Ariel Armony - Civil Society in Cuba - A Conceptual Approach PDF
Ariel Armony - Civil Society in Cuba - A Conceptual Approach PDF
Ariel Armony - Civil Society in Cuba - A Conceptual Approach PDF
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction XIII
Part I
Religion, Culture, and Society: Theoretical, Methodological,
and Historical Perspectives
Chapter 1 3
Theoretical and Methodological Reflections about
the Study of Religion and Politics in Latin America
Daniel H. Levine, University of Michigan.
Chapter 2 17
Civil Society in Cuba: A Conceptual Approach
Ariel Armony,Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars & Colby College.
Chapter 3 37
Cuban Diasporas: Their Impact on Religion,
Culture, and Society
Margaret E. Crahan, Hunter College and The Graduate
Center, City University of New York.
Chapter 4 55
The Evolution of Laws Regulating Associations and
Civil Society in Cuba
Alfonso Quiroz,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars &
Baruch College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York.
Chapter 5 69
Foreign Influence through Protestant Missions in
Cuba, 1898-1959: A Quaker Case Study
Karen Leimdorfer, University of Southhampton
Chapter 6 79
The Jewish Community in Cuba in the 1990s
Arturo López Levy, Columbia University
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Part II
Religion, Culture, and Society: Transnational Perspectives
Chapter 7 93
The Catholic Church and Cuba’s International Ties
Thomas E. Quigley, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
Chapter 8 103
Religion and the Cuban Exodus: A Perspective from
Union City, New Jersey
Yolanda Prieto, Ramapo College of New Jersey
Chapter 9 115
Cuba’s Catholic Church and the Contemporary Exodus
Silvia Pedraza, University of Michigan
Chapter 10 123
God Knows No Borders: Transnational Religious
Ties Linking Miami and Cuba
Katrin Hansing & Sarah J. Mahler, Florida International University
Conclusion 131
Agenda 137
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MARGARET E. CRAHAN
HUNTER COLLEGE AND THE GRADUATE CENTER,
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
T
he Latin American Program of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars hosted a seminar entitled
Religion, Culture, and Society on January 21-22, 2003 with
special emphasis on the case of Cuba. Participants included scholars, as
well as policymakers and practitioners. In an effort to better understand
the interaction of religion, culture and society in Cuba, as well as else-
where, the participants explored the applicability of the predominant ana-
lytical models used to comprehend the interaction of these three elements.
This was accompanied by a parallel exploration of concepts of civil socie-
ty in both socialist and non-socialist societies, together with a review of
the history of associationalism in Cuba and the impact of diasporas on
Cuban identity. The impact of transnational links, both past and present,
on the role of religions in Cuba was also analyzed in several presentations.
This was particularly useful given the degree of permeability Cuban cul-
ture and society have traditionally evidenced. While the seminar focused
primarily on Catholicism, attention was also paid to Protestantism,
Judaism and Spiritism given their contributions to the molding of Cuban
culture and society. Among the principal issues discussed were:
• How the study of the interaction of religion, culture and society
in any country challenges existing theoretical and methodological models to
define the units of analysis and locate each development, process, individual
and group within a broader context in order to assess their actual impact.
• To date five theoretical and methodological models have been
widely employed in the study of the interaction of religion, culture and
society: the institutional, popular (or Gramscian), phenomenological,
rational choice and ideal interest (or Weberian). The logic of each helps
determine the nature of the data sought, as well as the analytical
approach. The institutional and rational choice approaches tend to focus
on institutions and their drive to maintain influence and meet their goals,
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Margaret E. Crahan
both transcendental and material. Rational choice also assumes that reli-
gious behavior is influenced by individual and group interests. The popular
and phenomenological approaches tend to analyze the interaction of reli-
gion, society and culture in terms of processes of social and political trans-
formation which create new norms and actors that go beyond institutional
needs. The phenomenological, in particular, examines concurrent cultural
and institutional changes that may generate new capacities and modes of
action that are reflected in such phenomena as increased activism. The ideal
interest approach challenges rational choice by suggesting that religiously
motivated behavior can reflect ideological and faith convictions that priori-
tize the common good over individual or group interests. The most insight-
ful analyses generally employ a combination of approaches.
• In any analysis, it is essential to recognize the power of ideas
and beliefs and their role in the construction of a moral vocabulary that
provides guidelines for social and political organization and action. This is
particularly important when analyzing the roles of religion in societies in
forming, expressing and transmitting values.
• The difficulty that many analysts encounter in analyzing beliefs,
values and culture is rooted in the use of theoretical and methodological
frameworks that regard them as elusive and difficult to “measure.”
However, the beliefs, values and practices that constitute culture have a
material life that helps determine the interaction of religion, society and
culture. This material life develops in the arena between the realities of
daily life and such structures as church and state and are capable of being
identified and studied in detail.
• The analysis of civil society presents some similar theoretical
and methodological challenges particularly in different historical and cul-
tural contexts. For example, how does being part of civil society legit-
imize religious, political and other actors? In the case of the Brazilian and
Chilean transitions to democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, being active in
civil society helped legitimize groups that worked to build consensual
societal agendas. In Cuba the weakness of civil society and the strength of
the government does not provide the same degree of legitimacy or
resources for the building of societal consensus by civil society.
• The case of Cuba raises a critical question in understanding the
role of any civil society and religious actors in any society, that is, is a free
and pluralistic civil society only capable of reproducing capitalist hegemo-
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Executive Summary
ny or can the principles and norms that sustain a free civil society be a
basis for the incorporation of self-organized groups into a socialist system,
thus making it more pluralistic and participatory? If a pluralistic civil soci-
ety is deemed compatible with socialism, then a program of reform
would have to focus on expanding structures of participation in such a
way that they would not be totally subsumed into centralized political or
economic structures.
• The problem of a “unified versus pluralistic” civil society
involves three important conceptual and empirical issues. First, in cases
such as Cuba there may be tension between the concept of “pueblo”—the
people as a unified agent in the construction of socialism—and a myriad of
differentiated, heterogeneous groups wanting to make the socialist project
more participatory. Some analysts argue that Cuba needs to deepen the
autonomy of popular organizations as a way of allowing civil society to
help rebuild social and political consensus. Others question the pluralistic
concept of civil society in a context where people may define their iden-
tities according to gender, ethnic, racial and other cleavages. A second
issue concerns the fact that the Cuban political class has restricted the
debate about civil society and limited the broadening of the public sphere
arguing that civil society could become a “fifth column” on behalf of the
US. A third issue involves the effects of globalization on Cuba, particular-
ly the importation of consumption patterns from industrialized countries
introduced, in part, via tourists and the increasing relevance of transna-
tional actors in Cuba’s public sphere including religious ones. Such devel-
opments are occurring against a background of a strong history of associ-
ational activity and generalized religious beliefs, if not formal practice.
• In Cuba legislation from 1988 on paved the way for the spread
of all types of autonomous civil associations. By 1959 Cuban civil society
had evolved into one of the most advanced in Latin America despite gov-
ernment attempts to legislate its development. Since 1959-60 the
Cuban revolutionary government, through executive orders, has effec-
tively limited the autonomy and development of associative organiza-
tions. Efforts from 1976 and 1985 to institutionalize the revolutionary
process have produced laws that have codified the state’s control of associ-
ations and non-governmental organizations.
• Legally there cannot be “independent” non-governmental
organizations in Cuba today. By law, associative organizations are required
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Executive Summary
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Margaret E. Crahan
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INTRODUCTION
MARGARET E. CRAHAN
HUNTER COLLEGE AND THE GRADUATE CENTER,
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Introduction
viding such assent, for whatever reason, then the state might extract com-
pliance through coercion and/or through the assumption of some of the
organizational and social welfare functions of civil society. If the state does
not achieve consent, then its capacity to exercise state power is undercut,
even in the absence of challenges from civil society. In the case of Cuba
where both horizontal linkages within civil society and vertical linkages
with the state are limited, there is a real issue concerning the maintenance
of consent in terms of the state’s hegemony. Particularly since the end of
the Cold War and the economic crises of the 1990s, the capacity of the
Cuban state to extract consent from the citizenry based on the provision
of promised services has become difficult. This suggests that the mainte-
nance of the socialist system is dependent on the state’s generating a high-
er level of assent and/or exercising increasing control over civil society.
A prime issue raised concerned the likelihood of the reassertion
of state hegemony in Cuba in order to allow for greater pluralistic partic-
ipation. It was suggested that this would require the expansion of the ten-
dency already underway of locating organized civil society outside the
state. The former would theoretically allow for civil society groups to
have greater input into state policies and even challenge them. Such a
development might possibly increase citizen support for continued state
hegemony even in the context of a more dynamic discursive and politi-
cally competitive arena. Such developments are not, however, a guarantee
of increased participation in politics as some case studies have shown that
the growth of civil society activity within both socialist and non-socialist
societies may result in the exacerbation of distrust among sectors of
society, as well as towards the government. Whereas in Cuba high educa-
tional levels and a history of widespread associationalism, among other
factors, favor an expanded role for civil society, it would be unlikely with-
out substantial reforms on the part of the government to institutionalize and
legalize a larger role for civil society and its components, including religions.
