: VII
n. 4).
164
are peculiar to him. To some [smoke] appears as merely smoke, in its II 3.4-5
general form (<dhumamatram eva)\ on the contrary, those who are familiar
with it (tadvidas tu) grasp its specific aspect, for example, that it is the
smoke from burning leaves, just as an expert is able to grasp the par
ticular features of stones, silver etc. (manirupyadivisesa) and so on10.
However, the object that is manifested with these distinctions is not dif
ferentiated as regards space and time. Thus for the object ‘jar’ there is
the manifestation ‘being’ - which is in itself different [from the specific
manifestation ‘jar’ etc.] - common to all the countless other objects such
as cloth etc. and the cause of specific effects such as the determinate
awareness ‘is, exists’ which is produced by the mere fact of existing; still,
as regards the jar, there may be the manifestation ‘ja f known by the inner
and outer senses and common to every object with a broad base and bul
bous shape, and different from the other manifestations, i.e. absent in
cloth etc.; or yet another, ‘made of gold’, absent in clay jars etc. This
manifestation becomes the object of sensory experience depending on the
subject’s practical requirement and so on11. Each of these manifestations
is referred to for the practical purposes of communication, by those who
aim at obtaining this or that determinate result, with a single word: the
word ‘jar’ refers to the manifestation ‘jar’ and not to ‘being’ or ‘made of
gold’12. The manifestation ‘Caitra’ common to the different stages of
165
II 3.4-5 childhood etc. is devoid of place and so on; and what has been said
above applies to this, too. Thus causal efficiency is differentiated [for
every abhasa], - 4-5 -
tasya vastunah kaScid bhago gam yate, quoted in PVSV p. 62). As Dharmaklrti points
out in a subsequent passage, this does not mean that a thing has ‘parts’ (PV I.135ab
ekatvad vasturupasya bhinnarupa matih kutah), but only that it appears as associated
with various causes o f error concerning its nature; a word serves to remove one of
these causes (PVSV p. 64 tatraiva ca te sabdas tais tair bhrantikaranaih
sam srstarupa ivabhati yathasam ketam vicchedaya vyapriyante; cf. PV 1.50-51).
Dignaga’s statement quoted above is closely related, also in its formulation, to the
one found at the beginning of the PS (I.5ab): dharm ino ’nekarupasya nendriyat
san>atha gatih. They are like the two faces o f a coin. And similarly Dharmaklrti
explains the right way in which this assumed multiplicity of aspects and properties
is to be understood (PV m .23 1 ; cf. Hattori 1977: 52). See also Torella 1992: 333-
35.
13 The kdrikd hinges on the ambiguity of the expression niyatarthakriya, which
belongs simultaneously to both parts o f the sentence, with a different orientation of
meaning. At least this is the interpretation that Abh. gives in IPV and IPVV: things
have a multiplicity of arthakriyas, each one of which is inherent in every abhasa
that composes them; things, however (punah), also have a unity (and also a unitary
arthakriya), due to the predominance of one abhasa over the others and therefore
to their appearing according to a sameness of substratum.
14 The ultimate intention of this stanza is therefore, as I understand it, to res
tate the reality of the unity of the thing which the analysis carried out in the previous
stanzas had, in a sense, denied. The meaning of the sentence seems to coincide with
that o f Abh.’s avataranika to the stanza (IPV II p. 101 nanu evam pratyabhasam
eva vastutve eko ghatatm a na vastu syat; IPVV III p. 113 nanu evam eko ’rtho gha-
tatvalohitatvadyatmd na vastu bhavet, bhavati).
166
7. As in the case of the distinct rays of light in a torch and of the II 3.7
currents in the sea, so in manifestations that are not in contrast with
each other the notion of unity (aikyadhlhj is produced by their appear
ing as unitaiy entities (ekakaryaj.
- The individual rays of light in a torch appear as an undifferentiated
whole and the same holds for the currents of rivers in the notion of the
sea and for the various flavours in the panaka. Similarly, manifestations
such as ‘white’, ‘big’, ‘cloth’, capable as they are of interpenetrating, lend
themselves to the manifestation, in the direct experience itself, of the
various unitary things having a single, unitary, effect (tattadeka-
karyaikadravya°)]S. The same does not happen in the case of other
15 The very elliptical expression used in the karika (ekakarya, literally ‘produced
by one’) is analyzed by Abh. (IPV II pp. 106-7, IPVV III pp. 116-7) in its various
possible implications, which are substantially analogous to those succinctly indicated
in the vrtti. W hen one sees a unitary effect that cannot be traced back to the in
dividual components of a given aggregate, this proves that they form a new com
plex unity (ekam vastu, svalaksana). The vrtti says that certain manifestations,
characterized by mutual compatibility, may give rise to ekakarya (= ekakriya) -
namely to a unitary effect - and to ekadravya (= ekavastu, svalaksana) - namely to
their appearing as a unitary and individual reality; the notion of their unity is
produced by this. One must, however, remem ber that the individual abhasas con
tinue to keep their own specific identity and causal efficiency intact, ready to come
to the fore again depending on the attitude of the knowing subject. Ekakarya0 may
also be understood as internal bahuvrlhi referring to °ekadravya°: ‘of a unitary sub
stance with a unitary effect’. In this way the expression would be used in the same
sense in which it is understood, in an analogous context, by the Buddhist logicians
(to attribute unity to different entities on the grounds that they produce the same
single effect). Dharmaklrti, too, - as we have seen - makes the (illusory) non-dif
ference o f determinate entities derive from their producing a single effect - hence
the concept of sam anya (PVSV p. 57 ekakaryataiva bhavdnam abhedah). (A
somewhat parallel question is to be found in the capacity of a causal complex
(.hetusamagrT) to produce a single effect though being composed o f many different
causes to which Dharmaklrti does not acknowledge a common svabhava; see Stein-
kellner 1971: 184-88). Cf. also TS 2 0 lab ekakaryopayogitvad ekaiabdasya gocarah.
The reference to TSP p. 59 seems even more pertinent. Here Kamalasila (probably
bearing in mind PVSV p. 68) states that ordinary experience groups together data
that are completely heterogeneous and separate, such as a certain shape, colour etc.,
on the basis of their concurring to carry out a single function (e.g. that of contain
ing water), constructing in this way the unity of a ‘thing’ (e.g. the jar): ta eva
riipadayah saliladidharanarthakriyakarinah samudayo ghata id vyapadifyante. Return
ing to our text, it may be added that ekakarya0 in the vrtti definitely has a different
meaning from ekakarya in the karika: the expression is to be understood as a par
tial comment on eka° alone.
167
II 3.7 manifestations such as ‘blue’, ‘yellow’ etc. This is what we call ‘having
the same substratum’. - 7 -
168
that starts at that moment21 in the subject who aims at producing cer- II 3.9
tain effects, as regards a particular, individual object, differentiated by
various, specific sensations o f place etc. (desâdikâdhyaksântarabhinne)22,
and also [in the case o f that activity promoted] by inference.
- On the contrary, the bodily activity of a person (kâyapravrttih)23,
that may concern only the particular object in association with a whole
variety of perceptions (of place, time etc.), necessarily depends on the
concourse of several cognitive acts (pramânasamûhâd eva). This activity
may also be promoted by inference, qualified, of course, by the direct
perception of the property-possessor (dharmi°). — 9 -
for the knowledge o f the same svalaksana a single means (with svasam vedana) is
sufficient. This distinction corresponds to that between mere knowing and vyavahâra.
{Pramàna, as I have already pointed out, may be translated here as ‘cognitive act’;
it would be misleading to say ‘various means o f knowing’, as they may also be
various operations o f the same means - even if every pram àna is essentially new -).
The apparent contradiction is pointed out in ÎPV II p. 114, where three different
ways o f explaining it are proposed. As regards inference in particular, Abh. (IPVV
III p. 148) notes that the difference of the object, introducing a temporal differen
tiation, necessarily also brings about a difference in the nature o f the pram ânas;
indeed, it is not possible to say that the direct perception through which the dhar-
min is known is one with the inference itself, which knows the fire, in the classical
example, only indirectly through the linga.
21 At the moment when the cognition of the svalaksana occurs.
22 Abh. puts forward three distinct interpretations o f the compound. In the first
(following the order in I P W ) taking bhinne as a neuter substantivized adjective (=
bhede), one gets ‘there being a variety of perceptions’, where the locative is taken
to mean cause (nimittasaptaml); the need for a plurality o f pram ânas stated in the
commentaries depends on this. As Abh. notes, the second ‘the svalaksana being dif
ferentiated by perceptions of time etc.* coincides basically with the first; this is also
the meaning attributed to it by the vrtti. As regards the third interpretation ‘the
svalaksana constituting - though combined with perceptions of space etc. - an un
differentiated reality within the knowing subject’ (adhyaksa-antar-abhinne) - this
seems traceable only to Abh..
23 And, one understands, also the other two types of activity, that o f the mind
and o f the word.
169
II 3.10-11 (Tnukhyavabhasatah) consisting in a single reflective awareness (eka-
praty avamarsakhy at )24.
- Even if there may be a differentiation in the particular forms of the
manifestation (i.e. as regards whether the objects are near or far etc., evi
dent or not evident etc., external or internal), the unity of the objects is
not contradicted, because there is a single reflective awareness forming
the primary nature of the various particular manifestations25. - 10-11 -
170
13. Even if the reflective awareness of silver is one, this awareness II 3.13
‘silver’ referring to mother-of-pearl is not valid, since there is incongru
ence27 as regards the place, which has a qualifying function [in the
cognition] (upâdhidesâsamvâdât); also in the case of the double moon
the ether appears differently.
- Even if the cognitions as ‘silver’ of real silver and of mother-of-
pearl are in themselves equally real, insofar as in them the reflective
awareness ‘silver’ [on which its validity is based] is the same, however
the cognition ‘this is (here there is) silver’ referring to mother-of-pearl is
to be considered erroneous because of its impermanence (<asthairyât),
since it is not congruent as regards the accessory quality - place - , as
its connection with the place occupied by mother-of-pearl is later found
to be contradicted. Also in the case of seeing a double moon there is no
congruence as regards the place, occupied in this instance by the ether28.
- 13 -
171
II 3.14 14. Thus, both the differentiation o f things - due to qualities such as
sound and so on - and their non-differentiation - due to universals etc.
(jatyadibhih)29 - are possible on the basis of the unity of the knowing
subject.
- It is a fact of direct experience that qualities such as sound, form,
configuration and so on, suggest30 the differentiation of things and
universals etc. their unity: this is admissible only if the unity of the sub
ject is assumed. The determination of mutual differentiation also depends
on the unifying function [of the knowing subject]. - 14 -
172
sible in their multiformity insofar as the subject is stable. His volition II 3.15-16
makes the various objects that are manifest in reality, without lapsing
from their own nature of which he is the ultimate essence (tatsara-
svarupabhramse), appear and disappear by virtue of the power of maya.
In reality he alone possesses perpetual existence (satta) independently of
every other thing, since it would be contradictory to associate any form
of non-existence (previous non-existence, non-existence due to destruc
tion etc.) with him. Even if he is taught in terms of being and non-be
ing, nonetheless his nature as subject remains unaltered, since the teach
ing would be impossible there not being he who wishes to teach32. - 15-
16 -
17. [What in reality happens] is only that the use in practical reality
o f notions and expressions (°vyavaharah>) like ‘Lord’ etc., which due to
the condition o f obfuscation was not brought about earlier (apravar-
titapurvah), is promoted through the bringing to light o f the powers33.
173
II 3.17 - Only, the use in practical reality of notions and expressions like
‘Siva’, ‘Lord’ etc. referring to our self which is the knowing subject -
which was not brought about due to the total obfuscation caused by maya
- is established (sadhyate) for the purpose of teaching, meditation etc.
through bringing to light the reasons that justify it, i.e. the presence in
the I of the pure power of freedom etc. - 17 -
sadhanarupah, thus leaving the basic self-illuminating quality of his object intact.
This is what the sacred texts on the knowledge of the Self - the Vedanta, the Sid-
dhanta and the secret tantras - aim at (IPVV III p. 179 yavanti hi dtmajhanasdstrani
srutyantasiddhantarahasyatantrarupdni, tani atmani naiva siddhim apurvanlpam
racayanti / tasmat vyavahdramatrasadhanaphaldni eva tanlti bhavah).
174
II 4.1
C hapter IV
1. And thus, his power being infinite, he makes those things' manifest
thanks to his volition; and this constitutes his activity, his being creator
(nirmátrtáj.
- The knowing subject, that is essentially consciousness, having in
finite power, the Lord, by means of his volition makes those entities
manifest in this way. And it is precisely in this power of volition
(icchdsaktih) that his activity, that is, his being creator, consists. - 1 -
1 By ‘those things* Utp., according to Abh. (IPV II p. 152), means that the Lord
makes manifest what he had already previously manifested. His work of manifesta
tion is therefore continuous: it does not take place only once and it is uninterrupted
(iavicchinnena prabandhena).
2 The examination o f the relation of cause and effect begins with the statement
o f the Saiva position and the whole chapter is devoted to justifying this.
3 In the IPV (and similarly in the IPVV) Abh. proposes three distinct interpreta
tions of asatah satah. According to the one at the beginning of the Vimarsini (IPV
II p. 153) we have ankurasya sato 'sato va, with reference therefore to the tdrkika
(Vaise$ika) and Sarpkhya positions regarding the existence of the effect in the cause,
which is denied by the former and accepted by the latter (in the IPVV III p. 186
bljasyaiva seems to have to be corrected to ahkurasyaiva). The second is asadrupa-
sya satah (ankurasya), which may therefore be traced to the interpretation in the
vrtti. The third is asato ankurasya sato vd bljasya.
175
II 4.3-4 would the existent gain any advantage from obtaining existence [which
it already possesses]. If one then points out that in practical reality there
is general consensus on the existence o f the relation o f cause and effect,
[then one replies that] it consists in the fact that a thing, that is inter
nally present4 (antarviparivartinah), becomes, by virtue o f the power of
that indefinable Being (tasya kasyapi), the object of knowledge for both
senses.
- Attributing the nature of existent to what does not exist is con
tradictory, and it is already established in what exists. [The relation of
cause and effect consists in this:] a thing, already present within [the I],
is ‘created’ by the Lord, or in other words, is caused by him to become
the object of knowledge for the internal and external senses. —3-4 -
176
since it is recognized as being one by reflective awareness (<aikyena II 4.5
pratyavamrsyasya), despite the manifold changeable forms of the
manifestation. And it is precisely on the basis of this fact - i.e. that its
substratum is unitary - that its unity is proved. - 5 -
The action of creating (nirmanakriya) - Abh. explains (IPVV III p. 190) - concerning
an object which has the cognizer as its ultimate essence, is at the same time kartrstha
and karmastha.
7a See text note 170.
8 Abh. gives a different interpretation (IPV II p. 162): «... since the knowing
subject is the cause of the twofold, external and internal, manifestation of the e f f e c t...».
9 Here and elsewhere eka means both ‘unitary' and ‘one, single’.
177
n 4.8 cause may be exclusively attribued to the conscious being. For this
reason some consider the Lord efficient cause1°, but in so doing they be
come inconsistent in considering inert and insentient realities - such as
the seed etc. - which have no intentionality (niranusamdhanasya) n also
causes. - 8 -
178
10. The various things (tattat,), ja r etc., - lasting and able to fulfil II 4.10
the functions that are natural to them ('sthirasvarthakriyakaram)14 - may
also be produced by virtue of the volition of the yogins alone15, without
the need fo r clay or seed.
- By virtue of the volition of the yogins alone, without recourse to
clay etc., things such as the jar may be produced, that endure and are
capable of fulfilling the functions of the jar and so on. - 10 -
has to carry out etc. - depends. The potter's creativity must necessarily be seen
within the creativity of the Lord, otherwise one would not understand how clay etc.,
insentient as they are, can obey the craftsman’s will. See also §D I. 44-45ab and vrtti.
14 My translation conforms to the vrtti. Abh., though aware of the precise in
dications in the vrtti (ÏPVV III pp. 194-5 sthiram ca arthakriyâkaram ceti yojanâ
vrttikrtâ krta) takes tattat sthirasvârthakriyâkaram as a single compound (which thus
comes to mean ‘able to carry out lastingly the various forms of efficiency that are
natural to them’), claiming that his interpretation must also be considered admissible
(... iti sam âse ’pi na kascid dosah); we do not know if the fikâ authorized this type
o f construction. On the contrary, according to the vrtti, tattat is separate and refers
to ghatâdi and sthirârthakriyâkaram is to be understood as a karmadhâraya express
ing two qualifications of ghatâdi.
15 The example of the yogin [which occurs frequently in Indian philosophical
literature] was already to be found in the SD (see III. 34b-36a and Utp.’s vrtti, etc.).
See also above I. 5. 7.
16 The translation goes back to Abh.’s gloss (IPVV III p. 197 svabhâvo 'p i sva-
bhâvântaraniyato yo jâ ta s tatra utpattir eva kâryakâranabhâvâtmikâ mûlam. Cf. the
well-known passage from Dharmaklrti (PVSV p. 17) siddhas tu kâryakâranabhâvah
svabhâvam niyamayati.
17 Dharmaklrti, as we know, admits only two types of ‘essential connection’
(svabhâvapratibandha; see Steinkellner 1984) between things - or rather between
concepts identity (tâdâtm ya) and causality (tadutpatti). Therefore the only in
ference he considers valid is the one based on svabhâva (Steinkellner 1974, 1992)
- anupalabdhi also enters into its ambit (cf. Iwata 1992: 86-88) - , e.g. ‘this is a tree,
because it is a sim sapâ’ where the concepts are co-extensive, in that the one im-
179
II 4.11 reasons, if the certainty that this is not the creation of a yogin is lack
ing. However, even when this certainty exists, the status of logical reason
(hetuta) still depends on the necessity instituted by the Lord. - 11 -
plicilly embraces the other and refers to the same thing; or on karya, ‘there is fire
there, because there is smoke’. Utp. points out that the svabhavahetu, too, in the final
analysis emerges as being based on causality (tadutpattigarbha), given that the na
ture of a thing is that which is due to the causes that produced it (cf. above note).
Dharmaklrti had already expressed himself in similar terms (PVSV p. 99
salibljadinam api sa svabhdvah svahetor iti yo na taddhetuh so ’tatsvabhavah sya t;
PV I. 38 anvayavyatirekad yo yasya drpto *nuvartakah / svabhavas tasya taddhetur
ato bhinnan na sam bhavah II; cf. Steinkellner 1971: 188 notes 35 and 36). The
causal implication, as Abh. observes following the fika (IPVV III pp. 197 ff.), may
be evident to a greater or lesser degree. It is obvious when by virtue of the sva
bhavahetu ‘to be endowed with smoke’ one goes back to ‘to be endowed with fire’.
It is less evident, but equally present, in the case of ‘this is a tree, because it is a
SimSapa’; here it is, in fact, the cause o f the SimSapa - i.e. its seed - which infuses
it with the nature of tree {ibid. p. 202 SimSapabljasya visiytasya y d sunsapam prati
bljata SimSapakaranata, saiva vrksah'am tatra niveSayafiti; see also IPV II p. 175
svahetuta eva hi Simsapa vrksasvabhdvavyabhicarinl jatd\ and this cause that
produces the Simsapa as always united with vrksatva depends in turn on
Paramesvara’s power o f Necessity, iPV V III p. 200). It is therefore essential in each
case to establish at the outset that the smoke or the SimSapa in question are not
yogin creations. The inference based on svabhavahetu as conceived by Buddhists
and Saivas differs in that for the former it does not give rise, strictly speaking, to a
new and real knowledge. According to the Buddhist pram dna tradition, the very
relationship of gamya-gamaka between two essential properties is ultimately unreal,
just as is the distinction of a plurality o f properties within one thing. ‘All this
question o f inference and object to be inferred’ - Dignaga says in a famous passage
often quoted, in slightly different forms, by later authors (Randle 19262: 51-54; see
also PVSV pp. 2-3, IPVV III p. 200) - ‘depends on a differentiation between
property and property-possessor imposed by the mind, and does not concern the
actual external existence’. The difference between the two kinds of inference -
besides the operating of two concepts belonging to the same thing in the one case,
and to two distinct things in the other - would seem to lie in the fact that the
svabhavahetu can establish only vyavahara and not vastu ( N B J p. 106 tad ayam
arthah - vjksavyavahdro 'yam, SimSapdvyavaharayogyatvat). Abh., commenting on
the fika (IPVV III p. 213), distinguishes between vastu° , vastu\yavahara° and
Sabdavyavaharasadhana. In the Saiva view vrksatva and SimSapatva are two different
and in themselves completely autonomous dbhasas, set by the Lord in a relationship
o f samanadhikaranya but not necessarily present to consciousness at the same time.
Thus the status of the svabhavahetu, moving from a real entity towards an equally
real entity, com es to be, as it were, enhanced; as Abh. says (IPV II p. 180)
referring to the Buddhists, tasmat sairesu svabhavahetusv abhasabhedam vina
vyavaharamdtrasadhanam (ivyavahdramdtra, that is, Sabdavyavahara; IPVV III p.
213).
180
12-13. ISA new (nutanam) manifestation of smoke etc. derives from a II 4.12-13
manifestation o f fire etc. common to various other knowing subjects,
which, though not directly perceived at that moment, is its determining
condition (adhipatehj19. The effect, which is invariably concomitant with
18 These two stanzas respond to a twofold need. The first is the need to suc
ceed in explaining causality whilst remaining faithful to the equation âbhâsa=vastu
(how can one through inference determine the reality of a fire that is anâbhâta being
the cause o f smoke present here and now?). The second need is to obtain this result
by distancing oneself from the Vijnânavâdins, who, in maintaining that the âbhâsas
o f the cause and effect must belong to the same individual santâna, risk removing
every general value and therefore all practical importance from causality. The solu
tion proposed by Utp., according to how Abh. develops it, is the following. Some
subjects present in a certain place (e.g. the kitchen) grasp the relation of invariable
concomitance (vyâptigrahana) between fire and smoke, in general, but through the
observation of particular cases. Namely, they become one as regards these two
âbhâsas, or, in other words, there is a single âbhâsa Tire’ and a single âbliâsa ’smoke’
for all the subjects present. This identification is provided by the action of the Lord
him self through the power o f Necessity (niyatiÊakti), and here lies the fundamental
difference from the Vijnânavâdins. Later, one or more of these subjects finds him
self faced with a particular âbhâsa ‘smoke’ - thus present on his own mental con
tinuum (svasantânavartin) - and, remembering the previously established vyâpti,
goes back to a generic âbhâsa ‘fire’, which is immediately present to other subjects
(parasantânavartin): therefore at the moment of the inference the subjects involved
are found to be, by the very will of the Lord, unified as regards a particular smoke
and a generic fire. In the kârikâ bhüyah, understood in the vrtti as an adjective
referring to °pramâtr° (cf. vftti °pram âtrantara°), may also be taken separately as
an adverb. In this case it would mean ‘also later on’, i.e. also at a time subsequent
to the grasping o f the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, that is, at
the time when the inference is made (Bh II p. 185 blulyo ’p i na kevalam vyâptigra-
hanakâla eva api tu ànum ânakâle ’p i). This double interpretation o f bhüyah goes
back to the fikâ itself (cf. IPVV III p. 216).
19 O f the four pratyayas ‘causal conditions’ in the Sautrântika conception (as out
lined in SDS p. 85 te caivârah pratyayâh prasiddhâ âlambanasamanantarasaha-
kâryadhipatirüpâh ...) the adhipatipratyaya is the one most directly responsible for
the production and the specific nature of the effect (cf. M adhyamakavrtti p. 33 yas-
min sati y ad bhavati tat tasyâdhipateyam ity adhipatipratyayalakfanam ); for in
stance, it is the organ of sight that is the adhipatipratyaya o f the visual sensation,
in the presence o f a determinate object also able to arouse the sensations of taste,
smell etc. (SDS p. 86 caksuço ’dhipatipratyayâd visayagrahanapratiniyamah /
uditasya jnânasya rasâdisâdhâranye prâpte niyamakapi caksur adhipatir bhavitum
arhasi loke niyam akasyâdhipatitvopalambhât). In the AK the adhipatipratyaya is
included in a system (see II. 49-55a, 61 b-73) formed by six hetus and four pratyayas
- the other pratyayas are there hetu°, sam anantara0 and âlambana0 - (cf. de La
Vallée Poussin, 1923-31: I pp. 299-308; for different classifications inside the
181
II 4.12-13 the cause, is indicative flingamj o f the latter being there. On the con
trary, a manifestation of smoke different from the one we have spoken of
derives solely from the manifestation ‘smoke’ perceived by other subjects,
which takes on in this case the role of determining condition.
- The manifestation ‘smoke’ (in the distance etc.), which, though not
preceded by the direct presence of the manifestation ‘fire’, arises from the
manifestation ‘fire’ common to the various other knowing subjects in that
place and endowed with such causal power by the power of Necessity;
this manifestation ‘smoke’ is that which invariably makes known the ex
istence of this manifestation ‘fire’. On the contrary, that smoke which
derives from other smoke that already exists20 - the manifestation ‘fire’
now being completely extinct - , arises precisely from the manifestation
‘smoke’ present to the consciousness of various other subjects, which,
though not being directly perceived at that moment21 [by the subject who
makes the inference], is invested [by the Lord] with the role of deter
mining condition22, as we saw in the previous case. - 12-13 -
Buddhist tradition, id.: I p. 299 n. I; see also id. 1928-49: 448 ff. for the hetu-
pratyaya theory in the Vijnaptimâtralâ). The first hetit in the series (karana°) is
identified with the adhipatipratyaya. All dharmas can be kâranahetus (but not with
regard to themselves) in the general sense, in that they do not make obstacle to the
causal process; but there is a principal (pradhâna) kâranahetu which is that
responsible for the effective production of the effect - for example, sight or form for
the visual sensation or food for the body (AKBh p. 83; see also de La Vallée Poussin
1923-31: I pp. 247-248). The adhipatipratyaya in the kârikü therefore would
correspond to the pradhânakâranahetu. Actually, neither Utp. nor Abh. explain what
they exactly mean by adhipatipratyaya. In particular Abh. limits him self to point
ing out the character o f ‘being remote, out o f sight’ (ÏPV II p. 185 tasmât kâryât
so ’numlyate yatah parokso ’sâv adhipatitvâd eva, IPVV III p. 215 tac ca
vahnyâbhâsâdi yato ’numâtuh paroksam , tato ydhipatipratyaya ity ucyate, etc.). See
also n. 21.
20 The reference is to the smoke the shepherd puts into a leather bottle and lets
out later. The example, known as the gopcdaghatikâ, already occurred in $D V.67;
see also Karnakagomin’s commentary on the PVSV p. 99.
21 The adhipatipratyaya must necessarily belong to a different (earlier) time
from that o f the effect (cf. AKBh p. 84, where there is an exposition of the
Saulrantika criticism of the Sarvàstivàdins, supporters of the relation o f causality bet
ween co-existent dharmas\ see also PV III.246). And, on the other hand, if it were
not paroksa , it would be the object of direct perception and there would be no need
to resort to inference.
22 Each of the elements that enter into the relation of causality plays a role, that
does not directly derive from or coincide with its own nature (as in the Buddhist
182
14. Also the relation o f cause and effect conceived as ‘there being II 4.14
this, this other is produced fasmin safidam astij23 is not admissible for
realities that are insentient and as such incapable of ‘requiring’
(apeksa0)24.
- A fixed temporal succession of antecedent-consequent, which is ex
pressed in the formulation ‘there being this, this other is produced’, also
occurs between things that have no causal connections, such as for in
stance the rising in the firmament of the constellations of the Krttikâs
and Rohinl25. The relation of cause and effect should therefore be formu
lated thus: ‘there being the causal power of the thing that precedes, there
is the existence of the one that follows’. But this is not possible for in
sentient realities incapable of requiring26. And even if we understand the
meaning of the formula as ‘the causal power of the precedent constitutes
the existence of the consequent’, in this way, too, virtually nothing is
said; neither can the own nature, characterized by the causal power, of
the preceding element appear as the existence of the following one. - 14 -
183
II 4.15 15. In fact the meaning o f the locative case may not be applied to
self-contained entities, incapable of intentionality (anusamdhana0),
whether [cause and effect] are considered existent or non-existent.
