151-A Phil.

815

[ G.R. No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973 ]

NORBERTO MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST

FERNANDO, J.:
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari
and mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner
failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that
the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is
to the credit of his able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for
provisional liberty is carried on with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but
such valiant attempt to secure his release is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set
forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its command precludes a reconsideration. This
resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question of why the issuance of a brief
dismissal order does not in any wise offend against the constitutional provision requiring that
no decision "shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."[1]
1. Habeas corpus could properly be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the
illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of
habeas corpus as the writ of liberty. Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging
and all – embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no
toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ
imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of
physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge without loss of time. The party who is
keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he
must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation
of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a
showing, the confinement must thereby cease.
The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation.
Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued
after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring
the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. [2]
No allegation to the contrary may be entertained. It cannot be denied that petitioner's co-
accused, Nelso Unal, Hermogenes Lumanglas and Leopoldo Trinidad, had previously come
to this court to challenge the filing of one information where there were three victims.
Accordingly, this Court, in Unal vs. People,[3] required three separate amended informations.
There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued,
not only in the case of the parties in such petition, but likewise of petitioner. Habeas corpus,
under the circumstances, would not therefore lie.[4]
2. Even if it be granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is
he, however, entitled to bail? Precisely that is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the
absence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a
remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal
court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in
the order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of
discretion. In the landmark decision of Chief Justice Concepcion, People vs. Hernandez,[5] the
right to bail was rightfully stressed as an aspect of the protection accorded individual freedom
which, in his eloquent language, "is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a republican
state, like ours, * * *."[6] To be more matter of fact about it, there is this excerpt from de la
Camara vs. Enage:[7] "Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption
of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is
not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the
hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It
is, in the language of Cooley, a 'mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable
certainty, insure the attendance of the accused' for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything
unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against
him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be
too great to be resisted."[8]
The precise question, however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus
obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail. In the answer filed on behalf
of respondent Court, Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza did stress the absence of authority
on the part of special counselor Antonio R. Robles who was not authorized to intervene in
this case on behalf of the state but did so, his failure to object being the basis of the bail
granted by the municipal court of Mulanay, Quezon. Such an allegation was denied by
petitioner. We are not called upon to rule definitely on this aspect as independently thereof,
there are two other basic objections. One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was
still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in accordance with
our ruling in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan.[9] Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that all persons
shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in
custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's
release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'" [10] Secondly, and
what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The
authoritative doctrine in People vs. San Diego[11] is thus squarely in point: "Whether the
motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary
proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant
special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a
violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered
void."[12]
Nor is the San Diego ruling novel. As far back as 1958, in People vs. Raba,[13] it was held:
"Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial
fiscal at least three days before the hearing thereof and the court failed to require that a
reasonable notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly
in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard." [14] Just after San
Diego, this Court had occasion to stress anew such a principle in People vs. Bocar.[15] As set
forth in the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It cannot be denied that, under our regime of
laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused
is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception being when he is charged with a
capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. But even in the latter instance, the high
regard reserved by the law for personal freedom is underscored by the provision placing upon
the prosecution, not on the defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to
bail. This protective attitude towards the sanctity of the liberty of a person notwithstanding,
due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full
opportunity to present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the
prosecution in this case was deprived of the right to present its evidence against the bail
petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then
the issuance of the order would really constitute grave abuse of discretion that would call for
the remedy of certiorari."[16]
The last sentence in the above excerpt finds application in the matter before us. No grave
abuse of discretion to justify the grant of the writ of certiorari prayed for has been shown.
That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.
3. That brings us to the point raised in the motion for reconsideration objecting to our
dismissing the petition through a minute resolution. It is his contention that there should be an
extended decision. As noted at the outset, reliance is had on the constitutional provision
requiring a decision by a court of record to contain "clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based." According to a recent decision, Jose vs. Santos,[17] what is expected
of the judiciary "is that the decision rendered makes clear why either party prevailed under
the applicable law to the facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language
to be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the
particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no
sacramental form of words which he must use upon pain of being considered as having failed
to abide by what the Constitution directs." [18] What must then be stressed is that under such a
provision as held in the early case of Soncuya vs. National Investment Board,[19] the decision
spoken of is the judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary
civil or criminal case upon a stipulation of facts upon which its disposition is to be based. In
Bacolod Murcia Milling Co., Inc. vs. Henares,[20] the above decision was cited with approval,
with the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes containing the following: "Plaintiff-appellant assigns
as another error that the order appealed from does not contain any statement of the facts and
the law on which it is based. Obviously, this is based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court, and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. The contention is untenable, since
these provisions have been held to refer only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of
the trial court resolving incidental matters such as the one at bar."[21]
It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the
situation is subjected to a searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved
is just a mere incident in the prosecution of petitioner. Had he prevailed, he would have been
entitled to provisional liberty. Under the circumstances, as the facts of the case clearly
demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus being unavailing, we felt that a minute
resolution which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was not
inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties to dwell at length on their respective
contentions should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without
according the parties the fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the
Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose
the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the other, we deemed that the
constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that sense, a minute
resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a constitutional
command.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied, our resolution of January 26, 1973
dismissing the petitions for lack of merit reiterated and the temporary restraining order issued
by us on October 16, 1973 lifted so that the case against petitioner can be duly heard
forthwith. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Acting C.J., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