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Margaret E. Crahan
suggested that the situation was more complex. Historically Cuba had a
high level of associational activity. The proliferation of governmental reg-
ulations beginning in the nineteenth century attests to that fact and
reflects the degree to which various governments attempted to control
such activities. Beginning in 1959-60 the revolutionary government
imposed additional controls and since 1976 most civil associations have
been supervised by a state agency. International non-governmental
organizations are also closely regulated. The current growth of associa-
tional activities, a good number of which are aimed at supplying services
which the government is no longer capable of providing, has raised issues
of just how flexible the government is willing to be in order to accom-
plish social welfare goals upon which it bases its legitimacy.
The substantial economic difficulties precipitated by the end of
Soviet aid beginning in the early 1990s in Cuba have stimulated a return
to both formal and informal mechanisms to meet basic needs. Hence,
there is considerable pressure for more space for assistential efforts. These
include formal and informal groups, as well as legal, illegal and extralegal
organizations. Given the relatively greater degree of autonomy of reli-
gious organizations, as well as their access to international resources, they
enjoy certain advantages within a relatively circumscribed space. Growth
in this area has been tied to the vagaries of the Cuban economic situa-
tion, as well as to the government’s determination of the advantages of
cooperating particularly with religious groups.
Just as the history of associationalism in Cuba has been some-
what misinterpreted, so has its religious development. While it is true that
institutional religion did not generate as much involvement, as well as
denominational loyalty, as in some other Latin American countries,
Cubans have traditionally been believers. Their cultural identity or
cubanidad has been defined, in part, by the diversity of religions in Cuba
and a pattern of blending indigenous, Christian, Spiritist, Jewish and
other beliefs. This reality, encouraged by heavy in-and-out migration
throughout the island’s history, has resulted in more syncretism and eclec-
ticism than in most other Latin American countries.
While Christianity penetrated deeply into Cuban culture begin-
ning in the fifteenth century, there was always space for other beliefs
which contributed to a degree of tolerance and flexibility. Given the
diversity of peoples populating Cuba throughout its history, the fact that
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Introduction
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Margaret E. Crahan
RELIGIOUS TRANSNATIONALISM
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Introduction
mecca for those wishing to be inducted into these religions. The govern-
ment has facilitated this development, in part, because of the monies it
generates for the Cuban economy. International exchanges and ties by the
Protestant and Jewish communities have also proliferated in recent years.
Religions in Cuba, in general, have been cautious in the utiliza-
tion of international ties in order to maintain their images as deeply rooted
in Cuban culture and society, both past and present. At the same time
they find it increasingly incumbent on them to be more active in exercis-
ing leadership in dealing not only with moral issues, but also with gener-
alized societal problems. Such actions have been challenged at times by
the government as unpatriotic. Since the 1980s virtually all religions in
Cuba have been more assertive in exerting moral leadership particularly
via comments on such issues as the abuse of state power, corruption and
the weakening of the family and community. In this effort they have been
assisted by resources from abroad, in large measure due to connections to
international religious networks, as well as with the Cuban diaspora. Such
contacts function on a variety of levels including the denominational or
institutional level, as well as at the parish and individual level.
As a whole transnational religious links have greatly increased the
flow of information and contacts both to and from Cuba and encouraged
dialogue and greater understanding of the respective realities of Cubans
and Cuban Americans. Some of these exchanges are motivated by politi-
cal objectives, but many are encouraged by fundamental religious beliefs.
Overall, they appear not only to be expanding, but also encouraging rec-
onciliation which is bound to have consequences for the communities on
both sides of the Florida Straits, as well as for US-Cuban relations.
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PART I
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CHAPTER 1
orty years ago the study of religion in Latin America focused on the
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Daniel H. Levine
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tion, documents were the indispensable raw material for any study of reli-
gion and politics: religion was, by definition, limited to the Catholic
Church, conceptualized as a formally structured institution and represented
by written documents and statements of its leaders. Politics was, by defini-
tion, limited to the formal actions of governments, represented by documents
and laws, complemented by personal and familial relationships within the
social and political elite. In the face of a process of change out of which new
ideas, organizations, actors and spheres of action were emerging, the old
legalist and constitutionalist framework evidently could no longer provide
guidelines for research.Thus it was necessary to devise new methodological
options in the light not only of the new perceptions of realities, but also the
reality of the changes underway. Given the fact that every methodological
option necessarily has a theoretical foundation, it is also necessary to trace,
however briefly, some lines of theoretical change.
Modernization theory obviously did not explain either the origins
or the dynamics of the changes underway.Above all, I was interested in how
new forms of being religious (ideas, practices, organizations and institutions)
emerged and were consolidated, and how these caused the faithful to view
the world from another perspective and to organize for collective action. Ideas
of equality, democracy, rights, participation and justice emerged to compete
with norms of hierarchy, authority, submission and a fatalist acceptance of
reality. I began my effort to relate values with experiences via a study
focused on the activities and values of Catholic prelates in two countries,
Colombia and Venezuela (Levine, 1981). In a later book, I carried the
analysis of institutions and elites farther into the arena of popular religion,
studying the experiences of base Christian communities and pastoral agents
(Levine, 1992).The trajectory of my own work on the subject reflected the
general evolution of the field: focusing on change, conflict and the creation of
new actors and forces within Catholicism.
METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES
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Daniel H. Levine
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Daniel H. Levine
bases of any study and to collect data beyond archival documents and the
formal structures of the religious institution. The deficiencies of this
approach derive from its virtues. To insist on the grass roots, the popular
and a rereading from below carries with it the risk of underestimating the
power of institutions (and the loyalty that they engender), and of overes-
timating the autonomy of popular groups in the religious domain. A case
in point is the experience of the CEBs.
For many analysts working along Gramcian lines, these groups
encapsulated the origins of a new popular culture, part of a wave of
mobilization that would give rise to new forms of “doing politics.” Over
time, however, and with the accumulation of empirical studies, it has
become evident that these hopes were exaggerated. These groups were
neither as numerous nor as radical, or even as lasting, as they had been
portrayed. The problem was, in part, theoretical and, in part, due to the
lack of analytical tools that detailed the continuous relations among the
grass roots and institutions, popular masses and leaders.
The phenomenological approach, with which I identify togeth-
er with other authors, such as Michael Dodson (1990), Michael Lowy
(1998), Scott Mainwaring (1989) and David Lehmann (1996), places
emphasis on a dialectical relationship between institutional identity
(established through documents, interviews with leaders and work with
organizations) and the needs, capacities and identities of those who come
to the churches. Thus it is an attempt to combine the best of the institu-
tional and Gramscian approaches. The theoretical emphasis is in the rela-
tion between the transformations of consciousness and ideas on one side
and the creation of new forms of action, organization and alliances on the
other. The phenomenological part emerges out of the neo-Weberian
emphasis on the autonomy of religious categories and, consequently, on
the need to reconstruct the logic of these categories as a base to under-
stand the logic of commitment and of action.
Given the objective to describe the relationship between the for-
mation of ideas, expression via ordinary actions, mobilizing agents and
the audience—authors working along these lines have typically mixed
analytical methods, utilizing interviews, formal polls, participant observa-
tion, life histories and archival documents. The strength of this approach
comes from this multiplicity of methods. Its strength can also be its weak-
ness given the problems of replicating any study.
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Daniel H. Levine
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Daniel H. Levine
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
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Daniel H. Levine
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CHAPTER 2
I
have chosen a broad definition of civil society to frame the analysis in
this paper. I abstain, though, from suggesting my own definition. I uti-
lize the one proposed by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina in their
volume Civic Engagement in American Democracy - a definition
that has been widely accepted in the social science community and that,
though crafted for liberal democracies, is still helpful in the case of a system
such as Cuba’s. Skocpol and Fiorina conceive of civil society as groups and
social networks through which people become involved in political and com-
munity activities (1999b: 2).This definition emphasizes that, in addition
to formal groups (which are, for the most part, the most evident expression
of associational life), there are multiple other ways in which people link to
each other.The notion of “ties” effectively conveys the idea of the variety of
social linkages, which range from social movements and informal networks to
various “publics” that engage in debates in the public sphere.
As this definition implies, civil society excludes the family.
Skocpol’s and Fiorina’s definition also connotes the idea that civil society
results from the uncoerced action of individuals. It understands civil society
as different from political society, which is the arena in which political actors
compete for the responsibility to exercise control over the apparatus of the
state (Linz and Stepan 1996: 8). Finally, this definition does not make
any references to “for profit” objectives. I consider that civil society is, in prin-
ciple, different from involvement in the marketplace because, fundamentally,
it is not dominated by profit-making objectives (Young 1999: 143-148).