- Effect and also cause may be understood as existent or as non-exis
tent; but, whatever the case, they still remain insentient realities, self-con
tained and lacking intentionality, whose being is independent of other en
tities. And it is for this reason that the meaning expressed by the endings
of the subordinate cases27, whose essence is precisely its dependence on
a predominant element, is not applicable to them. - 15 -
16. On the basis of what has been said the only logically admissible
relation between things is to be found in the meaning o f the case en
dings, which consists in a relation between the action and the factors of
the action (kriyakaraka0) and has as its only foundation the knowing sub-
ject28.
27 All the cases are subordinate - excluding, o f course, the nominative which is
by definition svatantra - (IPVV III p. 231 dvifiyadayo); the kartr presides over and
promotes the carrying out of the individual functions of the various karakas and they
all bring about the main action expressed by the verb. But subordination itself
presupposes a conscious dynamism, an intentionality which everything that is con
ceived as jada, as confined in itself, cannot possess, as well as a capacity for unifica
tion, for establishing relations, which is all expressed in the single word,
anusamdhana, in all its concentration of meanings. However one wishes to conceive
this dependence (we have seen that, following the Cika, Abh. has distinguished two
types, anyonyalagnatarilpa and abhiprayarilpa), it is precluded from inert and insen
tient realities. Utp. returns to this subject and develops it further in the SSVr (p. 2):
na hi jadayoh sam bandhinor apekparlho ghatate paratantryartho va / athapy ahkura
eva bijam apek$ate blje va para tan tro bhavati, tadayattvades tadatm alabhasyety etad
api na samyak; upacaro hy ay am apek$ata iva paratantra iveti syat, na tu jadasya
mukhyaivakarik$a prarthana cecchaiva visista apeksa paratantryam va parapravan-
ata paraklyaviniyogakarikfa svecchacarananirodhalaksanah samkalpavisesa eva
samgacchate, alabdhatm anas catmalabhartham apeksadi kathyate. If the Buddhist
premises are accepted - Abh. concludes (IPVV 111 p. 231) - the relation of cause
and effect therefore remains inexplicable, seeing that however one puts it - blje sati
ahkuro, bijad arikuro ’hkurasya bijam etc. - no formulation stands up to a logical
examination, as there is no room for assuming the role itself of karaka.
28 This concept is already formulated in substantially the same terms in §D IV.
32ab vinaikatvam ca na bhavet karakatvam kadacana; Utp. gives a very succinct com
mentary on this, referring the reader to the IPK (and commentaries) for a more ex
tensive treatment o f the subject: ghatades ca yad etat svakaryakaranam bhavadbhir
isyate tac cidekarilpatvam vina na syat / jadasya nirabhisamdheh karanayogad ity
etad api Isvarapratyabhijhayam evoktam.
184
- The connection between earth, seed, water and so on is correctly II 4.16
understood as the meaning of the case endings consisting in a relation
between verbal action and the factors of the action, depending on a single
subject, and is not to be identified with some other type of ‘dry’ (suska)29
connection such as that of cause and effect. - 16 -
17. Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one anothers
veiy nature, merely the unity of the two is obtained, fo r if there were any
distinction it could not be said that they have the same nature30.
- Even if it is maintained that cause and effect have one another’s
form, the only result would be that they are a single thing and not that
they constitute a relation. - 17 -
185
II 4.19 tion. On the contrary, it is possible in the case of a conscious unitary
reality.
- This is not possible for an insentient reality, because its nature
which is single would conflict with its appearing in differentiated forms.
On the contrary, it is possible for an absolutely limpid (svacche), unitary,
conscious reality, because there is no conflict here between its unity and
its capacity to receive manifold reflections32. - 19 -
186
this conscious principle. If, however, it renders externally manifest II 4.20
through an act of determinate thought combined with a desire to act in
this way, then action is possible35. On the other hand, an insentient reality
cannot even be the agent of the action of being - ‘it exists, is’ - since it
does not possess the freedom that is manifested through ‘wanting to be’
(bubhusayogena)36. Thus the ultimate truth in this regard is that the
knowing subject, and he alone, ‘causes’ the insentient reality ‘to be’
(bhavayati), or, in other words, appears in various forms such as mount
Himacala and so on. - 20 -
21. Therefore causality, agency, action are nothing but the will o f him
who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various
manifestations o f jar, cloth and so on.
- The very will of him who is free and has consciousness as his na
ture to appear as universe constitutes his being cause as regards the
universe, in the form of agency; and this is the power of Action. In this
way action in the primary sense (mukhya) - i.e. the desire to act -
belongs uniquely to the agent, one, whose essence is consciousness.
says (IPV II p. 205), action, which is single, could not be the svabhava o f two things,
if these were utterly different form one another. This moment of unity occurs in the
first attempt towards action (<ciklrsa), when the object is still completely immersed
in the I. It must be pointed out that Abh.’s commentaries give three or four different
interpretations o f the karika, according to whether abhasabhinnayoh is made to
depend on ciklrsa, param arsa or kriya respectively; however, these interpretations
are not incompatible and, on the contrary, broaden the implications of the meaning
as a whole.
35 Action, Abh. explains, following the fika (see text note 207), is the ‘rendering
manifest’ (abhasana), whose essential feature is constituted by the very first impulse
o f thought and will to act (param arta - ciklrsa or iccha) which already contains in
embryo the future manifestation and extemalization (cf. SD I. 19-20a and vrtti).
36 A certain action may be attributed to an insentient reality (§DV r p. 159 ghato
’rthakriyam udakaharanadikam karoti), only in a figurative sense; strictly speaking
it would not be permissible even to say that it ‘is’, unless one takes into account that
this satta that practical experience ascribes to it is in reality sivatakhya; see above,
Introduction pp. XV-XVI. This point is developed by Utp. in the vrtti on SD IV.
32b-33a, where Somananda solves in the same terms the problem of the attribution
in discourse of the qualification of karaka (and thus of case endings) to entities that
are by definition non-existent, such as the antelope’s horn etc. Bhartrhari would have
faced the problem by referring to the distinction between mukhyasatta and vastvartha,
on the one hand, and upacarasatta and sabdartha, on the other. On the related
question whether (kdrakas') agency presupposes animation see Cardona 1974.
187
II 4.21 There is no object of action without an agent; action, in fact, is attributed
to the object etc. only in a figurative sense, through the agent37. - 21 -
37 All the other karakas may even be absent from the sentence, but the presence
o f the subject is enough to ensure the carrying out of the verbal action, and, vice
versa, even if all the other karakas are present the absence of the subject alone makes
the action impossible (IPVV ITT p. 253; cf. VP III. 7. 101-2 and Helaraja’s com m en
tary). Cf. SPr II. 54 prakasate sam vid eka tadanyat tu prakasyate / prakasyam ca
bhavet karma tac ca kartra vina katham II «Consciousness alone shines; that which
is other from it is illuminated. What is illuminated is the object, and how can the
object subsist without a subject?».
188
m i.i
C h apter I
1 This is the sense that is expressly indicated by Abh. (IPVV III p. 257).
2 This knowing subject is, first and foremost, the supreme knowing subject,
Paramesvara, but also every limited subject, insofar as Siva is his model and ul
timate essence. What the karika expounds is therefore the iivatatn>a (IPVV III p.
258 sivatatwalaksanasya parapram atur); all the tattvas, from Sadasiva and Isvara
(see the following karika) are his modes of being, or so-to-speak internal modifica
tions, he is the sole reality (ibid. p. 257 sivatattvarp hi sarvapadarthdnarp vapuh, p.
263 sivatattvam eva ekani vastusat). Utp. does not place this supreme reality (called
Isitr in the following karika) beyond the scale of the tatWas, but at the top of it, as
the union between siva and sakti. His powers are absolutely pure (cf. above 1.8.11)
in that they are without object. If at the pati level the subject sees the world as his
own body (III.2.3, IV. 1.4), at the param apati level we cannot even speak of the
knowable (IPVV III p. 367 param apatau tu bhagavati pram eyakathaiva na asti, ibid.
p. 266 na ca iiva pade visvam kincit). All the universe is completely dissolved into
the 1; sivata is precisely the plane where only the T exists. At various points in the
SD Vr a (not constant) distinction is made between Siva on the one hand and
Paramasiva (or Paramesvara) on the other seen as the all-inclusive form (p. 3); el
sewhere (p. 27) the God is expressly said to assume the form of the thirty-six prin
ciples, all indistinctly understood as karya (... tattvanlpam sattrimsattattvasarpkhyam
karyam rupena bibharti). It must be borne in mind, however, that what Utp. primari
ly intends to do in this work is to render explicit the teaching of his master
Somananda. Bhaskara (Bh II p. 211 ff.) distinguishes between prakriyasdstra (IPK
is one of these), whose aim is to describe the nature o f the tattvas (tattva-
svanlpakathana), and sdraiastra (e.g. the M alinlvijaya), devoted to the teaching of
the supreme non-duality. According to the latter, within Sadasiva - since it has the
nature of i antabrahman - there is not a full contact with Sakti; thus Sakti is posited
as a separate principle (the thirty-fifth) above Sadasiva and is to be united with Siva
(the thirty-sixth) distinct from Sadasiva. Though in reality Siva and Paramasiva are
one single thing, Anasritasiva refers to his specific nature (svarupanirdesa) and
Parasiva refers to his pervading the whole scale of principles. However it is not
189
m 1.1 - Action, subject to temporal succession, is nothing but extemaliza-
tion; it pertains to the knowing subject, the self, which resides within.
Thus cognition and action are mutually inseparable in him. - 1 -
190
- Isvara and Sadasiva are respectively opening outwards and closing m 1.3
inwards, the condition of externality and intemality. Pure Science (sud-
dhavidya) is the plane of him who, having all things as his essence,
thinks ‘I am this universe’, where the two terms have the same substratum
(sdmdnadhikaranyena)1, without any differentiation between external and
internal, cognizable object and cognizing subject, both resting on the sole
reality which is pure consciousness. - 3 -
191
Ill 1.5 5. Here9 there is imperfection (aparatvam) on the one hand - because
things are manifested as other than the self - , perfection (parata) on the
other - because they are veiled by the 1. This is in fact the perfect-imper
fect state (paraparadasa).
- Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of ‘this’, per
fection because all the cognizable is veiled by the I 10: this is therefore
the perfect-imperfect condition. — 5 -
in the sense that it ‘know s’, is aware of, all forms of cognition (X.5 sasannafiva
satatam sarvangalingane ksama / na tatha prakrfi buddhir bahiranga yatas tu sa //).
However, Vidya is bound to the limited human condition (X.20a paurusam bhavam
aSritya), and, as such, it illuminates the ordinary cognizable reality (X.15b vedyar-
thapratipadika) but it cannot reveal the highest principles (X.20d na i ivarthapra-
da yika). This task pertains to Suddhavidya, which transcends the plane o f m aya
but acts on the plane of the limited subject, since it is only in him - not in the
akala subject and still less in the mukia - , in his consciousness, that the whole
universal deployment, from the lowest plane, is the object of knowledge (X.23
sivadyavaniparyanto yo 'yam adhvativistrtah / sa sarvai ca citau jiieyo nasivatvad
vimucyate II).
9 Or in other words, as Abh. comments (IPV II p. 227), ‘in the two principles
(Bh: Sadasiva and Isvara)’.
10 Cf. IPVV III p. 274 aparatvam apurnata anyakanksitvam idam iti, p a r a tv am
purnatvam aham iti.
11 According to a conception that Utp. does not present as his own (Abh., TPV
II p. 228, attributes it to the R auravagam a), Suddhavidya is the principle in which
differentiation appears, restricted, however, only to the sphere of the object: the
subject, in other words, without declining from its own total absorption in pure
consciousness (therefore no identification with a mind, body etc.) regards the o b
ject as other than himself. It is the condition of the Vidyesvaras - which we will
return to later - who, omniscient and omnipotent, face a reality considered other
than themselves. It may be added, again on the basis of Abh., that what differen
tiates this conception from that of the preceding karika is that there Vidya
represents in the sphere o f the consciousness ‘I-this’ the predom inance o f the I
which veils the ‘this’; whereas here it is the predominance o f ‘this’ veiled by the
I. The introduction of differentiation determines a certain assimilation with mayS
(the Raurava and other texts in fact call Suddhavidya also by the name of
Mahamaya); cf. R auravagam a, vidyapada, IV. 28b m ayopari m aham aya sar-
vakaranakaranam , a maya, however, which is not fully developed (aprarudha) be
cause the ‘this’ in it is incapable of developing in the sense of full duality, veiled
as it is by the I (the ‘purity’ of Suddhavidya consists precisely in this). Mahamaya
192
an agent having consciousness as his essence, as in the case of the HI 1.6
Vidyesvaras: this idea of differentiation is similar to that caused by the
power o f may a.
- Some consider Vidya as the view of everything as differentiated
[from the I], pertaining however to a subject [fully] endowed with con
sciousness and agency. This Vidya is also the power of maya. Being
beyond the flow of existence, the Mantresvaras and the Vidyesvaras
reside there12. - 6 -
is sometimes (cf. e.g. PTV p. 225) considered a distinct tattva - between Maya and
Suddhavidya - in the need to assign an abode to the vijfidnakevalas, which on the
hierarchical scale of subjects occupy an intermediate position between the
pralayakalas and the vidyeSvaras etc., located respectively in Maya and Sud
dhavidya; in other texts it is, on the contrary, included in Suddhavidya or in Maya,
depending on which o f its aspects - mentioned above - one wishes to refer to (see
Sataratnasam graha II. 24-27 and comm., $D V r p. 25; see also Dvivedi 1983:
U podghata, 139-141).
12 IPVV III p. 277 explains, following the ftka, the co-presence in this principle
of the Mantresvaras and Vidyesvaras on the basis of the essential unity of Mantras
and Vidyas (suddhanadiparam arsasarasabdardSikalasanratvena)\ the difference is
that in the former mukti, sam vedana and saktimat predominate, while in the latter
siddhi, vdcya and Sakti predominate.
13 The conception expressed in this karika (attributed by Abh., IPV II p. 231,
to the Sadardhasara, a text of the Trika school) seems to be that favoured by Utp.,
since it is not introduced as pertaining to ‘others’ (ibid. anye ity anukteh). Abh.
formulates it in the avataranika to the TPV as follows: in Sadasiva the differentia
tion is not evident, icchaSakti is in action; in ISvara the differentiation is evident,
the Sakti is jnana; in Suddhavidya (literally ‘in the Vidyesvaras’) the differentiation
is not only evident, but also fully developed (prariidha) - but only as regards the
plane of the knowable, subjectivity is untouched - kriyasakti is in action. After that,
with the differentiation which also embraces the sphere of the I, one enters the sam-
saric world, the realm of mayasakti. VidyaSakti is also in action on this plane, having
the opposite function from that of maya, that is, it discloses true reality to the yogins
and the jnan in s in whom the error of differentiation has been overcome and survives
only in the state of karmic impulse. The parallel avataranika in IPVV contains some
variants and seems more in line with Utp.: jnanasakti in Sadasiva and kriyasakti in
Isvara (as in SD II. 1); a residual trace of kriyasakti constitutes, on the contrary, the
power of Suddhavidya, also called Mahamaya.
193
Ill 1.7 - In beings in the flow of existence there is the recognition of the
self as Sovereignty thanks to Vidya14 and the state of ‘beast’ through the
action of maya. - 7 -
9. That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces a
cognizable reality assumed to be separate [from himself], such a subject
- who is in fact himself an object16 - is enveloped by the pentad con
stituted by Time etc.
14 On vidyasakti and its degrees cf. ¿DVp pp. 31-32, 25; see also below III.
2. 3.
15 Abh. (IPVV III p. 285) quotes a passage from the Rudrayamalasara (maya
vimohinl nama kalayah kalanam sthitam), to which the vrtti probably alludes.
16 All the various planes - from the body to the mind and finally the void -
with which a person believes he can identify his own subjectivity and which he op
poses to an objective reality considered ‘other5, are on the contrary, in the final
analysis, part of it, as they too are objects compared to the authentic subjectivity
constituted by consciousness (c/7). But if in one way they are not identical to con
sciousness they are however an expression o f it, there not being anything substan
tially other than consciousness and that does not ultimately merge with it. The error
is therefore a double error, paradoxical like the nature of maya which lies at its basis:
identifying consciousness, the I, with what is not consciousness is maya, but it is
maya too which causes what in reality is not different from consciousness to appear
as other than it. In order that the reality of the object may be conceived as being
differentiated from the I a degradation of the I is necessary. Without this identity
crisis the I, in its fullness, could only embrace the whole as his own self and the
word ‘this5 could not be uttered.
17 The manifestation of the present, characterized by vividness and clarity, is
the point of reference for conceiving a past and a future. The seat o f the experience
o f time, Abh. adds (IPVV III p. 287), is primarily the empirical subject and only
secondarily things, which receive their temporal colour from the time o f the subject
with whom they are associated.
18 Utp. himself, according to what Abh. reports (ibid. pp. 290-1, see text note
31), acknowledges two interpretations o f the expression karm aphala: ‘the action and
194
- That cognizing subject identified with the void etc. who faces the HI 1.9
whole of cognizable reality conceived as separate [from the self], is, in
fact, himself the object of cognition as ‘this’ and is conditioned by the
five priciples, Time and so on. From Time he derives, through the
manifestation of the present, the existence of the past and of the future17;
from Necessity the strict concatenation of [cause with] effect and of ac
tion with its fruit (karmaphalaniyamah) 18; from Attachment the yearning
for fruition; from Wisdom and Force this subject - who, however, is not
identified with consciousness nor is he free - derives a partial knowledge
and activity, essentially constituted by consciousness and freedom. - 9 -
its result (i.e. the karmic impulse that derives from it)’ or ‘the karma and its fruit
(i.e. the heaven etc.)’. The principle of Necessity is therefore that which ensures in
the subject the apparent validity and fixity of the cause-effect relation in everyday
experience, so that what is essentially the Lord’s creativity may appear as the
capacity of one thing invariably to produce another.
19 The relation between the series of subtle elements (tanmatra) and that of the
gross elements (bhuta, mahabhuta) is referred to in both the Samkhya and Agama
texts as the relation between universal and particular. The tanmatra represents the
archetypal, quintessential form of the relative mahabhuta of which it constitutes the
primary quality (sound-ether, tactile sensation-air, etc.), though not the only one, as
all the schools are forced to admit. In fact experience shows that - with the excep
tion of ether - all the gross elements also have some of the qualities that are not
considered co-essential to them; sound, for example - says the MrA, vidyapada, XII.
17 and relative vrtti - is present not only in ether, but also in air, fire, water and
earth. Thus two distinct conceptions emerge. According to the first every gross ele
m ent possesses only one single quality and, if we perceive others, this is due to its
combining or connecting (sam parka, sannivesa) with other elements. Abh. (IPVV III
p. 299) quotes, with reference to this, a line from the MPA, ksubhitdt sparsatan-
m atrad dviguno vyilhato marut (not found in the published text; but cf. vidyapada,
XX. lcd-2ab yat tat prak sparsatanmdtram tdmasam sam udahrtam / tatksobhad
abhavad vayur dviguno vyuhalaksanah), which he glosses with purvabhutantara-
vyuhayogat. This is the thesis of the ancient Samkhya, which will be later supplanted
195
Ill 1.10-11 ments called earth etc., of which there are also five, and they are essen
tially no different from the former (tàny eva)20. The ear, the skin, the
eye, the tongue and the nose are the five instruments of cognition; the
voice, the hands, the feet, the excretory and genital organs are the five
instruments of action. The internal organ is threefold: the mind, the in
tellect and the sense of the I. This cognizable reality, composed of
products and instruments and divided into twenty-three forms, has a
single and undivided plane called pradhâna, which constitutes its radical
foundation. -1 0 -1 1 -
in the classical Sarpkhya by the thesis of the accumulation of qualities (ether has
sound, air has sound and tactile sensation, and so on, until one reaches earth which
possesses all five), which is that generally accepted in the theoretical section o f the
Agamas (e.g. Kalottara, Pauskara etc.) and presupposed by ritual. Furthermore this
accumulation is generally explained as deriving from the fact that the individual
tanmatra generates the relative mahabhuta not in isolation, but by associating itself
with the other tanmatras in various ways (see Paufkaragam a, pumstattvapatala, II.
243-4, cit. in Saivaparibhasa p. 125; MPA, vidyapada, XVIII. 102-104ab, etc.).
20 This seems to mean that the gross elements do not have a different reality
from the essential qualities that compose them, combined and separate (cf. the frag
mentary quotations from the (Ika on this point in the vrtti, cited by Abh., IPVV III
pp. 299-300, ‘tany eva iti vrttim \ya ca tfe ‘tany eva c d ityadind lnatu vastvantaram').
This principle is clearly fomulated in TA IX. 289: «In this regard the earth etc., as
is attested by direct perception, are nothing but an aggregate of qualities, neither,
separate or different from them, does any subject appear that may be called earth
and so on».
196
m 2.1
C hapter n
1. Such being the structure of reality1, Rudra is the deity that presides
over the state in which this2 subjectivity exclusively subsists; Brahma and
Visnu3 reside in the flowing of the differentiated cognizable reality.
- Rudra is he who presides over the condition of pure [limited] sub
jectivity represented by the void or by an extremely subtle body formed
by the puryastakd4 - in other words, over the condition in which there
is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality. Brahma and Visnu
preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the
former causing creation and the latter continuity. - 1 -
197
i n 2.2 of the samsara. With the recognition of the true reality of the self at
tained thanks to Science he is free. - 2 -
on the following kârikâ, as may be gathered from Ï P W III p. 312 âha 'niyatyâ' iti
niyatir yatah karmano m ülabhümih; see also vrtti on m . 1. 9.
6 All these elements, i.e. the contaminations (kleša) - avidyâ, râga, asmitâ,
dveça and abhiniveša - and so on, are listed in Yogasütra II. 3 ff.
7 The fundamental maculation, ‘concerning the anu' (ânava), or the reduction of
consciousness to a minimal, ‘atomic’, state (anu),
8 The maculation ânava, which is often simply called ‘maculation’, is necessari
ly the basis of the other two and is, in the course o f recovering consciousness in its
fullness, the last to disappear.
198
periences is the karmic maculation. All three are solely the work o f the ID 2.5
power o f may a.
- When, there being this twofold anava maculation, cognizable
reality, though in reality not separated from the subject, appears differen
tiated from him, there is, on the basis of this other error, the maculation
known as mayic. The karmic maculation, which pertains to the agent
devoid of the light of consciousness, is due to the error of considering
the cause of births and so on the actions, which on the contrary - as has
been established - are not causes9. The Lord’s will to create these three
maculations is called the power of maya. - 5 -
9 The error on which the karmic maculation is based is therefore that o f attribut
ing to the actions and karmic impulses determined by them the status of cause as
regards birth, length o f life, quality of fruitions etc. Actions, being insentient realities
(ja d a ), cannot, according to the conception expounded in the Kriyadhikara, be the
cause of any thing whatsoever, the sole real cause is the agent, the Lord.
10 This is, in particular, a reference to the Samkhya conception of the purusa
in the state of kaivalya (cf. IPVV III p. 319). The use of the expression ‘are created
(nirmita) by the Lord’ points out how all these various maculations and levels of
subjectivity are merely a ‘construct’ created by the free dynamism o f Consciousness.
11 Here begins the description of the various categories o f subjects. Utp. ex
pressly mentions the Vijnanakevalins, the Pralayakevalins, the Vidyesvaras and the
Sakalas, implicitly referring to the more classical division (see MV I. 15 ff.) which
lists seven levels of subjectivity - Siva, Man tram ahes vara, Mantresvara, Mantra,
Vijhanakala, Pralayakala and Sakala - (see e.g. TP, MrA, TA, PH etc.). There are
variations in the texts as regards the attribution and location in the scale o f the prin
ciples; in the latter case this ambiguity is often due to the confusion between on
tological plane and field of action. Besides this there are other divisions, based on
different criteria (e.g. the well-known one of the Svayam bhuvagama in kevala, sakala
and amala; see Sataratnasamgraha 1. 34); cf. Dvivedi 1983: Upodghata, 134-35. As
199
in 2.7 - These subjects characterized by the pure light of consciousness are
differentiated from one another, though there is no differentiation as
regards their attributes of consciousness, permanence etc. This occurs be
cause they are created thus by the Lord and for no other reason. This
class of subjects, corresponding more or less to the purusas of the
Sâmkhya, has the name of Vijnânakevala12. - 7 -
8. The agents that are identified with realities other than conscious
ness, such as the void etc., are the Pralayâkalas13. Karmic maculation
also pertains to them; on the contrary, mâyic maculation may or may
not be present (Vikalpitah).
- The Pralayakevalins assume as I the void, the prâna etc., not grasp
ing their having consciousness as true nature. In these limited souls the
karmic impulses are also present; on the contrary, the mâyic maculation
regards the ŠD, first (I. 31) vidyá, vidyeša, mantra and mantrešvara are mentioned,
then (I. 41c-43) pašu, šánta, kevaleša kevalašambhu, pralayakevalin and
vijáánakevalin. The division of the subjects - mostly, as has been said, into seven
classes - may be considered the common heritage o f Shaivism in the broad sense,
whilst keeping in mind the remark of Jayaratha (TÁV vol. VII pp. 7-8), according
to which this differentiation between subjects is particularly appropriate to the dualist
schools such as the Siddhánta (siddhántadaršanádisamucitam).
12 The state of Vijňánakevala (or Vijňánákalas), Abh. explains (ÍPVV HI p. 322),
may be attained through a special initiation aimed only at going beyond the path of
m áyá without there being any conjunction with the supreme reality, or through the
creative meditation (bhavaná) o f the puru?a in the state o f isolation, without the kar
mic bond, according to what is expounded in the Gita; or through concentration
(idhdranč ), contemplation (dhyana ) and absorption (sam adhi ) that have as their ob
ject the path o f máyá as far as this point of deployment. The attainment of this state
is therefore a special kind of experience (bhogavišefa). It is for this reason that one
may speak of its being similar to the state of the Sámkhya purusas but not absolute
ly identical to it.
13 ‘Devoid of kalá because o f dissolution’ where ‘dissolution’ is generally the
state o f total absorption pertaining to deep sleep, and 'kalď stands for the various
principles that constitute the faculties and products (IPV II p. 152), listed above, III.
1. 10-11. The máyic maculation is present in the state o f savedyasaufupta, in the
state o f deep sleep in which the traces of objective reality still remain; this is the
level of identification with the mind (buddhi). In the state of apavedyasausupta, to
which the identification with the void and the prána corresponds, every cognizable
reality is completely swallowed up and with it the máyic maculation, which just con
sists in the apparition of a cognizable object differentiated from the subject. These
states are analyzed in the following kárikás.
200
may or may not be present, depending on whether there is connection HI 2.8
with cognizable reality or not. - 8 -
14 The Vidyesvaras are a group of eight deities headed by Ananta, whom Siva
invests with determinate functions; in particular, they are called to cooperate in the
liberation o f the limited souls, acting as intermediaries in the revelation o f the teach
ing of Siva, etc. They employ another class of subjects as their instruments, the
seventy million Mantras; they are identified, as some texts indicate explicitly (see
MrV, vidyapada, p. 46, TAV vol. VI p. 55; cf. also IPVV II p. 405), with the class
o f the Mantramahesvaras. It may be useful to mention the clear description given
by the M oksakdrikd of Sadyojyotih and the relative vrtti of Ramakantha (particular
ly II 73-94), obviously without wanting to impose it in every detail as the norm for
the whole ¿aiva tradition. In this the terms vidya and mantra - and consequently
Vidyesvara and Mantresvara - are interchangeable; the Vidyesvara-Mantresvaras are
however divided into a higher group of eight headed by Ananta (which we can there
fore call Mantramahesvaras) and a lower group (apradhana) of a hundred and
eighteen, composed o f the hundred Rudras etc. The higher Mantresvaras are situated
ontologically below kriyasakti. After them, but still above m aya, come the seventy
million Mantras, they too are divided into two parts, one half impelled directly by
Siva and the other by the Mantresvaras. Then follow the hundred and eighteen
Mantresvaras which are mantraprayojakas but have an inferior status, as they are
situated within maya - and are consequently sakalas, just as the first two groups are
niskalas. Regarding their functions, the higher Mantresvaras arc distinguished from
the lower ones since only they perform the five activities of creation etc. in the
mayic world. All the Mantresvaras and the Mantras together attain supreme libera
tion once Ananta ceases to exist, which happens after he has completed the five ac
tivities, at the beginning o f the mahdpralaya. As regards the discrepancies between
the texts it may be remembered, for example, that the PH places the Mantrama
hesvaras in the saddsivatattva, SvT X. 1060 and TP 1. 10 vrtti place the Vidyesvaras
in the Isvaratattva, etc.
