2 Jagannath Memorial Moot Court Competition-2020: Versus

2ND JAGANNATH MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
JMNMCC-02
2ND JAGANNATH MEMORIAL MOOT COURT
COMPETITION- 2020
UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND
SECTION 114 READ WITH ORDER XLVII OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSAMA
IN THE MATTER OF
The Board of Oswalians...……………………………………………………...... Appellant
Versus
Mr. G …………………………………………………………………….…... Respondent 1.
Anand Asharam……………………………………………………….……... Respondent 2.
Lord Gamma ……………………………………………………….…….…. Respondent 3.
Janmasthan ………………………………………………………….….……. Respondent 4.
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
ON SUBMISSION TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF BOSAMA

Page 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………...…….. 4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………6
A. LIST OF CASES.
B. LIST OF BOOKS.
C. LIST OF STATUTES.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION……………………………………………….…..…..10
STATEMENT OF FACTS……………………………………………………………….…12
ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………………………….………..….14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………………………………….…..15
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………………………………………..……..16
[ISSUE 1:] WHETHER “LORD GAMMA’ AND THE ‘JANMASTHAN’ ARE JURIDICAL
PERSONS? CAN THEY BE REPRESENTED BY A NEXT FRIEND?
A. THAT LORD GAMMA AND THE JANMASTHAN ARE NOT A JURIDICAL PERSON……….16
B. THAT LORD GAMMA IS NOWHERE HELD TO BE A MINOR AND HENCE, SUIT 4 IS
INVALID………………………………………………………………………………16
[ISSUE 2:] WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

MAINTENANCE OF THE DISPUTED SITE CLAIMED BY ANAND ASHRAM IS
MAINTAINABLE IN THE EYES OF LAW?
A. THAT THE ACT OF PLACING THE IDOL OF LORD GAMMA AND BRINGING DOWN OF THE
PAGODA BY THE INDOOS GOES AGAINST ARTICLE 300A………………...……………18
B. THAT THE INDOOS LOST THE RIGHT TO MANAGE THE DISPUTED SITE WHEN THE
PAGODA WAS CONSTRUCTED IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY………………..…….…..20
C. THAT ANAND ASHRAM CANNOT PERFECT THEIR TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED SITE
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION EVEN IF THE STATUTORY PERIOD IS OVER……..….21
[ISSUE 3:] WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

DETRIMENTAL TO THE OSWALIANS UNDER ARTICLE 14 AND 15(1) OF THE
INDIAN CONSTITUTION?

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A. THAT THE JUDICIARY IS A PART OF “STATE” UNDER MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA…………………………………………………………….22
B. THAT THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM WAS DISCRIMINATORY TO THE
OSWALIANS UNDER ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA………………23

C. THAT THERE WAS NEITHER ANY INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA NOR ANY RATIONAL
NEXUS TO THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY
THE ACM…………………………………………………………………………….24
[ISSUE 4:] WHETHER THE ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE INDOOS FROM 1949 TO
1991 REGARDING THE DISPUTED SITE ATTRACT THE PROVISIONS STATED
UNDER PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991?
A. THAT THE INDOOS “CONVERTED” THE PLACE OF WORSHIP OF THE OSWALIANS, I.E.,
THE DISPUTED SITE INTO A PLACE OF WORSHIP OF THEIR OWN……………………25
PRAYER…………….…….………………………………………………………...………27

Page 3
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
s/. Section
u/s. Under section.
Art. Articles
AIR All India Report
UOI UOI
WLR Weekly Law Reports
SCR Supreme Court Reports
LT Law Tribunal
Corpn. Corporation.
v. Versus
Hon’ble Honorable
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
U.P Uttar Pradesh
M.P Madhya Pradesh
W.B West Bengal
T.N Tamil Nadu
KER Kerala
All Allahabad
MAD Madras
Guj Gujarat
Ori Orissa
CWL Calcutta Weekly Notes.
Mys. Mysore
P&H Punjab and Haryana
Kar Karnataka
Ltd. Limited

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FIR First Information Report

CPC Code of Civil Procedure
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure.
ACM. Additional City Magistrate
ASB Archaeological Survey of Bosama
GPR Ground Penetrating technology
Dr. Doctor

Page 5
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF CASE LAWS USED:
1. Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar, (1999) 5 SCC 50.

2. Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, (1969) 1 SCC 555.
3. Bumper Development Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,
[1991] 1 WLR 1362 (2).
4. Raj Behari Lal and Ors. v. Dr. Mahabir Prasad and Ors., AIR 1956 ALL 310
5. Chiranjit Lal v. UOI, (1950) SCR 869.

