Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
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* SECOND DIVISION.
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Although the right to a
preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution but a mere statutory privilege, it is nonetheless considered a
component part of due process in criminal justice.
Same; Same; Same; The law itself withholds such right from a
respondent who is not himself or herself a public officer or employee, such
as Nelly Ong.—It is argued, however, that even if RA 1379 is considered a
criminal proceeding, Nelly Ong is still not entitled to a preliminary
investigation because the law itself withholds such right from a respondent
who is not himself or herself a public officer or employee, such as Nelly
Ong.
TINGA, J.:
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This Petition for Certiorari, dated December 13, 1996 seeks the
nullification
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of the Resolutions of the
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Sandiganbayan dated August
18, 1994 and October 22, 1996. The first assailed Resolution
denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss the petition for forfeiture filed
against them, while the second questioned Resolution denied their
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are as follows:
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VOL. 470, SEPTEMBER 16, 2005 9
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
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Congressman Bonifacio H. Gillego executed a Complaint-Affidavit
on February 4, 1992, claiming that petitioner Jose U. Ong, then
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), has
amassed properties worth disproportionately more than his lawful
income. The complaint pertinently states:
In his Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of December 31,
1989 (Annex “A”), Commissioner Jose U. Ong declared
P750,000.00 as his cash on hand and in banks. Within a short period
thereafter, he was able to acquire prime real estate properties mostly
in the millionaires choice areas in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila costing millions of pesos as follows:
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10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
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5 Id., at p. 38.
6 Id., at pp. 42-51.
** Director Agapito B. Rosales.
7 Id., at pp. 52-93.
*** By Graft Investigation Officer II, Christopher S. Soguilon.
8 Id., at pp. 91-92.
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other sources of income, and he being the recipient thereof, copies of which
he is entitled as a matter of right and party recipient on the claimed loan and
retirement benefits, respondent Jose U. Ong, is hereby directed to submit in
writing within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this ORDER, the
following, namely:—
Failure of the respondent to comply with this ORDER within the period
hereinabove prescribed shall be deemed a waiver on his part to submit the
required controverting evidence and that he has no evidence on hand to
show proof on the existence of the claimed defenses as above set forth 12
and
that this case shall be considered for resolution without further notice.
13
Instead of complying with the Order, Ong filed a Motion, dated
February 17, 1993 for its recall, the voluntary inhibition of the
handling investigators, and reassignment of the case. Ong objected
to the proceedings taken thus far, claiming that he was not notified
of the subpoenas issued to SGV and Allied Bank requiring them to
substantiate Ong’s claims. The
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his wife, petitioner Nelly Ong, and docketed as Civil Case No. 0160.
The Petition alleged that the total value of the questioned assets
is P21,474,585.00 which is grossly disproportionate to Ong’s lawful
income from his public employment and other sources amounting to
P1,060,412.50, considering that Nelly Ong has no visible means of
income. This circumstance allegedly gave rise to the presumption
under Sec. 2 of RA 1379 that the questioned properties were
unlawfully acquired.
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19
In its Order dated November 17, 1993, the Sandiganbayan
directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of petitioners. The writ, issued on November 18, 1993,
was duly served and implemented
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as shown in the Sheriff’s Return
dated December 1, 1993. 21
Petitioners Jose and Nelly Ong filed an Answer dated January
27, 1994, denying that their lawful income is grossly
disproportionate to the cost of the real properties they acquired
during the incumbency of Ong as BIR Commissioner. According to
them, the Special Prosecutor and the Ombudsman intentionally
failed to consider the retirement and separation pay Ong received
from SGV and other lawful sources of funds used in the acquisition
of the questioned properties.
