The Minimal State v the Welfare State:

A Critique of the Argument between

Nozick and Rawls

Rachael Patterson*

Abstract
This paper critically assesses the debate between Rawls and
Nozick as to whether the minimal state or the welfare state is
preferable. The first part provides an overview of Nozick’s
argument in favour of the minimal state; the second part
summarises Rawls’ idea of the role and nature of government as
being ideally expressed in the welfare state. Nozick’s criticisms
of Rawls are then considered, and a critique provided of the
approaches adopted by both Nozick and Rawls. The author
argues that Nozick does not succeed in his attempt to show that
Rawls is wrong.

Introduction
In 1994, one out of every 11 residents in New York was on welfare. In
1998 the then Governor of New York, George E Pataki, argued that
this was the result of welfare policies that “encouraged dependency,
punished initiative and destroyed the spirit.” To remedy this situation
he implemented a number of welfare reforms designed to promote
individual responsibility and the value of work.1
Welfare was replaced by Workfare. Under Workfare able-bodied
welfare recipients were required to earn their welfare by completing
work assignments. Those who refused faced losing their benefits. All
welfare recipients were required to be drug screened, and a lifetime
limit of five years was placed on the period of time over which a
person could receive cash benefits from the state. A program called
Learnfare, which provided welfare recipients with incentives to make
sure that their children completed their education, was also introduced.

* Lecturer, Deakin University School of Law.

1 Pataki G, “Promoting Individual Responsibility”,
<http://www.state.ny.us/renewdoc/final/promoindi-pg34.htm>
(30 November 2004).

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Under Learnfare, parents whose children were absent from school

without reason five or more times had their welfare benefits reduced.
As draconian as these reforms might sound, Pataki argued that they
were extremely successful. He stated that the reforms transformed the
New York State welfare program into one that fostered growth,
encouraged initiative and rewarded the taking of responsibility, and
that these measures had reduced the state’s welfare rolls by more than
37 per cent.2
Nozick, one of the most persuasive supporters of the minimal state,
would approve of the policies and changes implemented under the
Pataki administration. Rawls, on the other hand, would not. The first
part of this paper provides an overview of Nozick’s argument in
favour of the minimal state whilst the second summarises Rawls’
claim that the most ideal form of government is the welfare state. After
considering Nozick’s criticisms of Rawls the author provides a
critique of both approaches, and argues that Nozick’s attempt to
undermine Rawls’ argument in favour of the welfare state is
unsuccessful.

A Libertarian Argument in Favour of the

Minimal State
Nozick argues that the minimal state is the only morally justifiable
form of government. This contention rests upon his understanding of
the separateness of each person, the existence of inviolable rights, and
the side constraint that these rights impose on the behaviour of others.
Nozick claims that persons are rational, they are moral agents, and they
have free will. In addition, they have the ability to regulate and guide
their lives in accordance with some overall conception of their choice.
Nozick states:
[A person is] a being able to formulate long term plans for its
life, able to consider and decide on the basis of abstract
principles or considerations it formulates to itself and hence not
merely the plaything of immediate stimuli, a being able to limit
its own behaviour in accordance with some principles or picture

2 Pataki, note 1.

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 The Minimal State v the Welfare State:
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it has of what an appropriate life is for itself and others and so

on.3

When a person shapes her or his life in accordance with some overall
plan, that person gives meaning to her or his life.4 Persons, as such,
are separate entities capable of determining the meaning and direction
of their lives. Put slightly differently, we are all separate existences
capable of leading separate lives.5 According to Nozick, the
significance of each person’s possession of self-ownership is that
people should not be used as resources or as a means of achieving
some end. It is wrong, he states, to treat people as if they are merely of
instrumental worth, or to sacrifice one person for another. 6
The separateness of each person means that each person’s body and
liberty are separate and distinct from those of others. They belong to
each person and not to someone else. As such, Nozick states, only
each person has the right to decide what happens to her or his life,
body, liberty or property. Being inviolable and exhaustive, these rights
are absolute.
Nozick claims that the rights of others determine the constraints on
our actions.7 That is, a person’s rights are not merely superficial
claims that can be overridden. Rather, they are boundaries not to be
crossed without the free consent of the person whose rights they are.
Elaborating on this, Nozick writes:
[T]hat there are different individuals with separate lives and so
no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of
moral side constraints, but it also leads to a libertarian side
constraint that prohibits aggression against another.8

