06 - Walkdown Evaluations of Existing Facilities 2020
06 - Walkdown Evaluations of Existing Facilities 2020
06 - Walkdown Evaluations of Existing Facilities 2020
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Walkdown Evaluations
of Existing Facilities
6.1 INTRODUCTION
241
• Very few existing facilities can demonstrate conformance with current seismic
codes. Seismic design codes change constantly to incorporate lessons learned
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from past earthquakes and ongoing research and have usually become more
restrictive and more conservative.
• The walkdown method takes advantage of the lessons learned from the
earthquake performance of industrial facilities, namely that most installations
perform well, even when not designed specifically for seismic loads. The
occurrence of damage can usually be traced to known causes that could have
been mitigated by the evaluations described in this section.
• The walkdown method is cost-effective. The intent is for all components of
interest to be looked at during the walkdown, but more costly detailed
analyses are eliminated for all but the highest-risk items. Obvious problems
can be quickly identified and mitigated, as can those areas where low-cost
modifications or maintenance can significantly improve the seismic integrity
of the equipment/structure (e.g., missing hardware).
• The method is logical and defensible to regulators and owners. It considers
actual plant conditions; relies on demonstrated performance in past earth-
quakes, backed up by performance observations and data; and incorporates
the experience, judgment, and common sense of the engineers performing the
review. Several California regulators have accepted and recommended this
approach for CalARP seismic assessments.
• The method is appropriate for regions of high and low seismicity. The level of
seismic hazard can be accounted for in the walkdowns.
In summary, the walkdown methodology allows the owner to identify high-
risk items and assess potential safety, pollution, and economic exposure due to
seismic events.
the consequence analyses. For example, the process safety team may need an
indication of whether, in a given earthquake, a vessel might
Be undamaged,
○ Suffer minor damage and leak, or
○ Fail catastrophically.
• Collection of site data. Data of interest include seismic hazard data, fault
locations, available soil borings, plot plans to locate items, and seismic design
basis data applicable to the unit being evaluated.
• Walkdown evaluation of components. This is done systematically, using
checklists for each component, to document the evaluation and to serve as a
reminder of the screening criteria. Figure 6-1 shows an example evaluation
sheet.
• Review of drawings as necessary. This may be done to check adequacy of
reinforced concrete structures; to verify anchorage details; or to identify
configurations that cannot be visually reviewed due to obstructions, fire-
proofing, insulation, etc.
• Identification of items for analytical review. These may include “worst-case”
items or any items that appear to be seismically vulnerable. This is based on
the potential for damage that would cause toxic release, pollution, or other
unacceptable performance characteristics, such as damage that would cause
significant business interruption.
• Documentation of “poor” or “questionable” items for owners or regulators.
Sufficient explanation must be provided such that corrective actions, mainte-
nance, further evaluation, etc., will in fact address the engineer’s concerns. The
engineer must recognize that others may perform additional risk mitigation
without further consultation with the engineer who performed the review.
• Recommendation of structural or mechanical fixes or other efforts that would
mitigate risk from items listed above. The engineer may be required to
interact with process safety engineers and owners to evaluate the economic
and technical feasibility of structural and process modifications.
• Identification of consequences due to failure of each of these items and the
prioritization of any recommended risk mitigation actions according to the
consequences of failure and the existing level of risk.
A rating system may be appropriate, identifying
○ Major seismic vulnerabilities that should be fixed immediately;
○ Serious vulnerabilities that might require fixes, depending on
economics; and
○ Relatively simple fixes that might be performed in conjunction with
routine maintenance or during the next scheduled turnaround.
LOCATION:
SCREENING EVALUATION: SUMMARY
Summary of Evaluation:____Adequate____Not Adequate
____ Further Evaluation Required
Recommendations:
SCREENING EVALUATION:
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY/EQUIPMENT SPECIFIC
Noted Structural Integrity/Equipment Specific Concerns:
_____ Maintenance _____Functionality
_____ Brittle Material _____Ground Failure
_____ Corrosion _____Lateral Load
_____Other Concerns
Comments:
ADDITIONAL NOTES
SIGNATURES
Name: ________________________________
______ Date: ___________
Name: ________________________________
______ Date: ___________
Figure 6-1. This example walkdown sheet shows how a simple checklist can
remind the engineer of what to evaluate for a given piece of equipment.
material through the line, or whether the pressure drop will shut down production
of the material, may be more significant factors in prioritizing the hazards.