15 Unlike the Vijnanakalas.
16 The term Vidyesvara expresses, according to Abh. (TPVV III p. 325), the con
tact with knowledge and sovereignty (vidya-bodha and Isvaratva-kartrtva). These
subjects however - unlike the nature o f Sadasiva and Isvara, on which level dif-
201
Ill 2.9 reality. They do not possess the full faculty of action and are therefore
distinct from the Lord and one another17, as has been previously seen;
therefore, they too must be considered limited souls (anutvam). - 9 -
10. All the beings that are immersed in the flowing of existence, start
ing from the gods, are affected by the three maculations: but o f these it
is precisely the karmic maculation that constitutes the sole direct cause
of the samsara.
- The beings in the power of the samsara, from the gods to immobile
things, have all three maculations: but it is only the karmic maculation
that is responsible for setting in motion the samsara. - 10 -
ferentiation is not yet manifested - conceive the objects of their knowledge and ac
tion as different from themselves due to the mayic maculation; they are, rather,
similar to the Lord of the dualist doctrines.
17 See MrA, vidyapada, IV. 5.
18 The consciousness-principle (citlattvam), supreme consciousness, in its full
ness is constituted by the interpenetration of bodha (luminous, cognitive principle)
and of kartrta or vimarsa (dynamic principle which is expressed in the activity of
the I). The maculation called anava is responsible for the fragmentation of this unity
by suppressing either one or the other of these two components (cf. above karika
4). In the samsaric world cittatt\fam is found devoid of the bodha aspect and reduced
to only kartrta, but no longer a full kartrta (and not even an ‘almost’ full one, as it
was for example in the Vidyesvaras). It has now become a shadow of its former self
and is only partially revitalized by the contribution of the kala principle, ‘the partial
agency’. The consciousness-principle, thus limited, in the individual is therefore
found in a decidedly secondary position, superseded by the whole concretion of inert
realities with which the I is erroneously identified. In the verse (kalodbalitam ... cit-
tattvam) there is an obvious echo of passages form the scriptures; cf. v. I. 10 of the
Svayam bhuvdgama (Government Oriental MSS Library, Madras, MS. 16797) kalod-
balitacaitanyo vidyadarsitagocarah / ragena rahjitas capi buddhyddikaranair tatah II
and the substantially identical one of the Tantrasadbhdva cit. in SSV p. 37 (ad III.
3); cf. also Kiranagama I. 16.
202
by the power of kalâ pertaining to the Lord, is limited, being placed in i n 2.11
a subordinate state. And therefore the status of limited soul occupies here
a pre-eminent position. - 1 1 -
13. When the seat o f agency - T - is the void, understood as the ab
sence o f the mind etc., where only the karmic impulses exist (°samskara-
matrinij without any evidence or form, there is the state of the absence
o f the knowable 20.
- When there is a subjectivity characterized by the identification of
the I solely with the negation of the mind, the prâna and so on21, then
in the state of deep sleep, which means residing exclusively in the above-
203
i n 2.13 mentioned state, there is the absence of the knowable, in the sense that
the karmic impulses, though they exist, are imperceptible since they are
devoid of form. The difference from the Samkhya purusa lies precisely
in this. - 13 -
22 The kârikâ identifies ântarl vrtti with ŠCmyapramátr (ÏPVV explains that the
identification is only metaphorical, in actual fact the real relationship is one o f cause
and effect); the vrtti places ântarl vrtti (antarvrtti) in a bahuvrlhi referring to
šCmyapramátá. The ftkâ and TPVV explain that this bahuvrlhi may be understood in
two ways. In the first, antarvrtti is the very dynamism o f subjectivity - present in
the šCmyapramátr - that sets in motion the vital dynamism (jlvana) common to the
sensory powers, a dynamism which is that o f the five functions o f the breaths o f
life of whose differentiation it is the cause. In the second, with a subtle distinction,
it directly denotes the vital energy that is common to all the sensory powers and
sets in motion the various breaths. The mention of antarvrtti in bahuvrlhi (depend
ing on àûnyapramàtâ) is particularly pregnant; Abh. remarks that it aims at rem ov
ing the role of cause from the sensory powers and leading them back to their total
dependence on the agent who is the sole true source of their dynamism. The classi
cal passage_ on this in SK I. 6, which the IPVV does not fail to quote.
23 Cf. ÎPVV III p. 334 tâm vrttim Jivanalaksanâm ... utthâpayan jíva ity ucyate.
24 The limited individuality, the ‘living’ {fiva), the transmigrating nucleus, there
fore corresponds to the plane o f the identification of the I with the void (šunyáhantá)
or the prâna (prânâhantâ). It consists in a body called ‘eightfold’ (puryastaka), or,
according to another traditonal etymology, the ‘ogdoade that is in the body’, a kind
o f subtle body that forms the deep structure of the person and determines his con
tinuity as the vehicle of the I in transmigration and the depository o f the karma etc.
There are various opinions on its composition; from eight elements - five tanmâtras,
manas, buddhi and ahamkara (see Kâlottarâgama XVII 4cd-5ab, SK 111.17; see also
Sâm khyakârikâ 1. 40 and Gaudapâdabhàçya) - , which is probably the most widely
204
15. When the subject rests exclusively on these planes, this is the state UI 2.15
of deep sleep - similar to cosmic dissolution - which may or may not
be affected by the maculation o f mâyâ, depending on whether the know-
able is present or absent (savedyam apavedyam ca).
- On the plane of the identification with the void, since there is no
knowable reality, the maculation of mâyâ is absent. On the plane of the
identification with the prâna etc. the state of deep sleep, which is similar
to cosmic dissolution25, is affected by the maculation of mâyâ, since in
205
m 2.15 this state there is relation with the knowable, such as the contact with
pleasure and so on26. - 15 -
17. The creation which is stable, in that it is the object o f all the
senses and external, common to all knowing subjects, is the waking state.
- The creation which occurs thanks to the powers of all the internal
and external senses is the waking state. Here too, as in the dream state,
illusion may occur, in the form of seeing two moons etc.29 - 17 -
206
freedom is reduced. A slight (mâtrayâ) increase in freedom means n i 2.18
pleasure, joy etc., and thus a decrease in freedom is pain, aversion and
so on. The samsara constituted by all the fruitions is the bond. - 18 -
30 The prana in the broad sense of the word (breath, vital energy, life) is a func
tion, a mode of consciousness itself {cidvrtti; prak sam vit prdne parinata, said the
Tatt\>drthacintamani, cit in SSV p. 68 etc.), capable of transmitting life to realities
such as the body, which are in themselves inert and insentient (jada). This undif
ferentiated vibration (samanyaparispanda) is manifested in five fundamental forms
which include the whole range of states of consciousness. Rising and falling breath
(prana in the narrow sense of the word and apdna) characterize the state of ordi
nary consciousness (waking and sleeping). They incessantly travel from the heart to
the dvadasanta in opposite directions: the pra na, flowing towards the exterior (is
‘day’, ‘sun’), represents the tension towards the object, the apdna (‘night’, ‘moon’)
represents the tension towards the subject (cf. IPVV 111 pp. 342-343). The dualistic
opposition between prana and apdna is the same as that which pervades ordinary
consciousness. Now one now the other predominates, just as in the days of the year
night prevails over day and vice versa. This perpetual play o f opposition is
suspended in the state of deep sleep: in the savedyasau$upta when in the interval
between prana and apdna there is a momentary rest in the place of the heart, in the
apavedyasausupta throughout the duration o f deep states o f obnubilation, torpor etc.
If this suspension of the prdna-apana flow is immediately plausible for the
apavedyasausupta where by definition the pole of objective reality disappears, it is
legitimate, however, to ask oneself - as does Abh. (IPVV III p. 346), following the
fika - how this happens for the savedyasausupta, too. The flowing of the prana -
is the reply - does not depend on the mere presence of the cognizable (vedyamatra)
but on its appearing as separate from the subject, and the cognizable that is present
in this state (sensations o f pleasure etc.) is such that it appears, so to speak, to be
one with the subject {grahakad avicchinnam iva).
31 In the karika cheda therefore has the double meaning of ‘interruption’ (v/c-
cheda) - of the breaths as opposites - and ‘equality’. At this point - which corresponds
to the plane o f the Pralayakalas - the breath is precisely referred to as ‘equal’
(saniana). It does not, however, represent the definitive eclipse of prana and apdna
- which would entail going beyond phenomenal existence - but only a momentary
207
Ill 2.19 vfl)32, due to their increasing and decreasing being blocked, the breath
is called samana (‘equal’). - 19 -
20. Flowing upwards through the middle path, the breath is called
udana; it is in the fourth state and is made of fire, it corresponds to the
Vijnanakalas, the Mantras and the Lord33. The supreme breath is the
vyana, whose essence is all.
stasis in which they remain in the state of samskara, ready to manifest themselves
once more. They still have to be truly surpassed.
32 In his commentaries Abh. expounds two distinct traditional etymologies o f
visuvat: ‘capable (vat) o f pervading (visit)' and ‘that sets in motion (suvat) the dis
tinction (vi= vifesa) or the imbalance of duration between day and night’. Bh. finds
this second interpretation obviously contradictory, seeing that he insists against all
likelihood on glossing prerayati (with which Abh. explains suvati) with nivarayati.
The difficulty may perhaps be overcome by understanding that visuvat sets in m o
tion the imbalance only insofar as, there being a momentary balance, the imbalance
must necessarily follow. The passage from the Kalapada (another name for the
Kalottara) cit. in IPVV III p. 343 may be understood in this sense: sdm yam
vaisamyajanakam visuvat santatarp smrtam (this ardhasloka, not included in the
Sardhatriiatikalottara, probably comes from another of its many versions). The
image of the visuvat is not merely incidental but is taken from the Saiva scriptures,
where the systematic projection o f external time, with all its subdivisions (including
the visuvat) in the individual dimension, is frequently found, with the consequent
identification of cosmic time with ‘pranic’ time; in particular see Kalottaragama
(sardhatrisati) XI. 1-10 and X. 22-23 with the relative vrtti, SvT VII. 168 ff.; for
another use o f visuvat see for example SvT II. 316-334a; cf. S§P III pp. 358 ff.,
Saivdgam aparibhafam anjarl (transl.) p. 276. Similar conceptions are to be found in
the Buddhist Kalacakra school; Vim alaprabha, passim, Nadapada’s Sekoddesatlka pp.
42-44; on visuvat - but understood as taking place lagnodayabhisamdhau - see
Vimalaprabha p. 178.
33 It appears from the fragmentary indications in the IPVV that the fika sug
gests two interpretations of the compound vijhdndkalam antreio - a karmadharaya,
as is explicitly said, and not a dvandva (which would have required the plural). The
most obvious one is ‘the Vijnanakalas and the Lords of the Mantras’; the other,
adopted by Abh., is ‘the Vijnanakalas, the Mantras in the broad sense of the word
(i.e. Mantras, Lords of the Mantras and Great Lords of the Mantras) and the Lord
(Abh.: the Lord Sadasiva)’. From the pka quotations one would obtain, more precise
ly, ‘Vijnanakalas, the Mantras, the Lords of the Mantras and Isvara’, where
Mantresvara (Lord of the Mantras) derives, according to the tantra method, from
mantra and Tia, to which, however, an individual meaning is also assigned (cf. IPVV
III p. 352, nanu atra vyakhyane mantresvarah kena sam grhltah / mantrapadena
tajjafiyatvad Isapadena samanavdcyatakrtena tantranyayeneti).
208
- [The breath is referred to as] udana because - after accomplishing III 2.20
the unification of the prana and the apana through the interruption of
their flow along the two sides and transversely - it rises (udgamanat)
flowing upwards through the middle path34. This breath - which flows in
the fourth state - 35, similar to the middle eye, has the quality of fire be
cause it rises upwards. The breath ceases to flow in the state beyond the
fourth - this being the state of fullness and as such devoid of spatio-tem
poral delimitations - 36 and entering a state of absolute fullness takes the
name of vyana. These two states are to be attained since in them the
energy of the prana appears as essentially constituted by the supreme
Lord37. - 20 -
34 The middle path is the su$umna; the two side paths are ida and pihgala.
35 The breath udana rises, therefore, along the su§umna burning every duality
(IPVV III pp. 350-1 cites some of them: creation and reabsorption, prana and apana,
day and night, birth and death, aversion and attachment). The fourth state - together
with the state beyond the fourth - constitutes going beyond ordinary existence. In
this state differentiation dissolves like melting butter, the idanta is veiled by the I
as on the Sadasiva and Isvara levels. The objective realities with which the I had
identified himself are themselves transformed on contact with the I which is finally
recognized as endowed with the divine qualities o f sovereignty, permanence etc., so
that they continue to subsist, but as though they have ceased to be objects; they are
compared to copper which on contact with mercury is transformed into gold. In the
state beyond the fourth state the difference is only one of intensity; the quality leap
has already been achieved. The state beyond the fourth state, in which only the
‘pervading’ breath (vyana) subsists, is the stabilization o f the fourth, the differentia
tion is now completely dissolved, the idanta dispelled; remaining within the terms
of the simile suggested by Abh., even the gold into which the various levels of sub
jectivity have been transformed - from the body to the void - as it is increasingly
permeated by the mercury wears away and finally dissolves, these realities only sur
viving in the residual form of sam skara (cf. IPVV III pp. 327-8, 331, 350; IPV II
pp. 257-8, 270-1, 275-6).
36 In fact the flowing presupposes spatial and temporal change, whereas the
transfourth is the state of absolute simultaneous fullness.
37 Literally ‘similar to the supreme Lord’. But my translation is in conformity
with Abh.’s gloss (see text note 108), which in turn appears to follow Utp.’s indica
tions.
209
IV 1
2. There (tatra), realities such as the mind etc., which are included
in the sphere o f the 'this' freely created [by the Lord] (svasrstedambhage),
are caused by him to be considered as the fictitious I (ahamkara0) as
being the perceiving subject.
- This universe springing forth as constituted by the free expansion
(jrmbha°) of the supreme Lord4, realities that are created as the object
1 The translation refers to the most immediate and general meaning of the text
of the kârikâ. The far more complex explanation given by the vrtti depends on con
sidering the two terms of the expression aham idam first separately and then
together.
2 The above note has already mentioned how this interpretation has been arrived
at. As Abh. explains (see text note 2), we have here the reflective awareness of the
perceiving subject as not distinct from the other subjects, i.e. o f the fundamental
unity of the subject beneath the apparent fragmentation; the same applies to the ob
ject; and finally the awareness of the ultimate non-othemess (melana) of subject and
object.
3 Because starting from this the maculation begins to dissolve (see text note 1).
4 The text, which remains doubtful, seems to contain a double interpretation
0tantra) of tatra in the kârikâ (which I have translated in a deliberately vague m an
ner): mahesvarasya jrm blm m aye ’smin nirgate and tasminn idantâparâmarse. This
would coincide with the brief references in IPVV III p. 358 to the fikâ, which evi
dently gave this type o f interpretation: tatra iti vaiyadhikaranyena vivrtya sâmâ-
nâdhikaranyena vivrnoti (i.e. tatra taken alone or agreeing with °blwge). Abh. in his
two commentaries also follows the line of the simultaneous double function of tatra,
which he refers in both cases to Mahesvara: ‘Mahesvara being the self, the part ‘this’
is created by him upon a substratum constituted by him self’ (thus in the first case
210
of perception - the mind, the breath, the void - in the sphere of the IV 2
reflective awareness ‘this’, precisely these realities, which represent a
part of the knowable, are caused to be considered as the fictitious I and
are, on the strength of this, transformed into the limited perceiving sub
ject. - 2 -
211
IV 4 - The knowledge and activity of the Lord, together with maya, be
come sattva, rajas and tamas in the limited subject. - 4 -
and object. This power does belong to Siva but, as the formulation of the karika
points out, it is not on the same plane as the powers of knowledge and action, since
it is connected with differentiation (cf. ibid. p. 361).
8 This karika is intended to be a reply to those who want to take the parallel
between knowledge, activity, and maya, on the one hand, and sattva, rajas, and
tamas on the other, too far, by considering the latter ‘powers* o f the limited subject
just as the former are powers of Siva. Utp. replies that this cannot be so, because
the limited subject looks on them - and on all the deployment of phenomena that
evolves from them and is imbued with them - as other than himself, whereas the
power is by definition not separate from the subject who possesses it. In the limited
subject knowledge (prakafa) etc. are not spontaneous (naisargikya) and autonomous
functions, but require the contribution of other factors - e.g. the senses - in order
to be performed, which are all penetrated by and derived from the gunas. This is
why they are called gunas, i.e. ‘qualities, components’, but also ‘subordinate, auxiliary
elements’ (cf. IPVV 111 p. 362).
9 What has been said so far is only valid, however, within the limits of the
world of differentiation. Once the subject recognizes his own true nature, the objec
tive world ceases to appear in the guise of alterity and it is then that all the prin
ciples become what they effectively are, his ‘powers’.
10 W hat is referred to here, as the vrtti makes clear, is the guna rajas, con
stituted by the presence o f sattd as prakasa-ananda (the guna sattva) and by its
(their) absence (the guna tamas).
11 These qualities o f the Lord are involved with one another and in the final
analysis are identified with one another (cf. IPV II p. 289 ya sattd bhavanakartrta
212
On the contrary, in the individual self this light and beatitude, which have IV 6
become knowable realities, constitute sattva. Their absence is tamas. Sat
tva and tamas - or light-beatitude and their absence - though two dis
tinct entities, are mutually united to form rajas. In the limited subject ac
tivity and pain are called rajas. - 6 -
sphurattarupa ... saiva ... camatkararupa sail kriyaSaktir ucyate ... svatmaviSrantiru-
p at\fac ca saiva anandah). In the pasu the guna sattva corresponds to the satta and
ananda aspect in the Lord.
12 ‘On the plane of the limited subject’ is understood.
13 Some form of param arsa is inseparable from the pure light of cognition, as
reflective awareness reactive to it, an act of appropriation on the part of the I. On
this level, on which the ‘this’ is conceived purely and simply as a negation of the I
(IPVV p. 367), things are the object of param arta only in terms of ‘this’, without
any other differentiations. And furthermore it is specified that this param arsa is also
free from any contact with the conventional linguistic expression ‘this’, since the
word - which is, as we know, inseparable from it - is still at a level transcending
every articulated language, similar rather to a silent nod of the head. An example
that clarifies this is the dim and undifferentiated awareness of (and reaction to) what
is other than itself and that surrounds it, that the newborn child is presumed to have.
14 See the following karika.
15 Karika 7 has defined the status of the object in relation to the Lord. But Abh.
(IPVV III p. 367) makes it clear that it is not the supreme Lord in this case, since
at the level of Paramasiva one cannot speak of any objectivity whatsoever, this only
beginning to emerge when he assumes the nature of Sadasiva and Isvara (indeed the
213
IV 8 sphere of memory, imagination and so on, and have a variety o f distinct
names.
- The entities that are manifested separately, that is, the universals16
are shown by the limited subjects - thanks to the power of mental
elaboration (vikalpanasaktya)n - as the object of inner reflective aware
ness through various names such as ‘jar’, ‘silvery’, ‘white’, ‘cloth’, ‘cart’ and
so on. The limited subjects, conditioned by the experience of these ob
jects, then also make themselves the object of various denotations such
as ‘I am thin’, ‘I am happy or unhappy’. In memory this function of men
tal elaboration takes place in the wake of the previous direct experience;
in the various forms of imagination etc. it is, on the contrary, auton
om ous18. It is precisely this manifestation of a differentiation between
perceiving subject and object perceived, substantiated by the w ord19,
which constitutes the bond of the samsara in the limited soul. - 8 -
9-10. The creation that pertains to him is not also common [to other
subjects] and is dependent on the creation of the Lord. It occurs in the
limited subject - essentially identical to the Lord - in virtue o f the very
plane of the Lord (pati°, Isvaradasâ) corresponds to these). Kârikâ 8 expounds how
the object appears on the plane of limited subjectivity.
16 O f the two kinds of object, particular (svalaksana) and universal (sâmânya),
only the latter (cf. text note 16) is taken into consideration here, because the word,
which in this kârikâ is shown as that which accompanies and renders possible dis
cursive thought, has as its content precisely the sâmânya, i.e. the âbhâsa taken
separately (see above II. 3. 2).
17 Vikalpana is, as has been seen, that characteristic function o f discursive
thought that proceeds to define the object through the evocation and negation of
what is other than it. In this the essential role is played by the word, as the Bud
dhists show by the conception of the apoha.
18 See above I. 8. 1 ff.
19 Many saiva texts insist on the fundamental ambivalence o f the word, which
permeates every level of human activity. The powers of the word, often conceived
as the powers that preside over the various alphabetical classes, may lead man to
freedom or enmesh him even more in the samsara. To remain within the terms of
the discourse o f the vrtti, they may increase the dichotomies of the vikalpa but they
may also, if correctly polarized, gradually re-absorb the vikalpa in pure reflective
awareness - pure insofar as it is not dualizing (the two possible ways o f overcom
ing the vikalpa will be dealt with at some length later). IPVV III pp. 379-380 refers
to some o f the classical passages of these speculations with quotations from the SK,
the Timirodghâta (the explicit attribution to this text is contained in SSV p. 7) and
the MV, to which the SS, at least, can be added.
214
power o f the Lord, ignored, however, as such20, which aims at prevent- IV 9-10
ing the resting on the self, unstable, whose nature is vital energy, diver
sified in the multiplicity o f the various phonemes, coinciding with the ac
tivity of mental elaboration (Vikalpakriyaya).
- The individual subject - whose nature is identical to that of the
Lord - creates, thanks to the power of the Lord not recognized as such,
objects in the form of the various universals21, not perceptible on the part
of the other subjects and modelled on the direct experience of objects
that may be experienced by everyone. And this power of the Lord, aimed
at obstructing the resting on authentic subjectivity, takes the name of
maya; it contains the infinite number of all the various phonemes - K
etc. - , it is continuously in motion in the form of vital energy, it carries
out the function called ‘mental elaboration’. In this way it creates the ob
jects internally. — 9-10 —
11. The creation o f the Lord may be common or not common to all
subjects (sadharano ’nyatha ca), manifesting itself [in both cases] in all
clarity. With the suppression o f the mental constructs, resulting from con
centration on a single point, the plane o f the Lord is gradually reached22.
20 As we saw earlier, also the limited subject possesses an innate power of crea
tion which is in essence no different from that of the Lord, since the individual him
self is essentially identical to the Lord although he ignores or has forgotten this iden
tity. This power of creation, limited by non-awareness, remains restricted to the in
dividual sphere: what is created are images, feelings, ideas etc., which depend more
(as in the case of memory) or less (as in fantasy) on the objects in the phenomenal
world created by the Lord. These two kinds of objects and of creations are distin
guished by being the last ‘common to all subjects’, the others are ‘not comm on’ i.e.
not able to be experienced except by the limited subject who creates them. But the
power o f creation is essentially the same.
21 The object of the mental elaboration (vikalpa etc.) is not the svalak$ana, but
the sam anya, which is not attached to a definite time and place.
22 Or: ‘... becomes the object of the reflective awareness [‘I am this universe’]
peculiar to the condition of Isvara’. The creation of the Lord is therefore twofold.
On the one hand it constitutes the world of objective existence, regarding which all
subjects are coordinated; on the other - restricted to a single individual - it con
stitutes the sphere of dream and error, such as the mistaken sight of two moons,
which as far as clarity and immediacy are concerned is on the same plane as the
other (cf. III. 2. 16); cf. IPVV III p. 386 aiw arasya sargasya spasfavabhdsatvam,
ata eva avikalpyateti rilpam. This interpretation of the first part of the karikd and in
particular of the expression scidhdrano ’nyatha ca is that suggested by the vrtti, but
not the only possible one. For instance, one may understand, as appears from the
215
IV 11 - On the contrary, the creation of the Lord is common to all cogniz
ing subjects - since they are bom within it23 - or also limited to only
one subject like that which is manifested in dream, in error and so on,
where it concerns a single subject. Permeated only by the reflective
awareness of ‘I am this universe’, this creation of the Lord is free from
mental constructs (vikalpojjhita) - since no differentiation arises within
it24 - and it is manifested in all clarity {spastavabhasa ca)25. On this
plane, by applying oneself and intensely cultivating those moments when
the mental construct becomes attenuated, which occur sporadically (an-
tarantara) while the activity26 pertaining to the limited subject is taking
place, the beings in the power of the samsara gradually attain, through
fika, ‘the creation of the Lord, common or not common, is different (from the crea
tion o f the limited subject)’, in which asadharana (‘not common’) is implied by the
conjunction ca. To this Abh. adds an interpretation of his own (IPVV III p. 386 and
IPV II pp. 301-2): if the creation pertaining to the limited subject, or the creation
o f the vikalpas, assumes full vividness being experienced differently - i.e. recogniz
ing the power of the Lord in it - , then it too becomes common, i.e. able to be ex
perienced by everyone, as in the case of he who, being imbued with the energy of
the mantras, becomes able to transform his representations and intentions into reality;
in this case the pasavah sargah, too, can lead to the condition of the Lord Qsva-
ratam asya dadati). As he himself explains, the aitah sargah o f the karika may be
understood as pasavah sargah, insofar as also this latter form of creation rests, in
its ultimate essence, on the former; if this interpretation is not directly referred to in
the vrtti and fika - Abh. adds - it is only because the ultimate identity of the pasava
and aisvara creation is too obvious to be stated overtly.
23 In the sense that the creation of the object is parallel to that o f the subject.
Reality, in effect, is constituted by the interaction of determinate levels of subjec
tivity with the corresponding levels of objectivity (see e.g. PH pp. 6-7).
24 The absence of the split between subject and objective reality constitutes the
cardinal difference between Isvara’s creation and the pasu's creation (IPVV III p. 388
‘bhedanudayat’ iti / anena aisvarasya sargasya p a t a vat sargat vailaksanyam
darsitam ; see also II p. 329); and it is precisely for this reason that the creation of
the Lord does not represent a bond. However, it must be considered, Abh. continues
(ibid.), that in the pasu's creation two levels may be distinguished, and whereas the
first only shows the emergence of differentiation, with the mayic and dnava macula-
tions, it is the second, presided over by Brahma (cf. III. 2. 1) and consisting in the
various psychic and mental activities (pratyaya), that directly causes the karmic
maculation and binds to the samsara.
25 Dharmaklrti defines the type of knowledge that pertains to the yogins in
similar terms: PV III. 281 praguktam yoginam jnanam tesam tadbhavandm ayam /
vidhutakalpandjalam spasiam evavabhasate; see also PVin I. 28 and the following
passage in prose (Steinkellner 1972: 203).
26 I.e. the vikalpa.
216
the emergence of the state of the Lord in all its fullness, the dissolution IV 11
of the state of limited individuality. - 1 1 -
12. He who, having all as his essence, thus knows: «All this multi
form deployment is mine», he, even in the flow of mental constructs, at
tains the state of M ahesa21.
- Also the individual subject who - though continuing to produce
mental constructs deriving precisely from the power of the Lord - has
become fully aware of his own nature as Lord - ‘Mine is this multiform
deployment of the samsara’ - this subject, too, who permeates the
universe without any differentiation and transform s all the mental
constructs into pure reflective awareness, attains the state of Mahesvara.
- 12 -
27 This is an alternative path to that expounded in the previous karika; both are
directed to the same aim which is to free from the bond of the vikalpas. In the first
the vikalpas were gradually suppressed by fixing the ninnkalpa (cf. PH pp. 39-40;
IPVV III p. 386 avikalpakaparigrhltaspastavastuvisayaikagratavalambanena); here,
on the contrary, their inclusion - and transfiguration - in the sphere of the totality
o f consciousness is taught.