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Ariel Armony
This distinction does not mean that organizations in civil society cannot be
oriented to promote a group-specific economic agenda, as is the case of cham-
bers of commerce and economic policy think tanks in many countries. It does
not mean either that social interactions originally based on commercial
exchange at the micro level _as in the case of local black markets_ cannot
also function as a source of values, norms and shared identities.
In brief, viewed from the perspective of the public sphere, civil soci-
ety entails a combination of formal, semi-formal and informal associational
ties.These ties are manifested in varied and heterogeneous forms of associa-
tion.Accordingly, civil society can be considered both as a realm and an activ-
ity, expressed not only in formal associations but also in social movements,
different types of public fora (in which people debate collective problems), the
media, publishing, informal social networks and manifold instances of social-
ization (Cohen 1999: 58;Young 1999: 150-53). The resulting public
sphere thus refers to the multiple structures connecting civic organizations of
all sorts, social movements and various forms of formal and informal interac-
tion among people (Cohen 1999: 58).This sphere is dynamic in the sense
that it provides texture to competing views of the organization of the polity
and it creates spaces for debates and conflicts over power, claims to authority,
public policies and policy-making mechanisms, and norms and practices in
society (Ryan 2001: 237, 242; Cohen 1999: 58-59;Young 1999: 157;
Stepan 1988: 3).
The functions assigned to civil society as public sphere include the
exercise of control and influence over political society (legislatures, constitu-
tional courts, and the various arenas of policymaking), the role of engaging
people in identity building, the communication of information, the making
of public agendas, and the production of critical discourse (Fraser 1993;
Cohen and Arato 1992: 558, 560-63;Warren 2001: 77-82).The latter
has been seen as a crucial function, as civil society can create and circulate
“counterdiscourses,” which contribute to expose arbitrary power, express dis-
sent, facilitate discussion and deliberation, and circulate new ideas and social
practices (Young 1999: 151-53). One of the main tasks of studies of civil
society is to examine the processes of communication in civil society and how
debates in the public sphere enter the sphere of the state (Cohen 1999: 71).
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As Jean Cohen (1999: 58) has argued, in the public sphere people engage
in communicative interaction.
Associational life may contribute to create public opinion by stimu-
lating the networks that sustain public spheres in which people shape agen-
das, debate ideas and engage in various kinds of deliberations (Warren
2001: 61).This function, which he refers to as “public sphere effects,” has
the potential to produce persuasion (34, 61, 77-82). As I will argue,
persuasion, deliberation and voice play a central role in the construction of
hegemony in civil society–a central theme in Cuba today.This is why our
attention should be directed to formal associations (along the continuum
subordination/autonomy vis-à-vis the state) and the activities and ties that
constitute public space in Cuba.Thus, what matters most in the analysis of
civil society in the case of Cuba are the practices, capacities, and strategies of
citizens to create public action (Ryan 2001: 233).
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Ariel Armony
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Ariel Armony
1 Indeed, since the mid-1990s, “Cuba’s sudden economic opening and the growth of tourism
have made the entrance, access and circulation of foreign information, ideas and styles easier and
vaster. Whilst the state continues to hold a firm grip on official cultural production and main-
tains its hardline anti-imperialist ideological stance towards what it views as North American
cultural hegemony, it is having a harder time controlling the inflow of cultural trends from
abroad as well as people’s attraction to them.” (Hansing 2001: 735).
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even material goods and funds. The Elián González affair is one of the
most well-known examples of this type of social interaction, marked by
the fact that debates are no longer confined to a given national territory
but occupy a virtual, transnational space. There are also many other
examples of this communication process, for instance, the networks
developed by the Jewish and gay communities in Cuba. These transna-
tional networks introduce new forces that influence the nature of civil
society and oppose the sanctioning of a socialist civil society “by decree.”
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Ariel Armony
CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the deepening of socialism in Cuba -by
which I mean its democratization- is essentially tied to the creation of a plu-
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Ariel Armony
REFERENCES
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Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato. 1992. Civil Society and Political
Theory. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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Ariel Armony
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Wedel, Janine R. 1986. The Private Poland. New York: Facts on File.
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CHAPTER 3
T
he diasporic nature of Cuban history has resulted in a constantly
shifting juxtaposition of peoples, cultures and belief systems.The
encounters of indigenes, Europeans,Africans and others in Cuba in
the colonial period produced an intense process of interaction, change, adapta-
tion, borrowing, overlapping and abandonment of some cultural elements and
the construction of new ones. Hence, there developed patterns of parallelism as
symbolized by the identification of the Virgen de la Caridad with the spiri-
tists’ Ochún, Santa Barbara with Shango, and San Lázaro with Babalo Ayi.
Such syncretic processes eventually helped distinguish the residents of the isle of
Cuba from Native Americans, Europeans or Africans and gave rise to the
emergence of a unique cultural identity embodied in the word—cubanidad.
The definition of the latter was elaborated over time particularly during the
independence struggles of the nineteenth century against Spain and the strug-
gle against US penetration in the twentieth century.Today Cuban national
identity is intimately tied to cubanidad which encapsulates the diversity of the
constituent elements of Cuba’s religious, social and cultural phenomena,
including the holding of diverse religious beliefs by a single individual.
This presentation explores the interplay of religion, diasporas and
cubanidad from the sixteenth century to the present focusing on three major
diasporas-the African from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, that
occasioned by the struggle for independence and its repression in the nine-
teenth century, and the exodus after 1959.The latter two involved an esti-
mated ten percent of the total population at the time. All three occurred
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Margaret E. Crahan
within a context of ongoing in and out migration which began in the early
sixteenth century with the departure of recently arrived Spaniards for the
conquest of Mexico. Such flows continued throughout the colonial period
stimulated, in part, by the Iberian flotilla system and Cuba's emergence
as a commercial entrepôt, together with piracy, imperial competition and
the importation of Yucatecan indigenous peoples and Chinese contract
laborers. In the twentieth century there were notable streams of
Europeans beginning with demobilized Spanish soldiers after the 1895-
1898 war, as well as other Europeans looking for economic opportunities
or safety from pogroms and the rise of fascism in Europe. US citizens
came in substantial numbers, most notably as businesspeople, missionar-
ies, tourists, or retirees and included returning Cuban Americans. Hence,
diasporas occurred in the midst of a constantly shifting demographic profile.
Religions in Cuba were strongly affected by both the diasporas and
the constant migratory streams resulting in a notable level of flexibility and
permeability. The constant interplay of belief systems and practices has
resulted in the emergence of particularly Cuban forms of Catholicism,
Protestantism, Judaism and Spiritism. As a result they have helped define
Cuban identity in a context of substantial outside influences permeating the
island, as well as in foreign contexts.
The course of Cuban history has consistently helped define
cubanidad and the nature of the island’s religion, society and culture. For
example, the struggle for independence in the nineteenth century was
facilitated by the growth of a unique creole identity, as well as by Spiritist
and Catholic priests, together with Protestant ministers who helped legit-
imize the struggle. Some of these religious leaders, many of whom had
spent time in exile, disseminated information about alternative political,
economic and social models. Finally, as a result of the Cuban diaspora in
the late twentieth century, there have been substantial changes ranging
from new forms of Spiritism such as santerismo generated in response to
conditions Cuban Americans have encountered in the US and Puerto
Rico.The role of institutional churches has also changed from marginal-
ization in the mid-1960s to an increasing role in rethinking the island's
future, including what role civil society could play in dealing with such
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Cuban Diasporas
Cuba. Spiritist religions have been most prevalent among poorer Cuban
exiles and appear to have had some positive impact in strengthening their
communities. However, the emergence of Santerismo also suggests the
degree to which Afrocuban and other religions can be modified outside
the homeland. In contrast, in Cuba the spread of Spiritism in recent years
seems to have stimulated communities to engage in more effective
demand making on the government, as well as to protest as witness the
street demonstrations in Barbacoa in 1994.
In short, Afrocuban religions have clearly helped forge Cuban
national identity, as well as generate support for the struggle for inde-
pendence from Spain and resistance to US domination. Both in revolu-
tionary Cuba and in exile it has helped Cubans maintain their identity in
the face of foreign influences. In the 1960s and 1970s the government
criticized Spiritist practices, but they do not appear to have lost strength.
Indeed, Santería and the other Spiritist religions, are benefiting from the
current religious resurgence and are increasing their influence within
Cuban society on the island and in the US. That makes them well-posi-
tioned to exercise greater influence if civil society becomes more active.
