Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement

Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Fictionality and Perceived Realism in

Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative
Comprehension and Engagement
Rick Busselle1 & Helena Bilandzic2
1 School of Communication, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99163-2025
2 Universität Erfurt, Seminar für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, 99089 Erfurt, Germany
This article offers a theoretical framework to explain circumstances under which percep-
tions of ‘‘unrealness’’ affect engagement in narratives and subsequent perceived realism
judgments. A mental models approach to narrative processing forms the foundation of
a model that integrates narrative comprehension and phenomenological experiences
such as transportation and identification. Three types of unrealness are discussed:
fictionality, external realism (match with external reality), and narrative realism
(coherence within a story). We gather evidence that fictionality does not affect narrative
processing. On the other hand, violations of external and narrative realism are con-
ceived as inconsistencies among the viewer’s mental structures as they construct mental
models of meaning to represent and comprehend the narrative. These inconsistencies
may result in negative online evaluations of a narrative’s realism, may disrupt engage-
ment, and may negatively influence postexposure (reflective) realism judgments as well
as lessen a narrative’s persuasive power.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-2885.2008.00322.x
The power of stories is well noted (Bruner, 1986; Green & Brock, 2000; Strange,
2002). From nothing more than a sequence of textual, visual, and/or auditory sym-
bols, we construct worlds that are cognitively and emotionally engaging (Oatley,
2002) to the point that we may have difficulty returning to the real world and
may even see aspects of the real world differently afterward (Gerrig, 1993). This
experience of engagement is referred to with terms such as transportation, absorption,
and entrancement (e.g., Gerrig, 1993; Nell, 1988). Recent research suggests that
narrative engagement mediates relationships between exposure and acceptance of
story-related beliefs (Green, 2004; Green & Brock, 2000); for example, the relations
between exposure to entertainment education content and health-related attitudes
and practices (Slater & Rouner, 2002) and between television programs and public
policy preferences (Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006).
Corresponding author: Rick Busselle; email: [email protected]
Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 255

A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement R. Busselle & H. Bilandzic
An important factor related to experiential engagement with stories appears to be

the level of realism we see reflected in them (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2007; Green, 2004;
Hall, 2003; Zhang, Hmielowski, & Busselle, 2007). It seems plausible that stories we
consider authentic and true to life are most engaging (Green, 2004). But, it is also
plausible that engagement with a story leaves us with a sense that the story was
authentic. In either case, it is remarkable that the power of narrative is not dimin-
ished by readers’ or viewers’ knowledge that the story is invented. On the contrary,
successful stories—those that engage us most—often are both fictional and unrealistic.
Our purpose in this article is to explore the notions of realism and fictionality in
narratives. We begin with the mechanisms that underlie, facilitate, and inhibit
engagement with narratives as they relate to the notion of realism. We focus on
how perceptions of unrealness are linked to narrative processing. We use a mental
models approach to explain how meaning is constructed from a narrative. In this
approach, transportation (Green & Brock, 2000, 2002) into narrative is interpreted
as a flow-like state accompanied by a loss of awareness of self and the actual world.
Transportation is realized in constructing mental models of the narrative. Identifi-
cation, in the form of perspective taking, also is integrated into the model. With this
framework, we demonstrate that a viewer’s knowledge of a narrative’s fictionality
does not disrupt the construction process. Then, we build into our model two types
of perceived realism: First, the extent to which stories or their components are
similar to the actual world (‘‘external realism’’) and, second, plausibility and coher-
ence within the narrative (‘‘narrative realism’’). We suggest that violations of both
types of realism result from an inconsistency between the mental models that rep-
resent the narrative, general knowledge structures, and incoming narrative informa-
tion. These inconsistencies prompt negative cognitions, interfere with the processing
of the narrative, and inhibit the sense of being lost in the narrative. Further, online
judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986) of the unrealness of a narrative may be stored in
memory and subsequently influence memory-based, offline judgments of perceived
realism, resulting in an assessment of the narrative as ‘‘unrealistic.’’ Finally, we pro-
pose that observed inconsistencies undermine a narrative’s potential to entertain,
persuade, or enlighten.
This article addresses narratives in general, regardless of media. Certainly, dif-
ferent media have different attributes. For example, written texts require the reader
to imagine scenes and scenery, whereas television and film provide images. Also,
readers set the pace at which they process written texts, whereas consumers of
electronic media have little control over the rate at which information is presented
and must be comprehended. Although stylistic devices and representational con-
ventions may differ from medium to medium, understanding the narrative—as
‘‘the representation of an event or a series of events’’ (Abbott, 2002, p. 12)—should
be explainable by similar fundamental processing mechanisms regardless of the
medium in which narrative representations occur. This assertion is supported by
the fact that scholars have used similar theoretical approaches to explain the pro-
cessing of narratives in both written texts (e.g., Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 2002) and
256 Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association

R. Busselle & H. Bilandzic A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement
film (e.g., Ohler, 1994). In the present article, our primary concerns are not with
delineating differences between media but with audience members’ comprehension
of and engagement with narratives. The model of narrative comprehension and
engagement presented here explicates the relationships among comprehension
mechanisms, engagement-related experiences, and subsequent perceptions of the
story, and ultimately extends to the influences of narratives on audience members.
Mental models of meaning in narrative

Psychologists distinguish between the text on the page and the construction, per-
formance, or realization of the story in the mind of the reader (Bruner, 1986; Gerrig,
1993; Nell, 1988; Oatley, 2002). As Oatley (2002) describes this process, ‘‘the reader
becomes the writer of his or her own version of the story’’ (p. 43). Bordwell (1985)
suggests that the story is ‘‘the imaginary construct we create progressively and ret-
roactively . . . the developing result of picking up narrative cues, applying schemata,
and framing and testing hypotheses’’ (p. 49). This conception of narrative processing
positions the audience member as an active participant and defines reading or
viewing as an active process that occurs online and in real time as the audience
member constructs or realizes the story from the text.
Mental models offer a theoretical explanation for the process through which an
audience member constructs meaning from a narrative, as well as the activity in
which the audience member is engaged while doing so. Mental models are cognitive
structures that represent some aspect of the external world (Johnson-Laird, 1983;
van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). For example, most individuals have a mental model of
how a car is propelled even though they cannot actually see the force and mecha-
nisms that transform power from the engine into the rotation of the tires. There are
a number of different types of mental models as well as schemas involved in pro-
cessing narratives.
The primary mental model in story comprehension is the situation model
(Ohler, 1994; Wyer, 2004; Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan, Magliano,
& Graesser, 1995). This is ‘‘the microworld of what the story is about [including] the
spatial setting and the chronological sequence of episodes in the plot’’ (Graesser et al.,
2002, p. 234). In their event-indexing model of story comprehension, Zwaan et al.
(1995) suggest that ‘‘events and intentional actions of characters are the focal points
of situation models. As each incoming story event or action is comprehended the
reader monitors and updates the current situation model’’ (p. 292). We might
visualize a situation model as a mechanism in which information is assembled. This
mechanism is in motion as the narrative progresses. Before it lie bits of information
that are yet unknown—events, behaviors, or facts that have not yet been encountered
in the narrative. Behind it lies a coherent and logical assemblage of the information
that has been encountered so far in the narrative, albeit with questions and uncer-
tainties that may provide suspense or require resolution. Within the situation model,
at what would be the present moment in the narrative’s progression, the mechanism