6. Virendra v. State of UP, (1955) 1 SCR 415.
7. Promod v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288.
8. Wazir v. State of H.P, (1955) 1 SCR 408.
9. State of Mysore v. K.C Adiga, AIR 1976 SC 853.
10. Elizabeth Samuel Aaron v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 KER 162.
11. Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of UP, AIR 1982 SC 33.
12. Sri Nath Educational Society, Sisra v. State of UP, AIR 1996 ALL 187.
13. K. Sai Reddy v. Dy. Executive Engineer, AIR 1995 ap 208.
14. State of UP v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126.
15. State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar Rana, AIR 2004 SC 1851.
16. Hazur Singh v. Behari Lal, AIR 1993 RAJ 51.
17. Manmatha Nath Kayal v. Dt. Manager, FCI, AIR 1996 CAL 316.
18. Howrah Mills Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Shamin, (2006) 5 SCC 539.
19. Dharam Dutt v. UOI, AIR 2004 SC 1295.
20. Vimlaben Ajithbai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel, AIR 2008 SC 2675.
21. Karnataka State Financial Corn. v. N. Narasimhaih, AIR 2008 SC 1797.
22. Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., (2008) 15 SCC
517.
23. State of Kerala v. People’s Union for Civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46.
24. Aslam Mohammed Merchant v. Competent Authority, (2008) 14 SCC 186.
25. UOI v. Martin Lottery Agency Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 209.
26. Lachman Das v. Jagat Ram, (2007) 10 SCC 448.
27. Chandigarh Housing Board v. Major Gen. Devinder Singh, AIR 2007 SC 1723.
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28. Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Indusrtial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., AIR
2007 SC 2458.
29. State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha Vidya Sikshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545.
30. Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali, Syed, AIR 1961 SC 1402.
31. State of Rajasthan v. Sajjanlal Panjawat, AIR 1975 SC 706.
32. Azeez Basha s. v. UOI, AIR 1968 SC 662.
33. Khajamian Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161.
34. Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay, 1951 AIR 128.
35. Nata Pradhan v. Banchha Baral, AIR 1968 Ori 36.
36. Karnataka Board of Waqf v. Govt. of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779.
37. Smt. Pilla Akkayyamma v. Channappa, ILR 2015 Kar 3841.
38. N.S. Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 AIR, 1 1966 SCR (3) 744.
39. Budhan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191
40. Naresh Shri Dhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1.
41. Ujjam Bai v. UOI, AIR 1962 SC 1921.
42. Nain Sukh v. State of UP, AIR 1953 SC 384.
43. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, AIR 1995 SC 1011.
44. Champakan v. State Madras, AIR 1951 MAD 120.
45. Anjali v State of West Bengal, (1952) 56 CWN 801.
46. Narasappa v. Hazart, AIR 1960 MYS 59.
47. Vasundara v. State of Mysore, AIR 1971 SC 1439.
48. Satyandra Kumar Tripathi v. State of UP, AIR 2005 all 147.
49. M.C. Sharma v. Punjab University, AIR 1997 P&H 87.
50. Kathi Raning Rawal v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123.
51. State of Rajasthan v. Pratap Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1208.
52. Shashikant Laxman Kale v. UOI, 1990 AIR 2114.
53. Harbilas Rai Bansal v. The State of Punjab and anr, 1996 AIR
54. Adam Chaki v. Govt of India, AIR 2013 GUJ 66.
55. Nain Sukh v. State of U.P, AIR 1953 SC 384.
56. DS Nakara & Ors v. UOI 1983 AIR 130
57. Chitra Ghosh v. UOI (1969) 2 SCC 293.
58. Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 10.
59. Sammbhu Nath Jha v. Kedar Prasad Sinha, (1972) 1 SCC 573.

Page 7
60. Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P, 1993 SCC (Cri) 356.
61. Baradakanta Misra v. Bhimsen Dixit, (1973) 1 SCC 446.
62. S. Abdul Karim v. M.K Prakash, (1976) 1 SCC 975.
63. Rosnan Sam Boycey v. B.R Cotton Mills Ltd, (1990) 2 SCC 636.
64. State of Karnataka v. State of A.P, (2000) 10 SCC 607.
65. SEBI v. Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd., (2014) 5 SCC 429.
66. Nahar Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, (1993) 1 RRR
644 (DB).
LIST OF BOOKS:
Constitutional law:
▪ Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Jagadish Swarup: Constitution of India (3rd edition).

▪ Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Constitutional law of India (2nd edition).
▪ Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (15th edition).
▪ Durga Das Basu, Commentary on The Constitution of India (8th edition).
▪ Durga Das Basu, Commentary on The Constitution of India (9th edition).
▪ M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (17th edition).
Code of Civil Procedure:
▪ B. V. Viswanatha Aiyer, The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (8th edition).

▪ Foreword by: Hon’ble Justice P. Sathasivam (Supreme Court), Mulla’s Code of Civil
Procedure: along with high court, central and state Amendments (3rd edition).
▪ Majumdar, Commentary on The Code of Civil Procedure (16th edition).
▪ S. C. Sarkar and P. C. Sarkar, Sarkar: The Code Of Civil Procedure (12th edition).
▪ Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla: The Code of Civil Procedure (18th edition).
▪ Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla, Mulla: The Code of Civil Procedure (19th edition).
Central Acts:
▪ Universal’s Encyclopedia of Important: Central Acts and Rules (16th edition).
Limitation Law:
▪ Upendra Nath Mitra and Justice S. S. Subramani, Laws of Limitation and Prescription
(14th edition).

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LIST OF STATUTES:
▪ The Constitution of India.

▪ The Code of Civil Procedure.
▪ The Code of Criminal Procedure.
▪ Limitation Act.
▪ Indian Evidence Act.
▪ Places of Worship Act.

Page 9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The respondent has approached the Hon’ble Supreme court of law under Article 137 of the
constitution of India and Section 114 read with order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code.
ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READS:
137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court subject to the provisions of any law
made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power
to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.
SECTION 114 AND ORDER XLVII OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE READS:
114. Review. –
Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no
appeal has been preferred,
(b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code' or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of
judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make
such order thereon as it thinks fit
Order XLVII - Review
1. Application for review of judgment.
2. To whom applications for review may be made.
3. Form of applications for review.
4. Application where rejected.
Application where granted.
5. Application for review in Court consisting of two or more Judges.
6. Application where rejected.
7. Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application.

