Arson; categories.

There are actually two categories of arson, namely: Destructive Arson under Article
320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said
classification is based on the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the
value of the damage caused. Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. On the other hand,
Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills,
plantations, railways, bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishmen ts. People of
the Philippines v. Jessie Villegas Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010.
Arson; evidence. In the prosecution for the crime of arson, proof of the crime charged is complete
where the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and
(2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime. In arson, the c orpus delictirule
is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and of it having been intentionally caused. People of the
Philippines v. Jessie Villegas Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010.
Arson; objective of arson; distinguished from homicide/murder. In cases where both burning and death
occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or
arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the
main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the
other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when
fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done
so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson. People of the Philippines Vs. Ferdinand T.
Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010.
Arson; objective of arson; distinguished from homicide/murder. As it was not shown that the main motive
was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere
consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. People of the Philippines Vs. Ferdinand T.
Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010.
Arson; simple arson. A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as stated
in the information of this case reveals that the crime committed is in fact simple arson because the
burned properties are residential houses. People of the Philippines v. Jessie VillegasMurcia, G.R. No.
182460, March 9, 2010.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 188708 July 31, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALAMADA MACABANDO, Appellant.

DECIS IO N

BRION, J.:

This is an appeal filed by appellant Alamada Macabando assailing the February 24, 2009
decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00208-MIN. The CA decision affirmed
in toto the August 26, 1002 judgment 2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro
City, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of destructive arson, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

THE CASE

The prosecution's evidence showed that at around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, the appellant
broke bottles on the road while holding a G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
("manabla ko").3 Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house. 4

At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors shout that there was a fire.
When Cornelio went out of his house to verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He
got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. 5 Eric Quilantang, a neighbor whose house
was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a fire
extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling
bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3) shots in the air. 6 The
appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. 7

Upon hearing the gunshots, Cornelio hurriedly went home to save his nephews and nieces. 8 Eric
also returned to his house to save his belongings. 9

Fire Officer (FO) II Victor Naive and FOI Reynaldo Maliao conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in the appellant’s house; and that it had
been intentional. 10Barangay Chairman Modesto Ligtas stated that the fire gutted many houses in his
barangay, and that he assisted the City Social Welfare and Development Department personnel in
assessing the damage. 11

The defense, on the other hand, presented a different version of the events.

The appellant declared on the witness stand that he lived in the twostorey house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, which was owned by his sister, Madji Muslima Edemal. 12 He admitted that he felt
angry at around 2:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001 because one of his radio cassettes for sale had
been stolen.13 The appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio
cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn
his house, and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots heard by his
neighbors came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year
celebration.14

Lomantong Panandigan, the appellant’s cousin, stated, among others, that he did not see the
appellant carry a revolver or fire a shot on December 21, 2001. 15 Dimas Kasubidan, the appellant’s
brother-in-law, stated that he and the appellant lived in the same house, and that the latter was
asleep in his room at the ground floor before the fire broke out. 16

The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, before the RTC. 17 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge on arraignment. 18 In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto. It gave weight to the RTC’s factual findings
since these findings were based on unrebutted testimonial and documentary evidence. The CA held
that the totality of the presented circumstantial evidence led to the conclusion that the appellant was
guilty of the crime charged.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the appeal, but modify the crime committed by the appellant and the penalty imposed on
him.

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

We point out at the outset that no one saw the appellant set fire to his house in Barangay 35,
Limketkai Drive, Cagayan de Oro City. The trial and appellate courts thus resorted to circumstantial
evidence since there was no direct evidence to prove the appellant’s culpability to the crime
charged.

It is settled that in the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
sustain a conviction provided that: "(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all th e circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who has
committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination
of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt
of the accused."19

In the present case, the following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that l eads to an
unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house: first, the
appellant, while holding an iron lead pipe, acted violently and broke bottles near his house at around
4:00 p.m. of December 21, 2001; second, while he was still in a fit of rage, the appellant stated that
he would get even, and then threatened to burn his own house; third, Judith Quilantang saw a fire in
the appellant’s room approximately two hours after the appellant returned to his house; f ourth, the
appellant prevented Cornelio, Eric, and several other people from putting out the fire in his house;
fifth, the appellant fired shots in the air, and then threatened to kill anyone who would try to put out
the fire in his house; sixth, the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire; and finally, the
investigation conducted by the fire marshals of the Bureau of Fire Protection revealed that the fire
started in the appellant’s house, and that it had been intentional.

The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the
appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his
neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing
to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved
ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a
person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and
firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the
fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which,
to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it
likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and
that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his
burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his
preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. Notably, the appellant failed
to impute any improper motive against the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against him; in
fact, he admitted that he had no misunderstanding with them prior to the incident.

The Crime Committed

The CA convicted the appellant of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, as amended,
which reads:

Article 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon
any person who shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where
people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official
governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop,
meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited
to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of
whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in said building or edifice at the
time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is actually inhabited or not.

3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or

conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure. âwph
1 i1

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are
devoted to the service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence
of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding
creditors or to collect from insurance.

xxxx

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:
 1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance,
storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

In sum, "Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels,
buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, gove rnment or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons." 20

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, 21 on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. Section 3
of this law provides:

Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following:

1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;

3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or tunnel;

4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard, bamboo grove or
forest;

5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and

6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse. [italics and emphasis ours]

P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of
size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. 22 This law
punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree
of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social,
economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.23

The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements
have been proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own
house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established during
trial through the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire Protection which stated that
damaged houses were residential, and that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification
from the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise indicated that the burned
houses were used as dwellings. The appellant likewise testified that his burnt two -story house was
used as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many families will not convert the crime to
destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts punished under Article 320 of the
RPC. The established evidence only showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but
the conflagration spread to the neighboring houses.

In this regard, our ruling in Buebos v. People 24 is particularly instructive, thus:

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or
viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law
punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less
significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson.