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
CONCLUSION
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Cuban Diasporas
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Margaret E. Crahan
Cuban religions were Spiritist, which had grown steadily and permeated
Cuban culture over the course of the twentieth century. Nevertheless,
given their identification with the more popular classes, their practice was
often conducted discreetly, including by its bourgeois adherents. All religions
in prerevolutionary Cuba tended to be fairly permeable to outside influences
in good measure because of the constant in and out migrations of peoples
and their belief systems. This made religions in Cuba somewhat flexible and
adaptable, qualities that not only reflected the complexities of Cuban identi-
ty, but also the difficulties of constructing a unitary civil society.
The African diaspora to Cuba and the nineteenth and twentieth
century diasporas out of Cuba helped develop and reinforce a Cuban
identity, forged in part by memories and beliefs originating in the home-
land preserved and passed down in part via religious beliefs and practices.
The nature of cubanidad was molded by a combination of indigenous,
European and African elements. Political and economic impediments
imposed first by Spain, and then by the US, tended to slow down the
translation of a unique identity into the creation of a nation, as well as a
sovereign nation state with a strong civil society. The frustration of the
political expression of Cuban identity contributed to nationalistic fervor
that intensified over the course of the twentieth century and culminated
in a nationalist/anti-imperialist revolution in the 1950s. That helped facil-
itate the alliance with the Soviet Union and the acceptance of Marxism
Leninism, at least by the revolutionary leadership. Limited penetration by
institutional religion, particularly in the rural areas, further facilitated the
spread of a revolutionary ideology based on Marxism. Perhaps the most
substantial potential religious impediment to growing support for a
Marxist revolution was Spiritism, but the revolutionary government's
focus on improving living conditions for the poor, especially in rural areas
helped overcome resistance.
As long as the revolution was able to provide a reasonable level of
benefits, it maintained its legitimacy to a considerable degree, always
reinforced by appeals to nationalism and anti-imperialism. Today, howev-
er, the basis for the legitimacy of the revolutionary government is weak
given that it is rooted in the promise that control by the state of produc-
tion and distribution would guarantee the common good. Given the extent
of socioeconomic deprivation and growing inequality in the 1990s, Cuba's
socialist state is increasingly unable to legitimate itself. Hence, the revolution-
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Cuban Diasporas
ary government has seen its support diminish and in light of that has turned
to some marginalized sectors of society including religious believers. Such
overtures, which intensified in the 1980s at the time most religions were
experiencing renewal, have fortified religion. In addition, the deepening of
Cuba's political, economic and social crisis since 1959 has led more people to
turn to religion for psychological release and support, as well as hope.
Religious leaders, while they welcome the resurgence of reli-
gion, are also preoccupied by the possibility of future conflict and desta-
bilization. Many continue to be committed to revolutionary ideals and
accomplishments, but want a competitive political system and more space
for civil society. Given that the government has strictly controlled civil
society since the early 1960s, religious groups are among the very few
reasonably autonomous organizations within civil society. While some
progress has been made in building horizontal linkages and networking,
as well as creating consensus, there is not yet considerable dialogue and
agreement on how to reform Cuba. Yet religious groups appear to have
more possibilities than any other sector of civil society to influence the
reformulation of the polity. In this they have support from a good num-
ber of religions abroad, where many denominations are supportive of
using the revolution's accomplishments as a basis to build a new model for
the Cuban nation state, which would transcend the limitations of previ-
ous models. To accomplish this would truly be miraculous.
REFERENCES
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Margaret E. Crahan
Kirk, John. 1989. Between God and the Party: Religion and Politics
in Revolutionary Cuba. Tampa, FL: University of South Florida Press.
Lewis, B.H., ed. 1960. Methodist Overseas Mission, 1960: Gazeteer and
Statistics. New York: Board of Missions of the United Methodist Church.
Padula, Jr., Alfred L. 1974. The Fall of the Bourgeoisie: Cuba 1959-
1966. Ph.D. dissertation. University of New Mexico.
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CHAPTER 4
ALFONSO QUIROZ
WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
BARUCH COLLEGE & THE GRADUATE CENTER,
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
V
oluntary associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
are important bases of civil society.1 These organizations rely on their
legal status to attain broad civic goals.They can either thrive with pos-
itive legal norms or be curbed by confining legislation. Clandestine or illegal
associations have only an isolated and temporary social impact.Thus the legal
framework regulating associations and NGOs is key to the strengthening of
civil society.This presentation analyzes the historical and current legislation con-
cerning associations in Cuba to assess their impact on their evolution, autono-
my and contribution to the development of Cuban civil society.
In Cuba, moderate liberal legislation from 1888 on paved the way
for the blossoming of all types of autonomous civil associations. By 1959
Cuban civil society had evolved into one of the most advanced in Latin
America despite erratic conservative and dictatorial attempts to legislate its
control. Since 1959-1960 the Cuban revolutionary government, through
executive orders, has effectively arrested the autonomy and development of
associative organizations. Efforts from 1976 and 1985 to institutionalize
the revolutionary process have produced specific laws that have codified in
detail the state's control over associations and NGOs.
1 The concept of civil society can be briefly defined as the area of legally protected, non-gov-
ernmental, non-violent, self-organizing associative activities and institutions, outside the spheres
of family and the state, in modern market societies (Keane 1998: 6; Becker 1994: 7).
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Alfonso Quiroz
ORIGINS OF ASSOCIATIONS
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2 At the end of the Spanish colonial regime in Cuba in 1898 the members of the Sociedad
Económica decided to incorporate themselves, under the same name, as a private and fully
autonomous association. In the 1960s the Sociedad Económica was integrated into the official
Academia de las Ciencias. In 1994 the Sociedad Económica was revived as a NGO, under the
supervision of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Science, Technology and the
Environment. A fund in Spain permits its current semi-autonomous financing and the publica-
tion of its academic journal Revista Bimestre Cubana (third epoch).
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Alfonso Quiroz
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Alfonso Quiroz
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order No. 124 changed article 2 of the 1888 law to erase the distinction
between Catholic and non-Catholic religious associations. From then on the
Catholic Church and its organizations enjoyed the associative rights of other
private non-profit associations. Until 1959 the property and activities (cult,
educational, recreational) of Catholic and other religious organizations were
recognized and respected as those of any other private association.
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Alfonso Quiroz
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Alfonso Quiroz
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Alfonso Quiroz
regimes that ignored the existence and even the concept of "civil society,"
in Cuba civil society is officially recognized as a transitional step toward a
"socialist society" (Hart 1996: 5-7). The Cuban constitution and laws
emphasize the “socialist” character of the Cuban system and recognize the
associative elements of civil society. Accordingly state control over associa-
tions and civil society has to be recognized by foreign donor institutions
dealing with Cuban NGOs. If this is not done the donor institution is
identified with "imperialism" that "attempts to introduce chaos in the
Cuban Revolution by stimulating direct relationships with certain individ-
uals, promoting organizational models alien to our political system, and
unbalancing the democratic working of our society" (Hart 1996: 7).
The legal regulations for associations have served to undercut
greater independence by NGOs. Legal "NGOs" in Cuba today fall into
two broad categories: “top-down” organizations (Asociación Nacional de
Agricultores Pequeños [National Association of Small Farmers], for
example), which are initiated by the state, and “bottom-up” organizations
(Gran Logia de Cuba [The Great Lodge of Cuba], Consejo Ecuménico
[Ecumenical Council]), products of grass roots initiatives (Gunn 1995: 2).
All of the Cuban "NGOs" surveyed during this research have either a
supervising representative of the Ministry of Justice on their boards or are
supervised by a government agency as required by law. Current or former
high-ranking government officials head most of them. There are very few
truly autonomous or independent non-governmental associations.
Tendencies toward greater organic independence of Cuban NGOs
are curbed by existing legislation despite occasional autonomous initiatives
tolerated depending on case-by-case negotiations with the state. For exam-
ple, Centro Havana’s urban restoration foundation, linked to the Oficina del
Historiador de la Ciudad (Office of the Historian of the City), has an atyp-
ical financial arrangement with foreign donors guaranteeing the allocation
of foreign funds for restoration purposes only. In other words, the degree of
state control over associations and foundations may vary due to the persist-
ent tension between the associative private and local interests of civil society
and the controlling and financial interests of the state. However, any overall
transformation that could facilitate the growth of Cuban civil society needs
to include a relaxation of the current legislation limiting the autonomy and
activities of associations. This latter option, however, runs contrary to the
regime's well-established strategy of limiting reform.
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CONCLUSIONS
REFERENCES
Cobreiro, Manuel J., ed. 1916. Las vigentes leyes de reuniones y aso-
ciaciones. Havana: P. Fernández y Cia.
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Alfonso Quiroz
Hann, Chris & Elizabeth Dunn, ed. 1996. Civil Society: Challenging
Western Models. New York: Routledge.
Keane, John. 1998. Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Oxford:
Polity Press.