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8. Registry of application granted, and order for re-hearing.
9. Bar of certain applications.

Page 11
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTED SITE

1. INDOOS and OSWALIANS are two main communities of BOSAMA, a country known for its
culture and secularism. Due to the separation of Oswalians Republic of ATLANTIS from
Bosama, a treaty of accession was signed between both the countries regarding WANKA.
Oswalians were the strongest community of Wanka.
2. In the middle of Wanka there was a land in dispute. Indoos claimed it to be the birth place of
Lord Gamma, while the Oswalians claimed it to be a site of their historic PAGODA, build by
Emperor King Abar (in 16th century).
DESTRUCTION OF THE PAGODA BY INDOOS
3. The major part of the Pagoda was destroyed, on 21st November 1949 and an Idol of Lord
Gamma was placed inside the Pagoda. From the very first morning Indoos started offering
prayer there; FIR was registered in relation to the incident. On 23rd November 1949, the
Additional city Magistrate passed a preliminary order under s/145 of CrPC, and only two to
three saints were permitted to go inside the remaining pagoda for offering prayers.
4. Further, on 3rd March 1950, a blast took place on the disputed land of Wanka which destroyed
the major part of the Pagoda. Before this incident there was an intelligence report showing the
supply of arms and other information from Oswalians republic of Atlantis to the militants of
Wanka. In same year a suit 1, was instituted by Mr. G, a member of the Anand Asharam,
declaring his rights to offer prayers and other ceremonies at the disputed site. Simultaneously,
suit 2 was instituted by the Anand Asharam claiming for maintenance of the disputed site.
CLAIM FOR TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED SITE
5. Suit 3 was instituted by the Board of Oswalians in the year 1961 for a declaration of their title
on the disputed land. As per them there were uninterrupted prayers offered by the Oswalians
within the pagoda until 21st November 1949, that is, before the pagoda was defiled by the
Indoos with an act of placing the idol of lord gamma inside the pagoda.
6. Later, Suit 4 was instituted by the next friend (as third plaintiff) of Lord Gamma and the
Janmasthan, declaring the entire premises as the Birth land.
INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT
7. All the suits were transferred to the High Court on 10th June 1989. The high court passed an
interim order on 14th July 1989, directing the parties to maintain status quo with respect to the
property in dispute. Remaining pagoda was brought down in 1991 by a group of Indoos.

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8. The High Court on 23rd September 2002, asked the Archaeological Survey of Bosama (ASB)
for the investigation and survey of the disputed site by Ground Penetrating technology (GPR).
On 17th January 2003, the GPR in its report stated that many anomalies which could be
associated with ancient and contemporaneous structure such as pillars, foundations, wall slabs
et cetera. On 5th February 2003, High court directs the ASB to undertake excavation. The final
report by the ASB was submitted o0n 22nd July 2003.
JUDGMENT GIVEN BY THE HIGH COURT AND SUPREME COURT
9. In another judgment, the High court decided that, the Oswalians do not need a pagoda in order
to offer prayers to their god. Depending upon all these facts and circumstances in reference to
the current case, the High court decided that, the disputed land must be divided into two parts,
one for the Indoos and the other for the Oswalians. This judgment was again questioned in the
Supreme Court of Bosama. The court went ahead and stated that the disputed land must remain
with the Indoos as corroboratory evidence have been find in their favor. Also, the court
sanctioned a different land of eight acres to the Oswalians in the state of Wanka. Further not
being satisfied with the judgment of the Supreme Court of Bosama a review petition was filed
by the Oswalians.
ASB REPORT
10. Antiquities, glazed pottery, other object of interest were excavated from the site. Various
pillars were also found during the excavation.
a. North- Decorated stone blocks and 50 pillars with concrete foundation were found,
within regular intervals.
b. South- Cannot be discovered because of a steep slope.
11. Excavation of the disputed site showed a continuous cultural sequence. Weights, wheel made
on discs, broken animal figurines were also excavated. The 50 pillar and some other
archeological design suggested that, it was temple. As, this archeological design is very similar
to that of temples in North India.
12. Mutilated sculptures of divine couples and carved architectural members including foliage
patters were excavated. Simultaneously, the ASB Report explicitly states that there were
evidences suggesting that, structural phrases continued in the disputed site since the 10th
century.

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ISSUES RAISED
The following issues have been raised before this Hon’ble Court to be considered:
Issue 1:
Whether “Lord Gamma’ is juridical persons? Can it be represented by a next friend?
Issue 2:
Whether the ground of adverse possession and maintenance of the disputed site claimed by the
Indoos is maintainable in the eyes of law?
Issue 3:
Whether the order passed by the ACM is purposefully detrimental to the Oswalians under
Article 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution?
Issue 4:
Whether the actions initiated by the Indoos from 1949 to 1991 regarding the disputed site
attract the provisions stated under Places of Worship Act, 1991?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[ISSUE 1:] WHETHER “LORD GAMMA’ IS A JURIDICAL PERSONS? CAN IT BE