The Proper Penalty

Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion
temporal, which has a range of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, to reclusion perpetua. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty who se
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor,
or six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and whose maximum should be the medium
period of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years, taking into account the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
attended the commission of the crime. Taking these rules into account, we therefore impose on the
appellant the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As regards the award of damages, we sustain the lower courts' findings that the records do not
adequately reflect any concrete basis for the award of actual damages to the offended parties. To
seek recovery of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the be st evidence
obtainable.25

WHEREFORE, the assailed February 24, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 00208-MIN is AFFIRMED with the following MODIF ICAT IONS:

(1) appellant Alamada Macabando is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson
under Section 3(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1613; and

(2) he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

AT T EST AT IO N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERT IF ICAT IO N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Com1's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo. pp. 5-16: penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, and concurred in by
Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion.

2
Records, pp. 453-460; penned by Judge Noli T. Catli.

3
TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 6.

4
TSN, March 4, 2002, p. 8.

5
TSN, January 28, 2002, pp. 8-9.

6
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp. 8-10.

7
TSN, March 4, 2002, pp. 7-8.

8
TSN, January 28, 2002, p. 9.

9
TSN, February 4, 2002, pp.19-20.

10
Records, pp. 99-101.
11
TSN, April 12, 2002, pp. 5-11.

12
TSN, June 3, 2002, pp. 3-4.

13
Id. at 7-8.

14
Id. at 9-11.

15
TSN, May 2, 2002, p. 8.

16
Id. at 27-28.

17
Records, p. 4.

18
Id. at 12.

19
See Buebos v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008, 550 SCRA 210, 223, citing
People v. Casitas, G.R. No. 137404, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA 382.

20
People v. Murcia, G.R. No. 182460, March 9, 2010, 614 SCRA 741, 752.

21
A Decree Amending the Law on Arson.

22
People v. Malngan, 534 Phil. 404, 443 (2006).

23
People v. Soriano, 455 Phil. 77, 93 (2003).

24
Supra note 19, at 228.

25
We also point out that there is a discrepancy between the affidavit-complaint of Barangay
Chairman Ligtas and the certification issued by the City Social Welfare and Development
Department with regard to the names and number of fire victims. and the es timated cost of
the damage to their respective properties.
 Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 161083
PHILIPPINES,
represented by Chief Present:
State Prosecutor
JOVENCITO ZUÑO, CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
State Prosecutor
GERONIMO SY and NACHURA,
Prosecution Attorney
IRWIN MARAYA, PERALTA,

Petitioners, ABAD, and

- versus - MENDOZA, JJ.

HON. BASILIO R. Promulgated:

GABO, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge August 3, 2010
of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos,
Bulacan,
Branch II and
WILSON CUA TING,
EDWARD NGO YAO,
WILLY SO TAN and
CAROL FERNAN
ORTEGA,

Respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------x

DEC IS IO N

PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the July 24, 2003 Decision[2] and October 3,
2003 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985.

The facts of the case, as culled from the petition, are as follows:

On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of
Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation (Sanyoware) located
at Km. 8, McArthur Highway, Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. The Sanyoware
plant had four single-storey buildings, enclosed in concrete walls with steel
tresses and galvanized iron sheet roofing.

Sanyoware 2, Warehouse 2, the building that was razed by fire, was located
at the right innermost portion of the plant facing north. Sanyoware occupied
the right, western portion of the said building, while New Unitedware
Marketing Corporation (Unitedware) rented the other half, located at the left,
eastern portion. The building was divided at the center by a tall concrete
firewall with a steel gate.

Investigations were conducted by the Philippine 3rd Regional Criminal

Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) and the Inter Agency Anti -Arson
Task Force (IATF) of the Department of the Interior and Local Government.
Pursuant to the August 1, 2001 letter[4] of CIDG Regional Officer P/Supt.
Christopher A. Laxa to the Secretary of the Justice; the IATF’s October 25,
2001 Indorsement;[5] and the October 8, 2001 letter[6] of Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP) Chief Sr. Supt. Victoriano C. Remedio to the Prosecutor of
the DOJ, the following were accused of destructive arson before the Office of
the Chief State Prosecutor, namely: Samson Cua Ting, alias Ding Jian Zhi,
External Vice-President; Wilson Cua Ting, Plant Manager; Edward Ngo Yao
(Yao), President of New Marketing Corporation; Willy So Tan, alias Chen Yi
Ming, Vice-President for Operations; Carol Fernan Ortega, Assistant to the
External Vice-President; and John Doe and Peter Doe.

In support of the accusation, petitioner submitted the Sworn Statements of

Richard Madrideo, Jaime Kalaw, Raymund Dy, Chit Chua, Jennifer Chua
Reyes, Shanda Amistad, SPO1 Valeriano Dizon and Inspector Allan N.
Barredo.

In his sworn statement,[7] Richard Madrideo, a supervisor at Sanyoware

said that there were two separate sets of fire in the Sanyoware Warehouse
and that it was different from, but occurred simultaneously, with the fire at
the Unitedware Warehouse. Madrideo claimed that respondents Wilson Ting
and Yao instructed him that if anyone should ask about the fire, he should
say that the fires did not break out simultaneously and the cause thereof
was defective wiring. In his additional sworn statement, Madrideo claimed
that, days after the fire, he was threatened by respondents and was being
forced to write a sworn statement against his will.

Jaime Kalaw, a former head of the Maintenance Department of Sanyoware,

alleged in his sworn statement[8] that the cause of the fire could not have
been faulty electrical wiring, because the warehouse was relatively new and
that, on the day of the fire, the plant was not in operation so there was no
heavy load of electricity and all the circuit breakers were shut down. Kalaw
noted that a week before the fire occurred, almost 300 unserviceable molds
were transferred to the burned Sanyoware warehouse. A day before the fire,
expensive finish products were loaded in delivery trucks. In addition, Kalaw
alleged that he saw respondent Yao a day before the fire driving to the
Unitedware warehouse. Once inside, respondent Yao took a rectangular
shaped object from his vehicle.

Raymond Dy, a warehouse supervisor at Sanyoware stated in his sworn

statement[9] that a week before the fire occurred, he observed that saleable
products from the burned warehouse were transferred to the Sanyo City
Warehouse, while unusable components from the Sanyo City warehouse
were transferred to the burned warehouse. Dy alleged that the transfer of
the products was upon the orders of Charles Lee, the plant manager of
Sanyoware, who allegedly told the employees to finish the transfers on May
12, 2001.