Therefore, a person cannot violate the rights of others through either

interference or aggression. Nor can a person infringe upon other

3 Nozick R, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford, 1974, p 49.

4 Nozick, note 3, p 50.
5 Nozick, note 3, p 33.
6 Nozick, note 3, p 33.
7 Nozick, note 3, p 29.
8 Nozick, note 3, p 33.

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people’s rights in the pursuit of some object or goal, even if that goal
is to achieve an overall minimisation of the violation of rights.9 It is on
this basis, therefore, that Nozick rejects utilitarianism.
Nozick asserts that a person’s rights are so strong and far-reaching
“they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials
may do.” In Anarchy, State and Utopia Nozick considers this issue.
Is it possible, he asks, to justify the existence of a state? If so, what are
the limits on the state’s exercise of its coercive power? Alternatively, is
anarchy the only available option?
Nozick commences his treatment of these questions by stating that if
having government is superior to the most favourable state of anarchy
then the existence of the ‘state’ is justified. The best possible state of
anarchy that could reasonably be hoped for is one in which people had
the freedom to do as they chose, but nevertheless restrained their
actions in such a way that they respected the rights of others. In the
Lockean “state of nature”, for example, anyone can do what he or she
wants so long as it is within the bounds of the laws of nature.10 The
laws of nature hold that no one may harm another in health, life, liberty
or possessions. They also hold that a person has a right of self-
defence against those who would transgress those rights. When such
transgressions do occur, Nozick notes, individuals have a right of
rectification.
Although Nozick agrees that people have a right of self-defence he
considers that, as a result, there are a number of difficulties with the
Lockean “state of nature”.11 Nozick explains that in the “state of
nature” the understood natural law may not provide for every
contingency. Given the potential ambiguity of the natural law with
regard to some circumstances, it is possible that in judging their own
cases people will give themselves the benefit of the doubt and assume
they are correct.12 Nozick states: “they will overestimate the amount
of harm or damage they have suffered, and passions will lead them to
attempt to punish others more than proportionately and to exact
excessive compensation.” That is, in exercising their right of self-
defence, people will often be emotional and exceed the scope of such

9 Nozick, note 3, p 29.

10 Nozick, note 3, p 10.
11 Nozick, note 3, p 11.
12 Nozick, note 3, p 11.

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right. In turn, this will lead to further retaliation and feuds. Without a
firm means of settling such disputes, these feuds will be ongoing. On
the other hand, if people lack the power or ability to enforce their
rights, they may be unable to exact compensation when those rights
are transgressed.13
How might this situation be resolved? Nozick answers that, for various
reasons including friendship or the recognition that in unity there is
strength, groups of people might form “mutual protection
associations” in order to defend themselves and to exercise their right
to rectification. Under such an arrangement, all members of the
association are “on call” to defend and enforce the rights of other
members.14 However, this means that everyone is always “on call”,
and any member may call upon any other member or members for
protection. Nozick writes: “protective associations will not want to be
at the beck and call of their cantankerous or paranoid members, not to
mention those of their members who attempt, under the guise of self-
defense, to use the association to violate the rights of others.”15
Protection associations might resolve these problems through the
division of labour (that is, someone would be paid to provide
protection services and others would sell it), and by adopting a
procedure to determine the validity of claims. While this might go
some way to resolving intra-agency disputes, it would not provide for
the difficulties involved in conflicts between associations.16
Nozick argues that initially there may be several protective associations
within the same geographical area. When clients from different
agencies enter into dispute and the agencies cannot agree on how to
resolve the matter, they too will enter into conflict. The result of such
conflict will be that over time a natural monopoly will occur.
Eventually there will be only one protective association within a
geographical area: the dominant protective association.17

13 Nozick, note 3, p 12.

14 Nozick, note 3, p 12.
15 Nozick, note 3, p 12.
16 Nozick, note 3, p 16. Nozick notes that there will also be a problem with
resolving disputes that arise between members. He states that this can be resolved
if associations do not provide protection against counter-retaliation when a client
privately enforces his or her rights against some other member but that this
reduces intra-agency enforcement of rights to a minimal level.
17 Nozick, note 3, p 16.