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The following sections aim to give guidance for performing walkdowns of typical
components in a petrochemical or other industrial facility. Note that this guidance
is not intended to be all inclusive; listing all of the possible situations that an
engineer might encounter is impossible. Rather, the following issues represent
those that have been identified in the investigations of equipment performance in
earthquakes throughout the world over the last two decades. In addition, the
following incorporates the in-plant experience of engineers who have performed
seismic walkdowns of petrochemical and other industrial facilities, primarily in
California. In all cases, the walkdown engineer must use his or her common sense
and fundamental principles of engineering mechanics, as necessary, in identifying
potential seismic vulnerabilities.
resulting from design for other criteria, such as wind. However, displace-
ment-induced damage can occur at low levels of shaking.
(b) Severity of other hazards (faulting, soil failure, and landslides): Known
faults near the site should alert the walkdown team to be on the lookout for
situations where imposed displacement could cause damage, such as buried
piping, or equipment supported on different structural systems. Where
known faults run through the site, a walkdown evaluation may need to be
supplemented with additional geotechnical or other investigations. Soil
failure such as liquefaction could also greatly affect the severity of damage.
(c) Vintage of the facility and applicable codes at the time of construction:
Applicable codes and seismic design methods may have changed consid-
erably since a unit was designed. In particular, reinforced concrete design
codes changed in the early 1970s, adding detailing requirements that would
ensure ductile behavior in an overload condition. Evaluating overall
structural capacity in older units should be emphasized more than in
newer units. In addition, engineers evaluating older facilities should be
more alert for existing damage, such as dents in structural members,
damaged concrete, corrosion, etc.
(d) Overall quality of maintenance: Where overall maintenance appears to be
poor or inconsistent, walkdown teams should be alert for missing nuts and
bolts, unrepaired damage, field modifications, etc., especially in the primary
load path and connections (Figure 6-2). Significant deterioration may also
exist in structural members and their connections. The team should be on
the lookout for signs of active corrosion that may be somewhat hidden
under fireproofing or insulation (Figures 6-3 and 6-4).
(e) Additions or modifications to structures since original design: Over the
years, additional equipment may have been added to a structure, or the
original structure may have been expanded horizontally or vertically. An
overall seismic evaluation of the structure may not have been performed at
the time of a past modification. A review of the existing drawings can
provide valuable information regarding past modifications and provide
information regarding any structural upgrades at the time of the additions
or modifications.
(f) Priorities based on process safety considerations, pollution, regulatory
needs, etc.: The process safety engineers and owners should identify to
the walkdown team which components may warrant a more thorough
initial review due to safety, pollution, or economic consequences of damage.
6.5.2.1 Anchorage
Displacement resulting from inadequate or missing anchorage has probably been
the most common source of damage to equipment in past earthquakes. Among the
specific details noted to have caused problems are the following:
(a) Vibration isolators: Rotating equipment is often isolated from its support-
ing structure by the use of elastomeric pads or springs that do not transmit
the vibrational loads from the equipment to the structure. Those isolators,
which may appear on a quick visual review to be designed for lateral loads,
often lack the strength and ductility to resist seismic loads without failing
(Figure 6-5). One potential cause of failure is when the isolators are made of
nonductile material, such as cast iron, which may fracture rather than
deform under earthquake loading. Another potential cause of damage is a
lack of vertical uplift restraints. The equipment may bounce out of the
support and thereby lose its effective lateral support. A good detail on a
vibration isolator commonly includes “bumpers” in the lateral direction
(Figure 6-6) or stops that will not prevent motion but will limit the
displacement to tolerable levels. A good detail also includes uplift restraints.
In general, any vibration-isolated equipment should be carefully evaluated.
Isolators themselves should be evaluated, as should the consequences of
large displacements that may occur should that isolator fail.
(b) Welds: Nonductile failure may occur in situations where welds are over-
stressed. Situations of concern that might be identified during a walkdown
evaluation include
• Corroded welds, a concern that should be evaluated wherever standing
water accumulates or welds are constantly exposed to water;
Figure 6-5. This is an example of a failed vibration isolator. In this case, the spring
broke. Other times, the mounting may be made of brittle material, such as cast
iron and may fracture.