Chit Chua, an employee at the Accounting Department of Sanyoware,

claimed in her sworn statement[10]P95,000,000.00 to P96,000,000.00.
Jennifer Chua Reyes, a secretary at Sanyoware, alleged in her sworn
statement[11] that Sanyoware has an outstanding loan of P180,000,000.00
to various individuals. that Sanyoware was indebted to a number of banks
and corporations and that Sanyoware’s outstanding obligations amounted to

Shanda Amistad, a former stay-in worker at Sanyoware, alleged in her

affidavit[12] that, around 8:00 a.m. of May 13, 2001, she saw respondent
Yao driving a Canter truck of Unitedware loaded with goods. Yao went to
Sanyoware three times that day. Amistad found it unusual, since Yao did
not normally go to Sanyoware on Sundays and there were available drivers
at that time. Around 2:00 p.m. of the same day, respondent Wilson Ting
arrived.

SPO1 Valeriano Dizon (SPO1 Dizon), a fireman assigned at the Meycauayan

Fire Station, Bulacan, stated in his sworn statement[13] that he conducted
the examination of the fire that occurred on May 14, 2001. He alleged that
he took the statement of the witnesses, but Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan of
the BFP Regional Office, Region III, took the witnesses’ statements from him
before he could prepare the Final Investigation Report (FIR). Thereafter, Sr.
Supt. Linsangan summoned him, Inspector Allan Barredo and BFP C/Ins.
Absalon Zipagan, Municipal Fire Marshall of Bocaue, Bulacan, and showed
them the copy of the FIR and made them sign it. Inspector Barredo, in his
affidavit,[14] corroborated SPO1 Dizon’s allegation as to how Sr. Supt.
Lansangan summoned and ordered them to sign the FIR.

In their defense, respondents submitted a Counter-Affidavit[15] to refute

the allegations made against them, the significant portions of which read:

7. Principally on the basis of the “Salaysay” of Richard Madrideo attached

Annex “A” to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan dated September 22,
2001, and on the basis of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Ricky A. Hista and
of the “Karagdagang Salaysay” of Bobby Bacang and on the basis of our
inquiry from others, we have good reason to believe that one claiming to be
a representative of CRM Adjustment Corporation had indeed offered money
and jobs to persons to give perjured statements to make it appear that there
was arson and that we committed it. (The Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan,
together with the “Salaysay” of Richard Madrideo as Annex “A” thereto, the
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” of Ricky A. Hista and the “Karagdagang Salaysay” of
Bobby Bacang were all submitted last September 22, 2001 to the Inter
Agency Anti-Arson Task Force, Office of the Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government.

8. We would like to stress the fact that during the supposed investigation
of this arson case by complainant 3rd Regional Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, not one of us was invited by complainant to answer the
allegations of witnesses against us. As far as we know, complainant did not
even make an ocular inspection of the place where fire occurred.

9. Although the CIDG investigators were allegedly informed by Mrs. June

Go, a clerk of Sanyoware, that nobody could assist the team in the ocular
inspection, said investigators did not proceed to conduct an ocular inspection
when they actually did not need any assistance and when nobody was
preventing them from conducting the inspection.

10. Although Senior Police Officer Regino Raquipiso claims that when he
and SPO1 John Tabago returned to the factory, the ocular inspection was not
pushed through for alleged lack of clearance from the company owners,
there is no showing that said police officers insisted or demanded to conduct
then and there an ocular inspection.
11. Apparently, complainant solely relied on the statements of Jaime Kalaw,
Raymond Dy and Richard Madrideo in deciding to file the case at bar against
us.

12. Richard Madrideo executed a “Sinumpaang Salaysay” before SPO4

Regino D. Raquipiso, Jr. last June 29, 2001 wherein he claims, among
others, that there was a simultaneous fire that occurred in two places in
Sanyoware warehouse and in a place in Unitedware. However, said claim is
a blatant lie and perjured statement.

13. In his “Salaysay” (Annex “A” to the Affidavit of Carol Ortega Fernan
submitted last September 22, 2001 to the Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task
Force), Richard Madrideo admitted to the fact that he received the sum
of P1,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu and that he subsequently received another
sum ofP15,000.00 from Atty. Lugtu. Richard Madrideo was also given a
cellphone and was promised a job. According to said “Salaysay,” Atty. Lugtu
instructed Madrideo to state, among others, in his “Salaysay” that Madrideo
saw a simultaneous fire that occurred in two sides of the plant of
Sanyoware.

14. In the “Karagdagang Salaysay” of Richard Madrideo, he repudiated his

“Salaysay” by claiming that he was threatened and coerced by Respondents
into executing said “Salaysay.” Said claim is a blatant lie. In essence, the
story contained in the “Karagdagang Salaysay” regarding alleged threats and
coercion is nothing but a fabricated lie for the truth of the matter being that
his “Salaysay” was executed by him freely and voluntarily last July 30, 2001
at the conference room of Sanyoware. He was not threatened by anyone.
He was neither paid nor promised any consideration for executing said
“Salaysay.”

15. At any rate, I, Wilson Ting, and the security guards on duty can attest
to the fact that fire started at the warehouse of Unitedware and that it did
not occur simultaneously in different places.

16. In the Sworn Statement of Raymond Dy, he claims that Richard

Madrideo had told him that while the fire was on going at the Unitedware
warehouse, Madrideo saw the fire on top of the stock piles inside the
Sanyoware warehouse aside from that fire at the Unitedware. However,
Jaime Kalaw, who was allegedly informed about the fire by Raymond Dy, did
not mention in his Sworn Statement about any simultaneous occurrence of
the fire in different places. Jaime Kalaw even further stated in his Sworn
Statement that upon his inquiry from the employees, he was allegedly told
that the fire originated from Unitedware warehouse that spread to
Sanyoware warehouse.
17. The allegation of Jaime Kalaw in his Sworn Statement that all circuit
breakers were “off” position so that there was no flow of electric current that
may cause fire on the warehouses and the allegation of Raymond Dy that
during his roving before the fire, all the lights were “off” are not true for the
truth being that management had required that some lights be put on every
night in all the warehouses so that they can be well guarded. Besides, I,
Wilson Ting, and the guards on duty can attest to the fact that there were
lights in all the warehouses during the subject incident.