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CHAPTER 5
D
evelopment of a strong national identity at the outset of Cuban
independence was both hindered and facilitated by US political,
economic, social, cultural and religious penetration.The flood of
missionaries from the United States at the beginning of the twentieth centu-
ry stimulated changes in Cuban culture and society some of which dimin-
ished Cuba’s distinctness while at the same time helped Cubans to forge a
more independent national identity. US religious penetration transmitted
concepts of liberal democracy and civic participation that had resonance in
Cuba, while the assumption on the part of missionaries that their’s was the
better system—politically, economically, socially and religiously—fueled
nationalism and anti-Americanism.
US churches had evinced interest in Cuba prior to the latter’s war
of independence from Spain from 1895-1898. It was, however, the entrance
of the US into the war in 1898 and the attendant press coverage that
helped stimulate increased interest.There was considerable popular support
in the US for intervening in the war against Spain in the name of liberat-
ing what were regarded as the oppressed of Cuba.There was also a general-
ized feeling that the US had an obligation to rescue the Cubans.The image
projected by the press and politicians was of a benevolent US sacrificing its
soldiers for the good of all Cubans (Pérez, 1999, 356-57). Methodists,
Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Baptists and Quakers reflected these views.
The implication was that the US had a moral obligation to make sure that
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Karen Leimdorfer
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1-2 May Jones, letter to the Board, Gibara 22 February 1901, Jones’ letters p.49, Friends
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Karen Leimdorfer
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6May Jones, article, “Friends’ Missionary Advocate”, Holguin 12-17 April 1904, Jones’ letters p.
296, Friends Collection, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana.
7 Sylvester Jones, article “The Outlook for College Men and Women in Spanish-Speaking
Countries.” The Earlhamite, Vol. XXXIII, 6 April 1907, May and Sylvester Jones letters p. 366,
Friends Collection, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana.
8May Jones, “Christmas in Cuba”, Gibara, January 1901, Jones’ letters p.112, Friends
Collection, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana.
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Karen Leimdorfer
Jones put it:“The custom-house inspector and the leading city editor recently
put their children into our school, and both have favored us by attending the
services once or twice lately.The former…is the idol of the city, and a promi-
nent speaker on all public occasions….He became a member of the Episcopal
Church while in the U.S. Although we count it all joy to serve the poorest
and humblest, we hope that all these things may widen our influence.”9
9May Jones, article, Gibara 21 January 1903, Jones’ letters p.197, Friends Collection, Earlham
College, Richmond, Indiana
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and the upper echelon of Cuban workers. Missionary schools were ideal
for such purposes because they taught English and promoted “American”
values akin to those endorsed by the company. Nevertheless, it appears
that the agenda of UFCO and that of the Quakers did not always coin-
cide as the former seemed more interested in a school for the children of
their US employees, but contact with the Cuban community was of as
great importance to the Quakers.
CONCLUSION
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Karen Leimdorfer
REFERENCES
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CHAPTER 6
T
he analysis of the Cuban Jewish experience in the 1990s is
impossible without referring to the situation prior to that decade.1a
A review of the previous period allows us to identify clearly how,
starting in 1992, a new era in the history of the Jewish community in Cuba
was initiated. Following are some of the major developments within Cuban
Judaism from the outset of the Cuban revolution in 1959 up to the 1990s:
1) Between 1960 and 1962, there was a massive exodus of mem-
bers of the Jewish community, most of whom were destined for the US, while
others went to Latin America particularly to Mexico and Venezuela.This
exodus was stimulated, especially for members of the Jewish upper and middle
classes, by the nationalization laws of 1960 and 1961.A smaller group emi-
grated to Israel motivated by Zionism. Overall emigration was the result of:
a) the effect of the nationalization of businesses and the transition
to socialism on the upper and middle classes. Cuban Jews, without belonging
to the country’s elite, had taken advantage of economic growth in the 1940s
and 1950s. Many of them were successful in retail commerce and in small
and medium scale enterprises;
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of Cuban Jews, who increasingly felt themselves a part of the whole. The
social space where they developed the core of their lives was increasingly less
distinct from that of other Cubans.They attended the same schools, nursery
schools, beaches, etc. On the other hand, Jewish welfare institutions lost space
in the wake of the state taking over the administration of educational and
health services.
The official distrust for any civil society organization outside the
strictest state control posed a challenge to any organization on the margins,
including Jewish ones.Through the state, the Communist Party generated a
hostile environment towards the development of any independent group,
irrespective of whether it was political, religious or fraternal in character.
Moreover, for those revolutionaries who were part of the system and had an
interest in participating in Jewish activities, there developed a complex
dilemma of loyalties.
Nevertheless, to focus on the abandonment of the synagogues, com-
munity centers, or other organizations solely from a dynamic of the relations
between state policies and Jewish institutions is to reduce drastically the rich-
ness of the topic at hand.Those persons who lived in Cuba during the era in
question did so immersed not in a simple period of political change, but rather
in an authentic revolution. Irrespective of the turbulent epoch in which they
were immersed, many of them ended up thinking that they “were storming
Heaven.” For them, it was more important to take part in the agrarian and
military mobilizations, in literacy campaigns, or in the harvesting of the
sugar-cane crop, than in the religious or social life of the synagogue.
The Jews who remained in Cuba after the early 1960s were, in
general, the most assimilated ones, that is, the poorest and, as would be
expected, the most closely identified with the values of the left. It was the
Ashkenazi Jews from Eastern Europe and Russia who, given their coun-
tries of origin, the economic resources with which they arrived, presence
or absence of familial ties in the US, customs and language, were the
slowest to assimilate into the country’s culture. The Sephardim from
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2Given this, a concept of a “Cuban Myniam” was developed, in which God, and at times even the
Torah, was counted in order to have the required 10 “persons” established by the Halajic ritual.
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3 We refer in this case to the criterion within the orthodox and conservative Jewish movements
which hold that a person can only become a Jew through matrilineal descent or by election after
having gone through a rabbinical court and undergone the mikveh and, in the case of males, the
Brith Mila.
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Mexico and Argentina and particularly with the Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee (JDC) began to gain momentum.
In the beginning of the 1990s various rabbis, Jewish educators,
and regional leaders began to visit the island, and in coordination with
local leaders they designed a program that resulted in the establishment of
permanent education and development working groups sponsored by the
Joint Distribution Committee. These teams created a group of young peo-
ple able to administer religious services and community activities in all the
synagogues, and provided financial support for these activities as well as for
the community’s educational activities. Instruction in Jewish history,
Hebrew language, and religious traditions became more prevalent.
The Joint Distribution Committee also undertook to provide
rabbinical attention for Cuban congregations. For almost 30 years, the
Jewish community lacked even periodic rabbinical attention. The JDC
arranged for rabbis from other countries to visit Cuba, which facilitated
the conversions that took place in the 1990s. The latter included individ-
uals who had at least two years of participation in the community, had
Jewish ancestors or had married Jews and had previously attended educa-
tional courses of about a year’s duration. In accordance with conservative
ritual, all passed through a Rabbinical Court, the mikveh ritual and, in
the case of men, the Birth Mila. Out of these processes later emerged
many leaders of youth groups and other activists.
Towards the middle of the decade, there developed a more
consistent structuring of community organizations. Under the aegis of
the JDC, Gusher groups for adults between the ages of 30 and 60 years
of age and Simian groups for the elderly were created. The Bnai Brith
revitalized its social, including welfare, fraternal and cultural activities,
as well as its monitoring of anti-semitic activities. In 1996, the
Asociación Femenina Hebrea de Cuba (Cuban Jewish Female
Association) held a national meeting. In 1994 a Cuban branch of
Hadassah was created under the direction of Dr. Rosa Behar. This
organization, which links members of all the synagogues, channels
medicinal aid from congregations all over the world to the Cuban
community. As part of the collaboration with the JDC, an exchange
program with the Ministry of Health was designed whereby renowned
Jewish doctors, mostly North American, visited the country and
engaged in exchanges with local doctors.
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THE FUTURE
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REFERENCES
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PART II
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CHAPTER 7
S
ome believe that the Catholic Church in Cuba, from the moment of
the triumph of Castro’s Revolution in January 1959 to the years
immediately leading up to the papal visit of January 1998, was lit-
tle more than a shell.They held that the it was a small remnant of an essen-
tially pre-Vatican II church, one that had failed to respond adequately to the
challenges of the times and which the rest of the Catholic world was content
to ignore. There is some truth to the last point that the Church in Cuba
lived much of the last four decades in considerable isolation from the
Catholic Church beyond its borders. But the reality is much more complex.
This presentation seeks to recount the degree to which the Cuban
Catholic Church lost certain of its international ties, retained others and,
over time, developed new and important relationships that have redounded
to the benefit of the Church as well as the larger Cuban society.