assembles new information with information that the reader or viewer has already
encountered (e.g., setting, characters, and events). It also refers backward to answer
questions or clarify uncertainties. The assembly process is successful to the extent
that incoming information can be incorporated into the story as it exists up to that
point. That is, new information can be comprehended in light of that which is
already known. It is unsuccessful when the reader or viewer has difficulty incorpo-
rating new information into the extant mental models. It is tempting to invoke the
metaphor of a train moving along its tracks. But this would be inaccurate because
with the situation model, the tracks are not assembled until the train passes. In front
of the train would lie unrelated pieces of rail, wooden ties, and railroad spikes.
Behind it would lie an intact railway. Under the train, representing the present
moment in the narrative, the pieces are being put together and the track is being
constructed as the narrative unfolds. Most important is that, at any given moment,
the track being assembled must fit with the track that already has been assembled
both immediately previously and miles back on the narrative’s path.
Individuals construct mental models of a story from preexisting schemas and
stereotypes (stereotypes being a specific category of schemas that represent people or
groups; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Schemas are distinguishable from mental models in
that schemas exist independent of the story, whereas mental models are cognitive
representations of events and states of affairs constrained in the time and space of the
narrative (Brewer, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Markman, 1999; Roskos-Ewoldsen,
Davies, & Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2004). Because a story cannot make explicit all the
details necessary for a coherent story, the viewer relies on schemas from previous
experience to create a model of the story at hand (Rapaport & Shapiro, 1995). Thus,
a viewer or reader uses preexisting, generic schemas of, for example, people and
events to construct specific mental models that represent a specific story.
In addition to the schemas that we use all the time and that contain information
that applies both to the real world and to any narrative world we might encounter
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Graesser et al., 2002), schemas for story and genre are also
important, at least initially, in processing narratives (Ohler, 1994). Story schema
separates narrative experience from real life by imposing a narrative form or struc-
ture and by implying causality among events. Unlike real life, stories have a begin-
ning, middle, and end (Lacey, 2000; Nell, 1988). Thus, when we turn on a television
program or when someone says, ‘‘Let me tell you a story,’’ we retrieve a story schema
and with it the expectation, among other expectations, that upcoming information
will be causally and temporally related and that some conflict will be explicated and
resolved. Similarly, activation of a genre schema and therefore retrieval of knowledge
about genre allows us to anticipate the nature of the upcoming story. If, for example,
someone says, ‘‘In a park, a police officer discovered an old woman standing over
a corpse’’ or if the opening scene of television program shows us this, our schema for
the mystery genre may be activated. Science fiction, romantic comedy, and crime
drama all follow a story structure but differ in issues, conflicts, and, possibly, the
story progressions they present (Graesser et al., 2002). Different genres have typical

patterns of story, setting, and characters, and if readers possess such knowledge, they
are able to use the general pattern to construct the story for an unknown instance of
a particular genre (Segal, 1995a).
In addition to the situation model, the processing of a narrative requires cogni-
tive representation of the world in which the story occurs and representations of the
characters who inhabit that world. It may be impossible to truly separate these
intertwined mental models. However, for the purpose of exploring the role of con-
sistency and inconsistency among elements of narrative, we conceive of the story
world and the characters as represented by conceptually separate mental models that
interact with and are subordinate to the situation model.
Story world
The story world model is a relatively static mental model representing ‘‘a conceptual
domain that is temporally and spatially coherent’’ (Segal, 1995a, p. 71). It covers
setting and all that setting implies: place, time period, and general contemporary
state of affairs. Part of the story world model is the ‘‘story world logic’’—a set of
implicit constraints and rules that indicate what is possible in the story world and
what is not (Segal, 1995a). If the park in which a police officer finds an old woman
and a corpse is set in 1960s East Berlin, not only are time and place set but also logical
implications are inferred. For example, DNA evidence is not yet possible but finger-
printing is; cell phone technology is not yet available; and East and West Berlin are
divided in the Cold War. Each of these points becomes a rule in the story world logic
and each applies universally to all characters at all times.
The story world model starts with the assumption that the fictional world works
like the actual world. Segal (1995a) points out that the ‘‘first approximation’’ of the
story is that it complies with temporal and spatial constraints that rule the real world
and that the characters behave, think, and feel the way real people do. The ‘‘default
condition is verisimilitude’’ (Segal, 1995a, p. 72). Often, however, the story world
deviates from real life, forcing the audience to modify its understanding of the story
world logic while trying to maintain coherence in the story world (Segal, 1995a).
Using the actual world as a default makes sense. This heuristic saves time and energy
because we can simply assume that a fictional world functions like the actual world,
leaving only the task of tracking differences. In 1960s East Berlin, travel by car, train,
and plane was technologically possible, just as today. However, idiosyncratic of that
time and place, such travel may be restricted by the East German government.
Although story world logic is an important feature in processing narratives, often
the perceiver is not overtly conscious of it. However, it may be activated or brought
to consciousness. For example, an audience member knows at some level that cell
phones do not exist in 1960s Berlin. But the audience member would become overtly
aware of this knowledge only if the logic is violated, for example, by the police officer
answering a ringing cell phone.

Characters
Characters within a narrative are represented by character models (Rapp, Gerrig, &
Prentice, 2001). They also originate from previous knowledge, often in the form of
stereotypes (Graesser et al., 2002). The old woman in the park initially would be
represented by an ‘‘old-woman’’ stereotype. Then, the character model may begin to
evolve if we learn, for example, that she slipped a handgun into her coat pocket as the
police officer approached. The police officer also would be merely a stereotype until
we learn more about her. Once developed, character models contain characters’
identities and traits as well as their motivations and goals (Magliano, Zwaan, &
Graesser, 1999; Zwaan, Langston, et al., 1995). Character models may be established
as viewers infer traits based on characters’ behaviors through the course of events
(Rapp et al., 2001). Characters’ identities and traits remain relatively constant as the
story progresses or, more precisely, as the situation model moves forward. Con-
versely, characters’ relationships both to their own goals and to other characters
evolve with the progression of situation model. Thus, as the setting, characters,
and central objects are established, the situation model is initiated and more infor-
mation can be incorporated. For example, when the police officer rolls the body over,
we discover a large spot of dried blood in the center of the victim’s chest.
Zubin and Hewitt (1995) argue that the ‘‘relation between the story and the story
world in which it takes place, is fluid’’ (p. 130). Different theoretical approaches,
such as the constructionist theory (Graesser et al., 2002) and the event-indexing
model (Zwaan, Langston, et al., 1995), articulate the scope of the situation model
somewhat differently. We find it useful to distinguish between that which is con-
stantly changing—situation model—and that which is relatively more constant
throughout the narrative—story world and character models.
In summary, a situation model can be thought of as the vehicle through which
characters interact and experience events within a given story setting. When initiat-
ing engagement with a narrative, audience members use preexisting knowledge
structures about places, times, people, and events, as well as stories and genres to
begin constructing mental models and, from them, an understanding of the narrative
at hand. Characters develop as new information about them is presented; settings
vary from the real world to the extent that exceptions are implied or explained.
The more a story world varies from what we know, the more work we must to do
construct it (Segal, 1995a) but also the more rewarding that work may be.
Loss of self-awareness and flow