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The dominant protective association will occur because unless an

oligarchy is formed (under which all agencies within a region operate),
the protective associations cannot co-exist.18 The relative worth of the
product offered by each agency depends on its strength. Unlike other
goods and services, the agencies compete for clients and enter into
violent conflict when disputes arise between their clients. All its
customers will eventually leave an association that most often loses,
and join a stronger association.19 Alternatively, if agencies are
stronger in different geographical areas, a boundary will be established
dividing the different areas for which the associations are res-
ponsible.20
The dominant protective association, although similar, is not a state. A
state, Nozick writes:
[C]laims a monopoly on deciding who may use force and when;
its says that only it may decide who may use force and under
what conditions; it reserves to itself the sole right to pass on the
legitimacy and permissibility of any use of force within its
boundaries [and] claims the right to punish all those who violate
its claimed monopoly.21

Under a minimal state (the night-watchman state), all citizens receive

protection. The minimal state protects everyone against violence, theft
and fraud, and it provides for the enforcement of matters such as
contracts.
In contrast, the dominant protective association does not protect
everyone (since some people may choose not to join), and it allows
some scope for the private enforcement of rights.22 An ultraminimal
state differs from this situation only in so far as it claims a monopoly
over the use of force except that which is necessary for immediate self-
defence.23 Under both the dominant protective association and the
ultraminimal state there will be individuals who do not purchase

18 Nozick, note 3, p 17.

19 Nozick, note 3, p 16.
20 Nozick, note 3, p 16.
21 Nozick, note 3, p 23.
22 Nozick, note 3, p 23.
23 Nozick, note 3, p 26.

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protection, and who reserve (and act on) their right of self-protection.
As with the anarchic state of nature these individuals, influenced by
emotion, selfishness or revenge, may exceed the decrees of natural law
when exercising their right of self-protection and demand excessive
rectification. This is problematic.
It might be said that the ultraminimal state does not face this difficulty
since it claims a monopoly over the use of force. There is, however, an
inconsistency in this since if the protection of rights is the sole
concern of this type of government, it acts contrary to its legislative
function and purpose when it leaves some people’s rights
unprotected.24 This can be resolved if the ultraminimal state offers
protection without cost to those whom it prohibits from exercising
self-defence but who wish to retain this right. In doing so, however, it
becomes a minimal state.
On account of the difficulties associated with the state of nature,
Nozick claims that anarchy naturally gives way to either a dominant
protective association or ultraminimal state. In turn, these also give rise
to the minimal state. Nozick explains that this progression occurs, even
though unintended, similarly to how a pattern may be produced
without having a pattern in mind.25 On account of this (and given the
fact that it provides protection for all), Nozick concludes that the
minimal state is preferable to either anarchy or the ultraminimal state.
However, having said this, is the minimal state morally legitimate? It
might be argued that unless everyone pays for the protection provided
by the minimal state, those who pay are being forced to subsidise the
protection received by others.26 This amounts to redistribution and is
a violation of people’s property rights. Nozick notes that although the
minimal state appears to be redistributive, it is not. The minimal state,
he argues, may prohibit self-protection in order to protect the rights of
others. In return it is able to compensate for the loss of the right of
self-defence by providing protection. Therefore, the action of the state
is compensatory not redistributive.27

24 Nozick, note 3, p 29.

25 Nozick, note 3, p 18: The invisible hand explanation.
26 Nozick, note 3, p 25.
27 Nozick, note 3, p 67.

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Although the state can provide for the protection of people’s rights it
cannot legitimately exercise its political power in any other way. This
is because the existence of a state can only be justified when it
constitutes a minimal political authority. If the state were to seek a
wider role than the narrow function of providing protection, it would
interfere with the liberty and property of its citizens and in so doing
contravene their absolute rights. Nozick writes:
Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state,
limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft,
fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any
more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be forced
to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal
state is inspiring as well as right. Two noteworthy implications
are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the
purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to
prohibit activities to people for their own good or protection.28

The Liberal-Egalitarian Argument in Favour of

the Welfare State
In contrast to Nozick, others argue in favour of a more expansive state.
They claim that government is obliged to provide citizens with access
to those things that are basic to human life (should they choose to
accept them from the government), and to look after the welfare of
those who are least well off. Rawls, for example, argues in favour of
‘big’ government (including expansive state provided welfare,
education and health services funded through taxation) on the basis
that it is sometimes justified to treat people unequally where unequal
treatment results in improvements for everyone (most especially the
least well off).
Rawls defines society as “a more or less self-sufficient association of
persons” undertaken as a cooperative arrangement for the purpose of
mutual advantage.29 By forming an association and acting in
cooperation, those who belong to society can obtain benefits they
would not be able to achieve if they were acting on their own. Rawls