Figure 6-7. Example of a poor-quality weld, in this case a tank base plate to
checker plate decking. Where welds may be difficult, the walkdown team should
evaluate the quality closely.
Figure 6-8. Shim plates are often used for leveling vessels. Welds over these shims
may have severely reduced capacity. This poor detail is difficult to spot in drawings
or in the site investigation. In this case, the walkdown team should notice the
apparent thickness of the base plate.
Figure 6-9. Large cracks within 10-bolt diameters could reduce the tension
capacity of an anchor bolt. Cracks such as these through the anchor bolts could
significantly reduce their tensile and shear capacity.
Figure 6-10. Load cells are commonly used in the support for vessels. These may
lack the capability to resist lateral loads and should be carefully examined.
6.5.2.3 Maintenance
During walkdowns of facilities, engineers routinely observe conditions that
compromise the seismic structural integrity of equipment yet could be easily
taken care of through routine maintenance. This occurs even in otherwise well-
maintained facilities. As noted above, this is primarily a load path/anchorage issue
related to missing or damaged hardware.
6.5.2.4 Corrosion
The walkdown team should always be on the lookout for areas where corrosion
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may occur. The concern is not surface rusting, but a loss of structural strength that
may be indicated by thinning, pitting, or flaking. Areas especially vulnerable
would be where especially corrosive materials such as acid are present and where
water may accumulate.
Another area where corrosion may be a problem is where concrete cover is
spalled and the reinforcement is exposed. This is generally a matter of maintenance.
Because corrosion is often a high-priority general concern for a facility, the
plant may have a corrosion group that can assist in identifying potential problem
areas.
and saddle design may be by the vendor, while the attachment to the support
and the support itself may be by others; or finfan units, where the pipeways may
be designed by one group and the finfan and support framing by the vendor.
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In these situations, the walkdown team should be alert for inconsistent design
practices, an indication that one or more elements may not have been properly
designed for seismic loads.
Figure 6-11. Batteries must be kept from sliding off the racks. This is commonly
done with wraparound bracing, as illustrated here.
(e) If the engineer is reviewing the batteries to ensure their functionality after
an earthquake, related electrical equipment should also be included in the
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review and given special attention (e.g., inverters, control panels, etc.).
6.5.3.4 Control and Instrumentation Equipment
Control panels should be viewed with the same concerns as electrical cabinets. Of
particular concern will be the presence of trip-sensitive devices, such as relays.
When relays are present, the walkdown engineers should question process safety
personnel or operators as to whether those relays are required to function during
or after an earthquake.
Instruments on racks generally perform well, provided that they are secured
to the rack and the rack is anchored. Instrumentation such as thermocouples and
gauges are not an issue except where they can be damaged by impact or excessive
motion pulling out cables.
A few other issues particular to control and instrumentation equipment are as
follows:
(a) Control panels often contain components on rollers or slides. These
drawers may not have stops and have been observed to roll out and fall
to the floor during an earthquake. The walkdown engineers should check
for stops or other restraints on components on slides or rollers.
(b) Circuit cards often slide in and out of panels with no restraining devices.
These circuit cards have been observed to slide out and fall to the floor
during earthquakes. The engineer should look for restraining devices. Some
cards are restrained by tight friction and do not have latches. Retrofits may
be impractical.
(c) Control panels often have doors left open or unlatched. The swinging of
doors and resulting impact may be a concern if trip-sensitive devices are
present.
with vertical vessels, the vessels themselves are designed for pressure loads and
would be expected to perform well in earthquakes. The following concerns have
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6.5.3.6 Finfans
Finfans are air coolers typically mounted on top of pipeways. The following
considerations should be given to the seismic evaluation of these units:
• The structural adequacy of the support framing and the attachment to the
pipeway should be evaluated. Further investigation is warranted if the framing
6.5.3.7 Heaters
Boiler and heater structures are generally thick-walled steel vessels, supported on
several low concrete piers. They may also be cylindrical, supported on skirts
similar to other horizontal pressure vessels. Horizontal heaters are almost always
fixed at one pier with slotted bolt holes at other piers to allow for thermal
expansion.