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Thomas E. Quingley
In the 1940s and 1950s, Cuba was one of the Latin American
nations that most clearly exemplified the growing awareness in Church
circles of the centrality of Catholic social teaching in the life of the
Church. Cuban Catholics formed the linchpin of the Inter-American
Social Action Conferences organized in those years by the US bishops’
Social Action Department. The first Inter-American meeting was held in
1945 at Havana’s Belén High School, Fidel Castro’s alma mater.
Furthermore, Augustinians from the US had founded Cuba’s premier
Catholic university, Santo Tomás de Villanueva, and, given the proximity
and the ease of travel between the two countries, connections between
the two Catholic Churches were numerous.
The political tensions arising between the two governments begin-
ning in 1959, however, brought those ties to an abrupt end. After vigorous-
ly opposing the early show trials and summary executions of people con-
nected to the Batista regime, the bishops, for the first six months or so,
essentially refrained from criticizing the increasingly radical revolutionary
legislation, some of which directly and adversely affected the Church. They
were seeking, hoping against hope, to co-exist with a regime that was
becoming daily more hostile to the Catholic Church.
On July 26 of 1959, the Nuncio even celebrated a Mass at Havana’s
Cathedral with top officials, including Castro, present. But by November,
Cardinal Richard Cushing of Boston was publicly attacking the regime,
labeling Castro a Communist and referring to the Catholic Church there as
a Church of silence, a phrase used during the Cold War years to denote
Catholicism under Communism. Over the next two years there followed a
massive hemorrhaging of Catholics, the expulsion or coerced departure of a
high percentage of the country’s clergy and religious, and the departure of
some 800,000 Cubans, many of them active Catholics, with most of them
coming to the United States. Contacts between the Church in Cuba and in
the US became less frequent and more difficult. The Catholic Church in
Cuba indeed became a church of silence, and an increasingly isolated one.
YEARS OF ISOLATION
The sense of isolation was even more bitter as Catholic visitors and
writers, including world-renowned Catholic sociologists and theologians,
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Towards the end of the 1970s, partly through the patient diplo-
macy of the Vatican chargé, Monsignor Cesare Zacchi, relations between
the government and the Holy See gradually improved. An Office of
Religious Affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was
created to deal with some of the concerns of various religions, and, with
the appointment in late 1981 of the Bishop of Pinar del Rio, Jaime
Ortega Alamino, as Archbishop of Havana, the Catholic Church would
soon be poised to reach out to the world beyond. For his installation,
Ortega invited the Archbishop of Miami, Edward McCarthy, whose visit
was the first of a US bishop in over twenty years.
It is worth noting that Miami’s director of Catholic Charities,
the energetic and charismatic, Monsignor Brian O. Walsh, was also invit-
ed. As the guiding force behind Operation Pedro Pan, a program that
brought some 14,000 children to the US in the early years of the revolu-
tion, whose parents feared the Marxist indoctrination of the Cuban
schools after church-run schools had been closed, Msgr. Walsh was clear-
ly persona non grata and was not given a visa. However, according to the
Cuban Interest Section at the time, it was just a bureaucratic error.
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Thomas E. Quingley
REGULARIZING VISITS
It was now clearly feasible for more visits to take place. The same
three Cuban bishops and Msgr. Carlos Manuel de Céspedes from the
bishops’ conference came to the US in November 1987. Archbishop
Theodore McCarrick of Newark visited Cuba in March of 1988 and the
following month Cardinal John O’Connor of New York went for the
bicentennial commemoration of the birth of Fr. Félix Varela, the nine-
teenth century champion of independence. In visits in 1989 and 1990,
Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston began what was to become a lasting and
fruitful relationship between the archdioceses of Boston and Havana.
For his part, Cardinal O’Connor built upon the symbol of
Félix Varela as a bridge between the people of New York and Cuba,
since Varela, while in exile, had ministered in the US for thirty years.
Throughout his 1988 visit, he made repeated references to the role of
the Catholic Church as a bridge that unites people of varying back-
grounds and points of view, and that can also serve as a bridge between
peoples divided by distance and ideology. Thus, he promoted the idea
that the Catholic Church could help bridge the divide between
Cubans on the island and those in exile and, perhaps, between the US
and Cuban governments.
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GRADUAL REBOUND
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Thomas E. Quingley
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While their foreign travel was for years severely restricted, Cuban
bishops continued to make their required periodic ad limina visits to
Rome, enabling them to meet with bishops and others from many coun-
tries. And although they had only token representation at the 1979 Puebla
conference of Latin American bishops, the Cubans gradually became
more active in meetings of the Episcopal Conference of Latin America
(CELAM) and, later, the annual Inter-American bishops’ meetings which
bring together small groups of bishops from Canada, the United States
and Latin America for reflection on situations affecting the Catholic
Church in the hemisphere. The 1999 Meeting of Bishops of the Church
in America was held in Havana for the first time. In addition, several
international religious congregations of men and women have re-estab-
lished closer ties with their fellow religious in Cuba, and groups new to
Cuba such as Mother Theresa’s Missionaries of Charity and the Oblates
of Mary Immaculate have begun ministry there. A key factor has been the
willingness of the government to grant visas to foreign priests and reli-
gious, a spigot that can and has been turned on and off at the will of the
government.
CONCLUSION
For more than four decades the Catholic Church in Cuba has
experienced as many upheavals and crises, and as many moments of
growth and regeneration, as any other national Church in the world. The
strength and encouragement it derived from its international links were
severely limited throughout half of this period, restricted almost entirely
to its essential ties to the Holy See. The increasing contacts of the last two
decades, especially with the Catholic Church in Europe and the United
States, have helped open the Church in Cuba to a hitherto largely closed-
off world, and have opened parts of the world, especially the US, to Cuba
and its Catholic Church.
Many of the hopes for greater relaxation of government con-
trols, for greater space for the Catholic Church and civil society that were
generated by the papal visit have yet to be realized, and indeed the events
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of late 1999 and the following months signaled some reversals both in
relations between the Catholic Church and the government as well as
between Cuba and the US. Still, the advances of the recent past are
unlikely to be stymied for long, and the encouragement received and the
solidarity expressed by the Catholic Church outside Cuba assure an ever
brighter future for the Cuban Church and people of Cuba.
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CHAPTER 8
M
ost Cubans who left their country in the early 1960s were
Catholic.The social base of the Catholic Church in Cuba at
the time of the 1959 revolution was predominantly urban,
white, upper or middle-class. Although Cuban society was nominally
Catholic, the Church as an institution was weak, especially in the rural and
poor urban sectors of the population. Most people were baptized and identi-
fied themselves as Catholics, yet practicing Catholicism varied according to
class, race and region, while displays of popular religiosity were less tied to
the Catholic Church than in other Latin American countries.
The Catholic Church had supported the fight against Batista, but
soon after the revolutionary government took over in January 1959, conflicts
between church and state developed.Tensions over some revolutionary meas-
ures, particularly the nationalization of Catholic schools and the accelerating
antagonism between Cuba and the United States led to a rift between that
institution and the government.
Rising tensions in diplomatic relations between Cuba and the
United States, internal counterrevolutionary activity, the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion in April 1961 and Fidel Castro’s declaration that the revolution was
socialist in nature, escalated a process of social and political change which
inevitably forced people to take sides. Although other religious groups also
felt these pressures, the Catholic Church was at the forefront of the conflict.
Being Catholic gradually became synonymous with being counterrevolution-
ary, and being revolutionary increasingly implied atheism and automatic
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Yolanda Prieto
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ing-class families who left the country for ideological and economic reasons.
This new exodus represented another setback for the Catholic Church.
Many of these migrants were very active in their parishes and unlike earlier
migrants they realized that their trip might not be temporary. In addition,
they did not appreciate the bishops’ non-confrontational approach towards the
government, which was severely criticized by the first wave of exiles in Miami.
The Catholic Church’s isolated position in Cuba gradually began
to change in the 1970s-80s. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to
analyze all the factors that contributed to this, but the presence of a new
papal envoy whose mission was to improve relations between church and
state, the return of some priests to Cuba, one of whom was named
Archbishop of Havana, reforms by Vatican II and the Latin American
Bishops’ meetings in Medellín (1968) and Puebla (1979), led the Cuban
bishops to explore alternatives for a new position for the Catholic Church in
Cuba (Conferencia de Obispos Católicos de Cuba, 185-186).
Changes in the Catholic Church were coupled with changes in the
government. In 1977, Fidel Castro gave a speech to the Jamaican Council
of Churches in which he stated that there were no contradictions between
the aims of religion and the aims of socialism (Castro, 104). In 1985, he
discussed these issues further in an interview with Frei Betto, a Brazilian
friar, which was published as Fidel and Religion. In 1991, the
Communist Party decided that believers could become members and, most
importantly, a 1992 constitutional amendment redesignated Cuba as a sec-
ular rather than atheist state.While gaining more space in Cuban society,
the Catholic Church continued to face criticism from Miami exiles, who felt
it was selling out to the Communist government.