28 I.e. the so-called objective reality (cf. IV .11) facing both the liberated soul
and the bound soul.
29 Unlike the situation expounded in the previous karika, where the cognizable
subsisted though in a state of non-differentiation with the I - a state that Abh. com
pares to that of the plane of Sadasiva-Isvara - , here one cannot even speak of cog
nizable reality, as it has now been dissolved and absorbed in the I without a trace.
This is the state of the supreme Siva.
217
IV 15 15. Thus seeing the true reality of what is his own self and the
knowledge and action that pertain to him, he knows and creates objects
as he wishes.
- Having thus recognized as Lord his own self full of the infinite
powers of knowledge and action once the signs of recognition
represented by the powers have come to light, he sees and creates all
things at will. - 15 -
* * *
16. Thus this new, easy path has been explained by me as the great
master expounded it in the Sivadrsti. Thus he who, putting his feet on it,
brings to light in the self the nature of creator of the universe whose es
sence is the nature of Siva, and is uninterruptedly absorbed in it, attains
pei feet ion.
- Within the course of ordinary reality, in its various forms, solely
in virtue of an act of recognition (pratyabhijhamdtrdt) is the state of Siva
attained. This new path, devoid of tortuosity, was indicated in the treatise
that bears the name of Sivadrsti by the venerable Somananda, who had
direct experience of the form of the blessed Paramesvara; I have here
furnished a logical justification of this path, thus causing it to enter the
hearts of men. He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into
the nature of Siva, becomes in this.very life a liberated soul. - 16 -
17. Just like the beloved, who, after much insistence finally stands in
the presence of the maid in love, though he is there before her he does
not give her any pleasure until she recognizes who he is - as he seems
just like other men until that moment - , so fo r mankind the self, who is
yet the Lord o f the world, cannot manifest his own glory until his
qualities have been brought to light. For this reason the doctrine o f the
recognition o f the Lord has here been expounded.
- The example of the beloved shows that the recognition of the Lord
must be awakened30 and that its fruit is extraordinary. - 17 -
30 Utp. uses the causative form of the root upapad- , as he has done before, in
his oscillation between the meanings of ‘awaken’, ‘render possible’, and ‘justify logi
cally’ (cf. also the following kârikd).
218
18. In order that the ordinary man too can attain perfection f°siddhi°J IV 18
effortlessly, Utpala, son o f Udayakara, has explained with argumenta
tions (upapaditaj this recognition o f the Lord.
- This easy path to perfection has thus been shown. - 18 -
219
ABBREVIATIONS
Abh. Abhinavagupta
AK Abhidharmakosa
AKBh Abhidharmakosabha$ya
APS Ajadapramatfsiddhi
Bh Bhaskarl
HB Hetubindu
IPK Isvarapratyabhijnakarika
IPV isvarapratyabhijnavimarsinT
IPVV IsvarapratyabhijnavivrtivimarSinl
IS Tsvarasiddhi
KSTS Kashm ir Series of Texts and Studies
MMP Maharthamanjarlparimala
M PA Matartgaparamesvaragama
MrA M rgendragama
MrV Mrgendravrtti
MV Malinlvijaya
MW Mai inlvijayavarttika
NB Nyayabindu
NBT Nyayabindutlka
NM Nyayamanjari
PH Pralyabhijnahrdaya
PS Pram anasam uccaya
PTLV Paratrimsikalaghuvrtti
PTV Paratrimsikavivarana
PV Pramanavarttika (PV I = Svarthanumana, PV II = Pramanasiddhi, PV III =
Pratyak§a, PV IV = Pararthanumana)
PVSV Pram3navarttikasvavrtti
PVin Pramanaviniscaya
Sd Sivadr§ti
SD Vr Sivadr$tivrtti
§s Sivasutra
ssv Sivasutravimarsinl
Sv Slokavarttika
SK Spandakarika
SN Spandanirnaya
ss Sambandhasiddhi
ssvr Sarpbandhasiddhivrtti
SP Sarpbandhaparik§a
SPr Samvitprakasa
SDS Sarvadarsanasaipgraha
221
S$P Somasambhupaddhati
SvT Svacchandatantra
TA Tantraloka
TAV Tantralokaviveka
TBh Tarkabhasa
TP TattvaprakSsa
TS Tattvasamgraha
TSP T att vasamgrahapanj ika
TSa Tantrasara
Utp. Utpaladeva
VBh Vijfianabhairava
VP Vakyapadlya (the karikas are quoted according to Rau’s edition)
222
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In d e x o f i m p o r t a n t w o r d s in t h e Text:
(k = kârikâ; v = vrtti)
235
ü.4.8 (v); n.4.15 abodhata III.2.4 (k);
(k,v); IV.7 (v); abhäva 1.3.2 (v); 1.5.11 (v);
anekatä II.2.2 (k); 1.5.14 (v); 1.7.5 (v);
anekatva U.2.2 (v); 1.7.7 (k,v); 1.7.8 (k);
anekarüpatva 1.2.11 (k); 1.7.9 (k,v); 1.7.10
antarbahiskarana U.3.4-5 (v); (v); 1.7.11 (v); 1.7.12
antarlina 1.5.1 (v); 1.6.3 (v); (k,v); 1.8.3 (v); 1.8.5
IV. 14 (k,v); (v); U.1.6 (v); II.3.13
antarviparivartin n.4 .4 (k); (v); n.3.15-16 (k,v);
antarvrtti UI.2.14 (v); n.4.11 (k,v); n.4.20
antahkarana 1.8.8 (v); (v); UI.2.4 (v); HI.2.9
antahkrta 1.3.7 (k); (v); III.2.13 (k,v);
antahsthita 1.5.1 (k); 1.5.7 (k); III.2.15 (v); IV.6
1.5.8 (v); 1.6.7 (v); (k,v);
1.7.1 (v); IU. 1.1 (v); abhijña III.2.2 (v);
anyânapekçana 1.2.11 (k); abhijñána 1.1.3 (v); IV.15 (v);
anyonyarüpatva II.4.17 (v); abhijñápita III. 2.2 (k);
anyonyavi$ayave- abhiVdhâ II.3.4-5 (v);
dana 1.3.2 (v); abhidhâ m.1.7 (k);
anyonyavedana 1.3.2 (v); abhidhâna 1.5.17 (v); II.3.2 (k);
anyonyasvabhä- abhinavatva n.3.1-2 (v);
vatä II.4.17 (k); abhiniVviš 1.6.7 (v);
anyonyâpekça 1.2.11 (v); 1.7.4 (v); abhinna 1.4.3 (v); 1.5.4 (k);
anvaya 11.2.4 (k); II.2.6 (k); 1.7.3 (v); n.2.2 (v);
apaVdiš 1.4.1 (k); IV.5 (k); n.4.5 (v); n.4.19 (v);
aparatva IE. 1.5 (k,v); III.2.5 (v);
aparasparätmatva 1.7.7 (v); abhinnatâ II.3.14 (k);
aparijnäna IV.3 (k,v); abhimata 1.6.10 (k);
apariharaniyatva II.2.1 (v); abhiVman UI.2.18 (v);
apäna m .2.19 (k,v); m .2 .2 0 abhimâna m.2.13 (v);
(v); abhisvariga III. 1.9 (v);
apeksä 1.3.4 (k); n . 4 . 6 (k,v); abheda 1.5.10 (v); 1.5.20 (v);
n.4.9 (v); n .4 .14 III. 1.3 (v); IV.5 (v);
(k,v); abhram sa II.3.15-16 (v);
apohana 1.3.7 (k,v); 1.6.3 (v); arôpatva m.2.13 (v);
I.6.4-5 (v); 1.6.8 (k); artha 1.1.2 (v); 1.2.7 (k);
aprakäsa 1.3.4 (v); 1.2.8 (k); 1.3.4 (k);
apratyabhijnäna IV.3 (v); I.3.5 (k);I.5.7 (k,v);
apramänya 1.7.12 (k,v); II.2.1 (v); n.2.7 (k);
apramätva 1.7.7 (k); arthakâritâ 1.8.6 (v);
apravartita n.3.17 (k); arthakârin II.3.5 (k);
apravrtti III.2.16 (v); arthakriyâ I.8.6 (k,v); n.2.7
abädhita n .3.2 (k); U.3.1-2 (k,v); II.3.1-2 (v);
(v); II.3.10-11 (v); II.3.4-5 (v); II.3.6
abodha m .2 .5 (k,v); UI.2.8 (k); II.3.12 (k,v);
(k); n.4.10 (k,v);
236
arthitâ 1.4.2 (v); II.3.4-5 (v); avasäti* 1.4.7 (k);
II.3.9 (v); avasäya 1.3.3 (k); 1.3.5 (k);
arthitva 1.4.2 (v); II.3.3 (v); 1.5.21 (k); H. 1.8 (v);
arthin U.2.7 (k,v); II.3.4-5 avasäyin 1.2.2 (k);
(v); n.3.9 (k); avaVso 1.5.6 (k); II. 1.8 (v);
avakra IV. 16 (v); avasthä 111.2.3 (v);
avagähita I.2.5 (v); avasthäna m .2.11 (v); III.2.20
avacchinna II.3.8 (v); (v);
avaVdhr 1.2.1-2 (v); avasthita 1.8.2 (v); IV. 16 (v);
avadhyavadhimat 11.2.6 (v); avasthiti 1.2.11 (v); II.4.19 (v);
avadhyavadhim a- UI.2.13 (v);
dbhäva 11.2.6 (k); avahita 1.4.2 (v);
avaVbhä 1.6.4 (k); aviccheda II. 1.6 (v);
avabhäta 1.5.8 (v); avimarsana 1.6.10 (v);
avaVbhäs 1.2.2 (k); 1.4.3 (v); aviruddha U.3.7 (k);
1.4.5 (v); 1.5.20 (v); avirodha II.4.19 (v);
II. 1.3 (v); II. 1.8 (k); avirodhin 1.7.6 (k);
n.3.7 (v); U.3.15-16 avyabhicärin 1.8.11 (v);
(v); avyäprti 1.2.6 (v);
avabhäsa 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.4.2 (v); asat 11.4.2 (k,v); II.4.3-4
1.4.8 (v); 1.5.1 (k,v); (k,v); II.4.15 (v);
1.5.4 (v); 1.5.6 (k); asattä II.4.15 (k);
1.5.11 (k); 1.6.2 (k); asattva n.1.4 (k);
1.6.5 (k); 1.6.6 (k); asamanvita 1.7.4 (v);
1.6.8 (v); 1.6.9 (v); asampramoçana 1.4.1 (v);
1.7.14 (k,v); 1.8.2 asarpväda U.3.13 (k,v);
(k,v); 1.8.3 (k); 1.8.5 asädhäranl (srçji) IV.9 (k);
(k); 1.8.7 (k); II. 1.2 asthiti 1.8.3 (k);
(v); II. 1.4 (v); ü . 1.6 asthairya II.3.13 (v);
(v); II. 2.5 (k); II.3.1- asparsa 1.3.4 (v); 1.5.14 (v);
2 (v); II.3.3 (v); asväbhävikatva II.3.12 (v);
n.3.4 (k); n.3.7 (k,v); ahantä 1.4.4 (v); 1.5.17 (k);
11.3.11 (k); U.3.15- III. 1.5 (k,v); m . 1.8
16 (v); ni.2.16 (k); (k); IU.2.8 (v);
IV.8 (k,v); IV. 11 (v); m .2.13(k,v); m .2.14
avabhasana 1.5.1 (k); 1.6.2 (k,v); (k,v);
1.6.11 (k); 1.7.3 (v); ah am 1.1.1 (v); 1.1.5 (v);
IV.5 (v); IV. 11 (k); 1.4.4 (k,v); 1.4.7 (k);
avabhasin I.6.4-5 (v); 1.6.6 (k); 1.5.17 (v); 1.6.1 (v);
n.3.15-16 (v); IV.7 I.6.4-5 (k,v); 1.6.7
(k); (v); m. 1.3 (k,v);
avam arša 0.3.13 (v); UI. 1.4 (v); m. 1.8 (v);
avamrsyatä IV.2 (v); IV. 1 (k); IV. 11 (v);
avayava 1.2.9 (v); 1.5.6 (v); ahamkara 1.6.6 (v); III. 1.10-11
11.2.5 (v); (v); IV.2 (k,v); IV.3
avasä 1.4.7 (k); (v);
237
ahamparämarsa 1.5.17 (v); ätmavädin 1.2.5 (v);
aharnpratlti 1.2.2 (k); ätmavimarsa n .1.2 (v);
aharppratyaya 1.2.1-2 (v); ätmasamvedya 1.1.5 (v);
ahampratyava- ätmasthairya 1.2.5 (v);
marša 1.6.1 (k); ädisarga 1.6.7 (v);
ahampratyavam- ädisiddha 1.1.2 (k);
rsya 1.5.17 (v); ädhära 1.7.8 (v);
ahampratyeya 1.4.4 (v); ädhipatya II.4.12-13 (v);
ahammati IV. 14 (v); änanda IV.3 (k,v); IV.6 (k,v);
ahammrsyatä 1.5.17 (k); IV. 14 (k);
ahamvimarsa 1.8.8 (v); änugunya II.2.7 (v);
ahamvimaršana 1.8.11 (v); äntaratva 1.8.6 (k); 1.8.7 (v);
ahamvedya 1.4.4 (v) 1.8.8 (v);
ahrdayaňgamatva 1.1.3 (v); äntarya 1.8.8 (k);
ahetu m .2.5 (v); äbhä II.2.4 (k);
äkasmikäbhäsa 1.5.4 (k); äVbhäs 1.2.5 (v); 1.3.5 (v);
äkära 1.5.11 (v); II.2.5 (v); 1.4.2 (v); 1.5.6 (v);
n.3.4-5 (v); n.4.5 (k); 1.5.16 (v); 1.5.18 (v);
akaša I.6.4-5 (v); 1.5.21 (v); I.6.4-5
âkçipta 1.8.1 (v); (v); 1.6-10 (v); 1.8.7
äksepa II.3.14 (v); (k); II. 1.5 (k); II.3.4-
ägama 1.5.14 (v); 5 (v); II.4.1 (k,v);
äcchäda m . 1.5 (k); II.4.20 (v);
äcchädana UI. 1.5 (v); äbhäsa 1.2.1 (k); 1.2.4 (v);
änava (mala) m .2.4 (k); in.2.5 (v); 1.3.2 (k); 1.4.2 (k,v);
ätman 1.1.5 (v); 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.5.4 (k); 1.5.5 (v);
1.2.3 (k,v); 1.2.4 1.5.6 (v); 1.5.8 (k,v);
(k,v); 1.2.5 (k); 1.2.6 1.5.9 (k,v); 1.5.17 (v);
(v); 1.2.7 (k,v); 1.2.8 1.6.2 (v); 1.6.3 (v);
(k,v); 1.2.11 (v); 1.6.6 (k,v); 1.6.8 (k);
1.3.1 (k,v); 1.3.1 (v); 1.7.1 (v); 1.7.3 (v);
1.4.3 (v); 1.4.4 (k,v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.6 (v);
1.5.2 (k); 1.5.10 1.7.9 (v); 1.8.1 (k,v);
(k,v); 1.5.11 (v); 1.8.3 (v); 1.8.5 (v);
1.5.12 (k,v); 1.5.15 1.8.6 (k,v); 1.8.7 (v);
(k,v); 1.5.16 (k); 1.8.8 (v); n .1.4 (k,v);
1.5.17 (k,v); 1.5.20 n.1.5 (v); n.1.6 (k,v);
(k,v); 1.6.1 (v); 1.7.1 II.2.1 (v); II.2.2 (v);
(v); 1.8.5 (k); II. 1.6 II.2.5 (v); II.2.7
(v); II. 1.7 (v); (v); II.3.1-2 (k,v);
II.3.17 (v); II.4.18 II.3.3 (k); II.3.4-5
(k); I I I.l.l (v); (k,v); II.3.6 (k,v);
III.2.2 (v); III.2.19 II.3.7 (v); II.3.8
(v); IV .l (v); IV. 15 (v); II.3.10-11 (v);
(k,v); IV. 16 (k); II.3.12 (v); II.3.15-
ätmaparyavasita II.4.15 (v); 16 (k,v); II.4.5 (v);
238
n.4.7 (k,v); II.4.11 m . 1.3 (k,v); III. 1.4
(v); n.4.12-13 (k,v); (v); III. 1.9 (v); IV. 1
II.4.19 (k); II.4.20 (k); IV.2 (k); IV.7
(k,v); 11.4.21 (k); (v); IV. 11 (v);
III. 1.9 (v); II1.2.1 idambhäva UI. 1.4 (k);
(v); 111.2.16 (v); IV.7 indriya 1.3.2 (v); 1.5.4 (v);
(v); 1.5.8 (k,v); II.2.2 (k);
äbhasana 1.5.7 (v); 1.6.7 (v); n.4.4 (k); III.2.14
1.6.9 (k,v); 1.6.10 (k); (v); UI.2.16 (v);
äbhäsamänatä 1.5.4 (v); Isa 1.5.16 (k);II.3.17 (k);
âbhâsâtmatâ 1.5.4 (v); m.2.20 (k); IV.9-10
âbhâsita 1.4.2 (k); 1.5.8 (v); (k,v);
übhäta 1.5.8 (k); 1.5.18 (v); Išitr n.1.8 (k); IU. 1.2 (v);
n.1.7 (v); n.3.1-2 (v); Išvara 1.1.2 (v); 1.1.3 (v);
n.3.4- (v); 11.3.16 (k); 1.1.5 (v); 1.2.11 (v);
ämarsa 1.5.10 (k); IV. 1 (k); 1.5.10 (v); 1.5.16 (v);
äVmrs 1.4.2 (k); 1.4.8 (k); 1.5.17 (v); I.6.4-5
äV lamb n.2.4 (v); II.2.5 (k); (v); 1.8.9 (v); 1.8.11
älambanatä 1.3.3 (k); (v); U.1.5 (k); II. 1.7
äloka 1.7.10 (k,v); 1.7.11 (v); II.3.12 (k,v);
(k,v); n.3.15 (k); II. 3.17
äVvis 1.6.7 (k); IV. 16 (k); (v); II.4.1 (v); II.4.3-
âviçta 1.6.7 (v); 4 (v); II.4.8 (v);
âviçkarana 1.1.3 (k); n.4.9 (v); II.4.11 (v);
âviçkrta IV. 15 (v); III. 1.3 (k,v); UI.2.7
ävrtti II. 1.6 (v); (k,v); in.2.9 (v);
âvesa 1.2.7 (v); 1.3.1 (v); III.2.16 (v); IV .4 (v);
IV. 11 (v); IV. 16 (v); IV.6 (v); IV.9-10 (v);
âsaya III.2.3 (v); IV. 11 (v); IV. 12 (v);
äsraya 1.1.4 (k); 1.2.9 (v); IV .15 (v); IV .17
äsrayatva 1.2.6 (v); II.4.5 (v); (k,v);
âhlâda 1.8.3 (v); Isvaratä IV. 11 (k);
icchä 1.5.7 (k,v); 1.5.10 Išvaratva 1.5.7 (v);
(k,v); 1.6.7 (k); 1.8.9 ïsvarapratyabhijnâ IV. 18 (k,v);
(k); II.3.3 (v); II.3.12 Isvarabhâva IV .12 (v);
(k); II.3.15-16 (v); uccheda 1.2.4 (v);
II.4.1 (k,v); 11.4.10 utpatti II.4.11 (k,v);
(k,v); II.4.21 (k,v); Utpala IV. 18 (k);
UI.2.4 (v); IU.2.5 utpäda IV. 11 (v);
(v); III.2.7 (k); utpädana 1.6.7 (v); II.4.3-4 (v);
icchâsakti II.4.1 (v); II.4.8 (v);
idantä 1.5.17 (v); 1.5.20 (k); utprekçü 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.8.2 (v);
III. 1.4 (v); m. 1.5 (v); IV.8 (k,v);
III. 1.8 (v); IV.2 (v); udaya II.3.1 (k); II.4.14 (v);
IV.7 (k); Udayäkara IV. 18 (k);
idam 1.6.7 (v); 1.8.8 (v); udäna m.2.20 (k,v);
239
udVbal ÜI.2.11 (v); ekadeša 1.7.13 (v); II.2.5 (k);
udbalita m .2.11 (k); IV.2 (v);
udyama 1.1.2 (v); ekarüpatä II.2.5 (k);
udreka III. 1.2 (k,v); m.2.18 eklbhäva 1.5.16 (v);
(v); aikägrya IV. 11 (k);
unmajjana II.3 .15-16 (v); aikütmya 1.8.8 (k);
unmeça UI. 1.3 (k,v); aikya 1.2.9 (v); 1.4.3 (k,v);
upakära 1.1.1 (k); 1.6.6 (v); 1.8.6 (k);
upacaya m.2.18 (k,v); 1.8.10 (k);U.2.4 (k,v);
upadidikçu U.3.15-16 (v); II.2.5 (v); II.3.7 (k);
upaVdiš n.3.15-16 (v); U.3.10-11 (v); n.3.13
upaVdrs 1.1.3 (k,v); (v); n.3.14 (v); U.4.5
upadcša 1.3.6 (v);U.3.15-16 (v); m .2.7 (k);
(v); n.3.17 (v); aindriyaka II.3.4-5 (v);
upabrrphita IV. 1 (v); aisa IV. 11 (k);
upayoga II. 1.3 (v); II.2.1 (k); aisvarya I.1.2 (v); 1.5.13 (k,v);
U.3.15-16 (v); II.4.9 (k); III. 1.2 (v);
upayogin n.2.1 (v); III. 1.7 (k,v); ni.2.2
uparakta 1.5.11 (k); m.2.6 (v); (k); m .2.3 (v); IV. 11
uparodha IV. 10 (k); (v);
upaVlaks 1.1.5 (k); aunmukhya 1.5.15 (k);
upalaksana 1.7.4 (v); 1.8.4 (k); karana I.6.4-5 (v); m . 1.10-
upalaksita 1.1.3 (k); II. 1.3 (v); 11 (k,v); IV.5 (k);
upalabdha 1.4.1 (k); karanašakti UI.2.17 (v);
upalabdhiyogya 1.7.8 (k); kartr 1.1.2 (k); 1.2.11 (k);
upalabdhr 1.4.1 (k); I.4.1 (v); 1.6.7 (v);
upaVlabh 1.7.4 (v); II.4.5 (v); U.4.7 (v);
upalambha 1.4.5 (v); U.4.21 (v); m . 1.6 (k);
upaVl! 1.7.2 (v); III.2.5 (k,v); III.2.8
upasamhära III.2.1 (v); (k);
upasarjanatva III.2.11 (v); m.2.12 kartrkarmatva II.4.2 (k);
(v); kartftä 11.4.18 (k,v); U.4.21
upadána 1.5.7 (k); (k,v); m . 1.6 (v);
upâdeya III.2.20 (v); IV. 1 (v); m .2.6 (k); IU.2.9 (v);
upärüdha II.3.1-2 (v); m.2.11 (k,v); III.2.12
ullikhita 1.8.4 (k,v); (ktv); m .2.13 (k);
ullekha I.3.5 (k,v); 1.8.8 111.2.18 (k); IV.3 (v);
(k,v); 1.8.9 (k,v); IV.6 (v); IV. 16 (k);
II.3.12 (v); kartjtva 1.2.11 (v); U.4.2 (v);
Vu h 1.1.5 (k); 1.5.4 (v); m .2.6 (v); III.2.9
ekatä U.3.4-5 n.3.6
(v); (v); (k,v);
II.3.14 (v);n.4.17 karmatä U.4.2 (v);
(v); m.2.20 (v); karman 1.5.17 (k); II.2.3 (k);
ekatva 1.8.10 (k); n.3.11 (k); U.4.5 (v); n.4.21 (v);
n.4.5 (v); n.4.17 (k); m . 1.1 (k); IU.2.2
U.4.20 (k); (ktv); m .2.3 (v);
240
ÜI.2.5 (v); m .2 .8 käryalirigatä 1.7.5 (v);
(v); III.2.9 (v); käla 1.2.3 (v); 1.2.7 (v);
karmendriya 01.1. 10-11 (v); 1.2.9 (v); 1.4.2 (k,v);
kala m . 1.9 (v); III.2.11 1.4.3 (k); 1.4.4 (v);
(k); 1.5.2 (v); 1.5.8 (v);
kaläsakti III.2.11 (v); 1.5.14 (k,v); 1.5.21
kalita U.4.18 (v); (k,v); 1.7.1 (v); 1.7.3
kalpatva ni.2 .2 0 (v); (k); 1.7.13 (v); 1.8.2
kalpanä 1.2.6 (v); 1.6.6 (k,v); (v); II. 1.3 (k,v);
U.2.3 (k,v); n.1.5 (k,v); n .1.6
käya 1.1.5 (k,v); 1.2.9 (k,v); (k,v); II.2.1 (k);
II.3.9 (v); n .2 .2 (k,v); n.2.6
käraka 1.2.9 (v); 1.2.10 (v); (v); n.3.2 (k); U.3.4-
H.2.6 (k); 5 (k,v); II.3.9 (v);
kärana 1.5.7 (v); 1.8.6 (v); II.4.18 (k,v); I II.l.l
11.4.7 (k,v); 11.4.9 (k); III. 1.9 (k,v);
(v); II.4.14 (v); III.2.16 (v); III.2.20
II.4.15 (v); II.4.17 (v);
(k,v); III.2.10 (k); kälasakti II. 1.2 (k,v);
käranatä n.4.8 (v); 11.4.21 (v); Kjttikä II.4.14 (v);
käranatva II.4.2 (v); krama 1.2.9 (v); 1.5.4 (v);
kärma III.2.5 (k,v); III.2.10 1.6.7 (v); 1.7.1 (k);
(k,v); 1.7.3 (k); n . 1.1 (k);
kärmamala Iü.2.8 (k); m .2.9 (k); n.1.2 (v); n.1.3 (k,v);
kärya 1.5.6 (v); 1.7.9 (v); II. 1.4 (k,v); 11.1.5
1.8.6 (v); 1.8.11 (v); (ktv); 0.1.6 (k,v);
II.3.4-5 (v); II.3.6 U.1.7 (k); 0 .2.6 (v);
(v); n.3.7 (k,v); 0.4.5 (k,v); II.4.7
II.4.6 (k,v); II.4.7 (v); 0.4.9 (k); 0.4.18
(k,v); II.4.11 (k,v); (k); 10.1.1 (k,v);
II.4.13 (k); II.4.14 kriyä 1.1.2 (v); 1.1.4 (k,v);
(v); 11.4.15 (v); 1.1.5 (k,v); 1.2.8 (v);
II.4.17 (k,v); ID. 1.10- 1.2.9 (k,v); 1.2.10 (v);
11 (k,v); 1.5.17 (v); 1.5.19 (v);
käryakarmaphalani 1.6.11 (k); 1.8.11 (k,v);
y am a III. 1.9 (v); 0.1.1 (k,v); 0.1.2
käryakäranatä 1.7.2 (v); 1.7.4 (k); (k,v); II.1.3 (v); 0.1.4
II.3.8 (k,v); II.4.2 (v); 0.1.5 (k,v); 0.1.