REPRESENTED BY A NEXT FRIEND?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that (A) Lord Gamma is not a
juridical person because he is shapeless and formless. and (B).that Lord Gamma cannot be
represented through a next friend because nowhere it is stated that he is a minor hence, suit 4
is invalid.
[ISSUE 2:] WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that(A) the act of placing the idol of
lord gamma and bringing down of the pagoda by the indoos goes against article 300A. (B)It is
further contented that the indoos lost the right to manage the disputed site when the pagoda
was constructed in the sixteenth century . (C)That the Anand ashram cannot perfect their title
over the disputed site through adverse possession even if the statutory period is over.
[ISSUE 3:] WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that (A) the Judiciary is a part of
“State” under meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and (B) hence the interim
order passed by the ACM was discriminatory to the Oswalians under Article 15(1) of the
Constitution of India. (C) It is further contented that there was neither any intelligible
differentia nor any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved in the interim order passed
by the ACM.
[ISSUE 4:] WHETHER THE ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE INDOOS FROM 1949
TO 1991 REGARDING THE DISPUTED SITE ATTRACT THE PROVISIONS
STATED UNDER PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that (A) the indoos “converted” the
place of worship of the Oswalians, i.e., the disputed site into a place of worship of their own.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER “LORD GAMMA’ IS JURIDICAL PERSONS? CAN IT BE

REPRESENTED BY A NEXT FRIEND?
The counsel humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that Lord Gamma is not a juridical
person.
A. THAT LORD GAMMA AND THE JANMASTHAN ARE NOT A JURIDICAL PERSON
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar1 stated that God
has been considered as a formless and shapeless element. His essence is in the presence of the
omnipotent, not by reason of a particular form or image.2
The counsel contends that in the present case, Lord Gamma, a deity of the Indoos is shapeless
and formless. Corporate bodies can be considered as legal persons as they at least have a
physical entity. The idea of a legal person is premised on the need to ‘identify the subjects’ of
the legal system and an omnipresent being is incapable of being identified in any manner
meaningful to the law.3
The Court of Appeal observed in the case of Bumper Development Corporation Ltd. v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis4 -
“Neither God nor any supernatural being can be a person in law. A practical illustration of
the truth of this statement is that if the endowments were to vest in God as a supernatural being
litigation between different places of worship over their respective rights would be
impossible.”5
Assuming without admitting, if God would have been a person in law litigation between
different places of worship, involving their respective rights, would not be possible.
1
Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar, (1999) 5 SCC 50.
2
Supra note 1.
3
Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, (1969) 1 SCC 555.
4
Bumper Development Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, [1991] 1 WLR 1362 (2).
5
Id.
Page 16
The Court of Appeal further observed that any juridical person must be capable enough to be
identified, and for identification to happen, the person should have a name or description.6 The
idol of Hindus is an expression of a Supreme Being.7 Similarly, as Indoos worship idols, their
idols can also be considered a manifestation of one Supreme Being. For God to have an
identification, merely the name of the God would be considerable.8 The counsel submits, that
only the name of Lord Gamma is not sufficient to confer upon the status of juridical person.
Hence, in the light of all the precedents, it is humbly submitted by the counsel that neither Lord
Gamma can be considered as a juridical person.
B. THAT LORD GAMMA CANNOT BE REPRESENTED THROUGH A NEXT FRIEND AND HENCE,
SUIT 4 IS INVALID.
CPC Rule 1 of Order XXXII 9states that, “Minor” means a person who has not attained his
majority within meaning of the Indian Majority Act, 1875.10 The counsel submits that, a next
friend can represent in circumstance where the person is only a minor.11
In the present case, Suit 4 was filed by the deity of Lord Gamma and the “Janmasthan” through
a next friend. The suit was filed for declaration that the entire premises constitute the birth land
of Lord Gamma.12 Whereas, a next friend can only institute a suit which is in the name of a
minor.
In the case of Raj Behari Lal and Ors. v. Dr. Mahabir Prasad and Ors.13 it was stated that
in case of a minor or a person of unsound mind someone else can file a case on their behalf.
This someone else must be considered as a next friend. The counsel contends that there are no
precedents or provisions stating Lord Gamma as a minor within the means of Indian Majority
Act, 1875. Hence, the Suit 4 filed by the deity of Lord Gamma though a next friend is invalid.
6
Supra note 4. Observed: “Any juristic person must be capable of identification. This necessitates that person
‘having a name or description. Since every Hindu idol is a manifestation of one Supreme Being, one must look
elsewhere than to the name of God for an identification.”
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908). Rule 1 of Order XXXII: “Every Suit by a minor shall be
instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor.
10
Indian Majority Act, 1875 (Act no. 9 of 1875).
11
Supra note 9.
12
Statement of facts, para 6.
13
Raj Behari Lal and Ors. v. Dr. Mahabir Prasad and Ors. AIR 1956 ALL 310
Page 17
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