They presented several affirmative defenses, such as the alleged
deprivation of their right to due process considering that no
preliminary investigation was conducted as regards Nelly Ong, and
the nullity of the proceedings before the Ombudsman because the
latter, who acted both as investigator and adjudicator in the
determination of the existence of probable cause for the filing of the
case, will also prosecute the same. Moreover, the Petition also
allegedly failed to state a cause of action because RA 1379 is
unconstitutional as it is vague and does not sufficiently define ill-
gotten wealth and
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23
The OSG filed a Comment dated December 10, 1997, averring
that the reason why Nelly Ong was not made a party to the
proceedings before the Ombudsman is because her husband never
mentioned any specific property acquired solely and exclusively by
her. What he stated was that all the acquisitions were through his
own efforts. Hence, the Sandiganba-yan correctly held that Nelly
Ong is a mere formal party.
Furthermore, the presumption of innocence clause of the
Constitution refers to criminal prosecutions and not to forfeiture
proceedings which are civil actions in rem. The Constitution is
likewise not violated by RA 1379 because statutes which declare
that as a matter of law a particular inference follows from the proof
of a particular fact, one fact becoming
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27 Id., at pp. 476-500.
28 Id., at pp. 450-470.
29 G.R. No. 152154, November 18, 2003, 416 SCRA 133.
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(b) The public office or employment he holds and such other public
officer or employment which he has previously held.
(c) The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his
incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.
(d) A description of said property, or such thereof as has been
identified by the Solicitor General.
(e) The total amount of his government salary and other proper
earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and
(f) Such other information as may enable the court to determine
whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property
during his incumbency.
Sec. 4. Period for the answer.—The respondent shall have a period of fifteen
days within which to present his answer.
Sec. 5. Hearing.—The court shall set a date for a hearing which may be
open to the public, and during which the respondent shall be given ample
opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the court, how he has acquired
the property in question.
Sec. 6. Judgment.—If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction
of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the
court shall declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and by
virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the
State: Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months
before any general election or within three months before any special
election. The court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding
Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
[Emphasis supplied.]
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30 Ibid.
31 116 Phil. 1361; 6 SCRA 1059 (1962).
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6. To fully explain the valid and legal acquisition of the foregoing listed
property pointing out the sources of funding, circumstances and details of
acquisition, the following information is related:
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Respondent was offered this lot, and finding the same to be a good
investment, he obtained a loan from the Allied Banking Corporation
for P6,500,000.00. P5,500,000 was used by him in the purchase of
the above property. Respondent’s credit worthiness is self evident
from his Statement of Assets and Liabilities as of end of December,
1989 where his net worth is duly reflected to be P10.9 Million.
Xerox copy of the Certification executed by the Corporate
Secretary of Allied Banking Corporation attesting to the grant of a
five (5) year Term Loan of P6.5 Million pesos to Respondent on
October 24, 1990, is attached and incorporated as Annex “3.”
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...
(f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting
evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer
may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during
which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where
the appearance of the parties or witness is impracticable, the clarificatory
questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to
be asked
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39 I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, (2002) Ed., p. 366, citing Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 270.
40 G.R. No. 90529, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 667.
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30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ong vs. Sandiganbayan
wealth amassed41 after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved there.
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No rule has been better established in criminal law than that every man is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a criminal prosecution, therefore, the burden is upon the State to prove
every fact and circumstance constituting the crime charged, for the purpose
of showing the guilt of the accused.
While that is the rule, many of the States have established a different rule
and have provided that certain facts only shall constitute prima facie
evidence, and that then the burden is put upon the defendant to show or to
explain that such facts or acts are not criminal.
It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no
constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the
State of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of
guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without
unlawful intention.
. . . The State having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within
certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall
constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie
evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing
that such act or acts
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are innocent and are not committed with any criminal
intent or intention.
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42 People v. Alicante, G.R. Nos. 127026-27, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 440, citing
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A
COMMENTARY, (1996), p. 447.
43 Ibid., citing U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 (1916).
44 Id., at pp. 457-458.
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Petition dismissed.
——o0o——
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45 People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775, November 14, 1996, 264 SCRA 467,
citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245.
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