(k); II.4.4 (k); II.4.14 6 (v); 0.2.1 (k,v);
(k); 0.2.3 (v); 0.2.6 (k,v);
käryakäranabhäva 1.2.10 (k,v); 1.7.4 0.2.7 (v); 0.3.12 (k);
(v); 1.7.5 (v); II.4.14 0.4.1 (k,v); 0.4.5
(v); n.4.16 (v); (k,v); 0.4.7 (k,v);
käryatä 11.4.6 (v); 0.4.18 (k,v); 0.4.20
käryatva II.4.2 (v); n.4 .6 (v); (k,v); 0.4.21 (k,v);
IV.5 (k); m . 1.1 (k,v); m . 1.9
241
(v); IV.3 (k,v); IV.4 citikartrtâ 1.5.12 (k,v);
(k,v); IV.6 (k,v); citikriyâsakti 1.5.14 (v);
IV.10 (k); IV .15 (k); citišakti 1.5.20 (v);
kriyâkârakabhâva 11.4.16 (k,v); citkriyä 1.5.12 (k);
kriyätva 11.4.20 (v); cittattva 1.3.7 (v); 1.5.7 (v);
kriyâsakti 11.4.21 (v); IV. 15 (v); 1.5.21 (v); I.6.4-5
kleša III.2.3 (k,v); (k,v); 1.6.8 (v); 1.6.9
kçana 1.5.19 (k); (v); 1.8.11 (v); II. 1.1
kçetrajna IV.8 (v); IV.9-10 (v); (v); II.4.20 (v);
I V .ll (v); IV .12 (v); m .2.11 (k,v);
kçetrajfiatâ IV. 11 (v); citra II.3.15 (k);
gandha III. 1.10-11 (v); cidâtman 11.4.19 (k,v); II.4.20
gamaka II.4.12-13 (v); (v); III.2.12 (k);
guna 1.5.17 (v); II.3.14 (k); cidghana 111.2.2 (k);
m . 2.12 (k); IU.2.18 cidvapus 1.3.7 (k); II.4.21 (v);
(k); IV.5 (k); IV. 17 cetanakriyâ 1.5.12 (v);
(k); cetas 1.4.2 (v);
gunatâ III.2.11 (k); caitanya 1.2.8 (k,v); 1.5.12
gunavibhakti II.4.15 (v); (k,v);
grâhaka 1.4.8 (k); IV. 1 (v); chäyä 1.2.8 (v); II.3.4-5
IV.2 (k); IV.8 (v); (v); II.3.10-11 (ktv);
grâhaklkfta IV.2 (v); D.4.5 (v);
grâhya 1.4.8 (k); IV. 1 (v); cheda 111.2.19 (k);
IV.2 (v); IV.6 (v); jagat U.4.21 (k,v);
IV.8 (v); jatja 1.1.2 (v); 1.1.4 (k,v);
ghana II. 1.7 (v); II.2.5 (v); 1.5.4 (v); 1.5.11 (k);
IV .14 (k); 1.5.12 (k,v); II.4.2
caksus 1.6.10 (v); 1.8.8 (v); (k,v); U.4.8 (v);
111.2.16 (v); n .4 .1 4 (k,v); II.4.15
cañcalatá IV.9-10 (v); (v); II.4.19 (k,v);
camatkâra IV. 1 (v); IV.6 (v); II.4.20 (v); III.2.11
camatkrti 1.5.11 (v); (v);
caya 1.7.10 (k); jacjatva 1.2.7 (v);
cikirçâ II.4.20 (k,v); n.4.21 janasthiti 1.3.6 (k);
(v); jâgara m .2.17(k,v); IU.2.18
cit 1.2.7 (k,v); 1.2.8 (v); (v); UI.2.19 (v);
1.3.5 (v); 1.3.7 (k) jâgrat 111.2.19 (k);
1.5.10 (v); 1.5.13 (v) jücjya 1.2.8 (k);
1.5.19 (v); 1.7.1 (k,v) jâti 1.5.17 (v); II.2.5 (k);
1.8.7 (k,v); 1.8.11 (v) 11.2.6 (v); II.3.14
II.4.1 (v); II.4.8 (v) (k,v);
n.4.20 (k); n.4.21 (v) jihasâ 1.5.19 (v);
in.1.3 (v); m .1 .4 (v) Vjîv 1.1.4 (k,v); 1.1.5 (v);
m .1 .9 (v); IV. 14 (k) IV. 16 (v);
1.5.12 (v); 1.5.13 (k) jlva 1.6.11 (k); III.2.14
1.5.18 (v); (v);
242
jlvattva 1.1.4 (v); tirahkrta II.3.1-2 (v);
jlvana 1.1.4 (k,v); III.2.14 tiroVdhá II. 1.8 (v);
(k,v); tirodhána 1.1.5 (v); III. 1.7 (k);
jrm bhá IV.2 (v); tiryañc III.2.20 (v);
jñapti 1.3.2 (v); 1.7.12 (k); tisthásu II.4.21 (k);
III. 1.4 (v); turyadasa III.2.20 (v); IV. 1 (v);
Vjñá IV. 15 (k); turyátlta UI.2.20 (v);
jñátr 1.1.2 (k); II. 1.8 (v); traikálya 11.3.8 (v);
jñátrtva 1.2.11 (v); trailokya 11.3.8 (v);
jñáteya 1.2.10 (v); 1.7.2 (k); darsana 1.4.5 (k); 1.4.6 (v);
jñána 1.1.2 (v); 1.1.4 (k,v); 1.4.7 (k,v); 1.5.8 (v);
1.1.5 (k,v); 1.2.1-2 1.7.9 (v); IV.9-10 (v);
(k,v); 1.2.6 (v); 1.2.7 darsanayog; 1.7.8 (v);
(k,v); 1.2.8 (v); 1.3.1 dasá 1.2.7 (v); III. 1.2 (k);
(k); 1.3.2 (v); 1.3.6 n i. 1.3 (v); III.2.20
(k,v); 1.3.7 (k,v); 1.5.2 (v); IV.7 (v); IV. 12
00
y*
(v);
2
243
I.7.3 (k); II. 1.5 (k,v); (k); n .4 .1 4 (v); IV. 11
n.1.7 (k); 11.2.2 (k,v); (v);
II.2.6 (v); II.3.1-2 (v); niyati 11.4.9 (v); n . 4 . 1 1 (v);
II.3.2 (k); II.3.4 (k); m. 1.9 (v); UI.2.2 (v);
II.3.4-5 (v); n.3.8 (v); niyatišakti U.3.6 (v); n .4 .1 2-13
II.3.9 (k,v); II.3.13 (v);
(k,v); II.4.12-13 (v); niyama 1.3.2 (v); 1.5.3 (v);
deha 1.6.4 (k); 1.6.6 (v); niyamita n .3 .6 (v); n .3 .1 2 (v);
1.6.7 (k,v); II. 1.6 (v); niräkarana 1.1.2 (v);
III. 1.8 (v); nirdesa 1.4.6 (v); 1.4.8 (v);
dehatva IV. 13 (v); nirbhäsa II. 1.5 (k);
doça II.3.10 (k); nin/mä 1.5.16 (k); rV .9 -l0(v);
dravya I.5.12 (v); n.2.1
(k); nirmäna 1.6.11 (v); n .4 .2 (v);
II.2.5 (k); n.2.6(v); IU.2.4 (v); n i.2 .5 (v);
II.3.5 (k); II.3.7
(v); m .2 .6 (v); m .2 .7 (v);
dra$t r 1.2.2 (k); 1.2.6 (k,v); IV.7 (v);
dvayâkçepin 1.6.1 (k); nirmänatä II.4.11 (k);
dviçtha 1.2.11 (k,v); nirmänasakti II.1.8 (k);
dveša III.2.18 (v); nirmätrtä I.5.10 (v); 1.7.1 (v);
dharma 1.2.6 (k,v); 1.2.7(v); II.4.1 (k,v);
1.5.6 (v); m.2.20 (v); nirmita III.2.6 (k); IV.2 (v);
dharmin 1.7.13 (k,v);n.3.9 (v); IV.3 (v);
dhärana II.4.19 (v); nirmitatva II.4.11 (v);
dhl n.2.4 (k,v);n.2.6 (k); nirvikalpaka 1.2.1-2 (v);
II.3.7 (k); m. 1.3 (k); nirvrtti U.4.10 (v);
III. 1.6 (k); nirhräsa IV. 11 (v);
dhQma n.3.4-5 (k,v); II.4.12- nišcaya 1.1.3 (v); 1.6.1 (v);
13 (k,v); 1.6.3 (v); U .4 .1 1 (v);
dhvani n.3.5 (k); nišcayana 1.6.3 (k);
nabhas 1.6.4 (k); n.3.13 (k,v); nišcita 1.6.8 (k); II.4.11 (k);
Vnaš 1.3.6 (k); nisedha 1.1.2 (k); 1.6.1 (v);
nasta 1.4.2 (v); 1.7.11 (v); III.2. 13
nämaröpa 1.5.20 (k,v); (v);
nâsa 1.2.3 (v); 1.2.4 (k,v); nisarga 1.1.5 (v);
nityatä 1.2.7 (v); n.3.1-2(v); nisthiti 1.7.9 (k);
nityatva ni.2.7 (v); naipuna II.3.3 (v);
nidhana H. 1.2 (v); nyönatä UI.2.18 (v); m . 2 . 1 9
nibandhana 1.5.3 (v); 1.5.5 (k); (v);
1.7.3 (v); 1.8.6 (k); pati n i.2.3 (k,v); IV .6 (k);
IV. 16 (v); pada 1.4. 5 (k); II.2.4 (k);
nimajjana n.3.15-16 (v); n .3 .5 (k); II.4.15 (k);
nimitta 1.5.8 (v); U.4.8 (ktv); m . 2 . 1 5 (v); III.2.16
nimittakäranatva n.4.8 (v); (k,v); IV.2 (k); IV. 11
nimeça m. 1.3 (k,v); (k); IV. 16 (k);
niyata 1.8.11 (k); II.3.4-5 padärtha 1.3.7 (v); 1.7.1 (k,v);
(v); n.3.6 (k);n.3.12 1.7.9 (v);
244
paratantrlkrta III. 1.9 (v); pašu III.2.3 (k,v); IV.4
parata III. 1.5 (k,v); (k,v); IV.6 (k,v);
paratva UI. 1.2 (k); pasubhäva m . 1.7 (k,v); IV.8 (v);
paramäksara IV. 14 (k); päratantrya 1.2.11 (k,v);
paramänu II. 1.7 (v); II.4.2 (v); pisäca 1.7.11 (k,v);
paramätman 1.5.13 (k); 1.8.10 (v); pums IV.3 (k);
1.8.11 (v); pumstva III.2.3 (v);
paramärtha 1.1.1 (v); 1.3.6 (v); purahsthita 1.4.7 (v);
U.3.15 (k); II.4.20 puruça III.2.7 (v); m .2.13
(v); III.2.4 (v); (v);
parameša 1.5.20 (k); puryaçtaka III.2.1 (v); m.2.14
param esvara 1.1.1 (v); 1.5.14 (v); (k);
1.5.18 n.1.8
(v); (v); puryaçtakatâ IU.2.14 (v);
n.4.8 m.2.20
(k); (v); puryaçtakatva m.2.14 (v);
IV.16 (v); pum a n.1.7 (k); UI.2.4 (v);
param esthin 1.5.14 (k); m.2.6 III.2.9
(v); (v);
parasparasvabhä- m .2.20 (v); IV. 14 (v);
vatva II.4.17 (k); pûm atâ II.1.8 (v);
parätman 1.4.5 (v); pürnatva III.2.4 (v);
paräparadasa III. 1.5 (k); pûrvasiddha 1.1.2 (v);
paräparävasthä III. 1.5 (v); pûrvâparibhuta 1.2.9 (v);
parämarsa 1.4.2 (v); 1.4.6 (v); prthakçthiti 1.5.15 (k);
1.4.8 (v); 1.5.17 (k); pjthagbhüta 1.4.4 (v);
n.3.4-5 (v); n.4.20 prthivî U I.1.10-11 (v);
(k); IV.2 (k,v); IV.3 paurvâparya II.4.14 (v);
(v); IV.7 (k,v); IV. 11 prak arana IV. 16 (v);
(v); IV. 12 (v); praVkäs 1.4.8 (v); 1.5.4 (v);
paräVmrs 1.4.2 (v); 1.5.17 (v); 1.5.7 (k,v); 15.20 (v);
II.2.5 (v); II.4.20 (v); 1.5.21 (v); 1.6.8 (v);
paräväc 1.5.13 (k); 1.6.1 (v); 1.8.7 (v); n .1 .8 (v);
pariVchid 1.7.9 (v); prakaša 1.2.7 (v); 1.2.8 (v);
paricchinna IV.2 (v); I.m 5 (v); 1.4.1 (v);
parijñáta IV. 12 (v); IV. 17 (k); 1.4.3 (v); 1.5.2 (k,v);
parinäma 1.2.9 (v); n.4.18 (v); 1.5.3 (k,v); 1.5.10 (v);
parinamattä U.4.18 (k); 1.5.11 (k,v); 1.5.18
parinämin IV.5 (k); (v); 1.6.1 (k,v); 1.6.2
parinisthita 1.3.6 (v); 1.7.3 (v); (k,v); 1.6.7 (v); 1.8.7
1.7.9 (v); (v); 1.8.9 (k,v); 1.8.10
parinisthiti 1.7.6 (k); (k,v);1.8.11 n.1.7
(v);
parimita n.1.7 (v);m.2.11 (v); (v); n.3.7 (k); U.3.17
parimitatva III.2.4 (v); (k); IV.6 (v); IV.7
parimitatvakarana IV.3 (v); (v);
parisllana I V .ll (v); IV. 16 (v); prakâsatâ 1.2.7 (k); 1.2.8 (k);
parispanda 1.1.5 (v); 1.5.2 (k);
parešasakti 1.5.20 (k); prakâsamânatâ 1.4.3 (v); 1.5.2 (v);
paroksädh yak sata n.3.10 (k); prakäsätmatä 1.5.3 (v);
245
prakäsita 1.4.2 (v); prabhü 11.3.7 (v);
praVklp II.4.15 (k); IV.8 (k); prabhäva 1.1.3 (v);
prakäsya 1.5.3 (k); prabhu 1.5.16 (k); 1.6.7 (k);
pratipatti III. 1.4 (v); II. 1.2 (k,v); II. 1.4
pratibimba n.4.19 (v); (k,v); IU.2.5 (v);
pratiVbhä 11.3.4-5 (v); III.2.6 (v); IV.7 (k);
pratibhä 1.6.3 (k); 1.7.1 (k); pram ana 1.5.6 (v); 1.7.5 (k,v);
pratiVbhäs I.5.10 (v); 1.5.21 (k); 1.7.13 (v); II. 1.7
pratibhäsa II.3.6 (k); (v); n.3.1-2 (k,v);
pratiyoga 1.6.1 (v); 11.3.8 (k,v); II.3.9
pratiyogin 1.6.1 (v); 1.6.2 (v); (v); II.3.15-16 (k.v);
1.6.4-5 (v); 1.6.5 (k); II.4.11 (k);
pratisthä 1.1.4 (k); pramänatva n.3.15-16 (k,v);
pratisamdhäna 1.5.19 (k); pramätf 1.1.2 (v); 1.4.5 (v);
pratlti 1.5.17 (v); 1.7.9 (v); 1.4.6 (v); 1.4.7 (v);
pratyakça 1.1.5 (v); 1.5.1 (v); 1.4.8 (k,v); 1.5.1 (v);
1.7.4 (k,v); 1.7.7 (v); 1.5.2 (v); 1.5.17 (v);
1.7.13 (v); 1.8.1 (v); 1.6.3 (v); 1.6.6 (v);
1.8.2 (v); II.3.7 (v); 1.6.7 (v); 1.6.8 (v);
II.3.9 (v); 1.7.1 (k,v); 1.7.2 (k,v);
pratyaksatva 1.8.7 (v); 1.7.3 (v); 1.7.4 (k,v);
pratyak$lkära 1.4.2 (v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.6 (k,v);
pratyagätman IV.3 (v); IV.6 (v); 1.7.13 (k,v); 1.8.6
IV.8 (k); (k,v); 1.8.10 (v);
pratyabhijnä 1.1.1 (v); IV .15 (v); 11.1.6 (v); II. 1.7 (v);
pratyabhiVjñá 1.1.1 (k); 1.1.3 (k); n.2.3 (v); II.2.4 (k);
1.6.6 (v); IV. 16 (v); n.2.7 (v); n.3.1-2 (v);
IV. 17 (k,v); 11.3.14 (k,v); II.3.15-
pratyabhijñana 1.1.3 (v); III. 1.7 (v); 16 (k,v); II.3.17 (v);
pratyavamarša 1.4.1 (v); 1.5.11 (v); 11.4.1 (v); U.4.6
1.5.13 (k); 1.5.14 (v); (k,v); n.4.7 (v); II.4.9
1.5.19 (v); 1.6.1 (v); (v); II.4.12-13 (k,v);
11.3.3 (v); U .3.10-11 11.4.16 (k,v); U.4.20
(k,v); IV.8 (v); (v); m.1.1 (v); m .1 .9
pratyavaVmrš 1.4.7 (v); (k,v); III.2.1 (v);
pratyavamršya 11.4.5 (v); IU.2.2 (k,v); m .2 .3
Vprath IV.7 (v); (k,v); III.2.12 (v);
prathana 1.4.4 (v); 111.2.14 (v); III.2.16
pratha 111.2.5 (k); (v); III.2.17 (k); IV.3
pradaršana 11.3.17 (v); (v); IV. 11 (v);
pradaršita IV. 18 (v); pramâmâ n.3.15-16(v); ffl.2.13
praVdrš IV.8 (v); (v);
pradhäna II.4.2 (v); II.4.15 (v); pramätrtva 1.6.5 (k); III. 1.8 (v);
III. 1.10-11 (k,v); 111.2.14 (v);
pradhvarpsa II.3.15-16 (v); pramätrbhäva I.5.17 (v); I.6.4-5 (v);
prabodha 1.3.1 (v); 1.5.5 (k,v); pramiti II.3.15-16 (k,v);
246
prameya 1.4.5 (v); 1.7.1 (v); bähyatä 1.8.5 (k); 1.8.8 (k,v);
III. 1.9 (k,v); III. 1.10- n.4.6 (v); m .2.17 (k);
11 (v); III.2.1 (k,v); bähyatva 1.5.7 (v); 1.8.5 (v);
IV. 14 (v); 1.8.6 (k); 1.8.7 (k);
prameyatva 1.5.17 (v); bähyäntahkarana 1.8.8 (v); n.4.3-4 (v);
prayatna 1.8.4 (v); III. 1.11 (k);
pray oj aka III.2.10 (v); bähyäntaratä II.3.10 (k);
pral aya III.2.15 (k,v); bâhyâbhâsatâ II.4.8 (v);
Pralayakevalin III.2.8 (v); buddhi 1.2.8 (k,v); 1.5.18 (v);
Pralayâkala III.2.8 (k); 1.6. 4-5 (k,v); 1.6.10
pravartita II.3.17 (v); (k,v); II.2.1 (k);
praväha U.3.7 (v); m .2.20 (v); II.2.7 (v); II.3.7 (v);
praVvrt 1.5.10 (k); II.3.17 (k); n.3.13 (v); III. 1.8
pra vrtti 1.8.1 l(v);H .3.9 (k,v); (k); III. 1.10-11 (v);
prasväsa III.2.19 (v); III.2.13 (k,v); IV.2
prasartga 1.2.7 (v); 1.7.11 (v); (k,v); IV.3 (v);
prasara III.2.1 (k); IV. 12 (k); buddhïndriya III. 1.10-11 (v);
prasäda 1.1.1 (v); bubhûçâ n .4.20 (v);
prasiddha II. 1.3 (v); brrphita IV. 1 (k);
praVsidh 1.1.5 (v); bodha 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.2.3 (v);
präna 1.6.4 (k); n i.2.8 (v); 1.2.4 (v); 1.4.5 (v);
IU.2.11 (v); III.2.13 1.5.4 (k,v); 1.5.5 (v);
(v); m .2 .1 4 (k,v); m . 1.4 (k); III. 1.6
ni.2.15 (v); III.2.18 (k,v); III.2.4 (k,v);
(k,v); ni.2.19 (k,v); m .2 .6 (k,v); 111.2.7
IU.2.20 (v); IV.2 (v); (k,v); IU.2.8 (v);
IV.3 (v); IV.9-10 III.2.9 (k,v); III.2.12
(k,v); (k,v);
pranašakti III.2.20 (v); bodhatä III.2.4 (v);
prädhänya III. 1.2 (v); III.2.18 bodhatva III.2.7 (v);
(k); bauddha 1.8.9 (v);
prerana III.2.14 (v); Brahman III.2.1 (k,v);
prerikä III.2.14 (k); bhagavat 1.7.14 (v);
phala IV .17 (v); bhartr 1.8.9 (k); III.2.6 (k);
baddha IV. 13 (k,v); bhavattä 1.5.14 (v);
bandha m .2 .1 8 (v); IV.8 (v); bhavanakartrtä 1.5.14 (v);
bandhana UI.2.2 (k); bhavin III.2.10 (k);
bahirbhäva m . 1.2 (k,v); bhavisyat III. 1.9 (v);
bahiskära III. 1.1 (v); bhaviçyattâ II.1.6 (v);
bädhaka 1.7.7 (v); Vbhä 1.4.4 (k,v); 1.4.5 (k);
bädha n.3.13 (v); 1.6.7 (k); II. 1.7 (k);
bädhä 1.7.13 (k,v); III.2.5 (v);
bädhita 1.5.6 (v); bhäta 1.4.8 (k); II. 1.6 (k);
bädhyabädhakatva 1.7.6 (v); III. 1.8 (k);
bädhyabädhaka- bhäva 1.5.1 (k); 1.5.10 (k);
bhäva 1.7.6 (k); 1.5.12 (v); 1.5.13 (v);
247
1.7.2 (v); 1.7.3 (v); (k,v); III.2.6 (k);
1.7.9 (k); 1.8.7 (v); UI.2.9 (k,v); IV.8 (k);
II. 1.2 (v); II. 1.3 (v); bhinnata m .2 .7 (k);
II. 1.4 (v); II. 1.5 (v); bhuvana IV. 16 (k);
II. 1.7 (k,v); U.1.8 bheda 1.4.3 (k); 1.4.6 (k,v);
(v); II.2.4 (k); n.2.6 1.5.1 (v); 1.5.17 (k,v);
(v); II.3.14 (k,v); 1.5.18 (v); 1.5.21 (v);
II.4.1 (k,v); n.4.16 1.6.6 (v); 1.7.2 (v);
(k); n.4.17 (v); III. 1.4 1.7.14 (v); 1.8.6 (k,v);
(k,v); IU.1.5 (k); I.8.8 (k); II. 1.4 (k);
m.1.6 (k);m.1.8 (v); U.1.5 (v); U.1.6 (k,v);
III.2.3 (k); IU.2.16 U.1.8 (k); II.2.2 (v);
(k); IV.4 (k); IV.7 U.2.4 (v); II.2.5 (k);
(v); U.2.6 (v); U.3.1-2 (v);
bhavana 1.5.16 (v); II.3.17 (v); U.3.3 (v); U.3.4-5 (v);
bhavabhava 1.8.5 (k,v); II.3.15- U.3.5 (k); U.3.6 (k,v);
16 (v); II.3.9 (v); II.3.10-11
Vbhas 1.4.2 (k); 1.4.5 (k,v); (v); II.3.14 (k,v);
1.5.20 (k); 1.6.7 (k,v); 11.4.5 (v); U.4.17 (k);
n.1.6 (v); III 1.8 (v); U.4.18 (v); U.4.20 (v);
bhas U.1.6 (k); m.1.6 (k,v); III. 1.8
bhasana 1.4.3 (k); 1.4.4 (k); (k); III. 1.11 (k); IV.5
1.5.10 (k); 1.7.13 (v); (k,v); IV.8 (v); IV.9-
U.1.6 (v); III. 1.5 (k); 10 (v); I V .l l (v);
bhitti U.3.15 (k); bhedakata I.5.12 (v);
Vbhid 1.8.6 (v); II.3.3 (k); bhedabheda II.4.19 (k);
n.3.4-5 (v); bhedabhedavat 11.2.7 (k);
bhinna 1.2.6 (v); 1.2.10 (v); bhedita 1.5.11 (v);
1.3.4 (v); 1.3.6 (k); bhoga UI.1.9 (v); III.2.5 (k);
1.4.3 (k,v); 1.4.8 (k); m .2.18 (v); IV.3
1.5.2 (k,v); 1.5.3 (k,v); (k,v);
1.5.5 (v); 1.5.15 (v); bhranta n.2.7 (v); n.3.13 (v);
1.5.18 (k,v); 1.5.20 bhranti 1.3.3 (k,v); 1.3.4 (k,v);
(v); 1.5.21 (k,v); 1.6.2 1.3.5 (v); II.2.7 (k);
(k,v); 1.6.4 (k); 1.6.6 UI.2.16 (v); IU.2.17
(k); 1.7.4 (k); 1.7.6 (v); I V .ll (v);
(v); 1.7.8 (v); 1.7.9 bhrantitva 1.3.5 (k);
(k,v); 1.7.12 (v); mati 1.7.7 (k); 1.7.12 (k);
1.7.14 (k,v); 1.8.6 (k); n.2.5 (v); U.2.6 (v);
1.8.11 (v); n.1.2 (v) IU.1.3 (v); III. 1.5 (v);
II. 1.3 (v); II. 1.4 (v) madhyam arga m .2.20 (v);
II. 1.7 (v); U.3.5 (k) Vman 1.4.7 (k); IV. 13 (k);
U.3.4-5 (v); U.3.7 (v) m anas 1.5.18 (v); II.2.3
3.9
II. (k); n.3.11 (k) (k); I U .l.10-11 (v);
U.4.20 (k); UI.1.4 (v); III.2.16 (k,v);
UI.2.1 (k,v); III.2.5 mantra III.2.20 (k);
248
m antrešvara m.1.6 (v); m ukta m.2.2 (k,v); IV. 13
m aryáda II.4.9 (v); (k); IV. 16 (v);
mala UI.2.4 (k); m.2.5 mukti IV. 13 (v);
(v); III.2.10 (k,v); m ukhyatva III.2.12 (k);
m alatva UI.2.4 (v); mukhyasvabhSva n.3.10-11 (v);
m aháguru IV. 16 (k); mGdhatá II.3.17 (k);
mahásattá 1.5.14 (k); murtivaicitrya n.1.5 (k);
mahešatá IV. 12 (k); m eya 1.4.5 (k); III. 1.9 (k);
mahešvara 1.1.1 (k); 1.1.2 (k); m.1.10 (k); IV.13
1.3.7 (k); 1.6.7 (v); (k);
1.7.1 (k,v); 1.8.11 melanS IV. 1 (v);
(k,v); IV. 1(k,v); IV.2 moha 1.1.3 (k);
(v); IV.3 (v); IV.7 yukti IV. 16 (v);
(v); IV. 13 (k); yogin I.4.5 (k,v); 1.5.7 (k);
mahešvaratá IV. 12 (v); II.4.10 (k,v); n.4.11
maqr 1.6.3 (k); 1.8.10 (k); (k,v);
n.1.6 (k); II. 1.7 (k); yojana 1.5.8 (v); 1.6.6 (k,v);
11.2.3 (k); II.2.7 (k); rajas 1.8.11 (v); IV.4
n.4.7 (k); m.1.1 (k); (k,v); IV.5 (v); IV.6
III. 1.9 (k); (k,v);
m átrtá m.2.1 (k); rasa 1.3.2 (k,v); U.3.7 (v);
m ana 1.4.5 (k); m.1.10-11 (v);
m ánasya II.2.3 (v); r3ga III. 1.9 (v); m.2.3
máyá 1.1.3 (v); 1.4.8 (v); (v);
1.6.4 (k); 1.8.7 (k); rasi 1.5.7 (v);
II.3.17 (v); m.1.7 Rudra m.2.1 (k,v);
(k,v); IU.2.2 (k); rupa 1.2.8 (k); 1.3.2 (k,v)
m.2.3 (k); III.2.5 1.7.9 (v); 1.8.6 (v)
(k); IV.4 (k,v); IV.9- 1.8.9 (v); n.3.8 (v)
10 (v); III. 1.10-11 (v)
m áyám ala IU.2.8 (v); m.2.9 m.2.16 (v);
(k,v); m.2 . 15 (k,v); rodha III.2.19 (v);
máyásakti 1.1.5 (v); 1.5.18 RohinI II.4.14 (v);
(k,v); 1.5.21 (v); linga II.4.13 (k);
I.6.4-5 (v); 1.6.7 (v); lina 1.4.8 (v);
1.7.14 (v); 1.8.7 (v); llnata 1.7.3 (v);
n.1.2 (v); II.3.15-16 loka 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.3.6 (v);
(v); m.1.6 (k,v); n.4.4 (k); IV. 17 (k);
m.1.8 (k,v); m.2.5 lokapaddhati 1.8.10 (k);
(k,v); lokayátrá 1.5.6 (v);
m árga IV. 16 (k,v); IV. 18 varna IV.9-10 (k,v);
(v); vartam 3na I.5.1 (k); 1.5.17 (v)
mita n.1.7 (k); m.2.11 II. 1.6 (v); III. 1.9 (v)
(k); vastu 1.1.4 (v); 1.2.1-2 (v)
miti n.3.2 (k); 1.2.4 (k); 1.2.10 (v)
m ithyá n.3.13 (v); 1.5.15 (v); 1.7.9 (v)
249
I.8.3 (k); II.3.1-2 vibhakti II.4.16 (k,v);
(k,v); n.3.3 (v); viVbhä 1.6.7 (v);
II.3.6 (k»v); 11.3.15- vibhava IV. 12 (k,v);
16 (v); viVbhid n.3.4 (k);
väc 1.5.13 (v); 1.6.1 (k); vibhinna 1.7.2 (k); 1.8.10 (v);
III. 1.10-11 (v); IV.7 (k); IV.8 (k,v);
vâcya 1.5.13 (v); 1.5.17 vibheda II.4.18 (k);
(k,v); n.3.1-2 (v); vibhu 1.4.1 (v); 1.5.18 (k);
väcyatä n.3.8 (v); 1.7.14 (k); n.3.15-16
väsanä 1.5.5 (k,v); (v); III. 1.8 (v);
vikalpa 1.2.1-2 (k,v); 1.4.8 vibhrama III.2.16 (k);
(v); 1.5.16 (v); 1.6.1 vimali 1.1.5 (v);
(k,v); 1.6.3 (k,v); vimarsa 1.5.10 (v); 1.5.11 (k);
I.6.4-5 (k,v); 1.6.8 1.5.12 (v); 1.5.17 (v);
(k); 1.6.10 (k,v); I.5.19 (k); I.6.4-5
1.6.11 (v); 1.8.2 (k,v); 1.8.11 (k,v);
(k,v); 1.8.4 (k,v); II.2.6 (k); n.3.1-2
1.8.8 (k,v); IV.9-10 (k,v); n.3.13 (k);
(k,v); IV. 11 (k,v); vimaršana 1.5.8 (v);
IV. 12 (k,v); vimala 1.7.14 (k);
vikalpatä 1.6.2 (v); vimukta IV. 13 (v);
vikalpana 1.4.7 (v); II.2.5 (k); vimukti IV. 11 (v);
IV.8 (v); viVmrš 1.4.1 (k);
vikasa 1.8.4 (v); IV.5 (v); vimršattva 1.8.11 (k);
viVk| p I.6.4-5 (v); III.2.8 vimohini III. 1.8 (v);
(k,v); viruddha I.5.6 (v); II.3.15 (k);
vicchinna 1.4.8 (v); 1.6.6 (v); II.3.15-16 (v); II.4.3-
II. 1.6 (k); 4 (v);
viccheda III.2.20 (v); virodha 1.7.6 (v); n.4.19
viVjpnbh III. 1.8 (k,v); (k,v); IV.9-10 (v);
vijñátr II. 1.8 (k); viseça 1.2.6 (k,v); 1.5.4 (v);
Vijnänakevala m .2 .7 (k,v); I.8.2 (k); 1.8.4 (v);
Vijfiänäkala Ul.2.20 (k); II.3.4-5 (v); III.2.13
vijñeya II. 1.8 (k); (v);
vidyä UI. 1.6 (k,v); UI. 1.7 visränti 1.7.6 (v); UI. 1.3 (v);
(v); ID. 1.9 (v); IV.9-10 (v);
III.2.2 (k,v); višva I.3.7 (k,v); 1.5.14
vidyašakti III. 1.7 (k); (v); 1.5.18 (v); 1.8.11
vidyesvara III. 1.6 (k,v); m .2 .9 (v); II.3.15-16 (k,v);
(k); II.4.21 (v); III. 1.3
vidyešvaratva III.2.9 (v); (v); m . 1.6 (v);
vinišcaya 1.6.1 (k); III.2.3 (v); III.2.20
viparinâma II. 1.5 (v); (k); IV. 1 (k,v); IV.3
viparyaya III. 1.8 (v); (v); IV.5 (v); IV. 12
viparyäsa III.2.4 (v); m.2.5 (v); (k,v); IV. 17 (k);
vipäka III.2.3 (v); visvätman III. 1.3 (v);
250
vi$aya 1.2.4 (v); 1.2.5 (v); vyavasthà 1.3.5 (v); n.3.14 (v);