28 Nozick, note 3, p ix.

29 Rawls J, A Theory of Justice, revised ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999,
p 4.

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observes that this creates a “convergence of interests” but that it can

also lead to disputes, since it is possible for people to disagree over
how mutual benefits and the burdens incurred in obtaining such
advantages are to be distributed.30 Because of the scope for conflict,
Rawls argues that well-ordered society must be guided by a set of
related principles providing for the assignment of benefits, burdens,
rights, and duties. When these principles effect a proper distributive
balance within society, and are agreed upon and publicly affirmed by
all citizens, they constitute what Rawls defines as a public conception
of justice.31
Rawls claims justice is “the first virtue of social institutions”.32 The
principles encapsulated within public conceptions of justice apply to
the basic structure of society. That is, they govern the functions and
interrelationships of a society’s basic institutions, and determine how
these institutions make distributive decisions as to the assignment of
rights and duties.33 In providing for the assignment of rights and
duties, public conceptions of justice determine the scope of
government, and indicate the circumstances within which government
might legitimately exercise state power.
Rawls proposes a conception of justice called “justice as fairness”: he
abstracts it from social contract theory, and defends it as the most
reasonable and preferable conception of justice possible. By “justice
as fairness”, Rawls means the set of principles that would be selected
by persons in “the original position” to regulate society. “The
original position” is a hypothetical situation in which rational but
mutually disinterested individuals, capable of a sense of justice and
concerned to further their own interests, select, from behind a “veil of
ignorance”, principles of justice applicable to the basic structure of
society.
The “veil of ignorance” means that persons in the hypothetical
original position are unaware of such things as their wealth,
intelligence, social standing or conception of good.34 As a result they
are unable to predict what effect their decisions will have on their own

30 Rawls, note 29, p 4.

31 Rawls, note 29, p 8.
32 Rawls, note 29, p 3.
33 Rawls, note 29, p 11.
34 Rawls, note 29, p 11.

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life circumstances. If individuals in the original position choose

distributive principles that benefit some but disadvantage others, they
cannot be sure whether they will be favoured or whether they will be
disadvantaged. Rawls argues that because of this they will select
principles beneficial to all.
Since no one is able to select principles designed to be in her or his
own favour, persons in the original position are in an initial position of
equality. The principles they choose will be free from bias and the
result of a fair agreement. It is on this basis that Rawls asserts that a
society which satisfies the requirements of “justice as fairness”
comes as close as possible to being a scheme of cooperation to which
free and equal persons, under circumstances that are fair, would
assent.35
According to Rawls, two principles of justice would be selected in the
original position. Those two principles would be:36
(1) Individual citizens are entitled to an equal right to the “most
extensive scheme of basic liberties compatible with a similar
scheme of liberties for others.”
(2) “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.”

The first principle requires equality in the assignment of basic rights,

and guarantees various liberties such as freedom of speech, political
liberty, and liberty of conscience.37 The second principle applies to the
distribution of wealth and authority. It states that while the distribution
of income and power does not have to be equal, it must result in
compensating benefits for everyone, and it must occur in such a way
that the least advantaged gain the greatest benefit.38 This is known as
“the difference principle”.39 In addition, the second principle requires
that positions of authority and responsibility be accessible to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.

35 Rawls, note 29, p 12.

36 Rawls, note 29, p 13 and 53.
37 Rawls, note 29, p 53.
38 Rawls, note 29, p 65.
39 Rawls, note 29, p

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These two principles of justice are subject to a lexicographical

ordering in which the first is given priority over the second.40 This
means that the liberties protected by the first principle must not be
infringed on the basis that doing so will result in improved overall
social and economic conditions.
Rawls states that justice as fairness requires procedural justice in the
handling of any particular situation, and that procedural justice occurs
within the context of a social system designed to ensure that the
resulting distribution (derived outcome) is just.41 Rawls means that
not only do the two principles of justice require procedural justice, but
also they demand what he calls “background fairness”. This occurs
when there is “a properly organised democratic state that allows
private ownership of capital and natural resources.”42
A properly organised state conforming to “justice as fairness” is one
in which the basic structure of society is regulated by a just
constitution securing the liberties of equal citizenship.
[In such a society] liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought are taken for granted and the fair value of political
liberty is maintained. The political process is conducted, as far
as circumstances permit, as a just procedure for choosing
between governments and for enacting just legislation.43