18. Raymond Dy claims that the keys were usually kept by the guard on
duty, but that on this occasion, he learned from Shandra Amistad, a stay-in
helper, that the keys were then kept by Wilson Ting. Obviously, said claim
is based on hearsay and thus, should not be given any credence and
besides, I, Wilson Ting, deny said claim for the truth of the matter being that
the keys of Sanyoware are kept inside its main office and are not kept by the
guard on duty.

19. Raymond Dy also claims that the lights were 3 to 4 meters away from
the stocks, so that it could be impossible that stocks will be caught by fire if
and when the lights or electrical system leak down. However, said claim is
not true for the fact of the matter is that in the Unitedware warehouse and
in Sanyoware warehouse, there were so much pile[s] of stocks that some
pile[s] almost reached the lights.

20. There is also no truth to the allegation of Raymond Dy that a week

before the fire, saleable finished products from Sanyoware and Unitedware
were removed and transferred to Sanyo City warehouse. There is also no
truth to the allegation that non-useable components were removed from
Sanyo City and transferred a week before the fire to the warehouses that got
burned. Likewise, there is no truth that Charles Lee gave a deadline until
Saturday (May 12) to transfer non-useable components to the burned
warehouses. Said allegations are all fabricated lies designed to make it
appear that there was arson.

21. Long before the subject incident, I, Wilson Ting, had ordered to have
the stock piles that were in between the steel gate dividing Unitedware and
Sanyoware warehouses moved, not to have a pathway, but for the purpose
of closing the said steel gate. After said stock piles were moved, the steel
gate was padlocked.

22. There was nothing extraordinary or irregular for several delivery trucks
filled with stocks to stay at the parking area for the night and to leave very
early in the morning to avoid traffic. Considering the huge volume of
deliveries being made regularly by Sanyoware and Unitedware, delivery
trucks with finished products were often times parked in the evening and
during Sundays and holidays at the compound of Sanyoware and they
usually moved out very early in the morning from Monday to Saturday.
Thus, there was nothing extraordinary or irregular for some delivery trucks
with stocks at the parking area on the night of May 13, 2001, considering
especially that it was a Sunday.

23. Being the operations manager of Sanyoware, I have no fixed time and
schedule of work. Even on a Sunday or holiday, I, Wilson Ting[,] sometimes
visit the plant. Thus, there was nothing unusual that I, Wilson Ting, went to
Sanyoware last May 13, 2001. Due to several incidents of thefts that took
place inside the compound of Sanyoware and because of reports that the
delivery trucks at the parking lot might contain some items that were not
included in the inventory for delivery, I, Wilson Ting, as operations manager,
decided to be at Sanyoware on that Sunday (May 13, 2001) princi pally to
check the goods inside the delivery trucks. With the help of security guards
Bobby Bacang and Ricky Hista, I, Wilson Ting, checked the goods in all the
delivery trucks.

24. Being the President and practically the owner of Unitedware, a

marketing area of Sanyoware and the lessee of Sanyoware’s warehouse, I,
(Edward Yao), visit Sanyoware and Unitedware from time to time.

25. As my (Edward Yao’s) mother-in-law asked from me (Edward Yao)

some chairs and drawers, I (Edward Yao) drove my Pajero and went to
Sanyoware. I (Edward Yao) called up Wilson Ting and informed him that I’ll
be getting some chairs and drawers from Sanyoware for my mother-in-law.
From the plant of Sanyoware, I (Edward Yao) got some chairs and drawers.
When said chairs and drawers could not fit in my (Edward Yao) [P]ajero, I
(Edward Yao) left to get a van. I (Edward Yao) came back later driving a
van where the said chairs and drawers were placed. I (Edward Yao) brought
said chairs and drawers to my mother-in-law who selected and got only
some items and so, I (Edward Yao) returned to Sanyoware the remaining
items. Before I (Edward Yao) left again, Wilson Ting asked me to come back
for some chat and so, I (Edward Yao) returned in my [P]ajero. However,
after chatting with Wilson Ting, I (Edward Yao) left at around 9:00 o’clock in
the evening of May 13, 2001. Thus, just before the incident when the fire
occurred, I (Edward Yao) was not in the compound of Sanyoware.

26. There is no truth, however, to the claim that I (Edward Y ao) had
entered the warehouse of Unitedware and that I (Edward Yao) got a
rectangular shape black object from my vehicle while inside the warehouse
for the truth of the matter being that I (Edward Yao) did not enter said
warehouse and I (Edward Yao) did not get any object from my vehicle. I
(Edward Yao) got the said chairs and drawers from the plant of Sanyoware.

27. There is no truth that the company is suffering losses even before the
fire occurred. The loan of Sanyoware with Metrobank is fully secured by a
real estate mortgage wherein the value of the real estate, together with the
improvements thereon that was mortgaged is more or less double the
amount of the said loan and, thus, said real estate value is more than
sufficient to cover said loan of Sanyoware. On the other hand, the loan with
Equitable Bank is also fully secured by a real estate mortgage.

28. Before the subject incident, Sanyoware was making profits. There was
no year that Sanyoware incurred losses. Its business was going every year.
Prior to the subject incident, the record of Sanyoware with the banks was
quite good.

29. Likewise, prior to the fire, Unitedware was steadily growing. Every
year, its profit continued to go up. Last year, Unitedware made a huge
profit from its operation and it is expected that, despite the fire that burned
the warehouses, Unitedware will still make a good profit this year.

30. Complainant did not conduct any investigation, except to get the
statements of its witnesses: Madrideo, Kalaw and Dy. Likewise, the Inter
Agency Anti-Arson Task Force did not also conduct any investigation, except
in essence to ask the witnesses of complainant to identify under oath their
sworn statements executed before the complainant and to ask respondents
to submit their sworn statements and later to identify the same under oath.