1.2.8 (v); 1.3.3(v); U.4.9 (k);
1.3.4 (v); 1.3.5 (v); vyavasthâpaka 1.3.1 (v); 1.3.5 (v);
1.3.6 (v); 1.5.3 (k,v); vyavasthâpana 1.3.4 (v);
1.5.10 (v); 1.7.4 (v); vyavasthita m .2.1 (k);
1.7.14 (v); 1.8.2 (v); vyavahàra 1.2.4 (v); 1.3.6 (v);
1.8.5 (v); 1.8.11 (v); 1.5.6 (k,v); 1.5.16
U.3.2 (k); (v); 1.6.7 (k,v); 1.7.2
viçayatâ 1.6.10 (v); (v); 1.7.14 (k,v);
viçayatva 1.3.3 (k); in.2.16 (k); 1.8.1 (v); 1.8.10 (v);
viçayasthiti 1.3.5 (k); II.3.4-5 (v); II.3.17
visuvat ni.2.19 (k,v); (k,v); II.4.6 (v);
Viçnu m.2.1 (k,v); IV. 16 (v);
Vftti 1.5.18 (v); 1.8.11 (v); vyavaVhr 1.5.16 1.7.10
(k); (v);
IU.1.1 (k); UI.2.14 n.1.6 (v);
(k); IV. 18 (v); vyâna m.2.20 (k,v);
vedaka 1.3.1 (k); 1.4.3 (v); vyâpàra 1.2.9 (v);1.4.1 (v);
1.5.16 (v); m . 1.3 I.6.3 (v);1.6.6 (v);
(v); II. 1.1 U.2.3
(v);
vedayitr 1.2.1-2 (v); (k,v); II.3.1-2 (v);
veditf 1.4.3 (k); 1.5.16 (v); IV.9-10 IV. 11
(v);
-vedin 1.3.6 (k); (v);
vedya 1.2.1-2 (v); 1.3.2 vyâpin 1.2.9 (v); 1.5.14 (v);
(k,v); 1.4.4 (v); 1.4.5 1.7.1 (v);
(v); 1.5.16 (v); vyâpohana 1.6.2 (v); 1.6.3 (k);
III. 1.3 (v); III. 1.4 1.6.5 (k);
(k,v); ni. 1.5 (v); vyâmoha 1.1.3 II.3.17
(v); (v);
UI.1.9 (v); m.2.5 vyüha III. 1.10-11 (v);
(k,v); UI.2.6 (v); šakti 1.1.3 (k); 1.3.7 (v);
111.2.8 (v); UI.2.9 1.4.2 (v); 1.6.7 (v);
(k,v); III.2.13 (v); 1.8.9 (v); n.1.8 (v);
III.2.15 (k,v); IV.2 11.3.17 (k); n.4.1
(v); IV .13 (v); (v); II.4.2 (k);II.4.4
vedyata 1.8.8 (v); n.2.2 (k); (k); m.2.12 (v);
11.4.3-4 (v); IIL2.14 (v); m.2.16
vedyatva II.4.4 (k); (v); IV.5 (v); IV.8
vaicitrya 1.5.5 (k,v); n.1.5 (k); (v); IV.9-10 (k,v);
II.3 .15-16 (k,v); IV. 12 IV. 15
(v); (v);
IV. 10 (k); šaktitva 1.5.7 (v); n.4.1 (k);
vyakti 11.2.5 (k); IV.5 (k);
vyañjaka 11.3.10 (k); šaktimat 1.3.7 n.4.18
(k); (v);
vyatirikta 1.8.7 (v); UI.1.9 (v); IV.5 (k.v);
vyavadhâna 1.5.17 (v); 1.7.9 (v); šabda 1.2.1-2 1.4.8
(v); (v);
11.3.4-5 (v); 1.5.17 (v); U.3.1-2
vyavaVsthâ n.3.1 (k); n.3.1-2 (v); II.3.4-5 (v);
(v); U.3.8 (k,v); II.3.14
251
(k,v); HI. 1.10-11 (v); sattva 1.8.6 (v); 1.8.11 (v);
IV.7 (v); IV.8 (v); IV.4 (k.v); IV.5 (v);
¿arlra 1.2.1-2 (k,v); 1.6.4-5 IV.6 (k,v);
(v); UI. 1.8 (k); satsvabhävatä II.4.3-4 (v);
sariratä m .2 .3 (v); satsvarupatä II.4.3 (k);
sastra IV. 16 (k); Sadäsiva III. 1.3 (k.v);
Šiva 1.5.16 (v); 1.8.11 (v); sadbhäva 1.7.5 (k); 1.8.3 (k);
n.3.17 (v); IV. 14 sadvidyä III. 1.3 (k);
(k); saptaml II.4.15 (k);
sivatä IV. 14 (v); IV. 16 samanvaya 1.7.2 (v); 1.7.3 (k.v);
(k,v); I.7.4 (v); n.2.4 (v);
Šivadr?ti IV. 16 (k,v); II.2.6 (k.v); n.4.16
šuddha 1.4.5 (v); 1.5.13 (v); (M ;
1.5.15 (v); 1.7.8 (k); samarthana II.1.1 (k.v);
1.7.14 (v); 1.8.11 samala 1.7.14 (k);
(k,v); n.3.17 (v); samavapti 1.1.1 (k);
suddhatä m. 1.4 (v); samaveta 1.4.7 (k);
suddhavidyä m. 1.3 (v); samäna III.2.19 (k.v);
sünya I.6.4-5 (v); 1.6.6 (v); samävesa m.2.12 (k.v);
1.7.7 (v); II. 1.4 (v); samäsraya 1.1.2 n.4.16
(v); (k);
U.1.6 (k,v); m . 1.8 samullekha 1.6.11 (k);
(k); III. 1.9 (k,v); samüha n.3.9 (v);
m.2.1 (v); III.2.2 (v); sarpkara 1.5.3 (k);
III.2.8 (k,v); IU.2.11 sarpkalpa 1.5.16 1.5.18
(k);
(k,v); ni.2.12 (k,v); (k,v);
111.2.13 (k); m.2.14 sarpkucita 1.8.11 (v);
(v); IV.2 (v); saipketa IV. 7 (v);
sünyatä 111.2.13 (k); IU.2.15 samkhyä II.2.6 (v);
(v); sapighapana 1.3.6 (v);
šunyatva III.2.6 (v); samniveša 1.6.10 (v);
sväsa III.2.19 (v); saippramo^a 1.3.4 (v);
sakrdäbhäsa 1.7.3 (k); sarpbandha 1.2.10 (k.v); 1.2.11
sakrdvibhäta II. 1.6 (v); (v); 1.5.17 1.7.13
(v);
sakramatva II. 1.2 (k); (v); n.2.1 II.2.4
(k,v);
sat 1.2.8 (v); II. 1.4 (k); (k,v); II.2.6 (v);
n.3.4-5 (k,v); II.4.2 saipbandhitä 1.2.1-2 1.2.8
(v); (v);
(k);II.4.3 (k);II.4.15 sarpbandhin 1.2.8 (v);II. 1.1 (v);
(k.v); n.2.4 II.4.5
(v); (v);
sattä 1.2.9 (v); 1.2.10 (v); sambhinna 1.2.6 (v);
1.4.2 (v); 1.5.4 (v); sarpbheda U.2.2 (v);
1.5.14 (v); 1.8.2 (k); sarplagna U.4.16 (v);.
I.8.5 n.1.5
(k,v); (v); sarpllna 1.6.8 (v);
II.3.4-5 n.3.15-
(v); sapiväda 1.7.13 n.2.7
(v); (v);
16 II.4.2
(v); (k); n.3.13 (v);
II.4.3 n.4.14
(k); (v); saipvit 1.3.2 1.4.3
(v); (k,v);
n.4.20 IV.6
(v); (k); 1.6.8 (v); 1.7.1 (v);
252
1.7.2 (v); 1.8.10 (k,v); IV. 11 (k,v); IV. 13
sarpvitti 1.7.2 (k); (k);
saipVvid 1.3.3 (v); sädhita n .3.3 (k); II.4.5 (v);
sam vedya 1.3.6 (v); 1.5.18 (k); sädhya 1.7.3 (k); n.3.4-5
1.5.21 (k,v); (v);
samvedyatä 1.1.5 (v); sâpekçatva 1.5.15 (v);
sarpsaya 1.2.1-2 (v); säbhilapa 1.2.1-2 (k,v); 1.6.1
saipsarga 1.7.9 (v); (v);
samsara Iü.1.6 (v); m .2 .1 0 sàmakçya 1.8.1 (k);
(k,v); III.2.18 (v); sàmarthya 1.6.11 (v); n.3.3 (v);
IV.8 (v); IV. 12 (v); n.4.12-13 (v);
saipsärin m . 1.7 (v); in .2 .2 n.4 .1 4 (v);
(k,v); III.2.10 (v); sämänädhikaranya n .3 .6 (k,v); II.3.7
m .2.11 (v); IV. 11 (v); III. 1.3 (k,v);
(v); IV.7 (v);
samskära 1.2.5 (k,v); 1.2.6 (k); sâm ànya II.2.1 (k); U.3.1-2
1.3.1 (v); 1.3.2 (k,v); (v); IV.8 (v); IV.9-
1.3.4 (k,v); 1.6.6 (k,v); 10 (v);
1.6.9 (v); II.4.9 (k,v); sämänyarüpatä IV.7 (v);
III.2.8 (v); m .2.13 Särpkhya UI.2.7 (v); III.2.13
(k,v); (v);
samskrta IV.9-10 (v); sämya III.2.19 (v);
saipskfti 1.3.1 (k); IV.8 (v); sära II.3.15-16 (v);
sarpsthäna 1.6.10 (k); II.3.14 säratä 1.5.14 (k);
(v); säratva m. 1.4 (v); IV.7 (v);
saipsparsa n.3.15 (k); sähitya 1.7.9 (v); n.3 .9 (v);
sarga m .2.1 (v); IV. 11 (k); Vsidh 1.5.3 (k); 1.7.8 (k,v);
sarvakartrtva 1.6.11 (v); 1.7.12 (v); IV. 16 (k);
sarvajña 1.4.5 (v); siddha 1.1.2 (k,v); 1.1.3 (v);
sarvajñatva 1.6.11 (v); 1.1.5 (k,v); 1.2.11
sahabhäva II.3.8 (v); (k,v); 1.5.3 (k); 1.6.11
sahitatä 1.7.9 (v); (k); 1.7.8 (k,v); 1-7.12
säksatkära 1.5.19 (k,v); (v); 1.7.13 (k,v);
säksatk arana 1.8.9 (v); n .3 .15-16 (v); II.4.3-
sädäkhya m. 1.2 (k,v); 4 (v); II.4.5 (v);
sädrsya 1.3.2 (v); U.4.7 (v); IV. 16 (k);
Vsädh 1.7.9 (v); 1.7.10 (k); siddhi 1.1.2 (k,v); 1.1.4 (v);
II.3.17 (v); 1.2.5 (v); 1.2.6 (k);
sädhana 1.1.2 (v); 1.7.5 (k); 1.5.3 (v); 1.5.4 (v);
1.7.9 (k); 1.8.3 (v); 1.5.9 (k,v); 1.7.4 (k,v);
U.3.15-16 (v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.9 (v);
sädhärana 1.5.3 (v); II.3.4-5 1.7.11 (v); n .2.7 (k);
(v); n.4.12-13 (v); n.3.8 (v); IV. 18 (k,v);
m .2 .1 4 (v); III.2.16 sisrk$5 1.8.7 (v);
(v); DI.2.17 (k); IV .l sukha 1.2.6 (v); 1.8.3 (k,v);
(v); IV.9-10 (v); 1.8.4 (k,v); 1.8.6 (v);
253
1.8.8 (v); 1.8.9 (k,v); sphuratîâ 1.5.14 (k);
III.2.15 (v); m .2.18 sphuradrupatä 1.5.14 (v);
(k,v); IV.3 (k,v); smarana 1.4.2 (v); 1.6.9 (k);
supta m .2.19 (k,v); smarlr 1.2.6 (k,v);
susupta III.2.18 (v); Vsmr 1.4.1 (k); 1.4.3 (k);
suksmatva m . l . 10-11 (v); 1.4.4 (v); 1.4.6 (k);
súksmadeha m .2 .l (v); smrti I.2.1-2 (v); 1.2.3 (k,v);
Vsrj IV.9-10 (v); 1.2.4 (k,v); 1.2.5 (k,v);
sr?ta 1.5.17 (v); IV.2 (k); 1.2.6 (k,v); 1.3.1 (ktv);
IV.3 (k); 1.3.3 (k,v); 1.3.7 (k,v);
sm i 1.5.17 (k); n.1.8 (v); 1.4.1 (v); 1.4.2 (v);
m.2.16 (k,v); III.2.17 1.4.3 (k,v); 1.4.4 (k,v);
(k,v); 1V.9 (k); IV. 11 1.4.6 (k,v); 1.4.8 (v);
(v); 1.5.17 (v); 1.5.18 (v);
Somananda IV. 16 (v); 1.5.21 (k,v); 1.6.8 (k);
saukhya 1.8.3 (k); 1.6.9 (v); 1.7.5 (k,v);
sausupta m .2.15 (k,v); 1.8.2 (v); 1.8.5 (v);
sauçupti m .2.13 (v); m .2.19 n.1.6 (v); IV.8 (k,v);
(k); smrtita 1.3.4 (k);
sthäyin 1.2.3 (v); 1.2.5 (k); smftitva 1.3.4 (v);
II.3.15-16 (v); svacchatä 1.5.11 (v);
sthâvara III.2.10 (v); svatantrata 1.5.15 (k);
sthiti 1.3.4 (k); 1.3.5 (k); svapna m.2.16 (k,v); III.2.18
1.6.6 (v); 1.8.3 (v); (v); IV. 11 (v);
1.8.4 (k); 1.8.7 (k,v); svaprakáša 1.1.2 (v);
n.1.8 (v); II.3.13 (k); svabhava 1.2.9 (v); 1.4.5 (v);
U.4.5 (k,v); n.4.6 (k); n.3.8 (v); n.4.9 (v);
n.4.7 (k); 11.4.18 (v); n.4.11 (k,v); II.4.14
III. 1.2 (v); m.1.3 (v); (v); n.4.15 (v); ÏÏ.4.18
III.2.1 (ktv); IU.2.15 (v); m. 1.7 (k);
(k,v); IV.5 (k); svarasoditü 1.5.13 (k);
sthülasükçmatva III. 1.11 (k); svalakçana 1.2.1-2 (k,v); 1.4.2
sthairya n.2.1 n.3.1-2
(k); (v); (k,v); n.2.2 (v); II.2.5
sparsa 1.2.9 (v);I.6.4-5 (v); (v); n.3.6 (v); II.3.8
1.7.10 -
(k,v); m . l . 10 (v); n.3.9 (k,v); IV.7
11 (v); m.2.15 (v); (v);
spa$fa III.2.16 (k); IV. 11 svavisränti IV. 10 (k);
(k,v); svasamäpin 1.7.3 (k);
Vsprš II.3.4-5 (v); svasaipvit 1.3.5 (v); 1.3.6 (v);
sphatika 1.5.11 (k); 1.4.5 (k,v); II.4.5 (v);
sphuta 1.2.1-2 1.4.2
(v); (v); svasamvitti 1.7.5 (k);
1.6.11 1.8.4
(k,v); svasaipvedana 1.1.2 (v); 1.1.3 (v);
(k,v); m.2.13 (k); 1.1.5 (v); 1.3.2 (v);
sphutäsphutatva II.3.10-11 (v); 1.7.5 (v); 1.7.13 (k,v);
sphurana U.4.12-13 (v); svätantrya 1.5.13 (k,v); 1.5.15
sphuranakartrtä 1.5.14 (v); (v); 1.5.16 (k,v);
254
n.3.15-16 (v); U.3.17 svämin 1.1.1 (v); 1.5.10 (k);
(v); n.4.20 (v); m. 1.9 svairacärin 1.6.10 (k);
(v); in.2.4 (k,v); harça III.2.18 (v);
m.2.18 (v); IV.8 (v); Himäcala n.4.20 (v);
svatman 1.1.2 (k,v); 1.2.9 (v); hfdaya 1.5.14 (k,v);
1.2.11 (v); 1.3.5 (v); hrdayarpgamlkfta IV. 16 (v);
1.3.6 (v); 1.7.3 (v); hetu 1.1.1 (k); 1.3.5 (v);
1.7.5 (k); 1.7.9 (k,v); 1.5.5 (v); 1.8.1 (v);
n.1.7 (k); n.3.15-16 1.8.3 (k); 1.8.4 (v);
(v); n.4.14(k); m. 1.7 n.1.4 (v); n.1.6 (v);
(v); in.2.6 (k); IV. 1 n.3.17 (v); n.4.11
(k); IV .9-10 (v); (k,v); m. 1.8 (v);
IV. 13 (k,v); IV.17 m.2.1 (v);
(k); hetutä 1.5.4 (k,v); 1.5.5 (k);
svâtmaniçtha 1.7.6 (k); II.n4 (k); 1.7.4 (k); U.4.8 (k);
svâtmapratistha 1.5.14 (v); II.4.11 (v); n.4.18
sväbhäsa 1.3.2 (k); n.3.1-2 (v); n.4.21 (k);
(k,v); hetubhäva m.2.5 (v).
255
In d e x
257
anusamcayavada: 115n; 138 and n; 139n; 145; 146; 162n; 169n;
anusarjidhana, etc. (connection, unifica single reflective - (ekapratyavamaria):
tion, etc.): xvi n; 90n; 126n; 132 and n; 170n; the object of an unconventional
133 and n; 134n; 137; 138n; 159; 160; reflective -: 213; the object of inner re
163; 171; 183n; 184n; 185; 201; the two flective -: 214; the object of reflective -:
levels of meaning of the term 178n; 215n;
apadana: 162n; Badhanta Subhagupta: 113n;
apek?a, apek$ana (requirement, expecta bahydrthanumeyavada: 113n;
tion, dependence, etc.): 96 and n; 97 and bahyarthavadin: U4n; 116n; 117n;
n; 101; 183 and n; reciprocal - bahyavadin: xviii; 157n;
(ianyonyapekfa): 97 and n; beast (pasu): xxxi; xxxix; 198; 200n; 213n;
Apohasiddhi: 130n; -*s creation: 216n; state of -: 193; 194;
Arcaja: 137n; see also limited subject;
association (sahitya, sarpsarga, sahitata): BhagavadgJta: 103n; 200n;
142 and n; 143n; Bhagavan: 123n;
asvada: 119n; BhamatJ: 114n;
atmavadin: 89n; 9 In; 92n; 93n; Bhartrhari: ix; xix; xxiii n; xxiv; xxv and
atom: 115n; 155; 175; agglomeration o f - n; xxvi and n; 108n; 120n; 12In; 125n;
s: 115n; 126n; 150n; 164n; 165n; 176n; 187n;
Attachment: 195; 198; Bhasarvajna: ix;
avisarpvadin: 157n; Bhaskara (the author of the Sivasutra-
Avyayavinirakarana: 115n; varttika): xxx n;
awareness: xviii; 91; 125n; 131n; 152; 171; BhSskarakantha: xliii; xliv; xlv n; 178n;
173n; 186n; - of a limited subjectivity: 189n; 190n;
211; - of the action: 160; - of the self: Bhaskarv. xliii; lOln; 117n; 130n; 131 n;
153; determinate - (pratisarpdhana, anu- 135n; 137n; 143n; 148n; 154n; 161n;
sarpdhana, etc.): 125; 126; 158n; 163n; 181 n; 189n; 192n; 208n;
165; 17In; dim and undifferentiated -: Bhatta: 93n;
213n; immediate and mediated -: 132n; Bhattaraka Sundara: xliv n;
inner -: 86; 88; 176; interconnection Bhavopaharavivarana: xli n;
(identity) between reflective - and iabda- bhunjana: 118n;
na: 163n; introspective -: 108n; non- -: bimba: 113n;
215n; pure -: 108; reflective - *1’ (aharp- body: xxxii; xxxiv n; xxxv; 87; 88n; 90;
paramarsa): xxix; 123 and n; 124 and n; 94; 95; 104n; 11 In; 131; 132 and n; 133
128; 131; 132 and n; 151; 152; reflective and n; 134; 136; 155; 182n; 186n; 189n;
- ‘this* (idarpparamarsa): 123n; 151; 211; 192n; 194 and n; 198; 205n; 207n; 209n;
reflective - (vimaria, paramaria, etc.): 211; 217; -ly activity (kayapravrtti):
xxiv and n; xxv; xxviii; xl; 86n; 87n; 104 169; -ly movement: 87 and n; sthCdatama
and n; 105 and n; 106n; 107n; 109; 110; (the physical -): 205n; the pati's -: xxxi;
118 and n; 119 and n; 120; 122; 123n; the series of distinct moments of -
125 and n; 126n; 127n; 128; 152; 161; (JarTrasantana): 90n;
163 and n; 164n; 170; 171 and n; 177; bond: xvii; xviii; 207; 214; 216n; kaimic -:
187n; 202n; 203n; 210n; 21 In; 213 and 200n;
n; 214n; 216; 217; self- -, self-con Brahman: ix; xviii; xxvi n; 121 n; 197 and
sciousness (svasarpvit, svasamvedana, n; 216n; - devoid of consciousness: xviii;
etc.): xxiii; 92n; 99n; 102 and n; 108; the supreme -: xix;
258
breath: energy of the 209; equal - 218n; the meaning of the -: 150n; the
Csamâna): 207 and n; 208; falling - primary subject of the - (hetu): 150n;
Capâna): 207n; 209n; five -s: 205n; cause (hetu, karana): xix; xxxii; 95 and n;
pervading - (vyâna): xxxiv; 208; 209 and 96n; 97n; 112 and n; 113 and n; 114;
n; physical -: 132n; prâna (rising breath, 115n; 116; 117 and n; 130n; 137 and n;
vital -): xxxii; xxxiii; xxxiv; xxxix; 104n; 138 and n; 140n; 145n; 147; 148n; 149;
131; 132n; 200 and n; 203 and n; 204; 165; 167n; 168 and n; 169n; 175; 177;
206; 207 and n; 209n; 211; supreme 178 and n; 179; 180n; 181n; 182 and n;
208; suspension of the prâna-apâna: 183n; 184; 185; 186 and n; 199 and n;
207n; the dualistic opposition between 204n; - -effect relation: 93n; 95; 96n;
prâna and apâna: xxxiv; 207n; the five 137 and n; 138 and n; 149; 162n; 168n;
functions of the -s: 204n; identification 175 and n; 176; 183 and n; 184n; 195n;
of the I with the - (prânâhantâ): 204 and 204n; auxiliary -s: 178n; causal complex
n; 205 and n; unification of prâna and (hetusamagri): 167n; efficient -: 177;
apâna: 209; udâna -: xxxiv; 208; 209 178 and n; material -: 116; 178n; rad
and n; ical -: 195; the abhasas of the - and
Brhaspati: xiii n; effect: 18In; the pre-existence of the
Brhatparibhâsâvftti: 120n; effect in the -: 175n; 185n;
buddhi (intellect, mind): xxxii; xxxiv n; Chandogya Upanifad: 155n;
xxxv; 93 and n; 94; 97n; 101 n; 106; cognition, knowledge (Jnana): xv; xviii;
109n; 11 In; 123n; 124 and n; 126n; 131; xxviii n; xxx n; xxxii; xxxv; 86; 87 and
132 and n; 135n; 151 and n; 158; 159 n; 88n; 89n; 90 and n; 92 and n; 93 and
and n; 180n; 189n; 191 n; 192n; 194 and n; 94 and n; 95n; 97n; 98n; 99 and n;
n; 196; 200n; 203 and n; 204n; 210; 211; 100; lOln; 102; 103 and n; 106n; 107n;
object of the -: 135; 108 and n; 109 and n; 11 In; 112; 113n;
Buddhism: xxi; xxii; 114n; 115n; U9n; 122; 123n; 124 and
Buddhist logic (Buddhist pramâna tra n; 125n; 126n; 127; 129n; 13In; 134 and
dition): ix; xxii and n; xxvii; 139n; 144n; n; 135 and n; 137n; 138n; 139 and n;
Buddhist logician: xxii; xxiii and n; xxv; 140 and n; 141 and n; 142 and n; 143
xxix; 89n; 90n; 137n; 139n; 167n; and n; 144n; 145; 146 and n; 147; 15In;
camatkâra: xxiv n; xxxvi; 118 and n; 119n; 160n; 161 and n; 162 and n; 168n; 171
210; 212; and n; 172; 180n; 189; 190; 192n; 193n;
carvanâ: 119n; 197n; 202n; 203 and n; 205n; 211; 212
case, factor of the action (kâraka): 94 and and n; 213n; 218; - devoid of mental
n; 97n; 160; 184n; 187n; 188n; - elaboration (avikalpajnana): 125n; - of
endings: 185; 187n; subordinate -s: 184 the svalakfana: 163n; 169n; - that
and n; the meaning of the locative -: 184; pertains to the yogins: 216n; Brahma is
the nominative - is svatantra: 184n; associated with the first moment of -:
causal conditions (pratyayas: adhipati°% 197n; conflict between -s: 139; 146n;
hetu°% samanantara0 and âlambana0): erroneous -: xvi; 17In; indistinct -: 126n;
181 and n; 182 and n; interconnection between objects of -:
causality: 138n; 178n; 179 and n; 180n; 103; invalidating -: 141; invalidation
18In; 183n; 186n; 187; relation of - (badha) of -: 142n; 145 and n; 146n;
between co-existent dharmas: 182n; the non-validity of the -: 139; 145; partial -
Buddhist conception of -: 185n; and activity: 195; power of - (Jna-
causative: - form of the root upapad-: naiakti): xvii; xix; xx; 87n; 93n; 103;
259
126n; 21 In; 212n; 218; pure 152; the 119; power of -: xxxi; 119; 127 and n;
a priori condition of 86n; the supreme -: xxxvii; 104n; 11 In; 146n;
bodharilpata of 109n; the capacity 202n; free dynamism of -: 199n; the grad
(yogyatá) of 162n; the principle of the ual elevation of -: 146n; the light of -:
non-objectifiability of 109n; the series 114n; 127n; 198; 199; 200; - 4I-this’: 210;
of distinct moments of - (Jñanasantana): manifestation of - (cidvyakti): xv; xvi;
90n; unification of -s: xx; 102; 103 and power of the activity of -: 122; the prana
n; 107; 127n; 152; unifier of -s: 138n; is a mode of - (citvrtti): 207n; the sphere
the truth of a 157n; Vi$nu is associated of - ‘I-this’: 192n; the sphere of -: I90n;
with the continuity of 197n; 206; unitary -: 91;
cognizer, knowing subject, etc. (pramatf): contamination (klesa): 198 and n;
xxxii; 85; 86 and n, 7; 90; 97; 98n; 104; contemplation (dhyana): 200n;
107; 109; 110; 111 and n; 112; 118n; convention: 168n;
122; 123 and n; 128n; I30n; 131 and n; cosmic dissolution (pralaya): 19In; 203n;
132; 133; 134 and n; 136; 137; 138 and 205 and n; mahdpralaya: 2 0 In;
n; 139 and n; 140n; 145; 146 and n; 149; creation: xvii; xix; 133n; 197; 201n; 21 In;
151 and n; 152; 155; 159; 160; 161 and - of arrangements: 135n; - of the object
n; 167n; 169n; 172; 174; 175; 176n; 177 is parallel to that of the subject: 216n; -
and n; 178 and n; 181 and n; 182; 184; of things in the mental sphere: 206; also
187; 189 and n; 190; 194; 195; 197; 198; the limited subject possesses an innate
204; 206; 211; 216; the absolute - power of -: 215n; impure levels of -:
(paramarthapramatr): 11 In; the máyic 133n; mixed -: 133n; original -: 133;
11 In; 197; pure -: 133n; the action of creating
concentration {dharana): 200n; 215; (nirmanakriya): 177n;
congruence (sapiváda): 146; 157n; 160; creative meditation (bhavana): 200n;
171 and n; creator: 123n; 136; 175; - of the universe:
conjecture (utprek^ana): 135n; 147; 218; state of -: 118;
consciousness: xxiv; xxv; xxvii; xxviii; deep sleep: state of -: xxxii; xxxix; 200n;
xxix; xxxii; xxxiv n; xxxviii; xlii; 87n; 204; 205 and n; 207; state of apavedya-
90; 103 and n; 107n; 108; 11 In; 112; sau$upta: 200n; 203n; 207n; state of sa-
113 and n; 114 and n; 116 and n; 117; vedyasaufupta: 200n; 207n;
118 and n; 119n; 120 and n; 121 and n; delimitation: spatio-temporal -s: 209; the
123n; 124 and n; 125; 126n; 127 and n; mutual - of subject and object: 21 In;
128n; 130n; 131; 134 and n; 136 and n; delusion: 86; 87;
148n; 149; 150n; 151 and n; 152; 153; determination, determinate cognition, etc.