Justice as fairness also requires that there is fair, as opposed to formal,

equality of opportunity. This means, Rawls states: “in addition to
maintaining the usual kinds of social overhead capital, the government
tries to ensure equal chances of education and culture for persons
similarly endowed and motivated either by subsidizing private schools
or by establishing a public school system.”44 The government must
also enforce equality of opportunity in economic activities and
employment. This is to be achieved by “policing the conduct of firms
and private associations and by preventing the establishment of
monopolistic restrictions and barriers to the more desirable

40 Rawls, note 29, p 55.

41 Rawls, note 29, p 243.
42 Rawls, note 29, p 243.
43 Rawls, note 29, p 243.
44 Rawls, note 29, p 243.

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positions.” Finally, government needs to guarantee a social minimum

either by making available family allowances and welfare payments for
illness or unemployment, or by more systematic devices such as a
graded income supplement.45

Nozick on Rawls
Rawls’ idea of the role and nature of government as required by
“justice as fairness” is vastly different to that envisaged by Nozick.
This is due to their very different understandings of justice and the
relationship between equality and liberty.
In competition with Rawls’ “justice as fairness”, Nozick proposes
“an entitlement theory of justice”. Nozick claims:
[If the world] were wholly just, the following inductive
definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in
holdings:
(1) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the
principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the
principle of justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to
that holding, is entitled to the holding.
No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications
of 1 and 2.46

In summary then, a distribution is just “if everyone is entitled to the

holdings they possess under the distribution.”47 Whether or not this
is the case depends on whether the principle of justice in acquisition
and the principle of justice in transfer have been satisfied.
The principle of justice in acquisition deals with such matters as how
unheld things may come to be held, and the process by which this
occurs. Nozick states this principle is complicated, and declines to give
a more precise formulation. However, he notes that it does include the

45 Rawls, note 29, p 243.

46 Nozick, note 3, p 151.
47 Nozick, note 3, p 151.

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Lockean proviso, namely, a person’s entitlement to an acquisition

depends in part on there being “enough and as good left in common
for others.”48
The principle of justice in transfer “specifies the legitimate means of
moving from one distribution to another.”49 The final principle, that
of exhaustiveness, holds that the only means by which a person is
entitled to property within her or his possession is if:
(1) The property was initially acquired by just means; or
(2) The property was justly acquired from someone else who had
just possession of it.

The entitlement theory of justice is historical and unpatterned. It is

historical in so far as it takes into account past actions and
circumstances in determining whether a particular distribution is just.
It is unpatterned because it does not require distribution to occur in
correlation with some natural dimension or ordering such as merit or
need. On the other hand, Rawls’ “justice as fairness” is both a
patterned and an end-state theory of justice. It holds that just
distributions are to be determined by some ordering or natural
dimension as well as in accordance with structural principles of
justice.50
Nozick notes that Rawls’ conception of justice is incapable of yielding
a historical theory of justice since it depends on the original
position.51 People “[in the] original position either directly agree to
an end-state distribution, or they agree to a principle; if they agree to a
principle they do it solely on the basis of end-state considerations.”
As such, “the fundamental principles that they agree to … must be
end-state principles.”52 Since Rawls’ approach excludes the
possibility of persons in the original position ever endorsing a
historical theory of justice, if it can be shown that any historical theory
is correct then Rawls’ approach is wrong.