The third wave of Cuban refugees began to arrive in the United
States in April 1980. Following an incident at the Peruvian embassy in
Havana, the Cuban government announced that those seeking asylum
would be allowed to leave the country.Within 48 hours, more than 10,000
Cubans had taken refuge on the embassy grounds.The Cuban government
announced that the port of Mariel would be opened for those wanting to
leave. Mariel refugees were more representative of the Cuban population as
a whole than previous waves of exiles. The number of Afrocubans in this
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Yolanda Prieto
group was significantly higher than in the earlier waves: twenty percent com-
pared with three percent previously. Males outnumbered females by a ratio
of two to one (Prieto, 1984, 67). Some of these migrants had relatives in
the United States, and had long hoped to join them. Others had actively
supported the revolution, but had become discouraged mainly by increasing
economic difficulties in Cuba. After Mariel, the US government agreed to
authorize 20,000 visas annually to Cubans who wanted to leave the coun-
try. But in practice, legal migration between 1980 and 1992 was limited,
although a steady stream of refugees continued to reach the Florida coast on
boats and flimsy rafts.
The fourth massive wave of Cuban migrants came in the summer
of 1994 in boats and homemade rafts. Most balseros, or rafters, came from
the poorest socioeconomic sectors of Cuban society.The deep economic crisis
that Cuba experienced in the 1990s, pushed out thousands of people, many
(perhaps most) of whom did not have any relatives in the United States.
These refugees were encouraged to leave because, on the one hand, the
Cuban government relaxed restrictions, and on the other, the US Cuban
Adjustment Act, gave them legal status immediately.Thousands risked their
lives and many perished during the journey. In a very controversial measure,
the US government ordered all refugees picked up at sea to be detained at
the US Naval Base in Guantánamo. Eventually they were brought to the
mainland (Pedraza, 272-273). After this crisis, the US and Cuban gov-
ernments decided to start a new round of migration talks.The United States
again promised 20,000 visas a year, a promise never realized.
As opposed to the early exiles, few of the Cubans who left in the
1980s and the 1990s were practicing Catholics. This group had a more
diverse religious background. Growing up during a period of government
hostility toward religion, many had not had any contact with churches at
all. Also, since many of the recent refugees came from modest sectors of
Cuban society, they were much more likely to practice popular forms of reli-
giosity, including Afrocuban religions (Ramírez Calzadilla, 82-94).
The Catholic Church in Cuba adopted a clear position on migra-
tion this time. It exhorted Catholics to make a personal decision that was
illuminated by the Gospel and by their commitment to their faith and their
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Cuba and their uneasiness about the Cuban Church and the Cuban bish-
ops’ positions make them opt for silence. These first generation exile
church leaders feel very much rooted in their present parish experience.
Yet, this is slowly changing. Initially many of the Cubans were outraged
by Pope John Paul II’s 1998 visit to the island which they regarded as
legitimizing Fidel Castro’s government. At St. Augustine not a word was
said publicly about the trip. However, after it was clear that the visit had
been a success, Cuban parishioners began to express interest. Members of
the parish could see how involved the Cuban Church was in the com-
munity and how much social and economic help they provided to needy
Cubans. Many wanted to find ways to help the Catholic Church in Cuba
economically and to establish communication.
My observations conducting this research suggest that social class
and race are important factors behind the complex intergroup dynamics
taking place at St. Augustine and in Union City in general. New arrivals
from Cuba present a challenge. They come from all sectors of Cuban
society and are considered economic migrants rather than political exiles.
Many of the earlier refugees feel that the new ones are inferior. But at the
same time, the new Cubans may make a difference in the long run in
terms of a more open attitude about Cuba and about other Hispanics in
Union City, with whom they share the same social status. These migrants
have more contact with the island and travel there more frequently to
visit relatives. Many of the early exiles do not have family or contacts in
Cuba any longer. Therefore, their views on their native Church is less
informed and less accepting. Obviously reconciliation among Cubans
needs to be not simply between those on and off the island, but also
among those in exile. Given that the Catholic and other churches have
prioritized such reconciliation, the task of religious institutions and
believers is a major challenge.
REFERENCES
Betto, Frei. 1987. Fidel and Religion. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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Yolanda Prieto
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CHAPTER 9
T
he collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern
European countries ushered in a new era in Cuba, which Fidel
Castro himself called “a special period.” Since the late 1980s, we
have witnessed the strengthening of civil society in Cuba (Perez-Díaz,
1993). The Catholic Church through a variety of means has played an
important part of this process.The focus of this paper is what role are the
Catholic Church and Catholics playing in democratizing Cuba.
The “special period” in the 1990s and beyond is a crisis, which is
not only economic, but also a crisis of legitimacy.When the Soviet Union and
the Eastern European Communist countries collapsed, Cuba lost the Soviet
Union’s very generous subsidies and socialist markets. It became evident that
Communism had been rejected by a sizeable proportion of those who had
lived under it.That collapse precipitated a profound crisis of belief in Cuba.
The role the Catholic Church plays in Cuba today includes pro-
viding people with spiritual sustenance amidst the normal hardships of
daily life. Prior to the revolutionary transformation of Cuban society ini-
tiated in 1959, the Catholic Church was a major institution in a country
where many people identified themselves as Catholics, but only a few
attended mass regularly (Agrupación Católica Universitaria 1954).
Hence, Catholicism exerted great weight in the culture and less weight in
observance (Céspedes 1995). The Catholic Church strongly supported
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Silvia Pedraza
the efforts to end the dictatorship of Batista (1952-59), but when the
Castro revolution became radicalized, church and the state found them-
selves locked in a confrontation that culminated in the nationalization of
Catholic and other private schools, the expulsion of priests, and the
departure of most of the religious congregations from the island (Collazo
2001). Subsequently, the revolutionary government defined itself as
Marxist-Leninist and atheist, which contributed further to the massive
departure of Cubans. Moreover, being seen in a church, practicing the
faith, had real social costs: social ostracism in the neighborhood, loss of
promotions at work and the like. As a result, the Catholic faithful declined
in numbers, though those that remained often underwent a deeper mysti-
cal experience and gained a clearer understanding of the meaning of their
religious commitment (Suárez 2002). Particularly after the collapse of
Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Catholic
Church has provided an alternative vision of society–one where social
classes and races are not pitted against one another and where the message
is of justice with mercy, particularly helping others through compassion.
SOLVING PROBLEMS
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with the actual preparation of the dish, and still others would assist in
delivering it to the elderly. As a consequence, the church provided the
recipients as well as the providers with a new social network.
GIVING REFUGE
BUILDING DEMOCRACY
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Silvia Pedraza
other priest has played this role as publicly as Father José Conrado
Rodríguez. On September 8, 1994 the feast day of the Virgen de la
Caridad, in his church in Palma Soriano, Oriente Province, he read a let-
ter he had written to Fidel Castro. It stated:
For over 30 years, our country engaged in a politics at the
base of which was violence justified because of the presence of a pow-
erful and tenacious enemy only 90miles away, the United States of
America. The way in which we confronted this enemy was to place
ourselves under the…Soviet Union…. (since it) gave massive assistance
to our economy and our arms race, Cuba gradually fell into a state of
internal violence and profound repression….The use, within and
without our country, of hatred, division, violence, suspicion and ill
will, has been the main cause of our present and past misfortune.
Now we can see it clearly. The excessive growth of the state,
progressively more powerful, left our people defenseless and silenced.
The lack of liberty that would have allowed healthy criticism and
alternative ways of thinking (resulted in) hypocrisy and dissimulation,
insincerity and lying, and a general state of fear that affected everyone
in the island.…We are all responsible, but no one is more responsible
than you.…I can no longer remain silent, in good conscience….
Right now, if you wished, it would be possible to arrive at
a peaceful, negotiated agreement, through the process of a national
dialogue among people representing the various tendencies within
the Communist Party, the dissident groups in the island, as well as
Cubans in the diaspora. A popular referendum, free and democrat-
ic, would allow the voice of all our people to be heard.…
(Rodríguez 1995, translation mine).
Father Conrado’s letter to Fidel Castro was widely circulated in
Cuba as well as in the exile community. To many Cubans, in
both countries, it was “a clarion call.”
Obviously Father José Conrado thought the Catholic Church
needed to play a more active role than it had in solving the Cuban crisis and
paving the way for a democratic future. To him, the Cuban bishops’ 1993
statement “El Amor Todo lo Espera” (“Love Hopes All Things”) simply did
not go far enough (Conferencia Episcopal de Cuba, 1993). Hence, the depth
of the crisis and oppression caused the priest to act. In his work as a priest for
eight years in the two parishes of Palma Soriano and Contramaestre, Father
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José Conrado regularly visited and said mass in numerous towns. He felt
“that the situation was a real challenge, not only for my parishioners, but also
for me, as their suffering was my suffering…. That was when I decided to
act, to try to solve the situation with the means I had” (Yero 1996).