The main focus on a boiler structure will be the support system. Reinforced
concrete piers should be checked for adequate strength and stiffness, so that they
do not create a “soft story” effect. The reinforced concrete piers should also be
checked that the piers were detailed and provided with adequate confinement ties,
especially near the top of the piers where they confine anchorage.
The walkdown team should be aware of the possible presence of refractory
brick inside a heater or boiler structure. This will add weight to the equipment and
may be an additional source of internal damage to the equipment.
Figure 6-12. Vertical vessels are often supported on each end by a single reinforced
concrete pedestal. These vessels may be 30 ft (9 m) above the ground or more,
creating a large moment on the pedestal. Drawings may need to be reviewed for
this type of configuration. Special caution should be given to supports designed
prior to building code changes in the mid 1970s.
The walkdown team should be aware of signs of distress due to dead load
conditions or corrosion. Particular attention should be given to cases where
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6.5.3.10 Buildings
This document will not detail the evaluation of existing buildings. That topic is
covered in great detail in documents such as ASCE 41 (2013).
The engineer should be cognizant of the types of building construction that
have a higher potential for complete or partial structural collapse. While minor
damage or even collapse of some buildings may be acceptable, suspect buildings
should be identified to the process safety group. The following items are not
uncommon in petrochemical facilities and should be evaluated by the walkdown
team:
(a) Unreinforced masonry buildings are susceptible to partial or complete
collapse.
(b) Masonry infill in walls is susceptible to collapse.
(c) Tilt-up buildings are susceptible to partial collapse if they are poorly tied
together.
(d) Structures with vertical or plan irregularities may perform poorly in an
earthquake.
(e) Reinforced concrete frame buildings lacking ductile details may be suscep-
tible to failure.
Attention should be given to the level of functionality required of specific
buildings following an earthquake. For example, when evaluating a firehouse, the
walkdown engineer should make an evaluation to ensure that the operability of the
facility remains intact, such as the ability to open doors for fire engines to exit.
6.5.3.11 Stacks
Although unreinforced concrete stacks and chimneys have failed in earthquakes
and tall steel stacks have buckled, stacks generally perform adequately in earth-
quakes. The walkdown engineer should be aware of significant changes in building
codes over the years relative to tall, flexible structures, such as stacks. For example,
a stack designed in a high seismic zone in the 1990s may have required a minimum
lateral force of 0.20g. Using the current code, that same stack may require higher
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loads. However, the same structure may have been designed to 1/3 that load in the
early 1960s. This discrepancy may be a special concern in evaluating a spread
footing for overturning, as the footing may appear to be underdesigned. However,
because of the cyclic nature of dynamic loading, foundations have not been
observed to suffer gross overloading such that a stack could tip over in an
earthquake. This should not be a concern unless soils are liquefiable or very weak.
Note that past experience shows that other structures attached to furnace stacks
may be overstressed, such as trusses supporting ducts feeding to chimneys high
above the ground. The walkdown team should be alerted to look for situations
where flexible or sliding type connections are not present, as these connections tend
to preclude significant interaction between stacks and other structures.
Figure 6-13. Cylinders that are removed when empty often sit unrestrained on
vertical saddle-shaped supports. In this photo, a simple hold-down bolt prevents
motion while the cylinder is in use. The presence of a mechanism like this can be
judged to reasonably prevent overturning or sliding of the cylinder.
6.5.3.14 Piping
Process piping runs throughout petrochemical and other industrial facilities,
running directly between pieces of equipment, or often supported on overhead
pipeways. In many situations, the piping of interest will be particular lines
containing specified quantities of hazardous material. Several difficulties in
evaluating individual piping runs include
(a) With several lines on congested overhead racks, initially locating and then
following specific piping runs becomes extremely difficult.
(b) Piping may be difficult to locate, even with piping and instrumentation
diagrams (P&IDs) or flow diagrams. These drawings do not adequately
represent physical locations or distances of piping runs. Layout drawings
are usually not available.
(c) The walkdown engineer may have difficulty in identifying the boundaries of
concern, especially considering bypass lines, injection lines, valves, etc.
Given these difficulties, evaluating all piping in a given area is often more
practical and efficient. That method does require additional interaction with the
process safety engineers to determine the consequences of postulated damage.