31. On the other hand, the elements of Bocaue Fire Station and OPFM
Bulacan BFP Region 3 Intel and Inves Section conducted a thorough
investigation of the origin of the fire. Statements of security guards Bobby
A. Bacang and Mark Anthony Gabay were taken. Statement of the
operations manager Wilson Ting was also taken. The subject place was
inspected. Pictures were taken. Specimens were obtained from the place
where fire occurred and submitted to the laboratory for examination. Said
elements undertook other activities in line with proper investigation.[16]

After preliminary investigation, then State Prosecutor Carlos C. Pormento

issued a Resolution,[17] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an

information for Destructive Arson be filed against Wilson Ting, Edward Yao,
Willy So Tan and Carol Ortega. That the case against Samson Ting be
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to indict him under the charge.

As to the charge of Accessories against herein three (3) Fire Officers, let that
case be remanded to TF-IATF for further investigation.[18]

Pursuant to the foregoing Resolution, an Information[19] for Arson was filed

against Wilson Cua Ting, Edward Ngo Yao, Willy So Tan, Carol F. Ortega,
John Doe and Peter Doe, of the crime of arson, to wit:

That on or about May 14, 2001, in the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of

Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually helping one
another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously, destroy the warehouses known as Sanyoware Plastic
Products Manufacturing Plant and New Unitedware Marketing Corporation,
including the stocks of raw materials and finish products, machineries and
various equipments by maliciously burning the same for the purpose of
concealing or destroying evidence of another violation of law, and to conceal
bankruptcy to defraud creditors and to collect from insurance.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[20]

The Information was raffled to Branch XI, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos Bulacan, 3rd Judicial Region. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 300-47M 2002.

Prior to the arraignment of respondents and before warrants of arrest could

be issued, respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine
Probable Cause and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest
Pending Determination of Probable Cause.[21]

On February 27, 2002, the RTC issued an Order[22] dismissing the case, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

Accordingly, for lack of probable cause, the instant case is DISMISSED as

ordained under Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The RTC applied the equipoise rule in dismissing the case, because of its
observation that the sworn statements submitted by petitioner and
respondents contained contradictory positions.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[24] which was,
however, denied by the RTC in an Order[25] dated March 25, 2002.

On August 8, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for certioraribefore the CA

docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71985. On July 24, 2003, the CA issued a
Decision denying the petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion

committed by the public respondent, the assailed Orders dated February 27,
2002 and March 25, 2002 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the present
petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and is, accordingly, DISMISSED for
lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,

denied by the CA in a Resolution[27] dated October 3, 2003.

Hence, this instant petition, with petitioner raising the following ground for
this Court’s consideration, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING THE
EQUIPOISE RULE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[28]

Before anything else, this Court shall address a procedural issue raised by
respondents that certiorari does not lie considering that such special civil
action is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or more important ly,
a lapsed appeal.[29]

Respondents’ position is well taken.

It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court lies only when, “there is no appealnor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,” and certioraricertiorari not
being a substitute for a lost appeal.[30] cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,

A perusal of the records will show that petitioner received the ass ailed CA
Resolution on October 10, 2003. From that time on, petitioner had 15 days,
or until October 25, 2003, to file an appeal by way of a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, instead of filing the appeal on
the last day of reglementary period, petitioner simply allowed it to lapse.
Clearly, petitioner had an appeal, which under the circumstances was the
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On this point alone,
petitioner’s petition must be dismissed, as herein petition is without a doubt
a substitute for a lost appeal. In any case, even if this Court were to set
aside the procedural infirmity of the petition, the same still fails on the
merits.

In a petition for certiorari, the court must confine itself to the issue of
whether or not respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or
committed grave abuse of discretion.[31]

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary

inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether
the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of
probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is made by the
judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged – is the function of the investigating prosecutor.[32]

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. –

xxxx

(a) By the Regional Trial Court. – Within (10) days from the filing of the
complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the
resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may
immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a
warrant of arrest, or a commitment order of the accused had already been
arrested, pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted
preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed
pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by
the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.[33]

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People,[34] the task of the presiding judge

when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information, or any offense included therein, has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.
Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than evidence
that would justify conviction.[35] The purpose of the mandate of the judge
to first determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate
from the very start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.[36]

Based on the foregoing, the RTC acted within its jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case on lack of probable cause as the same is sanctioned
under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The penultimate question
to be resolved then is was such exercise of jurisdiction attended by grave
abuse of discretion?

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[37]

Petitioner’s main argument hinges on the propriety of the RTC’s use of the
equipoise rule in dismissing the case which was affirmed by the CA.
Specifically, petitioner contends that the equipoise rule cannot be used by
the RTC merely after the filing of the information, thus:

Since there must be a proper determination of the presence or absence of

evidence sufficient to support a conviction, i.e.,proof beyond reasonable
doubt, the equipoise rule shall properly come into play when the parties
have already concluded the presentation of their respective evidence. It is
only at this stage, not at any prior time and certainly not merely after the
filing of the information, can the trial court assess and weigh the evidence of
the parties and thereafter determine which party has the preponderance of
evidence. If both parties fail to adduce evidence in support of their
respective cases, an adverse decision would be rendered against the party
which has the burden of proof.[38]
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in
equipoise, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not suffice
to produce a conviction.[39]

To this Court’s mind, the reliance of the RTC in the equipoise rule is
misplaced as a review of previous Court decisions would show that the
position of petitioner is in fact correct. The equipoise rule has been generally
applied when the parties have already concluded the presentation of their
respective evidence as shown in a plethora of cases such as Abarquez v.
People,[40] Tin v. People[41] and People v. Leano.[42]

While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances
of the case at bar, the same, however, does not equate to an abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely an error of judgment.
More importantly, this Court finds that the RTC had in fact complied with the
requirement under the rules of personally evaluating the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence and that the assailed Order was
arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto, thus:

By this statement of Madrideo, it would appear fire broke out in two (2)
places, which, presupposes or implies that some sort of incendiary or
flammable substances were ignited to start the fire. The investigation
conducted by the Bocaue Fire Station, however, appears to have ruled out
the use of incendiary or inflammable substances. Annex “E” of the
Complaint, Chemistry Report No. C-054-2001 of the Bulacan Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office indicated that the specimen submitted by the
Bocaue Fire Station in connection with the fire in question was found
negative of any flammable substance. This finding was never debunked or
repudiated, which makes the misgivings of the police investigators about its
veracity unfounded. Thus, pitted against the allegation of Madrideo, this
physical evidence puts the truth of the latter in grave doubt. Physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses (People vs. Sacabin, 57 SCRA 707). Physical evidence are
mute but eloquent manifestations of truth and they rate high in our
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People vs. Uycoque, 124 SCRA 769).