Mental models can explain how readers or viewers construct meaning from a narra-
tive. But this does not yet capture the phenomenological experience of becoming lost
in a narrative (Nell, 1988). Green and Brock’s transportation-imagery model (Green,
2004; Green & Brock, 2000, 2002) is the most recent and one of the most compelling
descriptions of intense narrative engagement. The transportation-imagery model
describes a phenomenological experience in which ‘‘all of the person’s mental

systems and capacities become focused on the events occurring in the narrative’’
(Green & Brock, 2002, p. 324). Readers ‘‘lose track of time, fail to observe events
going on around them, and feel they are completely immersed in the world of the
narrative’’ (Green, 2004, p. 247). This transportation experience is compared to
Csikszentmihalyi’s (1990) concept of flow—the experience of total absorption into
an activity. During both transportation and flow, ‘‘the person’s attention is com-
pletely absorbed by the activity [and individuals] stop being aware of themselves as
separate from the actions they are performing’’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, p. 53; cf.
Green & Brock, 2002). According to flow theory, absorption is facilitated by a balance
between the ability of the individual and the challenge of the task (Csikszentmihalyi,
1990, 1997). Sherry (2004) applied this concept in arguing that media activities are
enjoyable to the extent that media users’ ability to comprehend the story matches the
program’s complexity or that video games are enjoyable to the extent the player’s
abilities match the game’s level of difficulty. Invoking the concept of flow is import-
ant because it suggests that engagement in narrative requires engagement in an
activity and near complete focus on that activity. In art or music, for example, flow
is centered on the creation of the artistic piece. In the case of narrative then, flow
should be centered on the construction of meaning. For example, as information
about the corpse, the woman, and the police officer is presented, a complex set of
models must be constructed. The gun in the old woman’s pocket suggests she may be
more than an innocent passerby. That the blood is dry suggests she is not the killer or
at least she did not just kill the victim. The old woman tells the officer that she was
out for a walk and stumbled upon the body. We can see that this would seem likely to
the officer because we know the officer is unaware of the gun in the woman’s pocket.
Our knowledge of the gun suggests there is more to the woman’s story. This narrative
experience is engaging to the extent that cognitions are focused on assembling
coherent models of the setting, events, characters, and their relationships, as well
as hypothesizing explanations and anticipating incoming information: Did the
woman bring the gun or might she have taken it from the dead man?
High levels of experiential engagement with a narrative can be seen as a flow-like
state centered on the construction or realization of the narrative. ‘‘Being lost’’ (Nell,
1988) can be understood as losing self-awareness as a result of complete focus on
constructing and elaborating mental models to represent the narrative at hand.
Transportation into narrative then can be seen as the extent to which an audience
member becomes absorbed into the activity of constructing mental models.
Deictic shift
When we engage with a narrative, not only might we lose awareness of our self and
surroundings but we also enter the story world. This psychological relocation into
the story separates narrative experience from absorption in nonnarrative activities,
such as sport or art. Deictic shift theory is useful in explaining this transition from
the actual world to the story world. Deictic shift theory (Duchan, Bruder, & Hewitt,

1995) maintains that in addition to creating the mental model of the story, readers
must locate themselves in the story by shifting the center of their experience from the
actual world into the story world: They are performing a ‘‘deictic shift’’ (Segal, 1995b).
The term deixis refers to an expression (a word, symbol, or action) that requires
contextual information in order to have meaning. Words such as I, now, or here refer
to different things depending on speaker, time, and location. The deictic center is the
cognitive structure that contains elements of a particular time, space, and person—
usually, the here and now of a person (Segal, 1995b). Experiencing a narrative requires
that the readers switch to the time and location of the narrative and the subjective
world of the characters from whose point of view the story is told. Readers are
motivated to perform this deictic shift because deictic adverbs such as here, now, today
make sense only from the deictic center of the story (Galbraith, 1995).
Boundaries, such as a chapter heading or rising curtain, cue the audience to
create mental space and to shift deictic centers in preparation for an upcoming
narrative experience (Segal, 1995a, p. 74). Deictic shift theory also explains why
people get the impression of direct experience when processing a narrative. In order
to understand the story, readers place themselves in the deictic center of the story
rather than remaining with their own, actual location, and literally perceive the story
from a perspective inside the story world (Zubin & Hewitt, 1995).
Indicators of deictic shift in filmic narratives are somewhat different from those
in written fiction but serve the same function. For example, psychological verbs
describing states of mind of the characters that are typical in fictional texts (Segal,
1995a) are rather unusual in film because they require a narrator. But characters in
film do use deictic verbs and adverbs in their direct speech, as well as nonverbal
deictic markers like pointing at something or looking in someone’s direction. Psy-
chological events are either expressed directly (‘‘I hate you’’) or conveyed through
facial expressions or gestures. Formal devices such as close-ups, cuts, or still frames
enhance this effect. Kuno (1987) compares the perspective that language can create
with perspectives that camera angles create visually. The emotional closeness sug-
gested by the screen may help construct a powerful deictic center in filmic narratives.
Moreover, there are always cues present as to location and time from which a viewer
may infer setting.
Deictic shift, transportation, and identification

In principle, there must be a deictic shift that transports viewers or readers from their
current location into the narrative, so they can understand what the statements of the
characters mean and to which person or location they refer. At a phenomenological
level, this has two consequences. First, when readers or viewers locate themselves
within the mental model of the story, they perceive the story ‘‘from the inside’’ and
have the feeling of experiencing directly what happens. Segal (1995b) points out that
deictic shift theory is ‘‘consistent with phenomenological experience. When reading
fictional text, most readers feel they are in the middle of the story, and they eagerly or

hesitantly wait to see what will happen next’’ (p. 14). Thus, transportation can be
seen as a flow experience in constructing the mental models of a story that is
accompanied by the positioning of oneself in the story world. To the extent that
this activity occupies cognitive resources, the audience member must give up con-
sciousness of his or her actual self and surroundings.
The second consequence of the deictic shift, at the phenomenological level, is that
readers or viewers identify with the character from whose position a story is told, in
the sense that they adopt a point of view that is not theirs and see the fictional world
through someone else’s eyes (Cohen, 2001; Oatley, 1994, 1999). Thus, identification
as it is implied by deictic shift theory encompasses taking on perspectives and
perceiving the events in a story with the bias of a character. In our example, the
situation is described as the police officer discovering the woman and the corpse,
suggesting the perspective of the officer. Alternatively, if the example had begun with
the woman noticing the approaching police officer, then the old woman’s perspec-
tive would have been suggested.
There are interpretations of identification that are contingent on the actual or
wishful similarity of a character to the reader, or on a reader’s liking of a character
(Liebes & Katz, 1990), that involve the reader or viewer giving up his or her own
identity and momentarily confusing identities (Zillmann, 1994). As Cohen (2001)
suggested, it is useful to keep these different notions separated. He argues in favor
of the point-of-view-interpretation of identification and defines it as ‘‘a process that
consists of increasing loss of self-awareness and its temporary replacement with height-
ened emotional and cognitive connections with a character’’ (p. 251). Cohen empha-
sizes that identification is not an attitude, an emotion, or a perception, but
a phenomenological process. This is consistent with deixis theory, which describes
the importance of point of view in constructing the situation model. As a process,
identification is no different from social interaction of everyday life, where it is fun-
damentally important to take on the perspective of another person and anticipate
reactions while planning one’s own actions (Cohen, 2001). Kuiken and colleagues
compare this position to a metaphor rather than simile: The reader is the character
for the duration of the story instead of recognizing similarities between him- or herself
and the character (Kuiken, Miall, & Sikora, 2004; Kuiken, Phillips, et al., 2004).
So far, we have described a theoretical framework of narrative processing with
mental models. In order to understand the story, viewers must construct a situation
model, character models, and a story world model with a specific story world logic.
Moreover, they must position themselves at the deictic center within the situation
model. We argued that this enables the viewers to take on the perspective of a char-
acter (identification).
We have redefined transportation as experiencing flow while constructing mental
models. We now turn to ways in which this process may be disrupted by issues of
unrealness. We focus on three reasons viewers may perceive a story as untrue: (a) The
story is invented, (b) the story is unlike what happens in the real world, or (c) the
story is incoherent.