CONCURRING
BARREDO, J.:
I concur in this resolution of denial, and I am writing this separate concurring opinion only to
further elucidate on why the minute resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing the petition in
this case cannot be faulted for lack of fealty to the constitutional requirement relied upon by
petitioner-movant that "(e)very decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based," for the very simple reason that the same
constitutional provision itself (Sec. 9 of Art. X) additionally provides that "(t)he Rules of
Court shall govern the promulgation of minute resolutions," which in effect means that it is in
the power of the Supreme Court to determine in every given case whether or not a minute
resolution is sufficient to serve the best interests of justice, even if the same should amount to
a final decision thereof.
I hold that it is a very short-sighted and impractical construction of this constitutional
provision to maintain that the separate reference to a "decision" in its first sentence and to
"minute resolutions" in the second sentence implies that the intention is to exclude the
possibility of minute resolutions in rendering decisions. It is true that both aspects of the
provision were conceived precisely to cure the anomaly of parties being left in the dark as to
the real basis of the court in resolving their controversy, and, what is more important, to
eliminate any possibility of abuse by judges whose decisions, if arbitrary, capricious or
intentionally partial, would readily be exposed by the obvious salience of its inevitable lack
of cogency and foundation, if a reasoned out decision were to be written by them. Besides, an
unreasoned decision naturally makes it difficult for the aggrieved party to seek redress
against it, since it would be like aiming at a moving or even invisible target. I am of the
considered view, however, that it was never contemplated that cases involving purely
procedural issues which do not directly affect the substantive rights of the parties should be
subject to the laborious and time-consuming procedure consequent of such constitutional
injunction. In other words, I refuse to believe that the constitutional fathers had in mind to
apply it to matters which relate to mere technicalities of procedure or those that constitute
nothing but incidents which do not directly affect the merits of the main substantive
controversy or issue between the parties.
It must be borne in mind that what really delays very often the rendering of a decision by a
court of record is the preparation thereof because of the time which generally has to be
consumed not only in analyzing the evidence and marshalling the same in a written essay
portraying the foundation, logic and precision of the ultimate conclusions of the court, but
also in gathering and quoting or copying or, at least, paraphrasing therein the pertinent and
relevant authorities, jurisprudence, statutes, rules, etc. Thus, it is easy to understand that to
require that all these be done when the pivotal issue is purely procedural would only mean
adding more to the delay in the final disposition of the merits of a case, rather than expediting
the same. Actually, it is very rare that adjective matters call for the laying down of
jurisprudence or jurisprudential rules or guidelines. Just imagine a case being the subject of
reasoned out decisions not only of the trial court but also of the Court of Appeals and of this
Court, only to be remanded to the lower court in order that the correct procedure may be
followed, and this, not without the possibility of its bouncing back to the higher courts as
regards other procedural points, leaving untouched in the meanwhile the real controversy. To
allow that the cited constitutional mandate be in itself the possible cause of the unnecessary
protraction of litigations is a plain absurdity. Indeed, it would be contrary to the obvious
intent of the framers of the Constitution to do so.
In the case at bar, it is true that the right of petitioner to bail is an important substantive right,
but it just happens that, as it appears to us, the real bone of contention here is not whether or
not the petitioner is entitled to the bail granted to him by the Municipal Court of Mulanay,
Quezon, but whether or not the correct procedure for such a grant has been observed. There
can be no question that such issue is purely procedural. The background circumstances extant
in the record do not furnish adequate basis for determining justly at this stage whether or not
the evidence of guilt of petitioner available to the prosecution and which it is willing to
present for the proper scrutiny of the court is strong. In fact, the stage for such determination
has not yet been reached, as the respondent court correctly ruled.[22]
The original criminal complaint charging petitioner and his co-accused with triple murder and
under which the bail in question here was granted had been ordered by the Supreme Court to
be amended in order to charge them with three separate murders, and as it is too evident for
any serious doubt that at the very least there consequently arose two new additional cases,
apart from the first one, the issue of bail has to be necessarily started from the beginning
insofar as these two new cases are concerned. It was, therefore, a purely procedural matter for
the respondent court to require that, since the fiscal has not recommended bail in any of said
cases, the regular procedure be followed of allowing the prosecution to prove that the
evidence of guilt is strong, and until such proceeding has been held and terminated, any claim
of right to bail is manifestly premature. While it is true that the amendment of the complaint
in order to change the charge against petitioner from triple murder in one single case to three
separate murder indictments in three respective distinct cases did not, as aptly contended by
able counsel, alter the factual basis for determining the strength or weakness of the evidence
of the prosecution, on the other hand, there is nothing to preclude modification of the
subjective position of the prosecutor, should he opt to now reveal his strong evidence and
place the same before the court, in attention to subsequent relevant developments warranting
such a move, instead of maintaining his former pose, assuming this to have been the case, of
not objecting to the grant of bail. And since the prosecution in this case has already
announced it is now in a position to oppose the grant of bail, it is but proper that the
procedure fixed by law for the purpose be adhered to. Accordingly, I cannot see how it can be
contended that the respondent court had abused its discretion, in denying petitioner's petition
for bail based exclusively on the findings of the municipal court in the original case, without
prejudice to resolving the same later after the prosecution has had the opportunity to properly
substantiate its opposition, a chance to which, it is now settled, it is entitled as a matter of
law. And considering that the point involved is purely procedural, it was in the better interest
of justice for the Court to issue the briefest decision in the form it has done. In any event, the
difference between the minute resolution petitioner complains of and a decision in the usual
form but succinctly stating that the petition is without merit, with one or two inconsequential
words added to indicate the fundamental basis of such a conclusion, can hardly be
characterized as more than formal, since petitioner's alleged right to bail has not been
altogether denied and may still be claimed by him, albeit, I feel it would not have occasioned
any harm had the court been a little more explicit - a norm that commends itself henceforth
for instances similar to the one at bar.
Esguerra, J., concurs in this opinion of Justice Barredo.