The counsel humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the grounds of adverse possession
and maintenance of the disputed site claimed by Anand Ashram, is not maintainable in the eyes
of law.
A. THAT THE ACT OF PLACING THE IDOL OF LORD GAMMA AND BRINGING DOWN OF THE
PAGODA BY THE INDOOS GOES AGAINST ARTICLE 300A.
According to Article 300A14:
“No person shall be denied of property save by authority of law.”15
The counsel humbly submits that a person can be deprived of his property in various ways.
Firstly, if the property of such person has been destructed16. Secondly, if immovable property
has been taken away,17 from the possession of an individual18. The right to property can be
curtailed, abridged or modified only by the State, exercising its Legislative Power. It can be
done only in accordance with law.19
The Oswalians have uninterruptedly offered prayers since the construction of the Pagoda. The
counsel submits, the Oswalians offered prayers in the Pagoda till 21st November, 1949.20 Later,
the pagoda was defiled by the Indoos and an idol of Lord Gamma (an Indoo Deity) was placed
in order to defile the sanctity of the Pagoda of the Oswalians.21 Indoos created hostile title for
themselves and took over the disputed property. Eventually, in the year 1950, a bomb blast
within the pagoda destroyed most of the structure.22 Thus, a group of Indoos, desecrated the
Pagoda and denied the Oswalians their right to offer prayers.
14
The Constitution of India, (1950), art. 300-A.
15
Id.
16
Chiranjit Lal v. UOI, (1950) SCR 869.
17
Virendra v. State of UP, (1955) 1 SCR 415; Promod v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1288; Bishamber v. State
of UP, AIR 1982 SC 33.
18
Bishamber v. State of UP, AIR 1982 SC 33; Wazir v. State of H.P, (1955) 1 SCR 408.
19
State of Mysore v. K.C Adiga AIR 1976 SC 853; Elizabeth Samuel Aaron v. State of Kerala, AIR 1991 KER
162; Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of UP AIR 1982 SC 33.
20
21
Id.
22
Page 18
In the year 199123 the pagoda was brought down by the Indoos. All these acts of conversion of
the religious institution and thereby denying the right to practice one’s religion by the Indoos
are not in consonance with Article 300A.24 It is thereby contented that this entire act goes
against the essence of Article 300A.25
The counsel humbly submits that taking possession of the land without any acquisition will
amount to violation of Article 300A and will be a “high-handed activity”.26 When a person
has been deprived of his belongings otherwise than in accordance with procedure prescribed
under law, even if the deprivation is non-final or temporary, nonetheless it would amount to
deprivation.27
The nature of the right under Article 300A is that though the right to property is not a
fundamental right, it is a constitutional right.28 Right to property while ceasing to be a
fundamental right would, however, be given express recognition as a legal right.29 It is the sole
duty of the state government to look after the issue that no person is deprived of their right to
property. Hence, in order to keep a check, the judiciary can provide the state with precautionary
measure.30
The protection under this Article is available to any person including a legal or juristic person
and is not confined to a citizen.31 It is clear from an understanding of these words that every
legal or juristic person has a protection with regard to their right to property. And that they are
not deprived of their property. The Oswalians being legal person in law, it was the duty of the
State to ensure the protection of the right to property of the Oswalians.
23
24
Supra note 13.
25
Id.
26
Sri Nath educational society, Sisra v. State of UP, AIR 1996 ALL 187; Sai Reddy v. Dy. Executive engineer,
AIR 1995 ap 208; State of UP v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126.
27
State of West Bengal v. Sujit Kumar rana, AIR 2004 SC 1851; Hazur Singh v. Behari Lal, AIR 1993 RAJ 51;
Manmatha Nath Kayal v. Dt. Manager, FCI, AIR 1996 CAL 316.
28
Vimlaben Ajithbai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashok bhai Patel, AIR 2008 SC 2675; Karnataka State Financial corpn.
v. N. Narasimhaih, AIR 2008 SC 1797; Entertainment Network (India) ltd. v. Super cassette industries ltd., (2008)
15 SCC 517; State of Kerala v. People’s union for civil liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46; Aslam Mohammed merchant
v. Competent authority, (2008) 14 SCC 186; UOI v. Martin lottery agency ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 209; Lachman Das
v. Jagat ram, (2007) 10 SCC 448; Chandigarh Housing Board v. Major gen. Devinder Singh, Air 2007 SC 1723.
29
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. pure indusrtial coke & chemicals ltd., Air 2007 SC 2458.
30
Howrah Mills co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Shamin, (2006) 5 SCC 539.
31
Dharam Dutt v. UOI, AIR 2004 SC1295.
Page 19
Right to manage an institution is a right to property under Article 300A.32 The counsel submits
that the Oswalians, had the management control over the disputed site. They offered prayers at
the disputed site uninterruptedly till 21st November, 1949. Later, by the acts of Indoos, they
were deprived of their property. 33
B. THAT THE INDOOS LOST THE RIGHT TO MANAGE THE DISPUTED SITE WHEN THE PAGODA
WAS CONSTRUCTED IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The Constitution is not retrospective because of which Article 2634 is not intended to confer
upon a denomination any right which it never had. Whereas, it intends to safeguard such right
it possesses or continues to possess as a denomination.35
The counsel submits that a denomination cannot claim its right over a property post-
constitution under any clause of Article 26.36 Provided that the denomination had the right to
manage and administer the property through a valid pre-constitutional order by a ruler. The
Constitution would not operate to re-invest the rights in such a denomination.37
As stated in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay38 fundamental rights only
came into existence after the enactment of the Constitution. Hence, constitutional rights can
only be enforced post- enactment and does not have a retrospective effect.
In the present case, it is a well-established fact that the Pagoda on the disputed site was built
under the instructions of Emperor Abar in the third decade of the sixteenth century39 which
turned into a holy place for Oswalians. The counsel contends that the Indoos lost their right to
manage the disputed site long ago in the sixteenth century on the order of a ruler. Anand
Ashram being a religious denomination, cannot claim any right over the property.
32
State of Bihar v. Project Uchcha vidya sikshak sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545.
33
Supra note 19.
34
Supra note 13, art 26. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section
thereof shall have the right— (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b)
to manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and (d)
to administer such property in accordance with law.
35
Durgah Committee v. Hussain Ali, Syed, AIR 1961 SC 1402.
36
Supra note 33.
37
Azeez Basha s. v. UOI, AIR 1968 SC 662; Khajamian Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161.
38
Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay 1951 AIR 128, 1951 SCR 228.
39
Page 20
In the light of the above stated the counsel contends that the Anand Ashram cannot claim the
right to manage the property under Article 26. It is so because fundamental rights do not have
a retrospective effect.
C. THAT ANAND ASHRAM CANNOT PERFECT THEIR TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED SITE
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION EVEN IF THE STATUTORY PERIOD IS OVER.
The counsel humbly submits that when a property is in dispute u/s 145 of CrPC40 and is pending
or has been filed within the stipulated period from the final order, the successful party cannot
possess the property until the litigation reaches finality. The continuance of possession on the
strength of the final order in s/145 proceedings is always subject to the result of the civil suit
or proceedings.41
In the present case the ACM issued a preliminary order u/s 145 of the CrPC declaring the
situation to be of an emergent nature and urging the citizens to maintain public tranquility. On
the 5th of December, 1949 the final order was passed as per which the charge of the inner
courtyard was transferred to the respondent and two to three saints were allowed inside the
inner courtyard to perform religious ceremonies.42 Finally, in 1961, the Oswalians filed a suit
claiming for a declaration of title to the disputed site.43
The counsel states, in cases of adverse possession, the onus of proving the hostile title lies with
the trespasser who was in a continuous possession of that property and also the fact that there
has been a completion of 12 years and that his title is absolute.44
Assuming without admitting that Anand Ashram could prove their possession of the disputed
site for over 12 years, it is contended that it would not create a title to the disputed site in favor
of Anand Ashram until and unless the final judgment is given by Court. Hence, the counsel
humbly submits that till the final decree is passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, Anand
Ashram cannot perfect their title over the disputed site through adverse possession.
40
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (act 22 of 1974). S/145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water
is likely to cause breach of peace.
41
Nata Pradhan v. Banchha Baral, AIR 1968 Ori 36.
42
Supra note 19.
43
44
Karnataka Board of Waqf v. Govt. of India (2004) 10 SCC 779; Smt. Pilla Akkayyamma v. Channappa ILR
2015 Kar 3841
Page 21
Therefore, in the light of the above stated ground of adverse possession and maintenance of the
disputed site claimed by Anand ashram is maintainable in the eyes of law
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