158n; 159n; 162n; 163; 171n; 172n; (iadhyavasaya): 100; 101 and n; 102 and
173n; 175; 180n; 182; 186; 187; 188n; n; 109 and n; 1 lOn; 124 and n; 126 and
191; 192n; 193; 194n; 195; 197;198 and n; 127 and n; I35n; 140n; 148n; 156;
n; 199; 200; 201; 202; 203 and n; 206; 158; 164n; 19In; - of mutual dif
21 In; 217 and n; - as receptacle of ferentiation: 172; - of the absence: 143;
everything that is gradually manifested: the absolute othemess of direct sensa
xxvii; individual -: xxxi; - as synthesis tion from -: xxv;
of prakasa-vimarSa: xxxvi; - devoid of Devasuri: 95n; 96n;
a subject: xxix; - principle (cittattvam): Devipancasatika: xiv; xxx n;
103 and n; 116 and n; 132; 134; 152; devotion: xxxvi; the state of: xxi n;
153; 186; 187; 202 and n; activity of -: Devyayamala: xii;
260
Dliarmakîrti: ix; xxii n; 88n; 89n; 95n; 96n; doubt: 89n; 90;
97n; 98n; 108n; 115n; I25n; I28n; 129n; dream: - slate: xxxii; xxxiv; I97n; 206 and
137n; I40n; I41n; 143n; I45n; 157n; n; 207 and n; 216;
162n; 163n; I64n; 165n; 166n; 167n; drsyanupalabdhi: 90n;
168n; I70n; I71n; 179n; 180n; 216n; Durvasas: xiv;
dharmin: 92n; I I9n; 145n; 169n; dvadasanta: 207n;
Dharmotlara: ix; 89n; I28n; 137n; 140n; effect (kdiya): xviii; 95; 96n; 97n; I25n;
157n; 129n; I30n; 137; 138 and n; 149n; 15In;
dhcirmyasiddhi: 145n; 160; 167 and n; 168 and n; 169 and n;
dhâtu: the six -s: xxvii n; 175; 177; I78n; 179; I80n; 181 and n;
differentiation, distinction: xvi; xvii; xxi; 182n; I83n; 184; I89n; absence of the -:
xlii; 89n; 127n; 129n; 146; 147; 149; 143; specific -: 166; ability to produce
154; 159n; I62n; 165; 170; 172; 185; external -s: 170; two modes of mani
192 and n; 193 and n; 200; 201-202n; festation of the -: 177;
203n; 212n; 213n; 216 and n; - between efficiency (arthaknya): xxvii; 149 and n;
external and internal: 191; - between 151 n; 163; 166; 167n; 170and n; 179
perceiving subject and object perceived: and n; - capable of -: 89n; °samvada:
214; - between subject and object of 160n; separate -: 164; reality of an object
knowledge: xxxviii; 156; 191; - between consist in its -: 170n; the things have a
the power and the possessor of the multiplicity of arthakriyas: I66n;
power: 212; - of the two related terms: ekatvaparamarsa: 186;
159; absolute -: 194; spatial -: 163; endings: personal - (tin): 123;
spatio-temporal -s: 127n; 161; 164; energy: 185; vital -: 204n; 207n; 215; path
temporal -: 155; 169n; the doctrine of - of the expansion of consciousness and -:
and non-differentiation: I72n; the error xv; see also sakti;
of -: 193n; the idea of -: xxxix n; the error: 101 and n; I02n; 160; 216; 88n;
stale of -: 212; causes of -: 166n; the sphere of dream
Dignaga: ix; 89n; 115n; 116n; 128n; 129n; and -: 2l5n; the subject of -: 17In;
159n; 161 n; I65n; 166n; 17In; 180n; theories of -: liv;
discourse (abhilâpa): 90; 128; exclusion (apoha% apohana, vyapoltana,
discoursive thought, mental elaboration, etc.): xix; xxii n; I28n; 129n; I30n; 131;
etc. (vikaipa, etc.): xvii; xviii; xxxii; 132n; 133n; 134; 165n; 214n; power
xxxv; xxxix; 89n; 90; 9 In; 92; 96; 97 of -: 103; - theory: 129n;
and n; 98n; 104n; 105n; 110; 11 In; existence: 105; 154; external -: 148;
113n; 116; I27n; 128 and n; 129n; 130n; perpetual -: 173; states of -: 95; the six
131; 132 and n; 133 and n; 134 and n; modifications of - (bhdvavikaro): I54n;
135 and n; 142n; 147; 148 and n; 150 expectation (wmwkhata): 97n;
and n; 151 and n; I52n; 159 and n; 165n; externality: 151 and n; 177; 190; 191;
214n; 215n; 216n; 217 and n; exempt fantasy (manordjya): 90; 135n; 152n;215n;
from -: xxxviii; xxxix and n; 90; 216; for form {rilpa, akara): xxvii; xxix; 87n; 89n;
the Buddhist: 13In; the activity o f -: 186; 90n; 94; 103; 113n; 129n; 144; 149; 154;
187; 215; the definition of -: 128n; the 164n; 165; 185n; 203; 204; 206;
main characteristic of -: 128n; object of fourth state: xxxii; xxxiv; xxxviii; xxxix;
the -: I35n; 213; power of -: 214; pro 208; 209 and n; 210;
gressive purification of -: xxxix and n; freedom (svdtanirya): xxiii; xxxii; 88n;
suppression of the -: 215; 120; 121; 122 and n; I23n; 139n; 146n;
261
150n; 187; 195; 198; 207; 214n; power intuition: 136n; 191 n;
o f-: 122n; 123n; 174; invalidation: 139n;
fruition: 207; 211; capacity for -: 21 In; invariable concomitance: 168n; 181 n;
function (vyapara): 162n; 163n; 171; 179; 183n;
future: 195; notions of past and -: 155; Isa: xxx; xxxii; 122;
Gaudapada: 155n; Isitr: xxxi; 189n;
Gaudapadabha?ya: 204n; Tsvara: xvii; xxx; 95n; 122; 123 and n; 124:
God: xxix; xxx; xxxiii; 116; 152; 189n; 15In; 152; 189n; 190 and n; 191 and n
213; 192n; 193n; 197n; 2 0 In; 203n; 208n
Goddess: xii; 209n; 213n; 215n; -’s creation: 216n;
gods: 202; Isvarapratyabhijnatika (or °vivrti): xxv;
gopalaghatika: 182n; xxx n; xli; xlii; xliii and n; xliv n; xlix;
Govindaraja: xiv; Isvarapratyahhijridkaumudi: xliv n;
Grammarians (Vaiyakaranas): xix; xxv; Isvarapratyabhijnanvayadipika: xliv;
120n; 121 n; the theories of the -: xv; see IsvarapratyabhijnavimarsinJ : xx n; xxviii;
also Vaiyakarana; xxx and n; xxxv n; xxxix n; xlii; xliii
Haribhaskaragnihotri: 120n; and n; xliv; xlv and n; xlvii and n; xlix
Harivrsabha: xxv n; and n; 1 n; li; lii; 85n; 89n; 92n; 93n
heart (hrdaya): xlii; 87n; 122 and n; I97n; 95n; 99n; lOOn; 101 n; 105n; 106n; 107n
207n; - of the supreme Lord: 121; 108n; 109n; 11 In; 119n; 120n; 123n
Helaraja: xxvi n; 108n; ll9 n ; 120n; 153n; 126n; 129n; 130n; 13 In; 133n; 138n
154n; 188n; 139n; 141n; 143n; 144n; 146n; 147n
Herubindu: 137n; 140n; 141 n; 143n; 148n; 154n; 158n; 161n; 162n; 163n
HeiubindiitTkd: 117n; 165n; 166n; 167n; 168n; 169n; 171n
ida: 209n; 172n; 175n; 177n; 178n; 180n; 182n
idanta: 118n; 123 and n; 209n; 21 In; I87n; 190n; 191n; 192n; 193n; 200n:
illusion: 101 n; 206 and n; 203n; 205n; 206n; 209n; 2l2n; 216n;
imagination (samkalpa): 89n; 124; 135n; isvarapraiyabhijnavimarsinlvydkfiyd: xliv;
214; hvarapratyabhijndvivrtivimaniinJ : xx n;
impurity: the basic -: xvii; xxii n; xxv; xxxi; xxxiii; xxxv; xxxix n;
incongruence: 171; xl n; xli; xlii n; xliii and n; xliv and n;
individuality: 133; limited - (pumstva): xlv; xlvii n; xlviii; xlix; lii; 85n; 86n;
198; dissolution of the state of -: 217; 87n; 88n; 89n; 90n; 9 In; 92n; 93n; 94n;
inference (anumana): xxii n; 88n; 11 In; 95n; 96n; 97n; 98n; 99n; lOOn; 10In;
113 and n; 114n; 116 and n; 117 and n; 102n; 103n; 104n 106n; 107n; 108n;
138n; 143n; 145 and n; 146n; 169 and 109n; llOn; 11 In 112n; 114n; 116n;
n; I73n; 179 and n; 180n; 18In; 182 and 118n; 119n; 120n 121 n; 122n; 123n;
n; definition of -: 117n; 124n; 125n; 126n 128n; I30n; 13 In;
inherence (samavaya ): 160; 132n; 133n; 134n 135n; 137n; 139n;
initiation: 146n; 200n; 141 n; 142n; 143n 144n; 145n; 146n;
instrument (karana ): xix; 162n; 163n; 195; I47n; 148n; 150n 153n; I54n; 155n;
2 0 In; -s of cognition: 196; the five -s of 157n; 158n; I62n 163n; 166n; I67n;
action: 196; 168n; 169n; 170n 172n; 173n; 174n;
intentionality (anusamdhana): 178; 184 175n; 176n; 177n 179n; 180n; 18 In;
and n; 182n; 183n; 184n 185n; 186n; 188n;
intemality: 151 and n; 177; 190; 191; 189n; 190n; 191n, 192n; 193n; 194n;
262
195n; I96n; 197n; 198n; 199n; 200n; Kaunda Bha||a: 120n;
2 0 In; 203n; 204n; 205n; 206n; 207n; kevalasambhu: 200n;
208n; 209n; 210n; 21 In; 2l2n; 213n; Kiranagama: xxi n; 202n;
214n; 215n, 216n; 217n; knowable, cognizable reality, etc. (pra-
Jsvarapratyabhijnavyakhya: x 1iv; mcya): xxviii n; xxix; xxxii; xxxiv and
Isvarasena: 140n; n; xxxviii; 87n; 90; I08n; 122; 124; 127;
isvarasiddhi: xxi; xxii; xl; I85n; 130n; 136; 140n; 191; 192n; 194; 195;
Isvarasiddhivrtti: xl; 197; 198; 199; 200n; 201; 202; 203n;
Jaina: xix; 205; 207n; 211; 213; 217 and n; relation
Jatisamuddesa: I08n; with the -: 206; the - according to the
Jayadrathaydmala: xiv n; Yogacara and the Sautrantika: 162n; the
Jayanta Bhatta: ix; xxvi n; 117n; plane of the -: 193n; the state of the ab
JayapTda: King -: ix; sence of the -: 203; 204; see also object;
Jayaratha: xiv and n; xxx n; xxxii n; xxxvii Krama: xii; xiv and n; xxxvi; xl and n; -
n; xxxviii; xxxix and n; xliv n; 200n; cult: xxx n; the - doctrine: xxx n;
Jinendrabuddhi: 129n; Kramakeli: xiv;
Jnanasrimitra: I30n; 137n; kriya (action, act, activity): xviii; xxix;
jrianin: xxxiv n; 193n; xxxii; xxxv; 86; 87 and n; 94; 95 and n;
joy (amoda, vikasa): xvii; xxvii; 119n; 148 97n; 98n; I03n; 123; 124; 125 and n;
and n; 207; 135; 150n; 152; 153 and n; 154 and n;
kaivalya: 199n; 200n; 157 and n; 158 and n; 159; 160; 175;
kala (Force); 133n; 195; 200n; 202 and n; 176 and n; 177; 184n; 185; 186 and n;
power of 203; 187 and n; 188; 189; 190; I93n; 198;
Kalacakra: 208n; 199 and n; 202n; 205n; 2 1 1; 212 and n;
Kalapdda: 208n; 213; 218; - of the powers of the senses:
Kali: - cult: xiv n; the doctrine of the -s: 206; faculty of -: 202; notion of -: 160
xiv; the twelve -s: xxx n; and n; partial knowledge and -: 195;
Kalikakrama: xxviii n; power of - (kriya&akti): xvii; 87n; 93n;
Kallata: xiii; xiv; 126n; 157n; 187; 193n; 201n; 21 In;
Kalottaragama: xxx n; 196n; 204n; 208n; 212n; 218; the Saiva conception of -:
Kdlottaravrtti: 205n; 94n; verbal -: 188n;
Kamalaslla: xxvi n; 129n; 143n; 167n; Kriyasamuddesa: 94n;
Kapalikas: xi; xxxiii n; - rites: xxxiii; Kr?nadasa: xliv n;
karanahetu: 182n; kjanikatva (instantaneity, momcntariness):
Karanas (or Karanesvaras): 197n; xxii n; the doctrine of -: 162n;
karma: 195n; 197 and n; 198; 201; the kfanikavadirt: 112n;
depository of the -: 204n; K§emariija: xiv and n; xxx n; xxxiii n;
Karnakagomin: 137n; 182n; xxxix; xl and n; xliv n; liv n; 119n;
kartrta (agency, agent subjectivity): 98n; Kulayukti: 119n;
178n; I85n; 187; 193; 198; 199; 201; Kumarila: 112n; I40n; 141n;
202 and n; 203; 206; 211; infinite -: 212; kundagolaka: xii;
Karyakaranabhavasiddlii: 137n; Lak^managupta: xxx n;
karyanupalabdhi: 143n; Laksmirdma: xl n;
Kathdmukhatilaka: xxii; Lak$mltantra\ xvii n; xxxvi;
Katyayana: 119n; 120n; language: xxvi; 97n; 98n; the lowest level
kaulaprakriya: xii; of -: 127n; the articulated -: 213n; lin-
263
guistic articolation, - expression: 125n; vidual self: xxxix n; the will of the -:
127n; see also word; xxxii; 118n; 151; 170; 181n; 199;
latent impression, - trace (samskdra): 91 lysis (nirvrti): 119n; power of: xxxi; su
and n; 92n; 99 and n; 100 and n; 101 preme -: xvii;
and n; 132; 133; 134; 147n; karmic maculation: xxxi; 199n; 2 1On; dnava -:
impulse: 193n; 195n; 199n; 201; 203; xxxi; 198 and n; 199; 202n; 216n;
204; see also vdsant7; karmic -: xxxi; xxxii; 199 and n; 200;
lay a : 119n; 201; 202; 216n; mayic -: xxxi; xxxii;
liberation: xvii; xviii; xxxii; xxxiii n; xxxv; 198; 199; 200 and n; 201; 202 and n;
xxxvii; xxxviii; 201n; - in life: xxxv; 205; 216n; three -s: xxxii; 202;
xxxix; two forms of - in life: xxxiii; Madhava: xxxvi; 137n;
light (prakdsa, etc.): xviii; xxiv; xxv; xxvii; Madhyamakavrtti: 181n;
xxviii; xxix; xxxi; 86n; lOln; 104n; Madhyamika: xxiii n;
105n; 106n; 107 and n; 108n; 111; 112 Madhydntavibhd^afJkd: 115n;
and n; 117; 118 and n; 121n; 124; 125n; Mahdbha$ya: xv n; 94n; 121 n; 176n;
127n; 128; 130 and n; 131; 136 and n; Malidbhdpyankd: 120n;
144 and n; 149; 150n; 15In; 152; 152; Mahabhafyoddyota: 121n;
155 and n; 163n; 167; 17ln; 172; I73n; mahdbhdta: 196n;
21 In; 212 and n; 213; Mahdnayaprakdsa: xxxix n; xli n;
limited subject (bound, etc.): xxix; xxxi; MahdrthamarijarJparimala: xxviii; xl; xli n;
xxxii; xxxiv; xxxv; I24n; 133n; 146n; liv n;
152n; 155 and n; 173n; 189n; I92n; mahasattdr. 121; the concept of - in
200; 2 0 In; 202; 203; 206n; 211; 212 Bhartrhari: 121 n;
and n; 213 and n; 214; 215n; 216; 217 Mahcsvara: xxx; 85; 103; 133; 136; 210
and n; creation of the -: 216n; see also and n; 211; 213; 217; state of -: xxxix;
beast; 217;
linga (logical reason): 138n; Mahesvarananda: xl; xliv n;
Lord: xvi; xviii; xxvii; xxxviii; xl; 86 and Mdlimvijaya: xii; xiv n; xxi; xxii n; xxxi
n; 87 and n; 88n; 98; 104 and n; 118; n; xxxvii; xxxix; I89n; 199n; 206n;
122 and n; 124 and n; I27n; 132; 133; 214n;
134n; 146; 147n; 153; 154; 155; 156; Mdlinlvijayavdritika: xxxvi;
170 and n; 172; 173 and n; 174; 175 manas: I24n; 15In; 204n;
and n; 176; 178 and n; 180 and n; 18 In; MdndCtkyakdnkdr. 155n;
182; 183n; 190; 194; 197; 198; 199 and Marigold: (or S a n ’amarigald): xxx n;
n; 200; 202 and n; 203; 206; 208; 210; manifestation (dbhasa): xxvii; xxviii and n;
211 and n; 212; 213 and n; 214 and n; xxxvi; xxxviii; 90n; 91; 105 and n; 106n;
215 and n; 217; 218; condition of the -: 112; 113; 114; 117n; 127n; 129; 130n;
216n; qualities of the -: 212n; supreme -: 131; 132; 133 and n; 135n; 136n; 137;
85; 122; I78n; 209 and n; 213n; creation 138n; 139 and n; 142; 146; 147 and n;
of the -: xxxix n; 214; 215 and n; 216 148; 149 and n; I50n; 151 and n; 154
and n; creativity of the -: 152n; 179n; and n; 155; 156; 157; 159; 160; 161 and
195n; free expansion of the supreme -: n; 163 and n; 164 and n; 165 and n; 166
210; power of the -: 151; 215; 216n; 217; and n; 167n; 168 and n; 169; I70n; 172;
power of the supreme -: 126; recognition 177; 180n; 181 and n; 182; 185; 186 and
of the -: xxxv; 85; 86; 87; 218; 219; n; I87n; 197; 213; 214n;
recognition of the identity of - and indi- Manoralhanandin: 115n;
264
Mantra: xxxii; 199n; 200n; 2 0 In; 208 and Nagesa: 12 In;
n; 2l6n; °prayojako: 2 0 In; the esserttial Naiyayika: xxi; xxii; xl;
unity of -s and Vidyds: I93n; ndmarupa: 126;
Mantramahesa: 203n; Narayanakarqha: xxii;
Mantramahcsvara: 199n; 2 0 In; 208n; Naresvaraparlksa: xxii;
Mantrapltha: xii n; Navyanyaya; 14 In;
Mantrasara: xli n; necessity; xxvii; 178; 180; 195; 197; power
Mantresvara; xxxii; 193 and n; 199n; 200n; o f - (niyatifakti): 166; I68n; I70n; I80n;
2 0 In; 208n; 181 n; 182; 183n; the principle o f -: 195n;
Matangapdramesvardgama: xxx n; 190n; I97n;
19 In; 195n; 196n; negation (nifedha): 129n; 130n; 13In;
maya: ix; xvii; 87; 110; 130n; 131; 174; I41n; 143n; 144 and n; 145n; 203n;
191 n; I92n; 193n; 194 and n; 197; 198; 21 In; 214n; - of the opposite: 128; object
200n; 201 n; 211; 212 and n; 215; Maha0: of -: 140n;
I92n; I93n; power of - (mayasakti): xxxii; nescience (avidya): ix; xviii; xix; 146;
88; I07n; 124 and n; 127; 132; 133 and notions of - and vivarta: xxvi n;
n; 146; 149; 150 and n; 153 and n; 173; niramsasvalakpanavada; 90n;
193 and n; 194; 199; 21 In; Nirukta: 154n;
meditation: 146n; 174; creative -: 122; niscaya (ascertainment, certainly): 87; 128;
object of -: 123n; 131; 137n; 151n;
memory: 89n; 90; 91 and n; 92 and n; 99 Nisisamcara: xii;
and n; 100; 101 and n; 102n; 104 and n; nifkala: 2 0 In;
105 and n; 106 and n; 107 and n; 109 notion: I23n; I24n; 140n; 173; 174; - of
and n; 110; 11 In; 124 and n; 127; 134; ‘this’; 192;
135n; 138 and n; I39n; 147; 148n; 149; Nyaya: xxii; xxiii; 129n; I58n;
155 and n; I91n; 197n; 206n; 214; 215n; Nyayabha$ya: 170n;
definition of -: I06n; power of -: 103; Nyayabindu: 89n; 117n; 128n; I40n; 143n;
105; criticism of-: I09n; essential quality 145n;
of -: 91; Nyayabindiifika; 89n; 117n; 128n; 140n;
MUindapanha: 115n; 142n; I43n; 157n; 162n; I80n;
Mlmamsa: xl; I29n; NyayantarijarT: ix; I17n;
Mimamsaka: 93n; - schools: ix; Nyayamukha: 129n;
Mimdmsdstltra: 117n; Nyayaramakara: 141 n;
Moksakaragupta: 89n; 113n; 115n; 130n; Nyaya-Vaisesika: xviii; I57n; 178n;
Mokfakarika: xiii n; 2 0 In; obfuscation; condition of -: 173 and n;
Mothers: xi; object: xv; xviii; xix; xxii; xxiv; xxviii and
Mrgendrdgama: I95n; 199n; 202n; n; xxxii; xli; xlii; 86 and n; 87n; 88n;
Mrgendrdgamavrtti: 201 n; 89n; 91 and n; 92n; 93 and n; 94n; 99
mukhyasatid: I87n; and n; 100 and n; 101 and n; 102 and n;
mukhydvahhdsa: I70n; 103; 104 and n; 105 and n; 106 and n;
mukia: xxxv; I92n; 197; 217 and n; 218; 107 and n; 108 and n; 109n; 110; III
multiplicity: 157; I58n; 159n; 160; - of and n; 112 and n; 113 and n; 114 and n;
manifestations: 186n; unity- - tension: I I5n; 116 and n; 117 and n; 118 and n;
160n; 119n; 121 n; 122; 123; 124 and n; 125;
Nadapada: 208n; 126n;127n; 128n; I30n; 131 and n; 133;
Nagananda: xliv n; 134 and n; 135 and n; 136 and n; 137n;
265
138; 139n; 140n; 141 and n; 142n; 143; Paribha$abhaskara: 120n;
144n; 145n; 146; 147; 148n; 150n; 151 Paribhdyasamgraha: 120n;
and n; 155 and n; 156; 158; 159; 160; Parthasarathimisra: 14 In;
161 and n; 162 and n; 163 and n; 164 particularization: process of -: 90n;
and n; 165 and n; 168n; 169 and n; 170 Paryantapaficdsikd: xxxvi;
and n; 17In; 172 and n; 173 and n; 174n; Paspasd: 12 In;
175; 176 and n; 177 and n; 180n; 181n; past: notions of - and future: 155; 194n;
187n; 188 and n; 189n; 190n; 191 and 195;
n; 192n; 194 and n; 195; 200n; 202n; Patanjali: 94n;
203n; 206; 207n; 209n; 210 and n; 214 pair, the - level: 189n; theparam a0 -: 189n;
and n; 215 and n; 218; - of direct Pauskaragama: 196n;
perception: 10In; 150; 182n; - of mem perceptibility: conditions of -: 142n;
ory: 124; - of the mind: 135; determinate perception, sensation, etc. (anubhava,
cognition of the -: 109; establishment of pratyakya): xvii; xviii; xxiv; xxv; xxxii;
the - (arthasthiti, °siddlti): 101; 102; 112; 86n; 89n; 90 and n; 91 and n; 92 and n;
the form of the -: 94; status of -: 86n; 99 and n; 100 and n; 101 and n; 102n;
107n; 213n; unity of the -: 164n; 104; 105n; 106n; 107 and n; 109 and n;
objectification: 86n; 87n; 88n; 110 and n; 111 and n; 113n; 115n; 116;
objectivity: 213n; levels of -: 216n; 117 and n; 120n; 123; 124; 125 and n;
Padasangati: xl; 126n; 132 and n; 134 and n; 135n; 136n;
pain: xvi n; xxi; 92 and n; 148; 151; 206; 137 and n; 138 and n; 140n; 141 and n;
207; 211; 212; 213; 142n; 143; 144 and n; 145 and n; 146
palate: I97n; and n; 147 and n; 148n; 150; 151 and n;
Pahcaratra: x; xi; xvii n; xix; 158 and n; 159n; 164n; 165n; 167; 168n;
PancjUa Asoka: 115n; 169 and n; 170n; 172; 181n; 182n; 196n;
Panini: 119n; 120n; 176n; 190n; 206 and n; 211; 214; 215; 218;
paramddvoita: xxi; permanence: 119n; 157; 161; 200; 209n;
Paramalaghumanjuya: 121 n; pingald: 209n;
Paramesvara (or Paramasiva): xxx; 12In; place, space (desa): xxvii; 89n; 90n; 93;
122n; 123n; 124; 156; 177; 180n; 189n; 94; 95; 104n; 105n; 115; 117 and n; 121;
190n; 213n; 218; the plane of -: 158n; 122; 126; 127; 130n; 135n; 141n; 142n;
Paramokfanirasakarika: xxxiii n; 143; 144n; 148n; 154n; 157; 158; 160;
Paramokfanirasakartkafika: xxxiii n; 166; 163n; 164n; 165; 168 and n; 169
paranumana: xxii n; and n; 171 and n; 206n; 215n;
Parapaiicasika: xli n; pleasure: 92 and n; 147; 148 and n; 151;
paraparadasa: 192; 206; 207; 211;
paraprakrti: I21n; power (sakti): xvi; 122; 165n; 189n; 193n;