In evaluating process piping, stresses due to inertial loads are not the primary
consideration, except in certain circumstances. Rather, the focus is on vulnerable
details, fragile attachments, and connections that may experience severe displace-
ments. The following observations should be considered when performing the
evaluation:
(a) Welded steel piping generally performs well in earthquakes and is typically
not susceptible to damage from inertial loading. Inertial loads may be a
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concern for nonductile materials, such as cast iron or PVC. Note that
materials such as cast iron are probably used because of their noncorrosive
properties, and changing the material on the pipeline is not a reasonable
option. In these cases stress analysis may be necessary.
(b) Lack of lateral supports will not necessarily lead to failure of the pipe. Piping
often spans very long distances without lateral supports with no damage or
failure. Rather, the emphasis should be on ensuring that the piping system
will not lose vertical support. For example, the walkdown engineers should
look for situations where the pipeline is near the edge of the support and
could slide off (Figure 6-14).
(c) Where lateral support is lacking, making the pipe very flexible, the walk-
down team should also be aware of situations where the pipeline may be
effectively “anchored” by a rigid connection of a branch line (Figure 6-15).
If the branch line is significantly smaller than the header (less than one half
the diameter), the pipe could be overstressed at the connection.
(d) The walkdown team should look for situations where vulnerable appurte-
nances or portions of a pipeline could be impacted and damaged due to
Figure 6-14. Pipes near the edge of a support without lateral stops may slide off.
Loss of vertical support is the primary concern in these situations, not the length of
span without lateral support.
motion of the pipeline or the impacting object. Examples include drain taps
or sampling lines that could be impacted by valve diaphragms on adjacent
lines. Of special concern are sprinkler heads on fire lines that might impact
hard sharp structural members (Figure 6-16). This has occurred several
times in past earthquakes.
(e) Mechanical couplings could fail due to excessive displacement or impact.
(f) Rod-hung systems, particularly fire protection systems within buildings,
can fail and fall when supported by short rod hangers configured such that
moments can develop at the top connection. This is a low-cycle fatigue
failure.
(g) Buried piping could fail where ground failure can occur.
(h) Piping attached to unanchored tanks or equipment can fail if flexibility in
the pipe is inadequate to withstand large displacements in the event of tank
uplift (Figure 6-17).
(i) In many instances, a relatively short span of large-diameter (8 in. or more)
pipe connects elevated vessels supported by independent structural systems
such as concrete frames. The stiff pipe may affect the interaction of the two
structures and can result in overstress at the flanges or elbow areas,
particularly when stress concentrations are accounted for. The walkdown
engineer should take this into consideration and if in doubt recommend a
proper coupled analysis of the entire system.
6.5.3.16 Ductwork
Ducting is often used in petrochemical and other industrial facilities to transport
hazardous gasses and may be identified by the process safety engineers as
requiring review. Duct construction can range from thin-gauge sheet metal to
steel pipe sections. Sheet metal ducting has failed during past earthquakes in
certain circumstances. Failure of sheet metal ducting generally is caused by
6.5.3.18 Substations
Substation equipment may be especially susceptible to damage in earthquakes.
Ceramic insulators often fail. Transformers that are unanchored, or lightly
anchored with friction clips, may slide and damage connections.
Figure 6-18. Eccentrically loaded connection in a wood cooling tower. The cross
member above is a retrofit.
Figure 6-19. Identical joint in the same wood cooling tower as shown in
Figure 6-18.
that they are inaccessible in an emergency after the earthquake. The walk-
down engineers would look for not only the proximity of the platforms to the
vessels, but also for sharp ends of supporting beams that could increase the
potential for damage.
• Walkways spanning different structures without adequate flexibility, such that
differential motion could cause collapse and falling of the walkways.
6.6 LIMITATIONS
References
ASCE. 2013. Seismic evaluation and retrofit of existing buildings. ASCE 41. Reston, VA:
ASCE.
CalARP. 2013. Guidance for California accidental release prevention (CalARP) program
seismic assessments. San Diego: CalARP Program Seismic Guidance Committee.
EERI (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute). 1996. Vol. 2 of Northridge Earthquake
reconnaissance report. Oakland, CA: EERI.
EPA. 1999. Chemical accident prevention provisions. 40 CFR Part 68. Washington, DC:
USEPA.
OSHA. 2014. Occupational safety and health administration standards. 29 CFR 1910.
Washington, DC: US Dept. of Labor.