Of note is the fact that Father Conrado had repeatedly decided
not to leave Cuba. Each time, he decided against it, his parents and
grandparents also chose to remain behind to accompany him, though
everyone else in the family was leaving. Father Conrado’s position has
consistently been that it is in Cuba that Cubans must carry the cross of
serving la patria (the homeland); that the compromiso (commitment) with
Cuba needs to keep those who care about its future in Cuba, not in exile.
For Cubans such as Father Conrado their religious beliefs make it imper-
ative to use their faith to construct a different Cuba. Their religious
beliefs are at the root of their commitment and activism.
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Due in part to the crisis of “the special period,” the 1990s witnessed
the rapid growth of a dissident movement. It takes its inspiration from the
worldwide human rights movement that found its most substantial expres-
sion in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
In recent years, among the many calls for change that have emanated from
inside of Cuba, two stand out: “La Patria es de Todos” (“Our Nation Is for
All”) and the Varela Project. The latter has petitioned the Cuban govern-
ment to democratize. In May 2002, over ten thousand signatures were deliv-
ered to the National Assembly of People’s Power. The Project demanded five
changes in Cuba: guarantees of rights to free expression and a free press; the
right to free association; amnesty for political prisoners; the right to form
small private enterprises; and a plebiscite under a new electoral law and gen-
eral elections. As Oswaldo Payá, founder of the Varela Project and the
Movimiento de Cristiano de Liberación (Christian Liberation Movement-
linked to the Christian Democratic International) expressed it: “Let no one
else speak for Cubans. Let their own voices be heard in a referendum”(Payá
2001). Another Catholic activist Dagoberto Valdéz, founder of the magazine
Vitral, has concentrated on promoting independent ways of acting and
thinking (Valdéz 1997). Though Vitral is a lay magazine, it is published with
the assistance and the printing press of the Archbishopric of Pinar del Río.
These are but a few of the initiatives currently underway.
CONCLUSION
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Hence, religion and politics are linked in Cuba. That does not mean that
one should expect the Cuban Catholic Church to be the fountainhead of
a large, popular, anti-Communist movement. Indeed, as Crahan (2002)
has underscored the Catholic Church in Cuba is unlikely to play a role
similar to its counterpart in Poland in the demise of the present regime.
Yet, in truth, what happened in Poland in its exit from Communism also
did not happen elsewhere in Eastern Europe–neither in Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet Union. For reasons that go beyond
the scope of this paper, to date the experience of Poland is unique. But
recognizing that does not contradict admitting the important role that all
religions in Cuba are playing today and the extent to which, for a large
part of the population, religion is an important source of help, an alter-
native in the quest for meaning that, at all times everywhere, men and
women inevitably grope for. And for those Cubans who strive to create a
democratic future, today religion is a vital source of support.
REFERENCES
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Silvia Pedraza
Pedraza, Silvia. 2002. “Pope John Paul II’s Visit and the Process
of Democratic Transition in Cuba.” In The Pope’s Overture and Civic Space
in Cuba, ed. Anthony Stevens-Arroyo. Scranton, PA: University of
Scranton Press.
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CHAPTER 10
S
ince 1959 over a million Cubans have migrated to the United
States, the majority of whom reside in metropolitan Miami, a region
that has become known as the capital of the Cuban exile. Decades
of anger, bitterness and distrust have dominated the official discourse and
image proffered by both sides, as witnessed globally during the Elián
González custody battle. Thus, the dominant image of the relationship
between Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits has been that of two
communities in a continuous state of cold war. From a wider perspective,
however, Cuba internally, and relations between Cuba and the US, are
undergoing major challenges and change is in the air.Among the telltale fac-
tors is that the decades-old US embargo against Cuba is increasingly being
questioned not only by US based churches, but also by a growing number of
members of the US Congress. Meanwhile the leader of the Varela Project,
Oswaldo Payá, is being discussed as a contender for the Nobel Peace Prize
for his democratization efforts on the island.What is causing all this change
and what does it tell us about relations between the two Cubas?
Research we have been conducting on transnational religious ties
between Miami and Cuba since 2001 brings a fresh perspective to this
puzzling question for two basic reasons. First, the dominant narrative
explaining these changes has been political-economic, focusing particularly
on external pressures such as how US businesses are lobbying for an end to
the embargo and internal pressures such as the Varela Project. We do not
deny the importance of these efforts, but we also contend that they help
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BACKGROUND
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devise ways to supply medicine and other scarce goods to the island without
drawing the wrath of either the Cuban or US governments. Thus began the
most recent stage in transnational religious ties between Cuba and the US.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
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kitchens and homes for the elderly. These contributions build transna-
tional rapport. In addition, since 1997 several high-level meetings
between clergy on both sides of the Florida Straits entitled Reuniones para
Conocerse Mejor (Meetings to Get to Know One Another Better) serve to
encourage a culture of dialogue. These exchanges, coupled with the
thousands of family visits by emigrees to the island, promote a face-to-
face diplomacy that buttresses and expands the existing religious space; a
space which is expanding rapidly and constitutes one of the few legiti-
mate arenas for rapprochement and reconciliation between Cubans on
the island and in the United States.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Disciples became Apostles of the Word and were
sent across cultural and political borders over two millennia ago to evan-
gelize, Christianity has been “transnational.” Many clergy today view
Cuba as the last great frontier for winning souls in the Western
Hemisphere. They are pushing hard to establish beachheads on the island,
taking advantage of the last decade of increased religious tolerance, for
what they expect will become extremely fertile ground in the post-
Castro era. Their denominational affiliations, as well as their political
intentions vary, but one thing that unites them is the conviction that
“God knows no borders.”
REFERENCES
Betto, Frei. 1987. Fidel and Religion. New York: Simon & Schuster.
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CONCLUSION
MARGARET E. CRAHAN
HUNTER COLLEGE AND THE GRADUATE CENTER,
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
T
he seminar discussions demonstrated repeatedly the complexi-
ties involved in the analysis of the interplay of religion, culture
and society. The initial suggestion that understanding such phe-
nomena required highly elaborated methodologies was repeatedly con-
firmed, particularly as the case of Cuba was examined. Add to this the
need to factor in the power of ideas and beliefs to transform societies and
one begins to understand how such studies are particularly arduous and
require both quantitative and qualitative analysis of a wide variety of vari-
ables. Hence, methodologies need to incorporate elements of a variety of
approaches in order to lay a basis for comparative study. If this is done
then even a case as unique as Cuba can provide valuable insights into the
interaction of religion, culture and society, particularly in terms of the
identification of new roles for religions in non-traditional contexts.
Analysis of the Cuban case also suggests that the worldwide
growth of religions is not limited to a particular political, economic,
social or cultural context, but rather the motive forces transcend such dif-
ferentials. In addition, the question was raised as to why such growth
occurred in a country in which secularism was strong even prior to a
Marxist revolution. Responses included the reassertion of a tradition of
belief, albeit highly diversified, reforms within various religions making
them more responsive to daily concerns, increasing loss of faith in the
revolution and the search for surcease in the face of stress inducing living
conditions. Finally, it was suggested that Cuba would be an interesting
case study in the evolution of religious pluralism, given the strengthening
of that tendency in the rest of Latin America.
A prime issue was what constituted political action by religions
and who should define it? In situations such as Cuba’s where the revolu-
tionary government arrogated to itself the setting of the parameters for
legitimate political action and who could engage in it, religions were ini-
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Conclusion
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Margaret E. Crahan
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Conclusion
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Margaret E. Crahan
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AGENDA
01/21/03
MODERATORS: Margaret E. Crahan,
Hunter College & The Graduate Center, City
University of New York
Joseph S. Tulchin, Latin American Program,
Woodrow Wilson International Center
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Agenda
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Agenda
01/22/03
Commentators:
• Philip Brenner, School of International Studies,
American University
• Hugo Frühling, Woodrow Wilson International
Center & Universidad de Chile
• William LeoGrande, School of Public Affairs,
American University
• Christopher Welna, Kellogg Institute,
University of Notre Dame
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BIOGRAPHIES OF PARTICIPANTS
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Biographies of Participants
City University of New York. From 1982-1994 she was the Henry R.
Luce Professor of Religion, Power and Political Process at Occidental
College. She was a Woodrow Wilson International Center Fellow in
1985-86 and 2000-01. She has published over seventy articles and books
including Africa and the Caribbean: Legacies of a Link, Human Rights and Basic
Needs in the Americas, and The City and the World: New York’s Global Future.
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Biographies of Participants
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Biographies of Participants
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Biographies of Participants
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Biographies of Participants
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Biographies of Participants
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