At this stage, it must be stressed that the Fire Investigation Report prepared
by the Bocaue Fire Station (Annex “D”) and the Certification made by the
Provincial Fire Marshall, Absalon Zipagan, point to the faulty wiring as the
cause or origin (sic) of the conflagration at bar. The Office the Regional Fire
Marshall also came out with the same findings. (Annexes “B” and “C”) All the
above reports and investigation stand as the official report of the fire in
question. Contrary to the Resolution, we find nothing in the respective sworn
statements of Supt. Absalon Zipagan, Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan and Insp.
Allan Barredo that deviated much less repudiated the aforesaid reports and
findings. Far from impugning their own investigation, the three (3) fire
officials simply narrated the steps that were taken at the provincial and
regional levels in the investigation of the Sanyo fire. Needless to state, the
investigation reports and findings carry the presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed. A mere affidavit cannot overcome this
presumption. (Transport Corporation vs. CA, 241 SCRA 77) Government
officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity and strong
evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. (Tata vs. Garcia, Jr., 243
SCRA 235)

The significance of the above reports and findings cannot be overlooked.

Note that F/CINSP. Absalon Zipagan, F/Insp. Allan Barredo and SPO1
Valeriano Dizon, Jr. were included as accessories in the complaint by the
DILG, Inter Agency Anti-Arson Task Force but the State Prosecutor did not
rule on their liability, which thus enhances all the more the probative value
of the said reports and findings.

This Court, likewise, noted that although the Inter Agency Anti Arson Task
Force was quick to rule out faulty electrical wiring, it did note arrive at a
definite theory how the fire started, leaving everything hanging in mid-air.

This Court is also hard put to make out a case from the actuations of some
of the accused before, during and after the fire. For one, the presence of
Wilson Ting and Edward Yao in the Sanyo premises before the fire is not
criminal per se. Both apparently have their own explanations, and following
the equipoise rule as elucidated above, no adverse implications can be
inferred therefrom. So are with the alleged utterances made by the accused
during and after the fire, having been said in the midst of tenseful happening
these can be attributed to their desperation over the loss of some of their
properties. And, consistent with the equipoise rule, if ever said statements
were uttered at all, they cannot serve as evidence against the accused for
the offense charged.[43]

The conclusions of the RTC which led to the dismissal of the information
against respondents cannot, in any sense, be characterized as outrageously
wrong or manifestly mistaken, or whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The
worst that may perhaps be said of it is that it is fairly debatable, and may
even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made
with grave abuse of discretion.[44]
Based on Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the RTC judge, upon the
filing of an Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she
finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by
the court within thirty days from the filing of the information.[45]

The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor

and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.[46] To this
Court’s mind, the RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating
the supporting evidence of the prosecution before arriving at its decision of
dismissing the case against respondents.

While petitioner mainly argues against the use of the equipoise rule, it
cannot escape this Court’s attention that ultimately petitioner is asking this
Court to resolve the propriety of the dismissal of the case by the RTC, on the
basis of the Information and the attached documents it had filed. This Court
however, will defer to the findings of fact of the RTC, which are accorded
great weight and respect, more so because the same were affirmed by the
CA. In addition, it bears to stress that the instant case is a petition
for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.[47]

The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction,

including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondent’s evaluation
of the evidence and factual findings based thereon.[48] An error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctible through the original special civil action of certiorari.[49]

In any case, the dismissal of herein petition does not preclude petitioner
from availing of any other action it deems appropriate under the premises.
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been
arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was
dismissed.[50] Moreover, while the absence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest is a ground for the dismissal of the case, the
same does not result in the acquittal of the said accused.[51]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The July

24, 2003 Decision and October 3, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 71985, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-37.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz, with Associate

Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; id. at 40-
50.

[3] Id. at 51.

[4] Rollo, pp. 117- 119.

[5] Id. at 120.

[6] Id. at 121-123.

[7] Id. at 124-125.

[8] Id. at 128.

[9] Id. at 129-132.

[10] Id. at 133-134.

[11] Id. at 135-137.

[12] Id. at 138.

[13] Id. at
 SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 182460

THEPHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.

JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, Promulgated:

Accused-
Appellant. March 9, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming

with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which found
appellant Jessie Villegas Murcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
arson and frustrated homicide.

In an Information dated 6 April 2004, appellant was accused of the crime of

arson committed as follows:
 That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of
Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by some evil motive, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire and burn a residential
house knowing the same to be inhabited by one FELICIDAD M. QUILATES
burning and killing said FELICIDAD M. QUILATES as well as burning and
damaging nine (9) other neighboring houses in the process, to the damage and
prejudice of said house-owners in the aggregate amount of THREE MILLION
PESOS (Php3,000,000.00), Philippines Currency, as well as to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of FELICIDAD QUILATES.

The charge is qualified by the resulting death of Felicidad M. Quilates.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Appellant was also charged in another Information for frustrated homicide,

the accusatory portion reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2980-BG

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, in the Municipality of

Bauang, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a knife one,
Alicia Q. Manlupig inflicting upon the latter stab wounds, thus performing all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it be reason of causes independent of the will;
that is, by the timely medical attendance rendered to said Alicia Q. Manlupig
which prevented her death, all to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
[4]
CONTARARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. Trial on the
merits ensued.
Based on the narration of prosecution witnesses, the facts follow. Eulogio
Quilates (Eulogio) is the owner of a two-storey house in Paringao, Bauang, La
Union. Among the occupants of his house were his sister Felicidad Quilates
(Felicidad); another sister Alicia Manlupig (Alicia); and nephew Herminio
Manlupig (Herminio). Appellant, who is the adopted son of Felicidad, occupied
one room in the house. At around 3:30 p.m. of 24 March 2004, appellant was
having a drinking spree with his cousin Herminio and brothers-in-law Joey Viduya
and Ricky Viduya (Ricky) in front of their house. Appellant and Herminio were
arguing over the matter of caring for Felicidad while the latter was confined in the
hospital. Ricky tried to mediate between the two. Appellant was then seen going
inside the house to get a bolo. When he emerged from the house ten (10) minutes
later, he ran after Herminio but the latter managed to escape unscathed. Appellant
again went back to the house. [5]