The counsel humbly submits that the interim order passed by the ACM was purposefully
detrimental to Oswalians under Article 1445 and 1546 of the Indian Constitution. No rights of
the Oswalians were specified in the said order or in any order.
A. THAT THE JUDICIARY IS A PART OF “STATE” UNDER MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
Section 3(4)(b) of CrPC47 states that the functions exercisable by an Executive Magistrate relate
to matters which are administrative or executive in nature. It is humbly submitted that all
executive magistrate (Additional City Magistrate) is a part of the executive (opposed to the
judiciary).48
It is submitted that being one of the “three great pillars of the State”,49 the Judiciary should also
be considered as a part of “state” within the meaning of Article 12 50. If it were not the rule-
making powers of the Court could violate fundamental rights with impurity.51.
45
Supra note 13. art 14. The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of
the laws within the territory of India.
46
Supra note 13. art 15. The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
47
Supra note 39, sec 3 (4) (b): which are administrative or executive in nature, such as, the granting of a licence,
the suspension or cancellation of a license, sanctioning a prosecution or withdrawing from a prosecution, they
shall, subject as aforesaid, be exercisable by an Executive Magistrate.
48
Available at: https://www.thestatesman.com/supplements/law/powers-of-the-executive-magistrate-
1502760285.html, (last viewed on: 15-01-2020, 14:25:13).
49
Available at: https://transformingindia.mygov.in/three-pillars-of-any-government-are-executive-legislature-
and-judiciary-the-nd/, (last viewed on: 15-01-2020, 14:22:43).
50
Supra note 13, Art 12: 12. In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, “the State’’ includes the
Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local
or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.
51
H.M. Seerval, Constitutional Law if India, pg.393 (1999).
Page 22
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of N.S. Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra52 and
Budhan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar53 stated that the courts can also violate provisions
under Article 14 and 15. The counsel submits that the order given by the ACM was also
violative of the Articles stated.
Hidayatullah, J. also stated that the court should come under state as mentioned under Article
13. Otherwise, the courts will have the authority to make rules violating the fundamental rights
or can pass judicial decisions abridging the fundamental rights.54
Hence it is submitted that while passing the order under section 145 of CrPC55 the ACM was
exercising his quasi- judicial powers. Therefore, in the light of the above stated the counsel
contends that the actions of the ACM should be considered as an act done by the state.
B. THAT THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM WAS DISCRIMINATORY TO THE
OSWALIANS UNDER ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
The scope of Article 15(1) of the Indian Constitution is very wide. It is leveled against any
State action in relation to the citizen’s rights.56 The said Article prohibits discrimination on
grounds of religion or caste identities so as to foster national identity which does not deny
pluralism of Indian culture but rather to preserve it.57
The counsel submits that taking considering the meaning and essence of these words it is clear
that the interim order passed by the ACM is purposefully detrimental to the Oswalians. As
none of their rights were specified in the said order. Article 15(1) states that no person of a
particular religion, caste, race, sex, shall be treated unfavorably by the State when compared
with persons of other religions, castes etc. merely on the ground that he belongs to a particular
religion, caste, race, sex.58
The significance of the word ‘only’ is that other qualifications being equal, the race, religion,
etcetera of a citizen shall not be ground of preference or disability. No person can be
discriminated on the basis of the grounds mentioned in Article 15(1)59. In the present case, the
52
N.S. Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 AIR, 1 1966 SCR (3) 744.
53
Budhan Choudhary vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191
54
Naresh shri dhar mirajkar v. state of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1.
55
Supra note 39.
56
Nain Sukh v. State of UP, AIR 1953 SC 384.
57
Valsamma Paul vs Cochin University, AIR 1995 SC 1011.
58
Champakan v. State Madras, AIR 1951 MAD 120.
59
Supra note 45.
Page 23
decree passed by the ACM does not prima facie have any grounds other than religious
considerations as mentioned under Article 15(1).
In the case of Kathi Raning Rawal v. State of Saurashtra60, it was observed that
discrimination involves an element of unfavorable bias.61 The counsel states that the element
of unfavorable bias is established earlier itself. That is, the non- consideration of the rights of
Oswalians by the ACM while giving the order.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted by the counsel that the differential treatment meted out to the
Oswalians is unconstitutional.
C. THAT THERE WAS NEITHER ANY INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA NOR ANY RATIONAL NEXUS
TO THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM.
The counsel contends that the when Article 1462 read in consonance with article 1563 it is
demonstrated that special treatment is meted out to a class of citizens not only on the ground
of religion, race, sex, caste, place of birth or any of them. It is the duty of the court to examine
the special circumstance under which a new classification was founded.64
The counsel submits that the two different requirements which are to be fulfilled are: -
I. It must be founded on intelligible differentia.