The realness of fiction

When we turn to fiction, we know that narratives are invented for the purpose of
entertaining us. From a rational standpoint, it is perplexing that consumers of fiction
care about people and events that they know are not real (Lamarque, 1981; Riffaterre,
1990; Yanal, 1999).1 One possibility for resolving this problem is to assume that
emotions we feel toward fictional characters are substantially different from those we
have in real situations. However, there is little evidence to support this. Gendler and
Kovakovich (2005) argue that ‘‘far from being exceptional, emotional responses to
nonactual situations are a fundamental feature of our cognitive repertoire’’ (p. 247).
Emotions toward fictional situations bear similarity to emotions we have in other
hypothetical situations, such as feeling empathy or experiencing emotions by merely
remembering or anticipating situations (Currie, 1997; Moran, 1994). In everyday
decision making, we consider different possible courses of action. Anticipating the
possible outcomes of those actions also activates emotional responses. Such ‘‘simu-
lated emotions’’ are crucial for deciding which actions to take (Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1999; Harris, 2000). Without having auto-
matic emotional responses to imagined situations, we would not be able to think
ahead, plan our actions, or determine different courses of action depending on
different predicted outcomes. Fictional emotions—emotions that are evoked by
fictional accounts—are similar to simulated emotions in that they also relate to
nonexistent situations. Gendler and Kovakovich (2005) argue that fictional emotions
operate using the same cognitive mechanisms as simulated emotions.
A different approach to coping with the question of why consumers of fiction
care about a story and its characters is to assume that they consciously suppress their
awareness that fiction is indeed fictional. This assumption is commonly referred to as
‘‘suspension of disbelief’’ (Worth, 2004).2 Suspension of disbelief builds on the
assumption that recipients must actively abandon their disbelief in the nonauthen-
ticity of fiction in order to engage in emotions and enjoyment. However, this posi-
tion has received criticism from both philosophy and empirical research in
psychology (e.g., Gendler & Kovakovich, 2005; Gerrig & Rapp, 2004; Worth, 2004;
Yanal, 1999). Some evidence is grounded in the concept of mental simulation. Worth
(2004) uses the notion of ‘‘mental simulation’’ to argue that readers or viewers run
emotions ‘‘off-line’’3 in the sense that they perceive the same input as the characters.
Thus, they are able to understand and simulate how the characters feel. Although the
experience of entering a fictional world is merely psychological, the experience is
cognitively similar to physically experiencing a real situation, rendering the distinc-
tion between real and unreal meaningless (Worth, 2004). Conceptualizing narrative
experience as a mental simulation does not require the reader to deal with fictionality
in a special way:
When we enter into a fictional world, or let the fictional world enter into our
imaginations, we do not ‘‘willingly suspend our disbelief’’. I cannot willingly
decide to believe or disbelieve anything, any more than I can willingly believe it

is snowing outside if all visual or sensory cues tell me otherwise. When engaging
with fiction, I do not suspend a critical faculty, but rather I exercise a creative
faculty. I do not actively suspend disbelief— I actively create belief.
(Worth, 2004, p. 447)
This argument is supported by psychological research showing that texts are
approached with initial credulity and not with incredulity, unless otherwise prompted.
Understanding and acceptance are thought of as the same process, whereas disbeliev-
ing requires additional mental resources (Gilbert, 1991). Gilbert, Krull, and Malone
(1990) found that both true and false information were represented as true by default.
This biased subsequent judgments such that information that was presented as false
was more often mistaken as true. Also, when processing was interrupted and subjects
did not have an opportunity to think about the information more thoroughly and
‘‘unaccept’’ or ‘‘unbelieve’’ it, they were more likely to mistake false information as true
than the reverse. In a similar way, time pressure and cognitive load lead to an increase
in mistaking false information as true (Gilbert & Gill, 2000; Gilbert, Tafarodi, &
Malone, 1993). Gilbert concludes that ‘‘[p]eople are credulous creatures who find it
very easy to believe and very difficult to doubt’’ (p. 117).
Gilbert’s research focused on false information rather than fictional texts, yet
the two are similar in that the events described in both types of text do not exist in
the actual world. Given this, Gilbert’s results have two consequences. First, credu-
lity as default implies that people do not have to overcome incredulity or suspend
disbelief. Instead, they immediately construct a mental representation of the story
without worrying about the epistemological status of the story. Also, the primary
reaction to a fictional narrative is not to literally believe that a fictional character
exists or existed or that an event has actually happened. The application of Gilbert’s
findings in narrative processing suggests that perceivers believe that the fictional
character is in danger, in joy, or in distress (Yanal, 1999). We do not think of our
police officer as real or fictional, but as a person investigating what appears to be
a murder. Second, the same credulity is used to process context-free assertions—
that is, information about the state of affairs that apply to both the fictional and the
actual world (Gerrig & Prentice, 1991). Information in the narrative is uninten-
tionally accepted as true and must be ‘‘unaccepted’’ effortfully. Along these lines,
Gerrig and colleagues actually reverse the argument of a ‘‘willing suspension of
disbelief’’ into a ‘‘willing construction of disbelief’’ (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999;
Prentice, Gerrig, & Bailis, 1997). ‘‘Our central claim is that people must engage
in effortful processing to disbelieve the information they encounter in literary
narratives’’ (Gerrig & Rapp, 2004, p. 268). Gilbert (1991) points out that the
assumption of default believing is implicitly made in dual-process theories (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986) where resource depletion reduces the ability to reject proposi-
tions that normally would not be believable. This means that people end up believ-
ing false propositions and not holding some neutral stance toward them. Gilbert
(1991) concludes that it

would seem, then, that for models of persuasion to make sense, they must
implicitly assume that acceptance occurs prior to or more easily than rejection,
or both, and that as a result, this initial acceptance remains even when
subsequent attempts at rejection are experimentally impaired. (p. 111)
Fictionality is not a problem for consumers of fiction. Within our mental models
approach, we conceptualize the information that a story is fictional as part of the
mental model that viewers create from a narrative. We conceive of this representa-
tion as a link between the story world model, the situation model, and the general
knowledge of what fictionality means. This makes fictionality simply one more
concept among many elements of the story that are represented, such as the events,
the characters, or the causal links among them. The link from fictionality to the
mental models of a story is created at the beginning of the story, and it may be
initially linked to all incoming elements. Usually, fictionality is not prompted in the
course of a story, as perceivers are busy processing the occurring events, and the
pragmatic status of a text is not relevant to the events and actions of the characters.
The situation model and the story world model will become stronger as their ele-
ments are activated during the narrative. The link to the concept of fictionality,
however, if not activated, should become weaker. Thus, when processing the story,
or thinking about it later, the fictionality concept should not readily activate. But
when prompted or primed to think about the pragmatic status of the story, viewers
are capable of retrieving information and implications related to fictionality. This
also is a possible explanation for a lack of source discounting under heuristic pro-
cessing conditions (e.g., Shrum, Burroughs, & Rindfleisch, 2004). Thus, the repre-
sentation of fictionality can be compared to tacit knowledge—knowledge that exists
and is usually not used in a conscious way or verbalized but when retrieved can
influence actions and thoughts (Polanyi, 1958).4
Rather than being a problem for the audience, fictionality as an element of the
mental model is functional for narrative experience in that it alerts the audience
that the story world logic may not conform to the actual world and that extensions
may be necessary. Extending the story world rules in deviation from the actual
world is a normal activity in processing fiction, and moreover it leaves intact the
other, unspecified rules of the real world. As Segal (1995a) points out, if external
cues associated with the narrative, such as the book jacket, identify the text as
fictional, readers are prompted to create a unique story world for this fictional
narrative that is based on, but not necessarily identical to, the actual world. In
opening up possibilities to accept premises different from the real world, informa-
tion on fictionality in the mental model relieves us of too hastily dismissing the
fictional world as faulty.5
Perceived realism
In the next two sections, we address the remaining two reasons viewers may perceive
a story as unrealistic: The story world may be unlike the actual world or the story may