Meanwhile, after pacifying appellant and Herminio, Ricky resumed

drinking. A few minutes later, he saw smoke coming from the room of
appellant. As Ricky was about to enter the house, he met appellant at the
door. Appellant apparently tried to stab Ricky but was unsuccessful. Ricky
witnessed appellant stab Felicidad and Alicia. [6]

Herminio, who had since come back to the drinking table, also saw the
smoke. He peeped through the small window of the house and witnessed appellant
burning some clothes and boxes in the sala. Herminio immediately went inside the
house to save his personal belongings. Upon emerging from the house, Herminio
saw his mother, Alicia, bloodied. [7]

Alicia testifies that she was sitting on a chair near the toilet when she saw
smoke coming out of appellant’s room. Before she could react, appellant came
charging at her and stabbed her. She sustained wounds on her upper thigh, arms,
below her breast and on her ear. Alicia was still able to ask for help, and her
daughter-in-law brought her to the hospital. [8]

Eulogio heard a commotion while he was cooking in the second floor of the
house. When Eulogio went down, he already saw smoke coming from the room of
appellant. He then saw Felicidad near the comfort room located outside the house
and was bleeding from her mouth. As he was about to help Felicidad, he met
appellant who was then holding a knife. Eulogio immediately ran away. [9]

Upon seeing Herminio, appellant immediately attacked him with a

knife. However, Herminio and Ricky were able to pin appellant down. Before
they could retaliate, the barangay captain arrived at the scene. [10] As a result, eight
(8) houses were razed.
 Inspector Ferdinand Formacion responded to the fire incident and saw fo ur
(4) houses were already burned. After putting out the fire, he and the arson
investigator conducted an ocular investigation and invited witnesses to the police
station to submit their sworn statements. SPO2 Rodolfo Lomboy, chief
investigator of Philippine National Police Bauang Police Station, was told by
witnesses that appellant intentionally set the boxes on fire inside the house. [11]

Eulogio estimated the value of his house at P250,000.00,[12] while another

sister of Felicidad, Pacita Quilates, presented a receipt covering the burial expens es
for Felicidad, amounting to P10,000.00.[13]

An autopsy was performed on Felicidad, and it was disclosed that she died
from “cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to third degree burns involving 90% of
body surface to include underlying tissues and organs.”[14]

Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He stated that while he was
having a drinking spree, he saw Felicidad go inside the house to get a glass of
water. He followed her and gave her water. He noticed Felicidad light a gas
lamp. He then went back to his friends and resumed drinking. He got into a
heated argument with Herminio. The latter struck him in the head. He
immediately went inside the house to get a weapon. He was able to get a bolo,
went back outside and hit Herminio. The latter ran away and appellant chased
him. Appellant met Alicia and confronted her about the actuations of
Herminio. But Alicia cursed him. Appellant thereafter hit her with the
knife. Appellant then fell on the ground and lost consciousness because,
apparently, he was struck by something in the back.[15] Appellant denied setting
the house on fire.[16]

On 30 May 2006, decision was rendered by the RTC, finding appellant

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson and frustrated homicide, thus:

WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg., the Court FINDS and

DECLARES the accused JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of arson as charged and defined under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the
victim Felicidad Quilates, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
 Php50,000.00 as death indemnity; Php10,000.00 as actual damages and another
Php10,000.00 as temperate damages.

Further, the accused is ordered to indemnify Eulogio Quilates the amount

of P250,000.00, representing the value of the burned house.

In Crim. Case No. 2980-Bg., the Court likewise FINDS and DECLARES
the accused JESSIE VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated homicide as charged and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS of prision correccional as minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as maximum; to pay the victim Alicia Q.
Manlupig the amount of Php10,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the
costs.

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with his
preventive imprisonment under the terms and conditions, provided for by Art. 29
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Let the record of Crim. Case No. 2979-Bg. be sent to the Court of Appeals
for automatic review.[17]

The trial court found that the corpus delicti in arson, as well as the identity
of the perpetrator, were established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
While there was no evidence to directly link appellant to the crime, the trial court
relied on circumstantial evidence.

In view of the penalty imposed, the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review and judgment.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s findings but reduced the
penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal, which was given due course by the Court
of Appeals on 22 January 2008. In a Resolution[18] dated 7 July 2008, this Court
required the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs.
Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) both filed their
manifestations,[19] stating that they would no longer file any supplemental briefs
and instead adopt their respective briefs.
 Appellant admitted to the crime of frustrated homicide, hence the review is
limited to the crime of arson.

Appellant maintains his innocence of the charge of arson. He questions the

credibility of some witnesses and specifically imputes ill-motive on the part of
Herminio in testifying against him, especially after their fight. [20] Appellant
submits that the testimonies of witnesses, which failed to turn into a coherent
whole, did not prove the identity of the perpetrator. [21]

On the other hand, the OSG banks on circumstantial evidence, as relied to by

the trial court, to prove the guilt of appellant. [22] The OSG vouches for the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and avers that their testimonies have
proven the corpus delictiand warrant appellant’s conviction. [23]

In the prosecution for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where
the evidence establishes: (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal
agency; and (2) the identity of the defendant as the one responsible for the crime.
In arson, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and
of it having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single eyewitness, if credible, is enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant
conviction.[24]

The photographs, [25] evidencing the charred remains of the houses,

established the occurrence of the fire. In this case, however, there is no direct
evidence to establish the culpability of appellant. At any rate, direct evidence is not
the sole means of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Established facts
that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction. Indeed, rules on evidence and
principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may be convicted
through circumstantial evidence.[26]

Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.─ Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
 (a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the

combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused. [27]

The appellate court considered the following circumstances to establish an

unbroken chain of events pointing to the logical conclusion that appellant started
the fire:

First, accused-appellant Murcia returned inside E. Quilates’ house after

chasing H. Manlupig with a bolo and after being pacified by R. Viduya and J.
Viduya;

Second, during the resumption of their drinking session, R. Viduya and H.