II. The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.65
In cases of intelligible differentia a group of person of thing are reasonably grouped together
apart from the others.66 Assuming without admitting, the ACM could state a secular reason for
the interim order, the counsel submits that there is no intelligible differentia to leave out the
Oswalians in the interim order and that there is no rational nexus to be achieved by excluding
the rights of the Oswalians from the interim order. The pertinent question here is not that the
Indoos were favored in the order but that the rights of the Oswalians were completely
overlooked in it.
60
Kathi Raning Rawal v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123.
61
Id.
62
Supra note 44.
63
Supra note 45.
64
Shashikant Laxman kale v. UOI, 1990 AIR 2114; Harbilas Rai Bansal v. The State of Punjab and anr, 1996
AIR 857.
65
Adam Chaki v. Govt of India, AIR 2013 GUJ 66.
66
DS Nakara & Ors v. UOI 1983 AIR 130
Page 24
The counsel brings to this Hon’ble Supreme Court’s attention that the rights of the Oswalians
were completely overlooked while the Indoos right to worship was respected.67 It is submitted
that no intelligible differentia can lie on the basis of language, religion, race, sex or place of
birth.68 Hence, in the light of the above stated the classification was clearly done on a religious
basis which is not permissible.
ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE INDOOS FROM 1949

TO 1991 REGARDING THE DISPUTED SITE ATTRACT THE PROVISIONS
STATED UNDER PLACES OF WORSHIP ACT, 1991?
The counsel humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court that the actions initiated by the Indoos
from 1949 to 1991 regarding the disputed site attracts the provisions stated under Contempt of
Court Act, 197169 and Places of Worship Act, 199170.
A. THAT THE INDOOS “CONVERTED” THE PLACE OF WORSHIP OF THE OSWALIANS, I.E., THE
DISPUTED SITE INTO A PLACE OF WORSHIP OF THEIR OWN.
Section 3 of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act,1991 states that-
“No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section
thereof into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of
a different religious denomination or any section thereof.”71
An understanding of the said section makes it clear that no one can convert a place of worship
of any religious denomination into a place of worship of a different religious denomination or
different section of the same religious denomination.
Section 2(b) and (c) of the said Act defines “conversion” and ‘place of worship” simultaneously
as-
“(b) “conversion”, with its grammatical variations, includes alteration or change of whatever
nature;
67
Supra note 19.
68
Chitra Ghosh v. UOI (1969) 2 SCC 293.
69
The contempt of court Act, 1971 ( act 70 of 1971).
70
Places of worship (special provision) Act, 1991 (act 42 of 1991).
71
Id, sec 3.
Page 25
(c) “place of worship” means a temple, mosque, gurudwara, church, monastery or any other
place of public religious worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof, by
whatever name called.”72
The disputed site is a place of worship as per Section 2(c)73 of the abovementioned Act, as the
Oswalians have been offering prayer there uninterruptedly until 1949. The Indoos on 21st
November, 1949 placed an idol of Lord Gamma inside the pagoda with the intention to defile
and desecrate the place. From the very next morning, the Indoos started offering prayer, which
had the effect of displacing the Oswalians from their place of worship. 74
The counsel contends that this amounts to “conversion” under meaning of Section 2(a) of the
abovementioned Act, as essentially, the offering of prayer at the site by Oswalians were
substituted with the Indoos offering prayer there. This, the counsel humbly submits, is an
alteration.
In the case of Nahar Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar the
institution in dispute was a Dharamshala, the name of which was recorded in the cultivation
column as “Mufade-arii”, which translates as “for the benefit of all”. However, the respondents
claimed the institution as Sikh Gurudwara under the said Act. A close scrutiny of revenue
records pointed out that at no point of time, the institution was established for use by Sikhs for
the purposes of public worship. The institution was never referred to as Sikh Gurudwara in
Government papers, nor Sikhs were ever found to be predominant worshippers. It was held that
mere grant from Sikhs and mere reading of Guru Granth Sahib would not convert an institution
which was purely religious and charitable from its inception for everyone, into a Sikh
Gurudwara, and thus, the institution cannot be considered a Sikh institution. 75
The counsel humbly submits that the disputed site was not a religious and charitable place but
a place of worship for Oswalians. Unlike the situation mentioned in the precedent, the place of
worship was thus “converted” for Oswalians under Section 2(b) of the said Act.
72
Supra note 69, sec 2 (b), (c).
73
Id.
74
Supra note 19.
75
Nahar Singh v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, (1993) 1 RRR 644 (DB).
Page 26
PRAYER
IN LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS

HUMBLY PRAYED BEFORE THIS HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO HOLD, ADJUDGE AND DECLARE
THAT-
1. “Lord Gamma’ and the ‘Janmasthan’ are not juridical persons and cannot be
represented by a next friend.
2. The ground of adverse possession and maintenance of the disputed site claimed by the
Indoos is not maintainable in the eyes of law.
3. The order passed by the ACM is purposefully detrimental to the Oswalians under
Article 14 and 15 of the Indian Constitution.
4. The actions initiated by the Indoos from 1949 to 1991 regarding the disputed site attract
the provisions stated under places of worship act, 1991.
OR/AND
Pass any other order that this Hon’ble Court may deems fit in the interest of justice and good
conscience.
And for this act of kindness the respondent shall forever be duty bound.
Date: **
Place: Bosama
Counsel on behalf of the Appellant.

Page 27

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2ND JAGANNATH MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2ND JAGANNATH MEMORIAL MOOT COURT

UNDER ARTICLE 137 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION AND

SECTION 114 READ WITH ORDER XLVII OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSAMA

The Board of Oswalians...……………………………………………………...... Appellant

Mr. G …………………………………………………………………….…... Respondent 1.

Anand Asharam……………………………………………………….……... Respondent 2.

Lord Gamma ……………………………………………………….…….…. Respondent 3.

Janmasthan ………………………………………………………….….……. Respondent 4.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

THE SUPREME COURT OF BOSAMA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

[ISSUE 2:] WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

PAGODA WAS CONSTRUCTED IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY………………..…….…..20

THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION EVEN IF THE STATUTORY PERIOD IS OVER……..….21

[ISSUE 3:] WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

A. THAT THE JUDICIARY IS A PART OF “STATE” UNDER MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE

OSWALIANS UNDER ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA………………23

NEXUS TO THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

FIR First Information Report

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

LIST OF CASE LAWS USED:

1. Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar, (1999) 5 SCC 50.

5. Chiranjit Lal v. UOI, (1950) SCR 869.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

▪ Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Jagadish Swarup: Constitution of India (3rd edition).

Code of Civil Procedure:

▪ B. V. Viswanatha Aiyer, The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (8th edition).

▪ Universal’s Encyclopedia of Important: Central Acts and Rules (16th edition).

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

▪ The Constitution of India.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

ARTICLE 137 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA READS:

Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-

(b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code' or

Order XLVII - Review

1. Application for review of judgment.

2. To whom applications for review may be made.

3. Form of applications for review.

4. Application where rejected.

Application where granted.

5. Application for review in Court consisting of two or more Judges.

6. Application where rejected.

7. Order of rejection not appealable. Objections to order granting application.

8. Registry of application granted, and order for re-hearing.

9. Bar of certain applications.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTED SITE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

Whether “Lord Gamma’ is juridical persons? Can it be represented by a next friend?

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

[ISSUE 1:] WHETHER “LORD GAMMA’ IS A JURIDICAL PERSONS? CAN IT BE

[ISSUE 2:] WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

[ISSUE 3:] WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

ISSUE 1: WHETHER “LORD GAMMA’ IS JURIDICAL PERSONS? CAN IT BE

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE GROUND OF ADVERSE POSSESSION AND

PAGODA BY THE INDOOS GOES AGAINST ARTICLE 300A.

According to Article 300A14:

“No person shall be denied of property save by authority of law.”15

THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION EVEN IF THE STATUTORY PERIOD IS OVER.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ACM IS PURPOSEFULLY

A. THAT THE JUDICIARY IS A PART OF “STATE” UNDER MEANING OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE

OSWALIANS UNDER ARTICLE 15(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.

I. It must be founded on intelligible differentia.

ISSUE 4: WHETHER THE ACTIONS INITIATED BY THE INDOOS FROM 1949

Section 3 of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act,1991 states that-

IN LIGHT OF THE ISSUES RAISED, ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AND AUTHORITIES CITED, IT IS

Counsel on behalf of the Appellant.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

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