be incoherent. Here, we are distinguishing between external realism judgments—the

extent to which fictional content is consistent with the actual world—and narrative
realism judgments—the extent to which there is consistency among logic, motiva-
tions, and events within a fictional narrative. In order to discuss these two types of
realism, it is also necessary to distinguish online realism judgments from reflective
realism judgments: Online judgments are those that occur as one is constructing the
mental models necessary to understand a narrative. Reflective judgments occur as
one retrospectively and probably more holistically evaluates the realness of narrative.
(For a discussion of online and memory-based judgments, see Hastie & Park, 1986.)
We propose that both external realism and narrative realism may be judged either
online or reflectively. Finally, we argue that audience members have no inherent
motivation to make positive judgments about realism while viewing and may have
little motivation to do so afterward. On the other hand, negative evaluations of
realism are both prevalent and important because they interfere with engagement.
Online realism judgments are made while the viewer is engaged with a narrative.
They are likely to be focused on a specific instance or moment within the narrative
and they are unlikely to be positive.
External realism
Underlying most perceived realism research is an assumption that either content
perceived as more realistic has greater influence or, in one case (Potter, 1986),
content must be perceived as somewhat realistic to have influence. Although many
conceptual dimensions of external realism have been offered, such as magic window,
plausibility, probability, and social utility (for reviews, see Busselle & Greenberg,
2000; Potter, 1988), the commonality is for respondents to judge ‘‘the degree of
similarity between mediated characters and situations and real-life characters and
situations’’ (Shapiro & Chock, 2003, p. 170). From a mental models perspective,
realism judgments can be thought of as a judgment of the consistency between the
mental models representing a narrative that are constructed as part of a narrative
experience (i.e., story world, character models, and situation models) and a viewer’s
appropriate, counterpart real life and media experiences as reflected in schemas and
stereotypes.
In the case of filmic narratives, most research has focused on memory-based
realism judgments (Busselle & Greenberg, 2000; Wilson & Busselle, 2004). Some-
times participants are shown a narrative and then asked to assess aspects of its
realism (e.g., Bahk, 2001; Bilandzic & Busselle, 2006; Taylor, 2005). More often,
respondents complete questionnaires containing items that measure perceptions
of the realism of a genre or genres, or of television in general (e.g., Busselle, 2001;
Perse, 1986; Pinkelton, Austin, & Fujioka, 2001; Potter, 1986). Little research has
focused on the online judgments viewers may make while viewing. Shapiro and
Chock (2003; Experiment 3) demonstrated that, when prompted to do so, parti-
cipants could monitor realism as they view and that across program segments per-
ceived realism is highly correlated with perceived typicality (also see Bradley &

Shapiro, 2005; Shapiro & Fox, 2002). To investigate unprompted, online realism
judgments, Busselle and his colleagues (Quintero-Johnson & Busselle, 2004; Wilson
& Busselle, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007) used a thought-listing procedure and found
negative relationships between memories of critical thoughts about a program while
viewing and postviewing realism judgments.
It is generally assumed that respondents report high realism when they observe
similarity between the fictional and the real worlds. This may be the case with
reflective, postexposure realism judgments but there is little reason to expect online
recognition of positive realism. Simply put, if one is viewing realistic content, there is
no reason to judge its realism. This argument is supported from several perspectives.
From a limited capacity standpoint (Lang, 2000), assessing realism should interfere
with processing other incoming information related directly to the narrative itself
(Bradley & Shapiro, 2005; Busselle, Ryabovolova, & Wilson, 2004). Moreover, crit-
ical evaluation should undermine enjoyment or escapist goals (Prentice & Gerrig,
1999). Also, the redundancy of judging the truth of something initially accepted as
true is inconsistent with a Spinozan model of veracity assessment (Gilbert, 1991). As
both cognitive psychologists (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1993) and communication
scholars (Bradley & Shapiro, 2005) have argued, and as we have argued above
regarding fictionality, individuals should accept information as true, ‘‘unless delib-
erative processing subsequently finds the proposition to be false’’ (Bradley & Shapiro,
2005, p. 312). Thus, we may conclude that if fictional content meets some threshold
of realism, judgments about realism are unnecessary and unlikely (except when
prompted by a researcher or a conversation about realism).
Conversely, observed dissimilarity or unrealness may be impossible to overlook.
The occurrence in a narrative of a behavior or event that is noticeably inconsistent with
a viewer’s relevant, preexisting schemas or stereotypes should prompt realism judg-
ments, which should be negative or critical, at least initially. This is not because the
viewer is monitoring realism but because such inconsistencies should interfere with the
smooth construction of mental models and thus motivate an evaluation of realism.
These prompted online judgments should be more specific than reflective, memory-
based realism judgments used in traditional perceived realism research. Rather than
requiring an evaluation of the realism of a program or category of content elements
(e.g., cops or crimes), online judgments focus on the specific moment and content that
prompted the judgment. This is the difference between an overall assessment, such as
‘‘police officers on TV behaving like real police officers,’’ and a judgment about
a specific moment in a specific narrative, such as ‘‘Lenny (of Law & Order) can’t really
break down that apartment door without a search warrant.’’
Reflective realism measures have been linked to experiential engagement. Focus
group participants told Hall (2003) that television programs were realistic if they
were emotionally engaging. Green (2004) found that the extent to which readers
judged a short story to be realistic was related to their feeling of being transported
into that story. We suggest that the relationship between realism and narrative engage-
ment may be related to negative online realism judgments, where observations of

inconsistency interfere with engagement, or, in the positive case, the absence of online
assessments is part of an engaging narrative experience. Given that consistency is the
default and realism is assumed, consistency should lead to no realism evaluation at all.
For example, a viewer is unlikely to observe that the police officer behaves as one would
expect a police officer to behave, and is therefore realistic. Inconsistency, on the other
hand, should present itself as abnormal or unexpected and result in the perception that
the narrative was in some way flawed or unrealistic. A viewer likely would take notice if
a police officer behaves unexpectedly by, for example, breaking down in tears over an
unfamiliar victim. Certainly, such behavior could be explained, but if not, the authen-
ticity of the portrayal of the character would be questioned.
Schemas and stereotypes are important for the assessment of realism or, more
accurately, a lack of realism, about people and events. Genre schemas are central to
story world models and their accompanying logic. Knowledge about genres helps the
viewer find the appropriate story world logic. Segal (1995a) points out that genre
knowledge makes comprehension of stories easier and that ‘‘the genre’s constraints
become its verisimilitude’’ (p. 72)—such that, as Todorov (1977) has described,
genre patterns become a benchmark for judging the verisimilitude of a narrative
even if it is the ‘‘antiverisimilitude’’ of the murder mystery making the most unsus-
pected person turn out to be the murderer. Todorov (1977) lays out that there is
a multiplicity of verisimilitudes, depending on the consistency of the narrative at
hand with genre patterns: ‘‘Comedy has its own verisimilitude, different from trag-
edy; there are as many verisimilitudes as there are genres’’ (p. 83).
Whether a lack of external realism leads to a disruption of narrative processing
should depend in part on how much the story explains deviations from the real
world. Deviations that are not explained, such as the use of cell phones in the 1960s,
may prompt critical thinking during reception, which should disrupt the construc-
tion of mental models. When the flow of processing is disturbed, viewers are likely to
disengage from the film and, at least momentarily, lose the sense of transportation.
Similarly, we assume that identification will be hindered because critical thinking
should move the viewer away from the narrative’s deictic center. Ultimately, this also
should interfere with enjoyment (Green, Brock, & Kaufman, 2004; Zhang et al.,
2007). However, an inconsistency between, for example, an event and the logic of
the story world may be resolved by the narrative if the story makes the deviation
plausible. For example, the police officer could use a cell phone despite the setting if
it is revealed that the officer is a member of a secret, hi-tech government agency that
is decades ahead of the times technologically and whose members carry cell phone-
like devices. In this case the existence of such an agency and the officer’s identity as
a member are revealed to audience members and can be incorporated as mental
models of the ongoing narrative are constructed.
Of course, the narrative must achieve or maintain coherence among different
schemas and mental models, such as the story world and the genre. For example, the
introduction of a secret government agency may be consistent with the story world
surrounding our old woman and police officer but inconsistent with a classic