Manlupig saw a thick smoke emanating from E. Quilates’ house partic ularly the
window of accused-appellant Murcia’s room in the ground floor;

Third, H. Manlupig peeped through the said window and saw accused-
appellant Murcia throwing cartons of clothes into the fire. Meanwhile, E.
Quilates, who was then cooking at the second floor, went downstairs and saw the
fire coming from the room occupied by accused-appellant Murcia in the ground
floor;

Fourth, R. Viduya saw accused-appellant Murcia stabbing F. Quilates and

A. Manlupig, among other persons. E. Quilates saw his sister F. Quilates with
blood oozing from her mouth. Accused-appellant Murcia met him at the ground
brandishing a knife at him which prevented him from helping the wounded F.
Quilates and forced him to run away for safety. E. Quilates’ other sister, A.
Manlupig, was also seen wounded and lying unconscious in the canal; and

Fifth, the houses of E. Quilates and his neighbors were razed by fire and
the commission of the crime of arson resulted in the demise of F. Quilates whose
remains were burned beyond recognition.[28]

Indeed, appellant was last seen inside the house before the fire
started. Eulogio and Ricky saw smoke emanating from the room of
appellant. Herminio testified that he saw appellant burning clothes in his
room. Appellant then went on a stabbing rampage while the house was on
fire. While nobody directly saw appellant burn the house, these circumstances
would yield to a logical conclusion that the fire that gutted eight (8) houses was
authored by appellant.

Necessarily, the issue narrows down to credibility of the witnesses. Worthy

of reiteration is the doctrine that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses,
the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since it
has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could
affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate
tribunal.[29]

In this case, We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the
lower courts.

Appellant imputes ill-motive on the part of Herminio. This Court does not
discount the fact that there was a fight between appellant and Herminio which
preceded the occurrence of the fire. However, it cannot be presumed that
Herminio will automatically give a false testimony against appellant. His
testimony, having withstood cross-examination, has passed the scrutiny of the
lower courts and was held to be credible.

The lower courts found appellant liable under Article 320(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. It may not be
amiss to point out that there are actually two categories of arson, namely:
Destructive Arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code and Simple Arson
under Presidential Decree No. 1316. Said classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused.[30] Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories
and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or
group of persons. On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 1316 covers houses,
dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,
airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. [31]

A close examination of the records, as well as description of the crime as

stated in the information, reveals that the crime committed is in fact simple arson
because the burned properties are residential houses.

At any rate, the penalty for simple arson resulting to death, under Section 5
of Presidential Decree No. 1613, [32] is reclusion perpetua to death. With the repeal
of the death penalty law through Republic Act No. 9346, the appellate court
correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

This Court, however, takes exception to the trial court’s award of damages.

With respect to the heirs of Felicidad, We modify the amount of temperate

damages from P10,000.00 to P 25,000.00, and accordingly delete the amount of
actual damages, in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva. [33] In said case, the
Court held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to
less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages forP25,000.00 is justified in
lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. [34]

Anent the actual damages awarded to Eulogio amounting to P250,000.00, as

indemnification for the burned house, We note that said amount representing the
value of the burned house was merely given by Eulogio as an estimate. It was not
substantiated by any document or receipt. For one to be entitled to actual damages,
it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party.[35]

Instead, We award temperate damages in accordance with Art. 2224 of the

Civil Code, providing that temperate damages may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proven with certainty. [36] It is thus reasonable to expect that
the value of the house burned down amounted to at least P200,000.00.
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding appellant JESSIE
VILLEGAS MURCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of arson and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:

1. Appellant is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Felicidad Quilates the amount

of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

2. The award of P10,000.00 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of

Felicidad Quilates is deleted.

3. Appellant is ordered to pay Eulogio Quilates the amount of P200,000.00 as

temperate damages.

The award of P250,000.00 as actual damages in favor of Eulogio Quilates is

deleted.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Remed ios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente and Enrico A. Lan zanas concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-15.
[2]
Presided by Judge Rose Mary R. Mo lina-A lim. Records, pp. 207-217.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 207-208.
[5]
TSN, 12 July 2004, pp. 3-4.
[6]
Id. at 6-8.
[7]
Id. at 17-20.
[8]
TSN, 27 July 2004, pp. 7-9.
[9]
TSN, 14 September 2004, pp. 6-8.
[10]
Id. at 20-21.
[11]
TSN, 20 September 2004, p. 10.
[12]
TSN, 14 September 2004, p. 8.
[13]
Records, p. 173.
[14]
Id. at 29.
[15]
TSN, 12 July 2005, pp. 4-11.
[16]
TSN, 26 July 2005, p. 9.
[17]
CA rollo, p. 107.
[18]
Rollo, p. 22.
[19]
Id. at 24-25 and 29-30.
[20]
CA rollo, pp. 90-91.
[21]
Id. at 93.
[22]
Id. at 126-127.
[23]
Id. at 125.
[24]
People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 180762, 4 March 2009, 580 SCRA 617, 627; Gonzales, Jr. v. People, G.R.
No. 159950, 12 February 2007, 515 SCRA 480, 486-487; People v. Oliva, 395 Phil. 265, 274-275 (2000).
[25]
Records, p. 178.
[26]
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 180448, 28 Ju ly 2008, 560 SCRA 419, 424.
[27]
People v. Delim, G.R. No. 175942, 13 September 2007, 533 SCRA 366, 375-376; People v.
Sevilleno, 469 Ph il. 209, 220 (2004); People v. Acosta, 382 Ph il. 810, 823 (2003).
[28]
Rollo, pp. 12-13.
[29]
People v. Gonzales, supra note 25 at 424-425; Bricenio v. People, G.R. No. 157804, 20 June 2006, 491
SCRA 489, 496.
[30]
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 294, 327.
[31]
Id. at 328.
[32]
Sec. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. – If by reason of or on the occasion of arson death results, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
[33]
456 Phil. 14 (2003).
[34]
Id. at 29.
[35]
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 412, 446-447.
[36]
People v. Berando, G.R. No. 177827, 30 March 2009; People v. Al moguerra, 461 Phil. 340, 362 (2003).