paratantiya (dependence, heteronomy, 205n; 212; 218; - of beatitude: 21 In; -
subordination): 96 and n; 97 and n; 101; to know and create: 135; -s of all the
122n; 150n; mutual -: 138; two types of - internal and external senses: 206; -s of
(anyonyalagnatdrilpa, abhiprayanipa): knowledge, memory and exclusion: 103;
184n; -s of the Lord: xxxv; 86; causal -: 182;
Paratrirjisika: xiv; xl n; 183; creative -: 156; expansion of the -s:
Paratrimsikalaghuvrtti: xli n; 212; sensory -s: 204 and n; the bringing
Paratrirfisikatattvavivaranam: xxxvi; 120n; to light of the -s: 173; the three -s: xvii
134n; 150n; I55n; 191 n; 193n; and n;
266
Prabhácandra: 95n; 96n; 170n; Pratyabhijndhrdaya: xxx; xxxiii n; xxxix;
Prábhákara: 93n; xl and n; 133n; 199n; 201n; 216n;
Prabhu: xxx; 217n;
pradhdna (primordial matter): 175; 185n; pratyak$atodr$ta: 117n; concept of -: 116n;
195; 196; pratyaya: 2l6n;
pradhdnakáranahetu: 182n; pratyayavaicitiya: Sautrantika’s -: 114n;
Pradyumna Bhatta: xiv; present: manifestation of the -: 194n; 195;
Prajñákaragupla: l l l n ; principle {tattva): xxix; xxx; xxxi; xxxvii;
Prakirnakaprakdsa: xxvi n; 109n; 119n; 158n; 189n; 190n; 192n; 193n; 195;
120n; 121 n; 154n; 165n; 199n; 200n; 212n; 217; a thirty-eight -:
Pralayákala: 146n; 193n; 199n; 200; 207n; 190n; a thirty-seventh -: 190n; supreme -:
Pralayakevalin: 199n; 200 and n; xxxi; the highest -s: 192n;
pram ü: 162n; product: 195; 212;
promana (criteria of right cognition, mean property: 89n; - -possessor (dharmin): 169;
of knowledge): xix; 90n; 114-115; 140n; differentiation between - and property-
161 and n; 162 and n; 163n; 168 and n; possessor: 180n; essential - (svabhdva):
169n; 172; 173n; 179; 180n; °samilha: 179 and n; sec also quality;
168n; non-differentiation between the -s prthagadhikaranya: 191 n;
and its result {prarna): 162n; puja: xviii;
Pramanasamuccaya: 115n; 125n; 128n; Pure Science (sttddhavidya): 191;
I29n; 161n; 162n; 165n; 166n; purufa: 93n; I99n; 200 and n; 204;
Pramanasamuccaya flka: 165 n; purya$(aka (the eightfold body): 104n; 197
Pramanasamuccayavfiti: 161 n; and n; 204 and n; 205n;
Pramdnavarttika: xxii n; 89n; 95n; 96n; quality (dharma): 92 and n; 119n; 124;
115n; 119n; 125n; 129n; 140n; 143n; 126n; 171; 172 and n; 212 and n; 218;
157n; 159n; 161n; 162n; 163n; 164n; substratum of -: 92; accumulation of -s:
I66n; 168n; 170n; 180n; 182n; 183n; 196n; see also property;
216n; rajas: 152; 211; 212 and n; 213;
Pramdnavdrttikdlamkdra: l l l n ; Rdjataranginl: ix;
Pramdnavarttikasvavrtti: 129n; 137n; Ramakantha (the disciple of Utpaladeva):
140n; 164n; 166n; 167n; 179n; 180n; xxvi;
182n; Ramakantha (the son of Narayanakantha):
Pramdnaviniscaya: l l l n ; 137n; 159n; xiii n; xxii; xxxiii n; 190n; 191 n; 201 n;
216n; 205n;
PramdnaviniscayafJkd: 137n; rasana: 119n;
Prameyakamalamdrtdnda: 95n; 170n; RatnakTrti: 130n;
pratibha: 136 and n; 197n; Rauravagama: xxx n; 192n;
pratibhdsa: 170n; Realists: 129n;
praiiii: 119n; reason: logical -: 138; 179; the status of
pratiyogin (counterpart, opposite entity): logical - (hetutd): 180;
122; 128; 129; 130n; 131; 132; recognition: 133; 173n; - of the true reality
Pratyabhijñá: xiv; xx; xxi n; xxii; xxiii and of the self: 198; act of -: xxxix; 87n; 218;
n; xxiv; xxv; xxvi n; xxvii; xxix; xxx n; non- -: 211; sign of -: 87; 218; sec also
xxxvi; xxxviii; xxxix; xl; xlii; xliii; 125n; Lord;
130n; 162n; - texts: xxxvii n; the teach reflection {pratibimha): 93n; 94; 113n;
ing of the -: xl; 186; 21 In;
267
relation: xv; xxii; xxiii; xl; 95 and n; 96n; Saktisiltra: xi n;
97 and n; 98n; I20n; 124; 136; 140n; Saktivadin: xviii;
146; 149n; 159n; 160; 184 and n; 185; - Sakyamali: I37n;
between a real thing and a unreal one: sanianddhikaranya: 191 n; relationship o f -:
xix; - between ta n n m tra and m a hdb fu lta : 180n;
195n; - between universal and particular: sdmdnyatodi\s(a: 117n; the concept of -:
I95n; - of action and factors: 95; 184; 116n;
185; - of agent and object of the action: samdvcsa (penetration, etc.): xxxii; xxxiii
175; - of gamya-gamaka: 180n; - of litiga- n; xxxv; xxxvii; xxxviii and n; xxxix;
littgin: 140n; - of vyuvashdpya-vyava- 203n;
sthdpaka: 162n; idea of -: 157; 159; inva- SambandltaparTksd: 95n; 96n; 97n;
lidating-invalidated - between cognitions: Sambandhapankydmtsara: 95n;
139 and n; 140n; 145n; reciprocal - Sambandhapariksdtikd: 95n;
between antecedent and consequent Sambandhasiddhi: xl; 95n;
parts: 94n; see also cause-effcct relation; Sambandhasiddhivrtti: xl; 97n; 98n; 183n;
Rgvedabhasya: 121 n; 184n;
Rudra: 197 and n; the hundred -s: 2 0 In; ^ambhunatha: xxi;
R u d r a y d m a la sd r a : 194n; samkalpa: 124n;
Sdbarabhdsya: 117n; Samkhya: xix; xl; 93n; 175n; 185n; 199n;
sabdabhdvand: 125n; 126n; 200 and n; 204; - texts: I95n; ancient -:
Sabdadhdtusamiksd: xxvii n; I95n; classical -: 196n;
.<abddrtha: 187n; Sdmkhyakdrikd: 204n;
sabdatultva: xix; xxvi; samsdra: xxxii; 197; 198; 202; 207; 214
iabdavyavahdrasddhana: 180n; and n; 216 and n; 217;
Sadakhya: 190 and n; samskara: see also latent impression and
Sadardhasdra: xxx n; 193n; vasana;
Sadasiva: xvi; xvii; xxx; 133n; 189n; 190n; Sanivitprakdsa: Il2n; 186n; I88n;
191 and n; 192n; 193n; 197n; 2 0 In; Samyuttanikdya: M5n;
209n; 213n; the plane of -: xix; Sankara: ix; 155n;
Sadasiva-Tsvara: the plane of -: I34n; 21 In; §artkaranandana: 95n; 12In;
2l7n; sail fa: 200n;
Saddhdlnsamikfd: xxvi; xxvii n; sdntabrahmavada: 186n;
Sftdhananda: xliv; santdna: 92n; 181 n;
Sadhanasamuddesa: xxvi n; Santdmdntarasiddhi: 88n; I08n;
Sadyojyotis: xiii n; xxii; 201n; §antarak?>ita: xxvi n; I29n;
s a h a v iv a k sd (the - principle): I lOn; Sdrasvatasamgraha: 155n;
sa h o p a la m b h a n iy a m a : 111 n; San adarsanasamgraha: 113n; 114n; 115n;
É a ivd g a m a p a r ib h á fd m a ñ ja r í: 208n; I37n; 18ln;
S a iv a p a rib ltd fd : xxxiii n; 196n; sarvasaktivilolatd: xxv n;
Saivasiddhanta: xi; xii n; xiii and n; xix; sarvasarvdtmavada: the doctrine of -: xv;
xxi; xxx n; xxxi; 174n; 200n; Sarvasiddhdntasamgralw: xxxvi; I12n;
Saivasiddhantin: xxi; xxxiii n; the un sdstra: prakriyd°: 189n; 190n; sdra0:
declared alliance with the -s: xxii; I89n;
Sakala: 146n; 199n; 201 n; 203n; Sdstrapardmarsa: xli n;
Sakti (Power): xi; xvii; xviii; xxx; 175; Sataramasamgraha: I93n; I99n;
176; ° p r a s a r a : xxvi; the highest -: 121 n; satyatd: xxvii; I50n; 15In;
268
Sautrántika: 89n; 112n; ll3n; I15n; 162n; xviii; xxxi; 189n; I90n; identification of
18In; - criticism of the Sarvaslivádins: the I with -: I73n; the absolute I of -:
182n; xxxii; the distinction between the 1 and -:
Sñyana: 121 n; xxxv; the nature of - {sivata): xvii; xxxv;
Science (vidyt1): 197; 198; 189n; 217; 218; the supreme -: xi; xxviii
scriptures {sastra): xvii; xviii; xxüi; n; 217n; the supreme condition of -:
revelation of the -: 106n; Vai§nava -s: xxxiv;
xxxvi; Sivadrtfi: ix n; xiii and n; xiv; xv; xviii;
Sckoddesaffkd: 208n; xx; xxi; xxi n; xxiv; xxv n; xxvi; xxvii;
self (átman): xvi; xvii: xxix; xxxiv n; xxxix xxxi; xxxiii: xxxviii; 116n; Il8n; 119n;
and n; 85; 86; 87 and n; 88 and n; 92 I20n; 126n: I39n; I49n; I52n; 179n;
and n; 93 and n; 94; 95n; 98; I02n; I03n; 182n; I84n; 187n; I93n; 200n; 218;
107; I I6n; I I8n; 119 and n; 123 and n; Sivadrtfivrtti: xvi n; xvii; xxvi; xxvii n; xxx
124 and n; 126; 127 and n; 128; 133; n; xxxi; xxxiv; xl; xliii n; 126n; 149n;
136; 138n; 156; 172; 174n; 190; 192; I87n; I89n; I90n; I93n; I94n;
194; 195; 198; 199; 206; 207; 210 and Sivadrtfyalocana: 150n;
n; 213; 215; 218; awareness of the 153; Sivagrayogin: xxxiii n;
conscious -: 203; permanent 90; 91 and Sivastotrdvall: xxi and n; xxviii; xxx n;
n; supreme 120; 152; the - of others: xxxi: xxxvi; xli and n;
108; the - of the Lord: 118; the - of the Sivasdtra: xxxiii; xiv n; xxxi n; 119n;
supreme Lord: 122; identification with I55n; 2l4n;
the - of others: 108n; priority of the -: 86n; Sivasutravartrika: xxx n;
sense: 112n; 113 and n; 116; 117; 124n; Sivasfitravimarsim: xiv n; xxviii n; 86n;
132n; 135; 144 and n; 158n; 2l2n; - of II In; I I9n; I33n; 202n; 206n; 207n;
the I: 196; activity of the individual -s: 2l4n;
100; external and internal -s: 151; 165; Sivatanusastra: xiii n;
169; 176; 206; individual -: 100; internal Sivopadhyaya: xl;
- {manas): 124 and n; internal -s {antahka- Slokavarttika: 93n; 141 n;
rana): I32n; 135n; 205n; object of the - Somananda: xiii and n; xiv; xvi; xvii; xviii;
s: 15 1 and n; 206; powers of the -s: 205n; xix; xx; xxi; xxii n; xxiii; xxv n; xxvi
206; and n; xxvii; xxviii; xxix: xxx n; xxxvii;
sentience {caitanya): xxviii; 93; 94; 119; xxxviii; I20n; 152n; I89n; 218;
separation: xxxv; 142; 150; 15In; see also Somasambhupaddhati: 208n;
differentiation; sovereignty {aisvarya): xxxviii; 86: 93n;
Siddhdntakaumudl: 120n; 120; 121; 173n; 193; 194; 198; 209n;
Siddhayogesvarlmata: xii; spanda: 12In; - school: xiv and n; sdmanya-
Siksasanmccaya: xxvii n; pari°: 207n; concept of -: xiv n; doctrine
similarity {sddrsya): 99n; 100 and n; 101 n; of the -: xiii; xxiii n;
102n; Spandakdrika: xiii; I24n; 204n; 214n;
Siradeva: I20n; Spandakdrika vivrti: xxvi;
Sitikantha: xli n; Spandanirnaya: xiv n;
$iva: x; xv; xvi; xvii and n; xviii; xxi; xxiii; SpandapradJpikd: xxvi n; xxvii n;
xxx; xxxi; xxxiii; xxxiv n; xlii; 86n; Spandasamdoha: 155n;
104n; 122; 123n; 152; 174; 189n; I90n; sphofa: xix;
197n; 2 0 In; 2l2n; 217; °rdpatd: xxvii; splmrattd (luminous vibrating): 121 and n;
Self-: xxix; °dbhdsa: xxviii; sivatatrra: 122;
269
Srikanfhïsamhitâ: xxx n; Suddhavidya: 190n; 191 n; 192n; 193n;
SrJmarigalâsâstra: xxx n; siifumna (the middle path): 208; 209 and
sthairya: 157n; 160n; n;
Sthiramati: 114n; 115n; svabhasa: 139n; 161n;
subject: xvi n; xviii; xix; xxiv n; xxviii and svabhdvahetu: 88n; 173n; 180n;
n; xxix; xxxiii n; xxxiv n; xxxvii; 86n; svabhavanupalabdhi: 143n;
87; 88n; 90 and n; 91; 92; 94 and n; 97n; svabhavapratibandha: 179n;
98n; 103n; 104n; 105; 106; 108; 109; Svacchandatantra: xii; 201 n; 208n;
110 and n; 112n; 118 and n; 119; 120n; s\'alak$ana (particular reality, individual -,
122 and n; 127 and n; 129n; 133 and n; particular entity, single individuality):
134n; 138n; 139n; 140n; 142n; 144n; xxii n; 89; 90 and n; 104 and n; 105 and
146n; 147n; 148 and n; 150n; 151; 152; n; 158; 160; 163n; 164n; 167n; 168;
153 and n; 155; 156; 159; 161 and n; 171 n; 213; 214n; 215n; - according to
162; 163n; 164 and n; 168n; 169; 172 Buddhist logicians: 89n; - according to
and n; 173 and n; 176n; 177; 181n; 182; saiva authors: 89n-90n; cognition of
185; 188n; 189n; 190n; 191 and n; 192n; the -: 169n;
193; 194 and n; 195 and n; 196n; 198; svarthanumana: xxii n;
199; 200 and n; 201 and n; 203 and n; Svdyambluivagama: 199n; 202n;
204; 205; 206; 207n; 210 and n; 211; Syadvadaratnakara: 95n;
212 and n; 213; 214; 215 and n; 216; syllabe: the supreme -: 217;
217; akala -: 192n; consciousness of the tadd tmy a: I79n;
knowing I59n; experience of the tadutpatti: 179n;
163; 164; hierarchy of -s: xxxi; condition tamas: 152; 211; 212 and n; 213;
of 108n; description of the various tanmatra: 195; 196n; 204n; 205n;
categories of -s: 199n; the divine - (pati): tantra: Bhairava -s: xi; xii and n; xxx n; the
xxxi; the knowing subject is the cause of secret -s: 174n; Trika -s: xii; Yamala -s:
the twofold manifestation of the effect: xii;
177n; the supreme knowing -: xxx; 189n; Tantraloka: xiii n; xiv and n; xxii n; xxviii;
true -: xxviii; ultimate -: I04n; unifying xxxi n; xxxii n; xxxvi; xxxvii and n;
function of the knowing -: 172; see also xxxviii; xxxix; 150n; 196n; 199n; 206n;
cognizer and agent; Tantralokaviveka: xiv and n; xxx n; xxxvii
subjectivity {pramatrta): xxxii; xli; 193n; n; xxxviii; xxxix and n; 200n; 2 0 In;
194n; 197; 198; 203; 204; 205n; Tantrasadbhava: xii and n; 202n;
authentic -: 215; dynamism of -: 204n; Tantrasdra: xxxviii and n;
fragmented -: xxviii; levels of -: 199n; Tantroccaya: xxxvii n; xxxviii;
209n; 216n; limited -: 197n; 211; 214n; Tarkabhafti: 89n; 11 In; 113n; 115n;
supreme -: 211; four levels of the limit Tattvabodhinl: 120n;
ed -: xxxvi; Taitvaprakasa: 190n; 199n; 2 0 In;
substance (dravya): 105; 115n; 119 and n; Tattvarthacintamani: 207n;
120n; 121 n; 126n; 157; 159; 160 and n; Tattvasamgraha: 94n; 11 In; 113n; 115n;
164; 167n; 117n; 130n; I62n; I67n; 183n; 206n;
succession: xxxviii; 94; 95; 136; 153 and Tattvasamgrahaparijikd: 143n; 162n; 167n;
n; 154 and n; 176; 177; 183n; spatial -: throat: 197n;
154; 155; 160; spatio-temporal -: 137; time (kala): xxvii; 89n; 90n; 91; 93 and n;
temporal-: 154; 155; 160; 183; 185; 189; 95; 104n; 105n; 107n; 117 and n; 121;
190; 122; 127; 130n; 135n; 136; 141n; 148n;
270
153; 154 and n; 158; 159n; 163n; 164n; upalabdhilakçanapvâpta: 14 In; 144n;
165; 168n; 169 and n; 171n; 172n; 185; updya: xxxviii n; dnava°: xxxvii and n;
194 and n; 195; 206n; 215n; cosmic -: sdkta°: xxxvii and n; xxxix; sdmbhava
208n; idea of 157; power of - (the divine means): xxxvii and n;
(kalasakti): 153 and n; pranic 208n; xxxviii; xxxix; the doctrine of -s: xiv n;
the three -s: 147; 168; xxxvii;
Timirodghdta: 214n; upayoga: 157;
Trika: xii and n; xiv; xvii; xxi; xxii and n; Utpalavaisnava: x;
xxx and n; xxxiii; xxxvi; xxxvii; xl; Vacaspatimisra: 114n;
xlviii; 193n; the Abhinavagupta’s xiv; vacuity (sdnyaid): I32n; 21 In;
Trikahrdaya (or °sara): xii; xxx n; 86n; Vaibhàçika: I13n; 115n;
Trikasadbhdva: xii; Vaisesika: 92n; 93n; U5n; 175n; the six -
trikavadin: 137n; categories: xxvii n;
Trimsika: 115n; Vaiyakarana: - tradition: xxvii; see also
Tripura: xxxvi; xl; Grammarians;
Tripurarahasya: xxxvi; Vdkyapadiya: xix; xxiv; xxv n; xxvi and
True Science (sadvidya): 190; 191; n; 94n; I08n; 120n; 12ln; 124n;
truth: relative -: 157n; 125n; 150n; 153n; 154n; 164n; 165n;
Tryambhaka (or Terambha): xiv; 188n;
turydtlta (the state beyond the fourth): Vdkyapadiyapaddhati: 125n; 126n; 164n;
xxxii; xxxiv; xxxix; 209 and n; the two Vdkyapadlyavnti: xix; xxv; xxvi n; 120n;
turyatltas delineated by Abhinavagupta: 125n; 153n; I65n; authorship: xxv n;
xxxiv n; Vâmanadatta: x;
-tva, -tal: the meaning of -: 12In; vdsand (karmic residual traces): xlii; xxxiv;
Ucchusmabhairava: xxviii n; 11 In; 107n; 113; 114; 203n; 208n; 209n; see
Udayakara: 219; also latent impression;
unity, non differentiation, etc. (aikya, vàsanâvaicitrya: Vijhânavâdin’s -: 114n;
abheda.eic.): 133 and n; 137; 157; 158n; vastu: 129n; I43n; 180n;
159 and n; 160; 163; 165n; 166 and n; vastvartha: 187n;
169; 172; 176n; 177; 184n; 185; 186; Vasugupta: xiii; xiv;
187n; 202n; 206; - -multiplicity tension: Vâtsyayana: ll7n;
160n; - between subject and object: 191n; Vedanta: xxix; 174n;
- in separation (bhedabheda): 159n; - of Vedantic schools: ix; xv; xxvii; citra-
light: 152; - of the objects: 170; - of prana brahmavddin: ix n; sphulingdtmavddin:
and apana: 209; - of the thing: 166n; ix n;
167n; 170n; 185n; notion of -: 167 and n; Vedantin: xviii; xxvi n; 186n;
universal (jati, samdnya): xix; xxvii; 90n; verbalization (abhidhdna): 97n;
105n; 106n; 113n; 121n; 124; 129n; 157; Vidyâ: 133n; 19ln; 192 and n; 193; 194;
159; 160 and n; 163 and n; 167n; 168 195; 200n; the -s: 2 0 In; the light of - -
and n; 172 and n; 213; 214 and n; 215 sakti: 133n; power of - (vidydsakti): 193
and n; hierarchy of -s: xxvii; the - as the and n; 194n; vidydtattva: 19In;
exclusion of the other: xxii n; univcrsals’ Vidyâpïtha: xii n;
- (mahdsamdnya): 12In; Vidyesa: 200n;
upacdrasalta: 187n; Vidyesvara: 192n; 193 and n; 199n; 201
upddlii (accessory condition, - qualifica and n; 202n;
tion): 148; 149; 154; Vijnanabhairava: xiv; xxv n; xl;
271
Víjñánakevala (Vijññnfikala, Vijñünakcva- Vrsabhadeva: 125n; 126n; 164n;
)¡n): xxxii; I46n; 193n; 199 and n; 200 Vyâkaranabluisanasâra: 120n;
and n; 203n; 208 and n; state of -: 200n; Vyâkhyâni: xiii n;
Vijññnavüda: ¡x; xv; xxviii; xxix; 11 In; vyapaka: I90n;
115n; vyapya: 190n;
Vijñánavádin: xviii; xx¡¡¡ n; xxvii; 89n; vyatireka: 113n;
11 In; 113n; 114n; 115n; 181n; vyava/nlra: xvi; xxiii; 87n; 91; 97n; 146n;
Vijñaptimátratá: 182n; 169n; 173n; 180n; 214n; the dimension
vikdsa (expansion): ll9 n ; 148n; of human activity and behaviour (loka°):
Vimalaprabhd: 208n; 103; vyavalulrasadhana: 87n;
vimarsa: its various translations: xxiv n; waking: - state: xxxii; xxxiv; 206 and n;
see reflective awareness; 207 and n;
Vimsatika: 114n; 115n; 116n; word: xix; xxvii; 87n; 89n; 90; 12In; 125n;
VinTtadcva: 95n; 126n; I27n; 129n; 130n; 164; 165 and
vi ruddhadharmddhydsa : 157n ; n; 166n; 168 and n; each dblulsa is
vi\saydbhdsa: 106; 111 and n; I12n; 113; connected with a -: xxvii;
117; 134 and n; 135; 138; 147; 161n; Word: xxiv; 128; 163n; 2l3n; 214 and n;
162n; 169; activity of the -: I69n; First - {adyii vac):
visesya: relationship of - -visesana: 129n; 120 and n; madhyamd: xlii; 197n;
vismaya: 119n; pasyanti: xix; xx; xxvi; xlii; supreme -
Visnu: x; 197 and n; (pardvdc): xix; xxv; xxvi; xlii; 120; 128;
visrdnti: 119n; 197n; all-pervasive power of the -: xxv;
visrdntisthdna: 86n; 123n; criticism of the triparlition of the -: xxv;
visuvat: 207; 208n; the first effusion of pasyanti: I97
vivaría: ix; xviii; xix; xxvi n; xxviii; fourth level of the -: xxvi; the funda
Sabdâdvayavâdins’ -: xxvi; mental ambivalence of the -: 2l4n; the
void {sdnya): xxxii; 132 and n; 155; 194 levels of the -: 12In; I97n; the supreme
and n; 195; 197; 200 and n; 202; 203 form of Pasyanti: xxvi: 120n; vaikhari:
and n; 204; 209n; 211; - identified with xlii; 197n; see also language;
the subjectivity (sdnydhantd): 205n; yoga: xi;
°pramdtr: 203n; 204n; identification Yogâcâra: 161 n; I62n;
with the -: 205; Yogasûtra: 104n; 12 In: 198n;
volition, will (icchd): xv; xxvii; 116; 118 yogin: xxxiv n; 108 and n; 116; 179n;
and n; 126n; 133 and n; 164; 173; 175; 193n; creation of a -: 179; 180 and n;
powerof- (icchdsakti): xvii; xxxviii; I26n; volition of the -s: 179;
175; 193n; the - of the subject: 135n; the Yoginihrdaya: xxxvi;
act o f-: 126n; I87n; the first moment of Yoginihrdayadipikd: xli n;
the -: xvii; the individual’s -: 152n; Yogimhrdayasetubandha: xl n.
272
CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................... » ix
Text .......................................................................................................... » 1
Translation .............................................................................................. » 83
Abbreviations......................................................................................... » 221
273
Finito di stampare
nel mese di febbraio 1994
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