mystery genre and its logic. There is no place in the story worlds of Miss Marple or
Sherlock Holmes for hi-tech gadgetry. Indeed, simplicity may be part of a genre’s
charm. On the other hand, the absence of gadgetry would be troublingly inconsistent
in the story world of James Bond.
Narrative realism
We have pointed out that consumers of fiction do not expect strict verisimilitude.
The extent to which real-world rules and premises are relevant to the processing of
a narrative depends partly on genre. Yet even the most authentic genres, such as
crime dramas, are unrealistic in ways that viewers find acceptable. Shapiro and
colleagues have referred to relative realism in pointing out that audiences are able
to judge even unlikely events that are not part of their own experiences as more or
less realistic by evaluating ‘‘how realistic an event is if that sort of event were to
happen’’ (Shapiro, Pena-Herborn, & Hancock, 2006, p. 278)—or, in other words, by
employing some sort of commonsense plausibility criterion. Content can vary from
realistic to unrealistic within the confines of a clearly unrealistic genre or story world.
For example, crime-drama viewers do not notice that cops are impossibly good
marksmen despite never practicing or that crimes are solved with impossible speed
and efficiency. Instead of being concerned with verisimilitude, audience members are
concerned with coherence and logic within a particular fictional context (Graesser
et al., 2002; Shapiro & Fox, 2002). We refer to this aspect of realness as ‘‘narrative
realism.’’
The constructionist approach to narrative processing assumes that two interre-
lated activities are central to processing: coherence and explanation (Graesser et al.,
2002). The first focuses on constructing a situation model in which actions, events,
and states make sense together. The second focuses on explaining ‘‘why the explicit
actions, events and states occur’’ (Graesser et al., 2002, p. 247). This includes, for
example, how actions fit with the traits and motives of characters (Rapp et al., 2001).
In fact, it may be less accurate to say that audience members are concerned with
coherence and explanation and more accurate to say that audience members begin to
question or counterargue if a narrative becomes incoherent or unexplainable. Some
evidence of this comes from experiments in which consistency within stories is
manipulated. For example, individuals read more slowly and were less likely to agree
that an event would occur when the event was described as having taken more time
than the story suggested had transpired (Rapp & Gerrig, 2002; Experiment 1).
Similarly, reading times were greater when an object’s properties changed from early
in a story to later (e.g., a sweater described first as green and then as blue) and its
relation to a character changed (e.g., first too large and then too small; Kaup & Foss,
2005). Also, reading times were found to increase when characters’ traits and behav-
iors were inconsistent (e.g., a vegetarian eating a cheeseburger; Albrecht & O’Brien,
1993). In each case, reading slowed—apparently because inconsistencies interfered
with comprehension. Unlike a reader, a viewer of television or film cannot slow the

rate at which he or she processes a story. Instead, observed inconsistencies should

interfere with comprehension and engagement. Television viewers report similar
concerns regarding coherence and explanation and link these to realism judgments.
Hall (2003) found that focus group participants judged a program to be realistic if it
is ‘‘internally coherent . doesn’t contradict itself . and leaves nothing jarringly
unexplained’’ (p. 363). Shapiro, Barriga, and Beren (2004) found that participants
took longer to make realism judgments about stories containing incongruent emo-
tional reactions. Prentice and Gerrig (1999) also suggest that doubt is prompted by
‘‘obvious cues,’’ which can lead to questioning the narrative and a retreat from the
story world (p. 531).
If coherence and explanation are audience members’ main concerns, then intru-
sive violations of narrative realism should be troubling for them. Again, we integrate
these violations into the mental models framework: Violations of narrative realism
occur when incoming information from the narrative is inconsistent with what is
already represented in the situation model, the story world model with its specific
story world logic, or the character models. For example, the audience should be
confused if the officer and the woman agree that the victim probably suffered a heart
attack. This conclusion is clearly inconsistent with the dry blood on the man’s chest,
which we know both characters have seen. This is similarly true of fantastical story
worlds: Yoda’s use of a handgun would be unrealistic, whereas his use of a light saber
(which doesn’t really exist) is realistic, not because of external realism, but because it
is consistent with the Star Wars story world.
Thus, we propose that spontaneous, online, narrative realism judgments should
occur when audience members notice—or fail to overlook—something in a story
that appears incoherent or unexplainable. This should take the form of counter-
arguing, something that engaged audience members should not be motivated, and
may be ill equipped, to do (Green & Brock, 2002; Slater & Rouner, 2002). Yet, it is
something viewers or readers must do when they cannot make sense of new infor-
mation or cannot incorporate new information into the current models of the
narrative at hand. As in counterarguing provoked by violations of external realism,
negative cognitions caused by violations of narrative realism disrupt the construction
of the mental model and lower the experience of transportation. In the same way,
identification is interrupted because the viewer or reader is drawn from the story
world and forced to think about the story from a more distanced perspective.
Narrative comprehension, engagement, and (un)realness in narratives

Our model of narrative comprehension and engagement describes how viewers or
readers construct meaning from narratives, how they engage with the narrative to
experience the flow-like sensation of transportation as well as identification with
characters, and how they may disengage due to violations of realism. The theoretical
framework we developed is useful to explain why some aspects of unrealness do not
disturb narrative experience and its subsequent influence, whereas others do.

The process starts with viewers or readers constructing three types of mental
models in order to represent a narrative (see Figure 1). The situation model tracks
the events and actions of the characters, as well as spatial and chronological cues.
Character models contain the identities, traits, and goals of individual characters.
The story world model is a more static structure, defining the spatial and temporal
setting, as well as the story world logic that represents the rules of the specific
fictional world. Deviations from the actual world must be introduced by the narra-
tive and made to seem plausible. For each of the models, consumers of stories use
their general world knowledge as a point of origin or departure from the real world
and to fill in gaps that are not made explicit by the story. Genre schemas in particular
are useful because they provide information about typical patterns of story world
logic, typical plots, and characters.
In order to understand a narrative, and as part of comprehension, individuals
must shift the center of their experience from the actual world into the fictional
world and position themselves within the mental models of the story. This deictic
shift enables them to experience the story from the inside and to assume the point of
view implied by the story. Transportation is redefined as a fluent and smooth
construction of mental models or experiencing a state of flow in this activity. Viewers
or readers may for short periods or longer durations lose their awareness of the
actual world, which may result in phenomena such as forgetting one’s self or losing
the sense of time. Identification in the form of taking on the perspective of a character
is the third component of narrative experience.
Figure 1 Model of narrartive comprehension and engagament.