48 Nozick, note 3, p 177.

49 Nozick, note 3, p 151.
50 Nozick, note 3, p 153.
51 Nozick, note 3, p 202.
52 Nozick, note 3, p 202.

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Nozick also criticises Rawls’ theory on the basis that it is a patterned

theory of distribution. He states that any given pattern in society may
be changed through voluntary exchanges and gifts. Where voluntary
acts of giving disrupt a perfectly just pattern of distribution, it follows
(if a patterned theory of justice is upheld) that such acts are unjust.
However, this alters the concept of possession, and also ignores the
fact that an integral part of self-ownership is the liberty to give things
to other people. Nozick writes:
The view that holding must be patterned perhaps will seem less
plausible when it is seen to have the consequence that people
may not choose to do acts that upset the patterning, even with
things they legitimately hold.53

Nozick notes that on hearing the term “distributive justice”, people

often presume that there is one principle or mechanism that effects
distribution within society. There is, however, “no central distribution,
no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly
deciding how they get doled out. What each person gets, he gets from
others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift.”54
This means, Nozick argues: “if things fell from heaven like manna,
and no one had any special entitlement to any portion of it [then] there
might be a more compelling reason to search for a pattern.” However,
“since things come into existence already held (or with agreements
already made about how they are to be held), there is no need to search
for some pattern for unheld holdings to fit; and since the process
whereby holdings actually come into being or are shaped, itself
needn’t realize any particular pattern, there is no reason to expect any
pattern to result.”55 Thus, in Nozick’s view, there is no need for
Rawls’ patterned theory of justice.

53 Nozick, note 3, p 219.

54 Nozick, note 3, p 149.
55 Nozick, note 3, p 198.

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Who is correct, Nozick or Rawls?

At the heart of the conflict between Nozick and Rawls is a
disagreement over the relative priority to be accorded to liberty and
equality. For Nozick, liberty will always be of the utmost concern in
justice and to the state. Equality, he notes, is irrelevant in determining
whether or not a just distribution of property has been achieved.
Rather, what matters is whether or not a holding was acquired by
legitimate means. If it was, then the distribution is just. Accordingly, it
will be unjust for anyone (including the state) to deprive a person of
such a holding even if this is done in order to aid another person. As
such, systems of taxation for the purposes of redistribution and social
welfare are unjust since they amount to the imposition of forced
labour. This is contrary to an individual’s rights of liberty of body and
property: that is, an individual’s right not to be forced to do certain
things.
Rawls, on the other hand, allows the government to prioritise equality
over liberty when the results of doing so may be reasonably expected
to be to everyone’s advantage: provided, however, that a person’s most
basic rights are not involved. An individual’s basic rights are provided
for under Rawls’ first principle of justice and can never be subjugated
to equality. Anything contrary to this would transgress the demands of
“justice as fairness”.
Whether Nozick’s argument in support of a minimal state, and against
Rawls’ theory of justice, ultimately succeeds depends on whether or
not he is correct in assuming that the holdings that a person has justly
acquired can be held without regard for the needs or claims of others
(except claims created by contract). Finnis, for example, argues:
If we see no reason to adopt his assumption that the goods of
the earth can reasonably be appropriated by a few to the
substantial exclusion of all others, and if we prefer instead the
principle that they are to be treated by all as for the benefit of
all according to the criteria of distributive justice … then the
question of [the legitimacy of] State coercion, which dominated
Nozick’s argument, becomes in principle of very secondary
importance.56

56 Finnis J, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, p 187.

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This is so because if the rights of property and liberty are not as

absolute as Nozick presumes, then by effecting redistribution through
taxation the government may simply be doing no more than enforcing
the various duties that property holders already have.57
Is Nozick wrong in assuming that a person’s right over her or his
property is absolute, and that he or she is not obliged to assist others?
Nozick grounds his arguments in favour of an absolute right to
property on the separateness of every person. Although Nozick is
correct in holding that people should not be used as resources or
means of achieving some end, this does not conclusively preclude
people from being under positive duties to assist others through
material contribution to their welfare. Consider, for example, that
Nozick concedes that the need to respect the liberty of others places
limits on a person’s ability to exercise liberty in doing what he or she
wants, whenever and wherever he or she wants. Similarly, it can be
argued that if unheld property is of a common or public nature before
acquisition, that is, before it is mixed with labour, then there is a need
to compensate others for their loss of interest in these previously
public or common goods. This, it might be said, acts as a constraint on
people’s ability to fully exercise their right to property such that they
ought to provide in some way for the welfare or needs of others.
Having said this, the author is not suggesting agreement with the
justification given by Rawls in favour of the welfare state, but only
noting that Rawls’ argument in favour of the welfare state has not been
fatally undermined by Nozick’s critique in the way he might have
hoped.

57 Finnis, note 56.

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