[1] Article VIII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution. As now worded in the present
Constitution, it reads: "Every decision of a court of record shall clearly and distinctly state the
facts and the law on which it is based. The Rules of Court shall govern the promulgation of
minute resolutions." Article X, Section 9.
[2]According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." The above provision has been substantially reproduced in the
present Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, with the modification that a warrant of arrest is
specifically mentioned and a "responsible officer, may, if provided for by law, cause it to be
issued."
[3] L-33393, May 18, 1972, 45 SCRA 56.
[4] Cf. Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.
[5] 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
[6] Ibid., 551.
[7] L-32951-2, September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
[8] Ibid., 6-7.
[9] L-14657, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 888.
[10] Answer, par. 3 (cc), 6.
[11] L-29676, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 522.
[12] Ibid., 522-523.
[13] 103 Phil. 384.
[14] Ibid., 386.
[15] L-27120, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 512.
[16] Ibid., 516.
[17] L-25510, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 538.
[18] Ibid., 542.
[19] 69 Phil. 602 (1940).
[20] 107 Phil. 560 (1960).
[21] Ibid., 570.
[22]We cannot fail but note the jurisdictional infirmity of the proceedings originally held by
the Municipal Court arising from its having acted without first acquiring jurisdiction over the
person of the accused who had not yet been placed in its custody whether by actual arrest or
voluntary surrender.
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