Based on our description of audience members’ active construction of mental

models representing characters, settings, and situations, as well as their use of pre-
viously held schemas representing people, places, times, stories, and genres, we can
make specific predictions about what may prompt spontaneous evaluations of realness
and subsequent disengagement from a narrative. We argue that the events that lead to
spontaneous evaluations of realness by audience members can be understood as vio-
lations of consistency between structures used in realizing the narrative. These struc-
tures are the text, real-world knowledge, and the mental models. The locations of
potential consistency or inconsistency are represented by double-headed arrows in
Figure 1. We focused on three aspects of unrealness that may manifest in inconsis-
tencies and subsequently interfere with the construction of mental models. First, view-
ers or readers may be bothered by a narrative’s fictionality; second, by its divergence
from the actual world; or, third, by flaws or incoherence within the narrative. We have
essentially ruled out fictionality as a source of disruption. Consumers of fiction need
not suspend their disbelief in order to emote with the characters of a story. Fictionality
is not a problem for the audience; knowledge of fictionality is integrated into the
mental models of the narrative but normally remains tacit during the narrative expe-
rience. In fact, tacit knowledge about a narrative’s fictionality prepares the viewer or
reader for a possible need to extend the story world logic.
The remaining two aspects of unrealness we defined as external realism—an unex-
plained divergence of the narrative from external reality—and narrative realism—
incoherence or implausibility within the narrative. We point out that audience mem-
bers have no reason to assess realism, especially during the narrative experience, except
when inconsistency is observed, suggesting to the audience that realism is lacking.
Violations of either type of realism cause disruptions of the narrative experience. The
central argument here is that perceptions of external and narrative realism are always
relative to the mental model constructed from the story. In the case of external realism,
we assume that not all deviations of the fictional world from the actual world result in
negative online cognitions about a narrative’s realness. Only deviations from the actual
world that are not incorporated into a specific story world logic should provoke
counterarguing. In the case of narrative realism, we do not expect negative online
cognitions about a narrative’s realness when the story world is internally consistent
and no inconsistencies become evident between the mental models of the narrative
and new information coming from the story.
When inconsistencies are observed, negative online cognitions about a narrative’s
realness disrupt the flow of constructing a mental model from a narrative and will
reduce the phenomenological experience of transportation. As shifting one’s deictic
center into the mental model of the narrative is dependent on constructing the
model, we can also assume that identification will be inhibited. Also, negative online
cognitions should prevent the perceiver from losing his or her awareness of self and
the actual world. A final consequence of the online evaluations of unrealness is that
they should negatively affect memory-based realism judgments, as well as other
outcomes that depend on narrative engagement, such as effects or enjoyment.

Caveats and testable propositions

The model implies a number of testable predictions. It predicts relations between the
availability and the focus of cognitive resources while viewing and engagement in
a narrative experience. For example, the more cognitive energy is allocated to con-
structing mental models, the more engaged the audience member should become.
Conversely, the more cognitive energy is allocated to critical evaluation, the less
engaged the audience member viewer should be. Further, observed inconsistencies
should prompt shifts in allocation of cognitive energy and should have predictable
effects on reflective evaluations of realism, as well as enjoyment. The model predicts
that spontaneous, online realism judgments are causal antecedents of both trans-
portation and reflective, memory-based realism judgments. Based on these funda-
mental assumptions, we can propose further hypotheses concerning other influences
in this process. For example, individual differences in viewers or readers may interact
with other constructs in the model. Some individuals will be more likely to observe
inconsistencies than others, and moods and traits should interact with situations and
content categories, increasing or decreasing the occurrence of critical evaluations.
Viewers, for example, may be predisposed to look for inconsistencies as a result of
interactions between tastes or attitudes and content, such as the disliking of an actor,
director, or genre, or a mood that is inconsistent with the activity of viewing in
general or with the viewing of a particular genre. Viewers or readers also may be
predisposed to look for inconsistencies due to more enduring traits, such as high
need for cognition or a relatively lower ability to experience transportation (i.e.,
transportability; Bilandzic & Busselle, 2007; Dal Cin, Zanna, & Fong, 2004). Such
predispositions have two predictable outcomes. One is avoiding stories or avoiding
certain content categories. The other is an increased tendency to observe inconsis-
tencies while processing the narrative. Both are testable propositions. Further, the
individual’s likelihood of engaging in critical evaluation may increase during a nar-
rative experience. On one hand, boredom, which may result from a mismatch
between a story’s complexity and an individual’s ability, may render cognitive
resources more available and increase critical evaluation, increasing the likelihood
of observing inconsistencies. On the other hand, critical evaluation may serve as
a defense mechanism when viewers or readers find content overly arousing or in
some way noxious, for example, while watching a horror film. Such noxious arousal
may also prompt a viewer to retrieve knowledge of fictionality as a defense, inde-
pendent of observing inconsistency.
Another possible factor in our model is content. The examples we have used
in this article may suggest a focus on content that is more mystery or suspense
oriented. The principles we have suggested should apply to a broad range of
content. However, the relative importance of identification and emotion versus
cognitive activity more in line with suspense or mystery viewing likely varies
from genre to genre. For example, mystery may focus viewers’ attention on
consistencies between clues and conclusions, whereas drama may focus attention

on consistencies between characters motivations and emotional reactions to

events.
The model we have proposed describes processes leading to engagement and
disengagement with narratives and the roles of fictionality and inconsistency in those
processes. In and of itself, understanding engagement and its underlying mecha-
nisms is important for understanding exposure to narratives and the rewards of
narrative experiences, such as entertainment and enjoyment. Ultimately, better
understanding of the experience of being engaged with narrative should help us to
better understand when narratives are more and less likely to influence our percep-
tions and beliefs about the real world.
Acknowledgment
The preparation of this article was supported by a grant to the second author from
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Science Foundation).
Notes
1 This conundrum is often expressed as a fictional paradox consisting of three plausible
assumptions that together are implausible: (a) we feel emotions toward fictional char-
acters and events, (b) we know that fiction is not real, and (c) we only respond emo-
tionally to things we know to be real. For a full discussion of the fictional paradox,
see Worth (2004) and Yanal (1999).
2 For a recent review of the concept, see Böcking and Wirth (2005).
3 A variation of such a ‘‘simulationist’’ view is expressed by Currie (1997) and Oatley
(1999).
4 Iser (1993) uses the term tacit knowledge for the distinction between reality and fiction.
However, Iser refers to expert knowledge in the literary community in the sense that
the distinction between fiction and reality is widely used and taken for granted. His
goal is to question this tacit knowledge and analyze its usefulness and, however, not
apply the notion of tacit knowledge to the reader and the influence on story
processing.
5 In fact, this phenomenon that we adjust rules for a possible world is conceivable for real-
world stories, too, when we have to contextualize a story in another historic and cultural
context. For example, to kill a human who is not an enemy is illogical by today’s
standards in Western societies, but is explainable within a religion that dictates human
sacrifice to the gods.
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« Fictionnalité » et réalisme perçu des histoires :
Un modèle de compréhension et d’implication narratives
Rick Busselle
Helena Bilandzic
Résumé
Cet article propose un cadre théorique visant à expliquer les circonstances dans lesquelles
les perceptions d’« irréalité » affectent l’implication dans les narratifs et les jugements
subséquents de perception de réalisme. Une approche par modèles mentaux du traitement
des narratifs forme la base d’un modèle qui intègre la compréhension narrative et les
expériences phénoménologiques telles que le transport et l’identification. Trois types
d’irréalité sont commentés : la « fictionnalité », le réalisme externe (concordance avec
une réalité externe) et le réalisme narratif (cohérence d’une histoire). Nous réunissons ici
des preuves à l’effet que la fictionnalité n’affecte pas le traitement narratif. D’autre part,
les violations des réalismes externe et narratif sont perçues comme des incohérences dans
les structures mentales des spectateurs, puisque ceux-ci construisent des modèles
mentaux de significations afin de représenter et comprendre le narratif. Ces incohérences
peuvent avoir pour résultats des évaluations négatives du réalisme d’un narratif sur le
coup. Elles peuvent également interrompre l’implication, influencer négativement les
jugements de réalisme à postériori (jugements réflexifs) et amoindrir la puissance
persuasive d’un narratif.

Fiktionalität und wahrgenommener Realismus beim Erleben von Geschichten: Ein
Modell zum narrativen Verstehen und Erleben
Rick Busselle
Helena Bilandzic
Dieser Artikel bietet einen theoretischen Rahmen, um Bedingungen zu erklären unter

denen die Wahrnehmung von Unwirklichkeit die Art und Weise des Erlebens von
Geschichten und daraus resultierend Realismusurteile beeinflusst. Unter Rückgriff auf
einen Mentale-Modelle-Ansatz zur Verarbeitung von Narrationen werden narratives
Verstehen und phänomenologische Erlebensweisen wie Transportation und Identifikation
im Modell integriert. Drei Typen von Unwirklichkeit werden diskutiert: Fiktionalität,
externaler Realismus (Passung mit der externalen Realität) und narrativer Realismus
(Stimmigkeit mit der Geschichte). Unsere Daten zeigen, dass Fiktionalität die narrative
Verarbeitung nicht beeinflusst. Allerdings wird deutlich, dass Verletzungen des
externalen und narrativen Realismus als Inkonsistenzen in den mentalen Strukturen der
Zuschauer wahrgenommen werden, da Zuschauer mentale Bedeutungsmodelle
konstruieren, um die Geschichte abzubilden und zu verstehen. Diese Inkonsistenzen
könnten in negativen Ad-Hoc-Bewertungen von narrativem Realismus resultieren,
könnten Erleben stören oder postrezeptive (reflektierende) Realismusurteile negativ
beeinflussen - und letztendlich die persuasive Kraft der Narration verringern.
La Ficción y el Realismo Percibido en la Experiencia de las Historias:
Un Modelo de la Comprensión y el Compromiso Narrativo
Rick Busselle
Resumen
Este artículo ofrece un marco teórico para explicar las circumstancias bajo las cuales las
percepciones de “irrealismo” afectan el compromiso de las narrativas y los juicios de las
percepciones de realismo subsequente. Un modelo mental de aproximación de los
procesamientos narrativos forma un modelo fundacional que integra la comprensión
narrativa y las experiencias fenomenológicas como por ejemplo la transportación y la
identificación. Tres tipos de irrelismo son discutidos: ficción, realismo externo
(correspondencia con la realidad externa), y realismo narrativo (coherencia dentro de una
historia). Juntamos evidencia que la ficcionalidad no afecta el procesamiento narrativo.
Por otro lado, las violaciones al realismo externo y narrativo son concebidas como
inconsistencias entre las estructuras mentales de la audiencia dado que ellos construyen
modelos mentales de significación para representar y comprender la narrativa. Estas
inconsistencias pueden resultar en evaluaciones online negativas de una narrativa de
realismo, pueden trastornar el compromiso, e influir negativamente sobre los juicios de
realismo después de la exposición (reflectiva) así como también disminuir el poder
persuasivo de la narrativa.
故事体验中的虚构和真实性感知：故事理解及投入模式
Rick Busselle
华盛顿州立大学
Helena Bilandzic
德国 Universität Erfurt
摘要
本文提供了一个理论框架来解释在何种条件下“不真实”的感知如何影响对故事的投入以
及随后对所感知之真实性的判断。以解释叙事处理的心里模式为基础，本文发展了一个融
故事理解和现象性体验（比如超越和认同）为一体的模式。三种“不真实”的情况得以讨
论，它们包括虚构、外在真实（和外在现实吻合）、和叙述真实（故事内部的一致性）。
我们所收集的证据表明：虚构对故事处理过程没有影响。另一方面，当受众构建有关意义
的心里模式以理解故事时，对外在真实和叙述真实的违背在受众的心里结构中被视为不一
致。这些不一致可能引发对叙述真实性的负面的即时评估、中断对叙事的投入、造成对反
刍性真实判断的负面影响、以及减弱故事的说服力量。
경험적 이야기의 허구성과 인지된 사실주의:
이야기 이해와 관여모델
Rick Busselle
Helena Bilandzic
요약
본 논문은 비실재성의 개념들이 이야기들에 있어서의 관여와 후속적으로 인지된
사실성의 판단에 있어 영향을 미치는 환경을 설명하기 위한 이론적 토대를 제공하고 있다.
이야기 전개에 대한 정신적모델 접근은 교통과 동일시와 같은 이야기적인 이해와
현상학적인 환경들을 통합시키는 모델의 토대를 형성한다. 세가지 유형의 비실재성들이
논의되었는바, 그들은 허구성, 외적 사실주의 (외적인 사실성에 일치되는), 그리고
이야기적인 사실주의 (이야기내에서의 일치)이다. 우리는 허구성은 이야기 과정에 영향을
주지 않는다는 증거를 확립하였다. 한편, 외적인 그리고 이야기적인 사실주의의 위반들은,
그들이 그 이야기를 대표하고 이해하기 위한 의미있는 전신적 모델을 형성하는 과정에서
관찰자의 정신적 구조들 사이에서의 비일관성을 인지하고 있다는 것을 발견했다. 이러한
비일관성들은 이야기의 사실주의에 대해 부정적인 온라인 평가를 산출하거나, 관여를
방해하거나, 이야기의 설득력을 감소시키고 추후노출 (반영적인) 사실주의 판단에
부정적으로 영향을 줄 수 있는 것이다.

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Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293

Fictionality and Perceived Realism in

Corresponding author: Rick Busselle; email: [email protected]

Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 255

An important factor related to experiential engagement with stories appears to be

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Mental models of meaning in narrative

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Loss of self-awareness and flow

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Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 261

Deictic shift, transportation, and identification

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Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 263

The realness of fiction

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be incoherent. Here, we are distinguishing between external realism judgments—the

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rate at which he or she processes a story. Instead, observed inconsistencies should

Narrative comprehension, engagement, and (un)realness in narratives

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Figure 1 Model of narrartive comprehension and engagament.

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Based on our description of audience members’ active construction of mental

Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 273

Caveats and testable propositions

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on consistencies between characters motivations and emotional reactions to

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Communication Theory 18 (2008) 255–280 ª 2008 International Communication Association 279

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Un modèle de compréhension et d’implication narratives

subséquents de perception de réalisme. Une approche par modèles mentaux du traitement

expériences phénoménologiques telles que le transport et l’identification. Trois types

d’irréalité sont commentés : la « fictionnalité », le réalisme externe (concordance avec

mentaux de significations afin de représenter et comprendre le narratif. Ces incohérences

coup. Elles peuvent également interrompre l’implication, influencer négativement les

jugements de réalisme à postériori (jugements réflexifs) et amoindrir la puissance

persuasive d’un narratif.

Dieser Artikel bietet einen theoretischen Rahmen, um Bedingungen zu erklären unter

Un Modelo de la Comprensión y el Compromiso Narrativo

percepciones de “irrealismo” afectan el compromiso de las narrativas y los juicios de las

percepciones de realismo subsequente. Un modelo mental de aproximación de los

procesamientos narrativos forma un modelo fundacional que integra la comprensión

narrativa y las experiencias fenomenológicas como por ejemplo la transportación y la

identificación. Tres tipos de irrelismo son discutidos: ficción, realismo externo

(correspondencia con la realidad externa), y realismo narrativo (coherencia dentro de una

historia). Juntamos evidencia que la ficcionalidad no afecta el procesamiento narrativo.